Chapter 11: Government decision-making

Introduction

¶11.1. Having clearly defined, effective and transparent structures for decision-making in government is essential. They ensure that the right information is obtained, that fully considered options are presented, and that a sufficiently wide range of views and experiences is reflected within a well-understood and clear process. They take on even greater significance during an emergency, when decisions with wide-ranging and potentially unknown impact often need to be taken quickly and on the basis of incomplete and evolving information.

¶11.2. Effective decision-making during a crisis also requires clear leadership and positive working relationships between decision-makers, advisers and officials. The strategic objectives of an organisation in response to a crisis are a crucial factor in its success or failure. It is the leaders of the organisation who are responsible for setting and maintaining these objectives. It is only when those in charge are clear on what they are trying to achieve that officials and experts are able to provide appropriate advice to facilitate informed decision-making and subsequently ensure the effective implementation of those decisions.

¶11.3. Building on the analysis of Chapter 9: Scientific and technical advice and Chapter 10: Vulnerabilities and inequalities, in this volume, this chapter is concerned with the effectiveness of decision-making by the UK government and devolved administrations in responding to Covid-19. In particular, it analyses the core governmental structures in which the most significant decisions were made. Cabinets are the ultimate decision-making body in the UK, Scottish and Welsh governments – in Northern Ireland, this role is carried out by the Northern Ireland Executive Committee.¹¹ INQ000092893_0009 para 2.5; INQ000255836_0211-0212 para 721(a); INQ000274154_0015-0016 paras 42-43; INQ000327735_0023 para 66; INQ000438174_0017 para 41 However, during the pandemic, bespoke decision-making structures were also established which, in effect, supplanted the Cabinets' role in decision-making in England and Scotland. The effectiveness of these bespoke structures is considered, together with the impact that the leadership and culture at the top of the UK government in particular had on the quality of decision-making in response to Covid-19.

Emergency decision-making

¶11.4. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and associated regulations and guidance set out the framework for civil protection in an emergency across the UK, taking into account the devolution of powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.²² Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/36/contents); 'Preparation and planning for emergencies: responsibilities of responder agencies and others', Cabinet Office, 20 February 2013 (https://www.gov.uk/guidance/ preparation-and-planning-for-emergencies-responsibilities-of-responder-agencies-and-others; INQ000196532) There are therefore a multitude of institutions, structures and systems responsible for pandemic preparedness, resilience and response across the UK.³³ See Module 1: The resilience and preparedness of the United Kingdom, UK Covid-19 Inquiry, July 2024, Chapter 2 (https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/documents/module-1-full-report)

¶11.5. As set out in the Inquiry's Module 1 Report, whole-system civil emergencies impact on the whole of society and therefore require a cross-departmental approach, both within and between the UK government and devolved administrations.

The UK government's emergency decision-making structures

¶11.6. COBR is the primary forum for agreeing and coordinating the UK government's response to major crises such as terrorist attacks, natural disasters and incidents of civil unrest.⁴⁴ INQ000250229_0014 para 50 It is chaired by the Prime Minister or a senior minister and is attended by ministers and senior civil servants from across government, allowing for cross-governmental coordination. It can consider specialist advice – for example, from the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) when scientific advice is required. This makes it the most appropriate structure for emergency decisions to be taken in response to the emerging crisis of a potential pandemic striking the whole of the UK.

¶11.7. Formal decision-making about the UK government's response to Covid-19 in the initial months of 2020 primarily took place in meetings of COBR.⁵⁵ INQ000236243_0021 para 65 Matt Hancock MP (Secretary of State for Health and Social Care from July 2018 to June 2021) chaired initial COBR meetings in January and February 2020 because of the Department of Health and Social Care's role as lead government department for UK-wide pandemic preparedness, response and recovery.⁶⁶ Module 1: The resilience and preparedness of the United Kingdom, UK Covid-19 Inquiry, July 2024, Chapter 2 (https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/documents/module-1-full-report); The Lead Government Department and its Role – Guidance and Best Practice, Cabinet Office, Civil Contingencies Secretariat, March 2004 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ media/5a79b2fded915d07d35b772a/lead-government-departments-role.pdf; INQ000022687); INQ000255836_0212-0213 para 721(c)Show full note

¶11.8. Mr Hancock explained that, as the lead government department, his department was "having to do things that in future ought to be done by other departments or at the centre".⁷⁷ Matt Hancock 30 November 2023 18/3-12 However, Professor Sir Patrick Vallance (later Lord Vallance of Balham), Government Chief Scientific Adviser from April 2018 to March 2023, recorded in his evening notes that, in January 2020, Mr Hancock was "desperate to own & lead" the response to Covid‑19.⁸⁸ INQ000273901_0001

¶11.9. A number of witnesses, including Mr Hancock, were of the view that the lead government department model was inadequate for responding to a whole-system civil emergency such as a pandemic. In essence, this was because such emergencies affect responsibilities across a number of different departments and therefore require 10 Downing Street and the Cabinet Office to drive the necessary response on the part of the whole government.⁹⁹ Matt Hancock 30 November 2023 16/20-23; Michael Gove 28 November 2023 7/19-8/8; INQ000273872_0026 para 123 In the Module 1 Report, the Inquiry recommends that the lead government department model should be abolished for whole-system civil emergencies and that the Cabinet Office should lead on preparing for and building resilience to whole-system civil emergencies.¹⁰¹⁰ Module 1: The resilience and preparedness of the United Kingdom, UK Covid-19 Inquiry, July 2024, Chapter 2 (https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/documents/module-1-full-report) For the same reasons that the Inquiry concludes in the Module 1 Report that the lead government model is fundamentally unsuited to whole-system civil emergencies, it was fatally flawed as a mechanism for responding to the Covid-19 pandemic.¹¹¹¹ Module 1: The resilience and preparedness of the United Kingdom, UK Covid-19 Inquiry, July 2024, Chapter 2 (https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/documents/module-1-full-report)

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¶11.10. In any event, from early March 2020 when Boris Johnson MP (Prime Minister from July 2019 to September 2022) began to chair COBR meetings, key strategic decisions about the response were made by Mr Johnson rather than Mr Hancock, and the lead government department model fell away.¹²¹² Matt Hancock 30 November 2023 19/9-11; INQ000280628_0018-0019 para 35 The response to the pandemic should have been led by the Cabinet Office earlier, with (as outlined in Chapter 2: The emergence of Covid-19, in Volume I) Mr Johnson chairing COBR meetings no later than 18 February 2020.

The devolved administrations' emergency decision-making structures

¶11.11. In Chapter 14: Intergovernmental working, in this volume, the Inquiry examines the role of the devolved administrations at COBR, but each devolved administration also had its own emergency response arrangements.

¶11.12. When the scale or complexity of an emergency is such that some degree of central government coordination or support becomes necessary, the Scottish Government activates its emergency response arrangements through the Scottish Government Resilience Room.¹³¹³ INQ000348720_0008 para 11 This was designed as part of the Scottish Government's resilience planning to support it in delivering a coordinated response to civil emergencies.¹⁴¹⁴ INQ000216651_0007 para 15; INQ000348720_0008-0009 paras 11, 14 The Scottish Government Resilience Room was activated to address Covid-19 on 29 January 2020.¹⁵¹⁵ INQ000348720_0009 para 17 It consisted of meetings of senior officials to provide advice to ministers on the handling of the emergency, and ministerial meetings, usually chaired by the First Minister, which considered that advice and agreed the strategic direction for Scotland's response.¹⁶¹⁶ INQ000348720_0009-0010 paras 15-20

¶11.13. Despite the Scottish Government Resilience Room being designed to be at the heart of the infrastructure to oversee and respond to emergencies, its role is not to take the lead or assume primary responsibility for action.¹⁷¹⁷ INQ000348720_0009 para 16; INQ000274154_0031,0039 paras 89.1, 116 Instead, it "enables relevant parties to come together to make decisions and coordinate their activity".¹⁸¹⁸ INQ000348720_0009 para 16; INQ000274154_0030-0031 para 88; Gillian Russell 28 June 2023 26/21-25, 28/13-17 This role of coordinating a strategic response is better suited to a shorter emergency, such as flooding. In the Covid-19 pandemic, decision-makers and their advisers began using ad hoc decision-making or decision facilitation groups, such as Gold Command (see below), to discuss the strategic response to the emergency.

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¶11.14. The 2019 Pan-Wales Response Plan provided for the Civil Contingencies Group (Wales) to be established:

" where an emergency has occurred or is likely to occur with a LEVEL 1 impact. The CCG [Civil Contingencies Group] will generally be convened for rising tide incidents such as pandemic flu."¹⁹¹⁹ INQ000107119_0010 para 2.1

¶The main purpose of the Civil Contingencies Group (Wales) is to "provide strategic leadership to the response to emergencies falling fully within devolved competence".²⁰²⁰ INQ000107119_0010 para 2.2 It is "chaired by a senior Welsh Government official and comprise[s] largely of representatives from Welsh Government Departments".²¹²¹ INQ000107119_0010 para 2.2 It was convened in response to Covid-19 on 4 February 2020.²²²² INQ000321239 The Pan-Wales Response Plan also provides for activation of the Emergency Coordination Centre (Wales), the primary function of which is to gather, coordinate and disseminate information.²³²³ INQ000107119_0016-0018 paras 3.1-3.18 As outlined in Chapter 2: The emergence of Covid-19, in Volume I, there was a lack of clarity about the extent of the operations of the Emergency Coordination Centre (Wales) in February 2020.²⁴²⁴ INQ000321228_0003; INQ000129852_0006 para 5.4

¶11.15. The Northern Ireland Central Crisis Management Arrangements (NICCMA) can be activated where an emergency has occurred (or is expected to occur) which is likely to have a serious impact.²⁵²⁵ INQ000092739_0003 paras 1-3 They are intended to be used only for the most serious of emergencies. NICCMA are "an integral part of UK arrangements" and are intended to feed directly into COBR.²⁶²⁶ INQ000092739_0014 para 36 The response of the Northern Ireland Executive had been planned for and tested as part of Northern Ireland's contingency planning in the event of a 'no deal' exit from the European Union. Over 800 civil servants had been trained as part of this exercise.²⁷²⁷ INQ000449440_0030-0031 paras 97-98 The decision to activate NICCMA was taken on 16 March 2020. By 17 March, only one person had volunteered to operate the hub. The hub did not ultimately become operational until 26 March.²⁸²⁸ Chris Stewart 2 May 2024 14/4-15, 16/5-10

¶11.16. During the pandemic, a number of bodies were established in accordance with the NICCMA Protocol. The Civil Contingencies Group (Northern Ireland) was the strategic coordination group "responsible for setting the overarching strategy for the NI [Northern Ireland] Administration's response to the emergency". It met daily from late March until late May 2020, when the frequency of meetings was reduced.²⁹²⁹ INQ000092739_0009 para 22; INQ000449440_0017-0018 para 54 Its membership comprised senior staff from all departments and key civil contingencies stakeholders.³⁰³⁰ INQ000438171_0005 para 19 A daily Situation Report (SitRep) was published to coincide with the group's meeting.³¹³¹ INQ000449440_0017-0018 para 54

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Other decision-making structures used during the pandemic

The UK government

¶11.17. The UK government used a number of different decision-making structures during its Covid-19 response. Mr Johnson told the Inquiry in his written evidence that he felt the structures that the UK government had in place to deal with the response were "effective, strong and resilient" and "enabled key decisions to be taken speedily and to coordinate different parts of government".³²³² INQ000255836_0201 para 693 However, during the Inquiry's public hearing, he expressed a more nuanced view, stating that the system was "all too diffuse" and that:

" for future pandemics there needs to be a – more clarity about which are the debating – the discussion meetings and which are the decision-making meetings".³³³³ Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 177/18-178/4; INQ000250229_0014

¶11.18. It is evident from the evidence received by the Inquiry (examined below) – and from the numerous reforms made to the UK government's decision-making structures during 2020 – that they required improvement during the pandemic.

¶11.19. By March 2020, there were concerns within the UK government that COBR alone was not able to "bear the weight of the whole-of-government effort that this now required".³⁴³⁴ Mark Sedwill 8 November 2023 63/10-17; INQ000273841_0026-0027 para 47; INQ000285989 As Helen MacNamara (Deputy Cabinet Secretary from January 2019 to February 2021) noted, issues were being raised that "would need more input from a wider group of departmental Ministers", adding:

" [C]oncerns included the wrong people being in the room and so the Prime Minister was not being given sufficiently expert policy advice; concerns about an over-mighty No 10 operating without Ministers, and the sense that too many groups of people were whirring around having similar conversations – duplicating efforts and creating confused lines."³⁵³⁵ INQ000273841_0026-0027 paras 46-47

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¶There was, therefore, a need to put in place decision-making structures suitable for a prolonged crisis. There were no established structures available to which the UK government could transition at that time, and so steps were taken to develop them.

¶11.20. On 13 March 2020, Sir Mark Sedwill (later Lord Sedwill), Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service from October 2018 to September 2020, advised Mr Johnson to establish four Ministerial Implementation Groups, chaired by ministers, covering healthcare, public services, economic response and international issues.³⁶³⁶ INQ000182338_0002; INQ000255836_0043 para 181; see also INQ000182343; INQ000250229_0024-0025 paras 94, 95 These were established on 16 March 2020, with "the status to agree collective decisions" in their respective areas.³⁷³⁷ INQ000250229_0024 para 94; INQ000087163; INQ000255836_0054 para 218 Mr Johnson explained that the Ministerial Implementation Groups "had the status of Cabinet Committees and took collective decisions".³⁸³⁸ INQ000255836_0217 para 724

¶11.21. In addition, a daily 09:15 Covid-19 Strategy Ministerial Group meeting became the key forum for oversight of all issues and strategy concerning the Covid-19 response.³⁹³⁹ INQ000255836_0054-0055, 0210-0211 paras 219, 719(c)-(d); INQ000259848_0022 para 40 These meetings took place until 15 May 2020, at which point they became Covid-19 Dashboard meetings, also chaired by Mr Johnson (these are discussed further below).⁴⁰⁴⁰ INQ000255836_0211 para 719(d)

¶11.22. The Chairs of the Ministerial Implementation Groups attended the daily 09:15 Covid-19 Strategy Ministerial Group meetings to escalate any issues where necessary, so that these could be discussed with the Prime Minister, who could provide a steer in preparation for agreement at COBR or Cabinet.⁴¹⁴¹ INQ000182343; INQ000255836_0210-0211 para 719(c); Simon Ridley 7 November 2023 3/16-25; INQ000259848_0008 para 16(d)(i); 'New government structures to coordinate response to coronavirus', Prime Minister's Office, Cabinet Office, Department of Health and Social Care, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, HM Treasury, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Boris Johnson, 17 March 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-government-structures-to-coordinate-response-to- coronavirus; INQ000086849_0002)Show full note Mr Johnson explained that the Ministerial Implementation Groups were:

" an attempt to delegate some decision making to ministers, but so many decisions were proving so difficult and so sensitive that in the end they had to come to me".⁴²⁴² INQ000255836_0044 para 185

¶11.23. However, the Ministerial Implementation Groups had significant structural flaws.⁴³⁴³ INQ000259848_0032, 0075-0076 paras 51, 166; Simon Stevens 2 November 2023 9/21-25; INQ000252914_0085, 0094 paras 374, 408; Martin Reynolds 30 October 2023 83/3-16; INQ000185351_0015-0016 para 48; INQ000280628_0014 para 26; Michael Gove 28 November 2023 97/11-17, 37/15-23; INQ000232194_0070 para 297; INQ000217031

¶11.24. Firstly, the separation of decision-making into four different policy areas in a whole-system crisis caused duplication, as well as siloed and confused decision-making.⁴⁴⁴⁴ INQ000259848_0075-0076 para 166; Simon Stevens 2 November 2023 9/21-25; INQ000252914_0085, 0094 paras 374, 408; INQ000185351_0015-0016 para 48; INQ000280628_0014 para 26; Martin Reynolds 30 October 2023 83/3-12 Alex Thomas, expert witness on political and administrative decision-making, explained:

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" [I]t quite rapidly became clear that there were overlapping remits, that the co‑ordination between these four MIG [Ministerial Implementation Group] structures was not working well, they were trespassing on each others' policy and operational functions, and that decision-making through those MIGs was proving difficult."⁴⁵⁴⁵ Alex Thomas 13 October 2023 39/8-15

¶11.25. Secondly, the Ministerial Implementation Groups were ineffective in holding departments to account because they were chaired by the Secretary of State whose work the group was intended to scrutinise.⁴⁶⁴⁶ INQ000265687_0001; Michael Gove 28 November 2023 37/15-20, 97/11-1; INQ000280628_0014 para 26 For example, in March 2020, Munira Mirza (Director at the 10 Downing Street Policy Unit from July 2019 to February 2022) raised concerns with Michael Gove MP (later Lord Gove), Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster from July 2019 to September 2021 and Minister for the Cabinet Office from February 2020 to September 2021, that the Department of Health and Social Care was overwhelmed. However, the fact that Mr Hancock was chairing the Healthcare Ministerial Implementation Group meant there was "little opportunity to scrutinise DH's [the Department of Health and Social Care's] capacity and delivery" in relation to ventilators and personal protective equipment.⁴⁷⁴⁷ INQ000265687_0001 Mr Gove agreed that there was a structural flaw with the Ministerial Implementation Groups because there was "a danger in having a department mark its own homework".⁴⁸⁴⁸ Michael Gove 28 November 2023 97/11-17 Sir Christopher Wormald (Permanent Secretary to the Department of Health and Social Care from May 2016 to December 2024) also confirmed a lack of independence of the groups.⁴⁹⁴⁹ INQ000280628_0014 para 26 Mr Thomas explained:

" [I]n general, a Cabinet committee or similar group works better if it is chaired by a senior minister who is able to hold departments to account from outside the department rather than inside."⁵⁰⁵⁰ Alex Thomas 13 October 2023 39/23-40/1

¶11.26. These issues became apparent to 10 Downing Street within weeks, in April 2020. This was in part because of the failure of the Ministerial Implementation Groups to identify problems in the Department of Health and Social Care, which were becoming clearer to those in 10 Downing Street and the Cabinet Office by that time.⁵¹⁵¹ INQ000273841_0058-0059 para 117 In addition, the Cabinet Office structures intended to support decision-making were under strain and lacked an effective coordinating function with oversight across all the work being done in the Cabinet Office to support decision-making.⁵²⁵² INQ000273841_0059-0061 paras 118, 120; INQ000207294_0009 para 2.15; INQ000198066; Martin Reynolds 30 October 2023 103/13-17 Mr Thomas described the structural performance of the Cabinet Office up to May 2020 as "chaotic".⁵³⁵³ Alex Thomas 13 October 2023 15/22-16/5

¶11.27. When Mr Johnson was ill with Covid-19 in April 2020, as outlined in Chapter 5: Exit from lockdown, in Volume I, a 'Quad' of UK government ministers was established by Dominic Raab MP (Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and

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¶First Secretary of State from July 2019 to September 2021).⁵⁴⁵⁴ INQ000252914_0045 para 197; INQ000263374_0009 para 28a It initially comprised

¶Mr Raab, Mr Gove, Mr Hancock and Rishi Sunak MP (Chancellor of the Exchequer from February 2020 to July 2022).⁵⁵⁵⁵ INQ000255836_0213 para 721d; INQ000263374_0009 para 28a Officials and advisers – including Professor

¶Vallance and Professor (later Sir) Christopher Whitty (Chief Medical Officer for

¶England from October 2019) – would also occasionally attend, along with members of the Covid-19 Taskforce.⁵⁶⁵⁶ INQ000255836_0213 para 721d; INQ000259848_0010 para 16(g)(ii) Mr Johnson continued to convene meetings of the Quad when he returned to work in late April 2020.⁵⁷⁵⁷ INQ000263374_0009 para 28a

¶11.28. Ms MacNamara and Martin Reynolds (Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister from October 2019 to February 2022) led a 'C-19 Response: End of Phase 1 Review' in May 2020.⁵⁸⁵⁸ INQ000136763 (final draft of report); INQ000136755 (early draft of report); INQ000273841_0071 para 145; INQ000207294_0012- 0015 para 3.6; INQ000185351_0017 para 55 This review was initiated by Ms MacNamara to address both the structural and cultural problems that had become evident, and to determine how decision-making structures and Cabinet Office teams could be improved to better support decision-making in the next phase of the response.⁵⁹⁵⁹ INQ000273841_0071-0072 paras 145-146; INQ000207294_0012-0015 para 3.6; INQ000185351_0017 para 55 The review concluded that the Ministerial Implementation Groups should be stood down and replaced with two Cabinet committees: a Covid-19 Strategy Committee (Covid-S) and a Covid-19 Operations Committee (Covid-O).⁶⁰⁶⁰ INQ000183934. As discussed below, the Covid-19 Taskforce was also created at the end of May 2020. See INQ000273841_0073 para 148; INQ000092893_0040 para 5.53; Simon Ridley 7 November 2023 39/15-19. It served as the secretariat for Covid-S and Covid-O and commissioned the papers and agendas for their meetings. See INQ000255836_0214-0215 para 721(f), (g); Simon Ridley 7 November 2023 40/15-20. See also INQ000248852_0016-0017 para 3.3.8.Show full note Covid-S and Covid-O were based on a Cabinet committee model which, it was considered, had worked well to manage the UK's exit from the European Union.⁶¹⁶¹ INQ000207294_0011-0012 para 3.5

¶11.29. Mr Johnson agreed to implement these structural changes on the basis that a "governance structure that was more sustainable for the longer term was required".⁶²⁶² INQ000255836_0100 para 373 He also accepted that major decisions should continue to be taken by the Cabinet, although, as Cabinet committees, Covid-S and Covid-O had the authority to take decisions on behalf of the UK Cabinet.⁶³⁶³ INQ000183934_0002 para 1; INQ000255836_0098-0099 paras 367, 368; Mark Sedwill 8 November 2023 12/9-15; see also INQ000092893_0006 para 1.24; INQ000087165; INQ000259848_0033 para 54 These committees' roles were as follows:

Covid-S was established to drive the strategic response to Covid-19. It first met on 64

¶4 June 2020, chaired by Mr Johnson. It was also attended by Mr Sunak, Mr Raab,

¶Mr Gove, Mr Hancock, Priti Patel MP (later Dame Priti Patel), Secretary of State for

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the Home Department from July 2019 to September 2022, and Alok Sharma MP (Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy from February 2020 to January 2021).⁶⁶⁶⁶ INQ000183934_0005; INQ000250229_0035-0036 para 134. Sajid Javid MP (later Sir Sajid Javid), Secretary of State for Health and Social Care from June 2021 to July 2022, and Kwasi Kwarteng MP (Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy from January 2021 to September 2022) subsequently attended Covid-S when they succeeded Mr Hancock and Mr Sharma respectively in these posts.

¶• Covid-O was established to drive the delivery of the policy and operational

aspects of the response.⁶⁷⁶⁷ INQ000183934_0003 para 4; INQ000255836_0214-0215 para 721g; INQ000259848_0009-0010 para 16(f) It first met on 29 May 2020 and was typically chaired by Mr Gove.⁶⁸⁶⁸ INQ000250229_0036 para 135; INQ000259848_0009-0010, 0036-0037 paras 16(f)(ii), 64; INQ000183934_0006. It was, on occasion, chaired by the Prime Minister, particularly ahead of key decisions. See INQ000250229_0036 para 135; INQ000255836_0214-0215 para 721g. It was also attended by Mr Sunak and Mr Hancock, with other Cabinet ministers invited according to the agenda.⁶⁹⁶⁹ INQ000183934_0006

¶11.30. Covid-S and Covid-O continued to be the UK government's formal decision-making structures for the remainder of the pandemic, until they were stood down in September 2022.⁷⁰⁷⁰ INQ000092893_0042 para 5.63 As a result, COBR was not regularly convened after May 2020.⁷¹⁷¹ 'New government structures to coordinate response to coronavirus', Prime Minister's Office, Cabinet Office, Department of Health and Social Care, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, HM Treasury, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Boris Johnson, 17 March 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-government-structures-to-coordinate-response-to-coronavirus; INQ000086849_0002); INQ000236243_0022 para 70Show full note

¶11.31. Covid-S and Covid-O were more successful in facilitating effective decision-making than the Ministerial Implementation Groups.⁷²⁷² INQ000232194_0015 para 61; INQ000268041_0047 para 150; INQ000259848_0033, 0075-0076 paras 54, 166; Simon Case 23 May 2024 75/19-23; Rishi Sunak 11 December 2023 19/5-16, 21/4-23; INQ000302484_0034 para 131; INQ000228382_0028 para 13.23; INQ000280628_0015 para 27 James Bowler (Second Permanent Secretary to the Cabinet Office and Head of the Covid-19 Taskforce from October 2020 to August 2021) and Simon Ridley (Director General for Policy and Strategy on the Covid-19 Taskforce from May 2020 to July 2021 and Head of the Covid-19 Taskforce from July 2021 to March 2022) told the Inquiry that the Covid-19 Taskforce would organise a sequence of meetings for Mr Johnson to discuss decisions in a small group – including with Mr Sunak, Mr Hancock, Mr Gove and Professors Whitty and Vallance – before the decisions were to be discussed and made within formal decision-making structures.⁷³⁷³ INQ000248852_0017-0018 paras 3.5-3.6 Ms MacNamara noted that the Covid-19 Taskforce, Covid-S and Covid-O structural model resulted in Covid-19 Taskforce officials effectively advocating for a course of action to be approved by these committees, thereby circumventing the usual Cabinet process.⁷⁴⁷⁴ INQ000273841_0091-0092 para 185 She also said:

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¶" The downside of going smaller (both in the taskforce and the smaller make up of

¶Covid S or 0) was the loss of the richness of the balancing arguments that would come from civil servants and ministers from wider departments. One of the challenges of responding to Covid was that it is highly unusual in Whitehall to have one group of people advising on decisions that affect every aspect of government policy or of people's lives."⁷⁵⁷⁵ INQ000273841_0073-0074 para 149

¶11.32. Similarly, although it comprised an even smaller group of decision-makers, the Quad made a number of significant decisions. These included the approach to easing the first lockdown in the spring of 2020.⁷⁶⁷⁶ INQ000302484_0026 para 96; Mark Sedwill 8 November 2023 98/4-5 While these decisions were 'rubber-stamped' by COBR, Covid-S and Covid-O, the Quad exerted significant influence over decision‑making.⁷⁷⁷⁷ INQ000263374_0009 para 28a; INQ000089020_0009; INQ000195907; INQ000220057; INQ000249584

¶11.33. The UK Cabinet's role was often confined to approving decisions that had already been made at meetings of COBR, the Quad, the Covid-19 Strategy Ministerial Group, Covid-O or Covid-S – often just before the decision was publicly announced.⁷⁸⁷⁸ INQ000273841_0054 para 107; INQ000232194_0096 para 393; Mark Sedwill 8 November 2023 15/4-16; Simon Case 23 May 2024 54/5-8 Examples include the following:

The decision to impose the first UK-wide lockdown was made by COBR – the Cabinet did not discuss the decision until after it had been publicly announced.⁷⁹⁷⁹ INQ000056213; 'Prime Minister's statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 23 March 2020', Prime Minister's Office and Boris Johnson, 23 March 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-address-to-the-nation-on-coronavirus-23-march-2020; INQ000086759_0003); INQ000056136
The approach to easing the first lockdown in England was agreed at Quad meetings. The Cabinet was asked to approve Our Plan to Rebuild: The UK Government's COVID-19 Recovery Strategy only the day before it was publicly announced, which meant that there was no real opportunity for the Cabinet to influence the content of the plan.⁸⁰⁸⁰ INQ000232194_0095 para 391; INQ000250229_0034 para 130; INQ000268041_0047 para 149
The decision to impose the second lockdown in England was made by Covid-O. The Cabinet was informed just a few hours before the decision was made public and only after Covid-O's decision had been discussed in the media.⁸¹⁸¹ INQ000089102_0004-0005

¶11.34. Despite this, Mr Johnson told the Inquiry:

¶" Cabinet took numerous key decisions in response to Covid-19. I was clear that any major decisions on the Covid response would be discussed and agreed at full Cabinet."⁸²⁸² INQ000255836_0211-0212 para 721a

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¶Similarly, Mr Sunak stated: "Cabinet meetings were the forum in which key decisions were made."⁸³⁸³ INQ000263374_0014 para 40

¶11.35. Mr Gove, however, acknowledged that there were "certain moments when Cabinet should have been involved earlier in some of [the] decision-making" and that "at times this was done – partly for reasons of speed – too little, too late".⁸⁴⁸⁴ Michael Gove 28 November 2023 97/18-22; INQ000259848_0075-0076 para 166 Mr Hancock stated that there would be:

" an in-principle decision, and if it was highly significant, a Cabinet meeting would be called to ensure the Cabinet were informed and any dissenting views could be taken into consideration before the Prime Minister made a formal decision in Cabinet".⁸⁵⁸⁵ INQ000232194_0096 para 393

¶11.36. Lord Sedwill expressed his concern that the UK Cabinet was not as fully participative in decision-making as it should have been. He had had to remind Mr Johnson about the importance of involving the Cabinet "not just in the formal decision but in the formulation of that decision".⁸⁶⁸⁶ Mark Sedwill 8 November 2023 15/4-16/19 Ms MacNamara explained that "the Cabinet were not asked their opinion very often and not on decisions in flight".⁸⁷⁸⁷ INQ000273841_0054 para 107

¶11.37. Concerns about the sidelining of the UK Cabinet were raised in April 2020.⁸⁸⁸⁸ INQ000303253_0006 In a 22 May 2020 note to Mr Johnson on Cabinet structures, Ms MacNamara and Simon Case (later Lord Case), Permanent Secretary at 10 Downing Street from May to September 2020, recommended that "major decisions are taken by the full Cabinet".⁸⁹⁸⁹ INQ000183934_0002 para 1 However, even in November 2020 – almost a year into the pandemic – it was recognised that the Cabinet's role in significant decisions was limited.⁹⁰⁹⁰ INQ000326485_0018

¶11.38. The sidelining of the UK Cabinet created two difficulties in particular for decision-making in the UK government during the pandemic.

¶11.39. Firstly, the reduction during the pandemic in the usual checks and balances on decision-making, including the important role of the Cabinet, meant that advisers with little previous knowledge of government were able to turn an idea into policy and then law with little proper scrutiny.⁹¹⁹¹ INQ000273841_0066-0067 paras 133, 134 This resulted in resources being expended to prevent flawed decision-making.⁹²⁹² INQ000273841_0066-0067 para 134 Ms MacNamara explained that she had had to expend time "trying to stop the wrong things happening". For example, she:

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" had to shut down a proposal to apply different conditions to school re-opening and not tell people why in order to experiment with the impact of different measures – the idea of systematically trialling what worked was not as much of a problem as not being transparent about it".⁹³⁹³ INQ000273841_0066-0067 para 134; INQ000303253_0006

¶11.40. Secondly, it prevented a wider perspective and challenge being brought to decision-making.⁹⁴⁹⁴ INQ000273841_0054, 0064 paras 107, 129; Simon Case 23 May 2023 54/8-14; Mark Sedwill 8 November 2023 16/20-17/5 Although there was diversity in Mr Johnson's wider Cabinet, there was a lack of gender, racial and socio-economic diversity among the senior ministers and advisers attending key decision-making structures, including the daily 09:15 Covid-19 Strategy Ministerial Group meeting, the Quad, Covid-S and Covid-O.⁹⁵⁹⁵ Lee Cain 31 October 2023 57/19-58/25, 71/9-14; INQ000252711_0027-0028 para 121(c)-(d); INQ000273841_0051, 0054, 0073- 0074 paras 101, 107, 149; INQ000308302; INQ000303245_0010

¶11.41. Ms MacNamara told the Inquiry:

" [T]he overwhelming majority of ministers and advisers managing the response were men. This was particularly true at senior levels."⁹⁶⁹⁶ INQ000273841_0051 para 101

¶11.42. Ms MacNamara also raised concerns about the lack of ethnic diversity among the people involved in and advising on decision-making.⁹⁷⁹⁷ INQ000273841_0054 para 107; INQ000303253_0022-0023 Mr Case observed in June 2020 that, although some ethnic minority groups were represented in decision-making forums, others were not.⁹⁸⁹⁸ INQ000303253_0023

¶11.43. Similarly, Lee Cain, Director of Communications at 10 Downing Street from July 2019 to November 2020, stated that "there were challenges of gender diversity, socioeconomic diversity and ethnic minority diversity at the very top of … the PM's [Prime Minister's] top team".⁹⁹⁹⁹ Lee Cain 31 October 2023 57/19-23 He explained:

" [O]ne of the challenges you face when you work on policy is the dynamic of the room, which in this case was white and middle aged … without diversity, some policy decisions slipped through the cracks."¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰ INQ000252711_0028 para 121(d)

¶11.44. Mr Cain described "predominantly white, middle-aged men around the table" at meetings, while a group that was predominantly women was a "secondary cast" attending by Zoom.¹⁰¹¹⁰¹ Lee Cain 31 October 2023 87/4-17 Ms MacNamara confirmed that, from about April 2020:

" [I]t was really, really obvious that not only were there hardly any women there, but when they were there … they had to turn their screens off … on the Zoom meeting or they were sitting in the back row or – there just weren't any women talking."¹⁰²¹⁰² Helen MacNamara 1 November 2023 71/5-10

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¶11.45. A number of witnesses confirmed that there was a lack of gender diversity in UK government decision-making forums throughout 2020.¹⁰³¹⁰³ Martin Reynolds 30 October 2023 106/18-21; Simon Case 23 May 2024 58/10-16; INQ000303245_0010; Lee Cain 31 October 2023 87/19-24

¶11.46. According to Ms MacNamara, this centralisation of decision-making was problematic, as it compounded "a narrowed perspective" in UK government decision-making.¹⁰⁴¹⁰⁴ INQ000273841_0040 para 74 As a result, the potential impact of decisions on vulnerable groups such as women, children and ethnic minorities was not always well understood.¹⁰⁵¹⁰⁵ INQ000273841_0051-0054 paras 101, 103, 106; Helen MacNamara 1 November 2023 117/8-19; Lee Cain 31 October 2023 57/19-58/25 Ms MacNamara told the Inquiry that "the female perspective was being missed in advice and decision making".¹⁰⁶¹⁰⁶ INQ000273841_0050-0051 para 99; Helen MacNamara 1 November 2023 71/5-22; INQ000308302 For example, little consideration was given to the impact that lockdowns would have on domestic abuse, and "there was an attempt to tacitly restrict access to abortion by not making provision available outside of clinics that were closed".¹⁰⁷¹⁰⁷ INQ000273841_0052-0053 para 103

¶11.47. Mr Johnson conceded that "the gender balance of my team should have been better" and that "during the pandemic too many meetings were too male dominated".¹⁰⁸¹⁰⁸ Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 34/12-22 However, he denied that decisions were taken without considering the impact on women.¹⁰⁹¹⁰⁹ Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 163/7-164/11

¶11.48. It is understandable that, in times of crisis, when decisions must be taken with great speed, decision-makers may have to act without the benefit of a full debate in Cabinet. However, to ensure good decision-making and compliance with important constitutional principles, it is vital that decisions which have a major impact on the public are properly discussed and a full range of views is heard whenever circumstances permit. Had the UK Cabinet been used as more than a formality, Mr Johnson might have found the decision-making process easier, and action might have been taken earlier. Further, given the diversity in Mr Johnson's wider Cabinet, its proper involvement might have brought a more diverse perspective to decision-making and improved scrutiny and consideration of vulnerable groups.

The Scottish Government

¶11.49. While the Scottish Government purported to rule by Cabinet, more often than not decisions were taken by a small group of people and then formally approved by the Cabinet. Nicola Sturgeon MSP (First Minister of Scotland from November 2014 to March 2023) insisted:

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" Strategic decisions would be made by Cabinet and more operational ones by SGORR [Scottish Government Resilience Room]. These decisions would often be informed by discussions in 'Gold' meetings or Deep Dive sessions."¹¹⁰¹¹⁰ INQ000339033_0010 para 23

However, the evidence suggests that important decisions were, in practice, made outside the formal structures of the Scottish Cabinet and the Scottish Government Resilience Room.

¶11.50. The 'Gold' or 'Gold Command' (or other variations) structure was not a formally constituted group but an informal label attached to a series of meetings between senior decision-makers and their advisers that took place outside the formal decision-making structures.

¶11.51. The first of the Gold Command meetings took place on 24 August 2020, as a "strategic review discussion" attended by Ms Sturgeon, Ken Thomson (Director General for Strategy and External Affairs in the Scottish Government from December 2011 to September 2023) and other senior advisers.¹¹¹¹¹¹ INQ000429205 These meetings were then held regularly until early 2022, usually the day before the Scottish Cabinet was to meet.¹¹²¹¹² INQ000249361 No formal minutes were kept. Ms Sturgeon said that this was because "they were not decision-making meetings in the way Cabinet meetings were".¹¹³¹¹³ Nicola Sturgeon 31 January 2024 71/5-13

¶11.52. However, the Gold Command structure played an important role in the Scottish Government's decision-making during the pandemic.¹¹⁴¹¹⁴ INQ000214734_0006 para 19(p) Humza Yousaf MSP (Cabinet Secretary for Justice from June 2018 to May 2021 and Cabinet Secretary for Health and Social Care from May 2021 to March 2023) accepted that there were times:

" when a decision made by the former First Minister or discussed within Gold Command was not cascaded to the rest of Cabinet or all Ministers due to the fast nature of decision-making during the pandemic".¹¹⁵¹¹⁵ INQ000273956_0007 para 35

¶11.53. In June 2021, the Scottish Cabinet delegated decision-making powers to Ms Sturgeon during the summer recess following the emergence of the Delta variant of Covid-19. It noted that Ms Sturgeon would be supported "as required by the Gold Group structure of key Ministers".¹¹⁶¹¹⁶ INQ000214734_0006 para 19(p) The terms of the delegation required only that the Cabinet should be advised "in the event that the First Minister and Gold Group were to reach a decision that differed materially from Strategic Framework".¹¹⁷¹¹⁷ INQ000214734_0007 para 19(q) However, as formal minutes were not kept of Gold Command meetings, it is difficult to understand the nature and extent of the discussions in these meetings, including who attended and why.¹¹⁸¹¹⁸ Nicola Sturgeon 31 January 2024 71/10-13

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¶11.54. The delegation of decisions from the Scottish Cabinet to the First Minister and/or the Deputy First Minister of Scotland was regular and, on occasion, extremely wide.¹¹⁹¹¹⁹ INQ000273982_0029 para 76 For example, an emergency Cabinet meeting took place on 19 December 2020, following the emergence of a new, faster-spreading Alpha variant. The minutes noted that the Cabinet delegated "the responsibility for any further decisions that might be required to take into account any material changes in circumstances of which they might become aware" to Ms Sturgeon and John Swinney MSP (Deputy First Minister of Scotland from November 2014 to March 2023).¹²⁰¹²⁰ INQ000232744_0007

¶11.55. The First Minister and Deputy First Minister of Scotland also, on occasion, took it upon themselves to make significant decisions outside of the Cabinet structure. On 17 March 2020, the Scottish Cabinet discussed the possible closure of schools, but considered that the evidence in support of this measure was not yet clear.¹²¹¹²¹ INQ000362664_0005 para 18(c) It agreed:

" The advantages and drawbacks of closing schools and other educational establishments should be considered further over coming days in light of emerging evidence across the UK."¹²²¹²² INQ000362664_0009 para 19(d)

¶Mr Swinney explained that the Scottish Government needed to come to a "definitive conclusion about whether schools should remain open".¹²³¹²³ INQ000273979_0009 para 19 He and Ms Sturgeon discussed school closures informally following the Cabinet meeting on 17 March. He said:

" We took a decision that she should say on 18 March the likelihood was that schools would close on Friday 20 March and I confirmed this closure would take place in a statement to Parliament on 19 March."¹²⁴¹²⁴ INQ000273979_0009 para 19

¶This important decision was therefore taken by Ms Sturgeon and Mr Swinney outside the Cabinet decision-making process and in circumstances in which the Cabinet had agreed to keep the proposed measure under consideration. Although the situation was rapidly deteriorating, the Cabinet should have been sufficiently agile and engaged to play its central role in decision-making and not be sidelined in this way.

¶11.56. The use of the informal Gold Command meeting structure diminished the role of the Scottish Cabinet and reduced the transparency of the Scottish Government's decision-making during the pandemic. It also deprived decision-makers of a wide range of views. The Scottish Cabinet frequently became a decision-ratifying body, not the ultimate decision-making body.

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¶11.57. The Scottish Cabinet should have been involved to a greater degree in decision-making in Scotland. This would have ensured greater transparency and enhanced accountability for decisions taken by the Gold Command and, increasingly, Ms Sturgeon.

The Welsh Government

¶11.58. By contrast, the Welsh Cabinet was fully engaged throughout the pandemic and was an effective and inclusive central decision-making structure.

¶11.59. The Welsh Cabinet and First Minister of Wales "provided the fulcrum around which Welsh Government decision-making turned during the pandemic".¹²⁵¹²⁵ INQ000411927_0028 para 73 On 23 March 2020, attendance at meetings of the Cabinet was extended to include all Welsh ministers and deputy ministers.¹²⁶¹²⁶ INQ000371209_0011 para 30; INQ000389184_0009 para 28 Cabinet meetings were also attended by those officials who were key to the pandemic response.¹²⁷¹²⁷ Andrew Goodall 5 March 2024 37/3-20 Decisions taken by the Cabinet were usually reached by consensus.¹²⁸¹²⁸ INQ000371209_0011 para 30; INQ000389184_0010-0011 paras 36-37; INQ000346272_0031-0032 paras 106-107; INQ000327735_0023 para 66; Mark Drakeford 13 March 2024 4/17-20; INQ000391237_0010 para 36; INQ000371645_0004 para 15; Vaughan Gething 11 March 2024 19/5-17 The Inquiry has identified only two occasions when the First Minister of Wales had to act as the "first among equals" (meaning that he took the final decision where Cabinet consensus could not be reached).¹²⁹¹²⁹ Vaughan Gething 11 March 2024 190/23-192/6; Mark Drakeford 13 March 2024 170/14-173/9; INQ000389184_0010-0011, 0084 paras 36, 295; INQ000391237_0010 para 36; INQ000346272_0032 para 107

¶11.60. The use of the Welsh Cabinet for decision-making about its Covid-19 response enabled the Welsh Government to make transparent and collective decisions throughout the pandemic, informed by a range of views.

¶11.61. From early March 2020, Cabinet meetings were supplemented by meetings of the Covid-19 Core Group. This was an information-sharing forum that expanded to include an open invitation to all ministers, a representative of the Welsh Local Government Association (which represents all 22 local authorities in Wales), the leaders of the two opposition parties in Wales, various Welsh Government officials and the Chief Executive of the Wales Council for Voluntary Action.¹³⁰¹³⁰ Officials included the Chief Medical Officer for Wales, the Chief Scientific Adviser for Health in Wales, the Director of Local Government and Civil Contingencies, and the Director General of the Health and Social Services Group and Chief Executive of NHS Wales. See INQ000048787_0002 para 1.10; INQ000371209_0014-0015 para 42; INQ000391237_0012-0013 paras 48, 50; INQ000389184_0011-0012 para 38; INQ000396878_0034 para 124.Show full note

¶11.62. Mark Drakeford MS, First Minister of Wales from December 2018 to March 2024, established daily ministerial calls from early April 2020 (which senior officials also attended) to discuss "on the day" issues that needed to be responded to quickly.¹³¹¹³¹ INQ000048791_0002 para 1.4; INQ000371209_0015 para 43; Shan Morgan 4 March 2024 163/12-17 Decisions were not usually taken in those calls – instead, decisions that needed to be taken were flagged. Occasionally, but only when matters were particularly urgent, decisions were taken directly on the calls.¹³²¹³² INQ000389184_0012 para 39; INQ000391237_0012 para 47; INQ000371645_0004 para 16

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¶11.63. Some urgent decisions were taken by individual or smaller groups of ministers – such as when Mr Drakeford and Kirsty Williams MS (Minister for Education in the Welsh Government from May 2016 to May 2021) decided on 18 March 2020 that schools should be advised to close from 20 March (see Chapter 4: Realisation and lockdown, in Volume I) – or occasionally during calls between all ministers. Aside from these, however, there were no other ad hoc groups or committees taking decisions at ministerial level outside the formal structures.¹³³¹³³ INQ000362237_0024, 0026 paras 91, 97; see also INQ000349180_0003; Vaughan Gething 11 March 2024 132/20, 133/23

The Northern Ireland Executive

¶11.64. The arrangements for the governance of Northern Ireland are distinct and unusual in bringing politicians who are oppositional to each other (in terms of their designation as nationalist or unionist) together with non-aligned politicians (who designate as 'other') to form an Executive Committee that constitutes the government in Northern Ireland. It is a coalition government, but it is a multi-party (comprising representatives from five political parties), forced or 'coerced' coalition.¹³⁴¹³⁴ INQ000472398_0006 There are nine Executive Departments, one of which is The Executive Office (previously the Office of the First Minister and deputy First Minister) and each of which is a separate legal entity. The Executive Committee comprises ministers from each of the Executive Departments. These ministers represent the political spectrum in Northern Ireland.

¶11.65. The response of the Northern Ireland Executive to the pandemic must be seen through the lens of the power-sharing structures that govern how decisions are made, and the fact that, from 16 January 2017 to 11 January 2020, power-sharing was suspended and Northern Ireland was without a functioning Executive Committee. Accordingly, throughout that period, civil servants were precluded from taking decisions that fell within the purview of ministers (save in very limited circumstances).¹³⁵¹³⁵ INQ000438174_0025 para 85 As a result, decision-making structures in Northern Ireland for responding to a nationwide emergency had seriously atrophied.

¶11.66. Sir David Sterling (Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service and Permanent Secretary to The Executive Office from June 2017 to August 2020) observed that power-sharing in Northern Ireland could produce decision-making that tended towards the lowest common denominator. This could manifest in the most difficult or sensitive issues not being agreed or, on other occasions, being agreed by one party on the basis that something else would be 'traded' or 'conceded' by the other party in return.¹³⁶¹³⁶ David Sterling 1 May 2024 80/7-81/11 Sir Brandon Lewis MP, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland from February 2020 to July 2022, said that almost everything said or decided by politicians in Northern Ireland encompassed a subliminal, secondary message driven by the politics of Northern Ireland. This was not simply a question of positioning between the politics of unionism and nationalism, but also between the respective positions of each of the parties.¹³⁷¹³⁷ Brandon Lewis 9 May 2024 143/6-144/2

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¶11.67. Each Executive Department acts with a significant degree of operational independence.¹³⁸¹³⁸ This is in accordance with paragraph 24 of the Belfast Agreement of 1998 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ the-belfast-agreement), which provides that "ministers will have full executive authority within their respective areas of responsibility within any broad programme agreed by the executive committee and endorsed by the Assembly as a whole". Individual ministers have executive authority to determine policy and operational matters within their departments, without the general requirement to maintain a collective 'Cabinet position'. Neither the First Minister nor the deputy First Minister have powers to direct any minister or their department. This operational independence is subject to limits. By law, the Executive Committee is the forum for the consideration of matters that cut across the responsibilities of two or more ministers.¹³⁹¹³⁹ Section 20(3) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/47/contents) and paragraphs 19-20 of the Belfast Agreement of 1998, Strand One (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast-agreement) It also has the function of discussing and agreeing on other matters.¹⁴⁰¹⁴⁰ These include any significant or controversial matters that are clearly outside the scope of the Programme for Government (which sets out the immediate priorities of the Northern Ireland Executive) or significant or controversial matters that the First Minister and deputy First Minister, acting jointly, have determined should be considered by the Executive Committee. See section 20(4) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/47/contents).Show full note The Ministerial Code in Northern Ireland, in turn, makes it a duty to bring such matters to the attention of the Executive Committee for its consideration.¹⁴¹¹⁴¹ Ministerial Code, Northern Ireland Executive, 6 April 2006, page 10, para 2.4 (https://www.northernireland.gov.uk/publications/northern-ireland-executive-ministerial-code; INQ000262764)

¶11.68. Executive Departments in Northern Ireland are headed by ministers from different political parties. They do not act under the rubric of 'collective responsibility', which requires that ministers should be able to express disagreement freely in private but maintain a united front once decisions have been reached. As such, they are able to act with significant autonomy and operate in isolation from each other or, as described by Sir Brandon Lewis, in silos.¹⁴²¹⁴² Brandon Lewis 9 May 2024 136/20-21 Michelle O'Neill MLA (deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland from January 2020 to February 2022) characterised departments as having a "very siloed mentality".¹⁴³¹⁴³ Michelle O'Neill 14 May 2024 31/10-19 Based upon her experience, she believed that there should be:

" some sort of emergency ability to step in and change that structure, at least temporarily for the period of a pandemic or another unpredicted circumstance".¹⁴⁴¹⁴⁴ Michelle O'Neill 14 May 2024 31/10-19

¶11.69. Another unusual aspect of power-sharing in Northern Ireland is that the departmental permanent secretaries alone are ultimately accountable for their departments.

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¶11.70. Civil servants did not report to the Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service, who did not exercise day-to-day management of the permanent secretaries. This also caused complications. Ms O'Neill noted:

" Even the head of the Civil Service, because of the unique circumstance, can't direct other permanent secretaries to do certain things. So that makes, I think, the response to a pandemic or some other circumstances quite difficult in terms of our own system of governance."¹⁴⁵¹⁴⁵ Michelle O'Neill 14 May 2024 31/21-32/1

¶For example, when Northern Ireland moved to set up a hub as part of its civil contingency response to the pandemic, only 2 of 85 civil servants who had been trained volunteered to staff the hub. Even the Head of the Civil Service could not insist that people move to work in this area. This was a "fault line".¹⁴⁶¹⁴⁶ Michelle O'Neill 14 May 2024 47/22-48/14

¶11.71. Following the restoration of the Northern Ireland Assembly in January 2020 (after a period of suspension from January 2017), the Northern Ireland Executive largely disengaged from responding to the pandemic until mid-March 2020. Even then, and notwithstanding the fact that a number of significant matters were brought before the Executive Committee for its consideration, departments still retained significant control over the operational matters for which they were responsible. This created tensions in relation to the Department of Health (Northern Ireland), which was the 'lead department' in the response to the pandemic, given its primacy over the operational response to the pandemic.¹⁴⁷¹⁴⁷ INQ000213676; INQ000212916; INQ000183558

¶11.72. Some witnesses suggested that the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) was the lead department only "for the health response".¹⁴⁸¹⁴⁸ Richard Pengelly 7 May 2024 39/16-42/2; Robin Swann 13 May 2024 39/3-43/23 However, the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) was very much in control of the initial response to the pandemic.¹⁴⁹¹⁴⁹ INQ000436641_0009 para 30; INQ000418976_0010 para 32 This was inevitable, in part because it was more connected to the sources of expertise and advice available to the UK government. For example, the Chief Medical Officer for Northern Ireland collaborated with the Chief Medical Officer for England, and Department of Health (Northern Ireland) officials attended SAGE. Robin Swann MLA (Minister of Health for Northern Ireland from January 2020 to October 2022 and from February to May 2024) also attended COBR meetings until 2 March 2020. Ms O'Neill told the Inquiry:

" [I]t was the reality that in those early days Health were the only people that had the expertise and the advice, they were receiving the information from SAGE."¹⁵⁰¹⁵⁰ Michelle O'Neill 14 May 2024 64/21-24

¶11.73. Arlene Foster MLA, Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (First Minister of Northern Ireland from January 2016 to January 2017 and from January 2020 to June 2021) and Ms O'Neill conceded that there was no real oversight on the part of the Executive Committee of the response to the pandemic until about mid-March 2020.¹⁵¹¹⁵¹ Michelle O'Neill 14 May 2024 61/5-25; Arlene Foster 15 May 2024 12/7-12

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¶When asked about the activation of NICCMA, she said:

" As DoH [Department of Health (Northern Ireland)] was leading the pandemic response, NICCMA was to be activated when DoH asked for it to be activated."¹⁵²¹⁵² INQ000418976_0021 para 68

¶Yet the First Minister and deputy First Minister were both empowered to activate the protocol for NICCMA (which was not, in the event, activated until 18 March 2020).¹⁵³¹⁵³ INQ000092739_0014 para 36

¶11.74. Further, ministers had not addressed the role and ambit of the Northern Ireland Executive Committee during a pandemic. In a context in which departments operated with a high degree of autonomy and in highly compartmentalised or siloed ways, this was an issue that ought to have been confronted and settled at the earliest possible point. When the Executive Committee met on 26 March 2020, basic questions were raised as to its role. The Minister of Finance asked how the Executive Committee's authority was to be exercised, given that this was not just a health crisis but involved all government departments. Ministers asked where the "centre" was in terms of such decision-making.¹⁵⁴¹⁵⁴ INQ000065747_0010 These were important questions, but they ought to have been asked in or before January 2020 in preparation for the possibility of a pandemic.

¶11.75. The Department of Health (Northern Ireland) may have had legitimate concerns about the potential for delay or complication if the Executive Committee was to become involved in operational issues. However, notwithstanding that ministers in Northern Ireland do not act under the principle of collective responsibility, ministers ought to have found a way of reconciling the need for oversight of the whole of the government response to the pandemic without impairing the operational response.

¶11.76. Equally, Baroness Foster and Ms O'Neill did not consider that, during the pandemic, they had sufficient understanding and sight of important matters for which the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) bore responsibility, but which were also critical in relation to the responsibilities of the First Minister and deputy First Minister for civil contingencies.¹⁵⁵¹⁵⁵ Michelle O'Neill 14 May 2024 25/4-27/3; INQ000418976_0011 para 36; INQ000287536_0002; INQ000391436_0001-0002; Arlene Foster 15 May 2024 61/2-5 Mr Sterling noted at the time Ms O'Neill's clear frustration at having "little power or influence over the Health Service" and Ms Foster's frustration about the lack of information provided by the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) ("coupled with frequent surprises").¹⁵⁶¹⁵⁶ INQ000287536_0002; INQ000391436_0001-0002 She and Ms O'Neill would read media reports about information from the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) that had not been brought to their attention.¹⁵⁷¹⁵⁷ Michelle O'Neill 14 May 2024 138/20-139/2

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¶11.77. As a result, there was no proper ministerial consideration about what could be done across government to limit the spread of the virus. Nor was there meaningful examination of the planning of the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) – for example, of the arrangements that existed for testing and tracing and their capacity.

¶11.78. Concerns were still being expressed in December 2020 by Ms Foster and Ms O'Neill about the following:

¶"• Silo mentality from DOH and others, more co-ordinated approach required.

FM [First Minister] & dFM [deputy First Minister] 'don't know what's happening'; are responsible for Civil Contingencies."¹⁵⁸¹⁵⁸ INQ000391436_0001

¶11.79. Even when the Northern Ireland Executive Committee was engaged and provided with updates by Mr Swann, the minutes of those meetings demonstrate that the discussions in the early stages of the pandemic were cursory and superficial. Covid-19 was not substantively discussed as part of the agenda.¹⁵⁹¹⁵⁹ INQ000048442_0004; INQ000048441_0002; INQ000048445_0005; INQ000065693_0009-0010 There was no interrogation as to what planning was taking place or what arrangements were being made (eg for testing) as the pandemic gathered momentum. The Northern Ireland Executive failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation and this curtailed its ability to respond on a cross-departmental basis.

¶11.80. The Executive Committee should be more effective at exercising oversight across government in response to an emergency and more able to hold individual ministers and departments to account.

¶11.81. Additionally, with the exception of Mr Swann (who was the Minister of Health at the time), ministers who were not members of the two main parties were disadvantaged during the pandemic.¹⁶⁰¹⁶⁰ Naomi Long 9 May 2024 9/2-10/15 Naomi Long MLA (Minister for Justice in Northern Ireland from January 2020 to October 2022), a member of the Alliance Party, had the impression throughout the pandemic that discussions that occurred before Executive Committee meetings between civil servants, the First Minister, the deputy First Minister and the Minister of Health were negotiations for the ministers to come to an agreed position. This made it difficult to seek detailed advice from officials prior to Executive Committee meetings.¹⁶¹¹⁶¹ Naomi Long 9 May 2024 10/4-7 According to Ms Long, it was also "very isolating" because:

" we were taking decisions which would have a huge impact upon people's lives, and yet were not part of the wider conversation".¹⁶²¹⁶² Naomi Long 9 May 2024 10/7-10

¶It is understood that, given the system of mandatory coalition, prior collaboration between the two main parties in Northern Ireland happens routinely. A desire by the two main parties to narrow issues in advance of Executive Committee meetings in the hope of achieving consensus was understandable. However, given that each minister on the Executive Committee bore part of the overall responsibility for those matters they were asked to decide on, no ministers should have felt that they were excluded or deprived of their ability to properly scrutinise the decisions being made.

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¶11.83. The First Minister and deputy First Minister were not sufficiently empowered to hold departments to account or to ensure a joined-up response across the whole of government. There is a need to examine how the First Minister and deputy First Minister could be provided with temporary joint powers to direct the work of ministers and departments during an emergency, and how the Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service could be similarly empowered to direct civil servants. Consideration should also be given to how decisions that are usually subject to ministerial approval would be taken in circumstances where an emergency occurs while the Executive Committee is not formed.

Recommendation 9: Delegated powers in Northern Ireland in an emergency

¶The Northern Ireland Executive and UK government (in consultation with the Irish government where necessary) should review the structures and delegated powers of government in Northern Ireland to consider:

the empowerment of the First Minister and deputy First Minister jointly to direct the work of other ministers and departments during an emergency;
the empowerment of the Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service in relation to the allocation of civil servants to departments or to civil contingency structures during an emergency; and
how decisions that would usually be subject to ministerial approval would be taken should an emergency occur during the suspension of power-sharing arrangements.

Future decision-making structures for whole-system civil emergencies

¶11.84. COBR is the appropriate structure for the initial response of the UK government to a potential pandemic, as standing up a wider response across the whole of government is unnecessary if a virus is successfully contained. However, COBR is best designed to deal with acute, short-term emergencies, rather than a prolonged crisis extending over many months, such as a pandemic.¹⁶³¹⁶³ Imran Shafi 30 October 2023 149/6-11; INQ000280190_0012 para 39; Simon Case 23 May 2024 63/9-19; INQ000273841_0025 para 44; INQ000280628_0014 para 25; Mark Sedwill 8 November 2023 64/10-18

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¶11.85. There is currently no plan for identifying when a short-term emergency becomes a longer-term emergency, and likely an emergency affecting the whole of the UK which is unmanageable through COBR. The UK government and devolved administrations must, therefore, work together to determine how they will identify when this point has been reached and how they will transition from managing the emergency through COBR to managing it through appropriate longer-term structures in each nation.

¶11.86. The UK government should design longer-term decision-making structures – with strategic and operational elements similar to Covid-S and Covid-O – to be implemented in any future pandemic or other civil emergency at the point of transitioning away from COBR. These strategic and operational structures should be used by the UK government for longer-term decision-making in any prolonged future emergency. However, to avoid the difficulties for decision-making that the sidelining of the UK Cabinet during the Covid-19 pandemic created, the UK government must ensure that the Cabinet is substantively involved in decision-making whenever possible.

¶11.87. Pace and clarity of decision-making are plainly critical during the initial period of an acute emergency. There is an obvious risk that the substantive involvement of the UK Cabinet in decision-making during such periods – given its relatively large size compared with the Scottish and Welsh Cabinets – would have an adverse effect on the speed and effectiveness of UK government decision-making.

¶11.88. However, during a prolonged crisis such as a pandemic, there will be periods when there is more time for wider consultation. At such times, there is a critical role for the UK Cabinet to play as a safeguard in scrutinising the appropriateness and necessity of a proposed intervention, and for it to ensure that all relevant considerations and impacts have been taken into account before the decision is taken. This is especially important if, as was the case during the Covid-19 pandemic, decisions are made under secondary legislation, without the benefit of parliamentary scrutiny.

¶11.89. The Scottish and Welsh Cabinets are both of a relatively small size compared with the UK Cabinet, and are therefore better placed to be primarily responsible for longer-term decision-making in any future pandemic. As Professor Paul Cairney (expert witness on Scottish Government core decision-making and political governance) noted, their smaller nature is:

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" more conducive to collective conversation, and the cross-cutting nature of ministerial responsibilities means that there are fewer issues that could be deemed the sole responsibility of one".¹⁶⁴¹⁶⁴ INQ000274154_0016 para 45

¶11.90. Dr Andrew Goodall (Director General of Health and Social Services in the Welsh Government and Chief Executive of NHS Wales from June 2014 to November 2021 and Permanent Secretary to the Welsh Government from September 2021) explained that the Welsh Government is a "compact administration", meaning that "all ministers and senior leaders are 'under one roof' and are frequently 'in the same room' together".¹⁶⁵¹⁶⁵ INQ000327735_0025 para 77 The Welsh Government and the number of those attending the Cabinet was significantly smaller than that of both the UK and Scottish governments.¹⁶⁶¹⁶⁶ INQ000066086 (November 2019); INQ000066097 (January 2021); INQ000083229 (June 2021); INQ000066126 (May 2022) A number of witnesses agreed that the relatively limited number of attendees enabled the Welsh Government to work in a highly integrated way and make decisions at pace.¹⁶⁷¹⁶⁷ INQ000327735_0025 para 77; INQ000371209_0015-0016 para 45; Shan Morgan 4 March 2024 155/16-156/24

¶11.91. As such, the Scottish and Welsh Cabinets are the appropriate structures for longer-term decision-making in Scotland and Wales respectively in any future emergency.

¶11.92. Due to the distinct constitutional arrangements for Northern Ireland, the general role of the Executive Committee in decision-making cannot easily be compared with that of the Cabinets in the other governments of the UK. Nevertheless, the Executive Committee is the appropriate structure for longer-term emergency decision-making in Northern Ireland.

Recommendation 10: Civil emergency decision-making structures

¶The UK government and devolved administrations should set out in future pandemic preparedness strategies (see the Inquiry's Module 1 Report, Recommendation 4) how decision-making will work in a future pandemic. This should include provision for COBR to be used as the initial response structure and set out how the UK government and devolved administrations will transition from managing a pandemic through COBR to managing it through separate arrangements in each nation when it becomes clear that the emergency will be longer-term. It should include provision for longer-term decision-making structures in the UK government which consist of:

a strategy group to set the overall approach to each stage of the pandemic and take decisions on major interventions (eg entering and exiting lockdown); and
an operational group to take decisions on the implementation of the agreed strategy throughout the pandemic.

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¶The design of these structures should include an outline of decision-making procedures for each group. The strategy should make express provision for the involvement of the UK Cabinet in the decision-making of the strategy and operational groups. It should also provide that longer-term decision-making should be conducted primarily by the UK, Scottish and Welsh Cabinets and the Northern Ireland Executive. Decision-making groups in each nation should include a minister with responsibility for representing the interests of vulnerable groups. In the UK government, the Minister for Women and Equalities may be the most appropriate minister in this regard.