UK Covid-19 Inquiry, Modules 2, 2A, 2B, 2C: Core decision-making and political governance

Background

What it found

1. The Inquiry finds that the response of the four governments repeatedly amounted to "too little, too late", and that while the lockdowns of 2020 and 2021 saved lives, they became inevitable only because of the governments' own acts and omissions. p. 2 p. 213

   “The Inquiry finds that the response of the four governments repeatedly amounted to a case of 'too little, too late'. The failure to appreciate the scale of the threat, or the urgency of response it demanded, meant that – by the time the possibility of a mandatory lockdown was first considered – it was already too late and a lockdown had become unavoidable.”

2. The report finds that by mid-February 2020 the four governments knew enough to act, and that their lack of urgency, including during the half-term holidays, and their failure to make adequate preparations were inexplicable. It calls February 2020 "a lost month". p. 91 p. 91 p. 3

   “The four governments knew enough to spur them into action. Accordingly, the Inquiry finds that the lack of urgency (particularly during the mid-February school half-term holidays) and the failure of the four governments to take a grip of the situation and make adequate preparations are inexplicable.”

3. The Inquiry accepts the consensus of the evidence that the first mandatory lockdown should have been imposed a week earlier, and reports modelling that doing so would have meant about 23,000 fewer deaths in England in the first wave. It rejects the criticism that the governments were wrong in principle to impose a lockdown, and finds that none of the four governments had planned for a lockdown or for how to leave one. p. 5 p. 5 p. 200 p. 202

   “However, the Inquiry rejects the criticism that the four governments were wrong, in principle, to impose a lockdown. In any event, the UK government and the devolved administrations had received clear and compelling advice by this time that the exponential growth in transmission would, in the absence of a mandatory lockdown, likely lead to loss of life on a scale that was unconscionable and unacceptable.”

4. The report finds that the UK government, the Welsh Government and the Northern Ireland Executive failed to learn from the first lockdown in the autumn of 2020. It concludes that Mr Johnson should have ordered a circuit breaker lockdown in late September or early October 2020, describes decision-making in Northern Ireland as "chaotic", and finds that Scotland's stringent local measures avoided a second national lockdown that autumn. p. 6 p. 7 p. 7 p. 7

5. The report describes the vaccine rollout from December 2020 as a remarkable achievement, and finds that in 2021 the four governments led their plans by data rather than dates and in that respect had learned from earlier lockdowns. p. 8 p. 8 p. 374

6. Among its key themes, the Inquiry finds that the UK Cabinet was largely sidelined; that decision-making was affected by cultural problems in the UK government and the Northern Ireland Executive, including a "toxic and chaotic culture" at the centre of the UK government; that instances of ministers and advisers appearing to break the rules caused huge distress; and that ministers in all four nations made far-reaching laws with little or no parliamentary oversight. p. 10 p. 11 p. 11 p. 12

7. The report finds that the impact of the pandemic was not shared equally, that older people, disabled people and some ethnic minority groups faced a higher risk of dying, and that the harm restrictions would do to vulnerable groups, including children, was foreseeable but had not been adequately considered. p. 9 p. 9 p. 10

8. The report makes 19 recommendations, each set out in the chapter that explains it and together in Appendix 3. Among them, that each government agree a framework identifying the people most at risk from a disease and from the measures taken against it; that future pandemic strategies set out how decision-making will work, starting from COBR, the UK government's emergency committee; that emergency powers be made by the draft affirmative procedure as standard, with safeguards such as sunset clauses; and that a four-nations structure attended by all heads of government meet regularly during a pandemic. p. 96 p. 121 p. 207 p. 260

   “The UK government and devolved administrations should ensure that the draft affirmative procedure is the standard process for enacting substantial and wide-ranging powers in a civil emergency, such as a pandemic, under primary public health legislation. Any departure from this procedure should be the exception, with clear criteria and safeguards in place to prevent the bypassing of parliamentary scrutiny.”

Where to start reading

Short on time? These sections carry the report's argument. Each opens at the start of the section.

1. Executive summary p. xviii · Read →

   The Inquiry's own summary of the whole period, from January 2020 to the end of restrictions in May 2022; the place to start.

2. Key themes p. 8 · Read →

   What the Inquiry concludes about scientific advice, the impact on vulnerable groups, how each government made decisions, communication with the public, the law and relations between the four nations.

   “Time and again, public messaging failed to reflect the actual laws in place. Ministers made statements suggesting legal obligations where none existed, or vice versa.”

3. Lost time p. 91 · Read →

   The Inquiry's conclusions on January and February 2020, and why it does not accept that uncertainty about the virus justified the lack of action.

4. Decision-making leading to the lockdown decision p. 199 · Read →

   The Inquiry's analysis of the decision of 23 March 2020, why it came when it did, and why it was imposed without a plan for leaving it.

   “The lockdown decision of 23 March 2020 was as difficult a decision as any UK government or devolved administration has ever had to make.”

5. Chapter 15: Key lessons for future emergencies p. 261 · Read →

   Volume II's closing chapter, the lessons the Inquiry draws for the next pandemic or civil emergency, on planning, strategy, acting quickly, working together and data.

   “No plan entirely survives contact with reality, but the more scenarios that are considered and the more responses tested, the greater the likelihood that those making difficult – even impossible – choices will be better placed to react quickly and decisively.”

6. Appendix 3: List of recommendations p. 314 · Read →

   The 19 recommendations in full, in the order of the chapters that explain them; the list runs over two pages (Recommendations 9 to 19 on the second). Each also appears in its chapter, where the Inquiry gives its reasons.

   “During a whole-system civil emergency, the UK government and devolved administrations should each routinely publish technical advice on scientific, economic and social matters at the earliest opportunity, as well as the minutes of expert advisory groups – except where there are good reasons that prevent publication, such as commercial confidentiality, personal safety or national security, or because legal advice privilege applies.”