The weekend of 14 and 15 March 2020

¶4.36. In the early morning of Saturday 14 March 2020, a discussion took place on WhatsApp between Mr Johnson and Professor Vallance about the plan for responding to Covid-19. Mr Johnson expressed concern about the "terrifying … numbers of infections required for herd immunity to work if that is part of the strategy".⁷⁸⁷⁸ INQ000048399_0002 Professor Vallance advised Mr Johnson:

" The primary reason for flattening the peak rather than trying to completely [suppress] it is the problem of a severe second wave of outbreak later if we suppress really hard now. Herd immunity is not the strategy, but is a consequence – as more people get infected (as they will), we will start to develop immunity and that will be part of bringing transmission down and bringing it to a halt."⁷⁹⁷⁹ INQ000048399_0003

¶4.37. Shortly after this exchange, at about 08:00, Professor Vallance sent an email to colleagues which said, "I want to push for faster action."⁸⁰⁸⁰ INQ000212052_0001 Professor Vallance told the Inquiry that he wanted to push for restrictions to be introduced earlier and that "they may need to be more extensive if the government's objective of safeguarding the NHS were to be achieved".⁸¹⁸¹ INQ000238826_0081-0082 para 256 Professor Edmunds agreed and Professor Ferguson commented that "the policies will need to be more intense" and "go on for longer".⁸²⁸² INQ000228786_0001; INQ000212052_0001; see also INQ000048399_0006

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¶Later in the day, Professor Ferguson was asked to prepare a slide deck for Professor

¶Vallance that illustrated the potential healthcare demand resulting from mitigation measures (restrictions to slow the spread) versus suppression measures (restrictions to stop the spread) in a simple manner.⁸³⁸³ INQ000119697

¶4.38. That morning, Mr Johnson met with Mr Hancock, Professors Vallance and Whitty and several senior officials including Sir Christopher Wormald (Permanent Secretary to the Department of Health and Social Care from May 2016 to December 2024). Professors Whitty and Vallance informed decision-makers of SAGE's advice from the previous day that the country was now further along the epidemic curve than had previously been understood.⁸⁴⁸⁴ INQ000251645_0092 para 7.96 Mr Hancock explained that Professor Vallance:

" told everyone that while we had thought we were four weeks behind Italy on the epidemic curve, it was now thought that the UK was two weeks behind, which meant there was no time to lose … The data pointed to our reasonable worst-case scenario of over 500,000 deaths becoming a reality unless the Government stepped in hard and fast."⁸⁵⁸⁵ INQ000232194_0064-0065 para 272

¶Professors Vallance and Whitty indicated that SAGE had advised:

" [T]he right time to implement measures in our plan might be sooner than previously envisaged given the latest analysis."⁸⁶⁸⁶ INQ000136751_0001

¶4.39. Professor Whitty told the Inquiry that, at this meeting, it was made "clear to core decision makers that action was needed at speed, faster than had been previously anticipated".⁸⁷⁸⁷ INQ000251645_0093 para 7.98 Michael Gove MP (later Lord Gove), Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster from July 2019 to September 2021 and Minister for the Cabinet Office from February 2020 to September 2021, explained that this meeting was "a turning point, where we really began to shift gears to a more robust response".⁸⁸⁸⁸ INQ000259848_0019 para 32

¶4.40. Advice was to be provided by SAGE on a package of measures, to be discussed with Mr Johnson the following day, including "how we could implement further social distancing based on the epidemiology, with options ranging up to full lockdown".⁸⁹⁸⁹ INQ000136751_0001 This was the first time that SAGE had been formally commissioned to consider a lockdown strategy. It was a marked departure from the initial plan set out in the Coronavirus: Action Plan published on 3 March.⁹⁰⁹⁰ Coronavirus: Action Plan: A Guide to What You Can Expect Across the UK, Department of Health and Social Care, 3 March 2020 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5e5e2e91e90e071110454391/Coronavirus_action_plan_-_a_guide_to_what_you_ can_expect_across_the_UK.pdf; INQ000182380) Restrictions to stop the spread of the virus were now under serious consideration in the UK government.

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¶4.41. Notes from the meeting record that the possibility of a London lockdown in the near future was discussed.⁹¹⁹¹ INQ000146636_0064-0065 Mr Gove was recorded as saying "Go now!"⁹²⁹² INQ000146636_0065

¶4.42. Immediately after that meeting, Mr Johnson held a small group discussion with

members of the 10 Downing Street Private Office, including Mr Cummings, Dr Warner, Mr Shafi, Lee Cain (Director of Communications at 10 Downing Street from July 2019 to November 2020) and Stuart Glassborow (Deputy Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister from May 2019 to May 2022).⁹³⁹³ INQ000232194_0065-0066 para 276

¶4.43. Dr Warner explained that he told Mr Johnson:

" [ W]ith the current plan, we would quickly overload the NHS. Once the NHS was broken, it would not be able to treat those with Covid, and therefore those with survivable Covid would die. In addition, people would not be able to get treatment for regular conditions such as heart attacks. This meant that the number of deaths that would occur would be significantly higher than just the infection fatality rate from Covid."⁹⁴⁹⁴ INQ000269182_0038 para 134

¶Dr Warner used a whiteboard to brief Mr Johnson to this effect (see Figure 8).

¶Figure 8: Notes on a whiteboard during the meeting at 10 Downing Street on 14 March 2020

70,005 ! people We é

¶Source: INQ000196057

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¶4.44. Mr Johnson told the Inquiry: "It was absolutely clear by the Saturday that we had to act. We were out of time."⁹⁵⁹⁵ Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 124/24-25; see also INQ000146636_0070 According to Mr Cain:

¶" [T]he collective agreement in the room was that a full lockdown was the only strategy which could suppress the spread of Covid-19, save the NHS from collapse, and ultimately buy the Government more time, and that 'flattening the curve' could only really work as an interim measure until full lockdown could be achieved."⁹⁶⁹⁶ INQ000252711_0009 para 35

¶4.45. Mr Shafi told the Inquiry that Mr Johnson:

¶" agreed that he wanted to look at more aggressive measures, but did not decide in this smaller meeting on whether to implement them. He asked for the CMO [Chief Medical Officer] and CSA [Chief Scientific Adviser] – who were not present during this discussion – to validate the argument for firmer action presented in the room."⁹⁷⁹⁷ INQ000215035_0016 para 64

¶4.46. Mr Cummings told the Inquiry that Mr Johnson "asked reasonable questions including 'why aren't Hancock, Whitty, Vallance telling me this?'".⁹⁸⁹⁸ INQ000273872_0049 para 215

¶4.47. Mr Johnson said that, prior to the morning of Saturday 14 March 2020:

¶" [N]either SAGE, nor our scientific advisers had said that we were on the brink of a total lockdown. They may have begun to think it was possible, given the data we could all see. But they did not spell it out, or certainly not explicitly, as far as I can remember."⁹⁹⁹⁹ INQ000255836_0047 para 198

¶However, he explained that, at the meeting that morning, "the picture changed, or certainly my assumptions changed", and "it was clear that on current trends we might very soon be obliged to lock down the whole country".¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰ INQ000255836_0047-0048 paras 199, 202 This would be "an immense undertaking and could not be done overnight".¹⁰¹¹⁰¹ INQ000255836_0048 para 202

¶4.48. On the afternoon of Saturday 14 March 2020, Mr Cummings exchanged WhatsApp messages with Mr Johnson about flaws in the advice previously presented to him and failures within the Cabinet Office and the Department of Health and Social Care to appreciate the urgency of the situation (see Figure 9).

163

¶Figure 9: Message from Mr Cummings to Mr Johnson on 14 March 2020

¶Source: INQ000048313_0007

¶4.49. Later that evening, Mr Cummings suggested in a WhatsApp group with Mr Johnson, Mr Hancock, Professors Whitty and Vallance and Mr Cain that, on Monday 16 March 2020, the public should be told that the UK government would do what was required to prevent the collapse of the NHS, "including extreme social distancing / lockdown".¹⁰²¹⁰² INQ000048399_0003-0004 This consisted of "social distancing, work from home, oldies shouldn't go to weddings etc, closing pubs and nightclubs etc".¹⁰³¹⁰³ INQ000048399_0003-0004 He stated that this:

" means doing a bunch of stuff roughly 2-3 weeks (i think??) before we think the crunch point is cos there is a time lag on the effects and the cases already in the system feeding through to ICUs".¹⁰⁴¹⁰⁴ INQ000048399_0003-0004

¶Professors Whitty and Vallance broadly agreed.¹⁰⁵¹⁰⁵ INQ000048399_0004 Professor Vallance explained that the new modelling of further restrictions would be provided on 15 or 16 March for decision-makers to consider.¹⁰⁶¹⁰⁶ INQ000048399_0004

¶4.50. The discussion on WhatsApp about the UK government's approach continued into the evening of 14 March 2020. Mr Hancock noted that the UK government's initial response was "predicated, explicitly, on the inevitability of global spread" and questioned whether that was, in fact, inevitable. Professor Vallance suggested that they should "discuss tomorrow live".¹⁰⁷¹⁰⁷ INQ000048399_0005

¶4.51. The implications of SAGE's advice on 13 March 2020 were also considered in Wales on 14 March. Dr Rob Orford, Chief Scientific Adviser (Health) for Wales from January 2017, informed Dr (later Sir) Frank Atherton, Chief Medical Officer for Wales from August 2016, and Dr Goodall about the discussions at SAGE regarding NHS capacity. He queried if it was possible to determine whether the three sets of control measures would "reduce demand sufficiently for the re-aligned system to cope" in Wales.¹⁰⁸¹⁰⁸ INQ000383721_0005 This was significant:

164

" not just for ensuring the NHS is not overwhelmed but also as it might mean a change in the current population level approach towards more restrictive measures, which has a knock-on impact on herd immunity, potentially longer periods of measures and a more difficult winter".¹⁰⁹¹⁰⁹ INQ000383721_0005

¶Officials within the Welsh Government then went on to consider venues that could be used for step-down care, isolation facilities and "nightingale type wards".

¶Dr Orford responded, stating "we need to throw the kitchen sink at it".¹¹⁰¹¹⁰ INQ000383721_0001-0002

¶4.52. Some mass gatherings continued to go ahead. Two Stereophonics concerts went ahead in Cardiff on 14 and 15 March 2020. However, a Six Nations rugby match between Wales and Scotland, due to take place on 14 March, was called off by the Welsh Rugby Union the day before.¹¹¹¹¹¹ INQ000221921_0002 The Welsh Government had powers under the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 to prohibit such gatherings.¹¹²¹¹² The Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984, section 45c (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/22) Public Health Wales had recommended, on 13 March, cancelling the match due to concerns about the number of people who would be travelling and "the impact of crowding in pubs and other venues".¹¹³¹¹³ INQ000276282_0024 para 104 Mark Drakeford MS, First Minister of Wales from December 2018 to March 2024, said that the Welsh Government did not advise against it going ahead because the scientific advice did not justify interference and there was not an agreed four-nations approach.¹¹⁴¹¹⁴ Mark Drakeford 13 March 2024 85/10-19

¶4.53. At about 00:30 on 15 March 2020, Professor Graham Medley (Professor of Infectious Disease Modelling at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine and Co‑Chair of SPI-M-O from January 2020 to February 2022) warned Professors Whitty and Vallance that his latest review of the data suggested:

" [T]ransmission is growing faster than all expectation … we are days away from facing NHS overall load in 3 weeks."¹¹⁵¹¹⁵ INQ000228790_0001

¶However, he noted that this could be attributed to a problem with the data. Professor

¶Vallance replied and stated that he had "primed the politicians yesterday that this all looks closer than it did".¹¹⁶¹¹⁶ INQ000228790_0001

¶4.54. Shortly before 04:00 on 15 March 2020, in an email marked 'Urgent' sent to Professors Whitty and Vallance, Professor Ferguson explained that the "minimum policy" required to avoid NHS England surge capacity being overwhelmed would involve:

165

¶" closing schools and universities, home isolation of cases, and large-scale intensive social distancing – reducing all contacts outside the home and work by 75%+, preferably reducing work contacts by some extent".¹¹⁷¹¹⁷ INQ000048089_0002

¶He explained that this policy was:

¶" basically suppressing transmission, so population immunity will build up slowly. In the absence of a vaccine, we'll still be doing it in over a year's time."¹¹⁸¹¹⁸ INQ000048089_0002

¶Professor Ferguson also forwarded the email to Dr Warner, commenting:

¶" Even if we reduced the epidemic by ⅔ or more, it would still look very bad at the peak. What has changed is that NHSE has been more definitive at saying they are a long, long way away from coping with such levels of demand."¹¹⁹¹¹⁹ INQ000195888_0001

¶4.55. Professor Ferguson told the Inquiry that this was the moment at which it became "clearly apparent that exceeding NHS capacity was a government red line" and that these were the policies that needed to be implemented in order to achieve this.¹²⁰¹²⁰ Neil Ferguson 17 October 2023 175/4-13; see also INQ000263373_0005 para 11

¶4.56. Professor Edmunds also advised Professors Whitty and Vallance via email:

¶" [ W]e need a precautionary approach to our social distance policy. If the data are unreliable, then we need to step up our social distance measures much more rapidly than we might otherwise have thought necessary. I think we should immediately introduce HH [household] quarantine, banning of all social contacts (bars, restaurants, cinemas etc, in particular) and cocooning for the old and high risk groups. We might also want to flag up school closure."¹²¹¹²¹ INQ000207029

¶4.57. Professor Vallance told the Inquiry that, by this point, it was his "clear view that more extensive NPIs [non-pharmaceutical interventions] would have to be introduced" to safeguard the NHS in England "as early as possible, meaning within the coming week at the latest".¹²²¹²² INQ000238826_0084-0085 paras 264-266

¶4.58. At 09:37 on 15 March 2020, Professor Vallance emailed Professor Whitty and outlined that the two aims of the response were now:

¶" 1. To ensure that the curve of the epidemic is flattened to a degree that allows the NHS to cope

Protect lives through appropriate shielding of the elderly and vulnerable."¹²³¹²³ INQ000048090_0001; INQ000238826_0085-0086 para 267

166

To achieve this, household isolation, shielding and enhanced social distancing should be implemented "as soon as it is practical to do so".¹²⁴¹²⁴ INQ000238826_0085-0086 para 267

¶4.59. At about 10:30, Professor Vallance advised Mr Johnson they would need to "move to

the stricter quarantine and social distancing".¹²⁵¹²⁵ INQ000048399_0006 A short time later, Mr Johnson responded: "Seeing what happened in Italy we simply have NO TIME."¹²⁶¹²⁶ INQ000048399_0006

¶4.60. At 12:18, Mr Cummings informed Mr Johnson that Professor Vallance agreed that more stringent measures were now needed (see Figure 10).

¶Figure 10: Message from Mr Cummings to Mr Johnson on 15 March 2020

¶FYI vallance is on board with what will

measures as needed perhaps regionally -

¶Source: INQ000048313_0008

¶4.61. At about 13:00, Professor Ferguson emailed Professors Whitty and Vallance regarding a paper that his team was preparing to publish the following day. He explained:

" [ W]e will conclude that suppression is the only feasible strategy given how much hospital demand is likely to be exceeded."¹²⁷¹²⁷ INQ000228799_0001

¶4.62. Professor Edmunds and Sir Jeremy Farrar also emailed during the afternoon urging the implementation of stringent restrictions.¹²⁸¹²⁸ INQ000207029_0001; INQ000228800

167

¶4.63. It appeared that there was some reluctance within the Cabinet Office and Department of Health and Social Care to adopt the new approach advised by scientific advisers.¹²⁹¹²⁹ Helen MacNamara 1 November 2023 43/21-25, 44/1-4; INQ000238826_0088-0089 para 272; Patrick Vallance 20 November 2023 47/7-18; Dominic Cummings 31 October 2023 200/7-17 On the afternoon of 15 March 2020, a 'pre-meet' in preparation for a ministerial meeting with Mr Johnson was described by Ms MacNamara as "scratchy".¹³⁰¹³⁰ INQ000273841_0035-0036 para 65 She explained that, by this, she meant that:

" it felt like we really were in slightly different places in terms of a group of us in the centre who had got much further on how bad this would be quite quickly, and a … concern from DHSC [the Department of Health and Social Care] who knew as well if not better than we did that the planning wasn't there to support this".¹³¹¹³¹ Helen MacNamara 1 November 2023 43/21-25, 44/1-4

" to wait until the latest possible moment to tell people they had to stay at home whereas – based on the previous 24 hours – the Cabinet Office view was to follow the CMO's advice and lock down in 10 days at the latest and earlier if possible with every day helping to stem the tide".¹³²¹³² INQ000273841_0035-0036 para 65

¶4.64. A meeting chaired by Mr Johnson took place at 17:00 to discuss a further package of restrictions to be approved by COBR the following day.¹³³¹³³ INQ000146579; INQ000106216 It was attended by Mr Hancock, Professors Whitty and Vallance, Sir Mark Sedwill (later Lord Sedwill), Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service from October 2018 to September 2020, and Mr Cummings as well as other advisers and civil servants. A SAGE paper was presented at the meeting which advised that approximately 5% of Covid-19 cases would require hospitalisation and, of those, 30% would need ventilation.¹³⁴¹³⁴ INQ000119697_0004 These figures were now "NHS central case planning assumptions" as they were no longer a distant or unlikely possibility, but reality.¹³⁵¹³⁵ INQ000119697_0004 The UK government's Covid-19 Dashboard (published for the first time on 15 March 2020, although it did not contain any data on hospitalisation rates or occupied intensive care beds) was also presented.¹³⁶¹³⁶ INQ000174708; see also Covid-19 Dashboards for 17 March 2020 (INQ000055918), 18 March 2020 (INQ000056058), 19 March 2020 (INQ000055920) and 20 March 2020 (INQ000056076). The Covid-19 Dashboard was used to present data to decision-makers. Its role in decision-making is examined in Chapter 11: Government decision-making, in Volume II. It made clear that, if the restrictions that had been under consideration to date were implemented, surge critical care bed capacity in the NHS would still be overwhelmed "by 8-fold", and that remaining within NHS capacity would "require more intensive social distancing".¹³⁷¹³⁷ INQ000174708_0005

¶4.65. At the meeting, Mr Cummings argued: "[W]e should accelerate everything and go further and accept the risks of suppression and future waves to buy time."¹³⁸¹³⁸ INQ000273872_0051 para 229

168

¶Professor Vallance suggested the need for "an urgent lockdown at this meeting".¹³⁹¹³⁹ INQ000238826_0088-0089 para 272 He told the Inquiry he was later informed that Sir Christopher Wormald and Sir Mark Sedwill were "incandescent" with him for raising this in the meeting.¹⁴⁰¹⁴⁰ INQ000238826_0088-0089 para 272; Patrick Vallance 20 November 2023 47/7-18 Sir Christopher Wormald told the Inquiry he did not recollect this and that the meetings in 10 Downing Street were "tense but business like".¹⁴¹¹⁴¹ INQ000280628_0056 para 104; Christopher Wormald 2 November 2023 143/10-144/18 Slides were presented at the 15 March 2020 meeting that advised implementing various restrictions and outlined their potential impact.¹⁴²¹⁴² INQ000279910

¶Figure 11: Notes on a whiteboard during a ministerial meeting on 15 March 2020

¶Source: INQ000273872_0052-0053

¶4.66. Mr Johnson agreed to take a package of proposed measures to COBR the following day. These included immediate introduction of household isolation and advice that members of the public should socially distance, although this would be voluntary. Those aged over 70, pregnant women and people with particular health conditions would be advised to follow this advice more rigorously. The proposed measures also included the introduction of shielding for about 1.4 million clinically vulnerable people within a week.¹⁴³¹⁴³ INQ000146579; INQ000215035_0016 para 65; INQ000280628_0057 para 106 Although SAGE had noted on 13 March 2020 that not cancelling mass gatherings "potentially undermines the other actions and trust", it was also agreed to advise but not mandate a cancellation of mass gatherings and to direct that no public services support would be provided to any such events.¹⁴⁴¹⁴⁴ INQ000109142_0004 para 26

¶4.67. In Scotland, on 14 March 2020, Nicola Sturgeon MSP (First Minister of Scotland from November 2014 to March 2023) was said to be "uneasy" about the UK government's approach on the basis that it appeared to be out of step with other countries and the World Health Organization.¹⁴⁵¹⁴⁵ INQ000245702_0001 She asked to discuss with Dr Catherine Calderwood (Chief Medical Officer for Scotland from April 2015 to April 2020) and others the "aggressive containment approach that many other countries appear to be taking versus the UK manage it / flatten curve approach". She was concerned that the public was "already so far ahead of SAGE approach" in its behaviour and queried whether this "must surely change all the assumptions" on which the scientific advice to wait to implement restrictions was based. She questioned whether, in light of this, further restrictions should now be implemented, including social distancing for everyone and shielding for the elderly and vulnerable.

169

¶4.68. On 15 March 2020, there was a meeting of senior officials of the Scottish Government Resilience Room to discuss the advice that would be tendered to Scottish ministers in preparation for the COBR meeting the following day.¹⁴⁶¹⁴⁶ INQ000233522_0001 Dr Calderwood noted that some measures might be in place for a significant length of time and, as such, it was important not to implement any restrictions too soon.¹⁴⁷¹⁴⁷ INQ000233522_0002 She also made "very clear" that the scientific evidence did not justify any school closures.¹⁴⁸¹⁴⁸ INQ000233522_0002

The situation on 15 March 2020

¶4.69. By the weekend of 14 and 15 March 2020, it had become apparent within the UK government that stringent measures were necessary. The NHS in England would not be able to provide care for the large number of people infected with Covid-19 who were likely to need hospital treatment, in particular those requiring intensive care.

¶4.70. Professor Vallance in particular played a key role in bringing about the change of direction over that weekend. He told the Inquiry:

¶" [I]t became very clear that much more stringent measures would be needed …

and they needed to be introduced quickly. I made my views known about that, that that was the view of the SAGE committee and the modellers, and it was my view that we were in a position now where we had to move quickly. That decision, I believe, was understood."¹⁴⁹¹⁴⁹ Patrick Vallance 20 November 2023 45/12-19

¶Professor Vallance explained that, at the meeting on 15 March 2020, he was:

¶" unambiguous … that much more stringent measures would be needed now …

I also suggested on that day that London was so far ahead that it would be necessary to possibly lock down London."¹⁵⁰¹⁵⁰ Patrick Vallance 20 November 2023 45/19-46/1

¶He said:

¶" [O]n that weekend an in principle decision was taken that lockdown would be required. It then took several more days to work that into a full mandatory process."¹⁵¹¹⁵¹ Patrick Vallance 20 November 2023 46/2-6

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¶4.71. As it was, the delays in NHS data and modelling, the realisation that the reasonable worst-case scenario was likely to materialise and the emergence of new data indicating a higher level of cases combined to create the perfect storm. Nothing less than stringent restrictions to reduce the reproduction number (R) below 1 would now suffice to prevent the NHS in England being overwhelmed. The devolved nations were also facing a trajectory of increasing cases, the natural consequence of which would be similar unsustainable pressures on their NHS systems. The governments of the UK had left themselves no option other than to immediately implement stringent restrictions to stop the spread of the virus.