Introduction by The Rt Hon the Baroness Hallett DBE

¶The Covid-19 virus spread around the world rapidly and caused untold misery and suffering. The number of deaths across the UK for which the virus was responsible – calculated by whether Covid-19 is mentioned on the death certificate – is now over 230,000. This appalling loss of life resulted from the virus spreading across the UK in three successive waves. The devastating socio-economic consequences resulted both from the virus and from the decisions taken to respond to it.

¶This, the second report of the UK Covid-19 Inquiry, focuses on those decisions.

¶As democratically elected leaders, politicians were entitled to draw their own conclusions as to how to balance the ethical, public health, social and economic challenges posed by Covid-19. In this Report, I have considered whether their decisions were reasonable and justifiable in light of the information that was then known, or which ought to have been known, to determine if things could have been done better and to learn lessons for the future.

¶In doing so, I bear very much in mind that, in trying to stem the spread of the virus, politicians in the UK government and the devolved administrations were faced with unenviable choices. There were few, if any, easy decisions for them to make. The decisions to impose stringent social restrictions, including most obviously the lockdown decisions, gave rise to agonising dilemmas and were highly controversial. They were also taken under conditions of extreme pressure and often without access to data or a full understanding of the epidemiological position. Such an understanding is vital to any response to a pandemic.

¶Most importantly, politicians across the UK found themselves having to take decisions in the context of the UK lacking resilience and being ill prepared.

¶In its first report, relating to Module 1 on the resilience and preparedness of the UK, the Inquiry examined the state of the UK's central structures and procedures for pandemic emergency preparedness, resilience and response. It concluded that the UK was ill prepared for dealing with a catastrophic emergency, let alone the coronavirus pandemic that actually struck. In particular, it found that there were fatal strategic flaws underpinning the assessment of the risks faced by the UK. The UK government's sole pandemic strategy, from 2011, was outdated and lacked adaptability.

¶As a result, there was a damaging absence of focus on the measures, interventions and infrastructure required in the event of a pandemic – in particular, a system that could be scaled up to test, trace and isolate. The Inquiry recommended fundamental reform of the way in which the UK government and the devolved administrations prepare for whole-system civil emergencies.

¶Such reform is vital. Had the UK been better prepared, fewer lives would have been lost, the socio-economic costs would have been substantially reduced and some of the decisions politicians had to take would have been far more straightforward.

¶The decisions that politicians were forced to take were further complicated by the UK devolution settlements. This was primarily a health emergency and health is a devolved matter, but three of the nations of the UK form a single epidemiological unit (Great Britain). The other, Northern Ireland, forms an epidemiological unit with the Republic of Ireland. Whatever steps each government took, they were bound to be affected by the decisions taken elsewhere in the UK and by constant cross-border travel. In addition, the devolved administrations were generally reliant on the UK government for funding to support their emergency response.

¶Initially, the UK government and the devolved administrations followed the same path in responding to the pandemic but, in the summer of 2020, they began to diverge. This might not have been surprising, given the devolution settlement and the different characteristics of the four nations, but it did lead to difficulties for the people of the UK as they sought to comply with restrictions that varied around the UK – and it caused political controversy. This Report will examine those differences in approach and, where appropriate, compare them.

¶Some past public inquiries have provided definitive accounts of every aspect of the particular disaster, tragedy, other momentous event or government policy into which they were charged to inquire. However, as I observed in the Introduction to the Inquiry's first report, the Covid-19 pandemic – and the response to it from the UK government and the devolved administrations – was the most complex and multi-layered emergency to have struck the UK in peacetime. No inquiry, however large or however long, could possibly or sensibly inquire into every part of it. This Report does not seek to address every relevant decision or provide a historical record of everything that happened. It is focused on the key issues and decisions taken during the almost two and a half years of the pandemic, in order to identify the critical lessons to be learned for future pandemics or other civil emergencies.

¶Other modules of this Inquiry and their reports will consider specific aspects of the governments' response in more detail. At the time of publication of this Report, there have been public hearings in Module 3 (Impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on healthcare systems in the four nations of the UK), Module 4 (Vaccines and therapeutics), Module 5 (Procurement), Module 6 (Care sector), Module 7 (Test, trace and isolate) and Module 8 (Children and young people). Hearings will take place shortly in relation to Module 9 (Economic response) and Module 10 (Impact on society, which has a particular focus on key workers, the most vulnerable, the bereaved, mental health and wellbeing).

¶The speed and thoroughness with which the momentous events and decisions have been examined, from the emergence of Covid-19 in January 2020 until the final restrictions were lifted in May 2022, reflect a mammoth undertaking for the Module 2 (UK government), 2A (Scottish Government), 2B (Welsh Government) and 2C (Northern Ireland Executive) teams.

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¶During the investigation phase, there was an extensive and complex process of obtaining more than 2 million potentially relevant documents from a wide range of sources. This material was then examined by the Inquiry team and in excess of 180,000 documents were deemed to be relevant. These were disclosed to the 53 Core Participants to assist them in their preparation for the public hearings, which took place over 69 days and during which 166 witnesses were examined.

¶This reflects the enormously hard work of a large number of people, and I wish to express my gratitude to all those who have given so much of their time and resources to assisting the Inquiry. In particular, I am very grateful to the Core Participants and their legal teams, especially the groups representing bereaved people, for their helpful contributions to the Inquiry process. I would also like to thank the teams (both secretariat and legal) in Modules 2, 2A, 2B and 2C, without whose hard work, diligence and dedication the hearings and this Report would not have been possible.

¶Finally, I should like to thank those who have given evidence and those who have contributed to the Inquiry's listening exercise, Every Story Matters, and to the moving films played at each hearing about the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on them and their loved ones. They have shown great courage. Their accounts not only help me and inform the Inquiry's work, but also serve as a constant reminder of why the work of this Inquiry is so important.

¶The Rt Hon the Baroness Hallett DBE

¶20 November 2025

Voices

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¶" Five days after Daddy went into hospital we had to get the police to break into my mum's house because she was unconscious in bed. She was rushed to the same hospital and she would test positive when she got there. My dad died on the 10th of May. The day we buried Daddy, we were waiting for a phone call because that was the day they thought Mummy was going to die. But she died the next day. So we buried them three days apart."¹¹ UK Covid-19 Inquiry, Module 2C Hearing AM, 30 April 2024, module opening impact film, 14:16-14:54 (https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/video/UC9eFdKVwD1ARs3j9BSoGndw/dP1iAC3Khug)

¶Fiona Humphries, Northern Ireland Covid-19 Bereaved Families for Justice

¶" I feel that my mother was getting more and more nervous going into the second lockdown. I feel the Government were on TV every day talking about all these different things and there was no equality for her as an elderly lady. The elderly were not considered. It was a case of 'keep away from the elderly and vulnerable to protect them' meanwhile other people were in and out of each other's bubbles and houses. There was no consideration for the elderly. I feel they were just numbers. My mum caught covid and died in the hospital."²² INQ000279972_0006 para 32

¶Member of Scottish Covid Bereaved

¶" [My mother] said 'No I'm too afraid to go to the hospital, you know, if i haven't got it and it's just a really, really bad flu, then I'm going to end up with it, I don't want to be on my own' she said. So she was too afraid to go to the hospital."³³ Amanda Provis 28 February 2024 29/7-13

¶Amanda Provis, Covid-19 Bereaved Families for Justice Cymru, whose mother died the following day

¶" I think I immediately found it very difficult to grieve. Not in the traditional sense, in terms of the funeral, obviously that was not available to us but I found it very hard emotionally to feel the – to go through the natural emotional process of grieving, because I think what was blocking me was that I felt very strongly that his death was not an inevitability."⁴⁴ Joanna Goodman 4 October 2023 116/13-19

¶Joanna Goodman, co-founder of Covid-19 Bereaved Families for Justice