UK Covid-19 Inquiry, Modules 2, 2A, 2B, 2C: Core decision-making and political governance, Volume I · 2025
Decision-making leading to the lockdown decision
Decision-making leading to the lockdown decision
¶4.165. The lockdown decision of 23 March 2020 was as difficult a decision as any UK government or devolved administration has ever had to make. The highly polarised views in the public domain on the merits of the lockdown decision are testament to the complexity and unprecedented nature of the decision and the intensely difficult balance that had to be struck by the UK government and devolved administrations.
¶4.166. Each government was entitled to decide how to attempt to weigh the public health benefits of a lockdown against the social, economic and educational harm that would ensue. However, their task was made a great deal harder by inadequate planning, inadequate data and the absence of a coherent strategy.
200Flawed planning
¶4.167. The decision to impose a UK-wide lockdown was remarkable for the failure on the part of the four governments to anticipate and plan effectively for the possible need for a mandatory lockdown or to engage in any kind of anticipatory debate over the merits and consequences of such a restriction. As Professor Mark Woolhouse (Professor of Infectious Disease Epidemiology at the University of Edinburgh) observed, the imposition of a lockdown "was not part of the UK's pandemic preparedness planning at all".423 INQ000250231_0015-0016 para 85 He was "particularly concerned there was no concerted effort to come up with policy options that would have kept us out of lockdown".424 INQ000250231_0051 para 285 Professor Vallance explained that lockdown "was always possible, in theory, in the UK but had never really been considered in any detail before the Covid-19 pandemic".425 INQ000238826_0077-0078 para 244
¶4.168. The initial plan to respond to Covid-19 by slowing the spread of the disease, as articulated in the Coronavirus: Action Plan and pursued by the four governments until 16 March 2020, was inherently flawed.
¶4.169. That plan was partly based on the mitigation plan set out in the UK Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Strategy 2011 (the 2011 Strategy).426 UK Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Strategy 2011, Department of Health, 10 November 2011 (https://assets.publishing.service. gov.uk/media/5a7c4767e5274a2041cf2ee3/dh_131040.pdf; INQ000022708); Christopher Wormald 2 November 2023 108/10-11; Imran Shafi 30 October 2023 143/8-15 144/8-10 As the Inquiry concluded in the Module 1 Report, a major flaw in the 2011 Strategy was the assumption made that widespread infection could not be prevented and the role of government was limited to taking measures to slow the spread of the disease, pending the discovery of therapeutics or vaccines.427 Module 1: The resilience and preparedness of the United Kingdom, UK Covid-19 Inquiry, July 2024, Chapter 4 (https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/documents/module-1-full-report) As such, it envisaged the use of a limited set of restrictions to slow, rather than stop, the spread.
¶4.170. However, the assumption in the 2011 Strategy that the spread of an influenza pandemic could not be stopped was based on influenza's short generation time of one to two days. In this scenario, the capacity of test and trace services would likely be overwhelmed, particularly as case numbers continued to grow and infected people would likely have already passed on the virus by the time they were tested and isolated. Covid-19, however, was a different illness, slower moving but more deadly, and, unlike pandemic influenza, it was often transmitted by people without symptoms. By 3 February 2020, its generation time was estimated to be longer than influenza at six to seven days on average.428 INQ000051883_0002 para 11
201¶4.171. Despite the epidemiological differences between pandemic influenza and Covid-19, the plan for the delay phase of the Covid-19 response continued to be predicated on slowing rather than preventing the spread of the virus.429 Coronavirus: Action Plan: A Guide to What You Can Expect Across the UK, Department of Health and Social Care, 3 March 2020, p18, para 4.42 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5e5e2e91e90e071110454391/Coronavirus_action_plan_-_a_guide_to_ what_you_can_expect_across_the_UK.pdf; INQ000182380)
¶4.172. SAGE had advised on 28 January 2020 that "pandemic influenza infection control guidance should be used as a base case and adapted".430 INQ000061510_0003 para 20 Professor Anthony Costello, Professor of Global Health and Sustainable Development at University College London, told the Inquiry that, from this point:
" [T]he UK advisory die was cast. The UK medical and scientific group of experts saw it as a flu epidemic. In their view there was nothing the UK could do to stop it, only manage its progress to protect the NHS."431 INQ000281260_00010 para 37
¶As such, Professor Costello explained:
" [T]heir strategic and management decisions would draw upon a blinkered plan for the wrong virus: influenza, not a coronavirus."432 INQ000281260_0008-0009 para 30
¶4.173. Decision-makers should have taken into account epidemiological differences between influenza and Covid-19 and considered whether, in light of these, a response to Covid-19 limited to slowing the spread of the virus was appropriate.
¶4.174. To the limited extent that decision-makers considered prior to mid-March whether stopping the spread through the use of restrictions would be feasible, they were advised by scientists that this would lead to an exit wave of infections later in the year when restrictions were lifted.433 INQ000119430_0001 para 9; INQ000212223_0002; INQ000151558_0003; INQ000056221_0005 para 2; INQ000048399_0003; INQ000236391_0002 para 24 It was assumed that putting stringent restrictions in place – in the absence of effective treatments for the virus or a vaccine – would inevitably postpone the wave of infections until a time later in the year when the NHS would already be under strain from seasonal illnesses. This is why the initial plan anticipated building up immunity in the population through a single wave of infection in the spring and summer of 2020, as a potential means of bringing the pandemic to an end if, ultimately, a vaccine did not become available.
¶4.175. Yet there could have been an alternative. As Professor Halpern told the Inquiry:
202" The world – and more specifically Asian countries – had found another strategy: to build sophisticated test and trace systems strong enough to suppress the virus, at least for long enough to enable treatment and vaccines to be developed."434 INQ000188738_0039, 0040 paras 160, 163
¶4.176. The UK did not have a test and trace system at the start of 2020 that could be scaled up quickly. The ability to scale up diagnostic testing requires advance planning and resources. As Professor Whitty observed: "[It] cannot simply be switched on from a standing start once an emergency has begun."435 INQ000251645_0101 para 7.126 As noted in the Inquiry's Module 1 Report, the UK's testing and contact tracing system at the start of the pandemic was:
" designed to deal only with small numbers of cases of emerging infectious diseases, as opposed to mass testing or contact tracing … The UK government and devolved administrations could and should have invested in this infrastructure in advance of the Covid-19 pandemic, but had not done so."436 See Module 1: The resilience and preparedness of the United Kingdom, UK Covid-19 Inquiry, July 2024, Chapter 5 (https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/documents/module-1-full-report)
¶4.177. The UK government and devolved administrations did not have in place adequate plans for manufacturing and laboratory facilities to be increased. Other countries were not so ill-prepared. South Korea, for example, was able to scale up and deploy testing and contact tracing as a result of prior experience and investment, particularly as a result of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS).437 INQ000251645_0085 para 7.70 Professor Whitty told the Inquiry that the UK had "much to learn" from other countries in this respect.438 INQ000251645_0101 para 7.125
¶4.178. As a result of the lack of testing capacity, community testing had to be stopped and distribution of the tests restricted to those considered to be most in need. Not surprisingly, the virus continued to spread. Furthermore, little thought was then given to the possibility of putting stringent restrictions in place for a period of time to stop the spread and drive down infections, during which time test and trace capacity could have been increased to contain the exit wave.
¶4.179. As Dr Warner told the Inquiry, plans for stringent restrictions should have been worked up from the outset so they were available if they were needed.439 Ben Warner 6 November 2023 153/4-23 They were not. There was, therefore, no plan for the four governments to fall back on when it became apparent that stringent restrictions were necessary.
¶4.180. The absence of planning was further exemplified by the lack of an exit strategy from lockdown. Since the possibility of a prolonged period of mandatory lockdown was never contemplated in the initial plan, no thought had been given to a strategy for exiting a lockdown once one was imposed. Yet even when it became clear over the weekend of 14 and 15 March 2020 that a prolonged period of lockdown was distinctly likely, decision-makers did not direct work to begin on an exit strategy.
¶4.181. While a full exit strategy with identified milestones would not have been realistic, consideration should have been given prior to the implementation of the mandatory lockdown as to which tests would need to be met to exit the lockdown, as well as how the pandemic could ultimately be brought to an end. This would have enabled operational planning to be targeted towards creating those conditions.
203¶4.182. While the Inquiry acknowledges the pressure that all four governments must have faced in the lead-up to the mandatory lockdown, given that no planning for that eventuality had previously been done, they should have made arrangements for work to commence on options for an exit strategy when a prolonged lockdown became a distinct possibility over the weekend of 14 and 15 March 2020. Instead, work on how the lockdown should be eased did not begin until 20 March 2020 in England, 6 April in Wales, mid-April in Scotland and 20 April in Northern Ireland.
Inadequate guidance and restrictions before 16 March 2020
¶4.183. One of the most effective ways to limit the spread of a virus (and therefore to avoid the need for stringent restrictions on the public) is to persuade members of the public to take their own precautions. However, as the virus spread during March 2020, the initial advice to the public was weak. It focused on hand hygiene and little else. Face masks were positively discouraged for the public, mass gatherings continued to take place, thereby reinforcing the message that close social contact was approved, and Mr Johnson's optimistic nature frequently undermined the serious message he was meant to convey. In the Inquiry's view, members of the public should have been trusted and advised to take their own precautions at a much earlier stage.
¶4.184. The first significant restriction to slow the spread of Covid-19 was not implemented until 12 March 2020 (self-isolation advice). On 16 March, an advisory lockdown was put in place and gradually tightened over subsequent days, including by the closure of schools, until a mandatory lockdown was announced on 23 March (although it was not given legal force until a few days later).
¶4.185. Restrictions were implemented too slowly by the four governments, allowing the virus to spread to the point when the imminent collapse of health services in parts of the UK left the governments believing that they had no alternative but to impose a UK-wide mandatory lockdown.
¶4.186. Professor Woolhouse's view was that more proportionate and sustainable interventions (such as contact tracing, self-isolation, face coverings and respiratory hygiene) should have been introduced "as early as March 4th".440 INQ000250231_0027 para 149 He stated that, if at least some of the "substantial interventions" brought in during the week of 16 March 2020 had been introduced earlier, the need for a full lockdown could have been avoided: "[M]y maxim is: if you go early, you don't have to go so hard."441 Mark Woolhouse 16 October 2023 40/9-12
204¶4.187. Mr Johnson told the Inquiry that he thought it was "highly unlikely" that the imposition of earlier restrictions would have avoided a lockdown.442 INQ000255836_0087 para 329 However, had stringent restrictions short of a mandatory lockdown been introduced earlier than 16 March 2020 – when the number of Covid-19 cases was lower – the mandatory lockdown might have been shorter or, conceivably, avoided entirely. At the very least, there would have been time to establish what the effect of those restrictions on levels of incidence were and whether there was a sustained reduction in social contact. This would have enabled the governments to assess whether stringent restrictions short of a lockdown would suffice to prevent health services across the UK being overwhelmed and whether they were therefore a feasible policy option.
¶4.188. The reality is that the UK government and devolved administrations, through their slow responses in late February and early March 2020, denied themselves the possibility of being able to make that assessment. In effect, the likelihood of a mandatory lockdown significantly increased as a result of the failure to act more speedily before 16 March. That more stringent restrictions were not implemented before 16 March was the result of failures on the part of decision-makers, senior officials and scientific advisers.
Failure of decision-makers to identify sufficiently specific objectives
¶4.189. Over the weekend of 14 and 15 March 2020, it became apparent that the UK government was not willing to run the risk of the NHS collapsing, given the significant additional deaths that would result. However, prior to this, the outcome the four governments sought to achieve by implementing restrictions was not sufficiently specific to enable scientific advice to be provided on the options to achieve that objective.
¶4.190. As late as 20 February 2020, SAGE was still seeking clarity as to the objectives of the UK government's response, in order properly to advise on which restrictions could be implemented to achieve them.443 INQ000061517_0003 paras 7-8 Professor Vallance told the Inquiry that there were attempts "several times" to try to define a mortality number that the UK government was willing to tolerate as part of its initial plan for the response, but that "nobody would give that number".444 Patrick Vallance 20 November 2023 30/10-13
205¶4.192. Instead, scientific advisers were forced to provide advice about restrictions on the basis of their ability to "flatten" the peak generally, but without an appreciation of what the UK government's 'red lines' were in terms of numbers of infections or deaths, or the extent of the stringency of restrictions which the four governments would be willing to tolerate.
¶4.193. Professor Edmunds told the Inquiry that, because modellers on SPI-M-O did not know whether lockdowns were "politically acceptable", they "did not spend as much time on them in early March as we should have".446 INQ000273553_0021-0022 para 6.6.2 The lack of clarity about what the governments were seeking to achieve "may well have led to SAGE advice being too timid, particularly in the early days of the epidemic".447 INQ000273553_0104-0105 para 16.8 Professor Ferguson stated:
" [P]reventing the NHS from being overwhelmed only became apparent (to me at least) as a clear government red line from 13th March onwards."448 INQ000263373_0005 para 11
Flawed scientific advice about the timing of restrictions
¶4.194. Until the weekend of 14 and 15 March 2020, Professors Whitty and Vallance advised that restrictions should not be implemented until closer to the peak of infections.449 'Watch again: Boris Johnson says government is moving towards "delay phase" of coronavirus', YouTube, undated (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yc1alOEjDVA; INQ000223088_0004-0005); 'UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson holds a press conference on coronavirus', YouTube, 12 March 2020 (https://www.youtube.com/live/cAE8-e5_EKY; INQ000231053_0002-0004) This was, in part, due to their concerns about the severity of the indirect public health, social and economic impacts that the restrictions would have and, therefore, an understandable desire to limit the time the restrictions would be in place.450 INQ000251645_0111 para 7.162; INQ000238826_0072 para 229 However, it was also due in part to a concern that, since high compliance with restrictions during the peak was essential to reduce the strain on the NHS, restrictions should not be implemented too soon in case the public tired of complying with them before this point.
¶4.195. This notion of 'behavioural fatigue' was introduced by Professor Whitty.451 Christopher Whitty 22 November 2023 23/18-25/13; INQ000273901_0003 Mr Johnson told the Inquiry that Professor Whitty advised him in late February 2020:
206" [T]here were limits to human patience, to the willingness of the population to do as they were told. That is why it was so essential to get the timing right. If you went too early, for instance, you might have to sustain restrictions for longer than people could endure."452 INQ000255836_0022 paras 88-89
¶Professor Whitty said that he was "rightly told off by my behavioural science colleagues" for using the terminology 'behavioural fatigue'. He confirmed that it did not arise from SPI-B.453 Christopher Whitty 22 November 2023 25/12-17; INQ000251645_0111 para 7.161
¶4.196. Professors Whitty and Vallance both told the Inquiry that concerns about behavioural fatigue did not influence their advice about the appropriate time to implement restrictions.454 INQ000251645_0111 para 7.162; INQ000238826_0071-0072 para 228 However, on a number of occasions prior to mid-March 2020, both advised that restrictions should not yet be implemented for this reason.455 INQ000056219_0005 para 6; 'Watch again: Boris Johnson says government is moving towards "delay phase" of coronavirus', YouTube, 9 March 2020 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yc1alOEjDVA; INQ000223088_0004-0005); 'UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson holds a press conference on coronavirus', YouTube, 12 March 2020 (https://www.youtube.com/live/cAE8-e5_EKY; INQ000231053_0002-0004)
¶4.197. Regardless of whether it was due to concerns about public compliance or the political will to sustain restrictions over a prolonged period, Professors Whitty and Vallance were clearly worried that restrictions might not be sustainable if implemented too early. They advised that restrictions should be implemented closer to the peak of infections.456 INQ000048039; 'UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson holds a press conference on coronavirus', YouTube, 12 March 2020 (https://www.youtube.com/live/cAE8-e5_EKY; INQ000231053_0002)
¶4.198. As Mr Cummings pointed out to Mr Johnson on 14 March 2020, the scientific advice received prior to that point that decision-makers should not yet implement restrictions had been based only on the 'time to peak' rather than on the 'time to NHS collapse'.457 INQ000048313_0007
¶4.199. Scientific advisers had not appreciated the likelihood of the NHS being overwhelmed before then because of a lack of data in two areas:
-
¶
- Inadequate infection data: Professor Vallance explained that scientific advisers did not realise how widespread the virus was in the UK and that they were "flying blind but I don't think we knew how blind we were".458 INQ000238826_0098-0099 para 303 It was not until 13 March 2020 that data emerged indicating that the level of cases in the UK was much higher than previously recognised and that the UK was further along the epidemic curve (a visual representation of the number of cases over time) than had previously been estimated. This was exacerbated by the unknown extent of asymptomatic transmission.
- Inadequate hospital data and delayed modelling on health service capacity: As Professor Vallance explained: "[M]odellers had great difficulty in getting clarity on the NHS numbers … trying to get precise numbers on ICU beds and occupancy of other types of high-dependency beds was pretty difficult."459 Patrick Vallance 20 November 2023 32/2-13 Robust modelling on the likely impact of the virus on the NHS in England only became available following the meeting between NHS England and modellers on 1 March 2020. It was only then that it became clear that the NHS in England would be overwhelmed if the reasonable worst-case scenario materialised.
¶4.200. As a result, the need to implement stringent restrictions as a matter of urgency was underestimated by scientific advisers until 13 March 2020, when the real risk of imminent NHS collapse in England became apparent.
¶4.201. Professor Vallance observed that the lack of data "was detrimental to both the science advice and the political decision-making".460 INQ000238826_0021 para 50; see also INQ000309529_0032 para 108 He conceded that scientific advice was:
" trying to be too precise in terms of the idea of an optimal timing of interventions".461 INQ000238826_0098 para 302
¶He told the Inquiry:
" [T]he focus on trying to get that timing exactly right was incorrect. It was an error to think that you could be that precise. That's a really important lesson that came out of this … you need to go early."462 Patrick Vallance 20 November 2023 38/2-6
¶Professor Whitty said that the 16 March 2020 restrictions should have been implemented "several days earlier".463 Christopher Whitty 22 November 2023 33/7-11
¶4.202. The Inquiry acknowledges the difficulties facing the UK government's scientific and medical advisers. They were working under extreme pressure and in conditions of evidential uncertainty. However, they were aware that the absence of adequate data was likely to mislead as to the true extent of infection and the resulting impact on health services. Prior to 13 March 2020, they knew that they likely did not have an accurate understanding of the point at which the NHS would be overwhelmed. Accordingly, they should not have advised decision-makers up to mid-March that restrictions should not yet be implemented. At the very least, they should have made clearer to decision-makers the higher level of risk for the NHS that would arise from following that scientific advice, given the data gaps and assumptions on which it was based. In particular, Professor Whitty should have made clearer to decision-makers that his advice that public compliance with restrictions might wane if restrictions were implemented too early (the notion of 'behavioural fatigue') was based on an assumption he had made – and therefore could prove to be incorrect. He should have made it clearer that a decision to wait longer before implementing restrictions based on that assumption would therefore entail running certain risks in relation to NHS capacity.
208Failure of decision-makers adequately to interrogate scientific advice
¶4.203. Decision-makers in all four governments relied on the scientific advice before the weekend of 14 and 15 March 2020 that social distancing restrictions should not be implemented until closer to the peak of infections.464 INQ000056132_0005-0006; INQ000056221_0007 para 8; 'UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson holds a press conference on coronavirus', YouTube, 12 March 2020 (https://www.youtube.com/live/cAE8-e5_EKY; INQ000231053_0001) Mr Johnson explained that, prior to that weekend:
" [T]he scientific advice was that the measures that were necessary to delay and flatten the virus's peak and to reduce pressure on the NHS should not be brought in too early because this would risk behavioural fatigue and a greater second peak."465 INQ000255836_0086-0087 para 326
¶4.204. Mr Johnson told the Inquiry that he had not challenged the scientific advice to wait longer before implementing restrictions, despite "thinking there was something amiss", given that this advice did not seem to be consistent with the graphs presented at COBR on 12 March 2020.466 Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 116/3-15; INQ000255836_0036 para 150 The graphs indicated that the NHS would be overwhelmed in the reasonable worst-case scenario, even if all the restrictions were subsequently implemented.
¶4.205. Mr Hancock, Mr Sunak and Mr Gove all said the UK government accepted scientific advice that restrictions should not be implemented too early.467 Rishi Sunak 11 December 2023 65/6-68/5; Michael Gove 28 November 2023 53/16-58/23; Matt Hancock 30 November 2023 129/12-134/6
¶4.206. Mr Drakeford similarly explained that he had been advised by the Chief Medical Officer for Wales:
" [I]f you go too soon, you may lose the impact that you're looking for, because people won't be convinced … and the compliance may not follow up a level that you need."468 Mark Drakeford 13 March 2024 69/12-72/3
¶4.207. Ms Sturgeon confirmed:
" [T]here was a concern that introducing restrictions too early might limit their effectiveness should compliance have waned before optimal timing."469 INQ000339033_0089 para 244
¶4.208. This advice also influenced ministers in Northern Ireland. On 12 March 2020, Ms O'Neill raised the issue of whether Northern Ireland should introduce a similar set of restrictions (including school closures) to those introduced in the Republic of Ireland. Ministers were advised that there was "no medical/scientific evidence" to support the measures announced by the Government of Ireland and that there was a risk of creating a peak too early.470 INQ000232525_0001; INQ000289859_0001 Even as late as 16 March 2020 – the day an advisory lockdown was implemented across the UK – Mr Swann recorded in a note he made during a meeting of the Northern Ireland Executive Committee that restrictions:
209" [h]ave to be sustainable – if introduce too early can't sustain. What is best decision to take? Now is not right time to do it."471 INQ000065689_0007
¶4.209. Decision-makers and senior officials in all four governments failed adequately to interrogate the potential policy consequences of the scientific advice on which they relied in relation to the timing of the implementation of restrictions prior to the weekend of 14 and 15 March 2020. They should have done so to ensure that they understood the potential consequences for their healthcare systems of following the scientific advice to wait longer before implementing restrictions, given the incomplete data, uncertainties and scientific assumptions on which that advice was based. They could then have decided whether – in light of the potential policy consequences for their healthcare systems – they should follow the scientific advice or adopt a more cautious approach. Given the near collapse of health services in northern Italy, it was obvious that there was a high risk of health services in the UK being similarly overwhelmed if they did not act urgently.
An earlier mandatory lockdown
¶4.210. Over the weekend of 14 and 15 March 2020, it had become obvious to UK government decision-makers that much more stringent measures would have to be imposed in order to bring R below 1 and avoid the NHS in England being overwhelmed. The need for the ultimate intervention – an urgent mandatory lockdown – was openly debated. However, the package of measures that was agreed should be taken to COBR on Monday 16 March – and which was publicly announced later that day – did not expressly include taking such a step. The restrictions announced were advisory and did not constitute a mandatory lockdown. For example, there would be no compulsory closure of bars, restaurants, gyms or non-essential workplaces.472 INQ000238826_0093-0094 para 287 Further, schools and retail would not be required to close.
¶4.211. Mr Hancock told the Inquiry that, although "no one called [the package of measures announced on 16 March 2020] a lockdown, that is what it was".473 INQ000232194_0066 para 280 Professor Vallance explained that the package announced was "close to … a national lockdown, albeit one that was … advisory rather than mandatory".474 INQ000238826_0089 para 274 The question of whether to implement a mandatory or advisory lockdown had been "a political issue, not a scientific one".475 Patrick Vallance 20 November 2023 46/6-7
210¶4.212. There were a number of reasons why an advisory, rather than mandatory, lockdown was implemented on 16 March 2020.
¶4.213. Firstly, there was a desire to find the minimum level of restrictions that could reduce R below 1 by gradually increasing the stringency of the restrictions and monitoring their effect. It was hoped that an advisory lockdown might be sufficient if public compliance was high.476 Christopher Whitty 22 November 2023 34/25-35/15 As Professor Whitty told the Inquiry:
" [T]he real question … was what was the minimum set of interventions which could realistically move R from being above 1 to below 1 … Nobody wanted to introduce more restrictive interventions than necessary due to the very high social and public health cost of the interventions."477 INQ000251645_0094 para 7.102
¶Mr Johnson suggested that, rather than "rushing in", a period of 10 days was necessary while decision-makers and scientific advisers:
" closely monitored the available data, considered alternatives and worked out when and how best to impose the lockdown".478 INQ000255836_0086-0087 para 326
¶4.214. Secondly, the full operational planning to enable a mandatory lockdown to be implemented and enforced was not in place on 16 March 2020. For example, the Coronavirus Bill had not yet been passed and economic support packages, including furlough, were still being worked up. Even shielding, which had always been envisaged under the initial plan, was not ready to be implemented. As late as 19 March, the UK government had not yet finalised the categories of clinically high-risk people who would be advised to shield.479 INQ000056055; INQ000215035_0017 para 67; INQ000252711_0010 para 40; Dominic Cummings 31 October 2023 250/21 There were also practical issues to be resolved in Scotland in relation to shielding, and, by 18 March 2020, there were no real plans for implementing shielding in Wales.480 INQ000370154; Reg Kilpatrick 6 March 2024 191/3-13
¶4.215. Thirdly, according to Mr Cummings, part of the reason a mandatory lockdown was not announced until 23 March 2020 was that Mr Johnson oscillated between alternative policy options from 16 to 23 March. He explained that Mr Johnson:
" backed and veered from supporting a lockdown to being incredibly concerned about the prospect of ordering a lockdown".481 Dominic Cummings 31 October 2023 206/16-18; INQ000273872_0055 para 247
¶4.216. Mr Johnson described his concern about ordering a lockdown as:
211" an indication of the cruelty of the choice that we faced, and the appalling balancing act that I had to do throughout the pandemic".482 Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 128/23-25
¶It is wholly understandable that Mr Johnson should have wrestled with such a profound decision. Nevertheless, in the face of a virus that is spreading exponentially, failure to take early and decisive public health action is likely to have dire consequences.
¶4.217. By failing to take effective action at an earlier stage, the four governments left themselves insufficient time in which to determine whether the advisory measures would work.
¶4.218. The virus kept spreading and the threat to the healthcare systems of the four nations kept growing. By 23 March 2020, in the face of exponential spread and less than hoped-for levels of compliance, decision-makers could not afford to wait any longer.
¶4.219. The failure to announce a mandatory lockdown until 23 March 2020 meant that it was imposed at a higher and later stage of each nation's epidemiological wave, thereby guaranteeing higher levels of mortality and reducing the ability of the measure to bring R down. Professor Edmunds stated that the one-week delay "almost certainly led to thousands of additional deaths".483 INQ000273553_0059-0060 para 9.9 Professor Ferguson told the Inquiry that in later work which analysed the impact of restrictions in England:
" we explicitly modelled the counterfactual scenario of moving the lockdown of 23rd March back to 16th March, and estimated mortality ... would have been reduced by 48%".484 INQ000249526_0092 para 280; 'Key epidemiological drivers and impact of interventions in the 2020 SARS-CoV-2 epidemic in England', E.S. Knock, L.K. Whittles, J.A. Lees, P.N. Perez-Guzman, R. Verity, R.G. FitzJohn, et al., Science Translational Medicine (2021), 13(602), eabg4262 (https://doi.org/10.1126/scitranslmed.abg4262; INQ000212077)
¶That could have equated to a reduction in deaths in England from 48,600 to approximately 25,600 in the first wave up to 1 July 2020.485 'Key epidemiological drivers and impact of interventions in the 2020 SARS-CoV-2 epidemic in England', E.S. Knock, L.K. Whittles, J.A. Lees, P.N. Perez-Guzman, R. Verity, R.G. FitzJohn, et al., Science Translational Medicine (2021), 13(602), eabg4262 (https://doi.org/10.1126/scitranslmed.abg4262; INQ000212077)
¶4.220. Moreover, because the lockdown was imposed at a relatively late stage of the epidemiological cycle, when the levels of incidence were higher, a longer lockdown was required to bring down R0.
¶4.221. Many witnesses – including Professor Vallance, Professor McLean, Mr Hancock, Sir Christopher Wormald, Mr Cummings and Mr Cain – also told the Inquiry that a mandatory lockdown should have been implemented earlier than 23 March 2020.486 INQ000238826_0098 paras 300-301; INQ000309529_0038 para 126; INQ000232194_0006 para 23; INQ000280628_0065 para 122; INQ000273872_0106-0107 para 534; INQ000252711_0011 para 43 Professor Whitty acknowledged:
212" With the benefit of knowing what transpired and the ability retrospectively to piece together the timeline by which seeding of infection from Europe to the UK resulted in an upswing in domestic transmission, the first lockdown, and the various steps that led up to it, should have been implemented earlier. How much earlier is more debatable, but probably at least seven days."487 INQ000251645_0116 para 8.8
¶Mr Gove stated that he had believed that it would have been appropriate to impose a lockdown during the week of 16 March 2020. Indeed, he said that he had reached that conclusion the week before.488 Michael Gove 28 November 2023 80/16-17 He expressed regret that he had not been more
¶"forthright" in calling for an earlier lockdown.489 Michael Gove 28 November 2023 84/15-23 Mr Johnson disagreed. He said that he did "not believe that [the mandatory lockdown] should have been made earlier".490 INQ000255836_0086 para 325 However, all the scientific evidence is against him and the Inquiry agrees with Mr Gove.
¶4.222. There was no need for any delay and an urgent need for immediate action. The fact that operational planning and processes were not fully in place was no reason for delay. They could have been built up in the first few days of the lockdown.
¶4.223. The imperative for mandatory lockdowns in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland was not as great as in England, given that these nations were not as far along the epidemiological curve, but a lockdown in England and not in the other three nations would have been epidemiologically and logistically impracticable. Baroness Foster stated: "[T]here was no realistic alternative but to follow the UK Government's lead."491 INQ000418976_0025 para 82 Mr Drakeford made a similar point.492 INQ000371209_0039 para 125 Ms Sturgeon said that it would have been "virtually impossible in practical terms for Scotland to have entered full lockdown earlier than the UK government decided appropriate", given the need for the UK government to provide the resources for schemes such as furlough.493 INQ000339033_0076 para 203 The Inquiry accepts that it would not have been practical for one or all of the devolved administrations to take such a step in the absence of the UK government doing so.
¶4.224. Ms Sturgeon, Mr Drakeford and Ms O'Neill told the Inquiry that, with hindsight, the mandatory UK-wide lockdown should have been implemented earlier.494 INQ000339033_0076 para 203; Mark Drakeford 13 March 2024 105/5-10; INQ000436641_0025 para 87 Ms O'Neill recognised that this view was not unanimously held by the Northern Ireland Executive Committee.495 INQ000436641_0024 para 83 Ms Sturgeon said that she "would have wanted to introduce lockdown measures a week or so earlier. That we did not do so is a regret I carry."496 INQ000339033_0076 para 203 Mr Drakeford said he had no reason to disagree with the "broad consensus that it could have happened a week earlier than it did".497 Mark Drakeford 13 March 2024 105/5-10
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