The situation by the end of April 2021

The situation by the end of April 2021

¶7.114. The exit strategies were based on data rather than aspiration.²⁸⁷²⁸⁷ 'Don't drop "data, not dates" approach, UK adviser warns as Covid cases surge', The Guardian, 29 May 2021 (https://www. theguardian.com/world/2021/may/29/dont-drop-data-not-dates-approach-uk-adviser-warns-as-covid-cases-surge; INQ000370285) According to Professor Stephen Reicher, Professor of Psychology at the University of St Andrews, the relevant data were gathered according to World Health Organization principles. Notably, these principles were whether transmission was controlled and whether there was health service capacity to identify, test and treat all cases and also to trace and quarantine contacts. In addition, minimising outcome risks to the most vulnerable, the existence of preventative measures in workplaces, managing import and export of cases from hotspots and the participation of communities in the transition were all invoked.²⁸⁸²⁸⁸ INQ000370347_0053-0054 para 108

¶7.115. The UK government's COVID-19 Response – Spring 2021 roadmap was a good example of a well-defined and comprehensive strategy, with clear aims and objectives. It adopted the data-driven approach, marked with caution and incremental and monitored relaxation of restrictions. It sought to:

" balance health, including mental health, economic and social factors and how they disproportionately impact certain groups, as well as epidemiological evidence".²⁸⁹²⁸⁹ COVID-19 Response – Spring 2021, HM Government, February 2021, p8, para 8 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ media/6033cfdae90e076607c1bf18/COVID-19_Response_-_Spring_2021.pdf; INQ000185087)

¶However, it explicitly stated that the dates for easing restrictions were "wholly contingent on the data and … subject to change".²⁹⁰²⁹⁰ COVID-19 Response – Spring 2021, HM Government, February 2021, p8, paras 8, 10 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ media/6033cfdae90e076607c1bf18/COVID-19_Response_-_Spring_2021.pdf; INQ000185087) It provided clear information to the public and explained the rationale for the steps, along with setting out the evidential basis or scientific advice. For example, it explained:

" The sequencing of easing will be driven by the evidence on sources of transmission. Outdoor activity has been prioritised because the likelihood of COVID-19 transmission is substantially lower in the open air than indoors. This restores more freedom to people more quickly while minimising the impact on transmission."²⁹¹²⁹¹ COVID-19 Response – Spring 2021, HM Government, February 2021, p25, para 82 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ media/6033cfdae90e076607c1bf18/COVID-19_Response_-_Spring_2021.pdf; INQ000185087)

¶This allowed the public and businesses to plan ahead. When plans changed, there was a readily understandable rationale or metric, with clear criteria for the next step. This assisted in avoiding the mixed messages and reactive decision-making that had marked much of 2020 and the early part of 2021.

¶7.116. In Wales, Mr Gething believed that the Welsh Government struck the right balance in the easing of restrictions in 2021.²⁹²²⁹² Vaughan Gething 11 March 2024 194/17-22 In his view:

" [T]he vaccination gave us headroom to make choices but, dealing with the level of uncertainty about the level of population protection it provided, going through February and March in particular, we really did have to take seriously advice we'd had, taking account of where we were before Christmas."²⁹³²⁹³ Vaughan Gething 11 March 2024 195/9-14

¶The Welsh Government was right to adopt a cautious approach to lifting restrictions, given the uncertainties about varieties and the impact of vaccines, in the period from January to April 2021.

¶7.117. In Northern Ireland, some ministers expressed concerns that the pace of removing restrictions was too slow. Diane Dodds MLA, Minister for the Economy in Northern Ireland from January 2020 to June 2021, suggested that the length and complexity of the Executive's review process was threatening the continued existence of businesses already heavily affected by the ongoing restrictions.²⁹⁴²⁹⁴ INQ000048522_0002-0003 para 6 Edwin Poots MLA, Minister for Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs in Northern Ireland from January 2020 to October 2022, referred to the "glacial pace of easing".²⁹⁵²⁹⁵ INQ000065698_0005 Ms O'Neill explained:

¶" The time built in between key steps and relaxations was to allow for decisions to be properly informed by the health, community, and economic data and to see the real time impact of the steps taken on the prevalence of the virus.

¶This allowed us to use the ongoing modelling and take risk-based decisions on next steps. The Executive did not want to be driven by dates but by the evidence. A commitment was made to only keep restrictions in place as long as necessary."²⁹⁶²⁹⁶ INQ000436641_0051 para 199

¶Ms O'Neill considered that this "represented an appropriate, balanced, and reasonable strategy for reopening society".²⁹⁷²⁹⁷ INQ000436641_0051-0052 para 200 The Inquiry agrees. The Northern Ireland Executive's cautious approach to the relaxation of restrictions at this time was the right one, given the uncertainty about the emerging Alpha variant and the fragility of Northern Ireland's health service in this period. The caution demonstrated that lessons had been learned from what happened when restrictions were removed too swiftly in late 2020.

Winter lockdowns and exit plans

¶7.118. The Inquiry accepts that restrictions were lifted carefully and proportionately throughout the spring of 2021 across the UK, and to this extent lessons had been learned from previous lockdowns. This meant that the four governments were better placed at the end of April 2021 to balance recovery from the effects of the virus and restrictions with the continued need to manage the direct and indirect harms of the virus and emerging variants.

¶7.119. However, all four governments of the UK might have avoided the need for any further lockdown or exit strategy in the first place had the lessons of 2020 about the spread of the virus and its devastating consequences been learned earlier and more comprehensively.

¶7.120. It was clear at the beginning of December 2020 that R was likely to be above 1 in parts of the UK – especially Wales and some regions of England – and that the various measures that had been implemented had failed to reduce the relatively high level of incidence. Yet, all four governments decided to proceed with plans to relax (to varying degrees) the restrictions over Christmas. This decision was understandable but unjustified given the exponential growth of the virus. It gave rise to false hope.

¶7.121. It compounded their failure to take the necessary steps to get the virus under control. All four governments bear responsibility for the hurried and chaotic descent into further and immensely damaging lockdowns.