The situation at the end of May 2022

The situation at the end of May 2022

¶Figure 38: Cumulative daily deaths per 100,000 by date of death from May 2021 to May 2022 across the UK

¶21 21 21 r2

¶

• 02 20 22 — 20

• 20 20 — 20

• 1 22 20 — 22

ay ly Ju be r be ar y ch ay M ar M ptem vem Janu M Se No

¶Source: UK Health Security Agency Covid-19 data dashboard archive (https://ukhsa-dashboard.data.gov.uk/covid-19-archive-data-download)

¶8.189. The UK government's COVID-19 Response: Living with COVID-19 document suffered from many of the flaws identified in strategies developed at earlier stages of the pandemic. The strategy, which was reliant on vaccines, was unlikely to be sufficient in the event of a variant emerging with increased transmissibility or severity or in an evolved state, such that the population did not enjoy either natural or vaccine-induced immunity. Clear plans should have been in place for implementing measures in such scenarios.

¶8.190. Scotland experienced a comparably higher level of hospitalisation of Covid-19 patients between May 2021 and May 2022 than the UK as a whole.⁵¹⁹⁵¹⁹ INQ000274150_0015 One reason for the higher number of hospitalisations might have been Scotland's "older and sicker" population, with higher levels of underlying health conditions, which placed people at greater risk.⁵²⁰⁵²⁰ INQ000215495_0042 para 164; Roger Halliday 17 January 2024 157/18-159/15 This was especially evident in areas that were economically disadvantaged.⁵²¹⁵²¹ INQ000215495_0042 para 164; INQ000215470_0012-0013 para 46 Although hospitalisations in Scotland were comparatively higher than the rest of the UK during this period, the number of deaths in Scotland remained lower than earlier in the pandemic. All governments were faced with difficult choices between balancing the direct harms from the virus and other harms. These choices became more difficult later in the pandemic because there had been prolonged social and economic harm caused by the restrictions. The easing of restrictions by the Scottish Government in this period was a recognition that the balance of harms had shifted from earlier in the pandemic.

¶8.191. The Welsh Government was sensible in maintaining some restrictions throughout the first few months of 2022 while it awaited further advice about the severity of the Omicron variant and the impact of the vaccines on direct harm.⁵²²⁵²² INQ000391115_0051-0055 paras 206-214 This mirrored the Welsh Government's approach throughout the period from May 2021 to May 2022 – decisions were informed by scientific advice as the Welsh Government sought to balance the competing harms of the virus.

¶8.192. The position in Northern Ireland merits separate consideration. The narrative of the Covid-19 pandemic in Northern Ireland is book-ended by the absence of an Executive. The Northern Ireland Executive re-formed on 11 January 2020 before, once again, collapsing on 3 February 2022. The power-sharing arrangements in Northern Ireland broadly require any decisions that are significant, controversial or cross-cutting to be referred to the Executive. Consequently, the absence of an Executive meant that such decisions simply could not be taken. It is plain from examining the Northern Ireland Executive's decision-making throughout this period that many, if not most or all, of the decisions relating to the pandemic response in Northern Ireland were of the sort that required referral to the Executive Committee. It was, therefore, fortunate that the power-sharing institutions in Northern Ireland had been restored just prior to the pandemic. Following Mr Givan's resignation, in the absence of a functioning Executive Committee, Mr Swann had no alternative but to replace all existing Covid-19 restrictions set out in regulations with guidance. In the context of an ongoing pandemic, this is clearly unacceptable. If a further wave of Covid-19 infection had occurred in Northern Ireland after 3 February 2022, it is difficult to envisage how it could have been managed within Northern Ireland in the absence of a functioning Executive. The Northern Ireland Executive should urgently consider how decisions that would usually be subject to ministerial approval would be taken should an emergency occur during the suspension of power-sharing arrangements.