Reports that Matter

UK Covid-19 Inquiry, Modules 2, 2A, 2B, 2C: Core decision-making and political governance, Volume I · 2025

The lockdown decision: 23 March 2020

Section 31 of 59

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The lockdown decision: 23 March 2020

Dashboard 10:22 March 2020 Estimated population infected: 281,000 (calculated using SAGE assumption that actual infections = 1,000 x deaths) Total confirmed cases UK: 5,683 (4,792 in England, 416 in Scotland, 347 in Wales and 128 in Northern Ireland) Deaths: 281 (257 in England, 10 in Scotland, 12 in Wales and 2 in Northern Ireland) Number of tests carried out: 78,340 Source: INQ000056000_0002-0003

Figure 12: Daily confirmed cases from 1 to 23 March 2020 across the UK

  • 20 20 20 — 20

  • 20 20 20 — 20

h h ch ch ar c ar c ar ar M M M M

  • 2 9 16 — 23

Source: UK Health Security Agency Covid-19 data dashboard archive (https://ukhsa-dashboard.data.gov.uk/covid-19-archive-data-download)

4.151. SAGE met on 23 March 2020. It considered two urgent papers produced by the Scientific Pandemic Insights Group on Behaviours (known as SPI-B) the previous day. The first analysed the current level of adherence among the population to the advisory restrictions in place. It concluded: "[T]here appears to be room for social distancing to be increased still further."370 INQ000074912_0001 The second outlined options for improving adherence further.371 INQ000196761

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4.152. SAGE also discussed a SPI-M-O consensus statement on the Covid-19 outbreak in the UK as at 20 March 2020.372 INQ000071111 The statement advised that modelling now suggested that the doubling time of cases in intensive care units "is short, ranging from 3 to 5 days".373 INQ000071111_0001 para 1 Intensive care capacity would be exceeded in London "by the end of the month, even if additional measures are put in place today".374 INQ000071111_0001 para 2 It explained that the rest of the UK was "1-2 weeks behind London" and, in the absence of additional measures "being put into place in the next few days, it is likely that we will breach ICU capacity in other regions".375 INQ000071111_0001 para 3 It stated:

" Any measures enacted would take 2-3 weeks to have an impact on ICU admissions; school closures will take 1-2 weeks longer."376 INQ000071111_0001 para 4

4.153. SAGE concluded that the epidemic growth rate was faster than previously anticipated, with the doubling time estimated to be three to four days.377 INQ000052717_0002 paras 1, 8 High rates of compliance with social distancing measures would be needed to reduce R below 1 and to bring cases within NHS capacity.378 INQ000052717_0002 para 1 However, SAGE highlighted that there was uncertainty about whether there was the necessary compliance with social distancing needed to bring the epidemic within NHS capacity and that public polling over the weekend indicated there was room for improvement on compliance rates.379 INQ000052717_0002, 0003 paras 2, 20

4.154. On 23 March 2020, the Technical Advisory Cell in Wales also recommended consideration of "an immediate 'lockdown and release' approach".380 INQ000312930_0001 para 4 On 22 March, following a meeting with Mr Drakeford and Mr Gething, officials in Wales had been tasked to "prepare first cut [of a lockdown plan] so that we are ready either to respond to [the UK government] or move separately".381 INQ000336319_0002

4.155. A Covid-19 Strategy Ministerial Group meeting was held at 09:15 on 23 March 2020, chaired by Mr Johnson and attended by Mr Sunak, Mr Hancock, Mr Gove, Professor Whitty, Sir Simon Stevens and others.382 INQ000056264 Sir Simon Stevens explained that intensive care ratios in London had been increased from 1:1 to 1:8 and that it might not be sustainable for the NHS in London to continue to operate under this strain.383 INQ000056264_0004 He said:

" It was important not to be falsely reassured by the fact that hospitals were coping at the time. The NHS was doing well, but the numbers of those needing critical care would follow an exponential path. It was likely that the NHS would be overburdened."384 INQ000056264_0004-0005

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Professor Whitty advised:

" [E]mergency brake measures were needed now to get control of the immediate

situation, but it was likely that the measures already in place would be sufficient in the longer term."385 INQ000056264_0007-0008

Mr Johnson concluded that the UK government's advisory restrictions "did not seem to be working, and a stronger approach was needed".386 INQ000056264_0011-0012 He stated that the government should, that day, instruct people to stay at home unless they were in a specified occupation or could not work from home.387 INQ000056264_0012 People should only leave home to shop for necessities and to attend medical appointments, and social gatherings of any kind should be stopped.388 INQ000056264_0012 This should be reinforced with fines.389 INQ000056264_0012 Mr Johnson explained that this announcement was:

" within the scope of the original plan to introduce more distancing as and when

required, and so should not be couched as a big step change. Actions were being forced by the pace of events."390 INQ000056264_0012

4.156. At 09:45, a second Covid-19 Strategy Ministerial Group meeting was held.391 INQ000056102 Two papers on further restrictions were considered.392 INQ000056098; INQ000056258 One paper stated:

" Social distancing is happening, but it is uncertain whether there is a sufficient

level of compliance to prevent infections growing exponentially … In light of this uncertainty about the level of social distancing, and hence whether current measures are sufficient to push the reproduction number below 1 and therefore contain the spread, the Government may wish to take further steps to increase social distancing."393 INQ000056098_0001

The other paper explained that decision-makers needed to decide that day whether, to drive R below 1, the existing social distancing advice should now be enforced by law and the public told to stay at home.394 INQ000056258_0001 It was decided that the public should be informed to stay at home unless shopping for necessities, attending a medical appointment, daily exercise, or if it was not possible for them to work from home.395 INQ000056096 Non-essential retail should also be closed. It was agreed that Mr Johnson would announce this that evening.396 INQ000056096 Mr Johnson told the Inquiry that he "no longer had the luxury of waiting … it was over".397 Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 134/4-6

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4.157. At about 11:30 on 23 March 2020, Professor Van-Tam emailed Professors Whitty and Vallance and explained that participants in SPI-M-O were "seriously alarmed" and "of one mind that extra measures [were] needed right now – right across the country not just London". He stated that, even with extra measures, intensive care capacity in London would be "overrun", but the measures "might just avoid overrunning in the rest of England, but only just".398 INQ000228874 Professor Whitty assured him that "ministers are fully seized of the need to act".399 INQ000228874

4.158. At 17:00 on 23 March 2020, Mr Johnson chaired a COBR meeting by video link.400 INQ000056213 The First Ministers of Scotland and Wales, as well as the First Minister and deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland, were present.401 This meeting was originally planned to take place on 22 March but it was postponed (INQ000061710); INQ000366557 A paper was presented which recommended COBR agree to:

  • an order telling citizens to stay at home, other than in accordance with a short and restrictive list of permitted activities;
  • the closure of non-essential retail;
  • a ban on gatherings of more than two people in public; and
  • a ban on all social events.402 INQ000089938_0001-0002 paras 5-6; INQ000056213_0004 para 4

These measures were to be mandatory and enforced by law. COBR was advised that the restrictions should be announced that night, with clear guidance published immediately after the announcement, and that arrangements for enforcement should be clarified and come into force later that week.403 INQ000089938_0003 para 15

4.159. Professor Vallance explained:

" [T]he current rate of infection by a single person was 2.6-2.8 and this doubled in Intensive Care Units. The rate was doubling every three to five days which was similar to Italy, Germany and Spain."404 INQ000056213_0004 para 1

Mr Johnson noted that "measures needed to be taken as social distancing was not being adhered to at present".405 INQ000056213_0006 para 12; see also INQ000255836_0071-0072 para 275 While some activities had reduced (eg 'high street' by 28%, travel by 60% and socialising by 52%):

" [P]ark attendance had gone up by 200 per cent and queues in shops had increased. There were regional differences and showed lower compliance rates in some areas outside London."406 INQ000056213_0004 para 3

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4.160. COBR agreed that Mr Johnson and the devolved administrations would announce the recommended restrictions that evening with immediate effect.407 INQ000056213_0007 Mr Johnson noted that, given the sensitivities of the discussion, it should remain confidential until the announcements were made that evening.408 INQ000056213_0006 para 12 The decision to impose a mandatory lockdown was not approved by the UK Cabinet, which, as outlined in Chapter 5: Exit from lockdown, in this volume, did not meet to discuss this decision until the day after it had been announced publicly.409 INQ000056136

4.161. That evening, Mr Johnson made a televised address. He told everyone: "You must stay at home."410 'Prime Minister's statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 23 March 2020', Prime Minister's Office and Boris Johnson, 23 March 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-address-to-the-nation-on-coronavirus-23-march-2020; INQ000086759_0003) All non-essential retail in England was closed with immediate effect. Social and religious events, including weddings and baptisms, were prohibited. Public gatherings of more than two people were banned.411 'Prime Minister's statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 23 March 2020', Prime Minister's Office and Boris Johnson, 23 March 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-address-to-the-nation-on-coronavirus-23-march-2020; INQ000086759_0003) The First Ministers of Scotland and Wales made parallel announcements.412 'Coronavirus (COVID-19) update: First Minister's speech 23 March 2020', Scottish Government, 23 March 2020 (https://www.gov. scot/publications/first-minister-covid-19-update-1; INQ000354217); 'First Minister of Wales' statement on new coronavirus measures', Welsh Government, 23 March 2020 (https://www.gov.wales/first-minister-of-wales-statement-on-new-coronavirus-measures; INQ000350706) The lockdown was not announced in Northern Ireland until the following day.413 'Executive publishes list of essential businesses', The Executive Office, 24 March 2020 (https://www.executiveoffice-ni.gov.uk/ news/executive-publishes-list-essential-businesses; INQ000215024)

Dashboard 11:23 March 2020 Estimated population infected: 281,000 (calculated using SAGE assumption that actual infections = 1,000 x deaths) Total confirmed cases UK: 6,650 (5,585 in England, 499 in Scotland, 418 in Wales and 148 in Northern Ireland) Deaths: 335 (303 in England, 14 in Scotland, 16 in Wales and 2 in Northern Ireland) Number of tests carried out: 83,945 Source: INQ000120846_0002-0003

4.163. Mr Drakeford told the Inquiry that it was "likely that the Chief Medical Officer for Wales conveyed the view … in advance of the COBR meeting, as he was with me at that point", that a lockdown was necessary by this point. He believed this was also the view of the rest of the Welsh Cabinet.415 INQ000371209 0037-0038 paras 120-121; see also INQ000371209_0039 para 125; Mark Drakeford 13 March 2024 104/13-21 Ms Sturgeon noted that the scientific advice and modelling meant a lockdown at this time was the only option "realistically open to decision-makers".416 INQ000339033_0044 para 115

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4.164. Sir David Sterling described the decision as:

" effectively a fait accompli. The Executive was not involved in any meaningful

way in the UKG [UK government] decision-making process. In those early days I do not recall the CMO ever suggesting the [Northern Ireland] Executive should follow a different path and I also have no recollection that ministers ever seriously questioned the UKG's decisions."417 INQ000449440_0059-0060 para 171; see also Michelle O'Neill 14 May 2024 119/9-120/18

He also acknowledged that "Northern Ireland could not have moved into a lockdown before the UK did".418 David Sterling 1 May 2024 140/4-6 The Executive Committee had not been advised that a lockdown was necessary in Northern Ireland prior to 23 March 2020, nor had it had any detailed discussion about the prospect of a lockdown or scrutinised any departmental plans for this eventuality.419 Michelle O'Neill 14 May 2024 120/15-21; Arlene Foster 15 May 2024 88/10-12 Nonetheless, Professor McBride told the Inquiry that he considered that the situation was extremely serious and required a significant additional response.420 INQ000421704_0164 para 354; see also INQ000418976_0023 para 75; INQ000436641_0022 para 78 Both Ms O'Neill and Baroness Foster readily agreed with the proposition that Northern Ireland was "woefully unprepared" for going into a lockdown.421 Michelle O'Neill 14 May 2024 114/9-16; Arlene Foster 15 May 2024 88/17-22 NICCMA had only come into effect on 18 March 2020 and, by this point, government departments had not instituted detailed cross-government planning in preparation for a lockdown.422 INQ000086935

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