Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 2 Report · 2024
Chapter 100: Personal experiences
Chapter 100: Personal experiences
Introduction
¶100.1 It is appropriate that we begin our description of the response to the Grenfell Tower fire by recounting in their own words the personal experiences of those who were most directly affected. RBKC, as a Category 1 responder, had a responsibility to ensure that the needs of those affected by the fire were properly met. For that reason, the quality and effectiveness of the response must be judged in a large part by their experience. We recognise that, although many people were affected in similar ways, the experience of each person was unique and that recollections may be affected in many different ways. Although we do not doubt the sincerity and honesty of those who gave evidence, it has not been possible for us to obtain specific responses from those who were seeking to provide help and who might wish to put forward a different perspective. This chapter should therefore be read with that in mind. It should be understood as an account of the experiences of people who had suddenly lost their homes and all their possessions and were entirely dependent on others to satisfy their basic needs.
¶100.2 We received 220 witness statements dealing with the response to the fire. We also heard oral evidence from Karim Mussilhy, Hisam Choucair, Mahmoud Al-Karad, Mohammed Rasoul, Mouna El Ogbani, Fatima Boujettif, Hanan Cherbika, Nabil Choucair and Hanan Wahabi. An extensive thematic summary of the evidence of all those who had provided statements was read during the hearings.88 {Day264/108:21}-{Day264/213:12}; {Day267/41:16}-{Day267/93:10}. That substantial body of evidence has enabled us to examine in detail the steps taken by RBKC, London Gold, the TMO and the government to provide humanitarian relief.
¶100.3 Although our investigations have concentrated on the seven days following the fire, we acknowledge that it continues to have a searing effect every day on many of those affected. We are extremely grateful to those who have shared their experiences with us and thank them for their courage and dignity in recounting them.
¶100.4 Taken as a whole, the evidence portrays a community whose lives have been changed forever by the fire. We learnt much of the immediate effects of the fire and of the long- lasting trauma that so many have experienced and still do. Those affected include, but are not limited to, survivors who escaped from the tower, residents of the tower who lost their homes, those who lost loved ones and those who were evacuated from nearby properties, some of whom also lost their homes. Such is the closeness of the local community that many survivors and residents are also bereaved, having lost loved ones, friends and neighbours. It is clear to us that they were, and, most importantly, felt themselves to have been, comprehensively failed by those to whom they looked for protection in the wake of a major disaster. Safety and security are as much to do with the perceptions of those affected as they are with the actions of those responsible for providing protection.
18The early hours
¶100.5 While the emergency services were fighting the fire, survivors, residents of the tower and those evacuated from surrounding properties89 Residents were evacuated from Grenfell Walk, Treadgold House, Hurstway Walk, Barandon Walk and Testerton Walk. Residents were also evacuated from Bramley House but not for an extended period and did not require accommodation. were abandoned without information about where to go or what to do.90 Levi {IWS00001753/8-9} pages 8-9, paragraphs 34 and 36; Dainton {IWS00000939/12} page 12, paragraph 80; John {IWS00001681/2-3} pages 2-3, paragraph 11; Adam {IWS00001301/10} page 10, paragraph 85; Khalloud {IWS00001754/5} page 5, paragraph 24. There was "absolute chaos and confusion everywhere".91 Sadafi {IWS00001806/3} page 3, paragraph 8. The scene was described as a "horror film"92 Mussilhy {Day264/17:7-8}. and a "war zone".93 Cherbika {Day266/89:5}. Mr Mussilhy told us that the area was "engulfed"94 Mussilhy {Day264/20:5}. with people and, given the chaos on the street, he expected to see people in authority with high-visibility jackets and clipboards, but there was nobody.95 Mussilhy {Day264/22:2-21}. Such was the confusion about what to do or where to go that some survivors96 Moghaddam {IWS00001266/4} page 4, paragraphs 14 and 15. and residents of the walkways slept in their cars.97 Ranito {IWS00001256/4-5} pages 4 - 5, paragraphs 22 and 23. Other residents waited for hours for buses that they had been told would be coming to take them to a rest centre,98 Ahmed {IWS00001335/129} page 129, paragraph 358. but instead they had to walk in the early hours to rest centres that had opened spontaneously nearby.99 Thompson {IWS00000158/10} page 10, paragraph 60.
¶100.6 In the absence of timely support from the authorities, members of the community took it upon themselves to open informal rest centres. They organised themselves quickly in an effort to meet a diverse range of needs.100 The response of the community, voluntary and faith sectors is examined in Chapter 106. Community centres were filled with people with nowhere to go trying to find shelter. Although community rest centres did their best to support those affected, some were forced through overcrowding to refuse entry to those who were not survivors.101 Moses {IWS00001276/14} page 14, paragraph 97; Cherbika {Day266/87:21-24}. Some survivors had to sleep in rest centres,102 Khoudair {IWS00001616/11} page 11, paragraph 33; Alfawaz {IWS00001274/7} page 7, paragraph 55; John {IWS00001685/8} page 8, paragraph 33. while some of those who lived in the walkways were left wandering the estate, displaced and unable to return home.103 Ranito {IWS00001256/4-5} pages 4 - 5, paragraphs 22 and 23.
¶100.7 In the absence of anyone apparently in authority104 Ramiro Urbano {IWS00000496/8} page 8, paragraph 45. or any information, survivors and residents were left to fend for themselves, having experienced the shock of the fire and in many cases searching frantically for loved ones. So far as they could see, the council and the TMO had "vanished" in the immediate aftermath of the fire105 Chiapetto {IWS00001780/4} page 4, paragraph 15. and were conspicuous by their absence.106 Abebe {IWS00000847/10} page 10, paragraph 31. Although RBKC began to assemble a presence in and around the tower from about 2.30am107 Nick Layton (LALO) Initial Log {RBK00014632/1}. and the TMO from 3.30am,108 Summary of Actions taken by the TMO Document {TMO00899668/1}. they were not clearly visible to those who might need them.
19Emergency accommodation
¶100.8 Many of those who had lost their homes experienced a number of problems with emergency accommodation. They included uncertainty about how long they might have to stay in hotels, unsuitable rooms, problems with the provision of suitable food, the distance of hotels from the community and failures to provide for particular needs.
¶100.9 The initial allocation of accommodation was confused and inconsistent. Some of those affected were allocated emergency accommodation in community rest centres, as RBKC sent representatives to the Rugby Portobello Trust and the Clement James Centre. Ms Wahabi told us about her experience of being allocated hotel accommodation at the Rugby Portobello Trust on 14 June 2017. She said that there had been no clear system for the allocation of emergency accommodation. She described feeling like "cattle just coming through".109 Wahabi {Day267/111:10}-{Day267/112:14}. The interviews lacked privacy, empathy and humanity and were described by some as being undertaken in a robotic and formulaic way.110 Wahabi {Day267/111:10}-{Day267/112:14}; Simms {Day275/193:15-17}. The lack of any system meant that individual needs could not be catered for.
¶100.10 RBKC housing teams were sent only to the Rugby Portobello Trust and the Clement James Centre.111 Laura Johnson {RBK00035592/8} page 8, paragraph 33. Although TMO staff were sent to more community rest centres, they did not visit some important places, such as the Al Manaar Muslim Cultural Heritage Centre or St Francis of Assisi church.112 TMO Staff Cover on 14 June 2017 {TMO00869981}; Brown {Day274/31:10-25}. That contributed to a lack of awareness amongst those affected of what support with accommodation was available and where.
¶100.11 Some survivors had to wait for days before being allocated accommodation.113 Yousuf {IWS00001626/3} page 3, paragraph 14; Alves {IWS00001596/10} page 10, paragraph 53; El-Guenuni {IWS00002034/8} page 8, paragraphs 31. Others were not contacted about their emergency accommodation until two weeks after the fire and in the meantime had to make their own arrangements.114 Patel {IWS00001610/10} page 10, paragraph 49.
¶100.12 A particular concern was the lack of information about accommodation for those who had been taken to hospital. Some survivors were discharged with no information about where to go.115 Alhaj Ali {IWS00001533/12-13} pages 12 - 13, paragraphs 62 and 63. One family attended the Town Hall to try and get some information but were told to come back the following day as there was nobody available.116 Abdulhamid {IWS00001919/3} page 3, paragraph 16.
¶100.13 For those who were allocated emergency accommodation there was often a lack of support in getting there. Some survivors were given oyster cards;117 Abdulhamid {IWS00001919/3} page 3, paragraph 16. others were just told by telephone that a room had been made available to them but were given no information about how to get there. Many had no money and only the clothes they stood up in.118 Moses {IWS00001281/9} page 9, paragraph 47. Some people arrived at the designated hotel only to find that it did not have a booking for them119 Ali {IWS00001617/12} page 12, paragraph 144. and that they had to go and stay with friends.120 Alves {IWS00001587/18} page 18, paragraph 93. Due to booking errors, one former resident of the tower went to three different hotels before arriving at the right one.121 Batoon {IWS00001687/11-12} pages 11 - 12, paragraph 47.
20¶100.14 The emergency accommodation arranged by RBKC was in many cases wholly inadequate. Many were distressed to find that they had been placed in rooms on high floors.122 Thompson {IWS00002110/33} page 33, paragraph 120; Burton {IWS00001661/24} page 24, paragraph 129; Yahya {IWS00000498/8} page 8, paragraph 32; Hamide {IWS00001651/4} page 4, paragraphs 17 and 18. Those affected described how the rooms allocated to them were small and unsuitable.123 Mohamed {IWS00001545/11} page 11, paragraph 47; Abdu {IWS00001956/10} page 10, paragraphs 52 and 53; Yousuf {IWS00001626/3} page 3, paragraph 14. Families of four124 Alves {IWS00001587/18} page 18, paragraph 91; Chebiouni {IWS00001979/5} page 5, paragraph 24. and five125 Yahya {IWS00000498/8} page 8, paragraph 32; Adam {IWS00001301/12} page 12, paragraph 100. were given one room126 Rasoul {Day265/156:1-7}. with a double bed. One couple was given a single room with a single bed and had to wait for a double room a month later.127 Kabouh {IWS00001613/6} page 6, paragraph 30. Insufficient space in rooms meant that on one occasion a member of a family had to sleep on the sofa in the hotel reception.128 Jamalvatan {IWS00001704/5} page 5, paragraph 21.
¶100.15 The council did not tell people who had been placed in hotels how long they would be able to stay there,129 Macit {IWS00001563/12} page 12, paragraph 52; Shaw {IWS00001752/8} page 8, paragraph 39; El-Sawy {IWS00001829/7} page 7, paragraph 31. which added significantly to the anxiety that people were experiencing at that difficult time.130 Ho {IWS00001551/20} page 20, paragraph 82. One family with three children were placed in a hotel on 17 June 2017, but were told the next day that they had to find alternative accommodation for themselves.131 El-Guenuni {IWS00002034/9} page 9, paragraph 34. Many were told that they were booked in for only one night and had the uncertainty of not knowing whether the booking was going to be extended.132 Quang {IWS00001821/12} page 12, paragraphs 58. Some received notes under their doors saying they were booked in for another week133 Daniels {IWS00002065/15} page 15, paragraph 99. but others had a note left on the door giving them just a few hours to leave.134 Sadafi {IWS00001806/23} page 23, paragraph 73. Ms El-Ogbani put it particularly vividly. She told us that the uncertainty was "really stressful and made us really angry, because you don't know how you're going to live the next day … our future was blank".135 El-Ogbani {Day266/22:14-16}.
¶100.16 Although hotel placements were intended to be emergency accommodation, for many their stay was not temporary or short-term. Some people lived in inadequate and unsuitable conditions for months,136 Pasztor {IWS00001682/4} page 4, paragraph 17 (7-8 months); El-Sawy {IWS00001829/8} page 8, paragraph 34 (9 months); Ollivierre {IWS00001758/6} page 6, paragraph 26 (9 months); Elbouti {IWS00001605/11} page 11, paragraph 50 (10 months). and in some cases longer,137 Lopez {IWS00001680/8} page 8, paragraph 48 (14 months); Rasoul {Day265/154:14} (19 months); Cherbika {Day266/102:5} (just over a year); Hanan Wahabi {Day267/113:25}-{Day267/114:3} (18 months); Chebiouni {IWS00001979/6} page 6, paragraph 34 (18 months). while trying to rebuild their lives.
¶100.17 Some survivors and residents of the area surrounding the tower were accommodated in places far from their former homes. That created a sense of loneliness and isolation.138 Al-Karad {Day265/111:17-19}; Chiapetto {IWS00001780/3} page 3, paragraph 10; Pahlavani {IWS00001244/14} page 14, paragraph 42. Some survivors were allocated accommodation as far away as Wandsworth and described an "acute sense of being completely isolated".139 Demissie {IWS00001540/6} page 6, paragraph 21. They felt they were being ignored and "moved further and further away".140 Lukic {IWS00001760/6} page 6, paragraph 25. No account appeared to have been taken of the need for people to be close to hospitals in order to visit their relatives141 El-Guenuni {IWS00002034/9} page 9, paragraph 35. some of whom were in a critical condition.142 Gomes {IWS00001078/39} page 39, paragraph 203. Some described having to use two or three taxis each day for hospital visits, which was expensive and inconvenient.143 Neda {IWS00001302/3} page 3, paragraph 15. As a result, many people struggled to visit rest centres and hospitals as well as taking their children to school.144 Hassani {IWS00001636/17-18} pages 17 - 18, paragraph 72; Khalloud {IWS00001754/6} page 6, paragraph 31. Those affected described how stressful it was having to return to the area in order to visit the rest centres to obtain support.145 Ignacio {IWS00001820/15} page 15, paragraph 78.
21¶100.18 When arranging emergency accommodation RBKC failed to give sufficient consideration to the needs of particular groups. In some cases cots were not available for those with babies or young children146 Mensah {IWS00001944/9} page 9, paragraph 43. nor any means of sterilising babies' bottles147 Ignacio {IWS00001820/14} page 14, paragraph 70. or making up bottles of milk.148 Cherbika {Day266/104:15}-{Day266/105:8}. No consideration appeared to have been given to the needs of children or to the importance of space for homework and play.149 Cherbika {Day266/102:15}-{Day266/103:9}; Cherbika {Day266/119:9-20}; Chebiouni {IWS00002043/6} page 6, paragraph 35; Chebiouni {IWS00002043/8} page 8, paragraph 52. Some pregnant women were not given sufficient consideration; one was forced to sleep on a sofa or the floor because the only bed in the room was too high for her to get into it.150 Adam {IWS00001296/4} page 4, paragraph 23. Some of those who had restricted mobility struggled with their accommodation because it was not adapted to their needs, for example, by having a walk-in shower151 Moses {IWS00001281/10} page 10, paragraph 54; Rasoul {Day265/157:13-25}. or a bed lever.152 Lokko {IWS00001516/4-5} pages 4-5, paragraph 34. At the time of the fire, many of those who lived in and around the tower were observing Ramadan, but halal food was not available at all hotels153 Moses {IWS00001281/10} page 10, paragraph 58. and it was not possible to observe the requirement to eat at set times.154 El Amine {IWS00001946/10-11} pages 10-11, paragraph 46; El-Ogbani {Day266/23:20}-{Day266/24:5}; Choucair {IWS00001799/15-16} pages 15-16, paragraph 20(c). People relied on the provision of food and support from the community.155 Chebiouni {IWS00002043/6} page 6, paragraph 39; Jones {IWS00001691/5} page 5, paragraph 24.
¶100.19 An illustration of these difficulties was provided by Mr Rasoul. He told us in graphic terms how the needs of his elderly father with disabilities and of his children were not adequately assessed by RBKC in the immediate aftermath of the fire and that the support they needed had not been provided, despite their "lives being turned upside down" and the fact that they were grieving.156 Rasoul {Day265/171:19-25}-{Day265/172:1-5}.
¶100.20 There was significant confusion about whether food was available for survivors and residents at hotels and if so of what kind. One survivor, who lost her son in the fire, told us that she did not know what she was entitled to and so restricted herself to just one meal a day.157 Shawo {IWS00001290/4} page 4, paragraph 25. Some heard that the council would only pay for drinks, so they only ordered drinks.158 Lewis {IWS00001629/6} page 6, paragraph 25. Others spent their own money on food159 Al-Assad {IWS00001789/11} page 11, paragraph 67. because they did not become aware until a month after the fire that food would be paid for.160 Araya {IWS00001648/4} page 4, paragraph 20. Mr Rasoul told us that he had not been aware for several weeks that food was available.161 Rasoul {Day265/159:13-23}. The arrangements for obtaining food at some hotels made some people feel like refugees.162 Ortiz {IWS00001283/7} page 7, paragraphs 51 and 53.
22¶100.21 Other basic facilities, such as the means of laundering clothes, were not available.163 El-Ogbani {Day266/25:1-5}; Khalloud {IWS00001754/6} page 6, paragraph 30. Families had to pack their laundry into black bags and suitcases and take it to the laundrette in a taxi, which they felt was demeaning and humiliating. The picture we saw was that of a vulnerable group of people facing not only the shock, grief and trauma of the fire itself but also, as an immediate priority, the need to satisfy the most basic of their daily needs. Survivors described it as living in limbo, with no space to heal.164 Rasoul {Day265/160:10}-{Day265/161:5}.
The Walkways: the forgotten residents
¶100.22 Adjoining Grenfell Tower were a number of low-rise residential buildings known locally as 'The Walkways'. The Walkways consisted of Hurstway Walk, Barandon Walk, Testerton Walk and Grenfell Walk. Treadgold House was not one of the Walkways but its residents were also evacuated and displaced.165 Brown {TMO00869990/4} page 4, paragraph 18; Brown {TMO00894124/17-18} pages 17 - 18, paragraphs 60 and 61; Exhibit TB/59 {TMO00894203/2}. While the council grappled with its response to the needs of those displaced from the tower, residents from the surrounding properties said they felt forgotten.166 Sang {IWS00001939/11} page 11, paragraph 55.
¶100.23 In the days after the fire, responsibility for the residents evacuated from the surrounding properties appears to have been informally delegated by the council to the TMO. However, the numbers were huge: about 845 people had been displaced and were in need.167 Exhibit TB/11 {TMO00869977/2}; Brown {TMO00894124/17} page 17, paragraph 60. The TMO was singularly ill-equipped to deal with so many people. Residents described how in the provision of emergency accommodation their needs took second place.168 Boujettif {Day266/75:1-14}. Although they had been displaced from their homes, their needs were considered to be less important.169 Archid {IWS00001618/15} page 15, paragraph 83. They were left in an invidious position, unable to return to their homes while the cordon remained in place but with insufficient hotel rooms available to accommodate them all. Many sought help from family and friends. Not all were so fortunate and some displaced residents were left sleeping on the grass by the Walkways close to the tower.170 Dowlut {IWS00001787/10-11} pages 10-11, paragraphs 37, 38 and 39; Wake {IWS00001642/5} page 5, paragraph 18.
¶100.24 Residents of the Walkways voiced their resentment at the way in which the council determined eligibility for the provision of support, including emergency accommodation, noting that "trauma does not work along strict geographical lines".171 Bedford {IWS00001652/8-9} pages 8 - 9, paragraph 32. However, allocation of emergency accommodation to this group of residents was haphazard. Exceptionally, some residents were allocated accommodation at the Westway Centre as early as 14 June 2017.172 Novell {IWS00001288/10} page 10, paragraph 57. Those who were allocated hotel accommodation were placed much later on.173 Rullo {IWS00001655/9} page 9, paragraph 36. One resident of the Walkways was advised to stay at the Westway Centre despite being pregnant and having three children, aged one, six and twelve.174 Raihani {IWS00001263/2} page 2, paragraph 10. She was not placed in a hotel for two weeks.175 Raihani {IWS00001263/5} page 5, paragraph 22. Residents had to take the initiative to approach the council to try to secure a place in a hotel. For some that took a few weeks176 Al-Assad {IWS00001789/9} page 9, paragraph 54. but others were not placed in emergency accommodation until (in some cases) as late as October 2017.177 Lara {IWS00001589/11} page 11, paragraph 41.
23¶100.25 Others were actively denied emergency accommodation. One resident was told she should sleep on a friend's sofa;178 Richer {IWS00001253/11} page 11, paragraph 51. another family who lived in Testerton Walk were refused emergency accommodation by a representative of the council at the Westway Centre, because they lived "too far" from the tower, even though their neighbours were offered a place in a hotel immediately.179 Lasharie {IWS00001546/5-6} pages 5-6, paragraph 24.
¶100.26 Some Walkway residents tried to ask for accommodation through the council's housing line, with unsatisfactory results.180 Stergiopoulou {IWS00001586/11} page 11, paragraph 43. One resident called the phone line three times because the council had failed to respond to her enquiries. She was told not to call again as she was not a priority and that she was taking up the line.181 Hessel {IWS00001645/8} page 8, paragraph 33. Others had similarly miserable experiences and were told a hotel would be organised for them, only for no one to follow up or call them back.182 Gil {IWS00001679/7} page 7, paragraph 56; McMahon {IWS00001966/10} page 10, paragraph 43. One resident was able to secure emergency accommodation only when he mentioned his partner's chronic health condition, and even then the hotel to which they were sent was available for only one night.183 Ranito {IWS00001249/8} page 8, paragraph 39. The residents of the Walkways understood very well that many people needed help but they too were in shock and despair and needed somewhere to stay.184 Hessel {IWS00001645/8-9} pages 8 - 9, paragraph 33. Several of them did not know that emergency accommodation was available185 John {IWS00001681/3} page 3, paragraph 15. and did not ask for it.186 Hartley {IWS00001257/11} page 11, paragraph 43. At least one booked his own hotel accommodation as the only alternative was to stay at a rest centre, which he thought would have an adverse effect on his mental health.187 Norbert {IWS00001252/8} page 8, paragraph 41. One walkway resident who used a wheelchair was never made aware of the availability of emergency accommodation. He stayed at his sister's home for three to four days and then returned home to Barandon Walk where there was no hot water or proper wheelchair access.188 John {IWS00001681/3-4} pages 3 - 4, paragraphs 17, 20 and 21.
The lifting of the cordon
¶100.27 Among the residents of the Walkways there was a general state of confusion and uncertainty about whether it was safe to return to their homes.189 Hartley {IWS00001257/11} page 11, paragraphs 41 and 42; Levi {IWS00001753/12-13} pages 12 - 13, paragraphs 52 and 53; El-Sawy {IWS00001829/5} page 5, paragraph 22; Yahya {IWS00001825/10} page 10, paragraph 50. On the day after the fire, TMO staff told some residents that they could return at their own risk, but did not explain what the risks were or suggest any alternatives.190 Serroukh {IWS00001747/5} page 5, paragraph 22. Some residents received a text message later in the week saying they could return home, but when they tried to do so were denied access by the police.191 Boujettif {Day266/67:7-14}.
24¶100.28 Having nowhere else to go, some residents returned to their flats to find that there was no hot water or heating,192 John {IWS00001681/4} page 4, paragraphs 20-22. which was particularly difficult for those with small children.193 Serroukh {IWS00001747/5-6} pages 5 - 6, paragraphs 23 and 24. They were left to use the showers at Virgin Active194 Serroukh {IWS00001747/6} page 6, paragraph 24. and the Westway Centre.195 Archid {IWS00001618/14} page 14, paragraph 79. Other residents returned home on 15 June 2017 and were allowed in, only to be told later in the afternoon that they had to leave again.196 O'Connell {IWS00001574/5} page 5, paragraph 17.
¶100.29 The residents of Grenfell Walk were in a different position from that of other residents evacuated from nearby properties, in that, like the residents of Grenfell Tower, they needed to be resettled in new accommodation.197 Procedure Note for Resettlement Packages {RBK00028643}. The council does not appear to have fully understood that fact when it came to the provision of humanitarian assistance.198 Cherbika {Day266/116:23}-{Day266/117:23}. Ms Cherbika told us that "we needed help desperately, and every door we kept going to was closed because we wasn't bereaved or wasn't a survivor … we was in between. We didn't come out of the tower, but we couldn't also go back to our properties, so we were homeless, but nobody was helping…".199 Cherbika {Day266/117:16-23}. Some residents said that the difference in treatment between residents of the tower and residents of the Walkways created "hierarchy and a division" within the community which, before the fire, had been one.200 Moses {IWS00001276/13} page 13, paragraph 92.
The Westway Centre
¶100.30 The Westway Centre initially opened spontaneously as a rest centre.201 Norman {CFV00000061/2} page 2, paragraphs 2a- 2d. Staff responsible for its management said that no official support had been offered in the initial hours of the first day.202 Norman {CFV00000061/4} page 4, paragraph 2l. Representatives from RBKC and the TMO attended later on 14 June 2017203 Norman {CFV00000061/4} page 4, paragraph 2m. when it became the official rest centre in an attempt to concentrate support in one place. However, there were serious shortcomings in the way the centre was set up and managed, which meant that those who needed it encountered significant difficulties in obtaining immediate humanitarian support. We examine those shortcomings in Chapter 104. They included displaced residents being denied entry, a lack of clarity about the services available, a need for people to provide the same information on several occasions to obtain support of different kinds and an absence of staff representing those in authority, such as RBKC and the TMO.
¶100.31 Those working in the Westway Centre did not know that residents had been evacuated from nearby properties and that some had lost their homes. Many of those who went to the centre were therefore initially refused help.204 Gomez {IWS00001264/8} page 8, paragraphs 53 and 54. Some were denied entry altogether.205 Moussaid {IWS00001282/5} page 5, paragraph 25; Moses {IWS00001276/14} page 14, paragraph 99. Cherbika {Day266/89:16}-{Day266/91:4}.
¶100.32 A number of residents and survivors had difficulty gaining entry to the Westway Centre after a registration system was introduced on 14 June 2017.206 Girma {IWS00001732/12} page 12, paragraph 23. Many displaced people were asked to provide evidence of identity in order to enter the centre, despite the fact that they had lost everything in the fire. Sometimes those running help desks insisted on the production of identification documents before they would provide help.207 Thompson {IWS00002110/34} page 34, paragraph 123. Gaining access to the centre was considered so difficult that some residents had to "sneak in" after they had been refused official entry.208 Hirsi {IWS00001776/4} page 4, paragraph 11.
25¶100.33 Community leaders who visited the Westway Centre, described a multiple-choice system where people were asked "Are you a survivor, are you bereaved, or are you a visitor?"209 Simms {Day275/211:15-20}. The process was described as astonishingly perfunctory and without compassion.210 Simms {Day275/211:22-25}.
¶100.34 As part of the verification process, the Red Cross gave people wristbands on entry.211 Ranito {IWS00001249/7-8} pages 7 - 8, paragraph 37. Some residents were concerned that that made them easily identifiable in the street, including by journalists, and did not like being "marked" and given a new wristband every day.212 Vieiro {IWS00001798/12} page 12, paragraph 50; Dainton {IWS00001974/31} page 31, paragraph 177.
¶100.35 The experiences of those who came to receive support at the Westway Centre were not happy. The physical layout of the space was confused and the centre lacked basic systems for processing the influx of donations and signs to direct people to services of different kinds.213 Alves {IWS00001587/16} page 16, paragraph 83. Some survivors who had lost loved ones arrived at the Westway Centre after being discharged from hospital but did not see anyone from the council and were not given any help.214 Alhaj Ali {IWS00001533/12-13} page 12 - 13, paragraphs 62 and 63; Jolly {IWS00001621/6-7} page 6-7, paragraphs 30 and 31. Although the council had a desk there, its staff appeared to be "powerless" as they could not offer any support to those affected other than emergency accommodation.215 Miller {IWS00001940/12} page 12, paragraph 52. The centre was described as lacking "warmth"216 Boujettif {Day266/71:12-14}. and its atmosphere as being "formal and bureaucratic".217 Dainton {IWS00001804/24} page 24, paragraph 152; Wahabi {Day267/131:9-18}. For example, one individual who was trying to find five loved ones was told to send an email.218 Patterson {CFV00000055/12} page 12, paragraph 44. For some, "it felt like a shelter for government representatives and the council staff rather than a refuge and support centre…".219 Girma {IWS00001732/12} page 12, paragraph 23. Consequently, residents and survivors preferred the rest centres run by the community, as they were more "community orientated".220 Wahabi {Day267/131:9-18}; Girma {IWS00001732/12} page 12, paragraph 23.
¶100.36 A particular problem with the way in which the Westway Centre was organised was that those in need of assistance had to go there and say what they needed in order to receive support. However, that meant that some of those who were injured, traumatised or isolated felt that they could not obtain what they needed when they should have been the priority.221 Jolly {IWS00001621/6-7} page 6 - 7, paragraphs 30 and 31; Richards {Day275/150:24}-{Day275/151:4}. We were told that "it felt as though rather than coming to us for support, we had to go to them."222 Girma {IWS00001732/12} page 12, paragraph 23. Some were thankful that they had been able to obtain some of the services available at the Westway Centre, such as replacement documents. Others, however, said that they felt very exposed. They complained of a lack of privacy and said that, because everything was happening in one place, it was overwhelming.223 Wahabi {Day267/130:18}-{Day267/131:5}.
26¶100.37 Some survivors slept at the Westway Centre in the first few days following the fire. It was described by one person as being like a "refugee camp",224 Ragab {IWS00001536/6-7} pages 6 - 7, paragraphs 29 and 30. with people sleeping on mats and donated mattresses on the tennis hall floor.225 Norman {CFV00000061/7} page 7, paragraph 4(g). One member of staff was concerned that no consideration had been given to the trauma people had experienced.226 Norman {CFV00000061/7} page 7, paragraph 4(g). It was described as a "very sad place to be" and "somewhere for people that did not have anywhere better to go."227 Lukic {IWS00001760/4-5} pages 4 - 5, paragraphs 18 and 19. The Jafari family remained at the Westway Centre for 10 days228 Jafari {IWS00001815/14} page 14, paragraph 64. and describe staying there as "horrific" due to the lack of privacy.229 Jafari {IWS00001815/13} page 13, paragraph 55.
¶100.38 Given their role in supporting those affected by the fire, many community leaders had the opportunity to observe the services being provided at the Westway Centre close at hand. Some were of the view that centralising support at that location failed to consider existing relationships that those affected had with organisations in the area,230 Richards {CFV00000012/24-25} pages 24 - 25, paragraph 155. and that the centre was "intimidating".231 Richards {CFV00000012/6} page 6, paragraph 46; Richards {CFV00000012/16} page 16, paragraph 107.
¶100.39 Some staff from community rest centres refused to go to the Westway Centre and withdrew because they felt that the system in operation there was inhumane and cruel.232 Simms {Day275/203:17}-{Day275/204:4}. Instead of making traumatised survivors and the displaced constantly justify the need for support233 Richards {Day275/152:16-17}. there should have been a system, according to one volunteer, where people had to explain their situation once and receive the information and support needed in an environment where they felt safe and knew the staff.234 Richards {Day275/152:2-15}.
Financial assistance
¶100.40 There were significant problems in providing financial assistance to those affected by the fire. The council did not have a policy in place for arranging and distributing financial assistance or communicating how it could be obtained. As a result, many of those who had been displaced or who had lost their belongings in the fire235 Raihani {IWS00001300/4} page 4, paragraph 25; El-Ogbani {Day266/36:21}-{Day266/37:8}. had no access to funds at a time of unprecedented need and were trying to support themselves and their children.236 El-Ogbani {Day266/36:21}-{Day266/37:9}. Some people did not receive any financial assistance at all and were entirely dependent upon support from charities.237 Bonifacio {IWS00001887/7} page 7, paragraph 47. Others were actively denied assistance by the council. One survivor was told that she was not entitled to any financial assistance because she and her partner were in employment.238 Jones {IWS00001548/12} page 12, paragraph 56. Other survivors were refused assistance,239 Nalukwago {IWS00001568/1} page 1, paragraph 6. or offered a significantly lower amount,240 Afeworki {IWS00001756/5} page 5, paragraph 26. because they were not formally tenants of flats in the tower. Some residents who had been evacuated were refused financial assistance because they were leaseholders.241 Rullo {IWS00001655/9} page 9, paragraph 38. Although they did not feel ready to do so, some felt they had to go back to work soon after the fire simply because they could not afford to do otherwise.242 Al-Sadi {IWS00001247/7} page 7, paragraph 39. Some residents were refused payments because, as they understood it, the money allocated to them had been wrongly given to someone else.243 Serroukh {IWS00001747/7} page 7, paragraph 30; Yahya {IWS00001827/8} page 8, paragraph 37; Ollivierre {IWS00001758/6} page 6, paragraph 25. For those who did receive financial assistance, the payments were often significantly delayed;244 Ortiz {IWS00001283/8} page 8, paragraph 60. some told us that they had had to wait for over four months for any financial assistance from the council.245 Raihani (IWS00001300/4} page 4, paragraph 25; Richer {IWS00001253/12} page 12, paragraph 58; Talabi {IWS00001731/7} page 7, paragraph 22.
27¶100.41 The general experience was of inconsistency of approach. As an illustration, one resident received £500 to be shared with her brother,246 Ross {IWS00001826/12} page 12, paragraph 58. but others received as little as £100 in the first week and nothing thereafter.247 Wahabi {Day267/117:20}-{Day267/118:7}; Hariri {IWS00001295/11} page 11, paragraph 86. Payments made were often insufficient given the variety of needs, such as travel, food and clothing.248 Al-Karad {Day265/124:2-6}. People understandably felt demeaned and humiliated249 El Amine {IWS00001946/10} page 10, paragraph 44; Cherbika {IWS00001305/12} page 12, paragraph 100; Gil {IWS00001679/11} page 11, paragraph 90. when having to go back to ask for more financial assistance.250 El Amine {IWS00001946/10} page 10, paragraph 44. A great many of them were proudly independent and self-reliant and the experience of having to ask the authorities for a handout was a humiliating one.
¶100.42 The process of obtaining assistance was an uphill battle251 Abdulhamid {IWS00001919/5} page 5, paragraph 22. and for many, embarrassing and intrusive.252 Rasoul {Day265/164:5-11}. One survivor was told by the council to write down everything she needed money for, despite the fact she had lost everything in the fire.253 Dainton {IWS00001804/19} page 19, paragraph 124. Mr Al-Karad told us that the difficulties in obtaining financial support added greatly to the stress he was under and it was not easy to get help. He said that in the first few months he had had to fight for what he needed and sometimes ask for it "20 times".254 Al-Karad {Day265/121:22}-{Day122:4}.
¶100.43 The source of the problem was that the council did not take active steps to tell people what they were entitled to and how they could obtain it.255 Abdulhamid {IWS00001919/5} page 5, paragraph 22; Li {IWS00001622/9}, page 9, paragraphs 62 and 63. Instead, it waited for them to ask.256 Rasoul {Day265/164:11-18}. During the week following the fire, and in some cases even later, people became aware by word of mouth that they were entitled to financial assistance.257 Jones {IWS00001548/12} page 12, paragraph 56; Ahmed {IWS00001335/132} page 132, paragraph 364. By the time some people found out about the various kinds of assistance to which they were entitled, the council told them it was too late to claim.258 Abdulhamid {IWS00001919/5} page 5, paragraph 22; Toyoshima-Lewis {IWS00001725/66} page 66, paragraph 265.
¶100.44 Adequate and timely financial assistance in the immediate aftermath of a major incident is an essential aspect of an effective humanitarian response. Those who did receive such assistance described how it made a huge difference to them to be able to choose what they needed for themselves.259 Moses {IWS00001281/11} page 11, paragraph 61. In the absence of such support, others described the humiliation of having to search through donations to find suitable clothes, in some cases without success.260 Al-Karad {Day265/106:22}-{Day265/107:21}.
28Psychosocial support
¶100.45 In the immediate aftermath of the fire there was limited psychological support available and a lack of information about the kind of support that people could obtain. Survivors described how they struggled with their mental health, desperately needing help but not knowing where to get it at a time when they were at their most vulnerable.261 Ross {IWS00002356/8} page 8, paragraphs 42 and 45; Diejomaoh {IWS00001303/5-6} pages 5 - 6, paragraphs 27 and 28; Cherbika {Day266/106:1-22}.
¶100.46 Many survivors and residents did not hear about the availability of counselling support until a considerable time after the fire.262 Pahlavani {IWS00001244/15} page 15, paragraph 46; Ramirez {IWS00002061/6} page 6, paragraph 35. Several survivors said that they had not received offers of counselling until two years later.263 Sobieszczak {IWS00001555/8} page 8, paragraphs 29 and 30; Jamalvatan {IWS00001704/7} page 7, paragraph 30. In the absence of support from other sources, people had to arrange their own.264 Miller {IWS00001940/19} page 19, paragraph 90; Ramirez {IWS00002061/6} page 6, paragraph 35; Kebede {IWS00001795/10} page 10, paragraph 38; Jones {IWS00001710/5} page 5, paragraphs 29 and 30. Although counselling services were available at the Westway Centre, some chose not to make use of them as they did not consider it to be sufficiently private.265 Laci {IWS00001831/6} page 16, paragraph 40.
¶100.47 Psychological support was available from 16 June 2017 in some of the hotels in which displaced people had been accommodated and some of them understood that counselling services were available if needed.266 Vieiro {IWS00001798/10} page 10, paragraph 42. Other hotels did not provide such support, however, which meant that survivors had to go elsewhere if they wanted to find it.267 Wahabi {Day267/125:16-25}. Some residents were unable to obtain counselling services due to language barriers;268 Al Assad {IWS00001267/5} page 5, paragraph 25. others found it too difficult to undertake counselling sessions through an interpreter and so stopped attending.269 Kabouh {IWS00001942/7} page 7, paragraph 34. There were particular concerns about the lack of emotional support and counselling for children, all of whom had witnessed a grave tragedy and some of whom had lost family and friends in the fire.270 Cherbika {Day266/118:23}-{Day266/119:8}.
Key workers
¶100.49 The use of key workers was an important means of ensuring that those affected received the support they needed, but the system did not operate efficiently in many cases for a variety of reasons, including uneven and late allocation of key workers, inconsistent quality of service and a high turnover of staff.
¶100.50 Survivors were assigned key workers at different times, some within 24 hours of the fire,274 Jones {IWS00001548/14} page 14, paragraph 64. others only after waiting three or four months.275 Jamalvatan {IWS00001724/7} page 7, paragraph 29; Ranito {IWS00001249/9} page 9, paragraph 44. Some were not allocated key workers until a year later because they had not been residents of the tower, and only then after asking for one.276 Benjamin {IWS00001764/12} page 12, paragraphs 83 and 84. Others were not assigned a key worker at all.277 Young {IWS00001261/10} page 10, paragraph 47. Some residents of the Walkways were told that key workers were available only to former residents of
29¶Grenfell Tower and Grenfell Walk.278 Murray {IWS00001639/8} page 8, paragraph 43.
¶100.51 There was a similarly inconsistent approach to the allocation of key workers to the bereaved. Some people were contacted about a month after the fire,279 Pumar {IWS00002346/5} page 5, paragraph 29. while others were assigned a key worker some months later and then only after asking their family liaison officers to approach the council.280 Jniah {IWS00001600/16} page 16, paragraph 61.
¶100.52 There were mixed experiences of the quality of key workers, some of whom appeared to be more engaged than others. We were told of key workers who were not properly prepared for the task and not fully informed, and thus unable to provide support and information.281 Gashaw {IWS00001738/24} page 24, paragraph 24; Raihani {IWS00001300/5} page 5, paragraph 28. Residents often picked up important information before their key workers.282 Ramirez {IWS00002061/6} page 6, paragraph 36. That led to increased stress and uncertainty for many.283 Kassemdjian {IWS00001784/15} page 15, paragraph 77. Some key workers failed to respond to residents' questions,284 Patel {IWS00001610/15} page 15, paragraph 70. which caused further difficulty if support had to be arranged through a key worker.285 Patel {IWS00001610/15-16} pages 15 - 16, paragraph 72. A number of witnesses spoke of contradictory information about the support available being given by different key workers.286 Dainton {IWS00001974/35} page 35, paragraphs 201, 202 and 207. Some regarded their key workers as merely a "support placebo" because they lacked the authority to make decisions.287 Haynes {IWS00001809/9} page 9, paragraph 30.
¶100.53 On the other hand, some had more positive experiences of their key workers288 Ibrahim {IWS00001751/7-8} pages 7 - 8, paragraph 29. and found them to be a useful single point of contact.289 Hessel {IWS00001645/13} page 13, paragraph 53; Benkhaoula {IWS00001269/7} page 7, paragraphs 60 and 61. They provided regular information about the support available.290 Laci {IWS00001831/8} page 8, paragraphs 51 and 52; Sobieszczak {IWS00001562/13} page 13, paragraph 58. The benefits of the system were thus available but were unevenly distributed.
¶100.54 A number of those affected experienced a high turnover of key workers.291 Kasote {IWS00001775/8} page 8, paragraph 28; Sobieszczak {IWS00001562/13} page 13, paragraph 58; Neda {IWS00001302/4} page 4, paragraph 19; Beadle {IWS00001872/15} page 15, paragraph 61. In some cases, key workers had to step down because they had been assigned too many people to look after.292 Patel {IWS00001610/15} page 15, paragraphs 70 - 72. Others could not continue in the role because they had been traumatised by their work.293 Hessel {IWS00001645/13} page 13, paragraph 53. Mr Rasoul told us that he had been allocated six different key workers in one month, with one lasting for just a weekend.294 Rasoul {Day265/167:18-21}. Some developed positive and supportive relationships with their key workers,295 Alfawaz {IWS00001274/11-12} pages 11-12, paragraphs 88-91. but in many cases there was a lack of continuity, with some leaving after a number of months.296 Alhaj Ali {IWS00001533/26} page 26, paragraphs 131 and 132. For some, that was very unsettling. Ms Cherbika described her own experience thus: "They kept changing all the time. I probably went through eight or nine key workers, support workers, whatever workers …
30¶I felt like when I clicked with somebody … the council would take that person away".297 Cherbika {Day266/108:16-25}-{Day266/109:1-2}.
¶Some survivors were left for a time with no key workers.
¶100.55 A particular problem which some faced as a result of having a frequent change of key worker was that they had to describe their experiences from the beginning over and over again.298 Alhaj Ali {IWS00001533/26} page 26, paragraphs 131 and 132; Neda {IWS00001302/4} page 4, paragraph 19; Rasoul {Day265/167:5-17}; Ollivierre {IWS00001758/5} page 5, paragraph 24. Some people found that traumatising.299 Cherbika {Day266/109:7-19}; Al-Karad {Day265/126:19-24}; Rasoul {Day265/169:17}-{Day265/170:5}; Ali {IWS00001617/15} page 15, paragraphs 183 - 185.
Public communication
¶100.56 One common experience in the immediate aftermath of the fire was an absence of information from official sources about the assistance available. In the week following the fire those who had been displaced did not receive any communication from the council telling them what services were available or where to go for help.300 Ho {IWS00001551/16} page 16, paragraph 62. There were no calls or text messages from either the council or the TMO.301 Ho {IWS00001551/16} page 16, paragraph 62. The council did not use its website to provide information for those evacuated from the area within the cordon302 Hartley {IWS00001257/13} page 13, paragraph 50. who were waiting to find out when they could return to their homes.303 Quang {IWS00001552/20} page 20, paragraph 83.
¶100.57 Despite what they had been through, survivors and residents were thus forced to seek information for themselves, which caused additional stress.304 Le-Blanc {IWS00001271/26} page 26, paragraphs 239 and 240; Vieiro {IWS00001798/12} page 12, paragraph 49; Murray {IWS00001639/8} page 8, paragraphs 45 and 46; Gil {IWS00001679/13} page 13, paragraphs 102-104; Gashaw {IWS00001738/18} page 18, paragraph 20. Ms El-Ogbani told us that there was: "No one from government, no one from the authority. We didn't know where to go, we didn't know how to seek help, we didn't know what will happen next. It was just question mark, question mark, question mark…"305 El-Ogbani {Day266/29:17-21}. We heard the same experience voiced by many witnesses.
¶100.58 Mark Simms from the Rugby Portobello Trust told us that although RBKC had been gathering information, there was not much of it.306 Simms {Day275/193:7-18}. RBKC councillors offered help, but they were not there in an organisational role. They too, were struggling to get hold of information.307 Simms {CFV00000005/10} page 10, paragraph 42. There was an "absolute sense that everyone was overwhelmed".308 Simms {CFV00000005/10} page 10, paragraph 42; Simms {Day275/195:17}-{Day275/196:21}.
¶100.59 The lack of information had a direct effect on the distribution of support. Those who obtained information about the support available were the first to receive assistance, while those who did not were left behind.309 Abdulhamid {IWS00001919/5-6} pages 5-6, paragraph 27. That particularly affected vulnerable people, such as those with mobility problems and those who could not speak English.310 Abdulhamid {IWS00001919/5-6} pages 5-6, paragraph 27; Vieiro {IWS00001798/12} page 12, paragraph 49.
¶100.60 When official communications were eventually released, they were in English.311 El-Sawy {IWS00001822/10} page 10, paragraph 42. That included communications sent to those who had been placed in hotels. People described feeling at a disadvantage because they could not read English well and had significant difficulty in gaining access to services, which they felt created unfairness.312 Jamalvatan {IWS00001724/6-8} pages 6-8, paragraphs 27 and 33; Lopez {IWS00001680/11} page 11, paragraphs 68 and 69; Belfassi {IWS00001802/11} page 11, paragraphs 70 and 71; Elbouti {IWS00001605/13-14} pages 13-14, paragraph 64.
31¶They had to rely on family and friends in order to help them understand the information provided and said that an interpreter would have provided greater support.313 Quang {IWS00001821/15} page 15, paragraphs 75 and 76; Kebede {IWS00001795/11} page 11, paragraph 45; El- Sawy {IWS00001829/9} page 9, paragraph 41. Some people did not want to rely on friends and neighbours to interpret confidential and personal information.314 Belfassi {IWS00001802/11} page 11, paragraphs 70 and 71. In some cases interpreters were provided, but not always in the right language.315 Jafari {IWS00001815/16} page 16, paragraph 71. Despite complaints to the council and, later, London Gold about the need for materials to be provided in different languages, it took some time for that to be done.
Information about those missing
¶100.61 Those that were looking for their loved ones immediately after the fire encountered numerous obstacles to their searches.316 John {IWS00001685/8} page 8, paragraph 32. Some families desperately went from hospital to hospital, rest centre to rest centre, in their search for information, but to no avail.317 Ibrahim {IWS00001751/5} page 5, paragraphs 17 and 21; Nabil Choucair {Day267/7:23}-{Day267/12:2}. The overwhelming thrust of their evidence was that they had experienced feelings of utter helplessness and despair as they navigated an environment in which there was a complete absence of information.318 Nowak {IWS00001559/10} page 10, paragraph 50; Mussilhy {Day264/62:1-8}.
¶100.62 Family members visited the numerous rest centres that had been set up in the community, repeatedly asking for information about their loved ones.319 El-Baghdady {IWS00001535/8} page 8, paragraphs 36 and 38; Jniah {IWS00001600/9} page 9, paragraph 32; Chiejina {IWS00002348/5} page 5, paragraphs 30 and 32; Hisam Choucair {Day265/19:7-12}. It rapidly became apparent to them that neither the representatives of the council nor the TMO320 Rasoul {Day265/146:14-19}. were able to provide even the most basic information. The council staff at the Rugby Portobello Trust did not have a list of those who had lived in the tower and were asking people who they were and which flat they lived in.321 Dainton {IWS00001804/19} page 19, paragraph 122. Mr Rasoul told us that after he had escaped from the tower he had visited the Latymer Community Church (known at the time of the fire as the Latymer Christian Centre)322 Blanchflower {CFV00000045/1} page 1, paragraph 2. in his search for missing friends. There he found a representative from the TMO with a list of flat numbers and names, but the list incorrectly included people who no longer lived there.323 Rasoul {Day265/146:14-19}. As a result of the lack of information, the community felt compelled to compile its own list of those who were missing324 John {IWS00001685/8} page 8, paragraph 32. and piece together its own picture of what had happened.325 Burton {IWS00001661/29} page 29, paragraph 153. Mr Mussilhy told us that that was the only way for people to know who was still missing and who had survived.326 Mussilhy {Day264/68:15-24}.
¶100.63 By the evening of 14 June 2017, the Westway Centre had been designated as the official rest centre. As we have already described, the site was hard to access without documentary identification or a wristband, but there was no clear information about how or where to obtain a wristband.327 Mussilhy {Day264/32:20-21}; Chellat {IWS00001284/1} page 1, paragraph 5. Even those who managed to get into the Westway Centre felt that they did not receive adequate information or assistance.
32¶Although there were information desks there, they did not have information about those who were missing in order to assist those looking for loved ones.328 Anderson {IWS00001561/4} page 4, paragraphs 11-12.
¶100.64 In the absence of any official assistance, family members visited hospitals across London desperately looking for their loved ones.329 Hisam Choucair {Day265/39:25}-{Day265/40:3}; Nabil Choucair {Day267/10:25}-{Day267/11:4}; Al-Karad {Day265/97:11-25}; Anderson {IWS00001561/3} page 3, paragraph 10. It was difficult obtaining information from hospitals,330 Ramiro Urbano {IWS00001984/7} page 7, paragraph 42; Chiejina {IWS00002348/4} page 4, paragraph 26. which were concerned about releasing personal information.331 Hisam Choucair {Day265/50:9-14}; Nabil Choucair {Day267/46:24}-{Day267/47:2}. Hisam and Nabil Choucair told us about their painstaking visits to about 12 hospitals332 Nabil Choucair {Day267/23:2-12}. in the search for members of their family. For them that merely compounded the trauma.333 Hisam Choucair {Day265/72:14-20}.
¶100.65 Nabil Choucair told us about the call he made to the emergency services on 14 June 2017 seeking information about his family. He told us that he had searched rest centres, hospitals and had called the casualty bureau.334 Nabil Choucair {Day267/17:9}-{Day267/26:6}. He said, "We were left to fend for ourselves, left to try and find help. … There was chaos. … Nobody knew what they were doing …".335 Nabil Choucair {Day267/32:12-22}. Those looking for their loved ones felt "lost with no direction of what to do or where to go next".336 Anderson {IWS00001561/4} page 4, paragraphs 11 and 12.
¶100.66 In the days that followed families continued their searches, desperately trying to find information.337 Spence {IWS00001657/3} page 3, paragraph 11. A particular challenge arose when news of a different rest centre or possible hospital emerged, as they felt compelled to flock there in a (usually futile) attempt to obtain information.338 Hisam Choucair {Day265/34:1-4}. Some families were not able to carry out extensive searches themselves and had to rely on help from relatives, without which they felt "completely forgotten or overlooked".339 Lamprell {IWS00001673/7} page 7, paragraph 45. Some people who had lost loved ones lived abroad and did not receive any information about their family members, which was itself distressing.340 Ibrahim {IWS00001650/3} page 3, paragraph 12; Jebari {IWS00001550/4} page 4, paragraphs 15 and 18.
¶100.67 One survivor who escaped the tower but became separated from his wife, who perished in the fire, was placed in emergency accommodation without any information about her or how he might find her.341 Abdullah {IWS00001279/5} page 5, paragraph 22. Mr Mussilhy shared his experiences of his search for his uncle and his realisation as the days passed that "We were completely alone … and abandoned in the worst way possible while we were looking for our relatives."342 Mussilhy {Day264/27:7-12}.
¶100.68 A casualty bureau was opened by the Metropolitan Police at 08.00 on 14 June 2017.343 Chalmers {MET00077804/6}, page 6, paragraph 30. Its existence was publicised as a point of contact at 08.02344 Chalmers {MET00077804/11}, page 11, paragraph 51. but it was designed to receive information about those who were missing and not to release information to callers.345 Mendy {IWS00002349/2} page 2, paragraph 6. In the hours after the fire, many who called the number found it to be engaged346 Bernard {IWS00002337/7} page 7, paragraph 53. or were greeted with a recorded message stating that there were no people to answer calls and that they were waiting for call-handlers.347 Murphy {IWS00001709/3} page 3, paragraph 9. Others told us that, when they eventually got through, they were told that someone would come round or would call, but they did not hear back. Others called on many occasions but were told to call back another time for more information.348 Lamprell {IWS00001673/3} page 3, paragraph 20; Lamprell {IWS00001673/8} page 8, paragraph 49. When callers were able to have a conversation with the operator, they found it to be entirely one-way, the operator simply asking for information about the caller and those who were missing.349 Jones {IWS00001691/4} page 4, paragraph 15; Nabil Choucair {Day267/12:20-25}. The casualty bureau, at least to those who encountered it, was a means of gathering information, not providing information to relatives.350 El-Gourja {IWS00001700/5} page 5, paragraph 24.
33¶100.69 The failure to contact bereaved families soon after the fire left many feeling that they did not matter.351 El-Wahabi {IWS00001697/5} page 5, paragraph 21. Some of those affected felt that information was released by police in a haphazard way and that there was no co-ordinated effort to relay information to families.352 Chellat {IWS00001306/2-3} pages 2-3, paragraph 14. Due to the scale of events, it took a number of days for family liaison officers to be appointed.
¶100.70 Families had mixed experiences of family liaison officers. Some people were assigned an officer about a week after the fire and found that support reassuring.353 Anderson {IWS00001561/5} page 5, paragraph 16. Others, however, found the officer allocated to them formal and difficult to talk to.354 Alhaj Ali {IWS00001533/10} page 10, paragraphs 50 and 51. Some family members felt marginalised and unimportant355 Elsanosi {IWS00001837/4} page 4, paragraphs 12 and 14. because they were not allocated their own officer356 Jniah {IWS00001600/15} page 15, paragraph 55. when an officer had been allocated to another family member in accordance with Metropolitan Police guidance.357 Kieran {MET00077793/5} page 5, paragraph 16; Exhibit KK/1 {MET00077792/37-38} Section 5.7.
¶100.71 The absence of a clear and centralised system for providing information about those who were safe and those who were missing led to the growth of false information. Some people were told that their loved ones had been seen alive when they had in fact died.358 Daniels {IWS00002065/11} page 11, paragraphs 73 and 74; Chiapetto {IWS00001780/1} page 1, paragraph 2; Murphy {IWS00001709/3} page 3, paragraph 12; Wahabi {Day267/102:8}-{Day267/103:17}. It was difficult for family members to verify rumours that were circulating in the community as there was no single source of reliable information.359 Jniah {IWS00001600/4} page 4, paragraph 13. Those desperate for information were left in the dark and felt alone.360 Shawo {IWS00001290/5} page 5, paragraph 35. The dreadful results of the failure to establish a method of communicating with the former residents of the tower are best exemplified by the experience of one family who learned of their son's death by hearing about it on the television news.361 Shawo {IWS00001290/5} page 5, paragraph 35.
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