Intergovernmental working during Covid-19

Intergovernmental working during Covid-19

¶14.28. Mr Johnson and Mr Gove both told the Inquiry that the UK government faced an unsatisfactory choice regarding when decisions needed to be taken on a UK-wide basis. They could either ask the devolved administrations to attend UK government Cabinet sub-committees or decision-making bodies – with their status somewhat unclear – or reach agreement first at a UK government level and then work with the devolved administrations, but giving the appearance of decisions being imposed.⁵³⁵³ INQ000259848_0078 para 173; INQ000255836_0045 para 191 Mr Gove explained the concern that the former option would both expose disagreement within the UK government to the devolved administrations and involve those administrations in decision-making in which other UK government colleagues were not involved.⁵⁴⁵⁴ INQ000259848_0078 para 174 However, the latter option was "heavily resisted" by the devolved administrations.⁵⁵⁵⁵ INQ000259848_0078 para 174 The UK government chose the former option in the early stages of the pandemic. A bespoke four-nations meeting, chaired by Mr Gove, was subsequently established.

COBR

¶14.29. COBR was the primary forum in which the emergency measures in response to Covid-19 across the four nations were discussed and coordinated in the first few months of the pandemic (as discussed in Chapter 11: Government decision-making, in this volume). As a UK government structure, it could be convened only by the UK government, but representatives of the devolved administrations were invited by the UK government to attend COBR meetings relevant to Covid-19.⁵⁶⁵⁶ INQ000273747_0005-0006 para 15; INQ000255836_0212-0213 para 721(c) Helen MacNamara, Deputy Cabinet Secretary from January 2019 to February 2021, explained that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat was:

" immovable about the devolved administrations' inclusion in COBR, because to exclude them would have damaged the agreed protocols for operating across the UK within the devolution settlements".⁵⁷⁵⁷ INQ000273841_0024-0025 para 43

¶14.30. It was for the heads of each of the devolved administrations to decide which representatives should attend a meeting of COBR to which they were invited.⁵⁸⁵⁸ INQ000273747_0005 para 15 The First Ministers of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and the deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland usually attended. Nicola Sturgeon MSP, First Minister of Scotland from November 2014 to March 2023, assessed COBR as meeting too infrequently and being too ad hoc to be effective.⁵⁹⁵⁹ INQ000339033_0018-0019 para 46 Furthermore, the devolved administrations often received invitations from the UK government to attend COBR meetings with less than 24 hours' notice, and the papers were often circulated with insufficient time to prepare.⁶⁰⁶⁰ INQ000256827; INQ000062953; INQ000234018; INQ000258434; INQ000441534; INQ000273747_0007 para 19 Vaughan Gething MS, Minister for Health and Social Services in the Welsh Government from May 2016 to May 2021, believed that COBR would have been more constructive had longer notice been provided about what was going to be discussed.⁶¹⁶¹ Vaughan Gething 11 March 2024 32/23-34/5 Ms Sturgeon also considered that COBR meetings would have been more effective "had information and evidence been shared earlier".⁶²⁶² INQ000339033_0021 para 50 In her view, COBR meetings were held largely to approve formally decisions that had already been made by the UK government, rather than to encourage intergovernmental debate.⁶³⁶³ INQ000339033_0021 para 50 Arlene Foster, Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (First Minister of Northern Ireland from January 2016 to January 2017 and from January 2020 to June 2021), Michelle O'Neill MLA (deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland from January 2020 to February 2022) and Mr Swinney expressed similar views.⁶⁴⁶⁴ INQ000287771_0012 para 24; INQ000273783_0011 para 54; INQ000418976_0048 para 153 Mr Swinney explained that there was:

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" no real appetite to ensure the views and priorities of the Devolved Governments were fully addressed".⁶⁵⁶⁵ INQ000287771_0012 para 21

¶14.31. Greater efforts should have been made by the UK government to ensure that the devolved administrations could add value to decision-making through their participation in COBR meetings – including, where possible, by earlier sharing of agendas and papers. While this may have been difficult in the early stages of the pandemic, the failure to do so became less understandable as time went on.

¶14.32. The inclusion of the devolved administrations in COBR created some internal tensions in the UK government. Mr Gove recalled that some UK Cabinet members:

" bristled at the fact that sometimes the devolved administrations were involved in discussions and influencing decision-making in fora which they were not represented in".⁶⁶⁶⁶ Michael Gove 28 November 2023 114/7-16

¶14.33. The possibility of leaks was a perennial concern, and the inclusion of the First Ministers and deputy First Ministers was thought by some to make COBR less effective as a forum for making decisions.⁶⁷⁶⁷ INQ000273872_0020 para 82; INQ000236371_0052; INQ000174673_0001 This was largely due to political tensions between Mr Johnson and Ms Sturgeon, which hindered frank and full discussions.⁶⁸⁶⁸ INQ000273841_0024-0025 para 43; INQ000048313_0022 Ms MacNamara told the Inquiry that the inclusion of the devolved administrations in COBR made it:

" a less trusting and effective forum given the political relations between the Prime Minister and the First Minister of Scotland in particular".⁶⁹⁶⁹ INQ000273841_0024-0025 para 43

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¶Nonetheless, the decision to invite the devolved administrations to attend COBR was the right one. It was the primary forum in which, in the initial phase of an emergency, decisions were being taken by the UK government, and it provided the only forum for the UK government and devolved administrations to meet in the initial months of the pandemic, before longer-term structures were established. In the future, where the timing of public communications following discussions at COBR is thought to be important, the four governments should seek to reach an agreement at COBR as to how this will be handled.

Recommendation 18: Attendance at meetings of COBR by representatives of the devolved administrations

¶The UK government should invite the devolved administrations, as a matter of standard practice, to nominate relevant ministers and officials to attend COBR meetings in the event of relevant whole-system civil emergencies that have the potential to have UK-wide effects.

¶14.34. If COBR is not convened by the UK government, the devolved administrations may feel the need to convene an initial structure in their own nations to respond to a perceived public health risk. In such a scenario, the devolved administrations should facilitate their initial response through their own structures and seek to convene the intergovernmental structure recommended below as soon as possible.

Ministerial Implementation Groups

¶14.35. As explained in Chapter 11: Government decision-making, in this volume, on 16 March 2020 a Covid-19 Strategy Ministerial Group was established, meeting daily at 09:15, as well as four Ministerial Implementation Groups.⁷⁰⁷⁰ INQ000087163; INQ000255836_0054 para 218 The latter took decisions in the areas of healthcare, public services, economic response and international issues, and they were chaired by ministers other than the Prime Minister.⁷¹⁷¹ INQ000182343; INQ000250229_0024-0025 para 95 The First Ministers of the devolved administrations and the deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland were invited to attend the Ministerial Implementation Groups "as required", with the exception of the international issues group.⁷²⁷² INQ000250229_0025 para 96; INQ000182343; Mark Sedwill 8 November 2023 68/15-69/18

¶14.36. Mr Gething said that the groups provided ministers with a forum for discussion.⁷³⁷³ INQ000391237_0020 para 80 Ms Sturgeon stated that Scottish Government ministers who participated in the Ministerial Implementation Groups found them to be a "useful forum for seeking alignment when possible and understanding of respective positions where not".⁷⁴⁷⁴ INQ000339033_0019 para 46d Mr Swinney agreed that they were helpful and described them as "an attempt to try to create alignment and cohesion" in the approach between nations.⁷⁵⁷⁵ INQ000287771_0013 para 25 However, the devolved administrations were not invited to attend the 09:15 meetings of the Covid-19 Strategy Ministerial Group.

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The Covid-19 Strategy Committee and Covid-19 Operations Committee

¶14.37. As outlined in Chapter 11: Government decision-making, in this volume, the Ministerial Implementation Groups were disbanded in May 2020 and replaced by two Cabinet committees: the Covid-19 Strategy Committee (Covid-S) and the Covid-19 Operations Committee (Covid-O).⁷⁶⁷⁶ INQ000092893_0006 para 1.24; INQ000087165; INQ000259848_0033 para 54 The devolved administrations were understandably not invited to meetings of Covid-S because it was responsible for making decisions about the UK government's response to Covid-19.

¶14.38. The proposal for Covid-O suggested regular attendance by the devolved administrations in order to:

" bind the Devolved Administrations more closely in those areas where we want to take a UK-wide approach, and indeed to remain aligned and informed where we are content to see divergence".⁷⁷⁷⁷ INQ000217045_0002 para 5

¶However, it was decided at the first meeting of Covid-O – attended only by UK government ministers and officials – that representatives from the devolved administrations should be invited to attend only "by exception".⁷⁸⁷⁸ INQ000146703_0001 para 3 From the establishment of Covid-O (May 2020) to September 2020, the devolved administrations were invited to attend only when the agenda contained items where a UK-wide approach was needed.⁷⁹⁷⁹ INQ000259848_0009-0011 paras 16(f)(ii), 19(d) This changed on 30 September 2020, when Mr Gove wrote to the First Ministers of the devolved administrations (and the deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland), inviting them to attend weekly Covid-O meetings from 1 October 2020.⁸⁰⁸⁰ INQ000301794; INQ000259848_0050 para 96

Four-nations meetings

¶14.39. There was initially no specific mechanism convened to enable the four nations to discuss and agree on a common approach where it was deemed necessary.

¶14.40. When advising Mr Johnson on 13 March 2020 that he should establish the Ministerial Implementation Groups structure, Sir Mark Sedwill (later Lord Sedwill), Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service from October 2018 to September 2020, also recommended a regular meeting with First Ministers.⁸¹⁸¹ INQ000182338_0002-0003 para 7 However, this was not immediately established. Following the creation of the Ministerial Implementation

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¶Groups, COBR meetings became less frequent, which Baroness Foster suggested created difficulties:

" [T]he stated role for COBR was that it would continue to make strategic decisions. However, COBR was no longer sitting regularly and therefore, at this point, when each administration needed to make significant decisions around easing of restrictions and recovery, there was some frustration about the lack of information sharing."⁸²⁸² INQ000255838_0028 para 101

¶14.41. In the absence of regular engagement with the UK government, Mark Drakeford MS, First Minister of Wales from December 2018 to March 2024, wrote to Mr Gove on 20 April 2020 requesting a weekly information-sharing meeting.⁸³⁸³ INQ000216489 He repeated this request throughout the spring and summer of 2020.⁸⁴⁸⁴ INQ000273747_0025, 0030-0031, 0033 paras 77, 95, 97, 105; INQ000256848; INQ000216507

¶14.42. On 22 April 2020, Mr Gove held a meeting with the Secretaries of State for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – that is, the territorial Secretaries of State – to discuss Mr Drakeford's request and future engagement with the devolved administrations. The Secretaries of State expressed some caution about this request, and Mr Gove stated he had heard their concern that "regular meetings could be a 'potential federalist trojan horse'".⁸⁵⁸⁵ INQ000091348_0002 Mr Gove was aware that the UK government territorial offices (now known as the Scotland Office, the Wales Office and the Northern Ireland Office) wanted to be "fully involved" in his conversations with the devolved administrations, and his intention was to ensure that they were.⁸⁶⁸⁶ Michael Gove 28 November 2023 157/4-15 Mr Gove informed the territorial Secretaries of State that he would reply to Mr Drakeford "proposing meeting DAs [devolved administrations] on a fairly regular basis on Covid" but "won't commit to weekly meetings".⁸⁷⁸⁷ INQ000091348_0002 He wrote to Mr Drakeford on 29 April 2020, stating:

" To ensure that the response to Covid-19 is as effective as it can be, it is crucial we continue to take a coordinated approach to decisions related to the current measures. It is also particularly critical that our communications on these matters remain closely aligned. In light of this I propose we speak regularly to discuss our approach to social distancing and other measures as the situation evolves, both as a group and bilaterally, and including mayors, such as the Mayor of London, when appropriate. My office will liaise with yours to arrange times."⁸⁸⁸⁸ INQ000256939_0001

¶14.43. The status of COBR and the arrangements for information-sharing among the four nations were somewhat unclear to the devolved administrations from May 2020 as COBR was not convened regularly after this time. On 11 June 2020, Mr Drakeford stated in a letter to Mr Gove that it was "through official channels" that the Welsh Government had learned COBR had been stood down, rather than through direct communications from Mr Gove or Mr Johnson.⁸⁹⁸⁹ INQ000216519_0001 Mr Drakeford informed Mr Gove that the lack of engagement "gives the impression that UKG [the UK government] has given up on a four nations approach".⁹⁰⁹⁰ INQ000216519_0001 Similarly, on 19 June, Ms Foster noted: "Has COBR been stood down. Need predictability over next 3 weeks – gives us a forum for information sharing."⁹¹⁹¹ INQ000232552_0001-0002

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¶14.44. Mr Johnson had been advised in May 2020 that a Joint Ministerial Committee (a set of committees comprising ministers from the UK and devolved administrations) should be convened to "manage conversations with the DAs".⁹²⁹² INQ000183934_0003 para 6 He agreed.⁹³⁹³ INQ000255836_0098-0099 para 368 However, the Joint Ministerial Committee was not subsequently convened in relation to the pandemic response.⁹⁴⁹⁴ INQ000255836_0099 para 370; INQ000235213_0011 para 33; INQ000280190_0006 para 18; INQ000269372_0038 para 117 Instead, Mr Drakeford's requests resulted in four-nations meetings chaired by Mr Gove.⁹⁵⁹⁵ INQ000235264 It appears that there were recognised difficulties in the early months in establishing a regular and fixed meeting time for these four-nations meetings.⁹⁶⁹⁶ INQ000259848_0081-0082 para 182; INQ000199184 _0002 Mr Johnson told the Inquiry that he considered these meetings to be "equivalent" to Joint Ministerial Committee meetings and that they addressed the need identified in the advice.⁹⁷⁹⁷ INQ000255836_0099 para 370 However, as Ms O'Neill observed, even if an "imperfect forum", the Joint Ministerial Committee would have had the advantage of a joint secretariat staffed by officials from the Cabinet Office and the devolved administrations.⁹⁸⁹⁸ INQ000436641_0062 para 235; INQ000273783_0016 para 73

¶14.45. The four-nations meetings chaired by Mr Gove were attended by the First Ministers of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland and the territorial Secretaries of State. Professor (later Sir) Jonathan Van-Tam (Deputy Chief Medical Officer for England from October 2017 to March 2022) and Simon Ridley (Director General for Policy and Strategy on the Covid-19 Taskforce from May 2020 to July 2021 and Head of the Covid-19 Taskforce from July 2021 to March 2022) also often attended these meetings.⁹⁹⁹⁹ Jonathan Van-Tam 22 November 2023 233/18-23; INQ000269203_0010 para 2.1(iii); INQ000252914_0039-0040 para 164

¶14.46. Mr Gove explained that the purpose of the meetings was to give the devolved administrations an opportunity "to discuss and explain concerns and propose approaches" and to enable "frank discussion about particularly difficult issues".¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰ INQ000259848_0080-0081 para 180 Ms Sturgeon and Baroness Foster described the meetings as providing a useful forum for deepening their understanding of the planned response to the pandemic by the UK government and the governments of the other devolved nations.¹⁰¹¹⁰¹ INQ000339033_0019 para 46(e); INQ000418976_0048 para 154

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¶Baroness Foster explained that this allowed the governments "to learn from each other as to what might be effective in managing the response".¹⁰²¹⁰² INQ000418976_0048 para 154

¶14.47. Mr Gove and the leaders of the devolved nations described the meetings, on the whole, in positive terms, finding them to be worthwhile, constructive and courteous.¹⁰³¹⁰³ INQ000339033_0019 para 46(e); INQ000235213_0013 para 39; INQ000436641_0066 para 252; INQ000273747_0056 para 198; INQ000280190_0009 para 28; Michael Gove 28 November 2023 154/21-155/3 Ms O'Neill was less positive about these meetings than the other devolved leaders, stating that they "produced little of substance and were ultimately frustrating".¹⁰⁴¹⁰⁴ INQ000436641_0066 para 252

¶14.48. Ms Sturgeon told the Inquiry that the devolved administrations should have been integral to the UK government's decision-making where decisions were being taken that directly affected devolved policies.¹⁰⁵¹⁰⁵ INQ000235213_0029 para 93 However, she was generally positive about the effectiveness of the meetings in terms of their ability to provide a forum for airing and resolving – where possible – issues of contention among the four nations.¹⁰⁶¹⁰⁶ INQ000235213_0013 para 39 She explained that she:

" usually felt that the Scottish Government's views and perspectives were listened to and that efforts were made to address issues raised".¹⁰⁷¹⁰⁷ INQ000339033_0019 para 46e

¶14.49. Mr Drakeford believed that the meetings provided an opportunity to discuss matters ahead of decisions being made, rather than "turning up to be told what had happened whether we liked it or not".¹⁰⁸¹⁰⁸ INQ000280190_0010 para 30 Baroness Foster and Paul Givan MLA, First Minister of Northern Ireland from June 2021 to February 2022, both expressed the view that the meetings were primarily a vehicle for sharing information among the nations rather than a forum for seeking the input of the devolved administrations into UK government decision-making.¹⁰⁹¹⁰⁹ INQ000255838_0029 para 106; INQ000256605_0003, 0008 paras 79, 180 Professor Van-Tam also told the Inquiry that he understood the sharing of information to be the purpose of the four-nations meetings.¹¹⁰¹¹⁰ Jonathan Van-Tam 22 November 2023 233/18-23

¶14.50. Mr Gove told the Inquiry that he fed back the positions of the devolved administrations from these meetings to Mr Johnson continuously.¹¹¹¹¹¹ INQ000259848_0081 para 181 He explained that he saw it as his responsibility to ensure that the views of the devolved administrations were escalated to Mr Johnson so that they might be considered in decision-making.¹¹²¹¹² INQ000259848_0041, 0080-0081 paras 79, 180 Mr Hancock explained that, if a UK government decision also needed the agreement of the devolved administrations, then a four-nations meeting chaired by Mr Gove would be called to reach agreement.¹¹³¹¹³ INQ000232194_0096 para 393

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¶14.51. Mr Johnson explained that he decided four-nations meetings should be chaired by Mr Gove rather than himself for reasons of both principle and practicality.¹¹⁴¹¹⁴ INQ000255836_0044-0045 paras 186-187; Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 155/10-14; INQ000259848_0012 para 19(e) In terms of principle, he stated that he considered it to be "constitutionally a bit weird" and:

¶" optically wrong … for the UK Prime Minister to hold regular meetings with other DA [devolved administration] First Ministers, as though the UK were a kind of mini EU of four nations and we were meeting as a 'council' in a federal structure. That is not, in my view, how devolution is meant to work."¹¹⁵¹¹⁵ Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 155/22-156/8; INQ000255836_0045 para 188

¶14.52. This was not a principle with which the First Ministers agreed. Ms Sturgeon told the Inquiry:

¶" [ W]orking together constructively and in a spirit of mutual respect and support should have been more important than what the former Prime Minister clearly saw as the 'optics' of treating the Devolved Administrations as partners."¹¹⁶¹¹⁶ INQ000273749_0004-0005 para 13

¶Mr Drakeford was of the view that Mr Johnson's comment:

¶" demonstrates both a flawed sense of the proper governance of the United Kingdom and that the then Prime Minister had a hierarchical view of the UK, with the UK Government at the top of the structure. In this he was more influenced by status anxiety than by the substance of good decision-making … the Prime Minister should have met regularly with the First Ministers to discuss common positions and to co-ordinate announcements where it was helpful to do so."¹¹⁷¹¹⁷ INQ000280190_0005-0006 para 16

¶14.53. Mr Johnson also stated that he considered Mr Gove better placed to reduce political tensions and ultimately minimise divergence between the nations.¹¹⁸¹¹⁸ INQ000255836_0044-0045 para 186 He told the Inquiry:

¶" It was clear from my earlier experience that the DAs needed to be handled with care, given the powers they had to diverge."¹¹⁹¹¹⁹ INQ000255836_0044-0045 para 186

¶Mr Drakeford said that this characterised the devolved administrations as "unruly, unreliable adolescents whose judgements were flawed".¹²⁰¹²⁰ INQ000280190_0005 para 16 Mr Gething agreed that it appeared as though the UK government did not trust the devolved administrations.¹²¹¹²¹ INQ000391237_0017 para 68

¶14.54. However, Mr Johnson explained that his objective was to reduce the risk of political point-scoring and maximise four-nations cohesion, particularly in light of his difficult relationship with the Scottish National Party.¹²²¹²² INQ000255836_0044-0045 paras 186, 189 Lord Udny-Lister told the Inquiry that the UK government's relationship with the Scottish Government was "fairly tense".¹²³¹²³ Edward Udny-Lister 7 November 2023 183/12-20

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¶Both Ms Sturgeon and Mr Swinney considered that, around the time of the onset of the pandemic, the relationships between the UK and Scottish governments were

¶"pretty poor".¹²⁴¹²⁴ John Swinney 29 June 2023 105/8-11; INQ000339033_0016-0017 para 43 Ms Sturgeon explained that the vote on the UK's exit from the

¶European Union (EU) and the UK government's approach to negotiations with the

¶EU had resulted in a "significant deterioration in the relationship".¹²⁵¹²⁵ INQ000339033_0016-0017 para 43

¶14.55. The relationship between Mr Johnson and Ms Sturgeon was undoubtedly strained, particularly following Mr Johnson's visit to Scotland in July 2020, when he and Ms Sturgeon did not meet. When asked about events that contributed to the breakdown of this relationship, Elizabeth Lloyd (Chief of Staff to the First Minister of Scotland from January 2015 to March 2021 and Strategic Political and Policy Adviser to the First Minister of Scotland from August 2021 to March 2023) said that, by the time of the announcement of the second lockdown in England, the words "'broken down' to a degree overstates what was there to break".¹²⁶¹²⁶ Elizabeth Lloyd 25 January 2024 39/7-8 In her view, when Mr Johnson was in communication with Ms Sturgeon and the other First Ministers during the Covid-19 response:

" [H]e didn't want to be on those calls, he wasn't necessarily well briefed on those calls, and he wasn't listening to the points we were making on those calls. And so I think engagement with him came to be seen as slightly pointless during this period."¹²⁷¹²⁷ Elizabeth Lloyd 25 January 2024 39/15-24

¶14.56. The First Ministers were not wholly persuaded that it was appropriate for Mr Gove to chair the meetings rather than Mr Johnson. Ms Sturgeon described Mr Gove as "the UK government minister who tried hardest to understand the positions of the DAs and help address issues we had".¹²⁸¹²⁸ INQ000339033_0017 para 44 However, she explained:

" [T]he problem was that he wasn't always able, with his UK government colleagues, to turn agreements/mutual understandings that we reached in the … calls into practical reality."¹²⁹¹²⁹ INQ000339033_0017 para 44

¶14.57. Mr Drakeford described Mr Gove as a "centre forward without a team lined up behind him and where the manager was largely absent".¹³⁰¹³⁰ INQ000273747_0047 para 164 In his view, these meetings should have been supplemented with COBR meetings chaired by Mr Johnson.¹³¹¹³¹ INQ000280190_0010 para 30 He said that, while Mr Gove had influence and respect for the devolution settlement, it was Mr Johnson in his capacity as Prime Minister who would have had a determinative impact.¹³²¹³² Mark Drakeford 13 March 2020 17/12-18/8; INQ000273747_0056 para 198

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¶14.58. Ms O'Neill also considered that more regular contact with Mr Johnson would have been beneficial, given that he was the ultimate decision-maker in the UK government.¹³³¹³³ INQ000273782_0003-0004 para 17 She said that Mr Johnson's absence from these meetings:

" meant that he was one step removed from the issues raised by the devolved administrations and it also meant that this was not a decision-making body as the CDL [Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster] had to take back to the Prime Minister any concerns or issues raised by the devolved administrations".¹³⁴¹³⁴ INQ000273783_0018 para 84

¶However, Baroness Foster was of the view that, on the few occasions that

¶Mr Johnson did chair four-nations meetings, his presence did not have any material impact on their effectiveness.¹³⁵¹³⁵ INQ000255838_0029-0030 para 108

¶14.59. Mr Johnson reflected that, with hindsight, it might have been better if he had "tried to spend more time with the DAs and really tried to bring them with me".¹³⁶¹³⁶ Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 155/15-19

¶14.60. As four-nations meetings were, on the whole, chaired by Mr Gove, the only decision-making structure in which the First Ministers and deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland could regularly discuss the Covid-19 response with Mr Johnson directly was COBR. However, COBR did not meet between 11 May and 21 September 2020, nor between January and December 2021. As a result, there were very few interactions, at heads-of-government level, to discuss Covid-19 during this time.¹³⁷¹³⁷ INQ000273747_0032_0036 paras 100, 102, 119

¶14.61. It is clear that the four-nations meetings were, on the whole, a positive development and played an important role in facilitating the sharing of information about decision-making. However, despite Mr Drakeford's persistent requests and Sir Mark Sedwill's advice, it took too long for the UK government to convene them on a consistent basis. The UK government's failure to convene four-nations meetings on a regular – rather than ad hoc – footing earlier in the pandemic was unhelpful.

¶14.62. Mr Gove told the Inquiry that meetings were relatively infrequent between the four nations over the summer of 2020 because, as the four nations moved out of the first UK-wide lockdown, "there was less of a need to have the intensity of meetings that we had had beforehand".¹³⁸¹³⁸ Michael Gove 28 November 2023 165/15-22 The Inquiry disagrees. Significant decision-making concerning the easing of the first lockdown took place in the summer of 2020 in all four nations. It is notable that it was at this point that the approach to the response to Covid-19 began to diverge between the four nations. Regular and consistent communication, led by the UK government, would have enabled each of the four governments to ensure that its decision-making was informed by the decision-making in the other nations, and to decide whether to coordinate its approach accordingly.

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¶14.63. The Inquiry acknowledges that Mr Johnson had concerns about the difficult relationship that existed between him and Ms Sturgeon. Had Mr Johnson chaired these meetings, there was a real risk that this might have impacted their effectiveness. However, Mr Johnson was the ultimate decision-maker in the UK government during the pandemic. His absence from regular four-nations discussions reduced the political and practical importance of the meetings and – at least in theory – meant that any consensus reached in them could only be provisional.

The role of the UK government territorial offices

¶14.64. The territorial Secretaries of State had a limited role in UK government decision-making about the Covid-19 response.¹³⁹¹³⁹ INQ000269372_0038 para 119 This was the result of the more limited involvement of the devolved administrations' leaders in UK government decision-making structures and of the role undertaken by Mr Gove in representing the views of the devolved administrations in discussions with his UK government colleagues.¹⁴⁰¹⁴⁰ INQ000259848_0041-0042 para 79 The role that Mr Gove performed is traditionally within the remit of the territorial Secretaries of State. Mr Gove told the Inquiry:

" [I]t would not have been appropriate for the Territorial Offices to conduct all the discussions and would have created too arms-length a relationship between the devolved administrations and the centre of decision making in the UK government."¹⁴¹¹⁴¹ INQ000259848_0081 para 181

¶14.65. The territorial Secretaries of State did, however, play a role in facilitating the sharing of information between the UK government and devolved administrations. They attended the four-nations meetings chaired by Mr Gove, COBR meetings and, on occasion, Covid-O meetings.¹⁴²¹⁴² INQ000259848_0081 para 181; INQ000232507_0014 para 36; INQ000360600_0012 para 50; INQ000339033_0028-0029 para 68; INQ000421737_0006 para 15.3; see also, for example, INQ000088798_0001-0003, where the issue of border measures was discussed

¶14.66. In any future pandemic, there should be active engagement and information-sharing between the territorial offices and the devolved administrations. The territorial Secretaries of State should also play a role, where possible, in ensuring that the interests of the devolved nations are factored into UK government decision-making and that there is effective communication with the devolved administrations about the UK government's decision-making.

¶14.67. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland also leads on relations with the Government of Ireland and other international partners on issues relating to Northern Ireland.¹⁴³¹⁴³ INQ000148325_0003 para 15 The primary forum for engagement with the Government of Ireland during the pandemic was through intergovernmental Covid-19 'Quad' meetings (distinct from the UK government ministerial Quad meetings referred to earlier in this Report;

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¶see Chapter 5: Exit from lockdown, in Volume I). These were attended by either the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland or the Minister of State for Northern Ireland (depending on their availability), the Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs (representing the Republic of Ireland) and, from Northern Ireland, the First Minister and deputy First Minister. The respective health ministers for Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland also attended. The role of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in these meetings was:

" to lead on relations with the Irish Government, ensuring that issues relating to Northern Ireland were fully understood, and provide a UK Government perspective".¹⁴⁴¹⁴⁴ INQ000421737_0014 para 29

¶14.68. The Northern Ireland Office also established a trilateral coordination meeting comprising senior officials from the UK government, the Northern Ireland Executive and the Government of Ireland.¹⁴⁵¹⁴⁵ INQ000148325_0015 para 63 However, the Northern Ireland Office did not play any specific role in relation to the Republic of Ireland during the pandemic. Rather, it supported information-sharing among the Northern Ireland Executive, the UK government and the Government of Ireland. For instance, the Northern Ireland Office did not have any involvement in the creation or adoption of the April 2020 Memorandum of Understanding between the Northern Ireland Executive and the Government of Ireland concerning the approach to the pandemic.¹⁴⁶¹⁴⁶ INQ000148325_0038 para 93

¶14.69. Dr Andrew McCormick (Director General International Relations at The Executive Office from February 2018 to August 2021) considered that "deep tensions" over the UK's exit from the EU had a negative impact upon relationships at Northern Ireland Executive level and "were an important factor in the background of the work of the Executive on Covid-19".¹⁴⁷¹⁴⁷ INQ000421759_0018-0019, 0022 paras 54, 63 He also said:

" There was undoubtedly a chill in relationships between the UK and Irish governments before the pandemic as a result of the tensions over EU exit."¹⁴⁸¹⁴⁸ INQ000421759_0050 para 150

¶The existence of "tensions" between the two governments was also recognised by Sir Brandon Lewis MP, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland from February 2020 to July 2022.¹⁴⁹¹⁴⁹ Brandon Lewis 9 May 2024 172/3-173/17

¶14.70. In the context of a pandemic, the relationship between the UK and the Republic of Ireland is of obvious importance, given their shared and porous border. There should be greater cooperation and engagement between the UK and the Republic of Ireland in connection with future pandemic planning – in addition to the existing North South Ministerial Council (which brings together Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to discuss matters of mutual interest) and existing links between their respective departments of health.

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The effectiveness of other intergovernmental mechanisms

Health ministers

¶14.71. Although there was no formal mechanism for cooperation among the health ministers of the four nations, regular weekly calls were held throughout the pandemic to share information and to discuss matters of mutual interest (including the prioritisation and rollout of vaccines).¹⁵⁰¹⁵⁰ INQ000232194_0023, 0059 paras 90(h), 247; INQ000302485_0024 para 77; INQ000391237_0021 para 84 Jeane Freeman MSP, Cabinet Secretary for Health and Sport in the Scottish Government from June 2018 to May 2021, added:

" [T]he health secretaries of the four nations made an effort to explain to each other how and why management of the pandemic differed in each of the devolved nations."¹⁵¹¹⁵¹ INQ000273984_0013 para 52

¶14.72. Mr Hancock described his relationship with his counterparts in positive terms.¹⁵²¹⁵² Matt Hancock 1 December 2023 60/9-10 Sajid Javid MP (later Sir Sajid Javid), Secretary of State for Health and Social Care from June 2021 to July 2022, told the Inquiry that there was "a good level of trust" between the health ministers.¹⁵³¹⁵³ INQ000302485_0024 para 77 Eluned Morgan MS, Baroness Morgan of Ely (Minister for International Relations and the Welsh Language from December 2018 to October 2020, Minister for Mental Health, Wellbeing and the Welsh Language from October 2020 to May 2021 and Minister for Health and Social Services in the Welsh Government from May 2021) said that both Mr Hancock and Mr Javid took the relationship with the devolved administrations seriously, and that the regular meetings she attended were extremely useful, with an "unusual degree of trust".¹⁵⁴¹⁵⁴ INQ000371645_0050-0052 paras 193, 199 Similarly, Robin Swann MLA (Minister of Health for Northern Ireland from January 2020 to October 2022 and from February to May 2024) explained:

" [T]here was a level of engagement that we were able to have at those meetings that wasn't available to, I would say, any of the four of us elsewhere."¹⁵⁵¹⁵⁵ Robin Swann 13 May 2024 191/1-14

¶14.73. It is clear that these meetings were effective in enabling regular information-sharing among the health ministers of the four nations. They should be replicated in any future pandemic.

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Chief Medical Officers

¶14.74. The Chief Medical Officers for each of the four nations also met frequently throughout the pandemic.¹⁵⁶¹⁵⁶ INQ000251645_0029-0030 paras 2.75-2.76; INQ000215495_0013 para 50 From 24 January 2020, they held frequent meetings – often daily in the early weeks of the pandemic.¹⁵⁷¹⁵⁷ INQ000391115_0011 paras 41-42; INQ000248853_0058 para 5.190 By February 2022, they had met around 274 times.¹⁵⁸¹⁵⁸ INQ000248853_0058 para 5.190 The Deputy Chief Medical Officers for the four nations also often attended these meetings.¹⁵⁹¹⁵⁹ INQ000269203_0021 para 5.13

¶14.75. This frequency of meeting enabled the four Chief Medical Officers to discuss and test their thinking about the science and to ensure that the advice they provided to their respective decision-makers was coordinated and aligned where possible.¹⁶⁰¹⁶⁰ INQ000269203_0022 para 5.15; INQ000248853_0010, 0057, 0073 paras 5.6, 5.189, 5.193; INQ000251645_0030 paras 2.76, 2.78 Professor Sir Christopher Whitty, Chief Medical Officer for England from October 2019, explained that the Chief Medical Officers:

" learned from one another, challenged one another and often provided joint guidance aimed either at Government, the medical profession or the general public … there are no instances I can recall where there was a significant disagreement".¹⁶¹¹⁶¹ INQ000251645_0029 para 2.75; INQ000248853_0073 para 5.193

¶14.76. On occasion, the Chief Medical Officers also gave advice collectively – on issues including borders, education, vaccination, winter challenges, self-isolation periods and alert levels.¹⁶²¹⁶² INQ000248853_0058-0073 paras 5.191-5.192 Professor Whitty told the Inquiry that this was intended:

" to provide a basis for cross-UK decision-making, to give clarity across the four nations, to add strength of weight to the clinical advice or to make a clear public statement reflecting a collective clinical view".¹⁶³¹⁶³ INQ000248853_0058 para 5.191

¶14.77. Professor Whitty included the views of the Chief Medical Officers for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in his advice to UK government decision-makers when he felt that it was important for them to hear it – for example, in respect of UK government decisions that would have implications for the devolved nations.¹⁶⁴¹⁶⁴ INQ000251645_0030 para 2.77 This also enabled Professor Whitty to highlight, to UK government decision-makers, any differences in epidemiology among the four nations.¹⁶⁵¹⁶⁵ INQ000251645_0030 para 2.77

¶14.78. Simon Case (later Lord Case), Permanent Secretary at 10 Downing Street from May to September 2020 and Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service from September 2020 to December 2024, described the Chief Medical Officers' meetings as "absolutely vital" in enabling the sharing of information.¹⁶⁶¹⁶⁶ Simon Case 23 May 2024 175/12-15 The Chief Medical

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¶Officers for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – Professor Sir Gregor Smith,

¶Sir Frank Atherton and Professor Sir Michael McBride, respectively – agreed as to the effectiveness of these meetings.¹⁶⁷¹⁶⁷ INQ000391115_0011-0012 paras 43-45; INQ000421704_0071-0072 paras 157-158; INQ000273978_0168 para 657. Professor Smith was interim Chief Medical Officer for Scotland from April to December 2020 and Chief Medical Officer for Scotland from December 2020; Sir Frank Atherton was Chief Medical Officer for Wales from August 2016; and Professor McBride was Chief Medical Officer for Northern Ireland from September 2006.Show full note

¶14.79. Regular meetings between the Chief Medical Officers for the four nations should be an integral part of intergovernmental working in any future pandemic.

Chief Scientific Advisers

¶14.80. The UK government and devolved administrations also worked together at the scientific adviser level.¹⁶⁸¹⁶⁸ Patrick Vallance 20 November 2023 163/24-25 Professor Sir Patrick Vallance (later Lord Vallance of Balham), Government Chief Scientific Adviser from April 2018 to March 2023, had regular one-to-one meetings with the Chief Scientific Advisers for Scotland, Wales and (when in post) Northern Ireland, and meetings of the four Chief Scientific Advisers were held quarterly as part of a practice that pre-dated the pandemic.¹⁶⁹¹⁶⁹ INQ000238826_0213 para 660; Patrick Vallance 20 November 2023 164/13-15 Professor Vallance explained that "the four nations co-operated well in terms of scientific advice"¹⁷⁰¹⁷⁰ INQ000238826_0216 para 670 and "the science advice was uniform, pretty much, across the four nations".¹⁷¹¹⁷¹ Patrick Vallance 20 November 2023 164/21-22

¶14.81. However, Dr Rob Orford, Chief Scientific Adviser (Health) for Wales from January 2017, recalled that he had "limited communication with … Sir Patrick Vallance and … Chris Whitty outside of the forum of SAGE".¹⁷²¹⁷² INQ000390618_0014 para 38 He did, though, have regular contact with Professor Ian Young, Chief Scientific Adviser to the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) from November 2015, and Professor David Crossman, Chief Scientist (Health) for the Scottish Government from November 2017 to April 2022. Dr Orford stated that, since the pandemic, the contact between the Chief Scientific Advisers had improved; the Inquiry welcomes this.¹⁷³¹⁷³ INQ000390618_0014 para 39

Officials

¶14.82. There was also a good level of engagement between senior officials of the UK government and those of the devolved administrations. A weekly meeting called the 'Wednesday Morning Colleagues' group (which was established before the pandemic) was chaired by the UK government Cabinet Secretary and included all permanent secretaries to UK government departments and the devolved administrations.¹⁷⁴¹⁷⁴ Simon Case 23 May 2024 69/9-11, 171/2-7; Mark Sedwill 8 November 2023 143/11-18 Covid-19 was a key focus of the meetings held during the pandemic, and officials were able to provide updates regarding significant decisions and developments in their policy areas.

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¶14.83. Mr Case described these meetings as "incredibly valuable" as they provided a four-nations forum for more "free-flowing discussions about issues and challenges that we were facing" and which could not take place in other, more structured, meetings.¹⁷⁵¹⁷⁵ Simon Case 23 May 2024 171/22-25 Sue Gray (later Baroness Gray of Tottenham), Second Permanent Secretary to the Cabinet Office from May 2021 to March 2023, also held weekly meetings with her counterparts in the devolved administrations.¹⁷⁶¹⁷⁶ Simon Case 23 May 2024 171/12-16, 176/11-13 Mr Ridley joined these meetings.¹⁷⁷¹⁷⁷ INQ000252914_0039-0040 para 164

¶14.84. Sir Christopher Wormald, Permanent Secretary to the Department of Health and Social Care from May 2016 to December 2024, established regular meetings with the permanent secretaries of the devolved administrations from March 2020 to share views, developments and ideas about Covid-19.¹⁷⁸¹⁷⁸ INQ000280628_0109 para 210; INQ000371233_0019 para 64 Dame Shan Morgan believed that these groups were an example of effective communication among senior officials of the four nations.¹⁷⁹¹⁷⁹ INQ000371233_0006, 0019 paras 17, 63-64 The Inquiry agrees.

Divergence in the responses among the four nations

¶14.85. At a meeting with the territorial Secretaries of State in April 2020, Mr Gove expressed his view that – up to that point – the four nations had "marched more or less together in response to Covid-19".¹⁸⁰¹⁸⁰ INQ000091348_0001 Ms Sturgeon described a "broad commonality of approach in the early stages".¹⁸¹¹⁸¹ INQ000235213_0008-0009 para 26 The four administrations did indeed move, on the whole, in tandem until after the imposition of the lockdown in March 2020. The Coronavirus: Action Plan, Coronavirus Bill and decision to lock down in March 2020 had been mutually agreed. Lord Sedwill described the "willingness to align" during this initial period as "striking."¹⁸²¹⁸² Mark Sedwill 8 November 2023 70/25-71/13

¶14.86. As outlined in Chapter 5: Exit from lockdown, in Volume I, the devolved administrations began to diverge in late spring of 2020 when different decisions were made about the pace and extent of the easing of the first lockdown. Mr Johnson stated:

" [A]s the UK started to move out of lockdown, there was divergence across the Four Nations and each government took their own approach to lifting the restrictions."¹⁸³¹⁸³ INQ000255836_0116 para 422

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¶14.87. Ms Sturgeon explained that, after the initial lockdown decision in March 2020, "the co-ordination of four nations decision-making was patchy".¹⁸⁴¹⁸⁴ INQ000235213_0029 para 94 She noted that the positions of the devolved administrations often aligned with each other while the UK government was the outlier. Her view was that the mindset of the UK government often led to a lack of willingness, on its part, to understand and accommodate the different positions.¹⁸⁵¹⁸⁵ INQ000339033_0023-0024 para 55(d)

¶14.88. As the pandemic progressed, divergence increased.¹⁸⁶¹⁸⁶ INQ000255836_0116 para 422; INQ000259848_0079-0080 para 177; INQ000235213_0019 para 58 For example, Mr Johnson explained that the UK government and the Northern Ireland Executive moved faster than the governments of Scotland and Wales by reopening non-essential retail, pubs and restaurants sooner.¹⁸⁷¹⁸⁷ INQ000255836_0116 para 422 Different approaches were taken to tier systems and local lockdowns.

¶14.89. By September 2020, Mr Gove was advised that a four-nations statement concerning the Covid-19 response should be drafted, with a focus on high-level shared objectives "to avoid the risk of highlighting any current divergences in approach across nations".¹⁸⁸¹⁸⁸ INQ000199089_0001-0002 para 5 It had been agreed at a meeting on 24 July 2020 between Mr Gove and the devolved administrations that they should draft a statement "setting out a joint objective towards suppressing the virus across the United Kingdom".¹⁸⁹¹⁸⁹ INQ000198955_0001 A statement was not published until 25 September 2020.¹⁹⁰¹⁹⁰ INQ000091389 The UK government believed that work on the statement had been slowed by Ms Sturgeon's desire for the statement to assert that the UK government and devolved administrations were all committed to the elimination of Covid-19.¹⁹¹¹⁹¹ INQ000360600_0027 para 121 In the summer of 2020, Ms Sturgeon discussed with a member of the Scottish Government Covid-19 Advisory Group her attempts to persuade the UK government to adopt the language of elimination in the statement – eventually conceding that the UK government "simply won't use the word".¹⁹²¹⁹² INQ000398982_0037, 0041

¶14.90. Mr Gove told the Inquiry that, by October 2020, all four nations had a level of restrictions in place, "but there was little alignment in terms of direction".¹⁹³¹⁹³ INQ000259848_0060 para 115 Despite this, attempts continued to be made by the four nations to work together throughout the pandemic.¹⁹⁴¹⁹⁴ INQ000255836_0116 para 422 On 12 October 2020, a 'Winter Summit' was held between the UK government and devolved administrations to support working jointly.¹⁹⁵¹⁹⁵ INQ000259848_0054-0055 para 104; INQ000199190 As outlined in Chapter 7: Further lockdowns, in Volume I, the four governments worked towards an aligned approach to the relaxation of restrictions over the Christmas 2020 period.¹⁹⁶¹⁹⁶ INQ000216557; 'Four UK nations agree new rules for the festive period', Welsh Government, 24 November 2020 (https://www.gov.wales/four-uk-nations-agree-new-rules-festive-period; INQ000321231) However, a joint statement on restrictions over Christmas 2020 was ultimately signed only by the UK, Scottish and Welsh governments.¹⁹⁷¹⁹⁷ 'Joint statement on staying safe at Christmas from the UK Government, Scottish Government, and Welsh Government', Cabinet Office, 16 December 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-on-staying-safe-at-christmas-from-the-uk- government-scottish-government-and-welsh-government; INQ000220411_0002) Ms O'Neill told the Inquiry that the Northern Ireland Executive "were perhaps in a different space".¹⁹⁸¹⁹⁸ Michelle O'Neill 14 May 2024 177/2-12

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¶14.91. Others told the Inquiry that the extent of divergence between the four governments was overstated. Lord Sedwill explained that, in his view, there was "a consistent consensus" among the four governments on strategic questions about the response.¹⁹⁹¹⁹⁹ INQ000250229_0007 para 23 Mr Drakeford stated:

" [C]onsistency of approach was always more significant than the differences between us. When the Welsh Government faced the need to reinstate restrictions, in order to respond to upswings in infection, the same necessity faced all other governments in the UK. When the Welsh Government moved to remove some of the protections previously in place, all other governments across the UK were moving in the same direction."²⁰⁰²⁰⁰ INQ000371209_0091 para 294

¶Although Mr Drakeford would have preferred to stay aligned with the UK government, he felt that the lack of formal engagement made it increasingly likely that "we in Wales would need to develop an approach in response to the situation in Wales".²⁰¹²⁰¹ INQ000280190_0009 para 28

Reasons for divergence in responses

¶14.92. The devolved administrations were entitled, under relevant public health legislation and the Coronavirus Act 2020, to decide for themselves how best to address local conditions. The purpose of devolution is to enable decision-making to be exercised in a less centralised manner, taking into account local conditions.

¶14.93. However, Mr Johnson said that this "divergence in approach" among the four nations of the UK risked "considerable public confusion and frustration – when clarity of message was crucial".²⁰²²⁰² INQ000255836_0030 para 126 He explained that, in Scotland and Wales, there was a "greater degree of caution and a greater desire to keep within lockdown measures than there was in the UK government" and that this limited the ability of the four governments to move as one.²⁰³²⁰³ Boris Johnson 7 December 2023 129/9-130/2 In contrast, the First Ministers of the devolved administrations argued that divergence in the responses of the four governments was the consequence of the varying ways in which the Covid-19 virus spread across the four nations, and that their differing policies were a proper exercise of their devolved powers.²⁰⁴²⁰⁴ INQ000280190_0005 para 15; INQ000339033_0025 para 58; INQ000436641_0048 para 185

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¶14.94. It had been acknowledged at a COBR meeting on 10 May 2020 that there were likely to be instances of scientifically justified divergence among the four governments. A paper prepared by UK government officials for the meeting considered a four-nations approach to easing the first UK-wide lockdown and noted:

¶" It may be that, as a consequence of both the practicalities of the devolution settlement and scientific advice including on varying levels of R [reproduction number] across and within the four nations, that moving forward it will be necessary to keep measures in place in one nation (or region) of the UK while lifting them in others."²⁰⁵²⁰⁵ INQ000083782_0001

¶The paper recommended that, beyond a commitment to shared, high-level objectives, consistent with the devolution settlement, the four governments should:

¶" agree that guidance and regulations should reflect local evidence and circumstances, and may therefore be different from one another, and may change from time to time".

¶It advised that the four governments should "continue to work together to align approaches".²⁰⁶²⁰⁶ INQ000083782_0001 COBR agreed:

¶" [T]he importance of continuing a UK-wide four nations approach to controlling the spread of the virus, based on scientific advice and acknowledging the spread of the disease may mean differentiations in approach."²⁰⁷²⁰⁷ INQ000083828_0007

¶14.95. Mr Johnson accepted that, under the devolution settlements, it was entirely within the rights of the devolved administrations to announce policies that were different from those of the UK government.²⁰⁸²⁰⁸ Boris Johnson 7 December 2023 130/15-18 In contrast, Mr Hancock – even a number of months into the pandemic – appeared to misunderstand the devolution settlement, telling Mr Gove that official advice he had received that "public health is devolved" was wrong and that:

¶" Parts of public health are devolved (fat fighting; local response) but public health emergencies are a reserved matter. How can a sub on such an important matter miss such a critical part of the devolution settlement? … this clearly needs sorting out."²⁰⁹²⁰⁹ INQ000163134_0002

¶Mr Hancock told the Inquiry that he believed differences in approach across the four nations were "unhelpful, confusing and had no scientific justification".²¹⁰²¹⁰ INQ000232194_0008 para 30 He said he recalled "thinking that it was madness that the devolved Governments would be taking their own lead on domestic public health policy" during the pandemic.²¹¹²¹¹ INQ000232194_0052 para 218 As outlined in Chapter 13: Legislation and enforcement, in this volume, however, it had been Mr Hancock's own department that had led on the Coronavirus Act 2020, which had granted emergency powers to the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive to pass their own laws to protect against risks to public health arising from Covid-19.

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¶14.96. Ms Sturgeon explained that the divergence was caused by:

" various factors, including varying epidemiological conditions across the countries at any given time as well as different demographic, institutional and geographical factors".²¹²²¹² INQ000235213_0019 para 58

¶Mr Gove acknowledged that epidemiological differences between the nations in infection rate and differences in NHS capacity meant that it was reasonable for the different governments to take different decisions they considered necessary in order to respond to the situation in their countries.²¹³²¹³ INQ000259848_0082 para 184

¶14.97. However, a number of witnesses involved in the UK government's response to Covid-19 told the Inquiry that, in their view, part of the reason for the divergence in approach between the UK and Scottish governments was a desire on the part of the Scottish Government, on a number of occasions, to adopt different measures and language from the UK government for political rather than policy reasons.²¹⁴²¹⁴ INQ000259848_0078, 0080 paras 171, 178; INQ000237819_0012 para 27(iv); Matt Hancock 30 November 2023 203/13-20, 204/3-9; Matt Hancock 1 December 2023 60/9-16; Edward Udny-Lister 7 November 2023 186/4-8, 186/20-189/1, 188/7-11, 191/3-15, 206/10-207/2; INQ000268041_0066 para 228

¶14.98. Mr Gove stated:

" [T]he Scottish Government … sometimes have an incentive to accentuate the negative in the relationship, because the overall political aim of the SNP is to present the United Kingdom as a dysfunctional state."²¹⁵²¹⁵ INQ000371583_0019 para 60

¶He added that there were occasions when the Scottish Government:

" looked at things through a particular political prism with respect to whether or not the case could be made, in due course, for independence, and that therefore there were certain occasions where divergence was being considered through a political lens".²¹⁶²¹⁶ Michael Gove 29 January 2024 42/12-18

¶Nonetheless, he said that this was a marginal issue during the response and that, overall, "the Scottish Government worked very well with the rest of us". His experience was that the devolved administrations had the public interest first and foremost in mind.²¹⁷²¹⁷ Michael Gove 28 November 2023 159/4-16, 163/1-3

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¶14.99. The suggestion that the Scottish Government's decision-making during the pandemic diverged from that of the UK government for political reasons was firmly rejected by Ms Sturgeon.²¹⁸²¹⁸ INQ000273749_0010 para 35 She assured the Inquiry:

" [N]one of those decisions were influenced in any way by political considerations or by trying to gain an advantage for the cause of independence."²¹⁹²¹⁹ Nicola Sturgeon 31 January 2024 160/10-15

¶14.100. The Inquiry saw no evidence that either the UK government or the Scottish Government allowed political considerations to affect their pandemic-related decision-making. However, some individuals in the UK government undoubtedly perceived that the Scottish Government response was, at least in part, motivated by political considerations.²²⁰²²⁰ Matt Hancock 1 December 2023 60/9-16; INQ000237819_0012 para 27(iv); Alister Jack 1 February 2024 9/17-18; Michael Gove 29 January 2024 75/8-11 For example, Mr Hancock told the Inquiry that he believed Ms Sturgeon would put a political spin on taking "substantively the same decision", and he found that to be "a frustration".²²¹²²¹ Matt Hancock 1 December 2023 60/9-16 Lord Udny-Lister said the UK government's cooperation with the Scottish Government was "less effective" than with the Welsh Government or the Northern Ireland Executive, because of a perception that the Scottish Government:

" was keen to announce measures either before or after the rest of the UK for reasons which appeared more political than data-driven".²²²²²² INQ000237819_0012 para 27(iv)

¶He explained that the approach of the Scottish Government "caused confusion" and created "a great deal of distrust … and a lot of frustration" within the UK government.²²³²²³ Edward Udny-Lister 7 November 2023 184/23-185/15, 187/6-12

¶14.101. Ms Sturgeon similarly perceived Mr Johnson's visit to Scotland (as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom) in July 2020 as an attempt on his part to use the pandemic response as "some kind of political campaigning tool" to promote the merits of the Union.²²⁴²²⁴ 'Politics latest news: Nicola Sturgeon slaps down Boris Johnson for using Covid-19 as "campaign tool"', Daily Telegraph, 23 July 2020 (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2020/07/23/boris-johnson-scotland-visit-brexit-news-lockdown-update; INQ000274145) Ahead of his visit, Mr Johnson had noted, with reference to economic support, testing and the development of the vaccine, that "the sheer might of our union has been proven once again" and that "more than ever, this shows what we can achieve when we stand together, as one United Kingdom".²²⁵²²⁵ 'PM: Union stronger than ever', Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street and The Rt Hon Boris Johnson, 23 July 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-union-stronger-than-ever; INQ000548301)

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¶14.102. Mr Johnson and Ms Sturgeon did not meet during Mr Johnson's visit to Scotland. Instead, Ms Sturgeon posted the following message on the social media platform Twitter (subsequently known as X):

" I welcome the PM [Prime Minister] to Scotland today. One of the key arguments for independence is the ability of Scotland to take our own decisions, rather than having our future decided by politicians we didn't vote for, taking us down a path we haven't chosen. His presence highlights that."²²⁶²²⁶ INQ000274143

¶She further criticised Mr Johnson at a press briefing, stating that leaders should not use the pandemic as "some kind of political campaigning tool".²²⁷²²⁷ 'Politics latest news: Nicola Sturgeon slaps down Boris Johnson for using Covid-19 as "campaign tool"', Daily Telegraph, 23 July 2020 (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2020/07/23/boris-johnson-scotland-visit-brexit-news-lockdown-update; INQ000274145) However, as early as 30 June 2020, the Scottish Cabinet had agreed that:

" [C]onsideration should be given to restarting work on independence and a referendum, with the arguments reflecting the experience of the coronavirus crisis and developments on EU Exit."²²⁸²²⁸ INQ000214408_0013 para 56e; INQ000362780_0009, 0012 paras 12, 28(e)

¶14.103. Plainly, the relationship between Ms Sturgeon and the UK government was poor, and the approach adopted by Ms Sturgeon and Mr Johnson did nothing to improve it. The perception on the part of both the UK government and Scottish Government that the pandemic response was being used for political ends hindered intergovernmental relations between them at a time when trust between the administrations was paramount. In a future emergency, leaders of each of the four nations should seek to minimise political division and prioritise collective working in the public interest.

The need for closer intergovernmental working

¶14.104. In a letter of May 2020, Mr Gove emphasised the importance of sharing information and expressed his wish that each of the governments would:

" share our emerging strategic thinking as early as possible so we have the opportunity to align approaches ahead of announcements".²²⁹²²⁹ INQ000216507_0001

¶14.105. However, the effective sharing of information was not always achieved. Difficulties arose during the pandemic where information was often shared only shortly before changes were due to be implemented, hindering the ability of the other governments to plan accordingly. This happened on a number of occasions.²³⁰²³⁰ INQ000273747_0020-0021, 0026-0027, 0046 paras 61, 63-65, 82, 161; INQ000216519; INQ000256898 For example, in May 2020, the UK government gave the devolved administrations only one day's notice of its plan to change its public messaging from 'stay at home' to 'stay alert'.²³¹²³¹ Mark Drakeford 13 March 2024 110/8-111/23

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¶14.106. Ms Sturgeon told the Inquiry that she believed the UK government's communication with the devolved administrations should have been better, and that the coordination of decision-making was "hampered by the lack of advance notice of decisions taken by the UK Government", noting that the devolved administrations "were often given very little advance notice of UK Government decisions and sometimes none at all".²³²²³² INQ000235213_0029-0030 paras 93, 95 Similarly, Mr Givan explained that it would have been helpful if the UK government had given the devolved administrations greater notice of its announcements, in order to give them adequate time to consider how to respond.²³³²³³ INQ000256605_0006 para 19

¶14.107. Ms O'Neill explained that the UK government's decisions in relation to Covid-19 were usually communicated to the devolved administrations "at the last minute".²³⁴²³⁴ INQ000273783_0016 para 75 Baroness Foster and Ms O'Neill both described information-sharing by the UK government generally as tardy and incomplete.²³⁵²³⁵ INQ000255838_0032 para 117; INQ000273783_0027 paras 136-137

¶14.108. Mr Gove told the Inquiry that, while there were occasions "where insufficient notice was given to the devolved administrations of decisions that were likely to be taken" by the UK government – particularly in the early stages of the response – the UK government's communications with the devolved administrations improved as the rhythm of Mr Gove's engagement with them settled.²³⁶²³⁶ INQ000259848_0083 para 187; Michael Gove 28 November 2023 130/2-7 He explained that part of the reason for this was that some in the UK government were concerned there was a risk that the devolved administrations might leak information about these decisions if given greater notice. However, Mr Gove himself did not consider this to be a significant concern.²³⁷²³⁷ Michael Gove 28 November 2023 170/13-25

¶14.109. A particular issue in respect of which there was a need for close intergovernmental working during the pandemic was borders. While international border control is reserved to the UK government, matters such as testing and quarantine requirements for international travellers crossing the border into Scotland are public health matters devolved to the Scottish Government.²³⁸²³⁸ INQ000232507_0012; INQ000269372_0045 para 135 Ms Sturgeon explained that the "mix of reserved and devolved powers in scope" in relation to international travel restrictions meant that a four-nations approach – meaning close cooperation and collaboration – was essential.²³⁹²³⁹ INQ000339033_0164 para 498 Mr Drakeford agreed.²⁴⁰²⁴⁰ INQ000273747_0048-0049 para 169

¶14.110. For example, the issue of how to deal with international travellers arriving in England and then travelling to other nations within the UK to avoid stricter travel quarantine requirements required close intergovernmental cooperation.²⁴¹²⁴¹ INQ000339039_0026-0027 paras 94-95; INQ000215495_0041 para 158 This was an issue in Scotland and in Wales.²⁴²²⁴² INQ000215495_0041 para 158; Mark Drakeford 13 March 2024 180/13-18 Mr Drakeford said that most people who travel abroad to and from Wales do so through the ports and airports of England, which meant that, during the pandemic, "in effect, we simply had to do whatever the UK Government decided in this area".²⁴³²⁴³ Mark Drakeford 13 March 2024 180/1-8 He said that he:

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" disagreed with the UK Government's approach to international travel from almost beginning to end, but … the practicalities of international travel were not in the hands of the Welsh Government".²⁴⁴²⁴⁴ Mark Drakeford 13 March 2024 180/13-18

¶The Northern Ireland Executive also had to deal with international travellers arriving in the Republic of Ireland and then entering Northern Ireland.

¶14.111. Intergovernmental working was generally good during the pandemic.²⁴⁵²⁴⁵ Boris Johnson 7 December 2023 107/6-10, 108/15-18; INQ000339033_0023 para 54; INQ000273747_0054 para 191 However, there was nevertheless, at times, a lack of trust among the four governments and a perceived lack of respect shown towards the devolved administrations by some within the UK government, which hindered intergovernmental relations and thereby adversely impacted decision-making.

¶14.112. Ms Sturgeon told the Inquiry that one of the main challenges in intergovernmental working arose from the UK government's mindset that its position on any issue was the "orthodox or 'correct' one" and that any divergence from this was the devolved administrations being out of step, or motivated by politics, even when it was the UK government's position that was an outlier.²⁴⁶²⁴⁶ INQ000339033_0023-0024 para 55(d) She attributed this to a poor understanding, on the part of UK government ministers, of the practical application of the devolution settlement, and she noted that the UK government considered itself the "senior partner in the four nations context and that the DAs were accountable to it".²⁴⁷²⁴⁷ INQ000339033_0016-0017, 0025 paras 42-43, 57

¶14.113. Mr Gove denied that the UK government did not treat the Scottish Government as an equal partner during the pandemic.²⁴⁸²⁴⁸ Michael Gove 28 November 2023 182/19-22

¶14.114. Mr Drakeford, however, also perceived that the UK government considered itself to be at the top of a decision-making 'hierarchy'.²⁴⁹²⁴⁹ INQ000280190_0005-0006 para 16; see also INQ000391237_0017, 0145 paras 67, 548 Ms O'Neill's perception was similar, in that:

" [T]he UK Government approach was that they were responsible for decision-making and that they did not seek or welcome input from the devolved administrations, but rather expected us to adopt the approach which they have decided upon."²⁵⁰²⁵⁰ INQ000273783_0011 para 54

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¶Baroness Foster told the Inquiry that there was a lack of cohesiveness and a "mutual lack of trust" between the UK government and devolved administrations.²⁵¹²⁵¹ INQ000418976_0048-0050 paras 155, 160 She recalled that she was "not given an opportunity to speak at most meetings and there was no scope for discussion or challenge".²⁵²²⁵² INQ000418976_0048 para 153 Ms O'Neill agreed that, in general, the UK government seemed to treat the devolved administrations "with a degree of suspicion and as a problem to be managed" and that "the input of the devolved administrations was not sought, and when communicated, appeared unwelcome".²⁵³²⁵³ INQ000436641_0062-0064 paras 238, 244

¶14.115. There was a particular, constant tension and degree of lack of trust between the UK and the Scottish governments at the highest level. This was due largely to the personal and political antipathy between Mr Johnson and Ms Sturgeon, which influenced, in part, Mr Johnson's decision not to chair the four-nations meetings. This was also not conducive to effective intergovernmental relations or to good decision-making, and therefore it was not in the interests of the people of the UK. It is self-evident that, in any future pandemic, political antipathies or discord need to be set aside to better address the exigencies of the emergency.

A four-nations response

¶14.116. All politicians agreed that there needed to be a proper four-nations response in a pandemic. However, there were different views among the governments as to what this meant in practice.

¶14.117. Ms Sturgeon described a four-nations response as being one where the four nations:

" would work co-operatively and collaboratively, sharing insight and experience, and where possible adopt a common approach; if our approaches diverged – either because of epidemiological or other health factors, and/or a difference of opinion about the appropriate interventions – we would develop a mutual understanding of the reasons, respect each other's positions, seek to avoid confusion in our communications, and be mindful of creating unintended consequences for other administrations; and discuss areas where reserved and devolved responsibilities intersected, so that the UK government in reaching decisions on reserved matters would understand the DA perspective and any impact on the exercise of our devolved responsibilities."²⁵⁴²⁵⁴ INQ000339033_0025 para 58

¶Mr Drakeford likewise noted that the UK government should have appreciated that the devolved administrations had their own powers and responsibilities, and that there should have been regular meetings at a heads-of-government level to "discuss common positions and to co-ordinate announcements where it was helpful".²⁵⁵²⁵⁵ INQ000280190_0005-0006 para 16

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¶14.118. In contrast, Mr Johnson explained that, in his view, in future there would be "considerable advantages to treating the UK (or at least the island of Britain) as a single epidemiological unit".²⁵⁶²⁵⁶ INQ000255836_0139 para 496 Mr Gove expressed a similar view.²⁵⁷²⁵⁷ Michael Gove 28 November 2023 116/18-22

¶14.119. Mr Johnson argued that, in future, there had to be "a joined-up, a UK pandemic response". To achieve this, and to "bind the United Kingdom together", he recommended that either the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 should be used or legislation should be amended so that responsibility for responding to a pandemic would no longer be devolved and instead the UK government would become responsible for the response in all four nations.²⁵⁸²⁵⁸ Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 154/8-19; INQ000255836_0037 para 153 He told the Inquiry that, in his view, the divergence that arose between the four nations during the Covid-19 pandemic response was a problem, because it risked causing public confusion about what people were being asked to do.²⁵⁹²⁵⁹ INQ000255836_0030 para 126; Boris Johnson 7 December 2023 115/3-5 A number of witnesses explained that this was because divergence was both likely to cause public confusion about which rules applied where and to raise questions about why a certain approach was appropriate in one nation but not in another.²⁶⁰²⁶⁰ Edward Udny-Lister 7 November 2023 188/7-11, 189/10-15; INQ000232194_0008 para 30; INQ000255836_0030 para 126

¶14.120. Devolution has been a feature of the UK's constitutional arrangements for more than 25 years. Members of the public in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are well accustomed to policy decisions being made by devolved administrations which are different from those of the UK government. An effective four-nations response to a pandemic should be perfectly capable of accommodating differences in response among the four nations to the extent that they are considered necessary for the protection of public health in each nation. However, there must be open, regular and effective communication among the governments as to their plans for their responses and with regard to the rationales underpinning them.

¶14.121. The answer may lie in a new structure. In January 2022, a review of intergovernmental structures was published, undertaken jointly by the UK government and devolved administrations.²⁶¹²⁶¹ INQ000255836_0190-0191 paras 650-655; Review of Intergovernmental Relations, Cabinet Office and Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, 13 January 2022 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-review-of-intergovernmental- relations; INQ000083215); INQ000269372_0055-0056 paras 166-167 It established a Prime Minister and Heads of Devolved Governments Council, an Interministerial Standing Committee to consider strategic considerations, cutting across different policy areas, and a number of interministerial groups on specific policy areas – supported by a secretariat accountable to the Prime Minister and Heads of Devolved Governments Council, rather than to any specific government. This may facilitate engagement among the four nations in any future pandemic.

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¶14.122. In the future, a standing forum for intergovernmental engagement at heads-of- government level is required from the outset in any future pandemic, in order to ensure regular four-nations engagement.²⁶²²⁶² Review of Intergovernmental Relations, Cabinet Office and Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, 13 January 2022 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-review-of-intergovernmental-relations; INQ000083215_0004 paras 18-20) This would improve communication and relations among the four nations and thereby lead to more informed decision-making in each nation as well as to a reduced risk of public confusion arising from policy and legal differences in responses.

Recommendation 19: Intergovernmental structure and relations

¶While intergovernmental relations should be facilitated through COBR in the initial months of any future pandemic, the UK government and devolved administrations should ensure that a specific four-nations structure, concerning pandemic response, is stood up at the same time as the transition away from COBR to nation-specific decision-making structures. This should meet regularly during a pandemic and be attended by all heads of government. Arrangements for these four-nations meetings should be incorporated into future pandemic preparedness strategies (see the Inquiry's Module 1 Report, Recommendation 4).

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