UK Covid-19 Inquiry, Modules 2, 2A, 2B, 2C: Core decision-making and political governance · 2025
Support for advisers
Support for advisers
Resourcing and pastoral support
¶9.198. It is striking that the burden of providing advice to ministers fell on the shoulders of a few individuals, especially in the devolved nations.
¶9.199. In Northern Ireland, the burden fell almost entirely on Professors McBride and Young. Professor McBride was also heavily involved in the operational response to the pandemic. It is clear that, at a number of critical points during the pandemic, he and a small team of individuals within the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) were subject to massive pressure.
¶9.200. Describing the "very considerable demands" placed on staff within the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) generally, Professor Young explained:
" [M]y role as CSA within the Department is a part time one, with no deputy or any supporting infrastructure in the Department. This was addressed in a flexible way as part of the pandemic response, but I believe that more investment in scientific expertise and advice is required both in the Department and in other NI government departments."343 INQ000409589_0054-0055 para 146
¶9.201. Professor Young also described working "extended hours, seven days per week with essentially no leave over a very prolonged period". As he put it, the "demands on staff were excessive at times, and relentless".344 INQ000409589_0054-0055 para 146
¶9.202. Similarly, in Wales, Dr Atherton faced immense pressure and lacked administrative support, particularly from January to April 2020.345 Frank Atherton 4 March 2024 5/24-6/7 He frequently received ad hoc requests for advice through various channels, such as emails and phone calls, to assist Welsh Government officials. While he or his office provided advice as requested, they did not maintain a list of all requests.346 INQ000391115_0039 paras 152-153 Sir Frank Atherton also said that he struggled to manage the influx of information and lacked the resources to take comprehensive notes from early, informal meetings with Welsh ministers, officials and NHS Wales, although this would have been valuable.347 Frank Atherton 4 March 2024 7/18-9/7 In August 2020, he highlighted to Dr Goodall the unsustainable pressures on Welsh Government resources. He noted that many key individuals had put in exceptional hours and that much of their work to manage the pandemic had been "unseen and under- appreciated".348 INQ000066192 Dr Orford also noted the absence of administrative support for documenting some meetings.349 Rob Orford 4 March 2024 87/3-18 Although additional support was provided to Dr Atherton from May 2020 to February 2022, earlier assistance would have been beneficial.350 Frank Atherton 4 March 2024 5/10-6/7; INQ000391115_0006-0008 paras 20-27
54¶9.203. In England, the pressures on the Government Chief Scientific Adviser and Chief Medical Officers were no less intense. As Professor Vallance explained:
" The nature of the role meant that there was very little respite from work or pressure for many months on end, indeed for more than two years … Everyone was working under enormous stress and felt the intense strain of our responsibilities."351 INQ000238826_0157, 0159 paras 474, 480
¶9.204. In the event of a future pandemic, governments should give consideration to how best to support those advisers most heavily involved in the response. Such conversations should form part of emergency planning and preparation.
¶9.205. The scientific advisory groups operating during the pandemic depended largely on the goodwill of their participants and of the participants' employers. Those who participated in SAGE and its sub-groups did so in addition to their existing commitments. Most received no financial remuneration for the substantial time they dedicated to the response.352 INQ000236261_0085 para 14.15
¶9.206. Resources for SAGE and its sub-groups were significantly overstretched. There was very little direct government funding for scientific advisory work, which limited the ability of participants to engage fully with the relevant material. For example, the Environmental Modelling Group had "limited capacity to undertake more in-depth systematic reviews of published literature".353 INQ000236261_0019-0020 para 5.41 SPI-B had no resource to:
" search, critically evaluate and summarise the huge emerging relevant national and international datasets (e.g. from polling), policy and strategy documents and rapid research studies which were the key sources of data available to inform SPI-B advice".354 INQ000236376_0006 para 4.1
¶As Professor Keeling told the Inquiry, many participants would not have been able to provide the scientific input they did without support from UK Research and
¶Innovation (a non-departmental public body sponsored by the Department for
¶Science, Innovation and Technology) and host institutions.355 INQ000217363_0014 para 53
¶9.207. The work of the modelling group at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine was partly funded by an award from UK Research and Innovation. However, even this funding was insufficient. Professor Edmunds explained that the funding available through the scheme:
55" only lasted for a maximum of 18 months … the epidemic lasted for longer than two years, yet extensions to the scheme were not available".356 INQ000273553_0112-0113 para 16.29
¶9.208. Limited funding led to severe staff shortages in the later phases of the pandemic, which put an "intolerable burden" on those involved in the response.357 INQ000273553_0112-0113 para 16.29 Members relied on their colleagues to take on extra duties and on their employers to allow them time away from their academic research.358 INQ000260643_0022 para 3.39 Professor Noakes said that, although universities were provided with funding to "buy out" time for SAGE participants, this was "nowhere close to the financial value of the time that experts put in".359 INQ000236261_0085 para 14.15 It also led to a lack of clarity about the extent of participants' responsibilities. Professor Noakes stated:
" At times the lines between external participants on SAGE and what would be expected if I was a civil servant felt like they were blurred, in terms of the time input and number of requests … it felt like some in government forgot that external participants of SAGE had day jobs in a university alongside the advice they were giving around the pandemic response."360 INQ000236261_0085 para 14.16
¶9.209. This meant that participating scientists were placed under substantial mental and physical strain for an extended period of time. According to Professor Medley, SPI‑M-O participants responded to the lack of resources "by extending the working day but potentially with a consequent loss in performance and personal toll".361 INQ000260643_0022 para 3.41 Professor Edmunds described the workload as "enormous and unrelenting".362 INQ000273553_0026 para 6.18 Professor Van-Tam recalled:
" [It was] horrendous for all of us at the beginning, it certainly was in the kind of 16 hours a day mark, and it certainly was seven days a week, it was very, very intense."363 Jonathan Van-Tam 22 November 2023 162/19-22
¶Professor Vallance stated:
" The process of getting help and scaling up resources should have been simpler and there should be mechanisms in place to allow this to happen in the event of an emergency."364 INQ000238826_0221-0222 para 690
¶9.210. The same issues arose in the devolved nations. Some part-time advisers within the Scottish Government were required to increase their commitment at the cost of their other roles.365 INQ000339838_0030 paras 186-187; INQ000346264_0057-0058 paras 244-245 Professor Crossman, for example, did not undertake clinical cardiology work in the NHS in order to permit him to carry out his role in government.366 INQ000273976_0001 para 2
56¶9.211. Many members of the Technical Advisory Group in Wales volunteered their time. Professor Michael Gravenor, Professor of Biostatistics and Epidemiology at Swansea University, explained that the work of his team on modelling was carried out without payment until August 2021. He said that this would not be feasible in a future pandemic.367 Michael Gravenor 1 March 2024 166/22-168/1; INQ000347979_0011-0012 para 39 Dr Orford acknowledged the need for improvement in this area, suggesting that compensation for members' time should be considered.368 Rob Orford 4 March 2024 97/15-98/15; INQ000312569_0003-0004 para 6
¶9.212. Professor Young explained that the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) relied heavily on personnel from external organisations, such as local universities and the Strategic Investment Board, being made available by their employers to support the response through participation in modelling work or scientific advice structures. He emphasised that more investment in scientific expertise and advice is required, both within the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) and in other government departments.369 INQ000409589_0054-0055 para 146
¶9.213. It is inevitable that, in times of national emergency, the pressure on those playing significant roles in the response will be intense. Although the extent of voluntary contributions – and of the pressures involved – differed between the four nations, those experts engaged in providing advice to governments gave their time and expertise selflessly. However, reliance upon the goodwill of experts (and their employers) or the imposition of extreme workloads upon them is not a credible, sustainable or fair way of accessing critical advice. It is imperative that a proper mechanism is created for the engagement of experts and for providing compensation for time spent away from their substantive role.
Public scrutiny
¶9.214. During the pandemic, scientific advisory groups came under considerable scrutiny from the press, Parliament and the public. A significant number of the individuals who participated in those groups found themselves thrust into the spotlight.
¶9.215. Professor Julia Gog, Professor of Mathematical Biology at the University of Cambridge, who participated in SAGE and SPI-M-O, remarked: "The deluge of high profile media requests was not something I was at all prepared for."370 INQ000056475_0012 Professor Vallance told the Inquiry:
57" Due to limited resources it was not possible to offer media training to all SAGE participants in the early stages of the pandemic. We relied then, and are likely to rely in the future, on individual academic institutions seeking to help their faculty members with media support and training."371 INQ000147810_0027 para 83
¶Some media coverage went beyond reasonable interest, becoming intrusive and personal. Professor Vallance referred to cases in which newspaper photographers were "stationed outside houses" and details were published that "allowed identification of a home address".372 INQ000147810_0014-0015 para 48
¶9.216. Despite already working under intensely stressful conditions, many scientists and advisers were subjected to threats and intimidation via social media, emails, phone calls and letters. In one incident, Professor Whitty was accosted by two men in St James's Park, London in June 2021, harassed and assaulted. He required "police close protection for nine months".373 INQ000251645_0022 para 2.50 Professor Gog also said that she had never before been in a position where she was "sent abuse by people who clearly regarded scientists as 'fair game'".374 INQ000056475_0012 On occasion, the abuse was extended to friends and family members. In a particularly sobering moment during his evidence, Professor Van-Tam stated:
" I did not expect my family to be threatened with having their throats cut. I did not expect the police to have to say … in the middle of the night … 'Will you move out for a few days while we look at this and potentially make some arrests' … it was a very stressful time indeed. And, you know, my family didn't sign up for that."375 Jonathan Van-Tam 22 November 2023 163/1-10
¶9.217. It should not be assumed, nor should it be expected, that the scientific community will step up with the same vigour and enthusiasm in a future emergency. There is a real risk that intrusive media coverage, coupled with online abuse, other forms of malicious communication and physical harassment, will dissuade talented people from contributing to the provision of scientific advice. Professor Van-Tam expressed his concern that, should another pandemic occur, "people will not want to sign up for these roles and these jobs, because of the implications that come with them".376 Jonathan Van-Tam 22 November 2023 163/11-14 Similarly, in Scotland, Professor Devi Sridhar, Professor of Global Public Health at the University of Edinburgh, told the Inquiry that her participation in the Scottish Government Covid-19 Advisory Group had come at a major cost. Despite the fact that she, like all members of the group, contributed a significant amount of time on a pro bono basis, she was subject to public abuse, death threats and online conspiracy theories. She concluded that, as a result, "I honestly do not know whether I would serve on such a group again".377 INQ000339838_0030 paras 186-187 Every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that such abuse does not happen.
58¶9.218. In a national pandemic, it is inevitable that advisers will have some degree of public exposure. It is, however, wholly unacceptable that legitimate scrutiny and challenge should descend into hostility, threats and abuse. It is vital that, in future crises, the UK government and the devolved administrations provide improved pastoral assistance to scientific advisers involved in supporting the response. A package of support should be put in place for those who contribute their time to government advisory bodies, including advice on personal and online security and access to appropriate counselling.
Recommendation 5: Support to participants in advisory groups
¶The Government Office for Science (GO-Science), the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government and the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) should each develop standard terms of appointment for all participants in scientific advisory groups. These terms should include:
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- clarity around the nature of an individual's role and the extent of their responsibility, as well as the likely time commitment;
- payment where their time commitment means that they have to spend time away from their substantive role;
- access to support services; and
- access to advice on personal and online security, with procedures for escalating specific concerns.