16 March 2020: An 'advisory' lockdown

¶4.72. On 16 March 2020, the Northern Ireland Executive Committee met to consider a paper concerning the phased activation of the Northern Ireland Central Crisis Management Arrangements (referred to as NICCMA). This was the first point at which consideration was given to initiating cross-government civil contingency arrangements and it was agreed that the activation point had been reached.¹⁵²¹⁵² INQ000086883 The Executive Committee also discussed planning, though at a rudimentary level, concluding that Executive departments "can prepare own plans but have to join up".¹⁵³¹⁵³ INQ000065689_0017

¶4.73. New UK government decision-making structures came into effect on 16 March 2020.¹⁵⁴¹⁵⁴ INQ000087163 These included:

the introduction of a daily Covid-19 Strategy Ministerial Group meeting at 09:15, chaired by Mr Johnson and attended by "a small group of Ministers and key advisers";¹⁵⁵¹⁵⁵ INQ000182338_0002 para 4(a) and
the creation of four Ministerial Implementation Groups in key areas – healthcare, public services, economic response and international issues – with "the status to agree collective decisions".¹⁵⁶¹⁵⁶ INQ000250229_0024 para 94; INQ000182343; 'New government structures to coordinate response to coronavirus', Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street, Cabinet Office, Department of Health and Social Care, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, HM Treasury, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Boris Johnson, 17 March 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-government-structures-to-coordinate-response-to-coronavirus; INQ000086849)Show full note

¶4.74. A meeting chaired by Mr Johnson on the morning of 16 March 2020 discussed the need to plan for a lockdown in London, due to a sharp rise in cases in the city.¹⁵⁷¹⁵⁷ INQ000215035_0017 para 68; INQ000146636_0075-0078 Professor Vallance told the Inquiry that, at this meeting, he argued:

" [A] lockdown for at least London would be required if the government's stated policy of protecting the NHS and the vulnerable was to be achieved."¹⁵⁸¹⁵⁸ INQ000238826_0093-0094 para 287

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¶4.75. The Covid-19 Dashboard published on 16 March 2020 did not contain data on hospitalisation. It stated:

¶" Data was collected on 16 March but is believed to be inaccurate. Processes are being improved and accurate data is promised from 17 March."¹⁵⁹¹⁵⁹ INQ000183892_0005

¶These data on hospitalisation would not be provided in the UK government's Covid-19 Dashboard until 20 March.¹⁶⁰¹⁶⁰ INQ000056076 However, on 16 March, data from the new NHS Covid SitRep system became available.¹⁶¹¹⁶¹ INQ000249526_0082-0083 para 254 These set out the total daily numbers of patients who had been admitted to hospital or diagnosed with Covid-19, as well as data relating to bed occupancy and ventilator use. As a result, decision-makers in the UK government did not have an up-to-date understanding of NHS resources or the NHS's surge capacity until mid-March 2020. Data from the COVID-19 Hospitalisation in England Surveillance System (CHESS) concerning hospitalisation and intensive care unit cases also became available on 16 March. However, it was not until late March that CHESS was able to provide a more complete picture of these data.¹⁶²¹⁶² INQ000249526_0081-0082 paras 250, 253

¶4.76. SAGE met at 13:00 on 16 March 2020.¹⁶³¹⁶³ INQ000238826_0092 para 284; INQ000075664 It recognised that the objective of implementing restrictions was now:

¶" to avoid critical cases exceeding NHS intensive care and other respiratory

support bed capacity. The figures for capacity are now clear but intensive care bed capacity will increase by 20% or more."¹⁶⁴¹⁶⁴ INQ000075664_0002 para 10

¶4.77. As a result of the emergence of new infection data on 13 March 2020 and data on NHS critical care capacity, SAGE's advice "changed regarding the speed of the implementation of additional interventions".¹⁶⁵¹⁶⁵ INQ000075664_0002 para 1 At its meeting on 16 March, SAGE recommended that:

be accompanied by a significant increase in testing and the availability of near real-time data flows to understand their impacts".¹⁶⁶¹⁶⁶ INQ000075664_0002 paras 2-3

¶SAGE explained:

¶" [A]ntibody testing is particularly vital to address the central unknown question of the ratio of asymptomatic to symptomatic cases."¹⁶⁷¹⁶⁷ INQ000075664_0003 paras 20

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¶Public Health England stated:

" [T]esting is being scaled up over the coming weeks to 10,000 per day – focused on intensive care units, hospital admissions and key workers."¹⁶⁸¹⁶⁸ INQ000075664_0003 para 21

¶4.78. At this meeting, SAGE considered Imperial College London's Report 9: Impact of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs) to Reduce COVID-19 Mortality and Healthcare Demand, which advised that suppression was now "the preferred policy option".¹⁶⁹¹⁶⁹ Report 9: Impact of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs) to Reduce COVID-19 Mortality and Healthcare Demand, Imperial College London, 16 March 2020, p1 (https://www.imperial.ac.uk/mrc-global-infectious-disease-analysis/disease-areas/covid-19/ report-9-impact-of-npis-on-covid-19; INQ000228166) The report concluded that restrictions designed only to slow the spread of Covid-19, such as self-isolation, household isolation and social distancing of the elderly and others at most risk of severe diseases (shielding), would be likely to lead to "emergency surge capacity limits of the UK … healthcare systems … being exceeded many times over" and about "250,000 deaths" in Great Britain.¹⁷⁰¹⁷⁰ Report 9: Impact of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs) to Reduce COVID-19 Mortality and Healthcare Demand, Imperial College London, 16 March 2020, p16 (https://www.imperial.ac.uk/mrc-global-infectious-disease-analysis/disease-areas/covid-19/ report-9-impact-of-npis-on-covid-19; INQ000228166) However, it noted that implementing stringent restrictions designed to stop the spread of the virus would be challenging as they would need to be maintained until a vaccine was available to avoid an exit wave. This could be in 18 months or longer.¹⁷¹¹⁷¹ Report 9: Impact of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs) to Reduce COVID-19 Mortality and Healthcare Demand, Imperial College London, 16 March 2020, p2 (https://www.imperial.ac.uk/mrc-global-infectious-disease-analysis/disease-areas/covid-19/ report-9-impact-of-npis-on-covid-19; INQ000228166)

¶4.79. Professor Vallance told the Inquiry that this report confirmed his view that:

" more extensive NPIs would have to be introduced earlier in order to meet the government's policy objectives".¹⁷²¹⁷² INQ000238826_0091 para 280

¶4.80. A SPI-M-O paper considered at the SAGE meeting advised that social distancing by the general public, school closures, self-isolation, household isolation and shielding should be "followed as soon as practical".¹⁷³¹⁷³ INQ000119436_0001 para 3 SAGE explained that it could not be certain that the measures agreed by the UK government the previous day would be sufficient "to push demand for critical care below NHS capacity but they may get very close under the [reasonable worst-case] scenario".¹⁷⁴¹⁷⁴ INQ000075664_0002 para 16 It emphasised, however, that "[c]ompliance with the measures by the public" would be "key" for the restrictions to have the intended effect and it would take "two to three weeks before the impacts of measures are observed (this needs to be monitored carefully)".¹⁷⁵¹⁷⁵ INQ000075664_0002 paras 14-15

¶4.81. School closures were not part of the package of restrictions considered for immediate implementation. SAGE explained that, while closing schools was one of the less effective measures in reducing the peak, "it may nevertheless become necessary" to do so in future "in order to push demand for critical care below NHS capacity".¹⁷⁶¹⁷⁶ INQ000075664_0002 para 17 Further modelling of school closures was therefore commissioned from

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¶SPI-M-O and this would be considered by SAGE at its next meeting.¹⁷⁷¹⁷⁷ INQ000075664_0004 SAGE also raised an action point for the Department of Health and Social Care, NHS England and Public Health England:

" to urgently work with NHSX and GO-Science on a data strategy, ensuring there is access to real time data to track the UK epidemic".¹⁷⁸¹⁷⁸ INQ000075664_0004. NHSX was a unit of NHS England and the Department of Health and Social Care, responsible for setting policy and developing best practice for NHS technology, digital and data, including data-sharing and transparency.

¶4.82. Professor Ferguson described this SAGE meeting as "a significant pivot towards advising rapid introduction of more intensive" interventions, driven by two factors:

The existing approach "would lead to overwhelming healthcare demand and … such an outcome was now viewed by government as unacceptable".
"[P]reliminary surveillance data … suggested the epidemic was significantly more advanced in the UK than previously thought."¹⁷⁹¹⁷⁹ INQ000249526_0072 para 221

¶Professor Whitty similarly told the Inquiry that SAGE's advice from 16 March 2020 was "extremely clear: that without action we were going to be in very deep trouble".¹⁸⁰¹⁸⁰ Christopher Whitty 21 November 2023 26/2-7

¶4.83. Mr Johnson chaired the COBR meeting convened at 15:15 on 16 March 2020 to approve the package of further interventions to slow the spread of the virus that had been agreed at the UK government meeting he had chaired the previous day.¹⁸¹¹⁸¹ INQ000056183_0001 It was attended by leaders from the devolved administrations as well as, for the first time, Sadiq Khan (later Sir Sadiq Khan), Mayor of London from May 2016. Professor Whitty advised that the UK:

" was now at the cusp of a fast upward swing of the infection curve. On the basis of the NHS capacity model, further action should be taken."¹⁸²¹⁸² INQ000056210_0004 para 1

¶4.84. A commonly recognised information picture (CRIP) presented to COBR advised the implementation of a package that had been worked up the previous day. The package consisted of household isolation and 'soft' social distancing for the whole population (through encouraging people to work from home and limit their social mixing), particularly for those aged over 70, those with long-term medical conditions and pregnant women.¹⁸³¹⁸³ INQ000056184_0005 It also advised that shielding for the most vulnerable be implemented in England within the next week and that public services support should no longer be provided for mass gatherings, which would be advised not to go ahead.¹⁸⁴¹⁸⁴ INQ000056184_0005; INQ000056210_0004 para 3 It advised "no change recommended for now" in respect of school closures.¹⁸⁵¹⁸⁵ INQ000056184_0006 COBR approved the recommended package.¹⁸⁶¹⁸⁶ INQ000056210_0004, 0008 paras 2, 3, 14; INQ000056184_0005

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¶4.85. That evening, at a 10 Downing Street press conference, Mr Johnson told the public:

¶" [ W]e need to go further, because according to SAGE, it looks as though we're

now approaching the fast growth part of the upward curve. And without drastic action, cases could double every 5 or 6 days."¹⁸⁷¹⁸⁷ 'Prime Minister's statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 16 March 2020', Prime Minister's Office and Boris Johnson, 16 March 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-coronavirus-16-march-2020; INQ000052566_0002)

¶He announced the package of restrictions approved at COBR earlier that day, including:

household quarantine for 14 days when any member of a household had one of two symptoms – a high temperature or a new and continuous cough; and
advice to the public to stop "non-essential contact with others and to stop all unnecessary travel" as well as working from home where possible and avoiding pubs, clubs, theatres and other such social venues.¹⁸⁸¹⁸⁸ 'Prime Minister's statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 16 March 2020', Prime Minister's Office and Boris Johnson, 16 March 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-coronavirus-16-march-2020; INQ000052566_0002)

¶" the right moment, as we've always said, is to do it when it is most effective, when

we think it can make the biggest difference to slowing the spread of the disease, reducing the number of victims, reducing the number of fatalities".¹⁹¹¹⁹¹ 'Prime Minister's statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 16 March 2020', Prime Minister's Office and Boris Johnson, 16 March 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-coronavirus-16-march-2020; INQ000052566_0003)

¶4.87. People in London – which was said to now be "a few weeks ahead" – were asked to "pay special attention" to the guidance about social distancing.¹⁹²¹⁹² 'Prime Minister's statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 16 March 2020', Prime Minister's Office and Boris Johnson, 16 March 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-coronavirus-16-march-2020; INQ000052566_0003) Mr Johnson also explained that, from 17 March 2020, mass gatherings would no longer be supported by the emergency services in England.¹⁹³¹⁹³ 'Prime Minister's statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 16 March 2020', Prime Minister's Office and Boris Johnson, 16 March 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-coronavirus-16-march-2020; INQ000052566_0003) He stated:

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¶" [I]t is far more now than just washing your hands – though clearly washing your hands remains important."¹⁹⁴¹⁹⁴ 'Prime Minister's statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 16 March 2020', Prime Minister's Office and Boris Johnson, 16 March 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-coronavirus-16-march-2020; INQ000052566_0003)

¶4.88. Similar announcements were made across the UK that day. Ms Sturgeon advised people to avoid crowded areas and gatherings, including hospitality settings, and to avoid public transport as much as possible.¹⁹⁵¹⁹⁵ 'People advised to limit social contact', Scottish Government, 16 March 2020 (https://www.gov.scot/news/people-advised-to-limit-social-contact; INQ000548030) Working from home was recommended wherever possible. In Northern Ireland, The Executive Office announced the package of measures.¹⁹⁶¹⁹⁶ 'Statement from the Executive on Covid-19 response', The Executive Office, 16 March 2020 (https://www.executiveoffice-ni.gov.uk/news/statement-executive-covid-19-response; INQ000114480) In Wales, Mr Drakeford announced these new restrictions on 17 March 2020, following the announcement of the first death in Wales due to Covid-19 on 16 March.¹⁹⁷¹⁹⁷ INQ000271921; 'Chief Medical Officer for Wales announces death of first COVID-19 patient in Wales', Welsh Government, 16 March 2020 (https://www.gov.wales/chief-medical-officer-wales-announces-death-first-covid-19-patient-wales; INQ000048732_0001)

¶4.89. Professor Whitty told the Inquiry that he advised the UK government that SAGE was "strongly in favour" of this package of restrictions.¹⁹⁸¹⁹⁸ INQ000251645_0094-0095 para 7.104 He explained that they represented:

¶" a very major policy shift and a substantial move away from the personal

philosophy of the Prime Minister … It was also a major departure from the assumed policy of the previous planning for an influenza pandemic."¹⁹⁹¹⁹⁹ INQ000251645_0093-0094 para 7.100

¶He noted that the restrictions announced on 16 March 2020 were the "start of the Government's efforts to make a strong push for a reduction in social interactions", rather than those subsequently announced on 23 March.²⁰⁰²⁰⁰ INQ000251645_0093-0094 para 7.100

¶4.90. Mass gatherings should have been stopped before this point. Professor Vallance told the Inquiry that, on reflection, mass gatherings:

¶" should have been stopped earlier together with instructions about smaller indoor meetings and gatherings in pubs and clubs".²⁰¹²⁰¹ INQ000238826_0195-0196 para 597

¶Professor Sir Jonathan Van-Tam, Deputy Chief Medical Officer for England from October 2017 to March 2022, agreed that the continuation of mass gatherings was "unhelpful".²⁰²²⁰² Jonathan Van-Tam 22 November 2023 202/9 Professor Whitty said that, with hindsight, he would approach the issue of mass gatherings differently.²⁰³²⁰³ Christopher Whitty 21 November 2023 189/25-190/1-2 He stated that scientific advice on mass gatherings missed the important point that allowing these gatherings to go ahead "signalled to the general public that the government couldn't be that worried" and gave an impression of "normality at a time that what you're trying to signal is anything but normality".²⁰⁴²⁰⁴ Christopher Whitty 21 November 2023 189/13-24; INQ000251645_0087-0088 para 7.81 He also observed that scientific advice "likely underestimated the risk involved in travel to and from venues and in getting into the venue itself".²⁰⁵²⁰⁵ INQ000251645_0087-0088 para 7.81

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¶Professor McBride, who told the Inquiry that his advice to the Minister of Health in

¶Northern Ireland had been aligned with SAGE's recommendations, made similar observations.²⁰⁶²⁰⁶ INQ000421704_0098 paras 207-208; Michael McBride 10 May 2024 138/4-15

¶4.91. Mr Johnson conceded in hindsight that, while he followed scientific advice on mass gatherings, the UK government perhaps ought to have cancelled them "as a symbol of the government's earnestness".²⁰⁷²⁰⁷ Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 117/6-8, 118/20-23 Ms Sturgeon noted that the rugby match of 8 March 2020 had taken place the weekend before that announcement was made and noted: "[I]f I have a regret it is not that I took the decision too early, it's that we took it too late."²⁰⁸²⁰⁸ Nicola Sturgeon 31 January 2024 145/17-20 Reflecting on the Welsh Government's decision not to intervene in relation to the Scotland versus Wales Six Nations match originally scheduled for 14 March 2020, Mr Gething told the Inquiry: "[I]n all of the awkward choices we made that is definitely one that jars and I recognise that."²⁰⁹²⁰⁹ Vaughan Gething 11 March 2024 109/8-10

¶4.92. While scientific advice was clear that mass gatherings would not make a significant contribution to the spread of Covid-19, this advice did not sufficiently take into account the epidemiological risks of travel to and from events, which, for the majority of people, would be on (usually crowded) public transport. Nor did it sufficiently take into account the risks associated with groups socialising indoors before or after the event or watching the event on television in pubs.²¹⁰²¹⁰ INQ000061512_0003 para 5; INQ000052045_0003 para 8; INQ000061519_0004 paras 14-15 Further, it underestimated the importance of the message to the public to avoid unnecessary social contact. In any event, given the spread of the virus and that its containment had effectively been lost, it was wrong for the four governments not to prevent mass gatherings going ahead in March 2020 when Covid-19 was already circulating in the community. This sent the wrong message of normality at a critical point in the pandemic response.

¶4.93. On the evening of 16 March 2020, 10 Downing Street officials and advisers discussed the lack of centrally held plans in the UK government.²¹¹²¹¹ INQ000272142 Two days earlier, Munira Mirza (Director at the 10 Downing Street Policy Unit from July 2019 to February 2022) had emailed Clare Brunton (Private Secretary at 10 Downing Street), asking whether the Civil Contingencies Secretariat had a detailed civil contingencies plan for the response, as well as the NHS plan.²¹²²¹² INQ000272142_0002 On 16 March, Ms Brunton told Ms Mirza, Dr Warner, Mr Cummings and other 10 Downing Street officials:

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" Apparently departments hold their own detailed civil contingencies plans, as well as their business continuity plans. We do not have these centrally. The NHS also hold their own plans. CCS [the Civil Contingencies Secretariat] are working with DHSC to get appropriate sight of this."²¹³²¹³ INQ000272142_0001

¶In response, Dr Warner asked whether this meant "that the department of health haven't seen the NHS plans yet?"²¹⁴²¹⁴ INQ000272142_0001

¶4.94. Ms MacNamara told the Inquiry that she was still not sure whether the plans did exist somewhere, but, if they did, they "didn't exist in a way that was usable" by the Cabinet Office to coordinate the response.²¹⁵²¹⁵ Helen MacNamara 1 November 2023 23/23-24/17; INQ000273841_0016-0017 para 31 Mr Cummings described this as "shocking":

" This was another terrible sign fundamental things were broken: how could CCS not have seen departmental pandemic plans by 16/3?"²¹⁶²¹⁶ INQ000273872_0053 para 232 (emphasis in original)

¶The Inquiry agrees with Mr Cummings: it is astonishing that bodies like the Civil

¶Contingencies Secretariat and the Cabinet Office, which were charged with coordinating the response, still did not have sight of departmental civil contingency plans by the time the UK government had been advised to implement stringent restrictions.