The situation at the end of December 2021

The situation at the end of December 2021

¶8.160. Professor Vallance described the advice of SAGE in December 2021 as a "deeply worrying development".⁴⁵⁶⁴⁵⁶ INQ000238826_0150-0151 para 454 He said:

" It is easy with retrospect to dismiss these concerns as being overblown, primarily because we now know that the disease caused by Omicron in those with Covid-19 immunity proved to be, for most, relatively mild in a well vaccinated population."⁴⁵⁷⁴⁵⁷ INQ000238826_0150-0151 para 454

¶That was not known at the time, nor "was there good reason to assume that this would be the case".⁴⁵⁸⁴⁵⁸ INQ000238826_0150-0151 para 454

¶8.161. As Professor McBride observed in any event with regard to severity:

" Even if the number of people experiencing severe disease was less, as the CSA [Chief Scientific Adviser] and I said at the time in advice to the Executive on the number that may require hospital care 'a small percentage of a very large number is still a large number'."⁴⁵⁹⁴⁵⁹ INQ000421704_0229-0230 para 496

¶8.162. Mr Johnson said that he:

" now had the confidence to resist. By this stage of the pandemic, despite not being a scientist, I had looked at so much data that I felt I was getting better at understanding where it would go. I had a fascination with the South African data and felt that, given the date of vaccination and booster rollout, the rate of Omicron would spike soon and fall away."⁴⁶⁰⁴⁶⁰ INQ000255836_0182-0183 para 627

¶Similarly, Mr Sunak and others were "sceptical of the case for further restrictions".⁴⁶¹⁴⁶¹ INQ000263374_0142 para 529

¶8.163. In contrast, Sir Frank Atherton told the Inquiry that, in December 2021, he did not "know an awful lot" about the Omicron variant – he understood it was highly transmissible but that "the severity of the illness that it would cause" was unknown. He said:

" I was pessimistic but my pessimism was unjustified, and so we were lucky. But sometimes it's better to be wise than lucky."⁴⁶²⁴⁶² Frank Atherton 4 March 2024 57/2-19

¶8.164. The scientific advisers were best placed to judge the threat posed by the Omicron variant, although that does not mean that decision-makers were bound to follow their advice. There were compelling competing interests. Professor Whitty noted, however, that a "strong narrative developed among some that this was just a trivial infection and nothing to worry about".⁴⁶³⁴⁶³ INQ000251645_0161 para 8.115 Both he and Professor Vallance are correct in emphasising that this was not borne out in the data. The Omicron variant was not much less dangerous than the earlier variants. It was also not a trivial infection for many, particularly the elderly and those who developed Long Covid.⁴⁶⁴⁴⁶⁴ INQ000236456; INQ000236457

¶8.165. The UK government's approach in this period was, once again, overly optimistic. The greatest strategic risk was a variant that evaded natural and vaccine-induced immunity. The Omicron variant was potentially exactly that. Had it been so, Plan B would have been insufficient to meet the risk. The sheer number of infections demonstrates that, if vaccines were less effective or the Omicron variant had been as severe as previous variants in terms of morbidity and mortality, the numbers of deaths would have likely exceeded the earlier waves in the absence of another lockdown.

¶8.166. The measures taken by the Scottish Government on a precautionary basis in December 2021 were a reasonable step, in light of the emerging threat.⁴⁶⁵⁴⁶⁵ INQ000369765_0063 para 371 Mass self-testing was delivered by making free lateral flow tests available to the whole population of Scotland from late 2021, which allowed people to manage their own risk effectively by changing their behaviour when testing positive.⁴⁶⁶⁴⁶⁶ 'Coronavirus (COVID-19): Modelling the epidemic in Scotland (issue no. 88)', Scottish Government, 3 February 2022 (https://www.gov.scot/publications/coronavirus-covid-19-modelling-epidemic-issue-no-88/documents; INQ000369763); INQ000369765_0064 para 376

¶8.167. The Welsh Government also reintroduced restrictions, culminating in a move to Alert Level 2 from 26 December 2021. When case rates and, consequently, death rates began to rise throughout the autumn, it communicated its plans to the public, setting reasonable expectations that restrictions might need quickly to be reimposed if a highly transmissible new variant was identified or vaccine immunity began to wane. The Welsh Government had learned lessons from the failed responses of 2020. The booster vaccine was proving effective at protecting against severe disease for the most vulnerable. However, in light of gaps in data concerning the more general efficacy of vaccines and increasing pressures on the NHS, the introduction of some restrictions was sensible given the possible risks posed by this new variant and the Welsh Government's stated objective of not overwhelming the NHS. While the response during this period was assisted by the uptake of the vaccine and by the Omicron variant being less severe than may otherwise have been the case, the Welsh Government had clearly articulated objectives in 2021 – that restrictions must be linked to keeping cases at a manageable level without overwhelming the NHS – and it took the public with it during this period through regularly communicating its plans and potential responses. Its decisions remained linked to its objectives.

¶8.168. The decision of the Northern Ireland Executive to introduce precautionary measures at the end of December 2021 was a reasonable and appropriate course in the circumstances. Throughout November and December 2021, the rate of new Covid-19 cases in Northern Ireland had increased and health service pressures were ongoing. The clear advice of the Chief Medical Officer and Chief Scientific Adviser at that time was that additional measures were required immediately after Christmas in order to avoid the health service coming under severe pressure. The Executive Committee acted decisively and proactively upon receipt of the medical and scientific advice in December 2021. The decisions taken by the Executive Committee at this juncture demonstrate that the Northern Ireland Executive had, to some extent, learned important and necessary lessons from its management of the earlier waves.

¶8.169. The Inquiry is not persuaded by the suggestion that the Welsh and Scottish

governments' ability to make decisions had to be viewed in the context of the UK government refusing to make additional funding available. The minutes of the COBR meeting on 15 December 2021 record that there would be a review of "DA [devolved administration] funding" before Christmas.⁴⁶⁷⁴⁶⁷ INQ000083855_0004 para 4 The Treasury would necessarily require time to do this. Additional funding was confirmed just days later on 20 December. In any event, both the Welsh and Scottish governments had access to their own funds if further measures were deemed appropriate.