Chapter 21: The review of the Reynobond certificate

The BBA's review processes: an overview

¶21.1 Once the BBA certificate of 14 January 2008 relating to Reynobond had been issued, it became subject to the scrutiny processes in the contract between Arconic and the BBA designed to ensure its continued validity.²⁷⁹²⁷⁹ {BBA00008042/3} clause 6.

¶21.2 Although its processes changed over time, the BBA consistently monitored certificates by means of desk-based reviews carried out by Project Managers and factory inspections carried out by Technical Assessors. A desk-based review, which was carried out at least once every three years,²⁸⁰²⁸⁰ Albon {BBA00000158/8} page 8, paragraph 29. involved checking that statements in the certificate continued to be valid, ensuring that the product being sold by the manufacturer continued to be the one assessed and reviewing the certificate holder's public statements about BBA certification, including how it used the BBA logo.²⁸¹²⁸¹ Amoroso {BBA00010797/3} page 3, paragraphs 14-15; Amoroso {Day106/25:15}-{Day106/26:10}; Nkomo {BBA00010783/5} page 5, paragraph 12. Factory inspections involved inspecting and assessing factory production against a quality plan agreed with the manufacturer which set out what should be assessed in continuing surveillance,²⁸²²⁸² O'Neill {BBA00010789/3-4} pages 3-4 paragraphs 8-13; Albon {BBA00000158/8} page 8, paragraph 27; Amoroso {BBA00010797/11} page 11, paragraph 57. usually at six month intervals.²⁸³²⁸³ Haynes {BBA00010784/7} page 7, paragraph 29.

¶21.3 Typically a quality plan would require the Technical Assessor to examine the manufacturing process, including checking that the raw products, suppliers and methods of production were as had been originally described by the manufacturer and examining how it maintained quality in production.²⁸⁴²⁸⁴ {BBA00010870}. The process was co-ordinated with the desk-based reviews conducted by Project Managers, who agreed the quality plans with the certificate holders in advance of the inspections and considered the Technical Assessors' reports against them.²⁸⁵²⁸⁵ O'Neill {BBA00010789/4-5} pages 4-5, paragraphs 17, 20 and 22. However, the desk-based review and factory inspection were separate and distinct activities on the BBA's part, aimed at reviewing different aspects of certification. In particular, it was no part of a Technical Assessor's role to review fire performance testing data or certification, which was the responsibility of the Project Manager. In turn, it was for the certificate-holder to provide any new technical performance information to the Project Manager in accordance with the contract.²⁸⁶²⁸⁶ {BBA00010790}; Amoroso {Day106/37:1-6}. A Technical Assessor could not review the history of a product's fire performance testing in the limited time available for an inspection and in any event could not reasonably be expected to have the skill or experience required for that task.

¶21.4 From time to time Arconic entered into contracts with the BBA for the review and extension of the certificate. In each case it was a term of the contract that Arconic would provide the BBA with any test data available in relation to the product and would notify it of any new information relating to Reynobond and its performance that came into its possession.²⁸⁷²⁸⁷ The 2010 review contract referred to the 2007 terms {BBA00008044/11}; the 2014 reissue contract did not alter the original terms {BBA00010889}; the 2016 technical reissue contract provided for materially the same obligations of disclosure on Arconic {MET00053158_P18/141-151} clause 10.

The Agreement with CSTB

¶21.5 The initial assessment of Reynobond panels was based on data obtained from CSTB and the BBA therefore felt able to dispense with a quality plan and an initial factory inspection and to rely on CSTB's continuing monitoring of Arconic's quality standards. On 17 May 2007, Hamo Gregorian asked CSTB to confirm that it had been inspecting Arconic and, if so, whether it was satisfied that appropriate quality control had been maintained.²⁸⁸²⁸⁸ {BBA00008042/123}. He also asked CSTB to inform the BBA if it identified any major failures to comply with production processes affecting quality, or if it discontinued its visits. On 21 May 2007, Laurent Plagnol of CSTB agreed that it would identify any major failures to comply with processes affecting quality non-compliances for the BBA, although he did not directly answer Mr Gregorian's question whether quality control had previously been satisfactorily maintained.²⁸⁹²⁸⁹ {BBA00008042/123}. Mr Gregorian recorded that agreement on 21 April 2008.²⁹⁰²⁹⁰ {BBA00008042/121}. CSTB was not asked to provide the BBA with any testing information it held relating to the Reynobond product.

Review project 2011

¶21.6 At the end of 2010, the BBA and Arconic agreed a contract for the triennial review of the Reynobond certificate,²⁹¹²⁹¹ {BBA00008044/11}. which was conducted over the next few months by Project Manager Alpheo Mlotha.²⁹²²⁹² Project number S146895; Technical File: {BBA00008044}; Signed off by Review Report on 24 June 2011 {BBA00010810}.

¶21.7 On 11 February 2011, Mr Mlotha wrote to Arconic seeking information for the purposes of the review,²⁹³²⁹³ {BBA00008044/35}. including a list of customers, current technical literature and a letter from CSTB either confirming that there were no changes in the raw materials, manufacturing process or quality control procedure, or, if there had been, stating what those changes were.

¶21.8 Arconic's Quality Manager, Brigitte Gross responded on 11 April 2011 with the information requested (and no more),²⁹⁴²⁹⁴ {BBA00008044/33}. including a certificate from CSTB confirming that the technical properties of Reynobond 55 complied with the CSTB certification.²⁹⁵²⁹⁵ {BBA00008044/79-91}. Mr Mlotha was apparently satisfied that there had been no changes in the method of production, since he required only a few minor changes to be made to the text of the certificate at the next issue. Accordingly, the review project was closed on 24 June 2011 with the next review scheduled to commence by 15 January 2014.²⁹⁶²⁹⁶ {BBA00010810}.

Arconic Reynobond PE testing in 2011

¶21.9 On 9 February 2011, at almost exactly the same time as Mr Mlotha made his request for documents, CSTB issued a new EN 13501 classification report for grey Reynobond PE in rivet form based on the test which had been carried out in the previous June (Test RA11‑0032).²⁹⁷²⁹⁷ {ARC00000537}; {ARC00000383}; See Chapter 20. CSTB certified the fire performance as being Bs1, d0, which was better than that reported in the BBA certificate. Arconic did not give that information to the BBA, even though it was apparently an improvement, despite the fact that it was contractually obliged to do so.

¶21.10 Shortly after Mr Mlotha had completed his review in 2011, CSTB conducted further testing on Reynobond PE 55 in cassette form in accordance with European methods.²⁹⁸²⁹⁸ {ARC00000538}. On 12 October 2011, it issued certificate RA11-0244 classifying Reynobond in cassette form as Euroclass E.²⁹⁹²⁹⁹ {ARC00000538}; {ARC00000386}; See Chapter 20. However, Arconic did not disclose the certificate or the information it contained to the BBA. At that point, Arconic could have been in no doubt that Reynobond 55 PE in cassette form performed very badly in a fire and that the BBA certificate made no reference to that important information. Even if Arconic did not think that it was bound to disclose that information to the BBA immediately (as it was), it could have been in no doubt that it would have to disclose it at the next review in 2013.

Review project: 2013-2015

¶21.11 After the 2011 review, the BBA decided that it would no longer rely on foreign bodies (like CSTB) to conduct inspections but would use its own Technical Assessors to carry out that task. From that time until September 2017, Technical Assessor Shaun O'Neill carried out the inspection of Arconic's factory at Merxheim.³⁰⁰³⁰⁰ O'Neill {BBA00010789/7} page 7, paragraph 29.

Maria Barbeito's attempts to review the certificate – October 2013-September 2014

¶21.12 In October 2013, BBA Project Manager Maria Barbeito began the second triennial review of the BBA certificate for Reynobond.³⁰¹³⁰¹ {BBA00010741}. On 8 October 2013 she wrote to Claude Schmidt at Arconic attaching a draft quality plan for Arconic's agreement. That was the first quality plan proposed for the new certificate. In that letter she asked for documents relating to her review and asked Arconic for written confirmation that there had been no changes in the design, specification, context of use or other details that would invalidate the existing certificate, or if there had, to specify any changes.³⁰²³⁰² See her email dated 9 October 2013 {BBA00008089} attaching the letter {BBA00008090} and the draft quality plan {BBA00008091}. At the time it was customary for the BBA to use that form of words when making requests of that kind.³⁰³³⁰³ Amoroso {Day106/65:11-22}; Albon {Day110/35:1-8}.

¶21.13 Between 21 October 2013 and 7 May 2014 Ms Barbeito sent emails to Arconic on six occasions³⁰⁴³⁰⁴ {BBA00008085} attaching {BBA00008086} and {BBA00008087}; forwarded to Claude Wehrle {BBA00008092/1-2}; {BBA00008075} attaching {BBA00008076} and {BBA00008077}; {BBA00008095} attaching {BBA00008096} and {BBA00008097}; {BBA00008971}. seeking a response; she also attempted to telephone Arconic at least twice, but without success.³⁰⁵³⁰⁵ {BBA00008075}; {BBA00008663}. In an email to a colleague in July 2014, she described her frustration at Arconic's lack of response, saying that Claude Wehrle was very nice on the telephone but never sent any information.³⁰⁶³⁰⁶ {BBA00008663}. The BBA received no substantial response whatever from anyone at Arconic during that period.

¶21.14 On 18 July 2014, Ms Barbeito managed to speak to Claude Wehrle on the telephone and then sent him an email in which she repeated her request for documents, including written confirmation that there had been no material changes that would invalidate the certificate.³⁰⁷³⁰⁷ {BBA00008954} attaching {BBA00008955}. She and Mr Wehrle also discussed arranging a visit to Arconic's factory at Merxheim. Shaun O'Neill carried out the BBA's first inspection of the Merxheim factory on 10 September 2014. In his report he recorded that Claude Wehrle had told him that he had tried to communicate with the BBA several times to discuss the review but that his messages had gone unanswered and that he would like the Project Manager to contact him as soon as possible.³⁰⁸³⁰⁸ {BBA00010873/2}. However, the documentary record and recollections of other witnesses does not support Mr Wehrle's assertion.

¶21.15 In the period when Ms Barbeito was attempting to obtain a satisfactory response from Arconic, several changes in the classification of Reynobond 55 PE occurred, as we have described in Chapter 20. From 31 January 2014 the product in both cassette and riveted form had been classified E,³⁰⁹³⁰⁹ {MET00053158_P02/59}; {MET00053158_P04/135-138}. but by 4 December 2014, the two forms were again classified differently, with the cassette form retaining an E classification,³¹⁰³¹⁰ {MET00053158_P02/119-124}; {ARC00000395}; See Chapter 20. and the riveted form classified as C-s2, d0.³¹¹³¹¹ {MET00053158_P05/155-163}; {ARC00000397}; See Chapter 20.

¶21.16 Each one of those changes was important to the BBA's work on renewing the validity of the Reynobond certificate, but Arconic did not tell the BBA about them or attempt to discuss with it the amendment or withdrawal of the certificate.

Valentina Amoroso's review: September 2014-January 2015

¶21.17 Maria Barbeito then left the BBA, and at the end of September 2014 Valentina Amoroso joined the organisation.³¹²³¹² Amoroso {BBA00010797/2} page 2, paragraph 6. Ms Amoroso had a degree in materials engineering³¹³³¹³ Amoroso {BBA00010797/2} page 2, paragraph 5. but no experience or knowledge of cladding materials or of building regulations relating to fire.³¹⁴³¹⁴ Amoroso {Day106/10:15}-{Day106/11:2}. She started working on projects relating to cladding when she was transferred to the engineering department in November 2014 and was initially assigned to the review of existing certificates, which was thought to be simpler than a full technical assessment and more suitable for a newcomer.³¹⁵³¹⁵ Amoroso {BBA00010797/2} page 2, paragraph 7. One of the first projects she undertook was the resumption of work on the triennial review of Arconic's Reynobond 55 certificate.

¶21.18 Ms Amoroso's training in the skills required to assess cladding products and to understand fire performance was largely, if not completely, informal and self-directed. She read the applicable standards, asked questions of her seniors in the BBA, including those with greater expertise in fire performance, and attended some conferences and full-scale fire tests of facades.³¹⁶³¹⁶ Amoroso {Day106/10:6-11}; {Day106/13:3}-{Day106/14:4}; {Day106/14:22-25}. At one external event, she met Stephen Howard of BRE and thereafter she occasionally asked for his opinion on matters she did not understand.³¹⁷³¹⁷ Amoroso {Day106/17:19}-{Day106/18:8}. Ms Amoroso may have taken the initiative in learning about a new area of activity, but the BBA should not have asked her to conduct even a certificate review without any training in the knowledge and skills required for understanding cladding technology or fire performance.

¶21.19 One of the people to whom Ms Amoroso directed questions internally was Prayer Nkomo.³¹⁸³¹⁸ Amoroso {Day106/17:4-11}. He was a civil engineer³¹⁹³¹⁹ Nkomo {BBA00010783/2} page 2, paragraphs 4-5. who had worked at the BBA since November 2010 as a Project Manager. By the time of the 2013-2015 review he had developed some expertise in cladding technology but not in fire performance,³²⁰³²⁰ Nkomo {Day107/12:15-19}; {Day107/72:5-22}; Amoroso {Day106/17:4-11}. and it was only on the former that he assisted Ms Amoroso. In early January 2015, shortly after Ms Amoroso had begun working on cladding products, Mr Nkomo was promoted to the role of Team Manager and Ms Amoroso reported to him.³²¹³²¹ Nkomo {BBA00010783/2} page 2, paragraph 6.

¶21.20 Between the time of the first assessment of Reynobond PE and the date of the Grenfell Tower fire no one at the BBA had expertise in the reaction of materials to fire.³²²³²² Albon {Day109/88:22}-{Day109/89:8}; {BBA00010486} paragraph 3. If a question about fire performance arose, Mr Nkomo might approach Jon Denyer or John Albon,³²³³²³ Nkomo {Day107/19:14-18}; {Day107/102:8-19}. who by 2012 had developed some experience in the field but who were not trained experts.³²⁴³²⁴ Albon {Day109/88:17-22}. Mr Nkomo was aware that if he needed external assistance, he could ask for the matter to be referred to Exova,³²⁵³²⁵ Nkomo {Day107/18:6-10}; {Day107/18:23}-{Day107/19:2}. with which the BBA had made formal arrangements for advice.³²⁶³²⁶ Albon {Day109/91:7-20}; {Day109/106:17}-{Day109/107:12}; {BBA00010762/4}. However, Mr Nkomo did not routinely seek assistance and would only ask for help if he was unsure of a point relating to fire performance.³²⁷³²⁷ Nkomo {Day107/20:6-10}; {Day107/20:15}-{Day107/21:14}.

¶21.21 At Ms Amoroso's request³²⁸³²⁸ {BBA00010550/3}. Mr Nkomo contacted Claude Wehrle on 2 December 2014. Mr Nkomo was very clear in his subsequent email to Mr Wehrle that information provided to the Technical Assessor in the course of a factory visit was no substitute for responding to the Project Manager's request.³²⁹³²⁹ {MET00053158_P18/4}. Shortly after, Ms Amoroso again asked Arconic to provide written confirmation that there were no changes that would invalidate the certificate.³³⁰³³⁰ {BBA00008098}. Mr Nkomo's and Ms Amoroso's emails to Mr Wehrle arrived two days before CSTB issued new classification certificates for Reynobond 55 PE, in which the riveted form was classified C, and the cassette form E. Mr Wehrle must have been aware of those classifications at the time when Mr Nkomo and Ms Amoroso were pressing him for information.

¶21.22 Valentina Amoroso also noticed that the Reynobond certificate files contained no regular surveillance reports from CSTB about factory visits nor any arrangements for continued monitoring,³³¹³³¹ Amoroso {BBA00010797/10} page 10, paragraph 51; {BBA00008112}. although it did contain a report prepared by Shaun O'Neill after his review visit in September 2014. The BBA decided that it should make arrangements for continued monitoring.

¶21.23 At that point the BBA had received no information about the production of Reynobond since 2007 save for a report in 2011 and Mr O'Neill's report in September 2014. That seven-year gap in the BBA's information was significant.³³²³³² Amoroso {Day106/67:1-7}. In addition, no quality plan had been agreed at the time of the initial assessment, so the BBA did not have a yardstick by which to measure whether production had changed or the product was the same as that initially assessed. Nonetheless, it was content to proceed with renewing the certificate, provided a quality plan and continuing monitoring could be agreed with Arconic.

¶21.24 On 18 December 2014, Valentina Amoroso sent a request for information to Arconic's quality representative, Lilia Koscuk.³³³³³³ {BBA00008079/3-4}. In early January 2015 Ms Koscuk replied, saying that she agreed the proposed quality plan, but failed to provide the information that the BBA had requested for the purposes of the review.³³⁴³³⁴ {BBA00008079/3}. Ms Amoroso repeated her request on 7 January 2015 and again on 12 January 2015, when she imposed a deadline of 20 January 2015 for a response.³³⁵³³⁵ {BBA00008079/2-3}. Ms Koscuk responded by referring Ms Amoroso to various people at Arconic whom the BBA already knew, including Mr Wehrle.³³⁶³³⁶ {BBA00008079/1-2}. Her approach was entirely unhelpful, bordering on the obstructive.

¶21.25 On 22 January 2015 the BBA decided at a senior level³³⁷³³⁷ Nkomo {Day107/48:1-10}; Albon {Day110:39:1-7}. to complete the review with the information Ms Amoroso already had.³³⁸³³⁸ {BBA00008079/1}. The decision is inexplicable. The BBA had said that the information it was seeking from Arconic was essential to complete the review, as indeed it was. The BBA had received no confirmation of the performance of the Reynobond product from Arconic in the previous seven years and Arconic's failure to provide such information when asked was exceptional and extreme.³³⁹³³⁹ Amoroso {Day106/60:2-9}; {Day106/74:8-10}; Nkomo {Day107/43:23}-{Day107/44:3}; Albon {Day110/35:25}-{Day110/36:20}. The BBA should have realised that it was a case requiring particular attention rather than summary completion.

¶21.26 The BBA could and should have threatened to suspend Arconic's BBA certificate given its lack of response³⁴⁰³⁴⁰ See clause 13(a) of the BBA's standard terms {BBA00008042/3} clause 13(a). and should have done so if the information it required was not provided.³⁴¹³⁴¹ Albon {Day110/56:23}-{Day110/57:4}. However, it does not appear that such a step was ever considered, despite Arconic's wholesale lack of co-operation. Indeed, we were told that it was not the BBA's practice at the time to suspend certificates for a failure to respond to requests for information.³⁴²³⁴² Albon {Day110/56:23}-{Day110/57:4}. We consider that to be an unsafe and unsatisfactory position, but as a result the BBA completed the review using only publicly available information, such as the information available on Arconic's website, published technical datasheets and marketing brochures.³⁴³³⁴³ Amoroso {Day106/76:14-24}.

¶21.27 There is evidence that summaries of results were available in the CSTB's web database³⁴⁴³⁴⁴ {MET00053158_P02/62}; Wehrle {MET00053190/21} page 21, paragraph 70. and Ms Amoroso said that in January 2015 she would have referred to the certification available on the CTSB's website.³⁴⁵³⁴⁵ Amoroso {Day160/77:14-18}. Had she looked at those summaries she would, or at least should, have noticed the Cs-2, d0 and E classifications and questioned the contents of the BBA certificate. However, for whatever reason, that did not happen. In any event, according to Mr Nkomo, BBA did not consider it part of its responsibility on a review to look for fire testing data on laboratories' websites because the customer was obliged to provide information of that kind.³⁴⁶³⁴⁶ Nkomo {Day107/51:7}-{Day107/52:4}. That was not an unreasonable stance to take, but it should have been supported by a refusal to renew the certificate if the customer failed to provide information that was available to it.

¶21.28 The decision to close the review was made by Mr Nkomo to whom the matter was referred Ms Amoroso and probably also in discussion with their senior manager, the Head of Approvals.³⁴⁷³⁴⁷ Nkomo {Day107/47:13}-{Day107/48:25}; {Day107/49:12-19}; Amoroso {BBA00010797/12} page 12, paragraph 63; Amoroso {Day106/78:13}-{Day106/79:6}; Albon {Day110 /39:1-7}. Mr Nkomo told us that it was common for reviews to be closed despite a failure by the certificate holder to provide information, although that was not BBA policy nor encapsulated in any formal instruction.³⁴⁸³⁴⁸ Nkomo {Day107/54:23}-{Day107/55:14}; Albon {Day110/45:5-25}; Moore {Day108/7:14-21}.

¶21.29 We have seen no record of why this particular review was closed. Both Mr Nkomo and Ms Amoroso thought that it had probably been because it had become delayed,³⁴⁹³⁴⁹ Nkomo {Day107/57:14-17}; Amoroso {Day106/86:14-16}. and Mr Nkomo agreed there had been a backlog of reviews at the time.³⁵⁰³⁵⁰ Nkomo {Day107/57:21}-{Day107/58:9}; {BBA00008073}. A further reason appears to have been that the BBA was concentrating on agreeing a quality plan and continuing monitoring. Once that had been achieved, the BBA expected any changes in the product to be reported.³⁵¹³⁵¹ Amoroso {BBA00010797/12} page 12, paragraph 64; Amoroso {Day106/78:14-21}; {Day106/79:17-21}; {Day106/83:19}-{Day106 /84:16}. However, neither of those was a good reason for closing the review.

¶21.30 The BBA was under the impression that a product's fire performance classification would not change as long as the product itself or the manufacturing process did not change. For that reason, it thought there was no reason to check for new testing reports, but that ignored the fact that the European classification certificates said on their face that they expired five years from the date of issue. No one at the BBA working on the review of the certificate had regard to the fact that Arconic would need to have the product tested again and would or should have new fire performance information available. That would have been plain if anyone had considered the fire test data on which the initial assessment had been based.³⁵²³⁵² Amoroso {Day106/99:5-8}; {Day106/99:21-25}; {Day106/100:10-18}. Ms Amoroso did not consider that data because the process did not require her to do so.³⁵³³⁵³ Nkomo {Day107/66:4-5}; Albon {BBA00000158/16} page 16, paragraph 66; Albon {Day109/151:24}-{Day109/152:19}. That was an obvious flaw in the BBA's review process.

Arconic's submissions on the review

¶21.31 In an attempt to avoid criticism of its failure to provide information to the BBA Arconic argued that there had been no need for it to provide the BBA with any further information after it had disclosed Test 5A because, among other things, the certificate stated only that Reynobond PE panels were capable of achieving Euroclass B, depending on the configuration of the system in which they were tested.³⁵⁴³⁵⁴ Arconic Module 2 closing submissions {ARC00000770/30} page 30, paragraph 143. It said that the potential variations in the European testing regime made it possible for a single product to have more than one classification.³⁵⁵³⁵⁵ Arconic Module 2 closing submissions {ARC00000770/14} page 14, paragraphs 60-62; Arconic Module 6 closing submissions {ARC00000794/28} page 28, paragraph 83. Arconic also maintained that it never claimed that the panels would achieve Euroclass B in all circumstances.³⁵⁶³⁵⁶ Arconic Module 6 closing submissions {ARC00000794/29} page 29, paragraph 88.

¶21.32 In our view Arconic's arguments were wholly unrealistic. They ignored the terms of its contract with the BBA, which required it to provide any test data already available³⁵⁷³⁵⁷ {BBA00008042/3} clause 7(a). and immediately to notify the BBA of any change in the particulars supplied and of any new or additional information concerning the product or its suitability for use.³⁵⁸³⁵⁸ {BBA00008042/3} clause 7(g). The performance of Reynobond PE in cassette form was information available to Arconic which was highly relevant to its use, as it must have realised. If the BBA had been informed of it at any time before the completion of the review in January 2015 there can be little doubt that it would have amended the certificate to reflect such important information.³⁵⁹³⁵⁹ Amoroso {Day106/109:6-15}; Albon {BBA00000158/8} page 8, paragraph 27. Nor was it appropriate for Arconic to rely on CSTB giving the data to the BBA.³⁶⁰³⁶⁰ Arconic Module 2 closing submissions {ARC00000770/30} page 30, paragraph 142. Arconic's obligation was clear.

¶21.33 Furthermore, Arconic's submissions demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of the function of a BBA certificate. It was not, as Arconic appeared to suggest, to record the best performance that a product was capable of achieving. Its purpose was and is to provide construction professionals with independent and objective information about the nature and performance of products which can be relied on as complete and trustworthy. Those who relied on BBA certificates were entitled to expect that the description of the product concerned was complete and accurate, including any variation in performance when used in different circumstances.

¶21.34 Arconic also said that the Euroclass B classification was still valid at the time of the sale of Reynobond 55 PE for use on the Grenfell Tower refurbishment in March 2015³⁶¹³⁶¹ Derrendinger {MET00053191/37} page 37, paragraph 107. and that therefore the BBA certificate was not incorrect.³⁶²³⁶² Arconic Module 6 closing submissions {ARC00000794/29-30} page 29-30, paragraphs 83-87. It argued that when at the end of 2014 Reynobond PE 55 in riveted and cassette forms returned to being separately classified (C-s2, d0 and E respectively), they ceased to be classified E.³⁶³³⁶³ {MET00053158_P02/119-124}; {ARC00000395}; See Chapter 20. Arconic argued that, in effect, the classification in 2011 of Reynobond 55 PE in rivet form as Bs-1, d0 became effective once again and, being valid for 5 years, remained effective until February 2016. The effect of that argument is that there were two classifications for Reynobond 55 PE in rivet form in effect at the same time, one Euroclass B and one Euroclass C. That is unlikely, to say the least, and there is no evidence that that was its intention.

¶21.35 The obvious flaw in the argument is that there is no proper basis on which to read certificate RA13-0333 issue 2 dated 4 December 2014 as reinstating the result of the test carried out in 2011. The only sensible way of interpreting what occurred is that Arconic decided for a time not to rely on the Euroclass B classification and to consider all Reynobond 55 PE (whether in riveted or cassette form) to be Class E. It then decided to classify them separately again, but with the riveted form being Class C rather than B. That accords with the recollection of Mr Wehrle.³⁶⁴³⁶⁴ Wehrle {MET00053190/20-21} pages 20-21, paragraphs 68-70.

¶21.36 In any event, Arconic's argument applies only to Reynobond 55 PE in its riveted form. It is therefore completely irrelevant to the material supplied for use on Grenfell Tower in cassette form.

¶21.37 In any event, on 23 April 2014, when it sent the BBA certificate to those involved in the refurbishment to support the sale of Reynobond 55 PE for use on Grenfell Tower,³⁶⁵³⁶⁵ {CEP000000281}. Arconic itself considered the correct classification of the product in either form to be Class E. On any view, the BBA certificate was at that time inaccurate. The reality is that Arconic knew that Reynobond 55 PE in cassette form was Class E and that it had been consistently classified as such since 2011. However, it did not tell the BBA, nor anyone involved in the Grenfell Tower refurbishment and it appears that only one UK supplier was ever told about the true position.³⁶⁶³⁶⁶ Gwenaelle Derrendinger provided certificates showing that Reynobond 55 PE cassettes had achieved European Class E to Taylor Maxwell, a UK supplier, on 3 February 2014 {MET00053173/91} and 9 March 2015 {MET00053173/135}. On the latter occasion the certificate was sent following a request from Deborah French who by that time had left Arconic and joined Taylor Maxwell.

Reissue contract 2015

¶21.38 The BBA's closing report for the 2013-2015 review was issued on 10 April 2015. It stated that the certificate had to be reissued so that the text could be revised.³⁶⁷³⁶⁷ {BBA00008135}. The report also recommended that Arconic should check that there was no contradiction between the technical information that it published and that contained in the certificate.³⁶⁸³⁶⁸ {BBA00008135/6}. The BBA offered Arconic a contract for this work,³⁶⁹³⁶⁹ {BBA00010889}; {MET00053158_P18/31}. which Arconic accepted,³⁷⁰³⁷⁰ {MET00053158_P18/41}; {MET00053158_P18/38}. but for reasons which are unrecorded the BBA did not reissue the certificate.

¶21.39 None of the documentation closing out the review or generated when the contract for the reissue was offered referred to the fact that there had been any difficulty obtaining current information from Arconic and that a decision had been taken to rely solely on publicly available information. By the end of 2015, the BBA had introduced new documentary procedures under which information of that kind was recorded for the benefit of future reviewers. However, those procedures came too late to affect the 2015 review relating to Reynobond 55 PE.³⁷¹³⁷¹ Nkomo {Day107/67:9}-{Day107/68:3}.

Review project 2016

¶21.40 The next triennial review of the BBA certificate for Reynobond began on 12 October 2016 and was again carried out by Valentina Amoroso.³⁷²³⁷² {BBA00010742}. That was after the certificate of practical completion had been issued for Grenfell Tower and therefore too late to make any difference to that building. It is nonetheless relevant to how Arconic and the BBA continued to communicate and conduct themselves. This time, Ms Amoroso specifically asked for confirmation that no changes had been made to raw materials, manufacturing processes or quality control procedures.³⁷³³⁷³ {BBA00011051/5-6}. That was the standard form of request used by BBA Project Managers at the time³⁷⁴³⁷⁴ Amoroso {Day106/134:10-12}. and Ms Amoroso did not think it necessary to ask for a broader range of information.³⁷⁵³⁷⁵ Amoroso {Day106/137:5-24}.

¶21.41 Ms Amoroso corresponded with Nicholas Remy, Claude Wehrle's junior colleague in Arconic's Technical Sales Support team, who asked for clarification of precisely what documents the BBA wanted.³⁷⁶³⁷⁶ {BBA00011051/1-5}. On 24 October 2016, he provided the documents Ms Amoroso had asked for, namely, technical datasheets, commercial brochures, installation manuals and EU marking data.³⁷⁷³⁷⁷ {BBA00011051/1}. Before doing so, however, he wrote to Mr Wehrle on 18 October 2016 passing on part of Ms Amoroso's request.³⁷⁸³⁷⁸ {MET00053158_P18/61}. He said he felt as though he was dealing with something that was not clear cut and that what the BBA was coming to review had been "completely modified without them knowing anything about it". In response Mr Wehrle assured Mr Remy that they would talk about it to alleviate any bad impression that Mr Remy had.³⁷⁹³⁷⁹ {MET00053158_P18/61}. We do not know what exactly worried Mr Remy, but as far as we can tell, Arconic did not make any further information available to the BBA beyond complying strictly with Ms Amoroso's request.

¶21.42 During this review, Ms Amoroso came to the firm conclusion that references to the product in cassette form should not be included in the certificate because Arconic did not manufacture cassettes or control their fabrication by others.³⁸⁰³⁸⁰ Amoroso {Day106/150:15-19}; {Day106/151:12-15}; {Day106/153:16-20}; {BBA00011057}. However, she did not see any difficulty in retaining references to the product in riveted form, although that too required a further process of cutting to size and shape and drilling to be undertaken after the product had left the factory. She did not consider the wider implications of her conclusion so far as fire performance was concerned.

¶21.43 By late 2016, some at the BBA had become aware of cladding fires that had occurred abroad.³⁸¹³⁸¹ Nkomo {Day107/97:18-22}. As a result, the BBA's newly formed Technical Excellence team decided that statements about height restrictions should be added to certificates for cladding products, particularly ACM panels.³⁸²³⁸² Nkomo {Day107/96:10-15}. There was also a view at the BBA at that time that the use of the word "filler" in clause 12.7 of Approved Document B was ambiguous and that the word "etc." potentially broadened the ambit of that clause so that the core of an ACM product needed to be of limited combustibility to fall within it.³⁸³³⁸³ Albon {BBA00010723/36-37} pages 36-37, paragraphs 149-152. This is a subject examined in detail in Part 2 of this report. The BBA decided that holders of certificates for ACM products should either show that the core of the product was of limited combustibility, or that the panels achieved Euroclass A1 or A2, or that the cladding system when tested as a whole in accordance with BS 8414 could be shown to comply with the criteria in BR 135. The BBA decided that unless those statements could be included certificates for such products should state that they should not be used on buildings over 18 metres in height.³⁸⁴³⁸⁴ Amoroso {BBA00010797/16-17} pages 16-17, paragraphs 88-90; Amoroso {Day106/167:4-23}. Those statements were to be added at the next re-issue of each certificate relating to an ACM product.³⁸⁵³⁸⁵ Amoroso {BBA00010797/17} page 17, paragraph 91.

¶21.44 We are surprised that if the BBA had decided to add a statement to all certificates relating to cladding products for safety reasons, it did not take more urgent steps to revise those already in existence. Since the BBA did not publicise the change, a person relying on a certificate would not have known about the change in policy.³⁸⁶³⁸⁶ Amoroso {BBA00010797/16} page 16, paragraph 86; Amoroso {Day106/172:2-11}.

¶21.45 In February 2015, the BBA began using review checklists as part of the process leading to the completion of reviews.³⁸⁷³⁸⁷ Nkomo {Day107/68:13-20}; Nkomo {BBA00010783/5} page 5, paragraph 12e. The review checklist relating to the 2016 review of the Reynobond certificate indicated that it needed to be reissued for technical reasons, that references to the cassette form of the product should be removed, that statements should be added restricting the height at which it was suitable for use and that the wording should be refreshed generally.³⁸⁸³⁸⁸ {BBA00011085}.

Technical Reissue: 2016-2017

¶21.46 Valentina Amoroso began work on the technical reissue of the certificate in November 2016.³⁸⁹³⁸⁹ {MET00053158_P18/144-151}. The work was in progress at the time of the Grenfell Tower fire.³⁹⁰³⁹⁰ {MET00053158_P18/157-164}.

¶21.47 Almost immediately after the fire the BBA wrote to Arconic about its Reynobond certification.³⁹¹³⁹¹ {BBA00010769/6}; {MET00053158_P18/174-180}; {MET00053158_P18/181-182}. It briefly suspended the certificate due to Arconic's failure to respond,³⁹²³⁹² {BBA00010428}; {BBA00010429}. but Arconic wrote on 17 July 2017 advising that it had stopped selling Reynobond 55 PE for use on high-rise buildings and asking for the certificate to be maintained.³⁹³³⁹³ {MET00053158_P18/193-194}. The BBA was satisfied that it could continue to certify the product.³⁹⁴³⁹⁴ Moore {BBA00000159/4} page 4, paragraph 8.

¶21.48 On 21 July 2017, the BBA sent Arconic a draft of a revised certificate which stated that the panels were available in two grades, denoted "ST" and "FR". ("ST" was formerly denoted "PE" and contained an unmodified polyethylene core.)³⁹⁵³⁹⁵ {BBA00008221/3} clause 1.2 It also stated in clause 1.4 that the flat panels could be formed into cassettes, but that the manufacturing and use and fixing of cassettes were not covered by the certificate. Fire performance information was presented in a table which recorded that the FR version was classed B-s1, d0 and the ST version (i.e., the version with an unmodified polyethylene core) was classed B-s2, d0.³⁹⁶³⁹⁶ {BBA00008221/7}. The latter statement was undoubtedly wrong and was particularly dangerous in view of the failure to include in clause 1.4 any indication that the fire performance of the product in cassette form was markedly worse than in riveted form. The draft also made clear that only Reynobond FR achieved national Class 0 and all statements in the previous certificate to the effect that the product could be "regarded as" Class 0 were removed. The draft included restrictions on the use of the product on buildings over 18 metres in height.³⁹⁷³⁹⁷ {BBA00008220}; {BBA00008221}.

¶21.49 Although the draft certificate was intended only for Arconic's information,³⁹⁸³⁹⁸ {BBA00008220}. on 25 July 2017 Claude Wehrle commented on it, demonstrating that he had read it.³⁹⁹³⁹⁹ {MET00053158_P19/23}. He did not correct the errors in the European fire performance classification of the "ST" version, even though there was no basis on which at that stage Reynobond 55 PE could be described as Class B. Given that the certificate was being drafted by the BBA immediately after a serious fire in which many people had died involving the very product being certified, it is astonishing that it did not check that the fire performance information was correct but merely repeated old claims.⁴⁰⁰⁴⁰⁰ Amoroso {Day106/189:3-10}; {Day106/189:23}-{Day106/190:2}. Against that background it is even more astonishing that Arconic failed to say anything when presented with a draft certificate that contained materially and obviously incorrect information.

¶21.50 The BBA formally reissued the certificate on 4 August 2017.⁴⁰¹⁴⁰¹ {BBA00000046}. It stated, wrongly, that the standard PE panel with a grey/green Duragloss coating was classed B-s2, d0.

Re-issue September 2017

¶21.51 On 8 September 2017 Claude Wehrle informed Shaun O'Neill that Arconic was no longer selling Reynobond 55 PE at all in the UK.⁴⁰²⁴⁰² {BBA00010769/16}. On 22 September 2017 the certificate was amended and reissued, removing the references to Reynobond 55 PE.⁴⁰³⁴⁰³ {BBA00000049}. From that time the BBA certified Arconic's Reynobond FR product only.

The BBA's discovery of the Reynobond PE and FR test reports

¶21.52 On 29 January 2018, BBC journalist Tom Symonds met Brian Moore, then Operations Director of the BBA. Mr Symonds said that he had information that Arconic had changed the core of Reynobond 55 PE from translucent to black⁴⁰⁴⁴⁰⁴ Moore {BBA00000159/4} page 4, paragraph 11. and provided some details in writing shortly thereafter.⁴⁰⁵⁴⁰⁵ {BBA00008363}. On 19 February 2018 Mr Symonds sent the BBA a bundle of test reports on Reynobond 55 PE between 2013 and 2015 which showed that Reynobond 55 PE had Euroclass C and E classifications.⁴⁰⁶⁴⁰⁶ {BBA00009147/2} attaching reports: RA13-0333 (Classification Report for Reynobond PE, cassette, issued 4 December 2014, Class E); RA14-0339 (Classification report for Reynobond 55 PE, riveted system, issued 4 December 2014, classification Cs2, d0); RA15-0200 (Classification Report for Reynobond 55 PE, riveted system, issued 22 September 2015, Cs2, d0); RA15-0201 (Classification Report for Reynobond 55 PE, cassette system, issued 22 September 2015, Classification E).Show full note

¶21.53 Between February and April 2018 Brian Moore made extensive inquiries of Arconic and its legal representatives about the fire performance information in its possession that it had not disclosed to the BBA.⁴⁰⁷⁴⁰⁷ Moore {BBA00000159/5-13} pages 5-13, paragraphs 13-44; {BBA00010769}. On 27 April 2018 Arconic disclosed to the BBA six test and classification reports on Reynobond 55 FR dating from 2012 to 2016⁴⁰⁸⁴⁰⁸ {BBA00010769/69}. on the basis that the current certificate covered that product.⁴⁰⁹⁴⁰⁹ Albon {BBA00000158/14} page 14, paragraph 55. Had the BBA received those reports when they were created, no doubt it would have re-evaluated the product and reissued the certificate with more accurate and complete information. Arconic refused to provide test information about Reynobond 55 PE on the basis that the certificate no longer covered that product. By that time Arconic had become a core participant in the Inquiry.⁴¹⁰⁴¹⁰ {BBA00010769/69}.

¶21.54 Despite the non-disclosures and the highly material matters they revealed, the BBA did not immediately suspend or withdraw the Reynobond certificate. Mr Moore said that that was because the test reports on Reynobond PE obtained from the BBC had not come from CSTB directly and the BBA wanted to know what Arconic said about them.⁴¹¹⁴¹¹ Moore {Day108/83:4-16}; {Day108/84:8-15}. He also pointed out that at that time the certificate did not extend to Reynobond 55 PE.⁴¹²⁴¹² Moore {Day108/84:22}-{Day108/85:3}.

¶21.55 It was only on reading Dr Lane's report to the Inquiry in November 2018⁴¹³⁴¹³ Albon {BBA00000158/11} page 11, paragraphs 38-39; {BLAS0000036}. that the BBA became aware of the existence of Test 5B on Reynobond PE in cassette form and believed that it had the basis for taking action against Arconic.⁴¹⁴⁴¹⁴ Moore {Day108/99:12-15}. On 17 November 2018 it suspended the certificate for material non-disclosure in breach of contract⁴¹⁵⁴¹⁵ {MET00053158_P19/41-45}. and on 1 March 2019, it withdrew the certificate for Reynobond 55 in all forms.⁴¹⁶⁴¹⁶ {MET00053158_P19/47}.