Chapter 106: Voluntary, community and faith sectors

Chapter 106: Voluntary, community and faith sectors

Introduction

¶106.1 The evidence provided by local community leaders and representatives of the British Red Cross gave us a valuable insight into the assistance that they provided in the immediate aftermath of the fire. It is apparent that that assistance was required in order to fill a space which should have been occupied by RBKC.

¶106.2 We received 24 witness statements from individuals representing a range of local community organisations, charities and places of worship. Clare Richards, chief executive of the Clement James Centre, and Mark Simms, chief executive of the P3 Charity Group (of which the Rugby Portobello Trust is a part) gave evidence in person. Other organisations involved in the humanitarian response included the Al Manaar Muslim Cultural Heritage Centre, the Latymer Community Church, St Francis of Assisi Catholic Church, Notting Hill Methodist Church and the Harrow Club.

¶106.3 The evidence of witnesses from the local community painted a picture that portrays the very best of humanity. People from different backgrounds, faiths and communities came together in the face of grievous tragedy. They offered compassion, dignity and hope to the bereaved, survivors and the wider community. Their spontaneous response is a testament to the strength and resilience that characterises the North Kensington community. We pay special tribute to it.

A spontaneous community response

¶106.4 As a Category 1 responder RBKC was required to have regard to the voluntary sector organisations carrying out activities in the geographical area for which it was responsible.^19851985 The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005 {CAB00007003/13} Regulation 23; See also Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 14 – The Role of the Voluntary Sector {CAB00004534/3-5} paragraphs 14.3 - 14.17. The Emergency Preparedness guidance provides that:

"Category 1 responders must consider and discuss with relevant organisations the capabilities that those organisations within their area have to offer, and whether those capabilities should be built into response and recovery plans. Agreements reached should be captured in plans and signed off by all affected parties."^19861986 Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 14 – The Role of the Voluntary Sector {CAB00004534/4} paragraph 14.6.

¶106.5 Although the British Red Cross is neither a Category 1 nor Category 2 responder,^19871987 Adamson {BRC00000075/28-29} pages 28 - 29, paragraph 129. Michael Adamson, its chief executive, told us that it is recognised by the government as a voluntary society with a function auxiliary to that of the public authorities.^19881988 Adamson {BRC00000075/5} page 5, paragraph 24. That recognition establishes a relationship between the Red Cross and the government, such that, without being dependent on it, the Red Cross is required to have regard to the needs of the government when carrying out its primary responsibility to alleviate suffering in emergencies.^19891989 Adamson {BRC00000075/5} page 5, paragraph 24.

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¶106.6 RBKC had an established arrangement with the Red Cross but it failed to involve important community organisations in its contingency planning arrangements.^19901990 Simms {Day275/182:4-19}. It had no plans for the participation of community organisations in North Kensington and had not identified a function for any of them if an emergency occurred.^19911991 The Clement James Centre was on a list of centres in RBKC's Contingency Management Plan that would be opened in the event of an emergency to offer space but RBKC did not ask for it to be opened in response to the Grenfell Tower fire: Richards {CFV00000012/2} page 2, paragraph 5. Although RBKC had some limited engagement with larger voluntary organisations, it had not asked community leaders to become involved in a community resilience strategy, despite the willingness of many of them to take part.^19921992 Simms {Day275/182:10-14}; Richards {Day275/125:10-21}. This failure is particularly significant, given that local community organisations came to play a central part in the response to the fire.

¶106.7 RBKC also failed to engage with and make full use of those organisations after the fire had occurred.^19931993 Simms {Day275/182:20-23}. There was little or no consideration given to the value that local community organisations could provide in responding to the fire. They had an understanding of the history, character and diversity of the North Kensington community that larger voluntary organisations, such as the Red Cross, lacked.^19941994 Richards {Day275/169:1-8}. It was the existing relationships and trusted networks that enabled local community organisations to cater for the particular needs of those affected, and to do so in sensitive, informed and specific ways. Not only was RBKC unable to do that itself; it lacked the willingness and the skill to recruit the local community networks to help it.

¶106.8 As a result, the community response was entirely voluntary and self-generated.^19951995 Simms {Day275/182:20}-{Day275/183:2}; Richards {Day275/127:25}-{Day275/128:2}. In the early hours of 14 June 2017, community organisations opened their doors to provide shelter and sanctuary for those affected by the fire,^19961996 Sayed {CFV00000043/2} page 2, paragraph 7. despite the absence of any request from RBKC or the police. Community organisations were not aware of any co-ordinated response by the council;^19971997 Richards {CFV00000012/15} page 15, paragraph 104. nor were they asked to be part of one.^19981998 Richards {Day275/165:8-11}.

¶106.9 In the absence of any plan or official co-ordination, community organisations faced significant challenges in providing support to those affected. Community leaders were faced with hundreds of distressed people, not knowing whether emergency accommodation would be available for the coming night.^19991999 Richards {Day275/141:16-23}. Ms Richards from the Clement James Centre told us that she thought that, given the scale of the emergency, a team of people from the council would come to co-ordinate arrangements, but unfortunately that did not happen.^20002000 Richards {Day275/127:18-24}.

¶106.10 In the early hours of 14 June 2017 and throughout that day, community rest centres were packed with crowds of survivors, people searching for loved ones and shocked local residents evacuated from their homes.^20012001 Blanchflower {CFV00000045/3} page 3, paragraph 12. People could not obtain information about who had escaped from the tower, who was in hospital and who was still missing, which was particularly distressing.^20022002 Blanchflower {CFV00000045/3} page 3, paragraph 12. It was very difficult to know where to look for the missing or obtain reliable information to provide support to those in need.^20032003 Hisam Choucair {Day265/45:22}-{Day265/52:8}; Nabil Choucair {Day267/10:15}-{Day267/26:12}. Information was available only by word of mouth, but the situation was constantly changing.^20042004 Blanchflower {CFV00000045/3} page 3, paragraph 13. Despite expecting to be told what to do and to be a part of a co-ordinated plan, community leaders were left to support people with whatever resources they could muster.^20052005 Blanchflower {CFV00000045/7-8} pages 7 - 8, paragraph 28.

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¶106.11 Community organisations struggled to obtain information from official sources about what services were available.^20062006 Skinner {CFV00000002/7} page 7, paragraph 21. Organisations like the Clement James Centre, the Harrow Club and the Al Manaar Muslim Cultural Heritage Centre were trying to find out what was going on, without success.^20072007 Simms {Day275/210:2-6}. Mark Simms of the P3 charity told us that there had been no plan and that he had had no idea what the next day would bring, given that there was no communication from any official body about what to do.^20082008 Simms {CFV00000005/11} page 11, paragraph 48. He tried to contact the council BECC on 14 June 2017 but could not get hold of anyone by telephone or email.^20092009 Simms {Day275/185:18-20}. By the end of the day he still had not received any information from the council about the official response.^20102010 Simms {Day275/198:9-12}. Indeed, he said that even at the time he was giving evidence he was still waiting to find out what the longer term plan was.^20112011 Simms {Day275/198:25}-{Day275/199:1}. Day 275 was 10 May 2022.

¶106.12 Community leaders described the involvement of RBKC in the first few days as a "chaotic fog, in which little information was available".^20122012 Long {CFV00000010/6} page 6, paragraph 31. The absence of any overall co-ordination of the relief effort was regarded as astonishing.^20132013 Long {CFV00000010/6} page 6, paragraph 31. They said that the lack of information had compounded the distress for people in rest centres, with community leaders unable to provide any information or reassurance. The consequence was that people already facing so much stress were left to feel that nobody cared for them.^20142014 Richards {Day275/141:22-23}; Richards {Day275/164:4-14}. These are, of course, general impressions conveyed to us long after the event rather than recollections of particular circumstances, but they are consistent with other, more specific, evidence.

¶106.13 Community leaders told us that in the days following the fire local organisations providing a humanitarian response had received little support from RBKC, the government or the TMO. Three days after the fire, Abdurahman Sayed from the Al Manaar Muslim Cultural Heritage Centre told councillors that they were struggling to cope with the logistical demands of dispensing large volumes of donations, organising volunteers and providing support to those relying on their services. Despite a request for assistance, the Al Manaar Muslim Cultural Heritage Centre received no support from RBKC.^20152015 Sayed {CFV00000043/4} page 4, paragraph 17. Community leaders shared the frustration of those who felt that the council and the government were absent at a time where they were needed most. Any support that did come was often too little, too late.^20162016 Sayed {CFV00000043/8} page 8, paragraph 35; Sayed {CFV00000043/5} page 5, paragraph 22.

¶106.14 The experience of the community, voluntary and faith groups was that the authorities kept their distance and were slow to respond to the immediate needs of those affected by the fire. There was a clear need for an overall plan but instead, people were left to fend for themselves and not surprisingly they turned to the voluntary and faith sector and other organisations they trusted to fill the gap.^20172017 Blanchflower {CFV00000045/10} page 10, paragraph 41; Blanchflower {CFV00000045/3} page 3, paragraph 13.

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¶106.15 The following provides an indication of the support provided by some of the leading community organisations in what has been aptly described as a spontaneous outpouring of compassion.^20182018 Skinner {CFV00000002/1} page 1, paragraph 2.

Rugby Portobello Trust

¶106.16 The Rugby Portobello Trust provides support for young people in North Kensington and is located 400 yards from Grenfell Tower.^20192019 Simms {CFV00000005/1-2} pages 1 - 2, paragraphs 5 and 6. It suspended its normal services in order to assist survivors from June until October 2017. It supported about 210 people representing 165 households from Grenfell Tower and Grenfell Walk.^20202020 Simms {Day275/200:6-10}; {Day275/204:6-11}. It offered assistance of various kinds to survivors, including the provision of clothing, food, money, accommodation and medical assistance, as well as a pop-up pharmacy and temporary doctor's surgery.^20212021 Simms {Day275/199:7-16}. It also provided help with obtaining identification documents, access to bank accounts and technology.^20222022 Simms {Day275/185:21}-{Day275/186:6}; Simms {CFV00000005/18} page 18, paragraph 84. Subsequently, the Rugby Portobello Trust organised a scheme providing survivors with smartphones, laptops, televisions, kettles and microwaves.^20232023 Simms {Day275/199:21}-{Day275/200:4}. During the first week, it obtained about £80,000 in cash which it distributed to those in need.^20242024 Simms {Day275/186:11-16}. Later, at the request of the Charity Commission, it distributed payments in partnership with the National Zakat Foundation, a Muslim charity involved in the humanitarian response.^20252025 Simms {CFV00000005/14} page 14, paragraph 64. The Rugby Portobello Trust issued over 3,200 separate grants totalling more than £16.8 million from funds generated by public donations.^20262026 Simms {Day275/200:24}-{Day275/201:3}.

¶106.17 In its response to the disaster the Rugby Portobello Trust focused on the importance of dignity in providing humanitarian support.^20272027 Simms {Day275/188:1-16}. That entailed ensuring that survivors had access to money, rather than just donated goods, in order to give them the ability to regain an element of control over their own lives.^20282028 Simms {CFV00000005/8} page 8, paragraph 36; Simms {Day275/187:15}-{Day275/188:16}.

The Clement James Centre

¶106.18 The Clement James Centre is a local charity situated adjacent to the Lancaster West estate that supports the community through education, employment and wellbeing programmes.^20292029 Richards {CFV00000012/1} page 1, paragraph 3. In the immediate aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire, it provided food, distributed donations, provided access to information, collected prescriptions, obtained offers of accommodation which it allocated to those in need and created a list of those who were safe and missing.^20302030 Richards {Day275/129:3-15}; Richards {CFV00000012/2} page 2, paragraph 7. On 14 June 2017 the Clement James Centre was also involved in arranging emergency accommodation for people who had been displaced from the tower or surrounding blocks and had still not been told that they would be provided with accommodation.^20312031 Richards {Day275/145:1-9}.

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Al Manaar Muslim Cultural Heritage Centre

¶106.19 The Al Manaar Muslim Cultural Heritage Centre is a place of worship that also provides cultural education and outreach.^20322032 Sayed {CFV00000043/1} page 1, paragraph 2. Its response included the provision of food and water and the distribution of donations.^20332033 Sayed {CFV00000043/4} page 4, paragraph 13. As the fire occurred during Ramadan, the mosque was already catering for about 300 people every evening. That increased to about 600 people a day after the fire.^20342034 Sayed {CFV00000043/4} page 4, paragraph 12. It later helped to provide services such as counselling, art therapy and survivors' groups.^20352035 Sayed {CFV00000043/6} page 6, paragraph 27.

Other voluntary organisations

¶106.20 A number of other local community, voluntary and faith organisations also provided direct and immediate support. They included the Notting Hill Methodist Church, which provided a base for emergency relief in the first few days following the fire. It was particularly involved in the provision of clothes and toiletries to those from the Walkways and Grenfell Walk.^20362036 Long {CFV00000010/7} page 7, paragraph 34. The church helped those looking for missing loved ones to make posters appealing for information. The St Francis of Assisi catholic church offered a variety of support to those affected, including food and drink, spiritual and emotional support, practical assistance, such as mobile phone chargers, and the distribution of financial and other donations.^20372037 Skinner {CFV00000002/2-3} pages 2 - 3, paragraph 5. Local organisations sought to ensure that dignity, compassion^20382038 Richards {Day275/128:9-23}. and sensitivity to specific needs was at the centre of their response.

¶106.21 The Al Manaar Muslim Cultural Heritage Centre was well known and respected within the local Muslim community and provided support for those with specific needs in relation to prayer, clothes, food and observing Ramadan.^20392039 Sayed {CFV00000043/3} page 3, paragraph 9. That was particularly important, given that many of those affected were of the Muslim faith. Similarly, the Latymer Community Church provided a safe space, refreshments, and someone for people to talk to. A Muslim prayer room was set up within the church for those observing Ramadan. It started a memorial wall where people left messages and flowers and which became a focal point for the community.^20402040 Blanchflower {CFV00000045/4-5} pages 4 - 5, paragraph 17. Their actions acknowledged the importance of a humanitarian response that was sensitive to faith and culture and put that into action.

Official meetings

¶106.22 In the days and weeks that followed the fire, community leaders were involved in meetings with officials at various levels of government. An examination of those official meetings provide an insight into how the government was engaging with the community and a strong indication of the fundamental and pervasive problems that persisted in the humanitarian response, at least in the days after the fire.

¶106.23 The then Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Theresa May MP, attended the Clement James Centre on 16 June 2017 for an impromptu meeting.^20412041 Richards {Day275/152:21-25}. The purpose of the meeting was unclear, and the staff at the centre were given only 15 minutes' notice.^20422042 Richards {Day275/153:4-5}. The perception was that the Prime Minister was listening to what people had to say and gave everyone a chance to speak.^20432043 Richards {Day275/154:10-11}. However, not a great deal was achieved, not least because the meeting was cut short by the Prime Minister's security team due to crowds forming outside the church.^20442044 Richards {Day275/154:10-17}.

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¶106.24 A further meeting was arranged at 10 Downing Street on 17 June 2017 with the same people.^20452045 Richards {Day275/154:17-24}. Among the matters raised was the need for highly visible hubs^20462046 Notes from the meeting with Theresa May on 17 June 2017 {CFV00000041}. to be set up in the local area providing housing, legal support, counselling, police family liaison officers, financial support,^20472047 Richards {Day275/155:6-14}. psychological support and translators to ensure accessibility of information.^20482048 Richards {Day275/159:10}-{Day275/160:7}.

¶106.25 A particular complaint was that the people making the decisions were not communicating with those who were affected.^20492049 Richards {Day275/157:6-9}. London Gold, who had by then taken over leading the response, had not reached out to the community rest centres.^20502050 Richards {Day275/157:12-14}. There was a view amongst residents that people's experiences needed to be captured, which they suggested could be done through consulting a representative group of residents about their needs.^20512051 Richards {Day275/156:25}-{Day275/157:2}; Notes from the meeting with Theresa May on 17 June 2017 {CFV00000041}. However, nothing came of that suggestion.

¶106.26 A further meeting took place on 20 June 2017 with Hilary Patel from the London Gold team at which various people from the voluntary sector and council officers were present.^20522052 Richards {CFV00000012/23} page 23, paragraph 153. There was widespread dissatisfaction about the absence of further information or a commitment to resolve any of the problems that those affected were facing.^20532053 Richards {Day275/163:7-9}; Simms {Day275/202:16}-{Day275/203:3}; Simms {CFV00000005/13} page 13, paragraph 60. Mr Sayed of the Al Manaar Muslim Cultural Heritage Centre, who continued to be involved with official meetings in the days and weeks following the fire, felt that representatives were not properly prepared^20542054 Sayed {CFV00000043/5-6} pages 5 - 6, paragraph 23. to address the wishes of residents. Those affected were left with the sense that the council and the government simply did not care.^20552055 Sayed {CFV00000043/6} page 6, paragraphs 24 and 25.

¶106.27 Despite the fact that the community organisations were not designed to respond to an emergency, they played a central role in meeting the immediate needs of those affected by the fire.^20562056 Sayed {CFV00000043/8} page 8, paragraph 34. However, because of the failure of RBKC and the apparatus of London Resilience to act with the necessary speed, the Rugby Portobello Trust and other community organisations found themselves leading actors in the response to the fire.^20572057 Simms {Day275/214:4-8}.

¶106.28 Those directly affected spoke positively of the community's response.^20582058 Yousuf {IWS00001626/4} page 4, paragraph 25; Razza {IWS00001607/8-9} pages 8 - 9, paragraph 41; Sobieszczak {IWS00001562/12} page 12, paragraph 54. Mohammed Rasoul said, "The public's response in the tragedy was something I'll never forget for the rest of my life. To me, that represented what humanity should strive for… there were no barriers…everyone was proud of their identity, of their diversity…it wasn't a barrier…in that moment you had something that we could all strive for in this society [that] we should be proud of."^20592059 Rasoul {Day265/165:3-22}.

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