A second lockdown in England

A second lockdown in England

¶6.193. Covid-19 infections continued to rise in every region of England. The Office for National Statistics estimated that an average of 568,100 people had the virus by 28 October 2020, compared with 336,500 people from 2 to 8 October.⁴⁵²⁴⁵² INQ000146617_0001; INQ000061570_0002

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¶6.194. On 25 October 2020, Mr Johnson held a strategy session. Professors Vallance and Whitty were present, along with various 10 Downing Street officials. The Covid-19 Taskforce advised that hospital admissions and deaths were beginning to rise in low prevalence areas of England. Over the previous fortnight, the number of patients in hospital had approximately doubled in all regions.⁴⁵³⁴⁵³ INQ000217005_0007 The current approach was "highly unlikely" to drive R below 1 across England.⁴⁵⁴⁴⁵⁴ INQ000217007

¶6.195. Mr Johnson was recorded as asserting that he was "not going to be stampeded into a national lockdown".⁴⁵⁵⁴⁵⁵ INQ000273901_0608 He remained "deeply sceptical" about the need for this intervention, which he said the public would regard as a "massive failure".⁴⁵⁶⁴⁵⁶ INQ000146633_0007 In his evening notes, Professor Vallance recorded that, in the meeting, Mr Johnson had begun to "argue for letting it all rip", while others had advocated that the government's primary obligation was to save lives.⁴⁵⁷⁴⁵⁷ INQ000273901_0245 Professor Vallance also recorded that Mr Johnson had acknowledged that the situation was a "total shambles".⁴⁵⁸⁴⁵⁸ INQ000146633_0007 He was told that, if he went down the route of "letting it go", he needed to tell the public that he was "going to allow people to die".⁴⁵⁹⁴⁵⁹ INQ000273901_0608

¶6.196. A note submitted to Mr Johnson on 28 October 2020 warned that the situation was deteriorating. Although the north of England continued to be the most heavily affected by Covid-19, the infection rate was growing in every region of England and the wave was "sweeping south".⁴⁶⁰⁴⁶⁰ INQ000146617_0001-0002 paras 2, 4, 7 Mr Johnson set out his thoughts and concerns on the paper with a number of questions for his advisers. He questioned, among other issues, the assumption underpinning the advice that things would get better in the spring of 2021; the impacts of restrictions on mental health and the economy; what would be achieved by "smashing up the economy" without knowing how many times restrictions would need to be implemented; the utility of the test and trace and tiers systems; and whether localised or nationwide restrictions were necessary.⁴⁶¹⁴⁶¹ INQ000146617_0007-0008

¶6.197. On 29 October 2020, Covid-O noted that hospital occupancy would surpass the peak of the first wave by about 11 November 2020.⁴⁶²⁴⁶² INQ000090176_0004 Professor Van-Tam remarked that England was "now in a very bad place and would be in an extremely bad place by the end of November". He stressed that the UK government "had to do more".⁴⁶³⁴⁶³ INQ000090176_0005

¶6.198. On 30 October 2020, the Covid-19 Taskforce set out the deteriorating situation at a meeting of Covid-S.⁴⁶⁴⁴⁶⁴ INQ000136682; INQ000136686; INQ000136687 Later that day, the taskforce informed Covid-O that R was growing as quickly – if not more so – in areas with lower case rates. The taskforce proposed a four-week nationwide intervention, with a regional approach to deescalation.⁴⁶⁵⁴⁶⁵ INQ000090156; INQ000136684 The decision was taken to announce a second England-wide lockdown.

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¶6.199. At a UK Cabinet meeting the following day, Mr Sunak warned that this would cause "significant economic damage", but agreed that it was a "reasonable and right decision to do these things to save lives and the NHS".⁴⁶⁶⁴⁶⁶ INQ000089102_0005-0006; 'Prime Minister's statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 31 October 2020', Prime Minister's Office and Boris Johnson, 31 October 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-statement-on-coronavirus- covid-19-31-october-2020; INQ000086830) Mr Johnson had earlier commissioned the Covid-19 Taskforce and the Treasury to advise on the economic impact of the different options.⁴⁶⁷⁴⁶⁷ INQ000136672_0001

¶6.200. That evening, 31 October 2020, Mr Johnson publicly announced that England would enter a second lockdown on 5 November 2020. He emphasised the importance of not "overrunning" the NHS.⁴⁶⁸⁴⁶⁸ 'Prime Minister's statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 31 October 2020', Prime Minister's Office and Boris Johnson, 31 October 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-statement-on-coronavirus-covid-19-31-october-2020; INQ000086830) Unlike the first lockdown, schools and universities would remain open, with an emphasis on people being encouraged to go to work if they could not work from home. This lockdown was limited to a four-week period ending on 2 December 2020, after which the UK would return to a tiered system of local restrictions.⁴⁶⁹⁴⁶⁹ 'Prime Minister's statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 31 October 2020', Prime Minister's Office and Boris Johnson, 31 October 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-statement-on-coronavirus-covid-19-31-october-2020; INQ000086830)

¶6.201. Mr Johnson told the Inquiry:

" It was clear at this stage that local measures were insufficient and that we had to consider measures at a national level, rather than engaging with local leaders."⁴⁷⁰⁴⁷⁰ INQ000255836_0151 para 536

¶The dire epidemiological situation in England meant that policy-makers had "run out of road".⁴⁷¹⁴⁷¹ INQ000273872_0097-0098 para 496

¶6.202. Mr Case described 31 October 2020 as "a very dark day".⁴⁷²⁴⁷² Simon Case 23 May 2024 153/25, 154/1 He shared his frustrations about the decision-making process with Helen MacNamara, Deputy Cabinet Secretary from January 2019 to February 2021:

" It is horrid. We are back here because the state has failed. We have some massive questions to ask ourselves."⁴⁷³⁴⁷³ INQ000303253_0050

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¶Mr Johnson explained to the Inquiry:

" [ W]e wanted to try the tiered approach, we wanted to try the local approach. That was gradually running out of road and we had to go for national measures. But I always knew that we were – that was on the cards."⁴⁷⁴⁴⁷⁴ Boris Johnson 7 December 2023 56/24-57/2

¶6.203. The UK government immediately began to consider potential exit strategies from the second lockdown. On 3 November 2020, senior officials in the Department of Health and Social Care met to discuss potential measures. Professor Whitty advised that the exit strategy should be informed by data on the effectiveness of the tiers system, which would not be available for several weeks.⁴⁷⁵⁴⁷⁵ INQ000234141_0002. The effect was expected to be seen in approximately two to three weeks (INQ000061574_0002).

¶6.204. However, at a UK Cabinet meeting, Mr Johnson said that 2 December 2020 was "a hard deadline" to end the lockdown in England. The end of lockdown was to be date driven and not data driven. The UK government "would use every second to get mass testing working to avoid further lockdowns and find a way out of coronavirus". Mr Johnson emphasised that he "did not want to go back to a set of national measures after 2 December, at almost any cost".⁴⁷⁶⁴⁷⁶ INQ000088940_0005-0007

¶6.205. SPI-M-O advised the same day that, if England returned to the original tiering system in December 2020, the epidemic would continue to grow and a third lockdown might be needed in January 2021.⁴⁷⁷⁴⁷⁷ INQ000253921_0001-0006; INQ000148865 As discussed in Chapter 7: Further lockdowns, in this volume, this was prophetic.

¶6.206. On 17 November 2020, Covid-O confirmed that England would exit the lockdown on 2 December 2020. The Covid-19 Taskforce proposed to strengthen the existing tiers framework by:

¶
• providing "reinforced guidance" in Tier 1 on working from home, reducing travel and social mixing;
• permitting hospitality settings in Tier 2 to serve only "substantial meals and accompanying drinks"; and
• closing hospitality settings (other than for takeaway or delivery of food), indoor entertainment, personal care services and accommodation in Tier 3.

¶This would be a "standardised tier, imposed rather than negotiated, to ensure optimal effect and rapid deployment".⁴⁷⁸⁴⁷⁸ INQ000184006_0004 Professor Vallance informed Covid-O that

¶Tier 1 had done nothing to contain the virus, even in areas with low prevalence.

¶For this reason, any area in Tier 1 would be likely to move into Tier 2 immediately.

¶He advised that the UK government should wait for more data about the impact of the lockdown before making a final decision, so as to minimise the chance of unnecessary harm.⁴⁷⁹⁴⁷⁹ INQ000090928_0010-0011

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¶6.207. On 19 November 2020, SAGE advised that the relaxation of restrictions over the festive period carried a "significant risk of increased transmission and increased prevalence, potentially by a large amount". Keeping prevalence low before the festive season would reduce transmission when measures were eased.⁴⁸⁰⁴⁸⁰ INQ000061577_0001-0002, 0005

¶6.208. On 22 November 2020, the UK Cabinet approved the return to a localised tiers system, describing it as a "sensible and balanced approach".⁴⁸¹⁴⁸¹ INQ000089062_0006 The COVID-19 Winter Plan (published the following day) permitted the opening of non-essential retail, personal care services, indoor leisure settings and places of worship – as well as schools, colleges, universities and childcare facilities – in all three tiers. Everyone was to work from home where possible. Entertainment venues, hotels and other accommodation could open in Tiers 1 and 2, and up to 15 guests would be permitted at weddings, civil partnerships, wedding receptions and wakes. Up to 30 people were able to attend funerals.⁴⁸²⁴⁸² COVID-19 Winter Plan, HM Government, November 2020, pp26-30 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/covid-19-winter-plan; INQ000137262)

¶6.209. By 25 November 2020, the epidemic was shrinking in the north-west, north-east and Yorkshire. Only two NHS England regions (London and the South East) had R estimates at or above 1.⁴⁸³⁴⁸³ INQ000253897_0002 The purpose of the second lockdown was to bring R below 1 and thereby reduce the pressure on the NHS. As Professors Vallance, Whitty and Van-Tam all agreed, this objective was achieved.⁴⁸⁴⁴⁸⁴ INQ000238826_0132 para 395; INQ000251645_0149 para 8.77; INQ000269203_0106 para 7.42

Alternatives to the second lockdown

¶6.210. The Great Barrington Declaration (published on 4 October 2020) was an open letter authored and signed by three public health experts, including Professor Gupta. The declaration essentially called for the lifting of lockdown restrictions, so as to allow infection to spread through the community and thereby lead to population immunity (or 'herd immunity'). In tandem, focused measures for the protection of vulnerable people would be put in place. It stated:

" As immunity builds in the population, the risk of infection to all – including the vulnerable – falls. We know that all populations will eventually reach herd immunity – i.e. the point at which the rate of new infections is stable – and that this can be assisted by (but is not dependent upon) a vaccine. Our goal should therefore be to minimise mortality and social harm until we reach herd immunity."⁴⁸⁵⁴⁸⁵ INQ000250981_0003

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¶The declaration endorsed the "focused protection" approach that Professor Gupta had described previously in her arguments to Mr Johnson. It suggested that such a strategy would:

¶" allow those who are at minimal risk of death to live their lives normally to build up immunity to the virus through natural infection, while better protecting those who are at highest risk".⁴⁸⁶⁴⁸⁶ INQ000250981_0002-0003

¶6.211. The open letter was intended for a global audience and was not specific to the UK. It did, however, provide an alternative approach for the UK government to consider. As set out in Chapter 9: Scientific and technical advice, in Volume II, it will always be important for decision-makers to have access to alternative perspectives and advice.

¶6.212. Professor Whitty, however, considered the Great Barrington school of thought to be "scientifically weak, operationally impractical and ethically difficult".⁴⁸⁷⁴⁸⁷ INQ000248853_0093 para 6.22 He described it as "flawed at multiple levels".⁴⁸⁸⁴⁸⁸ Christopher Whitty 22 November 2023 15/25

¶6.213. The "focused protection" approach chimed with Mr Johnson's wish to pursue population segmentation. However, this approach was unlikely to have been a viable strategy for the UK government for a number of reasons:

¶
• It assumed that there would be long-term immunity resulting from infection. However, by October 2020, it was expected that individuals could be reinfected multiple times.⁴⁸⁹⁴⁸⁹ INQ000220154_0006 para 2.19
• It was not possible to identify, sufficiently reliably, those who were most vulnerable to severe disease. An unrestrained epidemic in the low-risk population had the potential to overwhelm the NHS. As Professor Woolhouse pointed out, "low risk is not zero risk".⁴⁹⁰⁴⁹⁰ INQ000250231_0032 para 176 A high proportion of individuals who became seriously unwell with Covid-19 "had limited risk factors (the Prime Minister being one)".⁴⁹¹⁴⁹¹ INQ000251645_0110 para 7.157 Others – not necessarily the same as those at risk of becoming seriously unwell or dying – would be at risk of long-term consequences, such as Long Covid (see Chapter 8: Learning to live with Covid-19, in this volume).
• The enforced isolation of vulnerable groups for a prolonged period of time would have had significant negative mental and physical health impacts.
• In practice, it was not possible to segregate the elderly and the vulnerable to the extent that they would be afforded complete protection from the virus. For example, they would need to interact with others to obtain basic necessities and support. Moreover, once the policy was lifted, it was "almost certain" that a further wave of infection would occur in older people.⁴⁹²⁴⁹² INQ000061570_0004

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The second lockdown decision-making process in England

¶6.214. As in March 2020, events in Europe in September and October 2020 provided an early warning of what was to come. Moreover, in the autumn of 2020, the UK was no longer facing an acute crisis. In contrast to the initial months of the pandemic, when decision-makers were "building the train tracks as the train was moving", they now had the benefit of experience.⁴⁹³⁴⁹³ Lee Cain 31 October 2023 65/18-19 The first wave had demonstrated the need to implement extensive interventions as soon as it became clear that they were required. As Professor Vallance explained, it was generally understood that it was necessary to "put in place measures in advance (the 'rules of the road') to allow a quicker implementation of interventions when needed".⁴⁹⁴⁴⁹⁴ INQ000238826_0131 para 391

¶6.215. However, the lessons from the failure in March 2020 to act quickly enough were not learned.⁴⁹⁵⁴⁹⁵ INQ000238826_0097-0098 para 299 This failure was appreciated by advisers. Mr Cain explained that most of the advisory team in 10 Downing Street "knew" by early September 2020 that a second lockdown was "an inevitability":⁴⁹⁶⁴⁹⁶ Lee Cain 31 October 2023 65/13-15

" [B]y the time we moved into this later period, I think the rump of Number 10 felt that, okay, we've learned all these lessons from the first period of lockdown, why are we now trying to ignore them again and repeat the exact same mistakes."⁴⁹⁷⁴⁹⁷ Lee Cain 31 October 2023 65/22-25, 66/1-10

¶6.216. As Mr Hancock rightly observed, there were "no excuses second time round".⁴⁹⁸⁴⁹⁸ INQ000232194_0008 para 31 Professor Edmunds concluded:

" The failure to act quickly to control this wave was not because of a lack of situational awareness or knowledge of how to control it. We let this second wave happen."⁴⁹⁹⁴⁹⁹ INQ000273553_0069-0070 para 10.28

¶6.217. Professor McLean described this as the "worst period" of the pandemic for this reason:

" We could see what was coming and could not understand why the government did not act upon the science advice by introducing effective interventions."⁵⁰⁰⁵⁰⁰ INQ000309529_0043-0044 para 144

¶6.218. The scientific advice was clear. By late September 2020, scientific advisers to the UK government had firmly advised that a circuit breaker was required. Hospitals faced being overwhelmed within weeks, with the numbers of infections, hospitalisations and deaths potentially surpassing the peak of the first wave by early November 2020.

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¶A "quick and hard" response was more effective than relying on softer measures and waiting for infection rates, hospital occupancy and death rates to rise.

¶6.219. However, the UK government resisted the expert advice of SAGE, SPI-M-O, its Chief Scientific Adviser, the Chief Medical Officer and other scientific advisers. Instead, it relied on a series of milder interventions that lacked scientific support and were unlikely to be effective, even if they had some slowing effect on the spread of the virus. Indeed, on 15 October 2020, a social contact study found that the impact of the rule of six, encouragement to work from home, the 22:00 curfew on hospitality settings and the imposition of local restrictions was limited.⁵⁰¹⁵⁰¹ INQ000061570_0003 paras 15-17. CoMix, which commenced in March 2020, surveyed a sample of the UK adult population to identify social contact trends.

¶6.220. The tiers system failed and, in doing so, led inexorably to the need for a further lockdown. Professor Whitty characterised the UK government's response as:

" bunny-hopping … we would accelerate into a bend unnecessarily and then have to slam on the brakes".⁵⁰²⁵⁰² Christopher Whitty 22 November 2023 66/24-25, 67/1-3

¶6.221. The decision to introduce a second lockdown was taken more than six weeks after SAGE had first advised in favour of a circuit breaker. There was a further delay of five days between the decision being made to impose a lockdown and it being given full legal effect. Unlike the circuit breakers in Wales and Northern Ireland, the second England-wide lockdown was not timed to coincide with the school half-term holidays. Schools did, however, remain open.

¶6.222. Some of those around Mr Johnson attributed a failure to act earlier to his inadequate leadership. Throughout September and October 2020, Mr Johnson continuously vacillated between policy options. The rule of six was described by Mr Cummings as:

" the product of the chaos around the PM at the time … it seemed the only practical way to get him to agree something that was simple enough he might stick to for more than 5 minutes".⁵⁰³⁵⁰³ INQ000273872_0093 para 468 (emphasis in original)

¶6.223. Two days after deciding on the rule of six, Mr Johnson was described in WhatsApp messages as being "in full trolley mode" (see Chapter 11: Government decision-making, in Volume II). Mr Case noted: "Spectacular today. We want to open up the economy ASAP, forget the bloody virus."⁵⁰⁴⁵⁰⁴ INQ000048313_0054 Similarly, in October 2020, Mr Johnson stated that he had:

" been slightly rocked by some of the data on Covid fatalities. The median age is 82 – 81 for men 85 for women. That is above life expectancy. So get Covid and live longer … it shows we don't go for nationwide lockdown."⁵⁰⁵⁵⁰⁵ INQ000267902_0001

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¶6.224. In his evening notes following a meeting on 25 October 2020, Professor Vallance observed that Mr Johnson had begun:

" to argue for letting it all rip. Saying yes, there will be more casualties but so be it – 'they have had a good innings' … PM then back on to 'Most people who die have reached their time anyway' … This all feels like a complete lack of leadership."⁵⁰⁶⁵⁰⁶ INQ000273901_0245

¶6.225. The following day, Professor Vallance recorded in his evening notes that Mr Johnson was in a:

" different mood … 'terrible, terrible, terrible numbers' … says 'we need to do local lockdowns fast, foot to the throttle, accelerate, we need action.' He is so inconsistent."⁵⁰⁷⁵⁰⁷ INQ000273901_0247 (emphasis in original)

¶6.226. In his evidence to the Inquiry, Mr Johnson stated that Professor Vallance's notes reflected instead:

" the deep anxiety of a group of people doing their level best who cannot see an easy solution and are naturally self-critical and critical of others".⁵⁰⁸⁵⁰⁸ Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 41/4-8

¶6.227. Mr Johnson's evident reluctance to impose another lockdown, accompanied by his wish to explore all other solutions first, was understandable. He was rightly concerned about the economic and societal harm that would ensue. However, this meant that the opportunity to regain control over transmission rates when incidence of the virus was lower was lost.

¶6.228. The decision-making process was made more difficult by a lack of alignment within the UK government. As case numbers climbed, competing voices clamoured to be heard. Some were calling for the UK to relax its response, while others were advocating a more stringent approach to the crisis.⁵⁰⁹⁵⁰⁹ INQ000250981; INQ000146605 The Department of Health and Social Care was primarily motivated by the need to mitigate the public health effects of Covid-19, whereas the Treasury was driven by its concern about the economic impact of restrictions.⁵¹⁰⁵¹⁰ INQ000236243_0025-0026 para 81 While these differing priorities were to be expected, the "tug-of-war" and jostling for influence undoubtedly placed Mr Johnson in a conflicted position.⁵¹¹⁵¹¹ INQ000236243_0030 para 98 Professor Vallance's evening notes provide an insight into the debilitating effect of these pressures on decision-making:

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" What [Mr Johnson] wants to achieve is a series of mutually incompatible options … he owns the reality for a day and then is buffeted by a discussion with [Mr Sunak]."⁵¹²⁵¹² INQ000273901_0597

¶6.229. There was also growing resistance in the media and in the UK Parliament to the prospect of a second England-wide lockdown, or indeed any form of circuit breaker.⁵¹³⁵¹³ 'Lockdown failed. We must follow the Swedish model and learn to live with Covid', Professor Mark Woolhouse, Daily Telegraph, 19 September 2020 (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/09/19/uk-needs-follow-swedish-model-learn-live-covid; INQ000103523) Mr Cain said that Mr Johnson was the "focus of a robust campaign from within his own base" and the "Tory backbenches", adding: "The term 'lockdown' had become political."⁵¹⁴⁵¹⁴ INQ000252711_0028 para 125 That there was opposition to a lockdown is not at all surprising, given the very significant social, economic and educational damage of the first lockdown.

¶6.230. It is clear that Mr Johnson felt he was being backed into a corner. Mr Cummings described Mr Johnson as "enraged". Mr Cummings alleged that, on 30 October 2020, Mr Johnson said:

" '[N]o more fucking lockdowns – let the bodies pile high in their thousands' … my impression at the time was that it was a mix of rage, frustration and fear."⁵¹⁵⁵¹⁵ INQ000273872_0098 para 497

¶Lord Udny-Lister also recalled Mr Johnson making this remark, possibly in

¶September 2020, although he was uncertain as to when it occurred or to whom it was directed.⁵¹⁶⁵¹⁶ INQ000237819_0017 para 32; Edward Udny-Lister 7 November 2023 192/23-193/6 Mr Johnson denied saying these words at any time. His position was "that we had to save human life at all ages, and that was the objective of the strategy".⁵¹⁷⁵¹⁷ Boris Johnson 7 December 2023 41/17-21

¶6.231. A number of scientific experts stated that, had a circuit breaker been utilised in September 2020, the second England-wide lockdown could have been reduced in both length and severity.⁵¹⁸⁵¹⁸ INQ000260643_0062-0063 para 6.30; INQ000233631_0001

¶6.232. Some witnesses disagreed with the position of SAGE, which was that the UK had reached that stage by September 2020. Professor Woolhouse explained that, in September, R was not as high as it had been in March 2020:

" This immediately indicated that we did not need such a drastic response as was felt necessary in March to bring the epidemic under control again; in other words, we did not need another lockdown."⁵¹⁹⁵¹⁹ INQ000250231_0036 para 200

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¶Professor Woolhouse was critical of Professor Vallance's opinion that the UK's response should be "quick and hard".⁵²⁰⁵²⁰ INQ000088263_0008 He expressed a different view, that "earlier action can be less drastic action".⁵²¹⁵²¹ INQ000250231_0036 para 201

¶6.233. Mr Hancock considered that an earlier implementation of the tiers system might have avoided both the need for a second England-wide lockdown and the subsequent closure of schools in January 2021.⁵²²⁵²² Matt Hancock 1 December 2023 3/17-21; INQ000232194_0144 para 558

¶6.234. As for when the second lockdown, once required, should have been imposed, Professors Vallance, Whitty and McLean all believed that it should have been imposed at an earlier date.⁵²³⁵²³ INQ000238826_0131 para 390; Christopher Whitty 22 November 2023 65/16-25; INQ000309529_0045 para 147 Other witnesses expressed similar views, including Sir Christopher Wormald (Permanent Secretary to the Department of Health and Social Care from May 2016 to December 2024), Mr Gove and Mr Cain.⁵²⁴⁵²⁴ INQ000280628_0067-0068 para 125; Michael Gove 28 November 2023 143/7-14; INQ000252711_0028 para 123

¶6.235. For his part, Mr Johnson told the Inquiry:

" I felt at the time – and still feel today – that the decision to impose a second lockdown was timely. If a government is to enforce such enormous restrictions on individual liberty, it must first try all other solutions."⁵²⁵⁵²⁵ INQ000255836_0155 para 549

¶6.236. The Inquiry accepts that a second lockdown was to be avoided at all costs. Unfortunately, the failure to take timely action had made one inevitable. Once the second lockdown had become inevitable, the sooner it was imposed the better. The Inquiry's view is that Mr Johnson should have ordered the imposition of a circuit breaker lockdown in late September or early October 2020.

¶6.237. Failure to take early and decisive public health action is likely to have dire implications in the context of a viral pandemic where the virus is spreading exponentially. Concern over the economic and societal damage ensuing from a circuit breaker had to give way to the greater imperative of saving lives. The failure to get a grip on the second wave sooner contributed to greater mortality and the inevitability of a second lockdown – one that was longer and, thus, more damaging.