The role of leaders

¶11.148. Effective decision-making during a crisis requires excellent leadership. Leaders are responsible for setting a clear strategy, making timely decisions and promoting positive working relationships between decision-makers, advisers and officials.

¶11.149. Further, an effective response to an emergency requires leaders to be realistic and candid with other decision-makers and advisers in relation to any challenges, so that these can be addressed at the earliest opportunity. It also requires leaders to follow the public health rules that they have asked the public to adhere to so that public confidence in the response – and ultimately compliance with it – is maintained.

Setting strategic objectives

¶11.150. The strategic objectives of an organisation are a crucial factor in its success or failure. Those responsible for implementing any policy will only deliver it effectively when they are clear on what they are trying to achieve. Strategy provides the essential basis for good decision-making and it is the leaders of the organisation who are responsible for setting strategic objectives.

¶11.151. In a national civil emergency, it is essential that the many arms of the state work together to ensure a coordinated and effective response. It is also necessary for the public and local officials (including local councils, public health teams and key workers, including medical staff) to know what is expected of them and why. Governments must be as clear as possible about the objectives they are pursuing and the means by which they will achieve these objectives (this is their strategy). Strategic objectives enable decisions to be made about how and when to act, or not to act. To be successful, each objective needs to be sufficiently clear, specific and achievable. There should also be underpinning quantifiable measures to assess the extent to which they are being achieved.

139

¶11.152. It is therefore incumbent on the leaders of governments and responsible ministers to ensure that appropriate strategic objectives for a response are articulated as soon as circumstances permit. However, at points during the Covid-19 pandemic, leaders in each of the four nations failed to do so. For example, as outlined in Chapter 4: Realisation and lockdown, in Volume I, the four governments' initial strategy for responding to the pandemic was flawed. Their objectives for the response were not sufficiently specific as to what outcome they were seeking to achieve. As a result, scientific advisers were unable to identify or advise decision-makers on the point at which restrictions should be imposed.

¶11.153. Clarity on specific strategic objectives is vital throughout a pandemic, not just at its outset. As the pandemic progressed, all four governments needed to ensure that those given the task of executing the response, and those – including the public – who were asked to modify their behaviour, were clear on the aims of these actions. The setting of successful objectives and their measurement did not happen consistently. For example, as outlined in Chapter 5: Exit from lockdown, in Volume I, the UK government failed to set an objective in relation to tolerable levels of incidence. As Professor Dame Angela McLean (Chief Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence from 2019 to 2023 and Executive Co-Chair of the Scientific Pandemic Infections Group on Modelling, Operational sub-group (SPI-M-O) from March 2020) told the Inquiry:

" [T]he strategy that the [UK] government in fact adopted post lockdown was to keep R [reproduction number] below 1, without taking a view about how many infections were tolerable … Without a commitment to a target level of infections, the aim of keeping below 1 [was] only half a strategy."²⁸⁸²⁸⁸ INQ000309529_0041 para 136

¶11.154. It was not until the third lockdown that the UK government set out an adequate framework in the COVID-19 Response – Spring 2021. As outlined in Chapter 7: Further lockdowns, in Volume I, this contained clear aims and objectives and outlined the factors that would be taken into account when deciding how restrictions – locally and nationally – would be scaled up and down.²⁸⁹²⁸⁹ COVID-19 Response – Spring 2021, HM Government, February 2021 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ media/6033cfdae90e076607c1bf18/COVID-19_Response_-_Spring_2021.pdf; INQ000185087) In doing so, this provided much-needed clarity on the four tests that would enable restrictions to be removed and on the data that would underpin the assessment of whether those tests had been met.

140

Acting in a timely manner

¶11.155. Decisive leadership is critical during a civil emergency. Timely decision-making is particularly significant during a pandemic, when a virus may be spreading exponentially and delays in decision-making will result in greater numbers of infections and deaths.

¶11.156. Many witnesses spoke of Mr Johnson's tendency to change his mind when making decisions and his disclination to make hard choices.²⁹⁰²⁹⁰ INQ000273841_0090 para 183; INQ000207294_0053 para 5.8; Lee Cain 31 October 2023 34/13-20; Dominic Cummings 31 October 2023 207/15-19; Martin Reynolds 30 October 2023 95/6-11 Dominic Cummings, Adviser to the Prime Minister from July 2019 to November 2020, described Mr Johnson as "bouncing back and forth" in March 2020 on the issue of whether to implement stringent restrictions, "according to who he spoke to last".²⁹¹²⁹¹ INQ000273872_0055 paras 245-247 He referred to Mr Johnson's oscillation as "trolleying".²⁹²²⁹² INQ000273872_0055 paras 245-246; INQ000267920; Dominic Cummings 31 October 2023 114/11-18; INQ000048313_0054 This term also came to be used by others to describe Mr Johnson's leadership.²⁹³²⁹³ INQ000303245_0011; INQ000048313_0056; Dominic Cummings 31 October 2023 114/11-18

¶11.157. Mr Cummings told the Inquiry that one of the causes of dysfunction in the UK government's response in the summer of 2020 was "the PM's constant u-turns on key decisions and inability to stick to any strategy", while Professor Vallance recorded in his evening notes on 13 July 2020 that the "ridiculous flip-flopping is getting worse".²⁹⁴²⁹⁴ INQ000273872_0092-0093 para 464; INQ000273901_0121 On 5 June 2020, Mr Case sent a WhatsApp message to 10 Downing Street officials stating that Mr Johnson had done a "complete u-turn" after meeting with the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the package for reopening.²⁹⁵²⁹⁵ INQ000267718 _0002

¶11.158. On 26 August 2020, Mr Case said to Mr Cummings and Mr Cain in a WhatsApp message that Mr Johnson:

" changes strategic direction every day (Monday we were all about fear of virus returning as per Europe, March etc – today we were in 'let it rip' mode cos [because] the UK is pathetic, needs a cold shower etc). He cannot lead and we cannot support him in leading with this approach. The team captain cannot change the call on the big plays every day. The team can't deliver anything under these circs [circumstances] … IT HAS TO STOP! Decide and set direction – deliver – explain. Gov't [government] isn't actually that hard, but this guy is really making it impossible."²⁹⁶²⁹⁶ INQ000048313_0053

¶11.159. Just a few weeks later, on the morning of 18 September 2020, Mr Case (by now Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service) told Mr Hancock that the circuit breaker proposal was "gaining traction" with Mr Johnson. However, by the end of the day this had changed, with Mr Johnson wanting to "double down on present strategy" instead, by way of "tougher local lockdown/enforcement" and "warning messages about what happens if people don't follow the rules".²⁹⁷²⁹⁷ INQ000129483_0001

141

¶11.160. On 25 October 2020, Professor Vallance recorded in his evening notes that, in a meeting, Mr Johnson had "argue[d] for letting it all rip … they have had a good innings" and said that "most people who die have reached their time anyway".²⁹⁸²⁹⁸ INQ000273901_0245 Less than a week later, Mr Johnson had imposed a second lockdown in England.

¶11.161. In his evidence to the Inquiry, Mr Johnson expressed regret about the hurt that the publication of these discussions, intended to be private, had caused and said he did not recognise the words ascribed to him. Insofar as he spoke bluntly from time to time, it was because there was a need to "represent the layman" and he wanted everybody in the room to feel that they could also speak freely.²⁹⁹²⁹⁹ Boris Johnson 7 December 2023 41/1-43/25, 179/4-184/23

¶11.162. Mr Case told the Inquiry that the oscillating nature of Mr Johnson's decision-making during the pandemic made "the governance process difficult to manage".³⁰⁰³⁰⁰ INQ000207294_0053 para 5.8; see also Simon Case 23 May 2024 26/18-27/12 As Mr Thomas explained, Mr Johnson's:

" tendency to say different things to different people, reverse settled decisions and be heavily influenced by pressure from different parts of the media made it difficult for civil servants and special advisers to understand the policy direction the Prime Minister wanted, whatever structure was in place".³⁰¹³⁰¹ INQ000236243_0027 para 85

¶11.163. Lord Sedwill explained that he sought to use formal decision-making structures to "force a decision and, once that decision was made, ensure that the government stuck to it".³⁰²³⁰² Mark Sedwill 8 November 2023 120/15-20 In doing so, he sought to "create a system which insulated the rest of Whitehall" from Mr Johnson's oscillation.³⁰³³⁰³ Mark Sedwill 8 November 2023 121/13-24 However, he conceded that this did not change the way Mr Johnson's decision-making operated within his inner circle.³⁰⁴³⁰⁴ Mark Sedwill 8 November 2023 121/10-24

¶11.164. As the Inquiry has acknowledged in previous chapters, it was understandable that Mr Johnson wrestled with the profound decisions that he had to make, particularly in the early stages of the pandemic. However, his oscillation continued throughout 2020, despite an increased understanding of the characteristics of the virus, the short-term impacts of stringent restrictions, and the importance of early interventions to reduce deaths and infections from Covid-19. As a result, in circumstances where the exponential spread of the Covid-19 virus meant that timely decision-making was essential, decisions were delayed. This was particularly the case between the summer and autumn of 2020: the second lockdown in England was not announced until 31 October 2020, six weeks after restrictions were first advised.³⁰⁵³⁰⁵ 'Prime Minister's statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 31 October 2020', Prime Minister's Office and Boris Johnson, 31 October 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-statement-on-coronavirus-covid-19-31-october-2020; INQ000086830); INQ000061565_0002 paras 2-3; INQ000061566_0002 paras 2, 6, 7; INQ000137293_0006 This allowed Covid-19 infections and deaths to rise in the interim. Following his experience of decision-making in relation to the March 2020 lockdown, Mr Johnson should have realised that, if there was a possibility that he would have to impose restrictions on the public, it would be beneficial to do so sooner rather than later.

142

¶11.165. Mr Gove, Mr Cummings, Mr Thomas and Gus O'Donnell, Lord O'Donnell (Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service from August 2005 to December 2011) told the Inquiry that it would be beneficial for training and exercises to be provided to ministers and officials to support them in decision-making during civil emergencies.³⁰⁶³⁰⁶ INQ000259848_0075-0076, 0086 paras 166, 194a; INQ000215548_0015 para 66; INQ000273872_0104 paras 523, 524; Alex Thomas 13 October 2023 80/18-25 The Inquiry agrees that the provision of such training is likely to improve the quality of leadership and ultimately timely decision-making in emergencies, including in any future pandemic. The Inquiry understands that, in the UK government, the Resilience Directorate of the Cabinet Office, the national security agencies and the Government Communication Service now all contribute to ministerial induction courses. In addition, the COBR Unit delivers specific crisis management training through the Crisis Management Excellence Programme.³⁰⁷³⁰⁷ UK Government UK COVID-19 Inquiry Response – Module 1 Implementation Update, Cabinet Office, 8 July 2025 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-government-response-to-the-covid-19-inquiry-module-1-report/uk-government-uk- covid-19-inquiry-response-module-1-implementation-update; INQ000625222) Suitable equivalent training must also be extended to ministers in the devolved administrations.

Setting and maintaining a constructive and collaborative culture

¶11.166. When it comes to workplace culture, the tone is set at the top. Good leadership is essential in fostering a constructive and collaborative culture where people at all levels of the hierarchy have the confidence to express their views candidly. This is essential in facilitating effective decision-making, particularly during a crisis, to ensure decision-makers have a sufficient plurality of views to consider when making decisions. In contrast, where a poor workplace culture exists and a range of perspectives and experiences are not encouraged, decision-making suffers.

UK government

¶11.167. There was a toxic and chaotic culture at the centre of the UK government during its response to Covid-19.³⁰⁸³⁰⁸ INQ000198066; INQ000207294_0067 para 6.33; Simon Case 23 May 2024 19/15-20/21; Michael Gove 28 November 2023 13/16-20; Helen MacNamara 1 November 2023 78/4; Edward Udny-Lister 7 November 2023 180/12-20, 181/8-14; INQ000303253_0001; INQ000303245_0006, 0009; INQ000207294_0007-0008 paras 2.10, 2.12; INQ000129289_0002; INQ000252914_0048 para 207 The 'C-19 Response: End of Phase 1 Review' led by Ms MacNamara and Mr Reynolds in May 2020 concluded that there was a poor culture and poor leadership behaviour, as well as "hostile ways of working within and between No 10 and the Cabinet Office".³⁰⁹³⁰⁹ INQ000273841_0074-0075 para 151 Mr Case explained that "good people were just being smashed to pieces".³¹⁰³¹⁰ Simon Case 23 May 2024 22/8-9

143

¶11.168. Some claimed that the culture was also sexist in nature.³¹¹³¹¹ INQ000136763_0003; INQ000273841_0052 para 102; INQ000207294_0013-0014 para 3.6.4; INQ000286044; INQ000286042; INQ000303253_0016; INQ000283369_0038 Individuals described the prevailing culture to the 'C-19 Response: End of Phase 1 Review' as a "superhero bunfight" and "macho".³¹²³¹² INQ000273841_0052, 0071-0072 paras 102, 146; INQ000136755_0001; INQ000207294_0013-0014 para 3.6.4 There was "a particular issue with junior women being talked over or ignored".³¹³³¹³ INQ000136763_0003; INQ000273841_0050-0052 paras 99, 102; INQ000207294_0013-0014 para 3.6.4; INQ000286044; INQ000286042; INQ000303253_0016 Ms MacNamara explained that there was a perception that "90%+ of people who were able to speak in a meeting or make their voice heard were male", and that there was a culture of "he who shouts the loudest" being listened to.³¹⁴³¹⁴ INQ000273841_0051, 0066-0067 paras 101, 134 Edward Udny-Lister, Lord Udny-Lister (Chief Strategic Adviser to the Prime Minister from July 2019 to November 2020 and Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister from November 2020 to February 2021) agreed that insufficient weight was given to the views of different people around the decision-making table.³¹⁵³¹⁵ Edward Udny-Lister 7 November 2023 177/12-15

¶11.169. The Inquiry acknowledges that those involved in the UK government's response to Covid-19 were working under significant psychological stress and pressure. However, as a result of the poor culture at the centre of the UK government, the quality of advice and decision-making suffered, causing it to be "inefficient" and "more difficult than it had to be".³¹⁶³¹⁶ Simon Case 23 May 2024 22/22-23/2; INQ000273841_0002 para 2 10 Downing Street and the Cabinet Office also struggled to recruit senior leaders.³¹⁷³¹⁷ INQ000303253_0010; Simon Case 23 May 2024 51/6-52/4 Although Mr Johnson told the Inquiry that he was not aware of any difficulties in recruiting, Mr Case claimed he had made Mr Johnson aware of this.³¹⁸³¹⁸ Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 34/4-35/7; INQ000303245_0009

¶11.170. The Inquiry received cogent evidence, including from Lord Udny-Lister, Mr Hancock and Mr Case, to the effect that Mr Cummings materially contributed to the toxic and sexist workplace culture at the heart of the UK government.³¹⁹³¹⁹ Edward Udny-Lister 7 November 2023 177/8-22, 181/8-14; Simon Case 23 May 2024 49/2-5, 50/19-51/5; Matt Hancock 30 November 2023 82/24-83/2; INQ000283369_0038; INQ000303253_0031 He used offensive, sexualised and misogynistic language, including in WhatsApp messages to Mr Johnson.³²⁰³²⁰ INQ000283369_0038; INQ000048313_0007, 0055 In one particularly disgraceful message, he launched a misogynistic attack on Ms MacNamara.³²¹³²¹ INQ000283369_0038

¶11.171. Notwithstanding Mr Cummings' undoubted ability and the fact that he had many qualities useful to a Prime Minister (as illustrated by his analysis of the UK's predicament in mid-March 2020 and his commendable action in bringing about a change in government strategy, addressed in Chapter 3: The first 12 days of March 2020, in Volume I), he was a destabilising influence. His behaviour contributed significantly to a culture of fear, mutual suspicion and distrust that poisoned the atmosphere in 10 Downing Street and undermined the authority of the Prime

144

¶Minister. Mr Case told Mr Johnson in the summer of 2020 that Mr Cummings was contributing to a culture of fear that was impacting the effectiveness of the support that could be provided to Mr Johnson by the Civil Service.³²²³²² INQ000283296_0006, 0032; Simon Case 23 May 2024 48/12-52/4 For example, Mr Case himself had displayed a notable reluctance to take up the post of Permanent

¶Secretary in 10 Downing Street, given Mr Cummings' behaviour. He only accepted the role on the basis that he would take instructions from Mr Johnson and Sir Mark

¶Sedwill and not from Mr Cummings.³²³³²³ INQ000303245_0001, 0002

¶11.172. Mr Hancock told the Inquiry that, at a daily morning meeting chaired by Mr Cummings, Mr Cummings had stated: "Decisions don't need to go to the Prime Minister."³²⁴³²⁴ Matt Hancock 30 November 2023 81/12-13 Ms MacNamara explained that it was not clear when Mr Cummings asked her, as a civil servant, to do something that he was asking on behalf of the Prime Minister.³²⁵³²⁵ Helen MacNamara 1 November 2023 144/9-17 Rather, she explained, "it wasn't asking on behalf of the Prime Minister, it was asking separate to", which is not what should happen.³²⁶³²⁶ Helen MacNamara 1 November 2023 144/9-17 Ms MacNamara told Mr Case on 11 July 2020:

" Dom is the most senior [adviser] and the most blatant in keeping things from the PM and driving a different agenda. It's that I object to – making the elected PM a puppet."³²⁷³²⁷ INQ000303253_0031

¶11.173. Mr Cummings strayed far from the proper role of a special adviser. The Code of Conduct for Special Advisers permits special advisers to "convey to officials ministers' views, instructions and priorities".³²⁸³²⁸ Code of Conduct for Special Advisers, Cabinet Office, September 2024, pp2-3, paras 4, 6 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov. uk/media/672b3df3fbd69e1861921bed/2024-09-30_Code_Of_Conduct_For_Special_Advisers__September_2024__-_Final.pdf; INQ000573832) Mr Cummings instead sought to make key decisions in 10 Downing Street which were for the Prime Minister to make, or to commission work without the express authority of the Prime Minister – an arrangement with which, it must be acknowledged, Mr Johnson was content.³²⁹³²⁹ INQ000302485_0016 para 49; Sajid Javid 29 November 2023 78/25-79/8; Matt Hancock 30 November 2023 81/2-17, 82/20-24; Helen MacNamara 1 November 2023 144/9-17; INQ000303253_0031

¶11.174. Mr Cummings' behaviour materially contributed to the departure of Sir Mark Sedwill as Cabinet Secretary.³³⁰³³⁰ INQ000303253_0015; INQ000048313_0007, 0022; Dominic Cummings 31 October 2023 216/6-8 On 14 May 2020, Mr Johnson told Sir Mark Sedwill that he had lost confidence in him.³³¹³³¹ INQ000185351_0018-0019 para 60; INQ000265620_0002, 0003 Although Mr Cummings claimed that he disagreed with the way in which Mr Johnson handled Sir Mark Sedwill's departure, he agreed that he had played a part in Mr Johnson's loss of confidence.³³²³³² Dominic Cummings 31 October 2023 215/7-216/19 It was ultimately agreed that Sir Mark Sedwill would leave his role as Cabinet Secretary but would remain in place over the summer to manage the transition to a new Cabinet Secretary and to mitigate the inevitable instability in the senior leadership of the Civil Service at a crucial time.³³³³³³ INQ000185351_0018-0019 paras 60-61; Mark Sedwill 8 November 2023 134/13-135/3; INQ000265620_0002-0003; see also INQ000250229_0001 para 2; INQ000207294_0036 para 4.1; INQ000303245_0001; Mark Sedwill 8 November 2023 135/12-136/10; INQ000207294_0010 para 3.1; INQ000048313_0007, 0022; INQ000303253_0009 Mr Johnson denied that Sir Mark Sedwill's departure had a damaging effect on the Civil Service, but the evidence before the Inquiry suggests otherwise.³³⁴³³⁴ Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 174/3-7; Simon Case 23 May 2024 169/15-22; Dominic Cummings 31 October 2023 215/15-25; INQ000273841_0079 para 160 His departure made some civil servants less confident to challenge others and was a distraction at a critical time in the pandemic response.³³⁵³³⁵ INQ000273841_0079 para 160

145

¶11.175. Mr Cummings also convinced Mr Johnson to seek to persuade Ms MacNamara, the second most senior civil servant in the Cabinet Office, to move to a role in another government department in the summer of 2020.³³⁶³³⁶ INQ000283282_0010; INQ000283369_0038; Helen MacNamara 1 November 2023 78/5-80/5 While these attempts were unsuccessful, they risked causing further instability at the heart of the UK government.

¶11.176. Both Mr Cummings' role in Sir Mark Sedwill's departure and his attempts to exert influence over Ms MacNamara's role likely contravened the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers, which provides that "special advisers must not exercise any power in relation to the management of the Civil Service".³³⁷³³⁷ Code of Conduct for Special Advisers, Cabinet Office, September 2024, p3, para 5 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ media/672b3df3fbd69e1861921bed/2024-09-30_Code_Of_Conduct_For_Special_Advisers__September_2024__-_Final.pdf; INQ000573832)

¶11.177. Nonetheless, Mr Johnson told the Inquiry that, while he "knew that some people were difficult, I didn't know how difficult they were".³³⁸³³⁸ Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 179/5-8 He did not seek to restrain or control Mr Cummings, nor did he exercise proper leadership in rectifying the toxic and chaotic culture adversely affecting decision-making. Mr Johnson should have addressed Mr Cummings' behaviour. The Inquiry has seen no evidence to suggest that he did so. Rather than instructing Mr Cummings to modify his behaviour or considering removing him from his post, Mr Johnson permitted him to continue in his role until Mr Cummings resigned and departed 10 Downing Street in November 2020, following a breakdown in their relationship.³³⁹³³⁹ INQ000273872_0005 para 1

¶11.178. Mr Cummings was not solely responsible for the poor culture at the heart of the UK government. Poor behaviour was also displayed by other senior leaders and advisers.³⁴⁰³⁴⁰ INQ000136763_0003 para 2; INQ000136755_0001 para 2 (early draft of report) An early draft of Ms MacNamara's review referred to "bad behaviours from senior leaders" such as "crowding the ball – showboating in meetings – belittling others contributions".³⁴¹³⁴¹ INQ000136755_0001, 0003 paras 2, 12 Mr Johnson was informed of the review's findings and provided with a copy of them in May 2020.³⁴²³⁴² Helen MacNamara 1 November 2023 63/9-17; INQ000185351_0018-0020 paras 57, 62; Martin Reynolds 30 October 2023 102/11-12 He was therefore well aware from an early stage of the Covid-19 pandemic response that the culture in the organisation he led was poor and was adversely impacting the effectiveness of the response.

146

¶11.179. Despite this, cultural problems continued for some months after Ms MacNamara's review concluded in May 2020.³⁴³³⁴³ Simon Case 23 May 2024 41/6-24, 157/6-13; INQ000207294_0067 para 6.33; Edward Udny-Lister 7 November 2023 179/1-5 Lord Udny-Lister told the Inquiry that the culture started to improve during the summer of 2020.³⁴⁴³⁴⁴ Edward Udny-Lister 7 November 2023 181/15-25 However, Mr Reynolds explained that the poor treatment of women remained an "ongoing cultural issue which I think we could have done more to address".³⁴⁵³⁴⁵ Martin Reynolds 30 October 2023 106/12-21 Mr Johnson dismissed the findings of the May 2020 review as merely "a civil service unease about the challenging approach of some of the special advisers", rather than recognising the wider systemic cultural issues it identified.³⁴⁶³⁴⁶ Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 174/16-175/1 He told the Inquiry that, while the culture was "occasionally argumentative", that was "no bad thing" – he "wanted … meetings in which people could speak their minds".³⁴⁷³⁴⁷ Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 175/22-176/20 Mr Johnson said that he:

" thought it was better on the whole for the country to have a disputatious culture in Number 10 than one that was quietly acquiescent to whatever I or the scientists said".³⁴⁸³⁴⁸ Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 179/9-12

¶11.180. The Inquiry accepts the need for challenge, but challenge does not need to lead to conflict. The Inquiry heard from a number of witnesses who believed that Mr Johnson intentionally sought to foster conflict and a chaotic working environment to drive debate and assist his decision-making processes.³⁴⁹³⁴⁹ INQ000273841_0011 para 20; Simon Case 23 May 2024 84/15-20; Michael Gove 28 November 2023 71/14-25 Mr Thomas explained that research had shown:

" that Boris Johnson engendered a chaotic No. 10, with competing power sources and unclear lines of responsibility".³⁵⁰³⁵⁰ INQ000236243_0027 para 85

¶Mr Cummings told the Inquiry that Mr Johnson had explained to him in July 2020 that "chaos isn't that bad. Chaos means that everyone has to look to me to see who is in charge."³⁵¹³⁵¹ INQ000273872_0095 para 484

¶11.181. Mr Johnson told the Inquiry that he did not "think any of [the cultural issues in 10 Downing Street and the Cabinet Office] made the slightest difference to our processes and our decision-making".³⁵²³⁵² Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 185/5-14 However, the evidence suggests that it was a culture in which louder voices prevailed and the voices of other colleagues, particularly women, were often ignored – to the clear detriment of good decision‑making.

147

Welsh Government

¶11.182. The Inquiry did not identify any issues related to either the culture or leadership within the Welsh Government during the response to the pandemic. Mr Drakeford had the confidence of his Cabinet and ministers described his approach as "careful, considered, and compassionate".³⁵³³⁵³ INQ000346272_0066 para 225 They said that he led a:

" team effort … with a clear understanding of respected roles and relationships in terms of expertise and authority".³⁵⁴³⁵⁴ INQ000366148_0014-0015 para 50; INQ000371645_0056 para 220

¶Many of those responsible for working on the pandemic response had already known each other and worked together positively for a number of years.³⁵⁵³⁵⁵ INQ000371209_0015-0016 para 45 The evidence presented to the Inquiry suggests that those positive relationships continued throughout the duration of the pandemic response.

Scottish Government

¶11.183. Key decision-makers and their advisers in the Scottish Government also maintained good and professional relationships throughout the pandemic. As Ms Sturgeon noted:

" Due to its scale, the UK government does not operate as cohesively as the DAs [devolved administrations] … agreement reached with an individual UK department can break down when it gets to the Cabinet Office or Number 10, and vice versa."³⁵⁶³⁵⁶ INQ000339033_0023-0024 para 55

¶11.184. Ms Sturgeon's leadership style was central to how high-level decisions were made within the Scottish Government. She was a serious and diligent leader throughout the pandemic. She explained that she chose to read widely from publicly available information in addition to the advice provided to her through the Scottish Government's own structures.³⁵⁷³⁵⁷ INQ000339033_0042-0043 para 114 She was experienced in processing large quantities of information and making judgements about what sources were of most utility and importance.³⁵⁸³⁵⁸ INQ000339033_0020 para 47 She encouraged those advising her to be clear if the advice being provided did not represent a consensus view and to set out what the differences of opinion were.³⁵⁹³⁵⁹ INQ000339033_0042-0043 para 114 She took responsibility for decisions – for example, in relation to the decisions about local levels, she publicly stated that "it's really important that the buck for these difficult decisions stops here, with me and government" and that:

148

" it's not fair for me and the government to try to offload those onto other people, be it local authorities or health boards".³⁶⁰³⁶⁰ 'Nicola Sturgeon: "Buck stops with me" on Scottish Covid tiers', BBC News, 20 October 2020 (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-54615683; INQ000351050)

¶11.185. However, Ms Sturgeon's desire to take full responsibility for the decisions made during the pandemic often meant that other senior decision-makers or advisers were excluded from the decision-making process, as described previously. Her leadership style was described by Professor Jason Leitch (National Clinical Director and Co- Director of the Directorate for Healthcare Quality and Improvement in the Scottish Government from January 2015) to Mr Yousaf in an exchange on 20 May 2021: "There was some FM 'keep it small' shenanigans as always. She actually wants none of us."³⁶¹³⁶¹ INQ000334792_0003

Northern Ireland Executive

¶11.186. Regrettably, some political leaders in Northern Ireland were not always able, in this time of extraordinary crisis, to set aside political and sectarian divisions and to govern jointly and effectively in the interests of the whole of Northern Ireland. Power-sharing had the potential to give government decisions in Northern Ireland a higher degree of democratic legitimacy than in other parts of the UK. It gave ministers the ability to say that decisions made were regarded by all political parties as being in the best interests of Northern Ireland (and that they had been informed by a diverse range of interests). However, some allowed political interests to inform their decision‑making. At certain critical points in the pandemic, ministers (from the two main political parties) failed to put the common interest of all people in Northern Ireland above their party political interests.

¶11.187. One clear example was the rapid degeneration of Northern Ireland Executive Committee decision-making about whether to close schools into a political issue. Ms O'Neill accepted in her evidence to the Inquiry that she had not called for the closure of schools prior to the Republic of Ireland doing so on 11 March 2020.³⁶²³⁶² Michelle O'Neill 14 May 2024 81/4-25, 82/1-15 At that point in time, the Northern Ireland Executive was simply not in a position to close schools and had not considered the ramifications of doing so.³⁶³³⁶³ INQ000289859 Indeed, on 12 March, Ms O'Neill made a public statement that Northern Ireland did not, at that stage, need to close schools.³⁶⁴³⁶⁴ Michelle O'Neill 14 May 2024 92/22-93/1 However, on 13 March (in her position as Vice President of Sinn Féin), she called for the immediate closure of schools. There was no Northern Ireland Executive Committee meeting between these changes of position. Ms O'Neill accepted that she might have contributed to public confusion, but felt that it was the right thing to do because people were already removing their children from schools on their own initiative. However, in the Inquiry's view, Ms O'Neill should have sought to resolve this issue with her fellow ministers, rather than adding to the uncertainty by acting unilaterally and undermining the Executive

149

¶Committee.

¶11.188. Further politicisation of the issue was evident at the meeting of the Executive Committee on 16 March 2020. This involved a vote, called for by the Sinn Féin Finance Minister, as to whether the Executive Committee should announce a planned closure of schools.³⁶⁵³⁶⁵ INQ000065689_0035 The vote divided along political lines. Those ministers who voted in favour of schools closing were those from Sinn Féin and the single minister from the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). Those voting against were unionist. The First Minister proposed a vote that the Executive Committee should close schools when Professor (later Sir) Michael McBride (Chief Medical Officer for Northern Ireland from September 2006) so advised, effectively delegating the decision to him.³⁶⁶³⁶⁶ INQ000065689_0037 This obviated the need for further debate.

¶11.189. Mr Sterling recorded at the time that the meeting was "excruciating", with "[no] leadership on display".³⁶⁷³⁶⁷ INQ000308444_0001 This was because "people had got into fixed positions, it had split along Nationalist/Unionist lines".³⁶⁸³⁶⁸ David Sterling 1 May 2024 167/4-18 He further observed that ministers had not shown strong leadership and had "been too quick to retreat into campaigning or community activist-mode". He said that ministers had not had to take difficult decisions but, when they had (and he cited school closures as an example), "they have been found wanting".³⁶⁹³⁶⁹ David Sterling 1 May 2024 168/5-12

¶11.190. On 19 October 2020, it was publicly reported that Edwin Poots MLA (Minister for Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs in Northern Ireland from January 2020 to October 2022) had said that the difference in transmission of Covid-19 between nationalist and unionist areas was "around six to one".³⁷⁰³⁷⁰ 'Coronavirus: Edwin Poots says he did not link virus with religion', BBC News, 21 October 2021 (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-54629146; INQ000470341_0002) Professor McBride told the Inquiry that multiple factors contributed to differences between geographic areas, and confirmed:

" [A]t no stage did I or the CSA [Chief Scientific Adviser] advise that one community was adhering to public health advice more than another and further we had no evidence to support such a conclusion."³⁷¹³⁷¹ INQ000421704_0197 para 427

¶This was an undisguised attempt to blame one section of society for rising rates by reference to the political views they held.

¶11.191. Another glaring example of the fraught nature of relationships was the four-day Executive Committee meeting beginning on 9 November 2020 about whether to extend the circuit breaker measures introduced in October 2020 for a period of two weeks after 12 November. The meeting involved two cross-community votes.

150

¶The concept of 'cross-community support' originates from the Belfast Agreement of 1998 (known as the Good Friday Agreement). It is defined in section 4(5) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and has since been incorporated into the Ministerial Code in Northern Ireland.³⁷²³⁷² Ministerial Code, Northern Ireland Executive, 6 April 2006, p12, para 2.12 (https://www.northernireland.gov.uk/publications/northern-ireland-executive-ministerial-code; INQ000262764) Section 4(5) defines 'cross-community support' as either:

the support of a majority of the members, a majority of the designated nationalists and a majority of the designated unionists voting; or
the support of 60% of the members, 40% of the designated nationalists and 40% of the designated unionists voting.

¶If cross-community support is not demonstrated in this manner, the vote fails.

¶11.192. On 9 November 2020, during the course of discussions about the proposal from the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) to extend the restrictions, Ms Foster sent a WhatsApp message to Mr Poots instructing him to "call for a cross community vote if needed".³⁷³³⁷³ INQ000356174_0053 No consensus was reached and the meeting was adjourned to reconvene the following morning.

¶11.193. On 10 November 2020, Ms Long voiced her objection to the use of the cross-community vote on the basis that it constituted sectarianism and ignored the people she represented.³⁷⁴³⁷⁴ INQ000213652_0035 Diane Dodds MLA (Minister for the Economy in Northern Ireland from January 2020 to June 2021) is recorded as having said that the meeting was not an "honest discussion" and that she was "distraught with [the] tone" of the debate.³⁷⁵³⁷⁵ INQ000213652_0008 Others complained that the meeting was "about theatrics" and was being leaked while it took place. They also claimed that, by blocking the proposals, the Democratic Unionist Party "put lives of citizens in danger".³⁷⁶³⁷⁶ INQ000116294_0094 The first cross-community vote took place at the instigation of the Democratic Unionist Party ministers, who succeeded in blocking the two-week extension.³⁷⁷³⁷⁷ INQ000213652_0028, 0037; INQ000356174_0053 This was despite the advice of Professor McBride that excess deaths would occur no matter which approach was agreed, but that having some restrictions in place was preferable to allowing all restrictions to lapse.³⁷⁸³⁷⁸ INQ000048497_0004, 0005 paras 21, 27 Mr Swann revised his proposal so as to extend the measures by one week.³⁷⁹³⁷⁹ INQ000048497_0006 Peter Weir (later Lord Weir of Ballyholme), Minister for Education in Northern Ireland from May 2016 to March 2017 and from January 2020 to June 2021, called for a further cross-community vote.³⁸⁰³⁸⁰ INQ000213652_0091 Once again, cross-community consent was not achieved, with all four Democratic Unionist Party ministers voting "against".³⁸¹³⁸¹ INQ000213652_0091-0092 How this was resolved is set out in Chapter 6: The second wave, in Volume I.

¶11.194. The meeting was almost universally regarded by witnesses as one of the lowest points in the pandemic and of their time in politics in Northern Ireland.³⁸²³⁸² INQ000421759_0040-0041 para 127; INQ000452485_0028 para 97; Robin Swann 13 May 2024 173/16-25 The strength of Professor McBride's reaction was captured in a message he sent to Professor Ian Young (Chief Scientific Adviser to the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) from November 2015) on the evening of 10 November 2020:

151

" Disgraceful they should all hang their heads in shame. How will history tell this story to the wife and two boys of a 49 year old who said goodbye to their father on Facebook on Friday as he lay in ICU [intensive care unit]. For the sake of two more weeks of effort."³⁸³³⁸³ INQ000370538_0026

¶11.195. The use of the cross-community vote in this context was inappropriate. There was room for legitimate debate about whether to extend the October circuit breaker restrictions, but this was not a cross-community issue. There were people from all communities in Northern Ireland who would be protected by restrictions and people whose livelihoods might suffer. The deployment of a cross-community vote also directly impacted upon decision-making immediately thereafter. Mr Swann declined to make recommendations as to what should happen when the compromise measures lapsed, explaining "such was the political tension at that time".³⁸⁴³⁸⁴ INQ000412903_0054 para 162 Baroness Foster rightly conceded that the use of the vote in this context resulted in damage to public confidence.³⁸⁵³⁸⁵ Arlene Foster 15 May 2024 126/4-8 That issues which touched upon the most important aspects of people's lives were used for political capital or for 'point-scoring' against each other by ministers is of profound concern to the Inquiry.³⁸⁶³⁸⁶ INQ000308439_0002

¶11.196. The dysfunction in decision-making in Northern Ireland seen during the pandemic, as evidenced by these incidents, should never be repeated.

¶11.197. Furthermore, one of the most consistent and concerning features of the Northern Ireland Executive Committee meetings during the pandemic was the extent to which they were affected by leaks. Papers were leaked beforehand and, even more seriously, the contents of meetings were leaked – sometimes while the meetings were going on. Ms O'Neill explained how the live tweeting of the meeting on additional restrictions added to its difficulty and complexity.³⁸⁷³⁸⁷ Michelle O'Neill 14 May 2024 128/11-22 Mr Swann described leaking as one of his biggest frustrations. He thought it was often deliberate in terms of conditioning the approach of the Northern Ireland Executive. Papers presented to ministers were provided to the media before the ministers had been able to discuss them and a public narrative established either to support or, mostly, to undermine recommendations.³⁸⁸³⁸⁸ Robin Swann 13 May 2024 14/9-15/1

152

¶11.198. In Ms Long's view, leaks at times created panic among the public. They also created a sense that the Northern Ireland Executive was incompetent. Additionally, leaking led to Ms Long finding out, often from journalists or news reports, what would be discussed at Executive Committee meetings, as opposed to finding out when she received her papers and briefings.³⁸⁹³⁸⁹ Naomi Long 9 May 2024 10/19-11/17

¶11.199. It is not clear who was responsible for each leak, but it is plain that an atmosphere existed in which such leaks were commonplace. Those responsible undermined Northern Ireland Executive Committee decisions and undermined the democratic imperative to maintain the confidentiality of ministerial discussions in the Executive Committee.

¶11.200. In the context of a pandemic, when ministers have to make difficult decisions that profoundly affect the lives of the entire population, the need for confidentiality of ministerial discussion is all the more important. Yet it was within this context that leaking became routine.

¶11.201. In the other three nations, ministerial codes impose collective responsibility on Cabinet members. By necessity, this requires ministers to maintain the privacy of opinions expressed by their colleagues in Cabinet meetings. The power-sharing arrangements in Northern Ireland would make it inappropriate to require ministers to maintain a collective position, but would not preclude similar requirements to protect the confidentiality of discussions. The Ministerial Code in Northern Ireland should therefore be amended to explicitly prohibit the disclosure of individual views expressed during Executive Committee meetings. The leaking of Executive Papers and discussions should be treated as a violation of the amended code.

Recommendation 13: Amendment of the Ministerial Code in Northern Ireland

¶The Executive Office should amend the Ministerial Code to impose a duty of confidentiality on ministers that prohibits the disclosure of the individual views of ministers expressed during meetings of the Northern Ireland Executive Committee.

Addressing challenges

¶11.202. Challenges will be encountered during any emergency. It is essential that leaders identify and understand the nature of these obstacles and that they are candid with other decision-makers and advisers about the scale of any such challenges. This approach ensures that any problems that may impede the effectiveness of the response can be addressed at the earliest opportunity.

153

¶11.203. However, during the pandemic, Mr Hancock did not adopt such an approach to challenges encountered by the Department of Health and Social Care. The department was undoubtedly under severe pressure in the initial months of 2020, and this impacted the effectiveness of the response.³⁹⁰³⁹⁰ INQ000273872_0025 para 120; INQ000273841_0030 para 56; INQ000285993; INQ000265687_0001 Yet Mr Hancock assured 10 Downing Street and the Cabinet Office that his department was managing the crisis effectively.³⁹¹³⁹¹ Dominic Cummings 31 October 2023 130/4-21; Helen MacNamara 1 November 2023 106/17-108/2 These assurances were later discovered to be unjustified.³⁹²³⁹² Dominic Cummings 31 October 2023 130/14-19; Helen MacNamara 1 November 2023 106/17-108/2

¶11.204. There were also concerns about Mr Hancock's truthfulness and reliability in UK government meetings.³⁹³³⁹³ Mark Sedwill 8 November 2023 112/6-15, 128/2-129/2; INQ000273841_0058-0059 para 117; Helen MacNamara 1 November 2023 107/23-108/2; Patrick Vallance 20 November 2023 127/7-17; INQ000273901_0131, 0454; Lee Cain 31 October 2023 66/15-67/3; INQ000048313_0026; INQ000303245_0005 On 3 June 2020, Sir Mark Sedwill sent a message to Mr Case stating: "It's been [quite] a pattern. Matt overpromising, underdelivering."³⁹⁴³⁹⁴ INQ000303245_0005 Lord Sedwill told the Inquiry that he had had concerns that Mr Hancock was "overpromising, overconfident", and that he had had to "double-check what we were being told" to make sure that programmes were in fact on track.³⁹⁵³⁹⁵ Mark Sedwill 8 November 2023 128/18-129/2 Professor Vallance also explained that Mr Hancock:

" had a habit of saying things which he didn't have a basis for, and he would say them too enthusiastically too early, without the evidence to back them up, and then have to backtrack from them days later".³⁹⁶³⁹⁶ Patrick Vallance 20 November 2023 127/6-11

¶Ms MacNamara described Mr Hancock's "nuclear levels of confidence" as a problem.³⁹⁷³⁹⁷ Helen MacNamara 1 November 2023 109/11-13 Mr Johnson identified a "chronic optimism bias" at the Department of Health and Social Care.³⁹⁸³⁹⁸ INQ000136761

¶11.205. These concerns about Mr Hancock began to emerge in April 2020.³⁹⁹³⁹⁹ INQ000273841_0058-0059 para 117 Ms MacNamara explained that, during this time, there were:

" increasing questions about the performance of DHSC [Department of Health and Social Care] and the Health Secretary where the issue was a lack of confidence that what he said was happening was actually happening".⁴⁰⁰⁴⁰⁰ INQ000273841_0058-0059 para 117

¶She told the Inquiry that there was "a pattern of being reassured that something was absolutely fine and then discovering it was very very far from fine".⁴⁰¹⁴⁰¹ Helen MacNamara 1 November 2023 107/2-4 Thereafter, the Cabinet Office and 10 Downing Street lacked trust and confidence in Mr Hancock and the Department of Health and Social Care.⁴⁰²⁴⁰² Christopher Wormald 2 November 2023 93/20-94/2; Mark Sedwill 8 November 2023 128/9-16

154

¶11.206. Mr Cummings advised Mr Johnson in April and May 2020 of the issues with Mr Hancock's reliability.⁴⁰³⁴⁰³ INQ000048313_0013, 0016 Mr Cummings advised Mr Johnson in August 2020 that Mr Hancock should be removed from his post.⁴⁰⁴⁴⁰⁴ INQ000283369_0038 Sir Mark Sedwill also told Mr Johnson of the concerns which had arisen in relation to Mr Hancock's candour and his tendency to overpromise, and advised Mr Johnson that he might wish to remove Mr Hancock from his post as Secretary of State as a result.⁴⁰⁵⁴⁰⁵ Mark Sedwill 8 November 2023 128/9-129/2; INQ000303245_0009; see also Mark Sedwill 8 November 2023 129/12-25, 130/23-131/22 Mr Johnson did not recall Sir Mark Sedwill advising him of this.⁴⁰⁶⁴⁰⁶ INQ000255836_0203 para 699; Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 193/19-194/2 He explained that, despite being aware of the concerns about Mr Hancock's impact on the effectiveness of the Covid-19 response, he thought Mr Hancock was doing a good job in difficult circumstances and did not think moving Mr Hancock would be worth the disruption it would cause.⁴⁰⁷⁴⁰⁷ Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 192/7-11

¶11.207. Mr Hancock told the Inquiry that "nobody raised any of these issues with me at the time" and denied that he had lied to or misled colleagues about the ability of the Department of Health and Social Care to respond effectively to the pandemic.⁴⁰⁸⁴⁰⁸ Matt Hancock 30 November 2023 23/23-25, 74/12-17 However, Sir Christopher Wormald told the Inquiry that he had, on one occasion, discussed these matters with Mr Hancock, and explained: "I don't think he was in any doubt that some people thought that [he was overpromising]."⁴⁰⁹⁴⁰⁹ Christopher Wormald 2 November 2023 89/8-90/11, 92/12-13 Sir Christopher Wormald explained that, at the time, he had not been aware of how widely these concerns were held.⁴¹⁰⁴¹⁰ Christopher Wormald 2 November 2023 92/12-13 He had thought they were confined to:

" a very small number of people who were not Mr Hancock's friends saying this, as opposed to a widespread thing around government".⁴¹¹⁴¹¹ Christopher Wormald 2 November 2023 93/1-3

¶In fact, the concerns were more widespread and justified.

¶11.208. As the most senior official within the Department of Health and Social Care, it was Sir Christopher Wormald's responsibility to rectify the overenthusiastic impression Mr Hancock had given to 10 Downing Street and the Cabinet Office about the ability of the Department of Health and Social Care to cope with its role in the pandemic response. 10 Downing Street and the Cabinet Office needed to understand the challenges the Department of Health and Social Care was facing and consider how these could be addressed. However, despite being aware of the assurances which Mr Hancock was providing to 10 Downing Street and the Cabinet Office on behalf of the Department of Health and Social Care – and that there were some concerns that these assurances were misleading – the Inquiry has seen no evidence that Sir Christopher Wormald took such action. His failure to do so gave rise to additional concerns at the centre of the UK government about the effectiveness of Sir Christopher Wormald's leadership at the Department of Health and Social Care.⁴¹²⁴¹² INQ000303245_0005, 0007

155

¶11.209. Mr Hancock's unjustified assurances to 10 Downing Street and the Cabinet Office that the Department of Health and Social Care was managing the crisis effectively – and Sir Christopher Wormald's failure to rectify these assurances – obscured the reality and the need for more action.

Following the rules

¶11.210. It is vital during an emergency that those in positions of leadership follow the public health rules that they require the public to observe. They must also deal swiftly and decisively with any instances of alleged rule-breaking among their ministers and advisers to ensure public confidence in the response is maintained. On a number of occasions during the pandemic, decision-makers and their advisers across the UK appeared to have broken Covid-19 rules.

¶11.211. In the first six months of 2020, a number of incidents of alleged rule-breaking became known to the public. As set out in Chapter 5: Exit from lockdown, in Volume I, Dr Catherine Calderwood, Chief Medical Officer for Scotland from April 2015 to April 2020, resigned on 5 April 2020 after making two trips to her second home during the lockdown.⁴¹³⁴¹³ Nicola Sturgeon 31 January 2024 119/2-4 In England, Mr Cummings held a press conference on 25 May 2020 to answer questions about whether his trip to Durham and Barnard Castle during the first lockdown had breached the rules.⁴¹⁴⁴¹⁴ 'Coronavirus: I don't regret what I did, says Dominic Cummings', BBC News, 25 May 2020 (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-52800595; INQ000651561) The actions of Mr Cummings in April 2020 were debated by the media for weeks, at a critical time during the first wave of the pandemic when members of the public were being not just encouraged but forced to stay at home. Professor Neil Ferguson, Mathematical Epidemiologist at Imperial College London, resigned from SAGE in May 2020, citing an "error of judgement" after the media reported that a woman with whom he was in a relationship had visited his home during lockdown.⁴¹⁵⁴¹⁵ 'Coronavirus: Prof Neil Ferguson quits government role after "undermining" lockdown', BBC News, 6 May 2020 (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-52553229; INQ000267746)

¶11.212. In Northern Ireland, the attendance of Ms O'Neill at the funeral of the veteran republican Bobby Storey on 30 June 2020 prompted immediate public criticism.⁴¹⁶⁴¹⁶ 'Sinn Féin leadership criticised over Bobby Storey funeral', BBC News, 30 June 2020 (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-53237980; INQ000548303) This had a profound impact upon ministerial relations and the operation of the Northern Ireland Executive Committee.⁴¹⁷⁴¹⁷ INQ000449440_0122 para 345; Robin Swann 13 May 2024 171/5-7 Sir David Sterling told the Inquiry that the deputy First Minister's attendance at the funeral "led to the biggest crisis in NI politics since devolution was restored in January that year".⁴¹⁸⁴¹⁸ INQ000449440_0121 para 344 Ms Long told the Inquiry that the circumstances of Mr Storey's funeral had caused the loss of the stability and cohesion that had previously existed in the Executive Committee, and that this was not fully regained.⁴¹⁹⁴¹⁹ Naomi Long 9 May 2024 53/10-17 When giving evidence to the Inquiry, Ms O'Neill expressed her regret at having attended the funeral.⁴²⁰⁴²⁰ Michelle O'Neill 14 May 2024 18/6-12 Ms O'Neill's actions led to Ms Foster declining to take part in joint press conferences. As a result, press briefings fell to the Department of Health (Northern Ireland), which meant that they were portrayed as being a 'health' response, not a joint message.⁴²¹⁴²¹ Arlene Foster 15 May 2024 92/10-13

156

¶11.213. Incidents of alleged rule-breaking were also reported in 2021. Mr Hancock resigned as Secretary of State for Health and Social Care in June 2021, stating that he had breached the social distancing guidance.⁴²²⁴²² INQ000174323; INQ000232194_0176 para 678 Events that have become known as 'partygate' were first reported in the media in November 2021.⁴²³⁴²³ 'Exclusive: Boris Johnson "broke Covid lockdown rules" with Downing Street parties at Xmas', The Mirror, 30 November 2021 (https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/boris-johnson-broke-covid-lockdown-25585238; INQ000548386) The Metropolitan Police Service confirmed that it had made 126 referrals for fixed penalty notices in respect of social events taking place within 10 Downing Street, in breach of the regulations at the time, but did not specify to whom they were issued.⁴²⁴⁴²⁴ Findings of the Second Permanent Secretary's Investigation into Alleged Gatherings on Government Premises During Covid Restrictions, Cabinet Office, 25 May 2022, pp4-6, paras 5, 6 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/findings-of-the-second-permanent-secretarys-investigation-into-alleged-gatherings- on-government-premises-during-covid-restrictions; INQ000273903) Mr Johnson and Mr Sunak both confirmed that they had received a fixed penalty notice for their attendance at an event at 10 Downing Street on 19 June 2020.⁴²⁵⁴²⁵ Findings of the Second Permanent Secretary's Investigation into Alleged Gatherings on Government Premises During Covid Restrictions, Cabinet Office, 25 May 2022, p5, para 7 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/findings-of-the-second- permanent-secretarys-investigation-into-alleged-gatherings-on-government-premises-during-covid-restrictions; INQ000273903) The events resulted in public outcry.⁴²⁶⁴²⁶ '"Another punch to the heart": Bereaved relatives furious at photos of PM drinking at No 10 lockdown party', The Independent, 24 May 2022 (https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/boris-johnson-partygate-bereaved-photos-b2085755.html; INQ000562335); 'Exclusive: Families who lost loved ones in Covid pandemic "sickened" by new Partygate video', The Mirror, 18 June 2023 (https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/partygate-video-families-covid-victims-30262154; INQ000562336); 'Exclusive: Our loved ones died alone while Boris Johnson ate cake – lying PM MUST resign', The Mirror, 13 April 2022 (https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/our-loved-ones-died-alone-26703401; INQ000562337)Show full note

¶11.214. Ms MacNamara told the Inquiry that she "would find it hard to pick one day when the regulations were followed properly inside that building [10 Downing Street]".⁴²⁷⁴²⁷ Helen MacNamara 1 November 2023 86/14-16

¶11.215. Unlike in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland, there were no allegations of rule‑breaking by the Welsh Government, save for one: an incident when Vaughan Gething MS (Minister for Health and Social Services in the Welsh Government from May 2016 to May 2021) was pictured with his child eating chips on a park bench.⁴²⁸⁴²⁸ INQ000391237_0062-0063 paras 247-252

¶11.216. The effectiveness of the Covid-19 response depended significantly on the public's willingness to comply with restrictions. It is not for the Inquiry to investigate and determine allegations of breaches by individuals, but it is clear that the events described above undermined public confidence in decision-making and significantly increased the risk of the public failing to adhere to measures designed to protect the population.⁴²⁹⁴²⁹ See INQ000207294_0052 paras 5.2-5.3; INQ000280628_0118 para 237; INQ000215035_0028-0029 para 111; Robin Swann 13 May 2024 172/8-11; Nicola Sturgeon 31 January 2024 120/18-24 This was especially so where perceived breaches were not dealt with swiftly and decisively. Mr Cummings' trip to Barnard Castle is a case in point.

157

¶11.217. The 'partygate' scandal led to a self-reported reduction in the intention to follow rules, with a YouGov survey finding that, of the 46% of people who reported that they were unlikely to follow restrictions over Christmas 2021, 21% stated that this was because "Government don't stick to rules/Downing Street parties".⁴³⁰⁴³⁰ 'One in ten would not follow new household mixing rules specifically because of No 10 parties', YouGov website, 10 December 2021 (https://yougov.co.uk/health/articles/39904-one-ten-would-not-follow-new-household-mixing-rule; INQ000197112) Research carried out as part of University College London's 'COVID-19 Social Study' showed "a clear decrease in [public] confidence in England" in respect of the UK government's management of the pandemic in the days following media reports of Mr Cummings' trip to Barnard Castle.⁴³¹⁴³¹ 'The Cummings effect: Politics, trust, and behaviours during the COVID-19 pandemic', D. Fancourt, A. Steptoe, L. Wright, The Lancet (2020), 396(10249), 464-465 (https://www.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31690-1; INQ000197110_0001) There was no similar large decrease in the confidence of Welsh respondents in the Welsh Government, or Scottish respondents in the Scottish Government, during the same time period.⁴³²⁴³² 'The Cummings effect: Politics, trust, and behaviours during the COVID-19 pandemic', D. Fancourt, A. Steptoe, L. Wright, The Lancet (2020), 396(10249), 464-465 (https://www.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31690-1; INQ000197110_0001). The study was limited to participants in England, Wales and Scotland.

¶11.218. Naturally, these incidents caused huge distress to members of the public – in particular, bereaved people who had complied with the rules and guidance despite massive personal and financial costs.⁴³³⁴³³ INQ000274154_0075 para 211; Nicola Sturgeon 31 January 2024 120/18-24 The very least the public should be entitled to expect is that those making the rules will abide by them.

158