A framework for emergency decision-making

¶11.93. Neither the UK government nor the Northern Ireland Executive had a formalised overarching framework to guide their decision-making during the pandemic. By contrast, as outlined in Chapter 5: Exit from lockdown, in Volume I, the Scottish Government published COVID-19 – A Framework for Decision Making (the four harms framework) on 23 April 2020.¹⁶⁸¹⁶⁸ COVID-19 – A Framework for Decision Making, Scottish Government, 23 April 2020 (https://www.gov.scot/publications/coronavirus-covid-19-framework-decision-making; INQ000369689) This document recognised four harms that emanated from the virus:

Harm 1: Direct harm to health as a result of Covid-19.
Harm 2: The wider impact on health and social care services – including how people used the services – and the postponement of other care and treatment in mobilising health and social care services in response to Covid-19.
Harm 3: Societal harm and harm to the broader way of living.
Harm 4: Economic harm.¹⁶⁹¹⁶⁹ COVID-19 – A Framework for Decision Making, Scottish Government, 23 April 2020 (https://www.gov.scot/publications/coronavirus-covid-19-framework-decision-making; INQ000369689)

¶11.94. The four harms framework was said to be an attempt "to give [the Scottish Government a] basis of reconciling some of those other harms with the acute health harm of Covid" and to reflect "the importance of a rational and evidence based approach to the relaxation of restrictions".¹⁷⁰¹⁷⁰ John Swinney 30 January 2024 161/12-15; INQ000287771_0047 para 97 Ms Sturgeon said that it provided "a rational basis for considering often conflicting harms".¹⁷¹¹⁷¹ INQ000339033_0041, 0089 paras 109, 243 Mr Swinney noted that the four harms framework "assembled the dilemmas" and that decision-makers "had to try to take the decisions that would allow us to navigate through those challenges".¹⁷²¹⁷² John Swinney 30 January 2024 138/14-18

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¶The recognition that the pandemic caused a multitude of harms across society – beyond the tragic loss of life as a direct result of Covid-19 infection – was essential.

¶Attempting to balance those harms was an extremely difficult task, particularly in the face of the uncertainty of the future course of the pandemic.

¶11.95. The four harms approach informed decision-making concerning Covid-19 in Scotland from April 2020 through to the lifting of the last legal measure in April 2022.¹⁷³¹⁷³ INQ000339033_0096 para 263 Although the Four Harms Group was not formally constituted until October 2020, Mr Swinney told the Inquiry that decision-making was consistent with the four harms framework from April 2020 and that "advisers were gathering together, putting that material together".¹⁷⁴¹⁷⁴ John Swinney 30 January 2024 167/8-20 The Scottish Cabinet began referring to the four harms from 28 April 2020.¹⁷⁵¹⁷⁵ INQ000214575_0008 para 28

¶11.96. In applying the four harms approach to its decision-making, the Scottish Cabinet proceeded on the basis that "limiting the spread of the virus should always be the first priority", with economic harms playing a secondary role. This was often in the context of a discussion about how those harms could be mitigated.¹⁷⁶¹⁷⁶ INQ000214451_0005 para 18(f) Harm 1 (direct harm to health as a result of Covid-19) was to be prioritised on the premise that "the only way to ultimately resolve [the other harms] was to deal with the Covid health harm".¹⁷⁷¹⁷⁷ Kate Forbes 30 January 2024 86/17-20 Kate Forbes MSP (Cabinet Secretary for Finance from February 2020 to May 2021 and Cabinet Secretary for Finance and the Economy from May 2021 to March 2023) explained that the logic of prioritising medical and scientific advice was that all the other harms would be more short-lived if infections were suppressed.¹⁷⁸¹⁷⁸ INQ000273982_0023 para 61 She said:

" [I]t was recognized that if Covid-19 was effectively managed through, for example, lockdowns then economic activity could restart more quickly. Failing to effectively manage Covid-19 could mean that economic activity was constrained and suppressed for longer."¹⁷⁹¹⁷⁹ INQ000273982_0025 para 66

¶11.97. The Scottish Government's thinking assumed that the economic harm of failing to bring the virus under control would be greater than the economic harm resulting from any measures it imposed. Prioritising the direct health harm of Covid-19 to this extent discouraged the consideration of whether some measures could provide a better balance across all four harms. Ms Forbes accepted that "we could have lessened the [economic] harm with better systems in place".¹⁸⁰¹⁸⁰ INQ000273982_0029-0030 para 78 For example, she noted:

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" We often provided funding to mitigate the impact of NPIs [non-pharmaceutical interventions] rather than avoid the harms of NPIs. For example, if we had invested in better technology up front for Test and Protect or in Education so that children's education wasn't disrupted, the harms might have been less pronounced."¹⁸¹¹⁸¹ INQ000273982_0009-0010 para 25

¶11.98. The four harms framework was a helpful basis upon which an evaluation of the harms caused by the countermeasures against the virus could be undertaken. However, the Inquiry agrees that the Four Harms Group's analysis and the Scottish Government's decision-making could have been more sophisticated in relation to the other harms caused by the prioritisation of limiting the spread of the virus.

¶11.99. As also outlined in Chapter 5: Exit from lockdown, in Volume I, on 24 April 2020 the Welsh Government published Leading Wales out of the Coronavirus Pandemic: A Framework for Recovery.¹⁸²¹⁸² Leading Wales out of the Coronavirus Pandemic: A Framework for Recovery, Welsh Government, April 2020 (https://www.gov. wales/sites/default/files/publications/2020-04/leading-wales-out-of-the-coronavirus-pandemic.pdf; INQ000349353) This framework was based on three pillars:

the evidence by which the Welsh Government would judge the current infection level and transmission rates;
the seven principles that would "form the basis for our approach to easing the current restrictions" – including whether a measure was of "relatively high positive economic benefit" and "high positive equality impact"; and
how the Welsh Government would enhance its public health surveillance and response system to enable it to track the virus.

¶Mr Drakeford said that "this framework formed the basis for the 21-day reviews that were carried out by Cabinet from 7 May onwards".¹⁸³¹⁸³ INQ000371209_0047 para 154

¶11.100. The Welsh Government's framework was updated on 15 May 2020 with the publication of Unlocking our Society and Economy: Continuing the Conversation, which provided a 'traffic light' guide to how the government would ease restrictions. It also referred to a series of "circuit breakers" – by which it meant indicators that could trigger restrictions, rather than the restrictions themselves – which would be monitored and would trigger decision-making on the reimposition of measures.¹⁸⁴¹⁸⁴ Unlocking Our Society and Economy: Continuing the Conversation, Welsh Government, 15 May 2020, pp11-12 (https://www.gov. wales/sites/default/files/publications/2020-05/unlocking-our-society-and-economy-continuing-the-conversation.pdf; INQ000320855) The first Coronavirus Control Plan for Wales, published on 18 August 2020, confirmed that the three pillars continued to "underpin" the Welsh Government's actions.¹⁸⁵¹⁸⁵ Coronavirus Control Plan for Wales, Welsh Government, August 2020, p6 (https://www.gov.wales/sites/default/files/ publications/2020-08/coronavirus-control-plan-for-wales.pdf; INQ000349794) These "circuit breakers" informed its decisions, and their breach formed an integral part of the advice provided to the Welsh Government to enact the 'firebreak' lockdown in October 2020.¹⁸⁶¹⁸⁶ INQ000048801_0002 para 1.4; INQ000048877_0003-0004

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¶11.101. The framework and the list of indicators continued to be updated in the next iterations of the Coronavirus Control Plan for Wales, to take account of new variants and the vaccine rollout.¹⁸⁷¹⁸⁷ Coronavirus Control Plan: Alert Levels in Wales – A Guide to Restrictions, Welsh Government, December 2020, pp4, 18 (https://www.gov.wales/sites/default/files/publications/2020-12/coronavirus-control-plan-alert-levels-in-wales.pdf; INQ000227576); Coronavirus Control Plan: Alert Levels in Wales – Coming out of Lockdown, Welsh Government, February 2021, p17 (https://www.gov. wales/sites/default/files/publications/2021-02/coronavirus-control-plan-alert-levels-in-wales-coming-out-of-lockdown.pdf; INQ000081858); Coronavirus Control Plan: Revised Alert Levels in Wales (March 2021), Welsh Government, March 2021, pp4-14 (https://www.gov.wales/sites/default/files/publications/2021-03/coronavirus-control-plan-revised-alert-levels-in-wales-march-2021.pdf; INQ000066069)Show full note By the time the July 2021 iteration was published, while the principles in the previous frameworks continued to apply, the Welsh Government was "confident that the balance of harms is shifting" and thus the indicators would be revisited.¹⁸⁸¹⁸⁸ Coronavirus Control Plan: Alert Level Zero, Welsh Government, July 2021, pp6-16 (https://www.gov.wales/sites/default/files/ publications/2021-09/coronavirus-control-plan-alert-level-zero-0.pdf; INQ000066070) The final iteration of the framework, Coronavirus Control Plan: Autumn and Winter 2021 Update, published in October 2021, confirmed the continued approach to balancing "the direct and indirect harms of different responses and restrictions".¹⁸⁹¹⁸⁹ Coronavirus Control Plan: Autumn and Winter 2021 Update, Welsh Government, October 2021, pp5-7 (https://www.gov.wales/ sites/default/files/publications/2021-10/coronavirus-control-plan-autumn-and-winter-2021-update.pdf; INQ000082368) It outlined the Welsh Government's strategic aims and principles, which included balancing of the 'five harms', and formally recognised those harms that exacerbated or created new inequalities.¹⁹⁰¹⁹⁰ Coronavirus Control Plan: Autumn and Winter 2021 Update, Welsh Government, October 2021, p7 (https://www.gov.wales/sites/ default/files/publications/2021-10/coronavirus-control-plan-autumn-and-winter-2021-update.pdf; INQ000082368). The five harms were: direct harms arising from coronavirus; indirect health harms; social harms; economic harms; and harms from coronavirus or the response exacerbating existing inequalities or creating new ones.Show full note

¶11.102. The Welsh Government had a framework to inform its decision-making in place from the easing of the second lockdown through to the lifting of restrictions in 2022. This framework outlined the ways in which the Welsh Government would measure the spread of and various harms from Covid-19, and how it would use various indicators to inform its decision-making in response. This framework was regularly reviewed and refreshed at appropriate junctures throughout the pandemic as new information came to light, and required Welsh ministers to seek to balance the various competing harms caused by Covid-19.

Dashboards and emergency decision-making

¶11.103. The way in which data to inform decision-making were presented to UK ministers developed from January to March 2020.¹⁹¹¹⁹¹ INQ000228382_0016 para 9.1; INQ000092893_0018-0019 paras 3.4-3.6; INQ000255836_0055 para 223 From 24 January 2020, data in England were presented to decision-makers through the commonly recognised information picture (CRIP), which was intended to provide decision-makers with "basic situational awareness to inform their decision-making".¹⁹²¹⁹² INQ000228382_0016-0017 paras 9.1-9.2; INQ000092893_0018-0019 paras 3.4-3.6 However, CRIPs initially included few data fields and little insight.¹⁹³¹⁹³ INQ000228382_0017 para 9.2 From 4 February 2020, the UK government also produced a daily, cross-departmental SitRep, which summarised the domestic and international position, scientific advice and communications.¹⁹⁴¹⁹⁴ INQ000092893_0019 para 3.5

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¶11.104. Following a request from Mr Johnson for a UK government dashboard that presented cross-departmental data on a daily basis in a more structured and visual way, a rudimentary dashboard was developed by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat.¹⁹⁵¹⁹⁵ INQ000183888 This was known as the Covid-19 Dashboard. It replaced CRIPs and SitReps on 16 March 2020.¹⁹⁶¹⁹⁶ The first dashboard can be found at INQ000174708. See also INQ000092893_0019 paras 3.6-3.7.

¶11.105. The Covid-19 Dashboard became a more sophisticated interactive digital tool on 24 March 2020.¹⁹⁷¹⁹⁷ INQ000255836_0055 para 223 This digital version of the dashboard was used to brief Mr Johnson and other senior UK government decision-makers at Covid-19 Strategy Ministerial Group meetings (which became Covid-19 Dashboard meetings in May 2020) from 26 March.¹⁹⁸¹⁹⁸ INQ000255836_0055 para 223; INQ000056267_0004 It was decided at the meeting of the Covid-19 Strategy Ministerial Group on 26 March that the dashboard should be "the single source of truth on data for PM meetings", and that only data "represented on the … dashboard" should be discussed in them.¹⁹⁹¹⁹⁹ INQ000056119 This decision meant that it was important for the dashboard to contain all the necessary data to inform ministers.

¶11.106. The Covid-19 Dashboard was also shared with the devolved administrations to ensure the four governments were working from the same data.²⁰⁰²⁰⁰ INQ000255836_0181 para 623; INQ000259848_0011 para 19c However, from April 2020, the devolved administrations began to use their own equivalents of dashboards.²⁰¹²⁰¹ INQ000048827 (an example of the Knowledge and Analytics Service data monitor); INQ000389184_0037-0038, 0041-0042 paras 130, 142; INQ000327735_0090-0091 paras 356-358; INQ000130401; INQ000412903_0063 para 192; INQ000360968_0024 para 7.2.3 Those dashboards contained key information and were the central points of reference for data for those governments during the pandemic.²⁰²²⁰² Jeremy Miles 12 March 2024 157/4-7; INQ000274147_0012-0015 paras 45-49; INQ000438174_0021 para 62; INQ000421714_0037 para 161; INQ000412903_0063 para 192

¶11.107. The range of data that the UK government Covid-19 Dashboard contained evolved throughout the pandemic. It included data on health, economic and social impacts.²⁰³²⁰³ See, for example, versions of the Covid-19 Dashboard dated 22 March 2020 (INQ000056000), 26 March 2020 (INQ000183917), 30 October 2020 (INQ000184002) and 4 January 2021 (INQ000136711). The dashboard showed the source of the data, as well as analysts' confidence in the data's validity, to help decision-makers gauge how much weight to attach to them.²⁰⁴²⁰⁴ INQ000228382_0019 para 9.17 Basing decisions on quality-assured data reduced the likelihood of data being cherry- picked to support a particular policy decision.²⁰⁵²⁰⁵ INQ000228382_0019-0020 paras 9.19-9.20 Nonetheless, the reliance by the UK government on the limited data in the Covid-19 Dashboard, at least in the initial months of the pandemic, skewed its decision-making. Data not included in the dashboard, such as longer-term impacts that were not immediately quantifiable (eg the impact on children of missing in-person schooling or the increase in domestic abuse) were at times overlooked.²⁰⁶²⁰⁶ INQ000273841_0025-0026 para 45 Decision-makers in any future pandemic should be mindful not to rely solely on the most readily available quantitative data. Consideration should also be given to longer-term health, social and economic impacts, which may not be easily quantifiable and which indicate less visible harms.²⁰⁷²⁰⁷ INQ000273841_0025-0026, 0056-0057 paras 45, 112, 113

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¶11.108. The introduction of the dashboards was not possible at the start of 2020 because the Cabinet Office lacked sufficient capability at the outset of the pandemic to launch a sophisticated data presentation tool.²⁰⁸²⁰⁸ INQ000273872_0085 para 414 Dashboard capability, infrastructure (including people) analytics and data streams should have been available and ready to activate at the outset of the pandemic. It took the Cabinet Office too long to build sufficient capability to improve the quality of the dashboard.

Continuity of decision-making during an emergency

¶11.109. It is possible that key decision-makers or advisers will become incapacitated during a national emergency. In a pandemic, it is entirely predictable that they may fall seriously ill or die. As outlined in Chapter 5: Exit from lockdown, in Volume I, Mr Johnson was unable to carry out his duties as Prime Minister for a period in April 2020 while he was ill with Covid-19, and Mr Raab deputised for him.²⁰⁹²⁰⁹ 'Statement from Downing Street: 6 April 2020', Prime Minister's Office, 6 April 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-from-downing-street-6-april-2020; INQ000182383) A number of decision-makers and senior advisers in the UK government were also ill with Covid-19 at the same time in March and April 2020.²¹⁰²¹⁰ These included Mr Hancock, Professor Whitty, Sir Mark Sedwill, Ms MacNamara and Dr Ben Warner (Special Adviser to the Prime Minister from December 2019 to May 2021).

¶11.110. Limited planning had been carried out by the UK government for succession arrangements in these circumstances.²¹¹²¹¹ Dominic Raab 29 November 2023 211/15-212/3 Although Mr Johnson had informed Mr Raab verbally when appointing him as First Secretary of State that he should deputise if Mr Johnson were ever indisposed, Mr Raab described the contingency planning that was in place as "pretty sparse".²¹²²¹² Dominic Raab 29 November 2023 208/20-209/6; INQ000268041_0038 para 125 There was no clear plan setting out the arrangements to be put in place to ensure continuity of leadership and decision-making.²¹³²¹³ INQ000252711_0012 para 47 Ms MacNamara drafted a high-level plan around the time that Mr Johnson became ill, which outlined how decision-making might continue should Mr Johnson become so ill that he was unable to make decisions on a short-term basis.²¹⁴²¹⁴ INQ000286029; Helen MacNamara 1 November 2023 52/18-53/3; INQ000273841_0046-0047 paras 88-89 It did not identify what arrangements might be put in place if Mr Johnson was incapacitated on a long-term basis with Covid-19.²¹⁵²¹⁵ INQ000286029_0003

¶11.111. Mr Raab explained that it was unclear how he was to do the job, as there was no manual or guidance.²¹⁶²¹⁶ Dominic Raab 29 November 2023 209/21-25 He stated that there ought to be clear guidance outlining how the role of deputising should be carried out.²¹⁷²¹⁷ Dominic Raab 29 November 2023 212/22-213/8 Ms MacNamara told the Inquiry that, while she and Sir Mark Sedwill had done some limited work on this matter in the summer of 2018, "there should have been more thinking in advance" for this eventuality and "there was an unavoidable element of making it up as we went along".²¹⁸²¹⁸ Helen MacNamara 1 November 2023 55/12-16; INQ000273841_0045-0046, 0048-0049 paras 86-87, 94

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¶11.112. It was through good fortune rather than proper planning that decision-making in the UK government with regard to its response to Covid-19 continued during this period. This was primarily because key decisions (such as about the first lockdown) had already been taken when Mr Johnson became ill. The circumstances – and their implications for decision-making – might have been quite different had Mr Johnson been incapacitated in early or mid-March 2020. It is not clear how critical decisions would have been made if he had fallen ill at this earlier time, or if he had not subsequently recovered. Ms MacNamara told the Inquiry that "it would have been much harder to manage had the Prime Minister been ill for longer".²¹⁹²¹⁹ INQ000273841_0049 para 95; see also INQ000308297

¶11.113. The Inquiry did not receive specific evidence about succession planning in the devolved administrations, because there was no cause to delegate powers during the pandemic as there was in the UK government. However, there are statutory provisions in place in each nation to allow for temporary delegation of First Ministerial functions in the event of absence or incapacity.²²⁰²²⁰ See section 45(4) of the Scotland Act 1998 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/contents), section 46(5) of the Government of Wales Act 2006 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/32/contents) and section 16A(11) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/47/contents) Nevertheless, the existence of statutory powers does not, in itself, guarantee effective succession planning. Clear and pre-agreed succession arrangements should be established in all four nations as part of planning for civil emergencies so that there is no ambiguity and to ensure continuity of leadership and decision-making should the incumbent for any reason be unable to act.

Recommendation 11: Contingency arrangements for key individuals

¶The UK government and devolved administrations should each establish formal arrangements for covering the roles of Prime Minister and First Minister (and in Northern Ireland, deputy First Minister) as applicable during a whole-system civil emergency, should the incumbent be unable to undertake their duties for any reason.

Recording decisions appropriately

¶11.114. To a significant degree, decision-making processes have always been informed by informal channels of communication outside the confines of formal meetings. Discussions using messaging platforms (including SMS text messages, iMessages and WhatsApps) largely reflect the type of conversations that would, in the past, have taken place informally in person. This was exacerbated during the pandemic by an understandable and obvious need to communicate and act quickly. The Inquiry was provided with a large volume of such material. For example, in the course of Module 2 alone, the Inquiry received approximately 250 different WhatsApp group or one-to-one conversations from over 24 custodians. However, a significant number of such messages were not retained, when they should have been – some deliberately, some accidentally and some in accordance with what owners believed was government policy.²²¹²²¹ See, for example, INQ000255836_0220 para 730; INQ000263374_0015 paras 43-45; INQ000207294_0054-0055 paras 5.12- 5.15; INQ000250229_0002 para 4; Mark Sedwill 8 November 2023 2/13-3/1; INQ000273833_0016 para 57; Helen MacNamara 1 November 2023 7/9-8/6; INQ000207294_0056 para 5.21; INQ000215035_0002 para 6; 'PM House of Commons Statement on COVID: 12 May 2021', Prime Minister's Office and Boris Johnson, 12 May 2021 (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-house- of-commons-statement-on-covid-12-may-2021; INQ000273904); Simon Case 23 May 2024 16/23-17/16; INQ000215035_0002 para 6; INQ000273979_0004, 0006-0007 paras 10, 16; INQ000273980_0006-0007 para 20; INQ000319509_0001-0002; Nicola Sturgeon 31 January 2024 33/25-34/17; INQ000273980_0015 para 42; INQ000287771_0008-0010 para 18; INQ000371233_0027 para 89; INQ000391237_0008 paras 26-28; INQ000303219_0073; INQ000331038_0248; INQ000303220_0031; INQ000479040; INQ000493685_0001-0003; INQ000255838_0030-0031 paras 112-113; INQ000436641_0102-0103 paras 400-404; Michelle O'Neill 14 May 2024 153/16-159/17; INQ000412903_0089-0090 paras 294-295; INQ000409641_0001; INQ000436641_0102 para 400; INQ000400592_0005, 0010, 0017; INQ000409705_0010; INQ000409694; INQ000409737_0006Show full note

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¶11.115. Mr Johnson told the Inquiry that there "was not 'Government by WhatsApp'" in the UK government during the pandemic.²²²²²² INQ000255836_0221-0222 para 736 However, there was evidence of UK government WhatsApp discussions about: possible interventions in March 2020; the lifting of restrictions in the summer of 2020; whether to implement a 'circuit breaker' lockdown in September 2020; the viability of population segmentation; mandating face coverings; and the reduction in social distancing.²²³²²³ INQ000102265_0002; INQ000283296_0002; INQ000129357; see also INQ000232194_0023 para 90e; INQ000259848_0076 para 167; INQ000303252_0006; INQ000251645_0026 para 2.62; INQ000248853_0053 para 5.161

¶11.116. Key decision-makers such as Ms Sturgeon and Mr Swinney used private phones for official business throughout the pandemic and to discuss aspects of the response. Ms Sturgeon used direct messaging on the social media platform Twitter (subsequently known as X) to discuss the pandemic response with Professor Devi Sridhar, Professor of Global Public Health at the University of Edinburgh and a member of the Scottish Government Covid-19 Advisory Group.²²⁴²²⁴ Nicola Sturgeon 31 January 2024 53/12-54/12; INQ000273979_0001-0002 paras 1-2; INQ000287766_0018; INQ000398982_0012, 0027

¶11.117. The Inquiry also saw examples of substantive discussions between ministers, civil servants and special advisers in Northern Ireland on instant communication channels.²²⁵²²⁵ INQ000400592_0005, 0010, 0017; INQ000371378_0004-0006; INQ000356174_0008, 0009, 0010, 0037, 0055

¶11.118. Although Welsh Government-issued phones did not support the use of WhatsApp, a number of relevant WhatsApp messages were disclosed to the Inquiry from ministers and officials from either personal devices or devices issued by the Welsh Parliament.²²⁶²²⁶ INQ000371233_0027 para 89; INQ000391237_0008 paras 26-27; INQ000396686_0003; INQ000436641_0102 para 400; INQ000400592_0005, 0010, 0017

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¶11.119. The use of instant communication channels as part of decision-making processes can compromise that decision-making. It risks decisions being made without decision-makers being properly sighted on all relevant matters and in the absence of sufficient advice. Moreover, subsequent debate may well be rendered less effective and less well-informed if decision-makers have already made up their minds based on preceding informal discussions.

¶11.120. Senior civil servants in the UK government expressed concerns on a number of occasions about the extent to which Mr Johnson's use of WhatsApp was affecting the quality of decision-making.²²⁷²²⁷ INQ000265619_0009; INQ000326485_0010; INQ000303252_0006 Mr Case intervened a number of times "to try and get serious discussions off WhatsApps".²²⁸²²⁸ Simon Case 23 May 2024 9/9-25; INQ000303252_0026 He told the Inquiry that this was necessary to ensure Mr Johnson was advised by people with the relevant expertise before making decisions, and for proper record-keeping of decision-making.²²⁹²²⁹ Simon Case 23 May 2024 10/1-11/15; see also INQ000303252_0006 It was also not always clear who was responsible for actioning matters raised in such informal forums.²³⁰²³⁰ INQ000265619_0009

¶11.121. Professor Whitty regarded WhatsApp as a poor means of communicating complicated technical advice, and sought to ensure this was supplemented with proper written advice to avoid misunderstandings.²³¹²³¹ INQ000251645_0026 para 2.62; INQ000248853_0053 para 5.161; see also INQ000228750_0002; INQ000238826_0171-0172 paras 516-520; INQ000102697_0002-0004, 0015-0017; INQ000228750_0002; INQ000251645_0026 para 2.62 One such misunderstanding arose in March 2020 in relation to the efficacy of testing asymptomatic individuals as a result of these issues being discussed on WhatsApp rather than on the basis of formal written advice.²³²²³² INQ000228750_0002; INQ000238826_0171-0172 paras 516-520; INQ000102697_0002-0004, 0015-0017 Professor Whitty stated that this was a "classic example of why government by Whatsapp is not the way to deal with these kinds of things".²³³²³³ INQ000228750_0002; INQ000238826_0171-0172 paras 516-520

¶11.122. The use of private channels also makes official record-keeping of decision-making more difficult and less reliable, which is likely to undermine external scrutiny of decision-making, transparency and, ultimately, public accountability.²³⁴²³⁴ WhatsApp in Government: How Ministers and Officials should use Messaging Apps – and how they shouldn't, Institute for Government, March 2022, p5 (https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/whatsapp-in-government. pdf; INQ000267871) The ability of government to comply with its legal obligations (including those under the Public Records Act 1958) in response to freedom of information requests, during court processes and in the work of public inquiries may also be impeded.²³⁵²³⁵ Public Records Act 1958 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Eliz2/6-7/51)

¶11.123. As a result, robust policies and practices for the use and retention of private, informal communications in government are essential. Despite this, it was not until March 2021, when it first became possible to download WhatsApp onto corporate devices, that 10 Downing Street put in place an internal policy specifically on the use and retention of WhatsApp messages.²³⁶²³⁶ INQ000218356; Simon Case 23 May 2024 6/10-17; INQ000207294_0056 para 5.21 The policy stated that WhatsApp was:

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" not officially approved for use in UK Government at this point. You should therefore be mindful of what you discuss on WhatsApp …

¶WhatsApp can be used for things like:

Confirming who is in the office,

Confirm a time for a meeting

Confirm receipt of a document …

WhatsApp chat should NOT:

Include any discussion about detailed policy or policy development …

I f you find a chat is unexpectedly developing into a more sensitive conversation, you should move the chat onto the No10 [10 Downing Street] IT system and continue it there."²³⁷²³⁷ INQ000218356

¶11.124. The Scottish Government's October 2019 Records Management Policy recognised that information needed to be retained not only about the context of decisions that had been taken, but also the rationale behind those decisions.²³⁸²³⁸ INQ000309551_0003 Yet a further policy, introduced in April 2020, stated that "messages should be deleted as soon as they are no longer needed", without providing a clear definition of what should be retained and why.²³⁹²³⁹ INQ000274180_0008. A further Records Management Policy (introduced in February 2021) clarified the material to be retained, stating that this included the "who, what, when, and why" of decision-making (INQ000309534). In November 2021, in a Mobile Messaging Apps Policy, the Scottish Government also introduced a specific obligation to transcribe the "salient points of any business discussions and/or decisions" at regular intervals onto the corporate record. See INQ000309543_0005 para 4.1; see also INQ000274180_0008.Show full note

¶11.125. Welsh Government policies required any instant communications that formed part of the public record to be saved on official systems, while "personal WhatsApp accounts may not be used for Welsh Government business".²⁴⁰²⁴⁰ INQ000396686_0003; INQ000218356; INQ000396684_0001 para 4; INQ000396685_0017-0018 para 6.6; INQ000371233_0027 para 89; INQ000391237_0008 paras 26-27 Nonetheless, concerns were raised that some individuals in the Welsh Government might have felt pressured to use instant communications in breach of policy to avoid being left out of relevant discussions.²⁴¹²⁴¹ INQ000396694

¶11.126. Ministerial guidance in place in Northern Ireland from March 2020 required all communications relating to official business to be captured on official information management systems or, at the very least, copied to an official email account.²⁴²²⁴² INQ000409728_0014 para 7.3

¶11.127. Since the pandemic, updated guidance about the use of non-corporate communication channels has been issued. In the UK government, "significant government information" must be "captured" on government systems at an appropriate frequency to support accountability, although there is limited information to help users identify what this is intended to cover.²⁴³²⁴³ INQ000421804_0002-0003 paras 14, 19, 23, 24; see also INQ000218356_0001 The Inquiry was also told that this policy was unlikely to require the recording on government systems of the WhatsApp material considered during the Module 2 hearings.²⁴⁴²⁴⁴ Simon Case 23 May 2024 11/16-13/17

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¶11.128. In December 2024, the Scottish Government announced that it would end the use of mobile messaging apps on official devices by the spring of 2025. Ministers would be expected to use a corporate device for Scottish Government business.²⁴⁵²⁴⁵ WhatsApp in Government: How Ministers and Officials should use Messaging Apps – and how they shouldn't, Institute for Government, March 2022 (https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/whatsapp-in-government.pdf; INQ000548300); see also the Scottish Government's Records Management Policy dated October 2019 (INQ000309551) and its Records Management Policy dated February 2021 (INQ000309534_0003), as well as its Mobile Messaging Apps Policy dated November 2021 (INQ000309543).Show full note

¶11.129. In Northern Ireland, as each Executive Department is a separate entity, there are multiple policies touching on similar issues, separate policies in respect of ministers and officials, and multiple versions of the same policies across different departments.²⁴⁶²⁴⁶ Jayne Brady 3 May 2024 156/17, 158/5-7 Jayne Brady, Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service from September 2021, described the resulting policy landscape as "fragmented and inconsistent" and agreed that "in the overall framework there is a significant opportunity for consistency in application".²⁴⁷²⁴⁷ Jayne Brady 3 May 2024 156/14-17, 158/5-7

¶11.130. Government business should be conducted using approved channels on official devices. This is to ensure the adequacy of decision-making processes and the retention of the requisite records, as well as to protect the security of communications. However, if in exceptional circumstances a person uses a private device for government business, they must ensure that all communications are retained and transferred to official systems. Policies should be updated to ensure this. Otherwise, governments have no real oversight of the extent to which private devices, as well as instant communication channels, are being used for government business. Appropriate record-keeping is also reliant upon individuals proactively identifying and transferring relevant information to official systems.

¶11.131. Relevant policies and codes of conduct for ministers and officials should reflect the seriousness of these principles. They should also be updated regularly to take into account current practices and also technological developments.

Civil Service support for decision-making

¶11.132. As described in Chapter 9: Scientific and technical advice, in this volume, decision-makers were provided with scientific and technical advice from various experts and bodies on the public health aspects of Covid-19 and the response, as well as from various parts of government on the economic, social and educational impacts of both the virus and the interventions.

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¶11.133. By the end of the pandemic, each of the four governments had a body to bring together these different strands of advice. In the UK government, this was the responsibility of the Covid-19 Taskforce, while the Four Harms Group and the Covid-19 Project Team performed similar roles for the Scottish and Welsh governments respectively. In Northern Ireland, this function was carried out by the Executive Covid Taskforce (see further below).

¶11.134. The UK government Covid-19 Taskforce was made up of officials and was responsible for developing the UK government's response strategy between late May 2020 and 31 March 2022.²⁴⁸²⁴⁸ Simon Ridley 7 November 2023 38/10-16; INQ000248852_0002 para 1.6; INQ000092893_0042 para 5.62; see also INQ000092893_0040-0041 paras 5.53, 5.57-5.58; INQ000252914_0086 para 376 It was formed as a result of the recommendation in Ms MacNamara's May 2020 review that a unit be established in the Cabinet Office to provide strategic leadership on the response.²⁴⁹²⁴⁹ INQ000136763_0005; INQ000273841_0073 para 148; INQ000207294_0016 para 3.11; Simon Ridley 7 November 2023 38/10-17; INQ000252914_0094 para 408; INQ000092893_0040 para 5.53; INQ000137226 The creation of the Covid-19 Taskforce rectified three deficiencies that had impeded the UK government's decision-making:

It provided clarity within the UK government as to which team within the Cabinet Office was responsible for supporting decision-making, and for ensuring that there was a single, consistent voice on strategy and policy across government.²⁵⁰²⁵⁰ Dominic Cummings 31 October 2023 127/7-23; INQ000252914_0086 paras 376-377 The Covid-19 Taskforce worked closely with UK government departments – in particular, the Department of Health and Social Care and the Treasury – and with Professors Whitty and Vallance to develop its advice.²⁵¹²⁵¹ Simon Ridley 7 November 2023 42/15-22 In doing so, it played a critical role in coordinating the UK government response across Whitehall and in improving the relationship between the Cabinet Office and the Treasury.²⁵²²⁵² INQ000263374_0005 para 20; INQ000255836_0100 para 373; INQ000092893_0040 para 5.54
It ensured that Mr Johnson received unified and consistent advice from 10 Downing Street and the Cabinet Office.²⁵³²⁵³ INQ000252914_0086 para 377 The Covid-19 Taskforce was the principal body responsible for briefing and advising Mr Johnson on all aspects of the pandemic.²⁵⁴²⁵⁴ INQ000302484_0027 para 102
It fulfilled the need for a single team at the centre to synthesise evidence across government to advise decision-makers on the development of strategy and the probable health, economic and social trade-offs of any potential decision.²⁵⁵²⁵⁵ INQ000207294_0015 para 3.8.2; INQ000302484_0034 para 130; INQ000092893_0040 para 5.54; Rishi Sunak 11 December 2023 19/22-20/5; INQ000248852_0002-0003 para 1.7 Prior to the creation of the Covid-19 Taskforce, no team in the UK government was responsible for doing this.²⁵⁶²⁵⁶ Simon Case 23 May 2024 86/1-22; INQ000236243_0023-0024 para 76 Mr Thomas told the Inquiry that, up until May 2020, there were issues in the Cabinet Office with: "talented individuals working extremely hard, extremely long hours, but not in a decision-making structure that was good either at responding quickly and authoritatively to rapidly developing external events or synthesising complex material that was coming in from scientists, economic advisers, other departments".²⁵⁷²⁵⁷ Alex Thomas 13 October 2023 15/22-16/14

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¶11.135. As the Covid-19 Taskforce provided a secretariat function to Covid-S and Covid-O, its creation meant that a single team had oversight of the advice being provided to both committees, and of their decisions. Teams within the Covid-19 Taskforce had specific responsibilities, including for the commissioning of advice and the analysis of data drawn from across multiple areas, including health, science, economics and public services.²⁵⁸²⁵⁸ INQ000248852_0007, 0008, 0011 paras 2.13, 2.14, 2.22.3 As outlined in Chapter 9: Scientific and technical advice, in this volume, the Covid-19 Taskforce took responsibility for commissioning advice from SAGE in order to ensure consistency of commissions from across government.

¶11.136. As outlined in Chapters 2 to 6, in Volume I, of this Report, before the Covid-19 Taskforce was functioning effectively, the UK government's structures for establishing a proper strategic approach were inadequate. The UK government understood that there had to be a balance between health, economic, educational and social impacts. However, in the absence of a body able to properly advise on the public health, economic and social trade-offs of potential decisions, the UK government failed to appreciate sufficiently that the imposition of the most stringent restrictions, including a lockdown, was not incompatible with seeking to minimise economic and societal harm if it led to a speedier reduction in the transmission of the virus and thus reduced the consequential need to impose further restrictions. Instead, as Mr Thomas explained, "decision-making became a 'tug-of-war' rather than a search for the best outcome".²⁵⁹²⁵⁹ INQ000236243_0030 para 98

¶11.137. This tension was particularly evident in respect of decision-making concerning the easing of the first lockdown in the summer of 2020 and in the lead-up to the second lockdown in England in the autumn of 2020.²⁶⁰²⁶⁰ INQ000236243_0030 para 98 Mr Thomas told the Inquiry that, during this period, the Department of Health and Social Care and the Treasury adopted opposing positions on the need for future restrictions, with the Department of Health and Social Care "focused on limiting the spread of the disease (arguably under-pricing the economic and social damage of lockdowns)" and the Treasury focused on:

" opening up the economy (arguably under-appreciating that a thriving economy was reliant on successfully controlling the virus)".²⁶¹²⁶¹ INQ000236243_0025-0026 para 81

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¶Mr Thomas stated that this period of decision-making was therefore:

" confused … because the objectives of different parts of government were not aligned, and the centre was not clear or strong enough to impose coherence".²⁶²²⁶² INQ000236243_0025-0026 para 81

¶11.138. Evidence from different UK government departments could not be drawn together appropriately for decision-makers to consider the potential trade-offs of different policy options.²⁶³²⁶³ INQ000236243_0030 para 98 Instead, Mr Johnson was often presented, in effect, with a zero- sum choice between protecting health (as advocated by the Department of Health and Social Care and Mr Hancock) and protecting the economy (as advocated by the Treasury and Mr Sunak).²⁶⁴²⁶⁴ INQ000236243_0030 para 98 In reality, there were likely more nuanced options available to decision-makers, but these could not be properly explored.

¶11.139. In Scotland, the Four Harms Group was convened in late October 2020, with responsibility for discussing direct health harm, broader health harm, social harm and economic harm, as well as potential responses to inform advice for decision-making.²⁶⁵²⁶⁵ INQ000280694 Prior to this, cross-governmental cooperation within the Scottish Government was said to be "informal".²⁶⁶²⁶⁶ INQ000215470_0007 para 25 Ms Sturgeon noted that the Four Harms Group was established "to help operationalise the Four Harms approach", bringing together senior officials and advisers as well as analysts and Public Health Scotland.²⁶⁷²⁶⁷ INQ000339033_0041, 0089 paras 109, 243; see also INQ000339033_0002-0004 para 8 and, for example, INQ000214575 and INQ000232665 Although the four harms framework was applied by the Scottish Cabinet from April 2020, the group – with its cross-governmental approach and senior membership – should have been constituted earlier.

¶11.140. The Northern Ireland Executive established a Civil Service-led Executive Covid Taskforce in December 2020.²⁶⁸²⁶⁸ INQ000065437 and INQ000212987; see also INQ000438174_0128-0129 paras 489, 490 Its terms of reference were clear that it would complement rather than replace existing delivery arrangements, to "improve clarity of mission, coordination of activities, and provide a holistic approach to communication".²⁶⁹²⁶⁹ INQ000212987_0002 para 1; INQ000411509_0023-0024 para 108 The Executive Covid Taskforce subsequently consolidated work already taking place across departments, local government and public sector agencies, as well as provided advice to support the Northern Ireland Executive Committee's decision-making.²⁷⁰²⁷⁰ INQ000438174_0050, 0128 paras 185, 486 It also ran a Cross-Departmental Working Group to consider the proposals relating to the relaxation of restrictions, and established a four-weekly review of restrictions.²⁷¹²⁷¹ INQ000438174_0129 para 490; INQ000421714_0004 para 21

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¶11.141. Events in the earlier stages of the pandemic had demonstrated a need to improve coordination of activities across government in Northern Ireland. According to Dr Jenny Pyper (Interim Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service from December 2020 to August 2021), there was also a failure to consider, sufficiently, the wider societal factors beyond health, including the economic implications of interventions.²⁷²²⁷² INQ000411509_0013 para 57

¶11.142. There was some initial resistance to the establishment of the Executive Covid Taskforce from the Minister for Health and the Minister for the Economy, which appeared to reflect a desire to retain control of their respective departments' activities.²⁷³²⁷³ INQ000065721_0008; INQ000196688_0003; INQ000411509_0022-0023 paras 102-104; Jenny Pyper 2 May 2024 195/13- 196/24, 199/18-200/2; INQ000412903_0058 para 175 Others suggested that the taskforce was "an obstacle to direct decision making by the Executive", "was very process-driven" and "tended to lean towards DoH's [Department of Health (Northern Ireland)] position".²⁷⁴²⁷⁴ INQ000436924_0020 para 78; INQ000415449_0016 para 57 Dr Pyper considered that the Executive Covid Taskforce's main limitation was the reluctance of officials in the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) to share emerging health data until they had been discussed with the Minister for Health.²⁷⁵²⁷⁵ INQ000411509_0025-0026 para 116 Nonetheless, several witnesses suggested that the taskforce did improve the practical coordination and alignment of the Northern Ireland Executive's response to the pandemic.²⁷⁶²⁷⁶ INQ000411509_0024 para 109; INQ000436642_0032 para 143; INQ000417101_0019 para 78; INQ000418976_0042 para 134 Ms Long noted that earlier engagement across departments and with stakeholders also served to reduce tensions within the Executive Committee regarding the non-health impacts of measures and their relaxation.²⁷⁷²⁷⁷ INQ000436642_0032 para 143

¶11.143. Overall, the Executive Covid Taskforce appears to have been a positive development which recognised the need for an improved cross-governmental response to the pandemic as a means of improving Executive Committee decision-making.²⁷⁸²⁷⁸ INQ000417101_0029 para 115 The establishment of the Executive Covid Taskforce to synthesise such information was, therefore, an appropriate step to take, albeit it ought to have been taken at an earlier stage.

¶11.144. In Wales, Reg Kilpatrick (Director in the Welsh Government with responsibility for civil contingencies from 2013) had established the Covid-19 Project Team in March 2020.²⁷⁹²⁷⁹ INQ000048808; INQ000274156_0013-0015 paras 42-47 This coordinated the Welsh Government's policy response, which included making links with the UK government and the other devolved administrations, providing a secretariat function to other groups and structures and, importantly, preparing advice and guidance on interventions for Welsh ministers. It was split into a policy team and an operational team.²⁸⁰²⁸⁰ INQ000274156_0013-0015 paras 42-47; INQ000321238; INQ000321245 Its work was extensive and varied, including producing a 'lockdown plan' for Wales, coordinating the development of a number of the Welsh Government's public-facing documents, and supporting those attending Ministerial Implementation Groups on behalf of the Welsh Government.²⁸¹²⁸¹ INQ000274156_0020, 0022-0023 paras 61, 70; INQ000292585_0034-0035 para 131; INQ000282461_0013-0014, 0015, 0017 paras 39, 44, 51; INQ000327735_0062 para 231 Responsibility for coordinating a wide range of evidence and inputs to (as well as advising on) the mandatory 21-day reviews of Covid-19 restrictions by ministers also fell to a subset of officials who sat within the wider Covid-19 Project Team.²⁸²²⁸² INQ000282461_0006-0007, 0012 paras 16-19, 37 The Inquiry agrees with Mr Kilpatrick that the team was an "essential component of the Welsh Government's internal arrangements throughout [the Welsh Government's] response to the pandemic" and that it was a dynamic structure that was able to flex, grow and reformulate as required.²⁸³²⁸³ INQ000274156_0015 para 47

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¶11.145. However, by March 2021, there were areas identified for improvement in Wales, including "an inconsistency about who is consulted for advice, who is invited to meetings, and why some people are engaged compared with others".²⁸⁴²⁸⁴ INQ000299966; INQ000371233_0030 para 101 There was also a lack of clarity about "roles, responsibilities and who influences decisions".²⁸⁵²⁸⁵ INQ000299966_0003 In future emergencies, therefore, senior officials should ensure that clarity of the structure and people's roles within it is given from the outset and that, if those roles evolve or change over time, individuals are clear about those changes.

¶11.146. Establishing a single team in the Cabinet Office to coordinate the response strengthened the provision of advice to decision-makers in each of the four nations. The bodies' synthesising functions – the coordination of evidence and advice from across government – improved the quality of decision-making, assisting decision-makers to understand the different health, economic and social trade-offs.²⁸⁶²⁸⁶ See also Rishi Sunak 11 December 2023 19/17-20/12; Simon Stevens 2 November 2023 10/8-13; INQ000236243_0030 para 100 As Mr Thomas explained, the Covid-19 Taskforce was "an important step in – over time – improving decision-making" and it "proved highly influential on the efficacy of decision making".²⁸⁷²⁸⁷ INQ000236243_0023-0024, 0030 paras 76, 99 However, it took time for these teams to fully define their roles and responsibilities and to reach their full effectiveness.

¶11.147. The operating procedures for a central taskforce should be designed as part of future pandemic preparedness strategies (see the Inquiry's Module 1 Report, Recommendation 4), so that each nation is able to implement these arrangements at the outset of any future emergency.

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Recommendation 12: Taskforces

¶The response to a future whole-system civil emergency should be coordinated via central taskforces in each of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, with responsibility for the commissioning and synthesis of advice, coordination of a single data picture and facilitation of decision-making processes. In preparation, the UK government and devolved administrations should each design the operating procedures for these taskforces, including, but not limited to, identifying the key roles needed to run the taskforces and how those roles would be appointed. The UK government should also identify the role of its taskforce in supporting decision-making procedures within the strategy and operational decision-making structures. These arrangements should be incorporated into future pandemic preparedness strategies (see the Inquiry's Module 1 Report, Recommendation 4).