July and August 2020

¶6.5. Throughout July 2020, there was a focus on relaxing restrictions, with more limited interventions and light-touch measures in place across the four nations. This included extending the mandatory use of face coverings.⁷⁷ INQ000090598_0002-0003; see also The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Wearing of Face Coverings in a Relevant Place) (England) Regulations 2020 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/791/contents); INQ000048482_0004-0005; INQ000065578; INQ000137373; INQ000350825; INQ000023258 Face coverings became mandatory in shops and supermarkets in England on 24 July.⁸⁸ The Next Chapter in Our Plan to Rebuild: The UK Government's COVID-19 Recovery Strategy, HM Government, July 2020, p10 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/our-plan-to-rebuild-the-uk-governments-covid-19-recovery-strategy; INQ000137239) From 10 July, a large number of countries were exempted from the travel quarantine requirements (creating 'travel corridors').

¶6.6. Shielding was paused across the four nations (with limited exceptions), beginning on various dates between 31 July and 16 August 2020.⁹⁹ 'Plans to ease guidance for over 2 million shielding', Department of Health and Social Care and Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 22 June 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/plans-to-ease-guidance-for-over-2-million-shielding; INQ000237302); 'Shielding to be paused', Scottish Government, 23 July 2020 (https://www.gov.scot/news/shielding-to-be-paused; INQ000369739); INQ000414515_0094 para 250; INQ000048475_0004 para 11; INQ000391115_0058 para 226Show full note In Scotland, it was announced on 30 July that schools would reopen full time from 11 August 2020, after the summer holidays, following scientific evidence and advice that it was safe to do so.¹⁰¹⁰ 'Schools to re-open full-time', Scottish Government, 30 July 2020 (https://www.gov.scot/news/schools-to-re-open-full-time; INQ000585000)

¶6.7. Work continued on test and trace digital applications. These were launched in Northern Ireland at the end of July 2020, in Scotland on 10 September 2020 and in England and Wales on 24 September.¹¹¹¹ INQ000411550_0078-0079 para 232; 'NHS COVID-19 app launches across England and Wales', Department of Health and Social Care, 24 September 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/nhs-covid-19-app-launches-across-england-and-wales; INQ000237570) During the autumn of 2020, the Scientific Pandemic Insights Group on Behaviours (SPI-B) and the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) advised that the effectiveness of the NHS test, trace and isolate system in reducing transmission depended critically upon self-isolation, and raised concerns about adherence to self-isolation and people's financial ability to self‑isolate.¹²¹² INQ000231034_0001; INQ000183867

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Airborne transmission

¶6.8. As important as the test, trace and isolate system was, determining the likely routes of transmission remained a vital part of developing plans to respond to the virus. Yet policy-makers paid insufficient attention to one possible route, namely airborne transmission.

¶6.9. Professor Catherine Noakes, Professor of Environmental Engineering at the University of Leeds and Chair of the Environmental Modelling Group (a sub-group of SAGE), told the Inquiry that the emerging evidence in about June 2020 suggested a possibility of airborne transmission at distances beyond two metres.¹³¹³ INQ000236261_0041-0042 para 9.28; INQ000192101 In her view, insufficient attention had been paid to the possibility of airborne transmission from as early as April 2020.¹⁴¹⁴ INQ000236261_0049 paras 10.6-10.7 The efforts of Professor Noakes and fellow scientists to raise their concerns is to be commended. The evidence was strengthened as more research and analysis of outbreaks was conducted, and, by 22 July 2020, the advice in a paper from the Environmental Modelling Group was clear that airborne transmission was possible in poorly ventilated spaces.¹⁵¹⁵ INQ000192133_0003 At its meeting on 23 July 2020, SAGE endorsed this paper, "noting its findings … on the importance of good ventilation".¹⁶¹⁶ INQ000119954_0001

¶6.10. Professor Noakes observed that "there may have been concern that declaring a disease to be airborne could lead to significant public concern", with the term 'airborne' potentially invoking ideas of catastrophic viruses seen in movies.¹⁷¹⁷ INQ000236261_0050-0051 para 10.11 Professor Sir Jonathan Van-Tam (Deputy Chief Medical Officer for England from October 2017 to March 2022) stated:

¶" [I]f we knew then what we know now, there may well have been less emphasis

on contact transmission and more emphasis on airborne transmission and ventilation."¹⁸¹⁸ INQ000269203_0140 para 13.8

¶6.11. The Inquiry is considering airborne transmission (and the methods used to combat it) in the context of healthcare in Module 3: Impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on healthcare systems in the four nations of the UK.

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The UK government's updated roadmap

¶6.12. As discussed in Chapter 5: Exit from lockdown, in this volume, Step 3 of the UK government's recovery strategy, laid out in Our Plan to Rebuild: The UK Government's COVID-19 Recovery Strategy (the May 2020 Roadmap), came into force in England on 4 July 2020.¹⁹¹⁹ Our Plan to Rebuild: The UK Government's COVID-19 Recovery Strategy, HM Government, May 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/our-plan-to-rebuild-the-uk-governments-covid-19-recovery-strategy; INQ000198892) It did not contain any steps after 4 July.²⁰²⁰ INQ000137228; INQ000207294_0020 para 3.19.6

¶6.13. Simon Case (later Lord Case), Permanent Secretary at 10 Downing Street from May to September 2020, proposed an additional chapter to include preparations for the winter and any second wave.²¹²¹ INQ000137228; INQ000207294_0020 para 3.19.6 This was agreed by the Covid-19 Strategy Committee (Covid-S) on 2 July 2020 and provided to Boris Johnson MP (Prime Minister from July 2019 to September 2022) in draft on 15 July.²²²² INQ000088245_0007 The draft chapter set out a plan to lift the remaining restrictions in England from 1 August 2020, with an ambition to return to normal by November 2020.²³²³ INQ000207294_0028-0029 paras 3.35-3.36; INQ000119899 The Covid-19 Taskforce advised that the current work‑from-home messaging should remain in place.²⁴²⁴ INQ000137238_0002 Mr Johnson, however, wished to provide more discretion to employers.²⁵²⁵ INQ000207294_0028-0029 para 3.35 Mr Case told Matt Hancock MP (Secretary of State for Health and Social Care from July 2018 to June 2021) that the taskforce's advice was an attempt to "balance realism with Johnsonian optimism! Chris [Professor (later Sir) Christopher Whitty, Chief Medical Officer for England from October 2019] doesn't like it."²⁶²⁶ INQ000129427_0002 Mr Hancock and the Department of Health and Social Care agreed with the scientific advice and considered the desire to return to normality by November to be "unachievable".²⁷²⁷ INQ000232194_0116 para 467 Mr Hancock was concerned that the draft chapter "underplayed the scale of risk of a second wave".²⁸²⁸ INQ000232194_0116 para 467

¶6.14. Mr Johnson explained to Covid-S on 16 July 2020 that the:

" central objective was to get life back to as close to normal as possible with the country as Covid-secure as possible before Christmas".²⁹²⁹ INQ000088249_0004-0005

¶Professor Whitty outlined that the return of schools in September 2020 and the winter would constitute "two significant risk moments".³⁰³⁰ INQ000088249_0005 He warned:

" Lifting measures … in November would increase risks. Once the winter had ended … it would be a safer moment to take risks."³¹³¹ INQ000088249_0005

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¶6.15. Mr Johnson told the Inquiry that he made this decision having concluded:

" [S]ocial distancing restrictions were having a significant real-world impact and millions were at risk of being made unemployed … there was a sufficient arsenal of countermeasures to seek to contain the virus."³²³² INQ000255836_0120-0121 para 434

¶6.16. The proposed approach was discussed by the UK Cabinet the following day before being publicly announced.³³³³ INQ000089026 Michael Gove MP (later Lord Gove), Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster from July 2019 to September 2021 and Minister for the Cabinet Office from February 2020 to September 2021, informed the devolved administrations.³⁴³⁴ INQ000199148

¶6.17. On 17 July 2020, The Next Chapter in Our Plan to Rebuild: The UK Government's COVID-19 Recovery Strategy, which updated the May 2020 Roadmap, was published. It outlined the UK government's ambition that a return to normality "may be possible by November at the earliest".³⁵³⁵ The Next Chapter in Our Plan to Rebuild: The UK Government's COVID-19 Recovery Strategy, HM Government, July 2020, p15 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/our-plan-to-rebuild-the-uk-governments-covid-19-recovery-strategy; INQ000137239) It stated that the virus was "in retreat", the UK government having "opened up the economy and society carefully and cautiously".³⁶³⁶ The Next Chapter in Our Plan to Rebuild: The UK Government's COVID-19 Recovery Strategy, HM Government, July 2020, p7 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/our-plan-to-rebuild-the-uk-governments-covid-19-recovery-strategy; INQ000137239) It explained that the number of new infections was now "stable and low" and, consequently, from 1 August 2020 a number of sectors would be allowed to reopen, including leisure. The decision to work from home would not be subject to government guidance but would be at employers' discretion.³⁷³⁷ The Next Chapter in Our Plan to Rebuild: The UK Government's COVID-19 Recovery Strategy, HM Government, July 2020, pp7, 14-15 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/our-plan-to-rebuild-the-uk-governments-covid-19-recovery-strategy; INQ000137239) Reference was made to the possibility of the resurgence of the virus between November 2020 and March 2021, but assurance was given that plans were in place to deal with this.³⁸³⁸ The Next Chapter in Our Plan to Rebuild: The UK Government's COVID-19 Recovery Strategy, HM Government, July 2020, pp9-10 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/our-plan-to-rebuild-the-uk-governments-covid-19-recovery-strategy; INQ000086693)

¶6.18. New powers for ministers and local authorities to implement targeted local measures in England, including lockdowns, accompanied the publication of The Next Chapter in Our Plan to Rebuild: The UK Government's COVID-19 Recovery Strategy, along with the publication of the COVID-19 Contain Framework: A Guide for Local Decision- Makers. This framework set out decision-making for monitoring and controlling local outbreaks,³⁹³⁹ COVID-19 Contain Framework: A Guide for Local Decision-Makers, UK Health Security Agency, 17 July 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/ government/publications/containing-and-managing-local-coronavirus-covid-19-outbreaks/covid-19-contain-framework-a-guide-for- local-decision-makers; INQ000593862); INQ000234406; see also INQ000233883; INQ000088861_0002 with NHS Test and Trace, the Joint Biosecurity Centre, local authorities and Public Health England working together to take action at a local level. Local restrictions were subsequently imposed in areas in the Midlands and the north of England.⁴⁰⁴⁰ The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (Blackburn with Darwen and Luton) Regulations 2020 on 25 July 2020 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/800/contents/made); The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions on Gatherings) (North of England) Regulations 2020 on 5 August 2020 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/828/contents/made); The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (Blackburn with Darwen and Bradford) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2020 on 3 September 2020 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/935/contents/made); The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (Bolton) Regulations 2020 on 10 September 2020 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/974/contents/made); The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (Birmingham, Sandwell and Solihull) Regulations 2020 on 15 September 2020 (https://www.legislation.gov. uk/uksi/2020/988/contents/made); The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (North East of England) Regulations 2020 on 18 September 2020 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/1010/contents/made)Show full note

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¶6.19. Throughout this period, Mr Johnson considered population segmentation and mass testing to be key to avoiding a further lockdown, as part of a focus on targeted and local interventions. An alternative 'segmentation and shielding' proposal had been developed in March and April 2020 by Professor Mark Woolhouse (Professor of Infectious Disease Epidemiology at the University of Edinburgh).⁴¹⁴¹ INQ000250231_0040 para 222; Patrick Vallance 20 November 2023 122/21-123/3 Professor Woolhouse proposed 'super-shielding'. This involved the shielding of those vulnerable to severe illness or death from Covid-19, but also targeted interventions for their closest contacts to reduce their risk of becoming infected with Covid-19 and subsequently transmitting the virus to the vulnerable person.⁴²⁴² INQ000250231_0040 para 223 Regular testing of closest contacts was a key intervention in this approach.⁴³⁴³ INQ000250231_0040 para 223

¶6.20. Professor Whitty had warned that population segmentation could not be relied upon to prevent the spread of Covid-19, given it was highly improbable that Covid-19 could be prevented from spreading between groups.⁴⁴⁴⁴ INQ000088249_0008 SAGE also concluded that mixing between age groups presented a challenge for any population segmentation policy based on age.⁴⁵⁴⁵ INQ000061555_0002 para 1 Despite this advice, Mr Johnson continued to seek plans based on population segmentation at a meeting of Covid-S on 22 July and, following a meeting with Rishi Sunak MP (Chancellor of the Exchequer from February 2020 to July 2022) and key advisers, on 29 July 2020.⁴⁶⁴⁶ INQ000088251_0005-0006; INQ000252914_0053-0054 paras 225-226

¶6.21. On 23 July 2020, SAGE considered a paper from the Scientific Pandemic Influenza Group on Modelling (SPI-M) on population segmentation by age and again concluded that this was "unlikely to be successful".⁴⁷⁴⁷ INQ000061556_0003 para 18 On 6 August 2020, SAGE considered a briefing (and had available a pre-publication paper) from Professor Woolhouse and agreed that work carried out on his views by the Scottish Government advisory groups would be discussed at SAGE once complete.⁴⁸⁴⁸ 'Segmentation and shielding of the most vulnerable members of the population as elements of an exit strategy from Covid-19 lockdown', B. van Bunnik, A. Morgan, P. Bessell, G. Calder-Gerver, F. Zhang, S. Haynes, et al., Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences (2021), 376(1829) (https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2020.0275; INQ000220376); INQ000351892; INQ000213073_0003. This work was later discussed by SAGE in October 2020: see INQ000061570_0003-0004 paras 18-22; see also INQ000250231_0040 para 222Show full note Professor Sir Patrick Vallance (later Lord Vallance of Balham), Government Chief Scientific Adviser from April 2018 to March 2023, and Professor Dame Angela McLean (Chief Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence from 2019 to 2023 and Government Chief Scientific Adviser from April 2023) told the Inquiry that Professor Woolhouse's proposal was unlikely to have succeeded, since increases in the incidence of Covid-19 in the wider population inevitably spilled over to shielded groups.⁴⁹⁴⁹ INQ000309529_0031-0032 paras 102-103; Patrick Vallance 20 November 2023 121/10-25 Additionally, there were concerns that Professor

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¶Woolhouse's proposal would:

" place most burden on multigenerational households … and ethnic minorities, where we know multigenerational households are more common".⁵⁰⁵⁰ Patrick Vallance 20 November 2023 123/4-8

¶6.22. Work was to continue on population segmentation through to September 2020, with more "serious work on segmentation" commissioned from the Covid-19 Taskforce by Mr Johnson and Mr Sunak.⁵¹⁵¹ INQ000252914_0054 para 226 In advice dated 7 September 2020, the taskforce concluded that segmentation could not be successfully delivered as an alternative to a "full national lockdown".⁵²⁵² INQ000070579_0001 It would not protect public health, nor would it minimise economic harm. Further:

" It would also create a society that divides thousands of families, which would have long term societal and mental health impacts."⁵³⁵³ INQ000070579_0001 para 3

¶As a result, the taskforce recommended focusing on a "softer" form of segmentation that involved taking steps to increase protection of the most vulnerable, improving communication about behavioural risk and limiting social contact generally.⁵⁴⁵⁴ INQ000070579_0001 para 1

¶Mr Johnson responded to this advice the following day, stating that "we need soft segmentation and the MOONSHOT".⁵⁵⁵⁵ INQ000252856_0001 The impact of the Moonshot programme – a same-day mass testing programme – is considered below.

Wales

¶6.23. Planning was also taking place in Wales with regard to localised measures. On 27 July 2020, the Welsh Government wrote to local health boards and local authorities asking them to work together on the preparation of local Covid-19 prevention and response plans to consider outbreaks of Covid-19 at a local level.⁵⁶⁵⁶ INQ000191780; INQ000147255 The following day, the Welsh Cabinet noted that there was "likely to be a resurgence of the pandemic in the Autumn and Winter".⁵⁷⁵⁷ INQ000048857_0003 para 2.3 Plans were subsequently submitted to Public Health Wales and reviewed during August 2020. Dr Quentin Sandifer, Executive Director for Public Health Services and Medical Director at Public Health Wales from October 2012 to December 2020, said that "it was quite clear that further work was required".⁵⁸⁵⁸ Quentin Sandifer 6 March 2024 65/1-8; INQ000191782_0005-0007

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¶6.24. The intention was for the Welsh Government to provide feedback.⁵⁹⁵⁹ INQ000191782_0007; INQ000191780; INQ000220655_0008 However, on 21 September 2020, the Welsh Government confirmed that it would not be providing formal feedback on the plans.⁶⁰⁶⁰ INQ000147256; Quentin Sandifer 6 March 2024 65/1-11; INQ000232439_0003 para 8 This surprised Dr Sandifer, who believed that:

" the health boards had been let off the hook and the opportunity to prepare Wales for the expected increase in case numbers as we approached the autumn had not been fully realised".⁶¹⁶¹ INQ000267867_0027 para 112

¶6.25. Dr Sandifer was concerned that the health boards would not be prepared for the winter.⁶²⁶² Quentin Sandifer 6 March 2024 66/3-12 The request to formalise local plans should have been sent to local authorities and health boards earlier in July 2020. As early as 1 July 2020, the Welsh Government had been considering the prospect of a "local lockdown".⁶³⁶³ INQ000349671_0002 para 7 Once requested, the Welsh Government should have provided feedback in a timely manner. Reg Kilpatrick (Director in the Welsh Government with responsibility for civil contingencies from 2013) agreed that the Welsh Government should have used the summer months to provide clarity about "what would happen and what should happen and what plans were available".⁶⁴⁶⁴ Reg Kilpatrick 6 March 2024 182/13-184/2 Had such clarity been provided in planning for local measures, this might have avoided the concerns expressed by local authorities with rising case rates in early September.⁶⁵⁶⁵ INQ000320919_0001

Early warning signs of a second wave

¶6.26. By 25 July 2020, there was grave concern in the UK government about the risk of a second wave hitting the UK. As in March 2020, developments across Europe provided an insight into what was to come. Mr Case noted:

" We are on the edge of this virus taking off again in this country – we are probably a week or two behind others in Europe, where numbers are starting to grow again."⁶⁶⁶⁶ INQ000137244_0001

¶These concerns were echoed by Mr Johnson in a WhatsApp message on 27 July:

" Folks looking at Spain and France and remembering March it is completely obvious we are about to be hit by a second wave."⁶⁷⁶⁷ INQ000048399_0025

¶6.27. On 29 July 2020, Mr Johnson sent a further WhatsApp message stating that Office for National Statistics data indicated there were 4,200 cases per day, an increase from 2,800 the previous week.⁶⁸⁶⁸ INQ000102205_0001 Mr Case replied, noting a "clear warning" in the data. The growth in London was "especially worrying". Action was required – there was "now an upward trend we can't ignore".⁶⁹⁶⁹ INQ000048399_0025

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¶6.28. The following day, SAGE advised that R was likely to be above 1 in England.⁷⁰⁷⁰ INQ000061557_0002 para 7 As a consequence, the Covid-19 Operations Committee (Covid-O) decided to postpone for at least two weeks the easing of restrictions proposed in The Next Chapter in Our Plan to Rebuild: The UK Government's COVID-19 Recovery Strategy. The requirement to wear face coverings was extended to a wider range of indoor settings, and a decision was taken to put local restrictions in place in north-west England owing to "higher infection rates".⁷¹⁷¹ INQ000088797_0006, 0009; INQ000106553_0002 para 4; INQ000062459_0002 Mr Johnson considered that this would "make a material difference to the transmission of the virus and would send a warning to the rest of the country".⁷²⁷² INQ000088797_0009 Notwithstanding the concerns, it was decided that the proposed relaxation to the work-from-home guidance planned for 1 August 2020 should still go ahead. Separately, although not discussed, the Eat Out to Help Out scheme (considered further below) was to proceed from 3 August.⁷³⁷³ A Plan for Jobs, HM Treasury, 8 July 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/a-plan-for-jobs-documents/a-plan-for- jobs-2020; INQ000235047)

¶6.29. On 31 July 2020, a telephone call took place between Mr Johnson and the leaders of the devolved nations.⁷⁴⁷⁴ INQ000327611_0004-0005; INQ000273747_0036 para 119; INQ000539015_0045 This was intended to encourage the devolved administrations to act in concert with the UK government, to prevent a disparity in messaging.⁷⁵⁷⁵ INQ000088797_0009 As a consequence of information shared about the increase in infections in north-west England, the Scottish Government warned people against visiting that area.⁷⁶⁷⁶ 'Coronavirus: Scots warned to avoid Covid hotspots in England', BBC News, 31 July 2020 (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk- scotland-53608460; INQ000357462); 'Travel to North West of England', Scottish Government, 31 July 2020 (https://www.gov.scot/news/travel-to-north-west-of-england; INQ000585003)

¶6.30. Similar steps were taken in Northern Ireland following rapid increases in infection. By 30 July 2020, the Executive Committee was told of a shift in the picture of transmission in Northern Ireland, with a rise in positive cases, although this was not translating into hospital admissions. This appears to have been attributed to instances of younger people becoming infected with Covid-19.⁷⁷⁷⁷ INQ000065789_0001

¶6.31. On 1 August 2020, the Northern Ireland Executive Committee was advised that the seven-day rolling average number of cases per day had increased more than three- fold since the beginning of July 2020.⁷⁸⁷⁸ INQ000353624_0001 On 6 August, the Executive Committee agreed to defer the reopening of non-food-serving pubs and bars, which had been due to take effect on 10 August, on the advice of Professor (later Sir) Michael McBride (Chief Medical Officer for Northern Ireland from September 2006) and Professor Ian Young (Chief Scientific Adviser to the Department of Health (Northern Ireland) from November 2015).⁷⁹⁷⁹ INQ000048484_0002 para 5 Part of the rationale for this advice was to ensure that schools could reopen and to prevent a scenario "that puts general lockdown measures back on the agenda".⁸⁰⁸⁰ INQ000353624_0001 The Executive Committee also decided that the use of face coverings in certain indoor settings, including shops, would be mandatory from 10 August (although children aged under 13, or people who could not wear a mask for health or disability reasons, were exempt).⁸¹⁸¹ INQ000414515_0046 para 102 By 13 August, there had been a rapid increase in transmission (particularly among young people) and there was a stronger upwards trajectory of case rates in Northern Ireland than there was in Great Britain (England, Wales and Scotland) or the Republic of Ireland.⁸²⁸² INQ000048485_0002 para 2

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¶6.32. On 13 August 2020, SAGE estimated that R was between 0.8 and 1 in England, but said that it might be above 1.⁸³⁸³ INQ000120551_0001 That same day, the Covid-19 Taskforce advised Mr Johnson that, while the UK government should implement the proposed easing of restrictions on 15 August, this should be balanced with tougher messaging on enforcement and fines of £10,000.⁸⁴⁸⁴ INQ000137249_0002-0003; see also The Health Protection (Coronavirus) (Restrictions on Holding of Gatherings and Amendment) (England) Regulations 2020 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/907/contents/made); The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Wearing of Face Coverings in a Relevant Place and on Public Transport) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2020 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2020/906/contents/made)Show full note Mr Johnson agreed and this was announced.⁸⁵⁸⁵ INQ000137249_0004; 'Prime Minister announces stronger enforcement measures as easements resume', Prime Minister's Office and Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, 13 August 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister- announces-stronger-enforcement-measures-as-easements-resume; INQ000053686)

¶6.33. On 18 August 2020, the Welsh Cabinet also agreed to relax restrictions from 22 August to allow up to four households to meet. Indoor meals with up to 30 people following a wedding, civil partnership or funeral would also be allowed. The Welsh Cabinet noted that the number of new daily cases in Wales was between 15 and 24, although the increase in cases in England was a "cause for concern".⁸⁶⁸⁶ INQ000048862_0003 para 1.9

¶6.34. On the same day, the Welsh Government published the Coronavirus Control Plan for Wales.⁸⁷⁸⁷ Coronavirus Control Plan for Wales, Welsh Government, August 2020 (https://www.gov.wales/sites/default/files/publications/2020-08/coronavirus-control-plan-for-wales.pdf; INQ000349794) This noted that, while case rates in Wales were currently low, "we know from experience elsewhere in the world just how quickly the virus can return, and how swiftly it can spread".⁸⁸⁸⁸ Coronavirus Control Plan for Wales, Welsh Government, August 2020, p2 (https://www.gov.wales/sites/default/files/publications/2020-08/coronavirus-control-plan-for-wales.pdf; INQ000349794) It outlined the Welsh Government's plans for management at a local level, with the health boards working closely with local authorities. However, it did not provide sufficient clarity for local authorities.⁸⁹⁸⁹ INQ000320919_0001; Reg Kilpatrick 6 March 2024 182/13-184/2 By 21 August 2020, modelling for Wales was still at an 'all-Wales' level. The Technical Advisory Cell recommended breaking down the modelling at a local level.⁹⁰⁹⁰ INQ000116015_0002

¶6.35. The Northern Ireland Executive was also considering localised measures. However, this was in the context of the higher incidence in Northern Ireland: R was higher in Northern Ireland than in the rest of the UK or the Republic of Ireland.⁹¹⁹¹ Arlene Foster 15 May 2024 95/9-14 On 20 August 2020, the Executive considered the possible need for local restrictions, with proposals for tightening restrictions on public and private indoor and outdoor gatherings.⁹²⁹² INQ000276510_0017 para 74(iv) Ministers expressed concerns about enforcement, whether hospitality venues were 'gaming' the system, and pubs being packed with people.⁹³⁹³ INQ000065790_0002 They agreed that local restrictions "should not be adopted at this time but this option should be kept open". They tightened restrictions on gatherings with effect from 25 August.⁹⁴⁹⁴ INQ000048486_0003 para 10(iv)

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¶6.36. On 20 and 27 August 2020, SAGE repeated its advice that R might be above 1 in England.⁹⁵⁹⁵ INQ000061560_0002 para 2; INQ000120552_0001 para 1

The Eat Out to Help Out scheme

¶6.37. The Eat Out to Help Out scheme offered discounts across the four nations on eating out from Monday to Wednesday between 3 and 31 August 2020.⁹⁶⁹⁶ A Plan for Jobs, HM Treasury, 8 July 2020, p17 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/a-plan-for-jobs-documents/a-plan- for-jobs-2020; INQ000235047); INQ000235019

¶6.38. The scheme was developed by Mr Sunak and the Treasury from May 2020 and was agreed by Mr Johnson before its implementation.⁹⁷⁹⁷ INQ000263374_0082 para 290; INQ000232086_0002; Stuart Glassborow 6 November 2023 80/3-12 Mr Sunak explained that he and Mr Johnson "thought that there was a sound policy rationale for introducing the scheme".⁹⁸⁹⁸ INQ000255836_0119 para 430 Both referred to the scheme providing financial support to the hospitality sector, given the impact of the first lockdown.⁹⁹⁹⁹ INQ000255836_0118-0119 para 429; INQ000263374_0067 paras 237-238; Rishi Sunak 11 December 2023 117/3-16 There was a second, equally significant objective:

" To incentivise consumers to return to the hospitality industry … by reassuring people that [it] is once again safe to consume and altering social behaviours that have become entrenched."¹⁰⁰¹⁰⁰ INQ000235019_0001

¶The rationale for creating a month-long scheme rather than a one-off financial incentive was that an ongoing incentive was more likely to achieve the scheme's policy aim of "breaking entrenched behaviours and encouraging the return to social consumption".¹⁰¹¹⁰¹ INQ000088069_0004 para 21 It reflected the importance of household consumption "for both the performance of the economy and employment in the near and long-term", given that this represented "63% of GDP [gross domestic product] … the largest part of the economy".¹⁰²¹⁰² INQ000215049_0053 para 157

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¶6.39. Mr Sunak emphasised that the Eat Out to Help Out scheme was implemented in the context of "the safe lifting" of restrictions and the reopening of pubs, restaurants and hairdressers, as agreed by the UK Cabinet on 23 June 2020 and announced that day.¹⁰³¹⁰³ INQ000263374_0075-0076 para 269; Rishi Sunak 11 December 2023 115/7-23 He explained that restrictions applied to hospitality venues during the operation of the scheme, such as:

" Covid-secure guidelines … This included placing limits on group sizes … ensuring a safe distancing between different groups, and the maintenance of social distancing measures of 'one-metre plus'."¹⁰⁴¹⁰⁴ INQ000263374_0076 para 271

¶Specific guidance had also been provided.¹⁰⁵¹⁰⁵ INQ000263374_0076 para 271; 'Pubs, restaurants and hairdressers to reopen from 4 July', Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Alok Sharma, 24 June 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pubs-restaurants-and-hairdressers-to- reopen-from-4-july; INQ000065410) As outlined in Chapter 5: Exit from lockdown, in this volume, social distancing guidance in England had already been reduced by the UK government – contrary to scientific advice – from two metres to one metre, in part in order to enable hospitality venues to open profitably.

¶6.40. The Eat Out to Help Out scheme applied UK-wide. However, the devolved administrations were neither consulted nor informed before it was announced.¹⁰⁶¹⁰⁶ INQ000339033_0115 para 320; INQ000391237_0076 paras 294-295; INQ000409589_0031 para 85; INQ000421704_0175-176 para 386; INQ000436641_0036 para 133; Rishi Sunak 11 December 2023 125/10-19 Both Mr Sunak and Nicola Sturgeon MSP, First Minister of Scotland from November 2014 to March 2023, told the Inquiry that the UK government had not been obliged to do so under the devolution settlement.¹⁰⁷¹⁰⁷ INQ000339033_0115 para 320; Rishi Sunak 11 December 2023 125/10-19 Even so, consulting the devolved administrations would have been sensible, given the potential public health implications of the scheme.

¶6.41. The Inquiry has not seen any evidence that the Treasury took into account the differing epidemiological conditions in the devolved nations when designing the Eat Out to Help Out scheme. It has seen limited evidence that the Treasury considered the different approaches to the response being pursued in each nation. It is difficult to see how the Treasury could adequately have done either, given the lack of consultation. At the time, there was no mandatory requirement to wear face coverings in indoor settings in Wales, despite pubs and restaurants reopening on 3 August 2020.¹⁰⁸¹⁰⁸ INQ000371209_0056 para 182 Such premises were still required to take all reasonable measures to maintain a two-metre social distance.¹⁰⁹¹⁰⁹ INQ000080969_0004 The Scottish Government was focused on the "maximum suppression" of the virus during this period.¹¹⁰¹¹⁰ Nicola Sturgeon 31 January 2024 187/2-10 Northern Ireland was facing significantly increased infection rates, and Professors Young and McBride had advised that pubs that did not sell food and were due to reopen should not do so.¹¹¹¹¹¹ INQ000353624; Ian Young 7 May 2024 163/20-164/4 By failing to consult the devolved administrations, the Treasury risked undermining the strategies that the devolved administrations had implemented in order to reduce infections.

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¶6.42. Mr Johnson, Mr Sunak and the Treasury also failed to consult or inform other UK government decision-makers, including Mr Hancock and senior advisers in the Cabinet Office, the Department of Health and Social Care and the Covid-19 Taskforce, about the Eat Out to Help Out scheme.¹¹²¹¹² Matt Hancock 30 November 2023 208/8-12; Simon Case 23 May 2024 130/13-14; Simon Ridley 7 November 2023 59/3-5; INQ000280628_0068 para 126 These decision-makers, along with the devolved administrations, were deprived of the opportunity to raise any concerns or to influence the scheme.

¶6.43. Mr Johnson initially told the Inquiry that the Eat Out to Help Out scheme was "properly discussed, including with Chris [Whitty] and Patrick [Vallance]".¹¹³¹¹³ INQ000255836_0119 para 430 However, he subsequently confirmed that no scientific advisers were present at his meetings with Mr Sunak at which the scheme was discussed.¹¹⁴¹¹⁴ Boris Johnson 7 December 2023 8/2-13 The Treasury, Mr Sunak and Mr Johnson failed to seek scientific advice in relation to the potential epidemiological risks of the scheme, despite being advised by Professor Whitty about the risk of indoor hospitality settings.¹¹⁵¹¹⁵ INQ000235261_0001; INQ000088242_0004 Professor Whitty explained:

" I do not think Treasury officials would have needed to consult me to know what I would have said however … I highlighted the risks of hospitality venues from very early in the pandemic multiple times."¹¹⁶¹¹⁶ INQ000251645_0125 para 8.32; see also INQ000238826_0115 para 346

¶6.44. Whether or not the scheme had a significant impact on the transmission of the virus (which Mr Sunak denied), it presented, at face value, a risk of increased transmission and was devised in the absence of any scientific advice. The scheme was also inconsistent with the UK government's overarching public health objectives for the response. As a number of witnesses observed, it undermined public health messaging about the importance of social distancing and being cautious in respect of socialising indoors.¹¹⁷¹¹⁷ Patrick Vallance 20 November 2023 93/14-23; Matt Hancock 30 November 2023 210/1-3; INQ000252711_0027 para 121(b); Lee Cain 31 October 2023 63/1-11 Professor Vallance explained that "up to that point the message had been very clear: … interaction between different households and people … was a high risk activity. That policy completely reversed it." It also provided financial incentives to engage in such activity. It was "a completely opposite public health message".¹¹⁸¹¹⁸ Patrick Vallance 20 November 2023 93/14-23 Lee Cain (Director of Communications at 10 Downing Street from July 2019 to November 2020) agreed, considering that the scheme:

" sent the wrong message to the country at a time when we were also trying to urge caution and keep social interaction limited and the virus under control".¹¹⁹¹¹⁹ INQ000252711_0027 para 121(b)

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The situation at the end of August 2020

¶6.45. The situation in Europe continued to foreshadow what was to come to the UK. By the end of August 2020, the real risk that the UK would be hit by a second wave of Covid-19 was clear to Mr Johnson and other decision-makers.

¶6.46. On 28 August 2020, the Covid-19 Taskforce had provided Mr Johnson with advice on strategy for the autumn of 2020.¹²⁰¹²⁰ INQ000137251 It outlined an optimistic plan A for a return to normal in November 2020, an alternative plan B for normality by Christmas 2020 and a contingency plan C for an England-wide response, if needed. While emphasising the importance of testing programmes to avoid another lockdown, Mr Johnson responded:

" We can and must deliver a version of plan A by Xmas … We are about to be HIT by French/Spanish LEVELS of infection. We must not DELUDE ourselves. So we must set out a new vision that does not involve another LOCKDOWN."¹²¹¹²¹ INQ000218343 (emphasis in original)

¶6.47. Mr Case complained about Mr Johnson:

" He changes strategic direction every day (Monday we were all about fear of virus returning as per Europe, March etc – today we were in 'let it rip' mode cos the UK is pathetic, needs a cold shower etc). He cannot lead and we cannot support him in leading with this approach. The team captain cannot change the call on big plays every day."¹²²¹²² INQ000273872_0061-0062 para 282

¶6.48. On 29 August 2020, Mr Johnson noted that the exponential spread of Covid-19 in France "will hit us unless we are insanely lucky".¹²³¹²³ INQ000283296_0025 Two days later, he stated: "[W]e have seen the wave coming for miles so we should be ready."¹²⁴¹²⁴ INQ000048399_0032 Mr Hancock told the Inquiry that "it was clear that a second wave was coming from late-August".¹²⁵¹²⁵ INQ000232194_0008 para 31

¶6.49. The UK government's focus throughout this period had been on lifting restrictions, with limited planning for a second wave. The use of localised restrictions and targeted interventions, such as 'smart' non-pharmaceutical interventions and consideration of population segmentation, had been prioritised. However, the measures that had been taken had not worked. Moreover, although face coverings had become mandatory in a number of settings in England, Mr Johnson described the policy as "totally fucked up".¹²⁶¹²⁶ INQ000283369_0041

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