Chapter 73: Modern materials and methods of construction

¶73.1 In the Phase 1 report, the chairman found that the absence of any training for incident commanders in how to recognise the need for evacuation reflected a failure to recognise the risk of fire taking hold on the outside of modern buildings.³⁰⁶³⁰⁶ Phase 1 Report Volume IV paragraph 27.9. He expressed the view that it was a surprising failure, given the long history of fires involving cladding on high-rise buildings both in this country and abroad, a history of which some people within the LFB had been aware for some time.³⁰⁷³⁰⁷ Phase 1 Report Volume IV paragraph 27.10.

Knowsley Heights and Garnock Court

¶73.2 Before the Lakanal House fire in July 2009, there had already been two significant fires in the UK which had involved the extensive spread of fire through combustible external panels. On 5 April 1991, a fire was started deliberately in a rubbish compound outside Knowsley Heights, an 11-storey residential building in Liverpool. The fire spread rapidly through a 90mm gap between the building's concrete outer wall covered with rubberised paint and rain screen panels which had recently been installed. The fire spread to the highest floor and seriously damaged the outer walls and windows of all the upper floors.³⁰⁸³⁰⁸ {LFB00031816/5-6}.

¶73.3 On 11 June 1999, a fire started on the fifth floor of Garnock Court, a 14-storey residential building in Irvine, Scotland. The fire spread rapidly to the higher floors through a vertical strip of external cladding, resulting in one fatality.³⁰⁹³⁰⁹ {LFB00031816/6}.

¶73.4 The fire at Garnock Court was the subject of a report by the Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee entitled Potential Risk of Fire Spread in Buildings via External Cladding Systems.³¹⁰³¹⁰ {CLG00019478}. The report, published in December 1999, drew attention to the risk of the unexpectedly rapid spread of fire through cladding systems, which could lead to disproportionate difficulties in firefighting and a shorter period available for escape from the building, potentially endangering life.³¹¹³¹¹ {CLG00019478/8} paragraph 10. The committee concluded that the evidence before it did not suggest that the majority of external cladding systems in the UK posed a serious threat to life or property in the event of fire, but went on to say that, notwithstanding that conclusion, it did not believe that it should take a serious fire in which many people were killed before all reasonable steps were taken towards minimising the risks. It recommended that all external cladding systems be required to be either entirely non-combustible or proved through full-scale testing not to pose an unacceptable level of risk from the spread of fire.³¹²³¹² {CLG00019478/9-10} paragraphs 18-20.

¶73.5 Apart from a passing reference to the Garnock Court fire in a presentation on the spread of fire across the facades of tall buildings created in 2016, the LFB failed to create any training materials which communicated to operational staff the key lessons to be learnt from those two fires. Deputy Commissioner Dexter said that she had been aware of the Knowsley Heights and Garnock Court fires during her time at the LFB position;³¹³³¹³ Dexter {Day179/94:9-18}. Commissioner Dobson said that he had been aware of the Knowsley Heights fire but not the Garnock Court fire.³¹⁴³¹⁴ Dobson {Day210/102:19}-{Day210/103:12}. Both agreed that those fires contained lessons for the LFB.³¹⁵³¹⁵ Dexter {Day179/94:19-23}; Dobson {Day210/103:9-20}. Commissioner Dobson's recollection was that the fires had been considered by the Operations and Fire Safety departments, which had concluded that the lessons from those incidents had already been learnt by the LFB or were not relevant to it.³¹⁶³¹⁶ Dobson {Day210/103:21}-{Day210/104:16}.

The letter to London Boroughs and social housing landlords

¶73.6 Also on 23 March 2009, AC Stephen Turek, then in charge of Fire Safety Regulation, wrote to London Boroughs and social housing landlords about fire safety in social housing.³¹⁷³¹⁷ {LFB00001805}. In his letter he said that it had been written in the light of a number of recent fires in social housing blocks,³¹⁸³¹⁸ {LFB00001805/1}. and drew attention to several aspects of construction that could present dangers. They included the following: a. Replacement windows, particularly uPVC window units, installed in a way that created

gaps that had been covered with non-fire-resisting materials which, in the event of a fire, distorted and allowed fire to enter the wall cavity;

¶b. Panels on the exterior walls of flats replaced with non-fire-resisting uPVC panels as part of replacement window units, which might have contributed to the total failure of windows during a fire, allowing the fire to pass upwards across the exterior wall and enter the windows of flats above;

¶c. A lack of fire-stopping in wall cavities, allowing the unrestricted rapid spread of fire through the building;

¶d. A lack of fire-stopping in service riser ducts allowing fire to spread rapidly through blocks of flats, trapping some residents due to smoke-logging and high temperatures in the escape routes;

¶e. A lack of fire-stopping between routes of escape and individual flats, which led to residents becoming trapped in smoke-filled flats and requiring rescue.

¶73.7 The letter had apparently been based on fire investigation reports relating to premises where such defects had been noticed following inspections by fire safety regulation officers.³¹⁹³¹⁹ Dobson {Day210/117:9-16}.

Conclusions

¶73.8 The evidence as a whole, but particularly the letter of 23 March 2009, shows that by that date some senior officers within the LFB had become aware: a. that non-fire-resisting panels which could contribute to the spread of fire had been used on the external walls of some blocks of flats;

¶b. that a failure of compartmentation caused by a lack of fire-stopping could lead to an unrestricted, rapid spread of fire through a building;

¶c. that such defects created a risk of residents' becoming trapped in areas of the building in which they should have been safe; d. that those hazards had already been encountered at some incidents; and

¶e. that the Building Regulations could not be relied upon to prevent buildings being exposed to risks of that kind.