The prospect of military action

¶135. Following Iraq's submission of the declaration on its chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes to the UN on 7 December, and before the inspectors had properly begun their task, the US concluded that Saddam Hussein was not going to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441 to comply with his obligations.

¶136. Mr Blair was advised on 11 December that there was impatience in the US Administration and it was looking at military action as early as mid‑February 2003.44

¶137. Mr Blair told President Bush on 16 December that the Iraqi declaration was "patently false".45 He was "cautiously optimistic" that the inspectors would find proof.

¶138. In a statement issued on 18 December, Mr Straw said that Saddam Hussein had decided to continue the pretence that Iraq had no WMD programme. If he persisted "in this obvious falsehood" it would become clear that he had "rejected the pathway to peace".46

¶139. The JIC's initial Assessment of the Iraqi declaration on 18 December stated that there had been "No serious attempt" to answer any of the unresolved questions highlighted by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) or to refute any of the points made in the UK dossier on Iraq's WMD programme.47

¶140. President Bush is reported to have told a meeting of the US National Security Council on 18 December 2002, at which the US response to Iraq's declaration was discussed, that the point of the 7 December declaration was to test whether Saddam Hussein would accept the "final opportunity" for peace offered by the Security Council.48 He had summed up the discussion by stating:

¶"We've got what we need now, to show America that Saddam won't disarm himself."

¶141. Mr Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, stated on 19 December that Iraq was "well on its way to losing its last chance", and that there was a "practical limit" to how long the inspectors could be given to complete their work.49

¶142. Mr Straw told Secretary Powell on 30 December that the US and UK should develop a clear "plan B" postponing military action on the basis that inspections plus the threat of force were containing Saddam Hussein.50

¶143. In early 2003, Mr Straw still thought a peaceful solution was more likely than military action. Mr Straw advised Mr Blair on 3 January that he had concluded that, in the potential absence of a "smoking gun", there was a need to consider a "Plan B".51 The UK should emphasise to the US that the preferred strategy was peaceful disarmament.

¶144. Mr Blair took a different view. By the time he returned to the office on 4 January 2003, he had concluded that the "likelihood was war" and, if conflict could not be avoided, the right thing to do was fully to support the US.52 He was focused on the need to establish evidence of an Iraqi breach, to persuade opinion of the case for action and to finalise the strategy with President Bush at the end of January.

¶145. The UK objectives were published in a Written Ministerial Statement by Mr Straw on 7 January.53 The "prime objective" was:

"... to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their associated programmes and means of delivery, including prohibited ballistic missiles ... as set out in UNSCRs [UN Security Council resolutions]. This would reduce Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbours and the region, and prevent Iraq using WMD against its own people. UNSCRs also require Iraq to renounce terrorism, and return captured Kuwaitis and property taken from Kuwait."

¶146. Lord Goldsmith gave Mr Blair his draft advice on 14 January that resolution 1441 would not by itself authorise the use of military force.54

¶147. Mr Blair agreed on 17 January to deploy a UK division with three combat brigades for possible operations in southern Iraq.55

¶148. There was no collective discussion of the decision by senior Ministers.

¶149. In January 2003, there was a clear divergence between the UK and US Government positions over the timetable for military action, and the UK became increasingly concerned that US impatience with the inspections process would lead to a decision to take unilateral military action in the absence of support for such action in the Security Council.

¶150. On 23 January, Mr Blair was advised that the US military would be ready for action in mid‑February.56

¶151. In a Note to President Bush on 24 January, Mr Blair wrote that the arguments for proceeding with a second Security Council resolution, "or at the very least a clear statement" from Dr Blix which allowed the US and UK to argue that a failure to pass a second resolution was in breach of the spirit of 1441, remained in his view, overwhelming; and that inspectors should be given until the end of March or early April to carry out their task.57

¶152. Mr Blair suggested that, in the absence of a "smoking gun", Dr Blix would be able to harden up his findings on the basis of a pattern of non‑co‑operation from Iraq and that that would be sufficient for support for military action in the Security Council.

¶153. The US and UK should seek to persuade others, including Dr Blix, that that was the "true view" of resolution 1441.

¶154. Mr Blair used an interview on Breakfast with Frost on 26 January to set out the position that the inspections should be given sufficient time to determine whether or not Saddam Hussein was co‑operating fully.58 If he was not, that would be a sufficient reason for military action. A find of WMD was not required.

¶155. Mr Blair's proposed approach to his meeting with President Bush was discussed in a meeting of Ministers before Cabinet on 30 January and then discussed in general terms in Cabinet itself.

¶156. In a Note prepared before his meeting with President Bush on 31 January, Mr Blair proposed seeking a UN resolution on 5 March followed by an attempt to "mobilise Arab opinion to try to force Saddam out" before military action on 15 March.59

¶157. When Mr Blair met President Bush on 31 January, it was clear that the window of opportunity before the US took military action would be very short. The military campaign could begin "around 10 March".60

¶158. President Bush agreed to seek a second resolution to help Mr Blair, but there were major reservations within the US Administration about the wisdom of that approach.

¶159. Mr Blair confirmed that he was "solidly with the President and ready to do whatever it took to disarm Saddam" Hussein.

¶160. Reporting on his visit to Washington, Mr Blair told Parliament on 3 February 2003 that Saddam Hussein was not co‑operating as required by resolution 1441 and, if that continued, a second resolution should be passed to confirm such a material breach.61

¶161. Mr Blair continued to set the need for action against Iraq in the context of the need to be seen to enforce the will of the UN and to deter future threats.