Chapter 3: The first 12 days of March

Introduction

¶3.1. By 1 March 2020, it was clear that Covid-19 had reached the UK and was a dangerous virus that potentially transmitted asymptomatically, and that sustained community transmission had likely occurred. In the absence of a scaled-up system for test, trace and isolate, the number of cases could not be calculated with any accuracy. The testing capacity in England was limited to only 2,100 samples per day.¹¹ INQ000223394_0001 Additional testing was being carried out in the devolved nations, but this was also limited.²² INQ000223394_0001

¶3.2. During the first 12 days of March 2020, it became apparent that containment of the virus had been lost. Community testing was ended and the next phase of the response commenced. This chapter examines the approach pursued by the UK government and devolved administrations to attempt to slow the growth of the virus during those crucial few days as it – and its appalling impact – spread around the UK.

¶Figure 3: Daily confirmed cases from 1 to 12 March 2020 across the UK

20 20 20 20 20 — 20
20 20 20 20 20 — 20

¶h ch h h ar h ar c ar ar c ar c ch ar c

¶M M M M M M

2 4 6 8 10 — 12

¶Source: UK Health Security Agency Covid-19 data dashboard archive (https://ukhsa-dashboard.data.gov.uk/covid-19-archive-data-download)

1 to 3 March 2020

¶3.3. On 1 March 2020, Professor (later Sir) Christopher Whitty, Chief Medical Officer for England from October 2019, announced that a further 12 people had tested positive for Covid-19 in England. This brought the total number of confirmed cases to 33 in England and 35 across the UK, including those previously reported in Northern Ireland and Wales.³³ 'CMO for England announces 12 new cases of novel coronavirus: 01 March 2020', Department of Health and Social Care, 1 March 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cmo-for-england-announces-12-new-cases-of-novel-coronavirus-01-march-2020; INQ000237298) Jeane Freeman MSP, Cabinet Secretary for Health and Sport in the Scottish Government from June 2018 to May 2021, confirmed the first positive test in Scotland from someone who had recently travelled from northern Italy.⁴⁴ 'Coronavirus (COVID-19) confirmed in Scotland', Scottish Government, 1 March 2020 (https://www.gov.scot/news/coronavirus-covid-19; INQ000591896)

¶3.4. On the same day, the UK government announced that a public health information campaign and "battle plan" for Covid-19 would be published later that week.⁵⁵ 'Health Secretary sets out government "battle plan" for COVID-19', Department of Health and Social Care, 1 March 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/health-secretary-sets-out-government-battle-plan-for-covid-19; INQ000237297_0003) Covid-19 would be:

" a standing item on the weekly Cabinet agenda, with the PM [Prime Minister] continuing to oversee the government approach".⁶⁶ 'Health Secretary sets out government "battle plan" for COVID-19', Department of Health and Social Care, 1 March 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/health-secretary-sets-out-government-battle-plan-for-covid-19; INQ000237297_0004)

¶The battle plan was also stated to be:

" based on the government's existing contingency plans for responding to a pandemic flu outbreak, but has been adapted to take account of the differences between COVID-19 and pandemic influenza".⁷⁷ 'Health Secretary sets out government "battle plan" for COVID-19', Department of Health and Social Care, 1 March 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/health-secretary-sets-out-government-battle-plan-for-covid-19; INQ000237297_0003)

¶3.5. Modelling groups from Imperial College London, Oxford University and the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine met with NHS England clinical leaders and planners at Imperial College London on 1 March 2020.⁸⁸ INQ000249526_0045 para 141 The purpose of this meeting was "to test whether the emerging view that the NHS would not have sufficient capacity to cope was correct".⁹⁹ INQ000116811_0044-0046 paras 161-168 NHS England explained that the meeting established:

" a shared ground and common set of model parameters in modelling upon which to work out what would need to be done for the NHS to be able to cope. A key omission in the initial SPI-M-O [Scientific Pandemic Infections Group on Modelling, Operational sub-group] work that was resolved in this workshop, was that it did not include accurate model parameters about the length of stay; the correction of which rapidly increased some of the concerns about lack of capacity."¹⁰¹⁰ INQ000116811_0046 para 168

¶The subsequent modelling estimated:

¶" that under a [reasonable worst-case] scenario, the NHS would be unable to meet

all demands placed on it, with demand on beds being likely to overtake supply well before the peak was reached".¹¹¹¹ INQ000116811_0047 para 169

¶3.6. This modelling, which was presented at a meeting of the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) on 3 March 2020 (see below), should have been available well before 1 March.¹²¹² INQ000116811_0047 para 169 SPI-M-O was responsible for producing modelling to inform UK government decision-making about implementing restrictions.¹³¹³ INQ000116811_0060 para 222 However, its ability to produce robust modelling was contingent on information being provided to it by NHS England to ensure that modelling parameters were accurate.¹⁴¹⁴ INQ000116811_0046-0047 paras 168-169 Professor Graham Medley (Professor of Infectious Disease Modelling at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine and Co-Chair of SPI-M-O from January 2020 to February 2022) explained that the modelling variables required clinical input from NHS colleagues.¹⁵¹⁵ Graham Medley 12 October 2023 131/22-132/16 SAGE had therefore noted as an action point on 20 and 27 February 2020 the need for NHS England to provide information to enable SPI‑M-O to carry out robust modelling on the impact of Covid-19 on the NHS.¹⁶¹⁶ INQ000061517_0005; INQ000106129_0003 NHS England, in turn, required input from SAGE and SPI-M-O in terms of agreed parameters and assumptions to work to.¹⁷¹⁷ INQ000151506

¶3.7. SPI-M-O modellers and NHS England met on 1 March 2020.¹⁸¹⁸ INQ000249526_0045 para 140; INQ000116811_0046 para 168 It was only when they did so that they reached a consensus on modelling parameters necessary to enable SPI-M-O to produce robust modelling on NHS England capacity in the reasonable worst-case scenario.¹⁹¹⁹ INQ000116811_0046-0047 paras 168-169 NHS England explained that the correction of model parameters relating to length of hospital stay at this meeting "rapidly increased some of the concerns about lack of capacity".²⁰²⁰ INQ000116811_0046 para 168

¶3.8. It is clear that efforts were made by all parties to achieve agreement on these parameters and assumptions to inform the modelling from mid to late February 2020, including the attendance of NHS England at a SPI-M-O meeting on 26 February, where it presented NHS modelling.²¹²¹ INQ000228664; INQ000151506; INQ000233672 Further, all were working in a period of uncertainty and with incomplete and evolving data. However, it is likely that the model presented to SAGE on 3 March 2020 would have been available sooner had there been swifter coordination and discussion between the parties about what was required.

¶3.9. Helen MacNamara (Deputy Cabinet Secretary from January 2019 to February 2021) described the tone of meetings in early March 2020 with Boris Johnson MP (Prime Minister from July 2019 to September 2022) as "jovial" and told the Inquiry there was a general view that "in implementing containment measures and suspending work and schooling, the Italians were overreacting".²²²² INQ000273841_0015 para 29 Edward Udny-Lister, Lord Udny-Lister (Chief Strategic Adviser to the Prime Minister from July 2019 to November 2020 and Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister from November 2020 to February 2021), said that there was a sense that the UK would not be as badly impacted by Covid-19 as Italy:

" [T]here was a feeling that we are going to do better than this, it's not going to be as bad as that."²³²³ Edward Udny-Lister 7 November 2023 148/23-24

¶3.10. The Northern Ireland Executive Committee held its first substantive discussion about Covid-19 on the morning of 2 March 2020.²⁴²⁴ INQ000065694 Professor (later Sir) Michael McBride, Chief Medical Officer for Northern Ireland from September 2006, advised that most people would experience minor illness, with about 5% of cases requiring hospital care and a case fatality ratio of 2% to 3%. He advised that the peak could last up to 15 weeks but that a widespread pandemic was not inevitable and planning should consider all eventualities.²⁵²⁵ INQ000065694_0003-0004

¶3.11. Robin Swann MLA (Minister of Health for Northern Ireland from January 2020 to October 2022 and from February to May 2024) accepted that, as at 2 March 2020, the message that the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) was conveying to ministers in Northern Ireland was that Covid-19 would not necessarily become a pandemic.²⁶²⁶ Robin Swann 13 May 2024 113/1-18 He conceded:

" [T]he failure may have been in the level of the alert or the seriousness that was moved up … I'm not sure as each level went up that we were ringing the bell loud enough as it went on, for other departments, other ministers in other areas actually to take up their actions and their responsibilities as well."²⁷²⁷ Robin Swann 13 May 2024 107/6-17

¶3.12. COBR met on the morning of 2 March 2020.²⁸²⁸ INQ000255836_0025 para 111; INQ000056217 This was the first COBR meeting about Covid-19 chaired by Mr Johnson. His involvement signalled to UK government departments that the crisis was a whole-system civil emergency and required a whole-of-government response. As a result, the role of the Department of Health and Social Care as lead government department fell away, with key decisions and overall policy responsibility taken over by 10 Downing Street and the Cabinet Office.²⁹²⁹ INQ000144792_0033 para 72 This meeting was attended by the First Ministers and deputy First Ministers of the devolved nations, health ministers and Chief Medical Officers. Professor Whitty advised COBR that:

" contact tracing for the source of infection for the last two cases in the UK had not been successful and that in both France and Germany there was now sustained community transmission … the aim for the DELAY phase, if CONTAIN failed, was to delay the peak of infections, to reduce the peak, and to minimise loss of life".³⁰³⁰ INQ000056217_0005 para 2

¶Professor Whitty also noted that SAGE was "looking at measures for social distancing" and "this advice would be ready in the following few days".³¹³¹ INQ000056217_0005 para 3 COBR agreed that parliamentary time would be allocated for new legislation (discussed further in Chapter 13: Legislation and enforcement, in Volume II) as well as the primary response document of the four governments, the Coronavirus: Action Plan, discussed below.³²³² INQ000056217_0005-0007 paras 5-13, decision 2; see also INQ000215035_0024 para 95; Coronavirus: Action Plan: A Guide to What You Can Expect Across the UK, Department of Health and Social Care, 3 March 2020 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ media/5e5e2e91e90e071110454391/Coronavirus_action_plan_-_a_guide_to_what_you_can_expect_across_the_UK.pdf; INQ000182380)

¶3.13. Vaughan Gething MS, Minister for Health and Social Services in the Welsh Government from May 2016 to May 2021, recalled that, at the meeting, Mr Johnson said "people should go about business and lives in normal manner".³³³³ INQ000391237_0041 para 167 Mark Drakeford MS, First Minister of Wales from December 2018 to March 2024, said that Mr Johnson's views created "a certain inhibition on some of the advice being taken as seriously as I think it was being proposed to us".³⁴³⁴ Mark Drakeford 13 March 2024 72/22-25

¶3.14. Following the COBR meeting, Nicola Sturgeon MSP (First Minister of Scotland from November 2014 to March 2023) chaired a ministerial-led Scottish Government Resilience Room meeting.³⁵³⁵ INQ000233559 There was a discussion about measures such as social distancing at this meeting, but this was not "in relation to any immediate concern" in Scotland.³⁶³⁶ INQ000233559_0003 Dr Catherine Calderwood, Chief Medical Officer for Scotland from April 2015 to April 2020, said that it was not expected that Scotland would need to move from the containment phase for a number of months, as there was only one positive case in Scotland.³⁷³⁷ INQ000591923_0001 However, she noted that it was necessary to have in place "a clear exit strategy from Social Distancing" before Scotland moved to the 'delay' phase and started to implement restrictions.³⁸³⁸ INQ000591923_0001

¶3.15. Mr Drakeford updated the Welsh Cabinet about COBR discussions and confirmed that a Welsh Cabinet sub-group would be formed (known as the Covid-19 Core Group), including ministers and key officials involved in the response.³⁹³⁹ INQ000048787. The Covid-19 Core Group met weekly to share information until 14 September 2020. See INQ000371209_0014-0015 para 42. On 2 March 2020, the Chair and the Chief Executive of Public Health Wales wrote a joint letter to Mr Gething, advising him that Public Health Wales continued to operate at an "enhanced" emergency response level and was mobilising as if it was in a major incident.⁴⁰⁴⁰ INQ000147277_0001

¶3.16. Richard Pengelly, Permanent Secretary to the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) from July 2014 to April 2022, had written to the Chief Executives of health and social care trusts on 26 March 2020, warning them that:

" In the weeks and months ahead, it will be more important than ever for Trusts to implement effective discharge arrangements for patients as soon as they are well enough to leave hospital in order to release beds for newly admitted patients. Trusts should also work to maximise and utilise all spare capacity in residential, nursing, and domiciliary care."⁴¹⁴¹ INQ000103691_0002

¶3.17. On 2 March 2020, Professor Sir Patrick Vallance (later Lord Vallance of Balham), Government Chief Scientific Adviser from April 2018 to March 2023, advised Matt Hancock MP (Secretary of State for Health and Social Care from July 2018 to June 2021) and officials in the Department of Health and Social Care and 10 Downing Street that there was a "1 in 5 chance" of the reasonable worst-case scenario materialising.⁴²⁴² INQ000102697_0005

¶3.18. On the same day, Health Protection Scotland was notified that a delegate who had attended a conference at a central Edinburgh hotel between 25 and 27 February 2020 had tested positive for Covid-19 while overseas.⁴³⁴³ INQ000339033_0078 para 210 On 3 March, Health Protection Scotland recorded a further positive case in Scotland of an individual who had also been at the conference.⁴⁴⁴⁴ INQ000273984_0030 para 132 A multi-agency Incident Management Team was activated and tracing of the delegates was undertaken. Of the 71 delegates at the conference, 23 subsequently tested positive for the virus – there were also 16 secondary cases among people who had direct contact with delegates.⁴⁵⁴⁵ Incident Management Team Report Conference Outbreak – March 2020, Public Health Scotland, 5 October 2021, p6 (https://publichealthscotland.scot/media/9575/incident-management-team-report-conference-outbreak-march-2020-oct21-english. pdf; INQ000147544) Subsequent genomic sampling of the virus as part of investigations into the outbreak determined that hundreds of viral strains had been introduced into Scotland in February and March 2020.⁴⁶⁴⁶ Incident Management Team Report Conference Outbreak – March 2020, Public Health Scotland, 5 October 2021, p27 (https://publichealthscotland.scot/media/9575/incident-management-team-report-conference-outbreak-march-2020-oct21-english. pdf; INQ000147544) The Incident Management Team later found that it was likely that:

¶" [T]he first introductions of SARS-CoV-2 in Scotland dated back as far as

19 February. This indicates that community transmission was likely to have occurred undetected up to 1–2 weeks earlier than the first detected cases."⁴⁷⁴⁷ Incident Management Team Report Conference Outbreak – March 2020, Public Health Scotland, 5 October 2021, p31 (https://publichealthscotland.scot/media/9575/incident-management-team-report-conference-outbreak-march-2020-oct21-english. pdf; INQ000147544)

¶Although Ms Sturgeon was in favour of disclosing the link between the conference and the first positive cases in Scotland to the public, she was ultimately persuaded not to by Dr Calderwood due to concerns about patient confidentiality.⁴⁸⁴⁸ INQ000225995_0001; Elizabeth Lloyd 25 January 2024 59/12-24; INQ000273978_0089 para 356; INQ000339033_0078-0079 para 211

¶3.19. At a press conference on 2 March 2020, Mr Drakeford described Wales and the UK more generally as "well prepared":

¶" We have implemented our planned response and we have robust infection control measures in place to protect public health."⁴⁹⁴⁹ INQ000227479_0001

¶3.20. SAGE met on 3 March 2020.⁵⁰⁵⁰ INQ000052319 It considered a paper from SPI-M-O, whose advice had developed significantly since February 2020. SPI-M-O now agreed that it was "highly likely" that there was sustained transmission of Covid-19 in the UK.⁵¹⁵¹ INQ000119430_0001 para 1 It was no longer only a "realistic possibility" but "almost certain" that sustained transmission would become established in the UK in the coming weeks.⁵²⁵² INQ000119430_0001 para 1; INQ000310090_0002 para 16 The doubling time (the length of time that it would take for the number of new Covid-19 infections to double) was estimated to be four to six days.⁵³⁵³ INQ000119430_0001 paras 4-5

¶3.21. This was a critically important measure for understanding how much time remains before a wave of infections will become large enough to overwhelm resources and reach its natural peak, although it is unclear whether or when SPI-M-O's advice about the high likelihood of sustained transmission in the UK reached decision-makers. It was likely that transmission had outpaced the UK's test and trace capacity by 3 March 2020 and therefore that containment had already been lost. SAGE was also hindered by a lack of knowledge about how many infections there were within the UK at this time, as a result of the limited number of tests available.

¶3.22. SAGE also considered a paper produced by modellers from the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine in collaboration with NHS England following the meeting on 1 March 2020, which advised that an unmitigated epidemic, in which people did not change behaviour, could:

100

" result in 570,000 deaths … in England and result in a peak demand of 990,000 non-ICU [intensive care unit] beds … and 130,000 ICU beds … at peak".⁵⁴⁵⁴ 'The effect of social distance measures on deaths and peak demand for hospital services in England', London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, 12 June 2020 [considered at SAGE 3 March 2020] (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-effect-of- social-distance-measures-on-deaths-and-peak-demand-for-hospital-services-in-england-3-march-2020; INQ000212223)

¶This was many times greater than the estimated 3,654 intensive care unit beds in England at the end of January 2020 (of which 83.3% were then occupied). In any event, not all of these beds would have been capable of providing invasive mechanical ventilation.⁵⁵⁵⁵ INQ000474255_0057 para 147; see also INQ000048089_0001-0002

¶3.23. On 3 March 2020, SAGE discussed the impact of potential behavioural and social interventions on the spread of a Covid-19 epidemic in the UK.⁵⁶⁵⁶ INQ000052319_0002 para 1 In a paper presented to COBR the following day, it advised:

" In the event of a severe epidemic, the NHS will be unable to meet all demands placed on it. In the reasonable worst-case scenario, demand on beds is likely to overtake supply well before the peak is reached."⁵⁷⁵⁷ INQ000056158_0001 para 3

¶The paper proposed implementing restrictions to change the curve (ie the number of new cases over time), "making the response of the NHS and other sectors more sustainable",⁵⁸⁵⁸ INQ000056158_0001 para 5 but stated:

" It should be noted that whatever the reduction in peak NHS bed demand achieved by these interventions, in the reasonable worst-case scenario demand will still greatly exceed supply."⁵⁹⁵⁹ INQ000056158_0003 para 14

¶Discussions within SAGE therefore focused on "non-clinical interventions to reduce and delay Covid-19 transmission", to be implemented during the delay phase of the response, including social distancing for over-65s.⁶⁰⁶⁰ INQ000119719_0002 paras 4, 6 It also remained of the view that there was no evidence that banning very large gatherings would reduce transmission.⁶¹⁶¹ INQ000119719_0002 para 7

¶3.24. This followed advice on the use of behavioural and social interventions from the Scientific Pandemic Insights Group on Behaviours (SPI-B), which noted that the UK government "should advise against greetings such as shaking hands … as a signal about the importance of hand hygiene".⁶²⁶² INQ000129014_0002 SPI-B also warned that "the efficacy of each intervention will be reliant on peoples' willingness to adhere, as well as the practicality of adhering to each measure" and that:

101

" A number of measures will require Government to rethink existing financial arrangements, e.g. home isolation for those on zero hours contracts who are ineligible for sick pay, people who are in receipt of universal credit or job seekers allowance unable to present themselves at job centres."⁶³⁶³ INQ000129014_0001-0002

¶SPI-M-O's advice to SAGE was that restrictions reducing contact would flatten the peak. Stringent measures would be expected to have greater impact but "a large increase in cases would be expected" once they were lifted.⁶⁴⁶⁴ INQ000119430_0001 paras 8-9 The London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine's advice included an assessment of a range of measures, including closing schools, 'cocooning' the elderly, social distancing measures and case isolation (as well as combinations of these).⁶⁵⁶⁵ 'The effect of social distance measures on deaths and peak demand for hospital services in England', London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, 12 June 2020 [considered at SAGE 3 March 2020], p2 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-effect-of- social-distance-measures-on-deaths-and-peak-demand-for-hospital-services-in-england-3-march-2020; INQ000212223) It stated that the restrictions needed to be implemented near the peak for maximum effect.⁶⁶⁶⁶ 'The effect of social distance measures on deaths and peak demand for hospital services in England', London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, 12 June 2020 [considered at SAGE 3 March 2020], p2 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-effect-of- social-distance-measures-on-deaths-and-peak-demand-for-hospital-services-in-england-3-march-2020; INQ000212223)

¶3.25. During Scottish Cabinet discussions on 3 March 2020, it was noted that "there was little evidence of community transmission in the UK, and new cases tended to be in 'clusters'" and a "relatively slow increase in the number of cases" of the virus was foreseen.⁶⁷⁶⁷ INQ000232901_0004 para 19 Although only two positive cases had been detected in Scotland by this time, this reflected a lack of testing rather than a genuine absence of cases. In early March, Scotland had capacity for just 350 daily tests.⁶⁸⁶⁸ 'Testing expansion', Scottish Government, 1 May 2020 (https://www.gov.scot/news/testing-expansion; INQ000357884_0003); INQ000273984_0064 para 280 Although community sampling programmes were being implemented, just 914 people had been tested for the virus in Scotland by 3 March.⁶⁹⁶⁹ INQ000189140; INQ000137447_0001 The Scottish Cabinet recognised that the response would move to the delay phase in the "near future".⁷⁰⁷⁰ INQ000232901_0004 para 15

¶3.26. At a UK Cabinet meeting on 3 March 2020, Mr Hancock said that there were 39 Covid-19 cases in the UK and the number was expected to rise.⁷¹⁷¹ INQ000056139_0004 He explained that "the scientific advice was that a global pandemic could be averted but that was increasingly unlikely".⁷²⁷² INQ000056139_0004 Mr Hancock confirmed that the Coronavirus: Action Plan would set out how the government might respond and that public health messaging would emphasise the importance of good hygiene, but "other than that, it was business as usual".⁷³⁷³ INQ000056139_0004 Mr Johnson confirmed that the UK was still in the 'contain' phase.⁷⁴⁷⁴ INQ000056139_0004

102

¶3.27. The first 10 Downing Street press conference was held on 3 March 2020.⁷⁵⁷⁵ 'Prime Minister's statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 3 March 2020', Prime Minister's Office and Boris Johnson, 3 March 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-at-coronavirus-press-conference-3-march-2020; INQ000086761_0002) Mr Johnson stressed that the country was "extremely well prepared" and that "for the vast majority of the people of this country, we should be going about our business as usual".⁷⁶⁷⁶ 'Prime Minister's statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 3 March 2020', Prime Minister's Office and Boris Johnson, 3 March 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-at-coronavirus-press-conference-3-march-2020; INQ000086761_0003) His confident announcement failed to reflect the gravity of the situation.

¶3.28. Mr Johnson also stated that he:

" was at a hospital the other night where I think there were actually a few coronavirus patients and I shook hands with everybody … and I continue to shake hands".⁷⁷⁷⁷ INQ000231042_0009

¶On 3 March 2020, SPI-B advised SAGE that:

" [T]he Government should advise against greetings such as shaking hands and hugging, given existing evidence about the importance of hand hygiene."⁷⁸⁷⁸ INQ000196743_0002

¶Mr Johnson told the Inquiry that this advice had not reached him by the time of the press conference.⁷⁹⁷⁹ Boris Johnson 6 December 2023 102/3-10 Nonetheless, it was unwise of him to have shaken hands with people and then to have publicly spoken about it.

¶3.29. Dominic Cummings (Adviser to the Prime Minister from July 2019 to November 2020) and James Slack (Director of Communications from November 2020 to March 2021) were concerned that Mr Johnson had not struck the appropriate tone at the press conference on 3 March 2020 and that he would need to be "forcibly stopped" from saying it was business as usual.⁸⁰⁸⁰ INQ000093223_0006 In a message on the same day to Lee Cain (Director of Communications at 10 Downing Street from July 2019 to November 2020), Mr Cummings said that Mr Johnson:

" doesn't think it's a big deal … his focus is elsewhere, he thinks it'll be like swine flu and he thinks his main danger is talking economy into a slump".⁸¹⁸¹ INQ000048313_0068. The reference to 'swine flu' was the 2009 to 2010 H1N1 influenza pandemic.

¶3.30. Following the COBR meeting on 2 March 2020, Mr Gething asked for his diary to be cleared. Mr Drakeford said this was to allow Mr Gething to "focus exclusively on coronavirus".⁸²⁸² INQ000320806_0005; Mark Drakeford 13 March 2024 68/5-13 However, on 3 March, an official who led the Resilience Team (the group within the Welsh Civil Service responsible for leading the response to civil emergencies in Wales) described the Emergency Coordination Centre (Wales) (discussed in Chapter 2: The emergence of Covid-19, in this volume) as "operating in support of the health agenda".⁸³⁸³ INQ000255778_0001 It was not considered "a civil emergency situation".⁸⁴⁸⁴ INQ000255778_0001 Dr Quentin Sandifer, Executive Director for Public Health Services and

103

¶Medical Director at Public Health Wales from October 2012 to December 2020, was:

" astonished at this. I mean, we're at the beginning of March, and Welsh Government resilience team were telling us that they didn't think we were approaching, if we weren't already there, a civil emergency."⁸⁵⁸⁵ Quentin Sandifer 6 March 2024 54/24-55/3

¶3.31. When asked when Covid-19 became the most significant matter on the Welsh Government's priority list, Mr Drakeford said:

" probably 4 March … we are now meeting every week as a Cabinet specifically on this matter, so our core group is established".⁸⁶⁸⁶ Mark Drakeford 13 March 2024 68/5-8

¶The Inquiry notes that Mr Drakeford did not attend the Welsh Cabinet meeting on

¶4 March 2020, having travelled to Brussels as part of St David's Day celebrations.⁸⁷⁸⁷ INQ000273747_0009 para 28; INQ000216456_0002 para 1.1

¶The first case of Covid-19 had been announced in Wales just days earlier. It is unfortunate that Mr Drakeford was not in attendance, particularly as the response to

¶Covid-19 was, at this stage, by Mr Drakeford's admission, the Welsh Government's priority.⁸⁸⁸⁸ INQ000227479_0001

¶3.32. It was only on 3 March 2020 that the Scottish Cabinet appears to have prioritised discussion of Covid-19 in its meetings.⁸⁹⁸⁹ For example, the discussion of Covid-19 at the previous Cabinet meeting on 25 February 2020 had taken place under "any other business" (INQ000238705_0009 para 44). It was agreed at this meeting that the Covid-19 outbreak should "continue to be treated as an urgent priority across all portfolios".⁹⁰⁹⁰ INQ000232901_0006 para 20

¶3.33. A briefing note prepared by the Civil Contingencies Policy Branch of The Executive Office, Northern Ireland on 3 March 2020 advised that "[a]s the preparations move beyond the health space there is an increasing need for co-ordination of the wider non-health work".⁹¹⁹¹ INQ000145786_0004 para 5 It recommended that the First Minister and deputy First Minister "note the escalating position in relation to Covid-19 and the need to make preparation for dealing with a potential outbreak of the disease" in Northern Ireland.⁹²⁹² INQ000145786_0006 para 13 It suggested: "The Executive may wish to meet to consider the impacts of an outbreak of Covid-19 in NI."⁹³⁹³ INQ000145786_0004 para 8 Nevertheless, The Executive Office did not, at that time, seek formally to initiate a coordinated, cross-governmental civil contingencies response. Consequently, the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) remained the lead government department and the Northern Ireland Executive Committee continued to have a relatively limited role.

104

¶3.34. The gravity of the situation was yet to be fully appreciated by the UK government and devolved administrations or reflected in their actions.