Local restrictions: England and Scotland

England

¶6.121. As discussed above, local restrictions, in the form of local lockdowns, were implemented across England from 4 July 2020 in accordance with the COVID-19 Contain Framework: A Guide for Local Decision-Makers. Professor Whitty expressed his view that, on balance, local lockdowns "did more good than harm … but it was a very far from perfect tool".²⁸⁵²⁸⁵ INQ000251645_0125 para 8.31 Professor Vallance did "not think the local lockdowns worked well", as people in the areas in which restrictions were proposed could travel with ease to nearby areas that were not subject to restrictions. This, in turn, led to spread of the virus between geographical regions.²⁸⁶²⁸⁶ INQ000238826_0112-0113 para 340 The other problem was that "lower prevalence areas were usually just at an earlier stage of an exponential curve and would quickly 'catch up'". He explained:

" Local lockdowns coupled with better use of effective testing, contact tracing and isolation … in lower prevalence areas that were not locked down might have worked."²⁸⁷²⁸⁷ INQ000238826_0112-0113 para 340

¶6.122. As Mr Hancock commented, this model of localised action had:

" created a complex patchwork of bespoke regulations and guidance which could be perceived as inconsistent, not readily understood by the public and often hard to enforce".²⁸⁸²⁸⁸ INQ000232194_0131-0132 para 521

¶His view was that "the local lockdown system, while working, needed to be strengthened and simplified".²⁸⁹²⁸⁹ INQ000232194_0127, 0131-0132 paras 508, 521

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¶6.123. Leicester, the first place to enter localised restrictions, exemplifies this complexity. From July 2020 – in contrast to the rest of the country – the "protected area" of the City of Leicester and the surrounding area (as defined by a list of postcode districts) was subject to a range of restrictions. Non-essential businesses (with a few exceptions) had to remain closed; most leisure and recreational facilities had to remain closed; food and drink establishments were not permitted to make sales for consumption on the premises; and places of worship could open for individual private prayer only. There were also restrictions on households mixing. After 14 days, two areas were removed from the protected area.²⁹⁰²⁹⁰ The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (Leicester) (Amendment) Regulations 2020 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/754) Six days later, non-essential retail was permitted to reopen.²⁹¹²⁹¹ The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (Leicester) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2020 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/787/made) After a further eight days, another borough was removed from the protected area, limiting it solely to the City of Leicester.²⁹²²⁹² The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (Leicester) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2020 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/823/contents) Two days later, on 3 August 2020, all Leicester regulations were repealed and replaced by restrictions on gatherings in private dwellings, which were followed by further amendments during August and September 2020.²⁹³²⁹³ The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (Leicester) (No. 2) Regulations 2020 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ uksi/2020/824/contents); see also, for example, The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (Blackburn with Darwen and Bradford, Leicester, and North of England) (Amendment) Regulations 2020 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/954/contents); The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (Leicester) (No. 2) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2020 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/987/contents)Show full note

¶6.124. The system for local lockdowns in England was subsequently codified into a tiers‑based approach. On 21 September 2020, Covid-O endorsed a "three tiered approach, with interventions increasing in severity going up the tiers".²⁹⁴²⁹⁴ INQ000090177_0008-0009 This proposal was not, however, implemented until 12 October 2020.²⁹⁵²⁹⁵ 'Prime Minister's statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 12 October 2020', Prime Minister's Office and Boris Johnson, 12 October 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-statement-on-coronavirus-covid-19-12-october-2020; INQ000075749_0001-0003) The three tiers were as follows:

Tier 1 (Local Alert Level: Medium) consisted of the measures that were announced by Mr Johnson on 22 September 2020.
Tier 2 (Local Alert Level: High) additionally prohibited household mixing indoors, with exceptions for support or childcare 'bubbles' and guidance to reduce unnecessary travel.
Tier 3 (Local Alert Level: Very High) included all the restrictions in Tiers 1 and 2, plus a baseline of: – prohibiting social mixing indoors and in private gardens, with the rule of six to apply in public spaces; – the closure of hospitality settings (with takeaway and food delivery services to remain open); – the closure of indoor leisure, entertainment and personal care services; and

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– prohibiting weddings and standalone ceremonies (unless they involved a single household) and allowing a maximum of 30 people at funerals.²⁹⁶²⁹⁶ INQ000234082_0003

¶Local areas could "request to go further than this baseline by, for example, imposing restrictions on the leisure, entertainment or personal care sectors".²⁹⁷²⁹⁷ INQ000234082_0003 para 9 However, they would not be permitted to close non-essential retail, schools or universities. Nor would they be able to reinstate the two-metre social distancing rule.²⁹⁸²⁹⁸ INQ000234082_0003

¶6.125. On 9 October 2020, the UK government began to negotiate Tier 3 restrictions with the areas with the highest prevalence of Covid-19.²⁹⁹²⁹⁹ INQ000237819_0017 para 33 Mr Hancock considered it to be "vanishingly unlikely" that local leaders would impose the full set of measures within Tier 3.³⁰⁰³⁰⁰ INQ000232194_0137-0138 para 538 In a meeting with Mr Johnson the following day, Mr Hancock voiced his doubt that local leaders would take responsibility for severe economic measures. He argued that the package "needed to be tougher and geographically wider to bring infection rates down".³⁰¹³⁰¹ INQ000252869_0001 Mr Gove expressed similar concerns.³⁰²³⁰² INQ000259848_0053 para 101

¶6.126. Following negotiations with Steve Rotheram, Mayor of the Liverpool City Region from May 2017, Liverpool was immediately placed under Tier 3 restrictions when the system came into effect on 14 October 2020.³⁰³³⁰³ INQ000249818_0004 para 11

¶6.127. In contrast, discussions concerning Greater Manchester were particularly acrimonious. Andy Burnham, Mayor of Greater Manchester from May 2017, described "2 weeks of meetings and intense disagreement with Ministers". He made multiple requests for additional funding to support those in the area who were most affected by the measures. Those requests were denied and the UK government unilaterally moved Greater Manchester into Tier 3 on 23 October 2020. Mr Burnham stated:

" In our view, Ministers were asking us to gamble our resident's [sic] jobs, homes, businesses, and a large chunk of our economy on a strategy that their own experts were telling them might not work."³⁰⁴³⁰⁴ INQ000216991_0028-0029 paras 93, 96

¶6.128. Sir Edward Udny-Lister (later Lord Udny-Lister), Chief Strategic Adviser to the Prime Minister from July 2019 to November 2020 and Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister from November 2020 to February 2021, referred to the protracted nature of the negotiation process. He observed that negotiators:

" had to engage with local political leaders, then local officials and then again with local political leaders in over twenty local authorities".³⁰⁵³⁰⁵ INQ000090266_0006

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¶Lord Udny-Lister described the Tier 3 negotiations to the Inquiry as:

¶" tense … the local authorities did not want to close their hospitality industry down.

¶It had only just started to get back on its feet."³⁰⁶³⁰⁶ Edward Udny-Lister 7 November 2023 197/10-13

¶6.129. Negotiations contributed to significant delays in implementation. On 27 October 2020, Professor Van-Tam informed Covid-O that the process of moving areas into Tier 3 was taking too long. Despite Nottingham having been "epidemiologically ready" for Tier 3 for the previous 10 days, the move had not yet been implemented. Given that the number of daily infections was doubling every 10 to 15 days, this delay was "disastrous" in public health terms.³⁰⁷³⁰⁷ INQ000090164_0004-0005; INQ000075012_0002

¶6.130. SAGE was not consulted on the tiers policy before it was implemented, but Professors Vallance and Whitty had repeatedly alerted core decision-makers to its flaws:³⁰⁸³⁰⁸ INQ000238826_0128 para 382

On 9 October 2020, Professor Whitty warned that Tier 3 measures were "likely to be neither significant enough to achieve a time limited firebreak, nor prolonged enough to maintain control albeit at a higher level".³⁰⁹³⁰⁹ INQ000229676_0002 Professors Whitty and Vallance set out two options that they considered had a "reasonable chance" of meeting the UK government's strategic goals. One was a package of interventions sufficient to reduce R to 1 or below in areas with rapidly rising transmission, which would remain in place for up to six months. The other was circuit breaker measures for a defined period of two to four weeks, which had a high chance of pushing R below 1 and could mean that fewer long-term measures would be required.³¹⁰³¹⁰ INQ000229676
On 11 October 2020, Professor Vallance told Covid-O that the Tier 3 baseline measures were "highly unlikely" to bring R below 1. In order to "stand a chance", it would be necessary to impose the full set of measures. Professor Whitty agreed.³¹¹³¹¹ INQ000090163_0005 In emails to the Cabinet Office, they emphasised that Tier 3 was "insufficient to make a real impact" and had the "potential for many loopholes".³¹²³¹² INQ000062726
On 12 October 2020, Professors Whitty and Vallance reiterated their advice to COBR. Professor Vallance again raised the idea of a circuit breaker.³¹³³¹³ INQ000083851_0005, 0008 At a subsequent press conference, Professor Whitty stated that the Tier 3 baseline measures "will not be sufficient, I think that is very clearly the professional view".³¹⁴³¹⁴ INQ000236412_0003

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¶6.131. Professor Vallance had "no doubt" that this advice was understood within government.³¹⁵³¹⁵ INQ000238826_0128-0129 para 383 In his personal evening notes on 11 October 2020, he recorded his frustration at:

" [b]eing asked to 'approve the measures knowing that it is not enough' … This is a massive abrogation of responsibility."³¹⁶³¹⁶ INQ000273901_0220

¶6.132. Mr Johnson told the Inquiry that, although he could "see the force" of the scientific arguments, he remained of the view that tiering was "worth a try".³¹⁷³¹⁷ INQ000255836_0155 para 549 The UK government's decision to implement the tier proposals, as drafted by the Covid-19 Taskforce, had gone directly against the advice of its most senior scientific advisers.

¶6.133. As predicted, incidence continued to grow rapidly across England.³¹⁸³¹⁸ INQ000087467_0001; INQ000061572_0003; INQ000183990_0012; INQ000090298_0001 On 17 October 2020, Professor Vallance recorded in his contemporaneous evening notes that he had received a WhatsApp message from Mr Cummings "a few days back", which read:

¶" This is a shitshow. We should have gone a month ago as we said."³¹⁹³¹⁹ INQ000273901_0233

¶6.134. On 21 October 2020, SPI-M-O noted that prevalence in most regions of England was now too high for a circuit breaker to be effective.³²⁰³²⁰ INQ000213277_0006 para 25 By 29 October, Mr Hancock had "come to the view that the tiers system, as introduced, had failed".³²¹³²¹ INQ000232194_0142 para 554

¶6.135. The tiers framework was an attempt by the UK government to simplify the previous local approach and to find a balance between a full England-wide lockdown and an unconstrained epidemic. However, the system suffered from a number of significant flaws:

The minimum package of measures for Tier 3 was neither sufficiently stringent nor long-lasting to bring R below 1.
Areas that were in lower tiers and subject to weaker restrictions saw rapidly increasing case rates. It was not until prevalence was high and hospitals were under strain in those areas that action was taken. This would inevitably lead to all local authorities having high incidence rates, which, as Professor Edmunds observed, equated to an "epidemiological levelling-up".³²²³²² INQ000273553_0068 para 10.23

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The negotiation process with local leaders was complex, time-consuming and politically divisive.³²³³²³ INQ000269203_0104 para 7.35 The crippling economic effects of restrictions meant that local leaders were motivated to prevent their area from being moved to a higher tier. This fractious atmosphere was exacerbated by the fact that case levels often varied between boroughs within a local authority, such as in Greater Manchester.³²⁴³²⁴ INQ000216991_0032 para 107; INQ000232194_0140 para 545

¶6.136. SPI-M-O subsequently analysed the impact of the tiers framework on viral transmission in England. It confirmed that Tier 1 measures alone were not sufficient to prevent the epidemic from growing rapidly. If R in a particular area was slightly above 1 and Tier 2 restrictions were implemented, these could "theoretically be just enough" to drive R below 1. If R was 1.1 or greater, the imposition of Tier 2 measures was "barely adequate" to stop epidemic growth and was "unlikely to turn epidemic growth rates negative". It was unclear whether baseline Tier 3 restrictions alone were sufficient at a regional or national level to reduce R below 1.³²⁵³²⁵ INQ000071722_0001-0003 paras 2, 4, 9

¶6.137. As Professor Whitty summarised, the tiers:

" were often a bit too late, not quite stringent enough to get R below 1, and too geographically circumscribed to have the effect needed".³²⁶³²⁶ INQ000251645_0142 para 8.61

¶Had the tiers framework been implemented more robustly in early September 2020 – when incidence was lower – it would have stood a greater chance of success. In turn, it might have been possible to avert a second England-wide lockdown. By mid-October 2020, however, it was too late.

¶6.138. Mr Johnson told the Inquiry that, with hindsight, he did not think local measures were the correct approach and that restrictions should have been introduced either UK-wide or not at all. He explained that the system involved a myriad of different rules, which people found confusing. He stated: "[I]f I have one 'takeaway' to offer from the pandemic, it is that I think the best approach is a UK-wide one."³²⁷³²⁷ INQ000255836_0148 para 529

Scotland

¶6.139. In late September 2020, the Scottish Government's advisers were also considering the introduction of a tiers system. On 27 September, a briefing noted that a 'levels' system could reduce the complexity of decision-making and communication. It recommended a five-levels approach – a baseline plus four levels of restrictions.³²⁸³²⁸ INQ000429240

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¶6.140. On 5 October 2020, the Scottish Government Covid-19 Advisory Group met to discuss proposals for additional measures in the context of rising case and hospitalisation rates.³²⁹³²⁹ 'Coronavirus (COVID-19) update: First Minister's speech 5 October 2020', Scottish Government, 5 October 2020 (https://www.gov.scot/publications/coronavirus-covid-19-update-first-ministers-speech-5-october-2020; INQ000354262) As within the UK government, there were concerns about circuit breaker measures, including the absence of an exit strategy that would ensure such circuit breakers were not needed repeatedly:

" Unless something changes we will … simply yo-yo in and out of restrictions. Frequent changing of restrictions is likely to lead to increased public confusion and may burn up public goodwill."³³⁰³³⁰ INQ000217915_0006

¶6.141. The Scottish Cabinet met on 6 and 7 October 2020 to discuss possible new measures, including the possibility of a two-week circuit breaker to stem the escalation of cases.³³¹³³¹ 'Covid in Scotland: Sturgeon to meet advisers over further restrictions', BBC News, 5 October 2020 (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-54415973; INQ000360171) The Cabinet noted that, in contrast to the position in March 2020, any measures would need to be considered against "the backdrop of seven months of damage to the economy" and the need to "ensure that non-COVID health harms were also tackled" in accordance with the four harms framework (see Chapter 11: Government decision-making, in Volume II).³³²³³² INQ000214451_0003 para 9 The Cabinet decided to introduce a new package of measures that was "not intended to be seen as a new 'lockdown' of the type seen across the UK from March 2020".³³³³³³ INQ000232743_0003-0004 para 9 This included further restrictions on the hospitality sector, but the rules on a maximum of six people from two households being able to meet would continue.³³⁴³³⁴ INQ000232743_0003-0004 para 9; 'New moves to stop COVID-19 spread', Scottish Government, 7 October 2020 (https://www.gov.scot/news/new-moves-to-stop-covid-19-spread; INQ000369721)

¶6.142. On 12 October 2020, the Scottish Government announced plans to draw up a tiered restrictions system similar to the one that had been announced for England.³³⁵³³⁵ 'Covid in Scotland: Sturgeon to draw up "three-tier" lockdown system', BBC News, 12 October 2020 (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-54509401; INQ000360170) Ms Sturgeon said that the Scottish Government was seeking to "align as closely as possible with other UK nations on a strategic level", although she stressed that the ultimate decision would be taken by the Scottish Government.³³⁶³³⁶ 'Covid in Scotland: Sturgeon to draw up "three-tier" lockdown system', BBC News, 12 October 2020 (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-54509401; INQ000360170)

¶6.143. On 23 October 2020, Ms Sturgeon unveiled Scotland's new five-level Covid-19 management system to allow a more flexible response to localised outbreaks. The plan came into effect from 2 November 2020.³³⁷³³⁷ 'Coronavirus (COVID-19) update: First Minister's speech 23 October', Scottish Government, 23 October 2020 (https://www.gov.scot/publications/coronavirus-covid-19-update-first-ministers-speech-23-october; INQ000354218) Baseline and Level 1 were akin to "the closest we can get to normality, without a vaccine"; Levels 2 and 3 involved more restrictions "focusing on key areas of risk – broadly, indoor settings where household mixing takes place"; and Level 4 involved "measures close to a return to full lockdown" to prevent overwhelming NHS capacity.³³⁸³³⁸ COVID-19: Scotland's Strategic Framework, Scottish Government, October 2020, p9 (https://www.gov.scot/publications/covid-19-scotlands-strategic-framework; INQ000245551)

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¶6.144. On 29 October 2020, it was confirmed that North and South Lanarkshire, Dundee and the Central Belt would be placed in Level 3 restrictions, while most of the rest of Scotland would be placed in Level 2. The Highlands, Orkney, Shetland, the Western Isles and Moray, where Covid-19 cases were relatively low, would be placed in Level 1.³³⁹³³⁹ 'Covid-19: Nicola Sturgeon unveils Scotland's restriction levels', BBC News, 29 October 2020 (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-54731245; INQ000357730)

¶6.145. Some local authorities identified practical difficulties arising from the operation of a five-level system in Scotland and a three-tier system in England. Moray Council said:

" Changes of levels and having different levels across LA [local authority] boundaries caused some confusion – as did it being called 'levels' in Scotland and 'tiers' in England. This caused outbreaks of arguments on our social media channels, which we worked hard to contain as there were often contributors giving conflicting information depending on whether they were personally choosing to follow UKG [UK government] or SG [Scottish Government] guidance."³⁴⁰³⁴⁰ INQ000183806

¶East Lothian Council agreed, stating that the:

" confusion arose due to the UK Government and Scottish Government issuing separate Guidance/Regulation and imposing differing COVID-19 Regulations, constraints and effective dates. As a county bordering England, this led to much confusion for local residents, visitors and businesses."³⁴¹³⁴¹ INQ000183797

¶6.146. Furthermore, individual local authorities identified two broad criticisms of the Scottish Government's operation of the levels system:

The centralised approach of the Scottish Government's decision-making did not properly engage with local authorities in relation to the local levels.
There was a lack of advance and effective communication from the Scottish Government to local authorities about the measures that would be imposed on them.

¶As Angus Council noted:

" The main causes of confusion resulted from the council hearing of new rules/ initiatives/restrictions at the same time as the public – specifically UK Government 5pm briefings and unscheduled Scottish Government briefings.

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This meant that if the rules were complex, contradictory and/or poorly articulated, the public would look to the council for guidance when we had no further information to give. This was frustrating, it diminished the council's credibility as a trusted source of information and therefore counterproductive in disseminating key messages."³⁴²³⁴² INQ000183790_0012