Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 2 Report · 2024
Chapter 55: The choice of ACM PE rainscreen panels
Chapter 55: The choice of ACM PE rainscreen panels
Initial proposals
¶55.1 Although the initial motive for overcladding Grenfell Tower was to improve its appearance, it was soon recognised that doing so could also provide a significant improvement in the energy efficiency of the building. Adding insulation to the outside, protected by a rainscreen, was proposed by Studio E as a solution.1052 {SEA00000007}. Discussions with RBKC's Planning Department resulted in a proposal to use zinc panels as a rainscreen, but from the early part of 2012 Bruce Sounes began to think of aluminium as an alternative because it was light, presented a limited risk of corrosion and was available in a variety of colours.1053 Sounes {SEA00014273/88} paragraphs 206 – 207; Sounes {Day20/108:11}-{Day20/113:8}
¶55.2 At the beginning of April 2012 Mr Sounes carried out some internet searches from which he identified CEP Architectural Facades Ltd ("CEP") as a potential supplier of the rainscreen.1054 Sounes {Day20/77:4-11}. He then contacted Geof Blades of CEP seeking information about cladding systems and prices1055 {CEP00048112/1}; Sounes {SEA00014273/35} page 35, paragraph 71; {SEA00003965}. and provided him with drawings and photographs of the tower.1056 {CEP000000043}. In response Mr Blades sent Studio E details of a high-rise cladding project on which an ACM rainscreen had been used in rivet fix.1057 {SEA00003941} The project involved Rockwool insulation {SEA00003942}-{SEA00003956}. Mr Sounes met Mr Blades on 11 April 2012 to discuss potential cladding options, but they did not talk about the fire performance of any of the elements of the cladding.1058 Sounes {Day20/83:8-12}. Geof Blades did not recall the content of the conversation – see Blades {Day41/85:3-7}.
¶55.3 Later that month Mr Sounes suggested Alucobond ACM panels as a possible option for the rainscreen, although he knew that at that stage RBKC's Planning Department did not care for aluminium on aesthetic grounds.1059 {SEA00004051}; {TMO10001143/4-5}; Sounes {Day20/83:20}-{Day20/85:15}.
¶55.4 On 28 May 2012, Mr Sounes indicated to Chweechen Lim of Artelia that both zinc rainscreen and render were being considered for the external facade of the building1060 {ART00006104}. and in her first budget estimate Ms Lim priced those two options.1061 {ART00005838}. Render is a plastered finish for external walls that provides a smooth surface and protects the underlying material against the elements. During July 2012 Studio E continued to look into various options for the cladding,1062 Sounes First Witness Statement {SEA00014273/52} paragraph 111; Sounes {Day20/89:25}. but zinc rainscreen appeared to be gaining preference on aesthetic grounds.1063 {EXO00000753/2}. In July 2012, Studio E sent Paul Dunkerton at the TMO a technical data sheet on a VM Zinc composite panel with a fire retardant core,1064 {SEA00005320} and {SEA00005330}. This panel was not ultimately selected for inclusion in the NBS Specification. although Bruce Sounes had not considered whether it complied with the Building Regulations or the guidance contained in Approved Document B.1065 Sounes {Day20/89:20-25}.
114¶55.5 On 7 August 2012 at a pre-application meeting with the Planning Department, Mr Sounes suggested zinc cladding,1066 {SEA00005602}. which was considered by the planning officer present to be acceptable.1067 Sounes {SEA00014273/53} page 53, paragraph 114; {SEA00005597/1}; Sounes {Day20/92:2-8}.
The move towards Reynobond ACM PE
¶55.6 On 16 October 2012, Mr Blades arranged an introductory meeting between himself, Mr Sounes and Deborah French of Arconic.1068 Sounes {SEA00014273/65} page 65, paragraph 136.6; {CEP000003961}. Mr Sounes thought that they had discussed the fact that Grenfell Tower was a high-rise residential block,1069 Sounes {Day20/96:14-17}. but the others did not remember that. Ms French said she did not remember ever having thought about the height of the building.1070 French {MET00053162} page 21, paragraphs 72-73; French {Day88/67:1}-{Day88/69:3}. She presented the rainscreen products that Arconic offered, including a metal composite with zinc outer skins (called "ZCM") and an ACM composite which could be painted to resemble solid zinc.1071 Sounes {Day20/93:19}-{Day20/98:7}; Sounes {SEA00014273/65} page 65, paragraph 136.6; Blades {Day41/85:12}-{Day41/92:20}. Neither Mr Sounes nor Ms French could remember having discussed the composition of the cores or their reaction to fire.1072 Sounes {Day20/98:3-7}; French {Day88/52:2-11}.
¶55.7 On 31 October 2012 Studio E issued its Stage C report,1073 {SEA00006429}. which included options for rainscreen materials, including zinc composite1074 {SEA00006429/28}; {SEA00006429/31}; {SEA00006429/32}. and aluminium.1075 {SEA00006429/32}. Although the Stage C Report addressed Approved Document L (Conservation of fuel and power) in detail,1076 {SEA00006429/81}. no detailed analysis of a similar kind was included in relation to Approved Document B.
¶55.8 Mr Blades remained in contact with Studio E. On 16 November 2012, he told Ms French that Studio E was inclined towards zinc but that there was still a chance for her to promote the sale of Reynobond panels.1077 {CEP00048712}; Blades {Day41/92:21}-{Day41/93:12}. He encouraged her in her efforts because if Reynobond ACM panels were chosen for the refurbishment, there would be a chance for CEP to be engaged as fabricator.1078 Blades {Day41/93:24}-{Day41/94:3}. Studio E continued to consider other cladding options1079 {SEA00007446}; {SEA00007448}, Sounes {SEA00014273/86} page 86, paragraph 192. and on 7 December 2012 Mr Sounes suggested that aluminium might be a better choice than zinc on aesthetic grounds.1080 {ART00000584/2-3}.
¶55.9 In January 2013, Mohit Kotecha of Leadbitter emailed documents to Geof Blades for cost estimation purposes.1081 {CEP00048886}. They included an outline specification showing VMZ composite zinc panels as the rainscreen.1082 {CEP00048887/6}. Despite that specification, Mr Blades provided a quotation1083 {CEP000000138}; {CEP000000148}. pricing only Reynobond Zinc Patina finish ACM and not the specified VMZ composite zinc panels. Although the price quoted included a full facade design service,1084 Blades {Day41/96:3-6}. Mr Blades did not consider whether the panels were suitable for use on a building over 18 metres in height.1085 Blades {Day41/101:12-17}.
115¶55.10 Geof Blades immediately sent the documents received from Leadbitter to Arconic.1086 {CEP00048962}. They included an outline specification with drawings showing the height and dimensions of the tower,1087 {CEP000000075/7}; {CEP00048966}. images of the tower, which showed it to be a tall building,1088 {CEP000000076}. and a scope of works which included a specification for Celotex FR5000 insulation.1089 {CEP00048971/5}. Although Ms French said that she did not remember whether she had looked at those documents,1090 French {Day88/64:5-11}. she accepted that she had become aware that the tower was a high-rise building.1091 French {Day88/66:18-23}. At that stage CEP was promoting Reynobond because it had a commercial interest in doing so. Mr Blades did not give any thought to whether the PE version was suitable for use on a high-rise building, but at that stage the distinction between a PE and FR core had not really come to the fore. In Mr Blades' mind "Reynobond" was synonymous with Reynobond PE.
¶55.11 In January 2013 the RBKC Planning Department rejected a proposal for green and yellow panels.1092 TMO Position Statement {TMO00837466/7}; {SEA00007275}; Sounes {SEA00014273/78} page 78, paragraph 164. In discussions between Artelia and Leadbitter later that month it became clear that Leadbitter's proposed costs were substantially higher than Artelia's Stage D cost budget estimate. In a costs workshop on 18 January 2013, Leadbitter made various value engineering proposals, including substituting aluminium panels for zinc, resulting in a potential saving of £250,000.1093 {ART00006072}. On 1 February 2013, Leadbitter costed the saving to be made by using aluminium panels at £300,000.1094 {ART00006045}; {ART00005812/7}; {SEA00007298}; {TMO00879771/10}; Maddison {Day59/84:17}-{Day59/85:13}.
¶55.12 In February 2013 Artelia asked Studio E, Curtins and Max Fordham to take a radical look at the specification to identify potential opportunities for value engineering.1095 {SEA00007413}. In the view of Studio E, one obvious possibility was to change the rainscreen from zinc to a cheaper material.1096 {SEA00007415}; Sounes {Day20/102:6}-{Day20/104:7}; {SEA00007414} Studio E also identified other potential cost savings, including scaling back the crown and changing the windows. Studio E had long held a preference for a Proteus Honeycomb zinc product,1097 The core of this product was an aluminium honeycomb structurally bonded between two thin sheets of metal – see {SIG00000248/9}. but it was under significant pressure from the TMO to specify a cheaper alternative to zinc.
¶55.13 Throughout February and March 2013 CEP continued to promote Reynobond ACM panels for use on the tower.1098 Blades {Day41/117:20-24}. Pursuant to the request to consider opportunities for value engineering, on 4 March 2013 CEP and Studio E met to discuss substituting ACM panels for zinc.1099 Sounes {SEA00014273/85} page 85, paragraph 190. In advance of the meeting CEP told Arconic that it would propose the Reynobond range of products.1100 {CEP000000150}; Blades {Day41/104:14}-{Day41/108:25}. Mr Blades said that he did so out of professional loyalty to Arconic, having already introduced them to the project, and during the meeting he supported the use of Arconic's Reynobond panels.1101 Blades {Day41/116:6-12}; Blades {CEP000008838/11} page 11, paragraph 7.42; Blades {Day41/117:8-19}. In doing so, he reinforced the impression held by Studio E that Reynobond PE was a suitable material for use on Grenfell Tower, although he had only limited knowledge of the regulatory regime governing the use of such products and, at that stage, only a limited understanding of the way in which Reynobond PE reacted to fire.
116¶55.14 In our view CEP should have taken steps to ensure that a person in the position of Mr Blades understood the behaviour, particularly in response to fire, of the products it supplied and had a general understanding of the regulatory regime that applied to them. In fact, he believed, quite wrongly, that "Class 0" was synonymous with "limited combustibility".1102 Blades {CEP00064247/14} page 14, paragraph 67; Blades {Day41/58:13-24}. Both he and Neil Wilson, the general manager, were under the impression that Reynobond PE had achieved Class 0,1103 Wilson {CEP00064249/5} page 5, paragraph 21; {CEP00064249/6} page 6, paragraph 24; Blades {CEP00064247/5} page 5, paragraph 22; Blades {Day41/192:18}-{Day41/193:5}. which was not the case, although it is fair to say that BBA Certificate 08/4510 relating to Reynobond ACM panels, of which he was aware,1104 Blades {Day41/57:14-19}. stated (wrongly) that the panels might be regarded as having a Class 0 surface.
¶55.15 Following the meeting, Mr Sounes felt that it might be possible to switch from zinc to ACM1105 {SEA00007442}. and reported to Alun Dawson of Artelia that other options included insulated render and Marley "Natura" fibre cement panels.1106 {SEA00007442} see also {SEA00000547/26}; {SEA00000909}; {SEA00007563/2}; Sounes {Day20/107:11}; Blades {Day41/8:16-19}. At the request of Mr Blades, Ms French sent samples of various Reynobond panels directly to Adrian Jess at Studio E between 22 March and 8 April 2013.1107 {CEP000000151}. Further samples were sent between the beginning of March and the end of June 2014.1108 Exhibit French DF/4 List of samples provided for the refurbishment project {MET00019919}.
¶55.16 In April 2013, CGL Systems Ltd, a facade designer and manufacturer who had been visiting Studio E's offices in connection with another project,1109 Sounes {SEA00014273/89} page 89, paragraph 209. provided Studio E with the names of cladding contractors, including Harley.1110 Sounes {SEA00014273/89} page 89, paragraph 209. Harley had already become aware of the project through commercial sources and on being told by CGL that its name had been given to Studio E,1111 {HAR00005352}; Ray Bailey {Day32/131:1-6}. it contacted Studio E by email to express its interest in the project.1112 {SEA00007603}. Harley's email included details of its previous projects, all of which involved ACM rainscreen.1113 {SEA00007604}; {SEA00007605}; {SEA00007606}; Ray Bailey {Day32/134:23}-{Day32/135:2}. Studio E did not make any enquiries about Harley,1114 Sounes {Day20/118:23-25}. nor did it investigate the construction of the external walls of the buildings involved in any of those projects.
¶55.17 On 17 April 2013, Studio E gave the TMO details of a number of alternative materials to zinc that could be used as a rainscreen, most of which were ACM.1115 {SEA00007563}. By that time the project had effectively stalled while the TMO made decisions about costs and procurement. Bruce Sounes said that it had been necessary to look at the cheapest options because that was what the TMO needed.1116 Sounes {Day20/111:21}-{Day20/112:9}.
117¶55.18 By June 2013 Mr Blades had become aware that an ACM panel with a fire resistant ("FR") core was available1117 Blades {Day41/43:17-23}. and realised that it would perform better in a fire.1118 Blades {Day41/44:11-13}. However, he consistently promoted Reynobond 55 PE and accepted in evidence that he had relied on its Class 0 classification in the BBA certificate without having a working knowledge of the Building Regulations.1119 Blades {Day41/57:5}-{Day41/59:7}.
¶55.19 In June 2013, Studio E was given a copy of Artelia's Draft Revised Project Brief, which stated that the primary driver of the project was value for money.1120 {SEA00007722}; {SEA00007721}. However, despite the fact that ACM was likely to be a cheaper option, Studio E still preferred zinc.1121 Sounes {Day20/120:2-11}.
¶55.20 In July 2013, following a meeting with Councillor Rock Feilding-Mellen, Bruce Sounes prepared a document describing a range of materials and fixing methods that could be used to provide a rainscreen for insulated cladding. Both zinc and ACM panels were illustrated,1122 {SEA00002067}. but the document did not mention fire safety. Studio E submitted a revised planning application to RBKC in July 2013 in which the proposed zinc composite rainscreen remained unchanged.1123 Sounes {SEA00014273/25} page 25, paragraph 48. The changes related predominantly to the lower 4 floors. {SEA00002077}.
¶55.21 On 20 August 2013, Studio E completed a revised Stage D report which included Rheinzink panels for the rainscreen with ACM panels as an alternative.1124 {SEA00008052}; {TMO10003310}; {TMO10003310/21-26}; {SEA00014616/37}. The Rheinzink panel was not combustible.1125 SEA00014616/41} at paragraph 1.2; {SEA00014616/37}.
The Hays Galleria meeting
¶55.22 On 27 September 2013, Bruce Sounes and Tomas Rek of Studio E met Ray Bailey and Mark Harris of Harley at a coffee shop in Hays Galleria near London Bridge to discuss options, costs and technical details for the cladding of Grenfell Tower.1126 {SEA00008375}; Sounes {Day20/129:15-25}; Harris {HAR00010159/4} page 4, paragraph 15; Harris {Day34/48:13}-{Day34/52:14}. During the meeting Harley showed Studio E photographs of some of their previous projects, including Ferrier Point, a high-rise overcladding project in East London, where Harley had installed face-fixed ACM panels over mineral wool insulation.1127 SEA00003497}; {SEA00003516}. Before the meeting, Harley sent an email to Studio E attaching information sheets for three projects: Castlemaine, Clements Court and Chalcots Estate, all of which used ACM as the rainscreen material {SEA00007603}. Studio E and Harley discussed cladding options, including Zinc Proteus HR with a honeycomb core and ACM.1128 Ray Bailey Witness Statement {HAR00010184/6} page 6, paragraph 22; Ray Bailey {Day32/139:4-23}. Mark Harris said1129 Harris {Day34/51:12}-{Day34/52:16}. that Harley had indicated to Studio E that Harley's clients were frequently forced to use ACM because it was the cheapest product available and that Harley had used ACM on tower blocks more than any other product. Ray Bailey claimed not to have expressed a preference for ACM1130 Ray Bailey {Day32/146:14-18}. and Tomas Rek did not recall any particular preference being expressed by Harley.1131 Rek {Day12/68:2-15}.
118¶55.23 Throughout the discussions between Studio E and Harley, price and aesthetics were the dominant considerations;1132 Ray Bailey {Day32/174:8-11}. the fire safety of the panels was not discussed at all.1133 Bailey {Day32/142:17-19}; Rek {SEA00014278/10} page 10, paragraph 30; Rek, {Day12/133:7-9}. Mark Harris accepted that Studio E had been relying on Harley to suggest materials that were suitable for use on the tower,1134 Harris {Day34/52:20}-{Day34/53:1}. but the individuals involved at Harley and Studio E did not turn their minds to the risks involved in using ACM, particularly on a building over 18 metres in height. They simply assumed that it was safe because it had been used on a number of other projects involving tower blocks.1135 Ray Bailey {Day32/145:2}-{Day32/146:4}; {Day32/173:18}-{Day32/174:4}; Harris {Day34/53:7-17}.
¶55.24 Despite the discussions about ACM at the meeting, Mr Sounes still preferred zinc or a zinc composite material. He told Harley that Studio E was looking seriously at Nedzink (a zinc composite panel)1136 Email from Bruce Sounes to Ray Bailey and Mark Harris dated 27 September 2013, {SEA00008809} in which he states, "we are looking seriously at Nedzinc's composite panel. The small sample we have in the office looks like Alucobond but is apparently zinc." See also Sounes {Day20/138:18-25}; {SEA00008985}. but, when he reported back to the TMO with Harley's rough estimate of £3 million based on zinc rainscreen cassettes,1137 {SEA00008809}. he pointed out that in Harley's experience budgets often forced clients to adopt face-fixed ACM.1138 {SEA00008790}. Peter Maddison responded asking whether Harley had given a similar cost estimate for aluminium rainscreen.1139 {SEA00008836}.
¶55.25 On 18 October 2013 Harley provided budget costs to Studio E1140 {HAR00005515}; budget attached at {SEA00002275}. omitting the requested quotation for Nedzink1141 {SEA00008985}. and listing three alternative options for the rainscreen, including Reynobond ACM panels and Reynobond zinc-faced panels. Mr Sounes, who was still pursuing zinc,1142 {SEA00009240}. replied asking for an indication of what the cost would be for Nedzink1143 {SEA00009237}. and explaining that the Reynobond Natural Zinc (also referred to as VM Zinc "Quartz") was not an option for aesthetic reasons.1144 {Day20/145:19-25}.
¶55.26 Harley provided further costs information to Studio E in November 2013, including a quotation for Proteus HR Composite, but expressed a clear preference for ACM because it had used it on many previous projects and was confident about the costs involved.1145 {SEA00009736}; Ray Bailey {Day32/173:18}-{Day32/174:11}. However, Mr Sounes remained adamant that Studio E had set out to use zinc and that if the budget allowed it the result would be excellent.1146 {ART00001895}. In the same email he explained that the TMO would also want ACM options in the tender, despite the fact that the planners did not like the standard finish.1147 {ART00001895}. On 7 November 2013, Mr Sounes forwarded his email exchange with Harley about the cost of different cladding options to Chweechen Lim of Artelia. At that stage Artelia was preparing the OJEU tender documentation and on 11 November 2013, Ms Lim told Mr Sounes that she would include ACM in the tender contract sum analysis and ask contractors to provide an optional cost for zinc panels to ensure that tenderers provided costs for both types.1148 {ART00001895}. Ms Lim noted that Harley's quoted costs were higher than Artelia's cost plan and were also higher than the TMO's budget.1149 {ART00001895}.
119¶55.27 Mark Harris responded to Bruce Sounes some two weeks later on 21 November 2013. He failed to answer Mr Sounes' question about the rate for Nedzink, but he gave standard rates for ACM cassette and face-fixed panels. The email makes clear the close business relationship between Harley and Arconic,1150 {HAR00005509}; Harris {Day34/95:22}-{Day34/100:6}. which led Harley to press for Reynobond panels to be used.1151 Harris {Day34/68:4}-{Day34/85:12}. By December 2013 Harley was seeking prices for Arconic's Reynobond ACM panels1152 {CEP000000267/3}; Ray Bailey {Day32/183:10-15}. and by the spring of 2014 it had become committed to their use on the project.1153 Albiston {Day35/76:17}-{Day35/77:4}.
¶55.28 Planning permission for the refurbishment was granted on 10 January 2014,1154 {ART00001999}. subject to conditions, including a requirement that the materials to be used on the external face of the building be approved in writing by RBKC.1155 See condition 3 {ART00001999/2}. On 15 January 2014 Arconic provided a quotation to CEP for Reynobond 55.1156 {ARC00000083}. Although silent about the composition of the core, Deborah French accepted that as a standard product it would have been polyethylene.1157 French, {Day88/128:22-25}.
¶55.29 CEP, the only fabricator which Harley approached for the supply and fabrication of the rainscreen,1158 Albiston {Day35/46:11-16}. sent two formal quotations on 21 January 2014. These differed only in respect of the window system proposed: Metal Technology,1159 {CEP000000268}. or Wicona.1160 {CEP000000270}. In relation to the rainscreen, the only quotation was for panels manufactured using 4mm Reynobond ACM with rivet fixings. Mr Blades confirmed that Harley had asked him to quote only for Reynobond.1161 Blades {Day41/137:8}-{Day41/141:2}. Following the receipt of the quotation, Harley sent its own quotation to Rydon on 29 January 2014, which did not include VM Zinc as an option.1162 {RYD00002606}; {RYD00002607}.
The NBS Specification
¶55.30 The final version of the NBS Specification produced by Tomas Rek at Studio E was dated 30 January 2014.1163 {SEA00000169}. It specified Celotex FR5000 insulation1164 {SEA00000169/73}. and Proteus HR zinc honeycomb rainscreen panels.1165 {SEA00000169/65}. See section 3 for further details of the CWCT Standard 2008; Rek {Day12/75:23}-{Day12/76:11}. It also asked bidders to provide alternative prices for ACM rainscreen panels, including Reynobond Duragloss 5000.1166 {SEA00000169/64}. The TMO agreed to the inclusion of ACM options in the NBS Specification for two reasons: first, because it wanted priced options, as RBKC's Planning Department had not yet granted consent for any specific type of rainscreen;1167 Maddison {Day59/88:3-10}; {Day59/92:5-10}. second, because it had in mind that it might consider options that were less expensive than zinc in order to reduce the cost.1168 Maddison {Day59/93:1-12}. Peter Maddison denied that the inclusion of ACM had been driven by the TMO; he said that the TMO had included the ACM options on the advice of its professional design team and in the understanding that it was compliant with all the regulations.1169 Maddison {Day59/91:4-18}; {Day59/92:17-24}. We accept his evidence about that.
120¶55.31 Studio E, which had drafted the NBS Specification, had not checked whether the materials specified for use in the cladding complied with the requirements of the Building Regulations or reflected the guidance given in Approved Document B.1170 Sounes {Day20/173:12-24}; Rek {Day12/23:2}; {Day12/20:15-20}; {Day12/24:16-21}; {Day12/27:7-21}. It appears simply to have assumed that they did because they had been used on other projects.1171 Sounes {Day7/170:2-5}; Sounes {SEA00014273/140} page 140, paragraph 343; Sounes {Day20/93:12}{Day20:95:14}. Appearance clearly played a central part in the choice of rainscreen,1172 Sounes {Day20/135:1-7}. which was entirely reasonable, but Studio E did not ask Exova, or any other fire engineer, to review the NBS,1173 Sounes {Day20/51:2-10}. nor did it ask itself whether ACM was an appropriate material to use.1174 Sounes {Day 20/105:12-15}; {Day20/72:1-4}. It was not common practice at Studio E to carry out a full assessment of materials for compliance at RIBA Stage D or E.1175 Sounes {Day20/64:13}-{Day20/65:3}.
¶55.32 Studio E did not investigate the fire performance of any of the proposed rainscreen panels. In his witness statement, Mr Sounes claimed that research and consultations, including with Exova, had not revealed any particular concerns or fire risks associated with the proposals or the materials,1176 Sounes {SEA00014273/140} page 140, paragraph 343.2. but he was unable to identify any specific research that he had done or persons he had consulted.1177 Sounes {Day8/57:2}-{Day8/58:6}. At all events, we are satisfied that Studio E did not consult Exova on the use of ACM rainscreen panels. Until the night of the fire Mr Sounes was unaware that ACM panels could be produced with different cores, some fire retardant and some not.1178 Sounes {Day20/176:17-24}. Indeed, he was unaware that any of the materials referred to in Harley's quotation might be available in fire-rated versions1179 Sounes {Day20/144:12-18}; {RYD00003953}. and simply did not think about the fire performance of the ACM panels.1180 Sounes {Day20/135:4-7}. None of those involved in the refurbishment at Studio E or Harley scrutinised the BBA certificate relating to Reynobond 55 PE properly.1181 Sounes {Day21/16:18-21}; {Day21/19:3-24}; {Day21/23:8-15}; Ray Bailey {Day33/36:11}-{Day33/37:3}; Lamb {Day38/23:17-24}; Anketell Jones {Day37/6:10}-{Day37/7:23}; Albiston {Day35/43:6-24}: Harris {Day34/178:1-5}.
¶55.33 Following the production of the NBS Specification and throughout the discussions in early 2014 between Studio E, Harley and Rydon, everyone involved concentrated on the appearance of the rainscreen panels to the complete exclusion of their fire performance.1182 Harris {Day34/115:12-25}.
Previous projects on which ACM panels had been used
¶55.34 Between 2006 and 2011 Rydon had carried out two substantial overcladding projects on high-rise residential buildings in London, the Chalcots Estate and Ferrier Point, using Harley as sub-contractor. Chalcots Estate comprised five tower blocks, four of which were 23 storeys in height and the fifth 19 stories.1183 {RYD00094236/25} page 25 paragraph 44-47. Ferrier Point was a 23-storey tower block. In both cases a company in the Rydon group was appointed as principal contractor under a design and build contract for the refurbishment of the building1184 {RYD00094236/26} page 26, paragraph 48-50. and in both cases Rydon installed ACM rainscreen panels over mineral wool insulation.1185 {RYD00094236/51} page 51, paragraph 103. Although in each case the core of the panels was unmodified polyethylene, there was one difference: the panels used were face-fixed (i.e. riveted to the supporting rails), whereas the Reynobond panels installed at Grenfell Tower were cassette-fixed.1186 The distinction is important for the purposes of understanding the BBA certificate governing Reynobond PE 55. See in particular Chapter 19. For reasons that will become clear, that was an important distinction.
121¶55.35 Rydon and Harley remained in close contact throughout the procurement process relating to the Grenfell Tower project and it is clear that they approached it as a team, so much so that Rydon's tender included notes on the background and experience of three of Harley's employees, Daniel Anketell-Jones, Mark Stapley and Robert Maxwell.1187 {RYD00094244/44}.
¶55.36 CEP had worked with Harley on ten previous projects, including the Chalcots Estate and Ferrier Point projects,1188 Blades {MET00040323/4} page 4, paragraph 3.3; {CEP000003010}. but the Grenfell Tower refurbishment was the only project it had undertaken with Harley using ACM panels in cassette form.1189 Blades {Day41/24:6-8}. CEP had supplied ACM panels for many other high-rise residential overcladding projects in the years leading up to the Grenfell Tower refurbishment, including both panels with unmodified polyethylene cores and fire-resistant polyethylene cores.1190 {CEP000003010}; Blades {Day41/21:5} – Blades {Day41/25:7}.
Early discussions about value engineering
¶55.37 At the time of the formal procurement process Rydon also had an existing relationship with the TMO and there had been at least some discussion within Rydon of the project and its connection with Peter Maddison before 5 April 2013.1191 Email from Steve Blake to Jeff Henton of 5 April 2013: "This is the Peter Maddison scheme which is right up our street." {RYD00001115}.
¶55.38 Stephen Blake, Rydon's Refurbishment Director, had known Peter Maddison and Sacha Jevans of the TMO since about 2000, having met them at various conferences.1192 Blake {Day28/92:8} – {Day28/93:15}. Although he had not seen either of them regularly, they had kept up a direct line of contact, as Simon Cash of Artelia recorded in an email in October 20151193 {ART00006206}. and as was broadly confirmed by both Mr Maddison and Ms Jevans.1194 Maddison {Day58/161:18}-{Day58/162:1}; {Day127/172:10-19}.
¶55.39 On 6 March 2014, during the OJEU tender process, Mr Blake sent an email to Tim Shutler of Rydon, copied to Jeff Henton, Rydon's chief executive, in which he said that at a recent housing conference he had met senior representatives from the TMO and had been given to understand that Rydon was the leading contender to obtain the contract for the refurbishment.1195 {RYD00086648}. The housing conference to which Mr Blake referred took place between 4 and 6 March 2014 in Brighton. According to Mr Blake, the "senior representatives" of the TMO were either Mr Maddison or Ms Jevans,1196 Blake {Day28/100:7-11}. but both of them denied having spoken to Rydon about the tender.1197 Maddison {Day58/184:11}-{Day58/187:9}; Jevans {Day127/174:17-21}. The tender interviews for the project were due to take place on 7 March 2014 and in our view the email speaks for itself. However it came about, it is clear to us that Rydon was given an indication of the likely outcome of the tender process while it was still going on. No other contractor was afforded the same benefit.1198 Maddison {Day58/202:7-13}.
122¶55.40 When he gave evidence Mr Maddison accepted that he had telephoned Mr Henton on 10 March 2014, after the TMO had interviewed all the potential contractors, to tell him that Rydon was in first position.1199 Maddison {Day58/195:6-23}; {Day58/197:2-12}. The next day Mr Henton sent an email to Alan Sharrocks and Simon Lawrence telling them that, subject to a small amount of value engineering, he expected Mr Maddison to recommend to the TMO board the following week that Rydon be appointed as principal contractor for the refurbishment.1200 {RYD00003279}.
¶55.41 Mr Blake had not been included in Mr Henton's email and he was unable to say why that was,1201 Blake {Day28/148:16}. or how the conversation between Mr Henton and Mr Maddison had come about.1202 Blake {Day28/149:8}. He was asked whether at that time (11 March 2014) he had understood that Rydon's appointment would be conditional on its willingness to accommodate the TMO's desire for value engineering and initially told us that he had not known that at the time.1203 Blake {Day28/152:14}. However, he had in fact been sent a draft of the email on 10 March 2014 by Sandra Guest, Mr Henton's assistant, who had asked him to give her the names of the Rydon employees who had been involved in the bid.1204 {RYD00086650}. Despite his prevarication, it is clear that Mr Blake had been in direct contact with Mr Maddison on or before 10 March 2014 about the results of the tender, because at 7.10pm on 10 March 2014 he had written to Mr Henton to tell him as much.1205 {RYD00094368}. Having been shown the contemporaneous documents, Mr Blake ultimately accepted that he had been aware by 10 March 2014 at the latest that the TMO required significant reductions in the cost of the project by way of "value engineering" if it was to go ahead.1206 Blake {Day29/10:11-16}. On 12 March 2014 Mr Blake sent an email to various Rydon employees telling them that Rydon would be asked by the TMO to find some savings in addition to those identified in the tender.1207 {RYD00003295}. Mr Maddison said that he had spoken to Mr Blake to establish that Rydon was prepared to work with TMO to value engineer the project once the contract had been awarded.1208 Maddison {Day58/203:12}-{Day58/204:4}; {TMO00879770/28}.
¶55.42 When asked about that exchange Mr Blake originally denied having spoken to Mr Maddison on 12 March 2014, but having been shown the contemporaneous documents he was forced to accept that his previous evidence had been untrue,1209 Blake {Day29/15:3}. though he said he had had no recollection of the emails. He also accepted that he and Mr Henton had had personal and private access to the top decision-makers on the project at the TMO.1210 Blake {Day29/16:15}. Mr Blake insisted that their relationship with Mr Maddison and Ms Jevans had not influenced the tender process.1211 Blake {Day28/120:19-20}. Peter Maddison did not score the tenders; that was done by Artelia, Jenny Jackson and the TMO, each of whom provided their own independent scoring, and Rydon came top. However, we are satisfied that Mr Maddison and Ms Jevans played an important part in ensuring Rydon's appointment, both in providing information to Rydon about the tender and in negotiating with it so that its appointment would proceed.
123Rydon's costing error
¶55.43 While those discussions were going on with the TMO, Rydon was also attempting to make good a mistake in the preparation of its tender that had led to a shortfall of approximately £212,000 in its costing. On 11 March 2014, Katie Bachellier, one of Rydon's estimators, had written to Mr Blake to tell him of the error. Mr Blake's response was to look for a way to claw back the loss that would otherwise be made.1212 {RYD00086654}. That had significant repercussions, which we describe below.
Value engineering before Rydon's appointment
¶55.44 On 13 March 2014, Peter Maddison sent an email to David Gibson of the TMO1213 Initially the email was wrongly sent to David Burns but was then forwarded to David Gibson: {TMO00850707}. with copies to Claire Williams and Jenny Jackson, the TMO's procurement consultant, telling him that Mr Blake was confident that a gap in the budget of £270,000 could be closed. Mr Maddison intended to include Rydon's proposals for achieving that reduction in the submission he was about to make to the TMO's board seeking its approval of Rydon as principal contractor.
¶55.45 Later the same day Mr Gibson sent an email to Mr Blake attaching a spreadsheet which indicated that the TMO was looking to achieve a saving in cost of around £800,000 in total.1214 {RYD00003302}; {RYD00003301}. The spreadsheet identified the cladding as offering a saving of £243,000, that being the saving that Rydon had included in its tender submission in respect of new aluminium cladding.1215 {RYD00094244/15}. The combined result of the TMO's request for Rydon to reduce its price by about £800,000 and Rydon's own estimating error meant that Rydon needed to achieve a saving in cost of just over £1 million even before it had formally been awarded the contract.1216 Lawrence {Day23/135:1}.
¶55.46 Mr Blake responded to Mr Gibson a little over five hours later, saying that he could see no reason why the reduction in cost that Mr Gibson had asked for could not be achieved. At that stage, however, he had not taken any steps to satisfy himself that such a reduction was in fact achievable.1217 Blake {Day28/169:13-25}. Mr Blake clearly understood that if Rydon could provide savings to match the TMO's budget, it would be awarded the contract.1218 {RYD00003302}.
¶55.47 On receipt of Mr Gibson's email, Mr Blake contacted Harley more or less immediately. A log entitled "Sales/tender progress report" kept by Mark Harris recorded that he had received a call from Mr Blake who had told him that Rydon had been informed "off the record" that they were in "pole position", but that the job was over budget. Rydon had asked Harley to confirm potential cost savings for them to table in discussions with the TMO.1219 {HAR00010160/5}. Private discussions between Mr Blake and Mr Maddison revealed by Mr Maddison's diary entries for 12 and 13 March 2014 are likely to have been the occasions when Rydon was given that "off the record" indication.1220 {TMO00879770/28}.
124¶55.48 On 14 March 2014 Mark Harris sent Rydon an email giving Harley's analysis of the savings that could be achieved by changing the materials used in the construction of the facade of the tower.1221 {RYD00003315}. He attached a document entitled "Grenfell Tower, London proposed VE cost savings", which set out the cost of Harley's "compliant bid" (i.e. its bid for provision of the facade system specified in the NBS Specification) in the sum of £3,736,595, together with two alternative window systems and four alternative cladding systems, each with an associated saving.1222 {RYD00003316}. Harley indicated savings that could be achieved by using zinc and ACM rainscreen panels as follows: Zinc (cassette-fixed): £157,385 Zinc (riveted): £279,764 Cassette-fixed ACM: £419,627 Riveted ACM: £576,973
¶55.49 Stephen Blake and Simon Lawrence both said that by that time it had been accepted by Harley and Rydon that ACM panels would be used if planning permission could be obtained.1223 Lawrence {Day23/151:20}; Blake {Day28/182:14-17}.
¶55.50 A meeting took place during the evening of Tuesday 18 March 2014, attended by Mr Lawrence, Mr Blake and Ms Bachellier on behalf of Rydon and Mr Gibson, Mr Maddison and Claire Williams on behalf of the TMO, at which they discussed how the project could be brought within the TMO's revised budget.1224 Lawrence {RYD00094220/5} page 5, paragraph 22. Mr Blake said that he could not recall the meeting in any detail, but he did remember that Rydon and the TMO had discussed the need to find a significant amount of savings to enable the scheme to meet the TMO's budget.1225 Blake {Day28/171:10}.
¶55.51 We do not know exactly what was discussed at the meeting because no record was kept of it. Mr Maddison described it as an "offline conversation" that was not part of the formal process, but specifically denied that it had been a secret meeting.1226 Maddison {Day59/13:11-20}; {Day59/14:24}. However, the TMO had been advised by its solicitors in February or early March that it was bound to assess all the tenders received for the project on the basis of the price and quality criteria set out in the tender documents and that the regulations did not allow it to enter into negotiations with individual tenderers before the contract had been awarded or even to invite all tenderers to submit revised offers. It was advised that it could run value engineering exercises with its selected tenderer only after it had entered into the contract. Ms Jackson therefore suggested that the TMO enter into the contract with Rydon at its tender price and then embark on value engineering, but she noted that there would need to be some informal discussion with the preferred contractor before they entered into a contract to ensure that it understood the TMO's approach.1227 {ART00006433}.
¶55.52 Simon Cash of Artelia agreed with Ms Jackson that the TMO could have an "offline discussion" with the preferred contractor and that the TMO was entitled to look for savings and seek Rydon's agreement in principle to work with it later to achieve them. He added that some savings had been identified and others might be put forward during that conversation.1228 {ART00008594}. He told us that he had not been comfortable about the TMO's meeting Rydon in that way but had felt under pressure from the TMO to agree.1229 Cash {Day48/233:7-19}. In oral evidence, Mr Cash said he had meant that the TMO could tell Rydon what its approach to value engineering would be once the contract had been awarded,1230 Cash {Day48/225:24-25}; {Day48/226:1-4}. without indicating that Rydon was the preferred bidder.1231 Cash {Day48/224/16-17}. If that was so, however, we do not understand why Mr Cash said that suggestions for savings might be put forward before the contract had been awarded. Nor do we think that is the plain meaning of his message. As employer's agent he should not have lent his support to discussions which, in the light of the advice that he knew had been given by the TMO's solicitors, he had every reason to think might not be consistent with the procurement rules.
125¶55.53 On 23 March 2014, after the "offline" meeting had taken place, the TMO received further advice from its solicitors.1232 {TMO10005632}. They said that the procurement process could be open to challenge if a contracting authority sought to vary a price after receiving tenders or entered into negotiations with its preferred contractor. In an email sent to Sacha Jevans, David Gibson and Claire Williams on 26 March 2014 Peter Maddison summarised that advice as "Low risk of challenge and low risk of success."1233 {TMO10005632}.
¶55.54 Peter Maddison said that the "offline" meeting on the 18 March 2014 and the conversations which had preceded it were in accordance with the solicitors' advice,1234 Maddison {Day59/12:21}-{Day59/13:3}. being solely to seek agreement to value engineering in principle, and to agree a process for doing so.1235 Maddison {Day58/198:6}-{Day58/199:19}. David Gibson, however, conceded that no record had been made of the meeting because the TMO had wanted to achieve a secret understanding with Rydon.1236 Gibson {Day54/34:21-25}. He was aware that holding it had been contrary to the legal advice given to the TMO and that there was a risk that the procurement process would be challenged if other contractors found out about it. He ultimately conceded that one purpose of the meeting had been to identify changes to the specification that would reduce the overall cost of the project.1237 Gibson {Day54/30:7}-{Day54/31:18}; Gibson {Day54/43:3-11}.
¶55.55 We do not accept Peter Maddison's characterisation of the discussions. Their clear purpose, which was understood by both the TMO and Rydon, was to achieve a reduction in the cost of the project that would be reflected in the contract price. Specific areas of savings were identified and figures were discussed. Peter Maddison said that there had been a commercial risk of challenge,1238 Maddison {Day59/15:11}-{Day59/17:3}. but that the discussions had not been improper.1239 Maddison {Day58/202:19}-{Day58/203: 6}. No doubt the TMO was in a difficult position: only three tenders had been received and all exceeded the budget as it then stood.1240 {ART00002197}. Repeating the procurement process would have caused considerable delay, which would have disappointed residents who had been waiting a long time for the refurbishment, and there was no guarantee that any of the contractors would bid again, or would bid again at a lower price.1241 Maddison {Day59/16:1-24}. However, we do not accept that Peter Maddison thought at the time that the "offline" discussions were consistent with the rules governing the procurement process; indeed, in answer to a question from the Chairman he accepted that they "did not strictly comply with the letter of the process."1242 Maddison {Day59/23:5-18}. That, of course, explains why the meeting was described as "offline", i.e. secret. Secrecy was essential so far as both the TMO and Rydon were concerned because transparency might defeat its object.
126¶55.56 On 17 March 2014, Philip Booth of Artelia had drafted a letter to Rydon formally notifying it of its status as the preferred bidder.1243 {TMO10005474}. Substantial amendments were made to the wording by Ms Jackson later that evening.1244 {ART00002210}. The amended version, dated 18 March 2014,1245 {ART00008632}. was sent to Rydon at 5.55pm, some time after the "offline" meeting had ended.1246 {ART00008755}. Although Artelia had been aware of the process that the TMO proposed to adopt, there is no evidence that Artelia had been aware of the meeting itself and it is likely that it sent the letter on the instructions of Mr Gibson or Mr Maddison.1247 Williams {Day54/192:7 – {Day54/193:3}. The letter referred to certain conditions, but said nothing about value engineering or the need to find substantial (or indeed any) cost savings. Unsurprisingly, the letters sent to the unsuccessful bidders the same day did not refer to the contact between the TMO and Rydon.1248 {ART00002224}; {ART00002219}.
¶55.57 Simon Lawrence reported to Mark Harris on 19 March 2014 that Rydon had been confirmed as the preferred contractor for the refurbishment, although the decision was yet to be formally approved. Mr Harris recorded in his log that Rydon was "keen to push this job down the face-fixed ACM route with standard colour finish".1249 {HAR00006044} and {HAR00010160}. He immediately contacted Deborah French of Arconic to procure samples of ACM rainscreen that would appear similar to zinc but at a lower cost.1250 {HAR00006044}; {CEP00051117}; {RYD00003525}; {RYD00003508}; {RYD00003524}. In the weeks and months that followed, there were extensive discussions between Harley, Arconic, Studio E, Rydon and CEP about the use of ACM rainscreen cladding, but they related only to its cost and appearance;1251 {ARC00000089}; {RYD00003890}; {HAR00000931}; {HAR00005692}; {HAR00000933}; {SEA00010775}; {RYD00003964}; {CEP00051309}; {HAR00005737}. certainly, there were no discussions about its reaction to fire. Peter Maddison's diary entry for 19 March 2014 suggests that he had been advised by the TMO's solicitors to agree with Rydon that the negotiations and the contract price should both be kept confidential.1252 {TMO00879778/4}.
¶55.58 On 20 March 2014, Katie Bachellier sent Peter Maddison and others at the TMO a summary of Rydon's value engineering proposals1253 {RYD00003489}. in the form of two documents entitled "VE Options 18.03.14"1254 {RYD00003490}. and "Cladding VE Options 18.03.14",1255 {RYD00003491}. which set out the cost savings that Rydon had presented to the TMO at the "offline" meeting on 18 March 2014. The first of those documents showed a possible saving of £862,041 (enough to meet the TMO's objective) if all the suggestions were adopted.1256 Lawrence {Day23/159:4}; Blake {Day28/190:15}. The second indicated the savings that could be achieved by the use of different rainscreen materials as follows: Zinc (cassette-fixed): £100,406 Zinc (riveted): £202,372
127¶Cassette-fixed ACM: £293,368 Riveted ACM: £376,175
¶55.59 Those figures were all lower than those that Harley had given Rydon on 14 March 2014. Stephen Blake, Simon Lawrence and Zak Maynard were all asked to explain why Rydon had not disclosed to the TMO the true extent of the savings that could be achieved by changing the rainscreen. Both Mr Lawrence and Mr Maynard accepted (though not in so many words) that the purpose was to enable Rydon to retain the difference in order to make up the shortfall caused by the £212,000 error in costing.1257 Lawrence {Day23/163:18}; Maynard {Day31/91:15}-{Day31/92:2}. Mr Blake conceded that Rydon had seen the change of rainscreen as an opportunity to generate additional profit for itself1258 Blake {Day28/193:6-8}. and ultimately accepted that Rydon was showing the TMO significantly less by way of savings than it was obtaining from Harley.1259 Blake {Day28/193:12}.
¶55.60 At all events, it is self-evident that Rydon stood to make a greater profit from the refurbishment if the rainscreen were changed to ACM, particularly if a face-fixed (riveted) system was chosen rather than a cassette system. It was therefore in Rydon's interest to promote the selection of ACM panels, which goes some way to explaining its enthusiasm for choosing that material and method of fixing. The TMO was kept entirely in the dark about Rydon's financial interest in recommending ACM.
The BBA certificate
¶55.61 Arconic held a certificate issued by the BBA in respect of Reynobond Architecture Wall Cladding Panels, the most recent version of which, at the time of the refurbishment, was dated 14 January 2008.1260 {ARC00000678}. Astonishingly, at no stage of the project did anyone at Rydon, Harley or Studio E examine the certificate with any care with a view to understanding how ACM panels with unmodified polyethylene cores might react to fire.
¶55.62 Deborah French gave Mr Harris a copy of the BBA certificate on 23 April 2014 and he passed it straight on to Simon Lawrence,1261 {RYD00003932}. apparently without giving it any consideration. Simon Lawrence sent a copy to Mr Sounes the same day and also arranged for a copy to be provided to Mr Blake on or around 6 May 2014 as part of a pack of documents relating to a meeting with RBKC's Planning Department.1262 {RYD00003932}; {RYD00004142}.
¶55.63 Mr Sounes did not spend long looking at the certificate; indeed he said that it had not been his practice to read the whole of a BBA certificate for any product that he was planning to recommend for a project.1263 Sounes {Day21/12:5-7}; {Day21/13:3}. He admitted that he had never read section 6 of the Reynobond certificate, which related to the fire performance of the panels, and said that investigating their fire performance had not been a concern at that stage.1264 Sounes {Day21/19:24}; {Day21/16:20}; {Day21/17:8}; Sounes {SEA00014273/154} page 154, paragraph 381. In his view Rydon had by that time taken over responsibility for the design of the project which included responsibility for assessing the suitability of any materials that might be used. Mr Sounes was not aware of the distinction between the fire retardant (FR) and unmodified polyethene (PE) versions of the product and he never discussed the matter with Harley or CEP.1265 Sounes {Day21/24:7-13}. For his part, Neil Crawford could not remember having looked at the BBA certificate before the fire and we think it unlikely that he did so.1266 Crawford {Day10/149:22}-{Day10/150:14}. No one at Studio E sought any guidance on the meaning or effect of the BBA certificate from Exova, Rydon, Harley, Arconic or anyone else.1267 Sounes {Day21/29:11-21}.
128¶55.64 Although Simon Lawrence may have looked at the BBA certificate generally, he did not study it in any detail and did not pay any attention at all to the section relating to fire performance.1268 Lawrence {Day24/4:11-14}; {Day24/6:5-14}. He did not ask Harley to check the test evidence on which the certificate was based, nor did he ask it whether the panels being proposed for use on the tower were in all respects the same as those described in it. Rather, he appears simply to have assumed that ACM panels generally were suitable for use on the tower because Rydon and Harley had previously worked together to install similar panels on the Chalcots Estate and Ferrier Point projects.1269 Lawrence {Day24/18:14}-{Day24/19:21}.
¶55.65 Mr Lawrence could not recall having discussed the BBA certificate with Bruce Sounes or anyone else and he did not discuss the fire performance of ACM panels with anyone at any stage of the project.1270 Lawrence {Day23/179:2-7}; {Day24/21:4} – {Day24/22:6}. When he sent the certificate to Mr Blake on 6 May 2014 he specifically drew attention to the fact that it stated that the panels were rated Class 0, which might suggest that he had addressed his mind to the question of the fire performance, at least to a limited extent.1271 {RYD00004142}. However, when he was asked about that email, he said that he had merely been trying to provide Mr Blake with as much information as possible and that he had not considered that the fire performance of panels to be relevant to the meeting.1272 Lawrence {Day24/35:19}-{Day24/37:9}. Mr Blake said that there had been no discussions at all within Rydon about which, if any, of the routes to compliance for external walls in Approved Document B had been adopted.1273 Blake {Day28/86:8-12}. Furthermore, none of those who gave evidence on behalf of Rydon was aware that Reynobond 55 panels were available with a fire retardant core, despite that being clear from the wording of the BBA certificate.1274 Lawrence {Day24/14:1-14}; Blake {Day28/48:20-23}; O'Connor {Day26/27:18-24}; Hughes {Day27/53:24}-{Day27/54:1}; Martin {Day30/116:4-7}. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that no one at Rydon gave any meaningful consideration at any stage to the part of the certificate that dealt with the fire performance of the ACM panels used on Grenfell Tower.
¶55.66 As for Harley, Ray Bailey had read the BBA certificate in 2008 at the time of the Chalcots Estate project and did not read it in detail again.1275 Ray Bailey {Day32/15:11-20}. He accepted that Harley was obliged to examine certificates such as the BBA certificate in order to satisfy itself that the products that were being used on the tower were appropriate,1276 Ray Bailey {Day33/37:4-11}; {HAR00000120}; {HAR00000391/2} at clause 4.2. but he said he had only been concerned to ensure that the BBA certificate confirmed that the panels had a Class 0 rating.1277 Ray Bailey {Day32/124:16-18}; {Day33/33:14-15}. He was not aware that that classification did not extend to the smoke silver polyethylene cored panels that had been selected for use.
¶55.67 Despite Mr Bailey's evidence, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that no one from Harley gave any serious consideration at all to the current BBA certificate. Daniel Anketell-Jones did not read it1278 Anketell-Jones {Day37/7:22}. and, despite having received a copy of the email from Ms French to Mr Harris attaching it, nor did Mike Albiston.1279 Albiston {Day35/43:24}. Harley's designer, Kevin Lamb, did not consider it to be part of his job to read the certificate; indeed, it had never crossed his mind that there might be one.1280 Lamb {Day38/23:19}.
129¶55.68 We think it is clear that none of those responsible for the design of the overcladding of Grenfell Tower asked themselves whether the BBA certificate could be relied upon as evidence that the ACM panels which they proposed to use, whether in face-fixed or cassette form, would result in the creation of an external wall which complied with the Building Regulations. In her evidence to the Inquiry, Ms French, who sold the cladding for Arconic, said that this fundamental lack of curiosity in the reaction of the panels to fire was more normal than otherwise.1281 French {Day88/187:21-25}.
¶55.69 The approach of RBKC's Building Control Department was much the same. Mr Allen accepted1282 Allen {Day47/80:3-13}; {Day47/77:4-12}. scrutinising certificates such as the BBA certificate and the test data referred to within them was a core function of a Building Control officer, but Mr Hoban did not look beyond the first page of the BBA certificate with its reference to Class 0.1283 Hoban {Day46/23:14-16}; Allen {Day47/80:3-24}; Menzies {Day60/97:14}-{Day60/98:6}; {Day60/99:2-16}. The reliability of a BBA certificate was accepted without question by RBKC's Building Control Department, but it was not Mr Hoban's practice to read BBA certificates in any detail.1284 Hoban {Day46/15:20}-{Day46/16:45}.
¶55.70 Geof Blades was aware of the existence of the BBA certificate and thought (wrongly) that it stated that Reynobond 55 PE panels had achieved a Class 0 fire rating, having failed to notice that only the FR version was said to have passed both the BS476-6 and BS476-7 tests.1285 Blades {Day41/60:4-25}. He did not appreciate that the certificate did not in that respect cover panels with an unmodified polyethylene core. He also thought, quite wrongly, that Class 0 was synonymous with limited combustibility1286 {CEP00064247/14} page 14, paragraph 67; Blades {Day41/58:11-12}; {Day41/60:19-24}; {Day41/131:10-12}. and failed to consider whether the nature of the core might affect its compliance with the Building Regulations. He had no understanding of the ways in which cladding systems could be shown to comply with the Building Regulations and Approved Document B.1287 Blades {Day41/64:7-12}.
Negotiations with the Planning Department
¶55.71 From March 2014 onwards, the attention of Studio E, Rydon, Harley and the TMO turned to obtaining approval from the RBKC Planning Department for the material to be used on the external walls of the tower. From that time, the only product that was proposed for use was Reynobond 55 PE ACM panels, i.e. with unmodified polyethylene cores.1288 Williams {Day55/20:9-15}. The only remaining questions were about colour and whether the fixing system should be cassette or rivet.
¶55.72 On 1 April 2014, a meeting was held to introduce the TMO to Rydon, as the main contractor for the project. The minutes of that meeting record that the TMO was told that there was a potential saving of up to £376,175 to be made if the material used for the rainscreen were changed from zinc to ACM and if rivet fixings were used.1289 {ART00002256}; Peter Blythe asked that the minutes of this meeting be kept confidential {RYD00003682}. Rydon did not tell the TMO that Harley was willing to reduce the cost of the rainscreen by as much as £576,000 for face-fixed ACM and if, as the minutes tend to suggest, the TMO was given to understand that the sum of £376,175 reflected the full amount of the reduction available from Harley, that was clearly false and was known by Rydon to be false.1290 Lawrence {Day23/174:1-9}; Blake {Day28/193:9-12}.
130¶55.73 Artelia immediately began to discuss with Rydon, Studio E, Harley, the TMO and IBI Taylor Young, an independent planning consultant appointed by the TMO, the best strategy for obtaining planning permission for the change in design.1291 {RYD00003898}; {SEA00010720}; {SEA00010767}; {RYD00004155}. On 8 May 2014, Stephen Blake attended a meeting with the Planning Department, together with (among others) Bruce Sounes, to discuss the proposed changes to the design of the facade. In an email to Claire Williams before the meeting, Simon Lawrence listed what he described as "agenda points" for the meeting, including, in particular, a proposal for changing the rainscreen from zinc to ACM. He intended to argue that ACM was not inferior to zinc.1292 {RYD00086654}. Mr Lawrence saw Rydon as an advocate for ACM against a reluctant planning committee because it had used ACM successfully on previous occasions. He thought it was in everyone's interests for ACM to be accepted, because there was a risk that, if it were not, the project might not go ahead at all.1293 Lawrence {Day24/32:2-6}. As we have already noted, Rydon also had a powerful financial interest in the choice of ACM.
¶55.74 When Mr Lawrence briefed Mr Blake before the meeting, he told him that the ACM panels they proposed to use had a Class 0 rating, but there was no discussion about their fire performance at the meeting. Indeed, he could not remember any discussion about the fire safety of the panels at all.1294 Blake {Day29/40:8-16}. Mr Blake said that he had not been aware of any consideration having been given to the fire performance of ACM panels at any time between May and October 2014, when final planning permission was obtained.1295 Blake {Day29/43:18}-{Day29/44:21}. The appearance and cost of the cladding, together with concerns about the programme, were the only matters considered by the council, either in its internal discussions or those it held with Studio E.1296 Feilding-Mellen {Day131/188:15}-{Day131/189:22}; {Day131/191:15}-{Day131/193:14}; {Day131/195:2-17}; {Day131/199:3-6}.
¶55.75 RBKC's Planning Department was principally concerned with two matters: the colour of the panels and the method of fixing. There is no evidence that the TMO, Rydon or Harley was aware that the method of fixing might affect the reaction of the panels to fire, but it did affect the appearance of the facade and was therefore regarded as an important aesthetic consideration.1297 RBKC Planning also considered whether the face-fixing could rust: {SEA00011359}. Bruce Sounes said that his own examination of the technical documents provided by Arconic concentrated on the colour charts because the focus at that time had been on the building's appearance.1298 Sounes {Day21/11:9-20}; Sounes {SEA00014273/154} page 154, paragraph 381. When one of the councillors, Rock Feilding-Mellen, intervened in the debate in July 2014, the only issues on which he commented were fixing method and colour,1299 {RBK00033430}; {RBK00003508}. with a heavy emphasis on the latter.
131¶55.76 The Planning Department had a clear preference for a cassette rather than a riveted system. On 23 May 2014, Simon Lawrence sent an email to Stephen Blake and Zak Maynard, in which he expressed his concern that the planners would accept only cassette-fixed panels on aesthetic grounds.1300 {RYD00005064}. His concern stemmed from the fact that Rydon stood to gain far less from the use of a cassette system than a riveted system.1301 Lawrence {Day24/69:10}.
¶55.77 On 17 July 2014, representatives of the planning committee visited Grenfell Tower to view a mock-up of the cladding.1302 {RYD00012461}; {RYD00012459}. Arconic supplied Reynobond ACM rainscreen for the purpose free of charge to CEP, which fabricated it. On 31 July 2014 the TMO informed Rydon that the planning department had approved ACM rainscreen cladding using cassette fixings and formal planning permission was granted for those panels in "smoke silver" on 25 September 2014.1303 {RYD00003932} attaching {HAR00000934}; {IBI00001802}; {RYD00014150}.
Fabrication by CEP
¶55.78 Once Reynobond 55 PE ACM panels had been approved, attention turned to their fabrication by CEP. Harley placed four orders with CEP for ACM panels to be used on the facade and crown of the tower, on 13 March 2015, 6 July 2015, 8 July 2015 and 9 November 2015.1304 {CEP000000512}, attaching {CEP000000513}; {CEP000000527}; {CEP000000528}, attaching {CEP000000529}; {CEP000000616}; {CEP000000617}; {CEP000007550}; {CEP000001124}; {CEP000001168}. Harley placed separate orders for the fabrication of the windows, in October 2014 and February and May 2015.1305 {CEP000000447}; {CEP000000469}, attaching {CEP000000470}; {CEP000000471}; {CEP000000472}; {CEP000000492}; {CEP00053848}; {CEP000005833}; {RYD00040435}.
Contemporaneous knowledge of the combustibility of ACM panels
¶55.79 Although it appears that neither Harley, nor Rydon nor Studio E gave detailed consideration to whether ACM rainscreen panels complied with the requirements of the Building Regulations, many of those involved in the decision to use them had some general awareness of their combustibility, in some cases as a result of personal experience. The most significant event, in our view, was the fire which occurred on the night of 16 January 2012 at Taplow House on the Chalcots Estate. Employees of Rydon and Harley, including Stephen Blake, attended Taplow House on 17 January 2012 to inspect the damage, including the damage to the ACM panels.1306 {HAR00010169}. A report produced by Harley on 17 January 2012 found that the fire had melted the windows of the flat in which it had started and had damaged the cladding, but had been prevented from spreading more widely into the cladding system (and in turn to other flats) by the cavity barriers around the windows.1307 {HAR00010169/3}. Mr Blake was pictured in the report pointing to the cavity barrier system around the damaged window.1308 {HAR00010169/3}; Blake {Day29/121:21-23}.
¶55.80 After the initial inspection on 17 January 2012, Harley and Rydon agreed that an abseil survey should be conducted. It took place on 18 January 2012 and a further report was produced by Harley on 23 January 2012.1309 {CEP000003223}. The report stated that the purpose of the inspection had been to examine the external facade of the building to ensure that the cladding panels were safe, as the fire had caused extensive damage.1310 {CEP000003223}. The inspection revealed that the ACM panels had distorted as a result of being exposed to heat and smoke, and the report contained photographs showing that they had been seriously damaged, having melted and warped.1311 {CEP000003223/5-14}. The abseil report was circulated to, amongst others, Mr Blake, Ray Bailey and Daniel Anketell-Jones.1312 {CEP000003223/2}. Despite the contents of the report, Mr Blake appears to have told David Hughes (of Rydon) that he had no concerns about the safety of ACM panels arising from the Taplow House fire.1313 Hughes {Day27/42:1-18}. Ray Bailey told us that the fire at Taplow House had demonstrated to Harley that ACM would burn1314 Ray Bailey {Day33/143:4-5}. and he accepted that Harley's failure to implement the lessons it had learnt from Taplow House in the designs of the windows at Grenfell Tower had been an error.1315 Ray Bailey {Day33/146:11-16}.
132¶55.81 There were other events which should have made those responsible for the cladding at Grenfell Tower aware of the dangers posed by the combustible nature of ACM panels. On 13 May 2013, Deborah French of Arconic wrote to Geof Blades, Neil Wilson and Roy Fewster of CEP to alert them to press reports of a fire in a building in the United Arab Emirates that had been overclad with ACM rainscreen panels.1316 {CEP00049719}. Mr Blades knew as a result of those exchanges that ACM panels with unmodified polyethylene cores were combustible.1317 Blades {Day41/123:14-15}. Ms French's email followed a message to CEP a few days earlier from Richard Geater, the UK sales representative of Alucobond's, another producer of ACM panels, which referred to the Tamweel Tower fire in Dubai and described the problems that had been encountered there with the use of cheap ACM panels with polyethylene cores.1318 {MET00053158_P10/157}; Blades {Day41/122:15-25}. Those messages ought to have prompted Mr Blades to reconsider whether it was safe to use Reynobond PE on any high-rise building in the UK, including Grenfell Tower, but regrettably he did not do so.
¶55.82 On 7 October 2014, Daniel Anketell-Jones attended the Annual General Meeting and Members' Meeting of the Centre for Window and Cladding Technology (CWCT), at which a presentation was given by Sarah Colwell discussing the regulatory requirements and testing regimes for the construction of facades.1319 {CEL00001037}. It is clear from the slides used at that presentation that the combustibility of rainscreen facades was discussed, including the large number of cladding fires that had affected high-rise buildings in other countries.1320 {CEL00001038/3}. Daniel Anketell-Jones said that he had no specific recollection of being at that presentation; he thought he had been there but that he had not been concentrating.1321 Anketell-Jones {Day36/5:16-18}.
¶55.83 It is unlikely to be a coincidence that on 8 October 2014, the day after that meeting, Samuel Anketell-Jones, a junior design engineer at Harley and Daniel Anketell-Jones's brother, sent Deborah French of Arconic an email asking for information about Reynobond ACM panels with a fire-resistant mineral core.1322 {MET00081175}. This email was disclosed to the Inquiry by the MPS in 2022 after the conclusion of the hearings and was disclosed to core participants in April 2023. Daniel Anketell-Jones told us that when he had proposed the cladding for Grenfell Tower he had not realised that Reynobond ACM panels were available with a fire-resistant core.1323 Anketell-Jones {Day37/8:13-18}; {Day36/212:21}-{Day36/213:8}. (Ray Bailey said that he had been aware that two kinds of panel were available as a result of reading the BBA certificate but had assumed that they performed in similar ways and that neither he nor anyone else at Harley had ever asked Deborah French about it.)1324 Ray Bailey {Day33/44:4-25}. Although it is not clear to which of Harley's projects the email related, it suggests quite strongly, particularly when viewed together with the information shared at the CWCT meeting, that Harley knew more than it was willing to admit about the availability of a fire-resistant version of the Reynobond panel and the dangers of using ACM with an unmodified PE core.
133¶55.84 In March 2015, discussions took place between Siderise, Harley and Rydon about the cavity barrier requirements for Grenfell Tower. For present purposes it is not necessary to refer to the details of the debate but it is worth drawing attention to some of the things said in the course of it by Exova, Studio E, Rydon and Harley. In an email of 27 March 2015, Daniel Anketell-Jones wrote to Ray Bailey saying, "There is no point in 'fire stopping', as we all know; the ACM will be gone rather quickly in a fire!"1325 {HAR00006585}. On 31 March 2015, Terence Ashton wrote to Neil Crawford saying, amongst other things, that it was difficult to see how a fire-stop would stay in place in a fire involving external flaming as it would cause the zinc cladding to fail.1326 {EXO00001434}. Mr Crawford agreed, expressing the view that "metal cladding always burns and falls off."1327 {EXO00001434}. Later the same day, he relayed Mr Ashton's opinion to Simon Lawrence.1328 {SEA00013051}. It is clear that Mr Lawrence read Mr Ashton's comments because he responded, "Excellent. That looks positive."1329 {SEA00013051}.
¶55.85 None of the witnesses was prepared to accept that those messages showed that those concerned were aware that ACM panels were combustible. Mr Ashton said that he had meant to say that metal rainscreen would not burn, but that if windows connected to metal cladding failed, the panels themselves would fall off the building in that area,1330 Ashton {Day18/103:4-10}. not that they would actually burn.1331 Ashton {Day18/104:10-14}. We do not accept that evidence. In our view he was aware that ACM panels would burn, but at the time he was still under the impression that the panels were to be zinc.1332 See Chapter 54 and our findings about Exova's work. Similar explanations were offered by Mr Crawford and Mr Anketell‑Jones. Mr Anketell-Jones said that he had been referring to the fact that ACM panels and their fixings were made of aluminium, which would melt at a lower temperature than steel, and was not referring to the combustibility of the panel itself or to the fact that its core was made of polyethylene.1333 Anketell-Jones {Day37/20:4}-{Day37/21:24}. He told us that at the time nobody had been aware that any of the materials were combustible,1334 Anketell-Jones {Day37/27:6-8}. and went on to explain that he had meant to say that metal cladding would melt, fail and fall off.1335 Crawford {Day10/154:6-7}. He denied that he had been aware that composite panels with a polyethylene core could contribute to the spread of flame.1336 Crawford {Day10/156:2-16}. For his part, Simon Lawrence simply said that he did not give any thought to what would happen if the rainscreen were exposed to flames.1337 Lawrence {Day25/11:17}. He said that if he had been aware that ACM would quickly fail in a fire, he would have checked with Building Control that it complied with the regulations and would then have looked into it further.1338 Lawrence {Day25/12:23}-{Day25/24:1}. In the event, it is clear that he did neither of those things. We agree with the view expressed by Deborah French in a witness statement given to the Metropolitan Police that it would have been obvious to anyone that polyethylene was plastic and flammable.1339 {MET00053162/7} page 7, paragraph 28. We are satisfied that Mr Crawford and Mr Anketell-Jones knew that ACM was combustible; Mr Lawrence may not have known, but ought to have taken the trouble to find out after he had been asked about the reaction of the panels to fire by Claire Williams in her email of 12 November 2014.
134¶55.86 However, even if none of them gave any real thought to the implications of using ACM panels with polyethylene cores, those representatives of Exova, Studio E, Rydon and Harley were aware that an external wall incorporating the rainscreen panels that were to be used on Grenfell Tower would not adequately resist the spread of fire across the surface of the building. That much is clear from the exchange of emails mentioned above.1340 {HAR00006585}; {SEA00013051}.
The "Lacknall moment"
¶55.87 On 12 November 2014, Claire Williams wrote to Philip Booth and Nick Valente of Artelia asking, amongst other things, whether in the light of the fire at Lakanal House there was any requirement for materials to be flame retardant.1341 {ART00003042}. Later the same day she sent an email to Simon Lawrence referring to Lakanal House and asking him to clarify the fire retardance of the new cladding.1342 {RYD00023468}. She was familiar with the Lakanal House fire principally because she had attended a presentation by Dr David Crowder of the BRE on 10 January 2014,1343 {TMO10040126}; Williams {Day55/126:21}-{Day55/130:20}. but could not recall any specific aspect of the presentation that had caused her to make a connection between that fire and the fire performance of the cladding chosen for use on Grenfell Tower. She also included in her email extracts from the NBS Specification for the project, which Philip Booth had sent her as a reminder of what had been specified.1344 {ART00008527/52} page 52, paragraph 173; Booth {Day50/62:9-15}; Booth {Day50/64:15}-{Day50/65:6}. He had suggested that she seek clarification from Rydon about the fire performance of the cladding. Mr Lawrence accepted that it had been part of Rydon's task as principal contractor to answer questions of that kind from the TMO and that, within Rydon, he was the person to do so.1345 Lawrence {Day24/166:18-23}.
¶55.88 Mr Lawrence told us that when he read Ms Williams email he had understood her to be referring to the glass reinforced concrete ("GRC") cladding that was to be installed on the lower levels of tower,1346 Lawrence {Day24/161:12}-{Day24/168:8}. but that was not what she had said in her email and, although the information she included had referred to GRC products, it had also referred to the CWCT standard for systemised building envelopes, which applied to the whole of the tower's facade. We are unable to accept that Mr Lawrence understood that message to refer only to the GRC element of the cladding installed at Grenfell Tower.
¶55.89 Mr Lawrence said that he would not have expected to respond to an email of that kind himself but would have sent it to the project's design team for a response.1347 Lawrence {Day24/164:1}-{Day24/166:23}. However, there is no record of his having done so, or indeed of any response to it, and Ms Williams could not recall having received any response.1348 Williams {Day55/145:25}. We think that Simon Lawrence simply failed to take any action at all in response to the email, possibly because he did not understand its significance, that Ms Williams did not pursue it, and that no one in the design team gave any consideration to the question she had raised, despite the fact that it was of real importance.
135¶55.90 In both his written and oral evidence David Gibson told the Inquiry that he had raised concerns about the fire performance of the rainscreen system during a meeting chaired by Philip Booth of Artelia in March or April 2015.1349 Gibson {TMO00000887/19} page 19, paragraph 99. He said that he had become concerned when he learnt that there was to be an air gap between the insulation and the rainscreen, as he had understood that a cavity of that kind had contributed to spread of fire at Lakanal House.1350 Gibson {TMO00000887/18} page 18, paragraphs 94-98; {TMO00842310/8} page 8, paragraph 23; Gibson {Day53/177:9-22}. He said that Mr Lawrence had assured him that the rainscreen was completely inert and would not burn at all.1351 Gibson {TMO00842310/8} page 8, paragraph 23. Claire Williams supported Mr Gibson's recollection.1352 Williams {TMO00842312/15} page 15, paragraph 64; Williams {Day55/159:18}-{Day55/160:6}. Both Mr Gibson and Ms Williams said they recalled being given hard copies of the minutes of the meeting drafted by Artelia which recorded Simon Lawrence's advice, although their accounts of how they received them were not consistent. Mr Gibson believed he received a copy at the next scheduled meeting1353 Gibson {TMO00000887/19} page 19, paragraphs 101 and 103; Gibson {Day53/190:5-14}. and said he had noted that "Lakanal" had been misspelled.1354 Gibson {TMO00842310/8} page 8, paragraph 22; Gibson {Day53/180:15-18}. Ms Williams did not think that Mr Gibson had been at the subsequent meeting; she said she had been given a hard copy which she had brought back to the office and read to him.1355 Williams {Day55/163:20}-{Day55/164:6}.
¶55.91 Neither Simon Lawrence nor Philip Booth recalled any such conversation nor any such minutes.1356 Booth {ART00008527/52} page 52, paragraph 173; Lawrence {Day24/170:6-10}; {Day24/171:15-18}; Booth {Day50/77:4-11}. In particular, Mr Booth said that compliance with the fire safety requirements of the regulations had not been discussed with him, because it was an absolute requirement, not a matter for debate.1357 Booth {Day50/60:8-14}. None of those who could be expected to have received copies of the minutes disclosed them, either in electronic or paper form, and there is no reference in any of the contemporaneous documents to an assurance of that kind. In those circumstances we are unable to regard the evidence of Mr Gibson and Ms Williams on this matter as reliable. We find the evidence of Mr Booth persuasive: as employer's agent, he was required to ensure that meetings were properly and fully recorded for the benefit of the TMO. If such an important assurance had been given at the meeting, he would have noted it. We consider it very unlikely that a paper document was produced and distributed at a meeting if no paper or electronic copy of it could be found, either on Artelia's systems or among the records or documents of any other party. Contrary to the assertions of Ms Williams that there is a gap in the minutes for February 2015,1358 Williams {Day55/175:6-8}. there is none.1359 {ART00006769}, It is clear in the footer that Progress Meeting 8 was held on 13 February 2015. The body of the minutes erroneously record this as having been held on 20 January 2014, the date of Progress Meeting 7 {ART00006766}.
136¶55.92 The matter does not end there, however. Ms Williams made no reference at all to any such assurance in her first statement; it was not until she made her second statement, produced after she had seen Mr Gibson's statement,1360 Gibson {TMO00000887/19} page 19, paragraphs 99-103. that she first mentioned it.1361 Williams {TMO00842312/15} page 15, paragraphs 64-65; Williams {Day55/154:1-{Day55/155:8}; {Day55/163:13-15}. Ms Williams said that she simply had not remembered the conversation with Mr Lawrence when she made her first statement,1362 Williams {Day55/154:5-19}. but it is difficult to understand how such an important matter could have escaped her mind. Moreover, she said that she had not recalled Mr Lawrence's assurance when she became aware of the fire on 14 June 2017.1363 Williams {Day55/155:9-17}. Again, that is difficult to understand. If she had been told that ACM panels were inert and would not burn, that assurance would surely have come to mind as soon as she became aware of the disaster.
¶55.93 Finally, it is worth bearing in mind that Ms Williams sought an assurance of a similar kind in two emails sent on 12 November 2014. In the first,1364 {ART00003042}. she told Mr Booth that she wanted to ensure that the flame retardance of the ACM panels was raised. In the second, her "Lacknall moment" email to Mr Lawrence, she said that she was writing to get clarification on the fire retardance of the new cladding. If Mr Lawrence had already given her a clear assurance before 12 November 2014, we think it unlikely that either of those messages would have been sent, or, if sent for other reasons, that she would not have referred to it. If the assurance was given after 12 November 2014 (as Ms Williams and Mr Gibson suggested), we think that she would have recalled telling Simon Lawrence that she had asked for the same information some months before but had not received a response. In the light of all the evidence we do not accept that Mr Lawrence gave Mr Gibson and Ms Williams any assurance of the kind they described.
137