Lost time
¶2.204. The Inquiry accepts that when the novel coronavirus first emerged in 2020, there was good reason to maintain a 'watching brief'. There were dangers to overreacting as well as to under-reacting.
¶2.205. However, the Inquiry does not accept that the UK government and devolved administrations can rely on a lack of certainty about the characteristics of the new virus to justify their failure to take effective action from mid-February 2020. By that time, it was known that the virus was spreading around the world and had reached Europe and the UK. There was likely sustained community transmission in the UK. Yet it was clear that the test and trace system was inadequate for a pandemic. There was a lack of adequate diagnostic capacity and an inability to scale up manufacturing and laboratory capacity.458 See Module 1: The resilience and preparedness of the United Kingdom, UK Covid-19 Inquiry, July 2024, Chapter 5 (https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/documents/module-1-full-report) This meant that by 27 February, only approximately 2,100 tests were being undertaken per day.459 INQ000273878_0012 para 35 In Northern Ireland, as at 10 February, it stood at 40 tests a day.460 Michael McBride 10 May 2024 73/6-7 By the middle of February:
" Wales had the capacity to carry out 100 tests a day … it clearly was not going to be sufficient to meet a mass testing regime."461 Mark Drakeford 13 March 2024 52/7-14
¶In Scotland, only 350 tests could be carried out each day.462 INQ000346190; Nick Phin 19 January 2024 192/12-193/9 Moreover, the known extent of asymptomatic infection and potential for significant asymptomatic transmission meant that the verified cases could only be the 'tip of the iceberg' of undetected infections.
¶2.206. The four governments knew enough to spur them into action. Accordingly, the Inquiry finds that the lack of urgency (particularly during the mid-February school half-term holidays) and the failure of the four governments to take a grip of the situation and make adequate preparations are inexplicable. They failed to anticipate the scale and speed of the oncoming pandemic and to act accordingly.
¶2.207. As the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response (established by the World Health Organization) reported in May 2021, February 2020 was "a lost month".463 COVID-19: Make it the Last Pandemic, The Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response, 17 September 2020, p29 (https://theindependentpanel.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/COVID-19-Make-it-the-Last-Pandemic_final.pdf; INQ000183545) This was certainly the case in the UK.
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