Circuit breakers in Wales and Northern Ireland

Circuit breakers in Wales and Northern Ireland

Wales

¶6.147. Mr Drakeford told the Inquiry that "things got worse much more quickly in September than we had anticipated".³⁴³³⁴³ Mark Drakeford 13 March 2024 143/15-144/2 At a review of restrictions on 1 October 2020, Dr Atherton confirmed a significant increase in new cases, with 398 cases reported the previous day.³⁴⁴³⁴⁴ INQ000048785 However, infection rates in Newport, one of the local health protection areas, were "stabilising". It was agreed that, from 3 October, single adult households in local health protection areas could form a bubble with another household.³⁴⁵³⁴⁵ INQ000048785 In advice shared with ministers on 5 October, the Technical Advisory Cell observed that, unless the current measures brought R below 1, it was:

" possible that infection incidence and hospital admissions may exceed scenario planning levels".³⁴⁶³⁴⁶ Technical Advisory Cell: Summary of Advice, Welsh Government, 2 October 2020, p2 (https://www.gov.wales/technical-advisory-cell-summary-advice-2-october-2020; INQ000066408); INQ000412103

¶6.148. On 5 October 2020, Felicity Bennée, Co-Chair of the Technical Advisory Group, emailed Mr Drakeford's office and other Welsh Government officials to:

" suggest that the First Minister may wish to ask CDL [Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster] whether they are willing to provide economic support for a firebreak/ circuit breaker around half term".³⁴⁷³⁴⁷ INQ000395839

¶6.149. Hospital admissions for Covid-19 in Wales soon doubled in a two-week period and, on 9 October 2020, the Technical Advisory Cell advised that there remained exponential growth.³⁴⁸³⁴⁸ INQ000222714_0002 para 2.8. Incidence had reached more than 100 cases per 100,000 people (INQ000066397_0002-0003). See also Rob Orford 4 March 2024 135/1-16 As Mr Drakeford explained:

" By the time we get halfway through October, though, we have got local lockdowns over almost half or more of Wales, and every week we're having to add more local areas to – in other words, it just hasn't worked."³⁴⁹³⁴⁹ Mark Drakeford 13 March 2024 144/15-18

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¶6.150. Specific modelling for a two or three-week firebreak was not sought until 11 October 2020.³⁵⁰³⁵⁰ INQ000374391 On 12 October, Public Health Wales advised that further restrictions should be implemented in the next two weeks and should last for at least three weeks.³⁵¹³⁵¹ INQ000056301 A combination of at least three restrictions was needed to bring R below 1, of which a short lockdown was one possibility.

¶6.151. Ms Bennée emailed a number of officials in the Welsh Government, stating that, while a short firebreak would be expensive, it would be "far cheaper than going to meltdown and needing to do it for 3 months. Cost is relative!"³⁵²³⁵² INQ000349942_0001

¶6.152. Dr Atherton also outlined to Welsh ministers the growing view of the Chief Medical Officers for the four nations that "some sort of circuit breaker will be needed".³⁵³³⁵³ INQ000198496 Mr Drakeford summarised the main options: strengthening local measures; introducing Wales-wide measures; or a short lockdown. Mr Drakeford confirmed that the aim of circuit breaker restrictions would be to "buy time and prevent the overwhelming of the Health Service". Subsequently, a firebreak implementation group of senior policy officials across the Welsh Government was convened.³⁵⁴³⁵⁴ INQ000320989

¶6.153. Mr Drakeford also repeated his request to Mr Johnson for an urgent COBR meeting on circuit breaker measures.³⁵⁵³⁵⁵ INQ000198495 Mr Johnson responded on 15 October 2020, stating that he would ask Mr Gove to "urgently convene a meeting" with the devolved administrations. However, by then, the position in Wales had already escalated.³⁵⁶³⁵⁶ INQ000198504_0002 Within the previous 24 hours, 90 people had been admitted to hospital and all 150 intensive care unit beds in Wales were occupied.³⁵⁷³⁵⁷ INQ000048796 para 1.7

¶6.154. Dr Rob Orford, Chief Scientific Adviser (Health) for Wales from January 2017, emailed Mr Drakeford, Dr Atherton and Dr Andrew Goodall (Director General of Health and Social Services in the Welsh Government and Chief Executive of NHS Wales from June 2014 to November 2021) on 15 October 2020. He attached modelling which illustrated that acting by the end of the week, and for three weeks rather than two, would have a greater impact in reducing deaths.³⁵⁸³⁵⁸ INQ000385731

¶6.155. The Welsh Cabinet met later that day. They discussed a paper that concluded: "[T]he balance of contributions to this paper appear to prioritise a shorter firebreak, even if this meant more widespread closures."³⁵⁹³⁵⁹ INQ000048876_0005

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¶The strategy outlined was:

" 1. A time-limited firebreak to attempt to bring Rt below 1 and address capacity constraints in healthcare infrastructure.

2. A subsequent revision of national rules and encouraging behaviour change in order to maintain Rt at around 1.1 over the winter."³⁶⁰³⁶⁰ INQ000048876_0001

¶6.156. The timing of the firebreak to include the school half-term holidays was intended to mitigate the impact on education and childcare.³⁶¹³⁶¹ INQ000048876_0006 The Welsh Cabinet therefore agreed in principle to introduce a firebreak from 23 October to 9 November 2020, subject to discussion the following week "to allow further work to take place".³⁶²³⁶² INQ000048796 para 1.3; INQ000216548

¶6.157. On 16 October 2020, Mr Drakeford informed Mr Johnson that the Welsh Government had begun to consider the imposition of a firebreak in Wales, to start on 23 October.³⁶³³⁶³ INQ000256872 That same day, regulations came into force preventing people living in areas of high prevalence in the rest of the UK from travelling to Wales.³⁶⁴³⁶⁴ 'Wales to introduce travel restrictions to prevent the spread of coronavirus', Welsh Government, 14 October 2020 (https://www. gov.wales/wales-to-introduce-travel-restrictions-to-prevent-the-spread-of-coronavirus; INQ000585006); INQ000023265 Mr Drakeford also wrote to Mr Sunak asking the UK government to bring forward the operational date of an expanded Job Support Scheme (which was due to replace the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, known as 'furlough') to 23 October from 1 November.³⁶⁵³⁶⁵ INQ000216554

¶6.158. On 18 October 2020, the Welsh Cabinet discussed the Technical Advisory Cell's advice, which recommended a two to three-week firebreak consistent with the earlier SAGE advice of 21 September.³⁶⁶³⁶⁶ INQ000048801; INQ000048877 Wales was in "material breach" of several of the triggers that might require further action, including intensive care unit occupancy.³⁶⁷³⁶⁷ INQ000048801_0002 para 1.4. Triggers (what the Welsh Government called 'circuit breakers') two and three (transmission) and six (hospital occupancy) had in fact been breached since 17, 27 and 30 September respectively (INQ000048887_0003). The Technical Advisory Cell recommended a two-phase approach: (i) a short firebreak; and (ii) a new, simpler, Wales-wide approach to restrictions following the firebreak. Economic advice to Cabinet was that the loss from closing businesses was estimated at approximately £100 million a week, and that a firebreak might reduce GDP by around 5%.³⁶⁸³⁶⁸ INQ000048887 Ministers were advised through the Technical Advisory Cell:

" [T]here is a reasonable likelihood that if we do not act now, we will need to take further, more expensive and longer action in the future to achieve a similar reduction."³⁶⁹³⁶⁹ INQ000048877_0005

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¶6.159. By 19 October 2020, the rate of infection in people aged over 60 was close to the rates seen in March.³⁷⁰³⁷⁰ INQ000048802_0002 para 1.3 That day, the Welsh Cabinet formally agreed to the implementation of the firebreak from 23 October to 9 November 2020.³⁷¹³⁷¹ INQ000048802 The firebreak reintroduced the requirement to stay at home, and the closure of non-essential retail, hospitality venues, close-contact services (such as hairdressers), hotels and holiday accommodation. It also reiterated that people should work from home wherever possible. The first week of the firebreak covered the school half-term holidays for most schools in Wales, with schools in three local authorities open for both the first and second weeks.³⁷²³⁷² INQ000362237_0068-0069 paras 237-239 Primary, special and secondary schools (for Years 7 and 8) would reopen as originally planned in the second week.

¶6.160. Mr Sunak confirmed later that day that, for operational reasons, the Job Support Scheme could not be brought forward, but that the existing Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme would remain in place until 31 October 2020.³⁷³³⁷³ INQ000216555

¶6.161. A number of Welsh Government witnesses, including Mr Drakeford, said that the provision of funding from the UK government had affected the Welsh Government's decisions on the timing and length of the firebreak.³⁷⁴³⁷⁴ INQ000371209_0070 para 227; INQ000274156_0048-0049 para 154; INQ000389184_0020 para 72 On 9 October 2020, Mr Drakeford had been informed of the expanded Job Support Scheme and its commencement date of 1 November 2020. However, he did not raise the question of additional economic support for a Wales-only lockdown, and it was not until 16 October that Mr Drakeford asked Mr Sunak to bring forward the Job Support Scheme. Mr Sunak had not replied to Mr Drakeford's request by the time the Welsh Cabinet formally agreed to the firebreak's timing and duration on 19 October.

¶6.162. The Welsh Government had to weigh up a number of factors in determining the timing and length of the firebreak. A longer, three-week firebreak, as advised, would have reduced transmission further and put Wales in a better position in December 2020.³⁷⁵³⁷⁵ Michael Gravenor 1 March 2024 175/20-176/3 Opting for a shorter firebreak was, however, within the reasonable range of responses from the Welsh Government. The Inquiry does not consider that the Welsh Government's decisions on timing or length were in fact impacted by UK government funding decisions.

¶6.163. Any lockdown or circuit breaker, even a local one, has substantial repercussions. Opinions vary as to whether they are effective in the long term. As Mr Kilpatrick explained:

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" Ministers were acutely aware of the range of social and economic impacts that a return to a strict universal lockdown across Wales would bring … It was considered that dealing with outbreaks at a local level would help to reduce the risk of individuals contracting the virus, while limiting the number of people subject to restrictions."³⁷⁶³⁷⁶ INQ000274156_0042 para 136

¶6.164. Mr Drakeford reflected in his evidence to the Inquiry that local restrictions had been a "failed experiment".³⁷⁷³⁷⁷ INQ000371209_0067 paras 215-216 It was reasonable for the Welsh Government to try to contain the virus with local measures targeted at those areas that were experiencing a steep rise in infections, while other areas remained stable. This was a "textbook public health response to an outbreak".³⁷⁸³⁷⁸ Mark Drakeford 13 March 2024 143/24-144/24 However, more work should have been undertaken over the summer months to provide a clear process for the timely implementation of local restrictions. By the time of the firebreak, "more of Wales geographically was in a state of local intervention than not".³⁷⁹³⁷⁹ Vaughan Gething 11 March 2024 163/3-164/23

¶6.165. There was also a lack of timely planning for the firebreak in Wales. The Welsh Government had received advice from SAGE on 17 and 21 September 2020 and, by 5 October 2020, Technical Advisory Cell advice and Ms Bennée's warnings. However, it did not seek specific modelling until 11 October, with work on planning the firebreak beginning on 12 October to then be implemented on 23 October.³⁸⁰³⁸⁰ INQ000061565_0002-0004 paras 1-5, 15, 17, 23; INQ000238826_0119-0120 para 359; INQ000061566_0002 para 2; INQ000395839; INQ000374391; INQ000371209_0067-0068 para 217; 'National coronavirus firebreak to be introduced in Wales on Friday', Welsh Government, 19 October 2020 (https://www.gov.wales/national-coronavirus-fire-break-to-be-introduced-in-wales-on- friday; INQ000651705) Both modelling and planning should have been in train prior to 12 October. The Inquiry appreciates that the decision to impose the firebreak over the school half-term holidays was intended to mitigate the length of time lost in face-to-face education. However, the same aim would have been achieved had it been imposed a week earlier, with half-term holidays for most schools then falling in the second and not the first week of the firebreak.

¶6.166. The post-firebreak regime was discussed by the Welsh Cabinet on 27 and 29 October 2020.³⁸¹³⁸¹ INQ000022503; INQ000227863 At the time, there was a worsening situation in Wales, with over 1,000 new cases each day of the previous week. Dr Atherton advised that it would take "some time" to see the impact of the firebreak, and he felt it was premature at that stage to make decisions on post-firebreak restrictions.³⁸²³⁸² INQ000022503_0003 para 1.8; INQ000391115_0044 para 172 Ministers agreed some specific measures, such as restrictions on indoor hospitality, but other areas, such as household mixing, would require further advice. Areas of Wales were deteriorating quicker than expected.³⁸³³⁸³ 'Chief Medical Officer advice on post-firebreak arrangements', Welsh Government, 3 November 2020 (https://www.gov.wales/chief-medical-officer-advice-post-firebreak-arrangements; INQ000048755)

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¶6.167. There were concerns about the ability of Test, Trace, Protect to cope and about the firebreak being for the minimum recommended period. Dr Atherton advised a gradual easing of restrictions. Nonetheless, Mr Drakeford made a public statement in the Welsh Parliament on 3 November 2020 announcing the restrictions that would apply on an all-Wales basis after the firebreak.³⁸⁴³⁸⁴ INQ000584995_0063-0069 Among other measures, schools, non-essential retail, leisure facilities for up to 60 people and hospitality settings would reopen. Groups of up to four people (from four different households) could meet, subject to limitations. Organised activities of up to 15 people indoors and 30 people outdoors would be permitted. Households could form an 'extended household' with one other household. Travel to and from England – which was, by this point, in lockdown – was prohibited and restrictions were placed on people entering and leaving Wales, given the high rates of Covid-19 present in Wales.

¶6.168. The firebreak ended on 12 November 2020. By 20 November, the Technical Advisory Cell advised that, while cases had decreased following the firebreak, "pushing back the epidemic by around 3 weeks", it was "likely" that its positive effects had largely been lost as cases were beginning to increase.³⁸⁵³⁸⁵ INQ000066436_0002 The Welsh Cabinet noted on 23 November 2020 that "there had been an increase in the spread of the virus amongst young people".³⁸⁶³⁸⁶ INQ000129860_0008 Advice on NHS capacity discussed by ministers on 24 November suggested that, unless further measures were implemented, demand on the NHS would rise unsustainably ahead of the Christmas period.³⁸⁷³⁸⁷ INQ000281964 On 25 November, Dr Atherton advised ministers that case rates were increasing and the situation was "fragile".³⁸⁸³⁸⁸ INQ000350028 Dr Orford advised that "early mixing data suggests R is now at 1.4" and there was a risk that the prevalence of the virus might double over Christmas. There was the potential for 1,600 additional avoidable deaths without further interventions.³⁸⁹³⁸⁹ INQ000350028 The Technical Advisory Cell reiterated:

" [I]t is better to intervene early than late; short and sharp interventions work; compliance wanes over time; and firebreaks and harder restrictions (e.g. tier 3+) can reduce levels of transmission in the community. Rules must be simple, understandable and achievable – with an agreed beginning and end."³⁹⁰³⁹⁰ INQ000048899

¶6.169. The Welsh Cabinet met on 26, 27 and 29 November 2020 to consider whether further restrictions should be implemented to "guarantee that families could meet for up to five days over the Christmas period".³⁹¹³⁹¹ INQ000048927_0002; see also INQ000048925; INQ000048930 A Cabinet paper outlined:

" Evidence from SAGE has suggested that Level 3 in Scotland could be effective at preventing growth of coronavirus and that Tier 3 (very high alert level) in England appears to have had a measurable effect in most areas."³⁹²³⁹² INQ000376546

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¶The Cabinet agreed to adopt a tiered system of restrictions on an all-Wales basis to commence on 4 December 2020, based initially on the interventions for Level 3 in

¶Scotland. Pubs, bars, cafes and restaurants would be required to close at 18:00 and would not be permitted to sell alcohol.³⁹³³⁹³ INQ000048927; INQ000048930

¶6.170. However, by 2 December 2020, the Technical Advisory Cell confirmed that both case numbers and hospital admissions were "nearly reaching levels seen at the beginning of the firebreak".³⁹⁴³⁹⁴ INQ000350039_0003 Dr Orford told the Inquiry that "'the science' did not align with important decisions", with the Technical Advisory Cell and Technical Advisory Group advocating for control measures that would keep infection rates lower – advice that he said was not followed.³⁹⁵³⁹⁵ INQ000356177_0064 para 248 The Inquiry understands the need to reopen the economy but it finds that the decision to allow up to four people from four different households to meet was misguided. The Welsh Cabinet could have reopened hospitality settings and restricted this to members of the same extended household only, or to fewer than four different households, thereby reducing household mixing. The Welsh Government relaxed restrictions too quickly following the firebreak.³⁹⁶³⁹⁶ INQ000390618_0050 para 152; Vaughan Gething 11 March 2024 180/9-11 This quickly led to the benefits of the firebreak being lost and to the need for the reintroduction of stricter restrictions at the beginning of December.

¶6.171. From August to December 2020, Wales had the highest age-standardised mortality rate of the four nations.³⁹⁷³⁹⁷ Ian Diamond 29 February 2024 80/10-12; INQ000271436_0045-0046 It is likely that a combination of failed local restrictions, a firebreak that was too late and the decision to relax measures too quickly all contributed to the higher mortality rate.³⁹⁸³⁹⁸ INQ000066291_0002-0003; INQ000390618_0051 para 154

Northern Ireland

¶6.172. At a meeting of the Northern Ireland Executive on 1 October 2020, Ms Foster advised that a point had been reached to consider and implement a "reset" of the approach to the management of the pandemic.³⁹⁹³⁹⁹ INQ000048491_0002 para 3 This, at least in part, seems to have emerged in response to concerns about compliance.⁴⁰⁰⁴⁰⁰ INQ000418976_0034 para 109 By this point, the number of Covid-19 hospital patients in Northern Ireland had risen to close to 25% of the peak levels seen during the first wave. The Executive Committee agreed to introduce additional restrictions for Derry City and Strabane Local Government District Area.⁴⁰¹⁴⁰¹ INQ000065632_0001 paras 1-2

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¶Figure 18: Increase in infections in Northern Ireland from 1 September to 1 October 2020

¶

• 0 0 0 0 — 0

• 02 02 02 02 — 02

¶t2 r2 r2 r2 r2 us be be be be Au g em em em em 31 pt pt pt pt

¶Se Se Se Se

¶
• 7 14 21 — 28

¶Source: UK Health Security Agency Covid-19 data dashboard archive (https://ukhsa-dashboard.data.gov.uk/covid-19-archive-data-download)

¶6.173. Baroness Foster told the Inquiry that the reset was intended "to try to get the public to sit up and take notice of the seriousness of the situation".⁴⁰²⁴⁰² INQ000418976_0034 para 109 It was:

" critical to get a clear, fresh message across to the public about the need for compliance with the restrictions in place, in order, hopefully, to avoid the need for more stringent restrictions. The reset was primarily around renewed messaging … but there was also emphasis placed on ensuring that the Regulations were being properly enforced."⁴⁰³⁴⁰³ INQ000418976_0034 para 109

¶In practical terms, the reset focused on the decision-making process and greater transparency in communications.⁴⁰⁴⁴⁰⁴ INQ000048491_0002 para 3 Baroness Foster acknowledged:

" [I]t was not as successful as we might have hoped as further restrictions did become necessary."⁴⁰⁵⁴⁰⁵ INQ000418976_0034 para 109

¶In short, the reset did not amount to the Executive Committee getting a grip on the situation that was fast developing.

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¶6.174. In a report dated 8 October 2020, Professor Young set out the pressures that were already facing the health and social care system in Northern Ireland:

" Most hospitals are running at more than 85% capacity, with some over 90%. There are already trolley waits … and ambulances queuing outside. This level of pressure does not usually manifest until later in the year. There is therefore a concern around how the system will deal with rising pressures over the winter period alongside increasing numbers of Covid+ patients."⁴⁰⁶⁴⁰⁶ INQ000276520_0005; see also Arlene Foster 15 May 2024 104/5-11

¶6.175. Professor McBride warned the Executive Committee that day that he had "never [been] more concerned" and that there should be "intervention now to avoid situation in 2/3 weeks".⁴⁰⁷⁴⁰⁷ INQ000065756_0017 In the same meeting, the situation was characterised as "apocalyptic".⁴⁰⁸⁴⁰⁸ INQ000065756_0016 The Executive Committee ultimately agreed that ministers would, over the coming days, meet individually or in small groups with Robin Swann MLA (Minister of Health for Northern Ireland from January 2020 to October 2022 and from February to May 2024) and Professors McBride and Young "to consider and discuss … future measures".⁴⁰⁹⁴⁰⁹ INQ000048492_0003 para 7

¶6.176. On 11 October 2020, Professor McBride advised Ms Foster and Ms O'Neill that Northern Ireland was 10 days away from the health service being overwhelmed. He stated that they were "[r]apidly running out of time".⁴¹⁰⁴¹⁰ INQ000286275_0002-0003 An email recorded his view that the situation was much more serious than in March 2020 and "beyond discussion and nuance".⁴¹¹⁴¹¹ INQ000439242_0001 Professor Young warned that "every day makes a real difference".⁴¹²⁴¹² INQ000286275_0002 Mr Swann had indicated that a six-week intervention was required.⁴¹³⁴¹³ INQ000286275_0003; INQ000212923

¶6.177. By 12 October 2020, Northern Ireland had a higher level of incidence than anywhere in the rest of Europe apart from the Czech Republic.⁴¹⁴⁴¹⁴ INQ000347375_0003 Covid-19 had "reached a phase of exponential growth" in Northern Ireland.⁴¹⁵⁴¹⁵ INQ000212923_0001 para 1

¶6.178. An Executive Committee meeting the following day considered the further progression and current state of the pandemic, noting the following:

¶
• There was a choice between introducing significant Northern Ireland-wide interventions immediately to avoid health service overwhelm, or inevitably having to take the same decisions following overwhelm, when there would be significant direct and indirect health consequences.⁴¹⁶⁴¹⁶ INQ000212923_0003 para 12

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¶
• Although a number of options were presented to the Executive Committee, only a six-week intervention offered "a realistic prospect of avoiding the need for further intervention until early in 2021".⁴¹⁷⁴¹⁷ INQ000212923_0009 para 35 Professors McBride and Young advised that the proposed interventions should be implemented "as soon as possible and no later than the 16th October for a period of 6 weeks ideally, or between 4 and 6 weeks".⁴¹⁸⁴¹⁸ INQ000212923_0010 para 37
• Ministers also considered the economic cost. The Department for the Economy advised that a single three-week circuit breaker could result in "hundreds of millions in lost output", even if assuming an immediate "bounce-back".⁴¹⁹⁴¹⁹ INQ000065652_0011 A six‑week intervention with education settings and retail closed was "likely to be at least twice as costly as a planned and well communicated lockdown [sic] three-week lockdown".⁴²⁰⁴²⁰ INQ000065652_0012 Keeping education settings and retail open would reduce the impact but was still "likely to have a very high economic impact".⁴²¹⁴²¹ INQ000065652_0013
• A paper by The Executive Office did not endorse any particular option but cautioned the Executive Committee: "Whatever we decide will have detrimental impacts in all dimensions and the issue we face is to find a tolerable balance between these harms, taking account of both short and long term consequences."⁴²²⁴²² INQ000208778_0005 para 11

¶6.179. The Executive Committee agreed to revoke the specific restrictions on Derry City and Strabane Local Government District Area. It also agreed to impose a four-week period of interventions across Northern Ireland, to take effect from 16 October 2020 and to expire at midnight on 13 November 2020.⁴²³⁴²³ INQ000065753; INQ000022458 These restrictions involved, for example, the closure of the hospitality sector, apart from takeaway and delivery of food, but did not entail the closure of retail or the closure of schools (save for the extended school break).⁴²⁴⁴²⁴ INQ000022458_0004 paras 17, 19(iv); INQ000208778_0001-0003 para 4 The half-term holiday for schools was also extended from 19 to 30 October, with schools reopening on 2 November.⁴²⁵⁴²⁵ INQ000022458_0003-0004 para 15

¶6.180. Ms O'Neill emphasised that this was a compromise. Her preference was that schools would close for a four-week period.⁴²⁶⁴²⁶ INQ000022458_0004 para 16 Baroness Foster explained that "six weeks was simply considered too long for a circuit breaker lockdown at that time".⁴²⁷⁴²⁷ INQ000418976_0037 para 118 The scientific advice at this time was that interventions were required in order to preserve hospital capacity, failing which there would be an impact on non-Covid-19 hospital beds and patients.⁴²⁸⁴²⁸ Arlene Foster 15 May 2024 105/17-25, 106/1-8 Baroness Foster said:

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" [ W]e wouldn't just look at the health advice, we would take into consideration other issues as well, and that's what we were trying to do."⁴²⁹⁴²⁹ Arlene Foster 15 May 2024 121/20-24; see also Arlene Foster 15 May 2024 121/7-17

¶6.181. By 15 October 2020, on the eve of the circuit breaker, R was 1.6, the Nightingale facility at Belfast City Hospital was in operation and there were confirmed outbreaks in care homes.⁴³⁰⁴³⁰ INQ000065686_0001 By 29 October, hospital inpatient numbers in Northern Ireland had reached a higher level than in the peak of the first wave of the pandemic.⁴³¹⁴³¹ INQ000065702_0002

¶6.182. During the initial two weeks of the restrictions, R was reduced to slightly above 0.7.⁴³²⁴³² INQ000065589_0001 However, the value of R was expected to increase slightly upon the return of schools after the extended half-term holidays.⁴³³⁴³³ INQ000065589_0002

¶6.183. On 5 November 2020, the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) advised the Executive Committee to extend restrictions for a further two weeks after 12 November, to avoid the health service becoming overwhelmed and potentially to avoid the need for further intervention before Christmas.⁴³⁴⁴³⁴ INQ000065589_0007 This was due to be discussed at a meeting of the Executive Committee the same day, but substantive discussion and decision-making were deferred as a result of leaking and concern about the public response.⁴³⁵⁴³⁵ INQ000065757_0009, 0011-0012

¶6.184. The Executive Committee met again on 9 November 2020 to make a decision on the proposed two-week extension. By this time, the numbers in intensive care units were the "highest figures yet". Numbers in hospitals were not decreasing, and capacity was currently near 100% and had been exceeded on a number of recent days.⁴³⁶⁴³⁶ INQ000213652_0001; INQ000276538_0002 Professor Young warned:

" Deaths will continue to increase in January and numbers will be significantly greater without further intervention."⁴³⁷⁴³⁷ INQ000276538_0002

¶6.185. Despite the seriousness of the position, Baroness Foster told the Inquiry:

" My DUP [Democratic Unionist Party] colleagues felt this was a breach of trust, and that extending the circuit breaker would not only be damaging for businesses (particularly for small business such as close contact services), and those on low incomes, but would also erode public confidence in the Executive."⁴³⁸⁴³⁸ INQ000418976_0037 para 118

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¶6.186. This Executive Committee meeting was adjourned and reconvened several times over the next few days, and involved two cross-community votes on 9 and 11 November 2020. The deployment of the cross-community vote mechanism (see Chapter 11: Government decision-making, in Volume II) was instigated by Ms Foster, but it was Edwin Poots MLA (Minister for Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs in Northern Ireland from January 2020 to October 2022) and Peter Weir (later Lord Weir of Ballyholme), Minister for Education in Northern Ireland from May 2016 to March 2017 and from January 2020 to June 2021, who ultimately called the votes.⁴³⁹⁴³⁹ INQ000356174_0053; Arlene Foster 15 May 2024 120/4-8, 20-24; INQ000048497_0003, 0007 paras 14, 45 Ministers also discussed a compromise to extend the restrictions by one week to avoid "everything falling" the next day.⁴⁴⁰⁴⁴⁰ INQ000213652_0077; INQ000048497_0006; INQ000458927

¶6.187. The content of the discussions was leaked throughout. This was described by a number of witnesses as marking a low point in politics in Northern Ireland – not just during the pandemic but generally.⁴⁴¹⁴⁴¹ INQ000421759_0040-0041 para 127; INQ000452485_0028 para 97; Robin Swann 13 May 2024 173/16-25

¶6.188. The use of the cross-community vote mechanism in this context was inappropriate. The Inquiry is not persuaded by the suggestion that its deployment was intended to achieve consensus.⁴⁴²⁴⁴² Peter Weir 8 May 2024 98/6-8; Arlene Foster 15 May 2024 125/13-17 Those responsible for deploying it appear to have politicised the debate. There was no minority issue at stake. There were people, across the community, who would have been better protected by timely and measured interventions by the government of Northern Ireland. This is discussed further in Chapter 11: Government decision-making, in Volume II.

¶6.189. On 12 November 2020, the Executive Committee agreed – albeit not unanimously – to a number of easements, including the reopening of close-contact services by appointment and the reopening of some hospitality settings with restricted opening hours from 20 November. The remaining restrictions were extended until 26 November, with all settings able to reopen from 27 November.⁴⁴³⁴⁴³ INQ000048497_0010-11 para 71

¶6.190. The Executive Committee met again on 19 November 2020, with a number of services being due to reopen the following day. Ministers were made aware that the numbers of cases, admissions, hospital inpatients and deaths, as well as intensive care unit occupancy rates, remained higher than during the peak of the first wave. They were also informed that the planned relaxations would result in R rising significantly above 1.⁴⁴⁴⁴⁴⁴ INQ000137370 Mr Swann did not offer any recommendations, as he was:

" of the opinion that specific recommendations would again result in a cross-community vote without proper consideration being given to the contents of the paper, such was the political tension at that time".⁴⁴⁵⁴⁴⁵ INQ000412903_0054 para 162; see also INQ000048498

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¶Mr Swann did advocate for a further two weeks of restrictions, "to protect hospitals" and "to keep [the] health service on its feet".⁴⁴⁶⁴⁴⁶ INQ000065739_0010, 0012, 0018; see also INQ000065739_0035 The Executive Committee agreed to introduce restrictions (albeit that schools and childcare were to remain open) from

¶27 November for a period of two weeks, following a one-week relaxation.⁴⁴⁷⁴⁴⁷ INQ000276547 Closecontact services, hospitality settings, pubs and bars therefore reopened with mitigations in the intervening days. Professor Young told the Inquiry that there was a correlation between this relaxation and a 25% increase in cases.⁴⁴⁸⁴⁴⁸ INQ000286272; Ian Young 7 May 2024 194/6-9

¶6.191. As a result of the decision on 12 November 2020, there was a week-long extension to the four-week period of restrictions, with a range of restrictions due to be lifted.⁴⁴⁹⁴⁴⁹ INQ000048497_0010-0011 para 71. This included the reopening of close-contact services and the reopening of hospitality settings on a graduated basis (with unlicensed premises such as cafes and coffee shops opening on 20 November 2020 with restricted opening hours). In effect, unlike in the period leading up to the first UK-wide lockdown in March 2020, the Executive Committee had greater control over the response to the pandemic in Northern Ireland. It had agency over its response and could use the knowledge it had acquired to manage rising transmission rates after July 2020. It was clearly warned that there would be a second wave once restrictions were lifted, and it was given clear advice that the best chance of meaningful intervention was an initial response by way of longer and more strenuous restrictions. However, the advice given for the purposes of the meeting on 13 October 2020 (namely that there should be restrictions from 16 October for a period of six weeks) was rejected, albeit that some ministers favoured more severe restrictions during this period.

¶6.192. On 19 November 2020, the Northern Ireland Executive subsequently agreed to introduce a two-week circuit breaker, but this was not to come into effect until 27 November.⁴⁵⁰⁴⁵⁰ INQ000276547 There was, therefore, a week-long period during this precarious stage of the pandemic when restrictions were relaxed in advance of the circuit breaker. By 8 December 2020, it was understood that the two-week circuit breaker had not had the impact hoped for, but, nonetheless, restrictions were eased in the two weeks leading up to Christmas.⁴⁵¹⁴⁵¹ INQ000065728_0002 It is difficult to discern any rationale for the approach taken. As discussed in Chapter 7: Further lockdowns, in this volume, the death rate reached its peak in Northern Ireland in January 2021. The starting point for that trajectory was this period from October 2020 onwards.