Chapter 82: Aspects of firefighting at Grenfell Tower

¶82.1 The operational firefighting response to the Grenfell Tower fire was investigated in Phase 1. In this chapter we address two particular topics relating to operational firefighting which the chairman considered called for further consideration in Phase 2: a. the effectiveness of the equipment used by the LFB on the night of 14 June 2017,

including aerial ladder platforms, ground monitors, positive pressure ventilation systems and lightweight portable pumps; and

¶b. the benefits offered by items of equipment that were not used at the Grenfell Tower fire, but which were available to fire and rescue services at the time, including smoke hoods and smoke curtains.

Aerial appliances, ground monitors and handheld branches

¶82.2 In the Phase 1 report the chairman made findings about the deployment of the principal items of equipment used by the LFB as part of its operational response to the fire. They included findings, to the extent that the evidence allowed, about the times and locations at which equipment was used during the course of the incident. In Phase 2, we have considered the effectiveness of that equipment and its deployment on the night of the fire, as contemplated in the Phase 1 report.¹⁷⁴⁵¹⁷⁴⁵ Phase 1 Report Volume IV paragraph 28.132.

¶82.3 The aerial ladder platform brought to the incident by Surrey Fire and Rescue Service (S13A1) could deploy water from a height of 42 metres, in contrast to similar vehicles operated by the LFB, which could project water from a maximum height of 32 metres.¹⁷⁴⁶¹⁷⁴⁶ Phase 1 Report Volume IV paragraph 28.133. Given that S13A1 was not used until after the last casualty had been rescued, the effectiveness of that aerial appliance has not been considered as part of our investigations.

¶82.4 In Mr McGuirk's opinion the LFB was successful in applying water to all four sides of the building, based on his own appraisal of the contemporaneous evidence and Dr Barbara Lane's analysis of the extent to which fire spread over the external walls on each side of the tower.¹⁷⁴⁷¹⁷⁴⁷ McGuirk, Firefighting Expert Report {SMC00000046/68-69} paragraph 183. The available images show a clear inverse correlation between the deployment of external firefighting equipment and the downward spread of fire, which was more limited on the south and east faces of the tower (down to floors 10 and 18 respectively) than it was on the north and west faces (down to floors 9 and 7 respectively). The images also show that a higher reach was achieved by the equipment deployed against the south and east faces of the tower, namely the ground monitor on the south side walkway and aerial ladder A245 on the east side. A213 contributed to the external firefighting on the east side, but to a much more limited degree, given the relatively early stage at which it needed to be moved away from the tower.

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¶82.5 It is clear that water was applied to the external faces of the north and west sides of the tower, albeit to a lower height, either by ground monitors or handheld jets or, more likely, a combination of the two, and appears to have been effective in limiting the downward spread of fire. That is consistent with Dr Stoianov's assessment of the application of water to the tower over the course of the incident.¹⁷⁴⁸¹⁷⁴⁸ Stoianov, Water Expert Report {ISTRP00000006/7-8}.

¶82.6 It is indisputable that the operators of the two aerial appliances on the east side of the tower, CM Daniel Harriman and FF Christopher Reynolds (who were in charge of A213) and CM Christopher Frost and FF Jason King (who were in charge of A245, overseen by WM Stuart Beale), demonstrated considerable courage and ingenuity on the night of 14 June 2017. CM Harriman and FF Reynolds operated their appliance for as long as practicable in very difficult circumstances, putting their own safety at risk from the burning debris that began falling from the tower soon after the appliance had been set up. CM Frost and FF King were successful in setting up A245 on the grass by the tower, although that was not in accordance with established procedure.¹⁷⁴⁹¹⁷⁴⁹ Policy 822: Operational use of aerial appliances {LFB00000189}. As Mr McGuirk said, that was a calculated risk and an appropriate exercise of initiative.¹⁷⁵⁰¹⁷⁵⁰ McGuirk, Firefighting Expert Report {SMC00000046/64} paragraph 170. CM Frost and FF King, overseen by WM Beale, also successfully devised a system that enabled their aerial to apply water up to floor 13 of the tower by strapping a high-pressure hose on to the cage of the platform.¹⁷⁵¹¹⁷⁵¹ Stoianov, Water Expert Report {ISTRP00000006/24} lines 8-9. That measure ensured an effective supply of water at the top of the appliance, despite the problems that the crew had initially experienced when trying to operate the monitor built into the cage of A245.¹⁷⁵²¹⁷⁵² McGuirk, Firefighting Expert Report {SMC00000046/64} paragraph 170. That was pure improvisation on the crew's part and, again, it was an appropriate and considered use of initiative, which assisted in the external firefighting efforts on the east side of the tower.

¶82.7 Taking all that into account, the LFB personnel who were responsible for external firefighting acted diligently and professionally in extremely difficult circumstances, including the fact that the ability of each of the aerial appliances to project water was limited primarily by the low water flow provided by the hydrants. That was particularly so in relation to A245, the water for which was supplied by the incorrectly labelled wash-out hydrant.¹⁷⁵³¹⁷⁵³ Stoianov, Water Expert Report {ISTRP00000006/238} lines 20-22. To a great extent, those factors were outside the control of the LFB personnel managing the appliances. It was not the LFB's responsibility to ensure that hydrants were correctly labelled¹⁷⁵⁴¹⁷⁵⁴ Stoianov, Water Expert Report {ISTRP00000006/67} lines 14-16; {ISTRP00000006/69}. and we therefore make no criticism of the firefighters who used that hydrant.

¶82.8 There are, however, two points that should be made. First, it is unfortunate that the information on the Mobile Data Terminal about the location and operational status of hydrants in the vicinity of Grenfell Tower was inaccurate. Hydrant H1, which was used to supply appliance G272, was not identified at all and Hydrant H4 was incorrectly labelled as defective,¹⁷⁵⁵¹⁷⁵⁵ Stoianov, Water Expert Report {ISTRP00000006/65}; {ISTRP00000008/73} lines 18-24; {LFB00024354}. but it is unlikely that those inaccuracies made any material difference to the effectiveness of the operational response. However, it is yet further evidence of more general problems with the LFB's systems for the collection and management of operational risk information.

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¶82.9 Secondly, we agree with Dr Stoianov's view that the communications between firefighters on the incident ground and Thames Water's technicians, who relayed information to the Network Management Centre,¹⁷⁵⁶¹⁷⁵⁶ Stoianov, Water Expert Report {ISTRP00000009/4}; {ISTRP00000009/7}. were essentially casual in nature causing relevant information to be lost or not communicated at all. We recognise that the firefighters who spoke to Thames Water either in person or by telephone were operating under enormous pressure and were doing their best to improve the effectiveness of the equipment being used. Nonetheless, there is no record of any clear and explicit request having been received by the Network Management Centre to make water available in accordance with the requirements of the main appliances in use at the incident.¹⁷⁵⁷¹⁷⁵⁷ Stoianov, Water Expert Report {ISTRP00000009/93}. WM Beale said that he had asked one of the technicians on the incident ground for more water, but in the absence of any formal or consistent system for passing requests to Thames Water, it is not surprising that the request was not received or formally noted at the Network Management Centre.¹⁷⁵⁸¹⁷⁵⁸ Phase 1 hearings: {Day34/84:9-19}; Stoianov, Water Expert Report {ISTRP00000009/93}. In any event, it was not the responsibility of operational personnel, who were trying to carry out or oversee firefighting operations, to ensure that the specific requirements of those appliances were communicated to the Network Management Centre. In the first instance, that should have been the responsibility of a bulk media adviser.

¶82.10 Subject to those qualifications, the firefighters involved in the firefighting operations outside the tower did all that they reasonably could to extinguish the fire and to protect the lives of those inside the building.

Other equipment

¶82.11 Positive Pressure Ventilation fans (PPVs) provide forced ventilation which can be used to clear smoke-filled environments or to prevent smoke from entering a clear space. The fan increases the pressure of the air in the area in which it is placed, thereby causing air to flow into the adjacent space. The technique is commonly used in multi-storey buildings.¹⁷⁵⁹¹⁷⁵⁹ McGuirk, Firefighting Expert Report {SMC00000046/73} paragraphs 199-201.

¶82.12 At the Grenfell Tower fire a PPV fan was requested at 02.57 and again at 03.07. Two PPV fans arrived at the incident ground at about 04.00 and were used for a very short time in the lobby of the tower, before being stopped because they were increasing, rather than reducing, the amount of smoke in the lobby.¹⁷⁶⁰¹⁷⁶⁰ Phase 1 Report Volume III paragraph 16.87; Wilson {MET00019953/3-4}, pages 3-4.

¶82.13 Mr McGuirk explained that, when fighting a fire in a high-rise residential building, a PPV fan needs to be sited in the first instance at the entrance to the stairwell where it can direct fresh air into the stairwell to clear it of smoke.¹⁷⁶¹¹⁷⁶¹ McGuirk, Firefighting Expert Report {SMC00000046/73} paragraphs 199-201; McGuirk {Day190/140:3-5}. There may be an opening at the top of the stairwell through which air and smoke can escape, but fans can still be deployed effectively even if there is no opening.¹⁷⁶²¹⁷⁶² McGuirk, Firefighting Expert Report {SMC00000046/73} paragraph 201.

¶82.14 It is clear that PPV fans could not have been used effectively at the Grenfell Tower fire, primarily because of the layout of the ground and mezzanine floors. For example, positioning them in the lobby area on the ground floor, as was done, would only have pressurised that area because of the door that led to the stairwell on the mezzanine on floor 2. They could have been moved into the stairwell, but would then have been able to draw air only from within and not from outside the building. The effect would have been to recirculate the smoke that was already in the stairwell,¹⁷⁶³¹⁷⁶³ McGuirk {Day190/140:11}-{Day190/141:10}. which was precisely the problem encountered by the firefighters who tried to use them. It is highly unlikely, therefore, that the fans that were brought to the tower could ever have reduced the spread of smoke within the stairwell or anywhere else in the building outside the lobby area.

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¶82.15 A light portable pump is a small, purpose-built, petrol-powered pump capable of providing a water supply from sources that are not accessible to standard pump appliances (for example, a lake). Pumps of that kind are normally used in rural locations and are designed to deliver small quantities of water. They have a limited pumping capacity of no more than 1,000 litres per minute and can produce relatively limited pressure. They require regular refuelling and, because they emit exhaust fumes, are suitable for use in the open air rather than inside buildings.¹⁷⁶⁴¹⁷⁶⁴ McGuirk, Firefighting Expert Report {SMC00000046/76} paragraph 207; ORR v0.7 {LFB00032988/501}.

¶82.16 There is some evidence that a light portable pump was brought to Grenfell Tower in the later stages of the incident, but it is unclear whether it was used.¹⁷⁶⁵¹⁷⁶⁵ McGuirk, Firefighting Expert Report {SMC00000046/76} paragraph 207. It is unlikely, however, to have made any material difference to the supply of water or indeed the operations that the LFB was able to carry out inside or outside the tower. In particular, the limited pumping capacity and pressure achievable by a pump of that kind meant that it was not capable of providing any significant increase in the supply of water for firefighting. It would also have been unsuitable for use inside a residential high-rise block due to the emission of exhaust fumes.

Equipment not used on 14 June 2017

¶82.17 The Inquiry heard evidence in Phase 1 about two other pieces of equipment that were potentially available, but which were not used at Grenfell Tower: smoke hoods and smoke curtains.

¶82.18 Smoke hoods are used to protect members of the public from smoke and noxious fumes for a limited period while they are being helped by firefighters to leave the building.¹⁷⁶⁶¹⁷⁶⁶ McGuirk {Day190/157:144}-{Day190/158:11}. Smoke hoods were not commonly used before the Grenfell Tower fire, but they have since been adopted by a number of fire and rescue services, including the LFB and Kent Fire and Rescue Service.¹⁷⁶⁷¹⁷⁶⁷ McGuirk {Day190/158:13}-{Day190/159:7}.

¶82.19 We think that smoke hoods could certainly have helped in the rescue of some residents of the tower, as is illustrated by the rescue by CM Tillotson's crew of two residents from floor 9 of the tower with the aid of two additional breathing apparatus sets that they had collected from the bridgehead to be worn by the residents as they were helped out of the building.¹⁷⁶⁸¹⁷⁶⁸ Phase 1 Report Volume II paragraphs 12.3-12.5, 13.18-13.19, 13.69-13.70 and 14.112-14.114.

¶82.20 Smoke curtains are sheets of fire-resistant material attached to a frame that is designed to be inserted into an existing door frame. A small opening in the base of the curtain allows firefighters to pass in and out through the door, while preventing or minimising the passage of smoke.¹⁷⁶⁹¹⁷⁶⁹ Grimwood {Day188/54:12}-{Day188/55:16}. The function of the curtain is to protect the integrity of the smoke-free area on the other side (typically the stairwell) while allowing firefighters to enter the smoke-filled area to carry out firefighting or search and rescue operations.

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¶82.21 Like smoke hoods, smoke curtains were not commonly used before the Grenfell Tower fire but have since been introduced by a number of fire and rescue services,¹⁷⁷⁰¹⁷⁷⁰ McGuirk, Firefighting Expert Report {SMC00000046/85} paragraph 235; McGuirk {Day190/163:9-16}. including the LFB.

¶82.22 Smoke curtains may be a useful way of preventing or minimising the spread of smoke within a building where there has not been widespread compartmentation failure. We think they could have been used in the first hour or so of the incident to reduce the amount of smoke entering the stairwell and thereby help residents escape. However, we do not think they would have been likely to help much after that time because of the extent to which the smoke had spread and the number of compartmentation failures.

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