Memorandum to the Attorney General, 'KEVIN DANIEL WILLIAMS (DECEASED) APPLICATION UNDER SECTION

¶13[1][B] OF THE CORONER'S ACT 1988', 11 January 2006, AGO000001240001, pp2-14. 62. Internal note prepared by Lord Goldsmith, Attorney General, 5 February 2006, AGO000001300001, p1.

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The disclosed documents establish that 'evidence gathering' by SYP in the immediate aftermath of the disaster focused on the 'incident itself', specifying a cut-off at 3.15pm or 3.30pm.
From the disclosed documents it is clear that, prior to the mini-inquests, the Coroner understandably was concerned about his capacity to control the scope of the inquests – a concern reflected in the advice he received from other coroners. 'Response' and 'rescue' attempts were considered to be 'post-incident' and would not be addressed at the inquests.
Prior to the generic stage of the inquests, the WMP investigation team (acting as coroner's officers) advised that its scope should be restricted to the period 2.20pm to 3.05pm.
The rationale presented by the Coroner for selecting 3.15pm as the cut-off, acknowledged as appropriate by the High Court in the Judicial Review proceedings and the Stuart-Smith Scrutiny, was that all who died had suffered fatal and irreversible injuries by that time.
3.15pm was chosen because it was an undisputed and recorded time when an ambulance arrived on the pitch. This served as a 'marker' and the Coroner rounded the time to the nearest quarter-hour.
The pathologists' medical opinion underpinned the Coroner's final decision. It concluded that all who died suffered irretrievable, fatal injury and there could be no recovery regardless of whether the deceased lived beyond 3.15pm. This opinion neglected the significance of the particular circumstances in which each individual died, including the absence of appropriate medical or treatment intervention.
The acceptance of the pathologists' medical opinion as incontrovertible is evident from the Coroner's notes, in his affidavit to the High Court in the Judicial Review proceedings (in which he described the 'expert' pathological evidence as 'overwhelming') and in his evidence to the Stuart-Smith Scrutiny.
Records of meetings between the Coroner and the families' legal representatives reveal that the representatives accepted the 3.15pm cut-off and portrayed families' concerns about the mini-inquests as 'minimal'.
As the extent of the correspondence from families demonstrates, this assumption was mistaken. The Coroner dismissed the families' requests to extend the cut-off beyond 3.15pm to incorporate the period of rescue and evacuation because he believed they misunderstood the role and function of the inquests.
The disclosed documents show that the Coroner formed the view that the case for extending the generic stage of the inquests beyond 3.15pm would require evidence of a new causal act that resulted in any one death (novus actus interveniens). He concluded that there was no evidence of such acts or interventions, a conclusion supported by the High Court in the Judicial Review proceedings and by the Stuart-Smith Scrutiny.
The families accepted that the primary cause of injuries was crushing but, supported by further medical opinion, they challenged the certainty that all who died had suffered irretrievable fatal injury by 3.15pm. Thus they sought further inquiry into the emergency response, rescue and treatment.
In his evidence to the Stuart-Smith Scrutiny, the barrister who had represented the families at the generic stage of the inquests informed Lord Justice Stuart-Smith that he had advised the families there was no new causal act beyond 3.15pm.

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In the Coroner's summing up he accepted that had resuscitation been administered correctly, and before the onset of 'irretrievable brain damage', some of those who died might have survived. Taken literally, this comment raises concerns about the sufficiency of inquiry into the period of rescue and resuscitation.
In the well-documented case of Kevin Williams and successive submissions by his family to the Attorney General, the initial pathologist's opinion appeared definitive, but further authoritative opinions raised significant doubts about the accuracy of that initial opinion.
The documents disclosed show that, considered alongside the restrictions placed by the Coroner on the examination of the evidence presented to the mini-inquests and the presentation of the pathologists' medical opinion as incontrovertible, the imposition of the 3.15pm cut-off severely limited examination of the rescue, evacuation and treatment of those who died. This raised profound concerns regarding sufficiency of inquiry and examination of evidence.

¶Review and alteration of statements

¶2.11.1 As discussed in Part 1, statements made by South Yorkshire Police (SYP) officers in the form of handwritten recollections of their experiences on the day of the disaster underwent an unprecedented process of review and alteration before their submission to the official inquiry.

¶2.11.2 On the authority of the Chief Constable this process was conducted by a small team of officers managed by Chief Superintendent Donald Denton in consultation with Peter Metcalf, a senior partner in the SYP solicitors, Hammond Suddards. Although widely known to those directly involved in the inquiries and investigations, the process only became public knowledge following submissions to the Stuart-Smith Scrutiny and their subsequent analysis.1

¶2.11.3 Focusing on the material disclosed to the Panel, and in response to requests by bereaved families, this chapter revisits the initiation, operation and results of the review and alteration of SYP officers' statements. It also considers the adoption of a similar process by the South Yorkshire Metropolitan Ambulance Service (SYMAS). The wider consequences of the review and alteration process are discussed in Chapter 6.

¶Development of the review and alteration process within South Yorkshire Police 2.11.4 The disclosed papers reveal that the process of review and alteration undertaken by SYP developed incrementally in response to requests for evidence from West Midlands Police (WMP). In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, on Sunday 16 April 1989, SYP began to shape the investigation that followed.

¶2.11.5 At this initial meeting senior SYP officers anticipated that police officers would be interviewed as witnesses (in fact this did not happen). A record of the meeting disclosed to the Panel stated: 'Every officer is going to have to be interviewed and a statement obtained and they are going to have to be interviewed by Detectives. Duty statements [written by officers] are out.'2

Stuart-Smith, LJ Scrutiny of Evidence Relating to the Hillsborough Football Stadium Disaster Cm 3878 London:

¶The Stationery Office (copy at HOM000045010001); and Scraton, P Hillsborough: The Truth Edinburgh: Mainstream

¶Publications, 1999 (1st Edn). 2. SYP briefing given at noon on Sunday 16 April 1989, SYP000010040001, pp9-14.

Chapter 11 Review and alteration of statements — 315

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¶2.11.6 In contrast to their professional training, officers were instructed not to record their experiences in pocket books and 'anyone who was involved yesterday take time to sit down and make some notes'. The briefing officer asked if officers had 'made a pocket book brief'. None had. The briefing officer continued: 'Do not start making pocket book entries. Yesterday was the most traumatic experience of my life and large chunks of it I cannot remember. I am sure it must be the same for many of you'.

¶2.11.7 The rationale for abandoning pocket book entries was not fully explained. However, in a meeting with Counsel some days later, Mr Metcalf stated that 'briefs, accounts etc will remain privilege'. Thus they would remain confidential to SYP and its legal advisers. In contrast, 'pocket notebook entries can be called for [by the Inquiry] and must be produced'.3

¶2.11.8 On Monday 17 April, a meeting was attended by Chief Constable Peter Wright, Chief Superintendents Brian Mole and David Duckenfield, and other senior officers.4 The chronology of the disaster was discussed, along with the process of evidence gathering.

¶2.11.9 At this meeting the process of note-taking, suggested the previous day, was developed. Detective Superintendent Graham McKay suggested that '[s]o far as the enquiry team is concerned – set down your recollections over the next few days. We should be doing that with officers at the game'. The Chief Constable replied: 'Very good point – all officers at the game to make records of their recollections'.

¶2.11.10 This was the first reference in the disclosed papers to gathering 'recollections', rather than 'notes'. While the planned use of the recollections was not set out in detail, the notes of the meeting recorded that the intention was to gather evidence to inform the forthcoming investigation by WMP. CC Wright stated: '[I]f we [SYP] leave it to the West Midlands to provide the evidence we might not get the broad scope of evidence flowing in'.5 SYP should be 'the authors of most of the information fed in'.

¶2.11.11 By 20 April the planned use of 'recollections' became more formalised and was explained in a letter from solicitors Hammond Suddards to SYP Deputy Chief Constable Peter Hayes.6 SYP would be expected to submit a 'formal proof of evidence' (a written submission) to the Taylor Inquiry.

¶2.11.12 This would include details of SYP's approach to policing Hillsborough and an account of events on the day of the disaster. To produce this 'proof of evidence', Hammond Suddards advised, 'it will be necessary to have statements from as many as possible of the Officers who were deployed at the ground on that day'.

¶2.11.13 Because the statements to be provided by SYP officers were 'not required for the purpose of any criminal investigation', there was 'no reason ... for them to be prepared on CJA [Criminal Justice Act] forms and indeed many can, in our view, be self-taken, in the sense of simply forming a record of the recollections of the Officer concerned'. The quality of the Chief Constable's submission to the Taylor Inquiry would, they advised, 'depend very much on the accuracy and quality of information provided by the Officers who were on duty'.

Meeting with Counsel, 26 April 1989, SYP000097210001, p2. 4. Notes of SYP meeting,17 April 1989, SYP000129200001, p37. 5. Notes of SYP meeting,¹⁷¹⁷ December 1997, HOM000030920001, p1. April 1989, SYP000096360001, p50. 6. Letter from Hammond Suddards to Deputy Chief Constable SYP,²⁰²⁰ April 1989, HOM000016460001, pp1-5. April 1989, SYP000096850001, pp8-10.

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¶2.11.14 On 25 April, DCC Hayes informed WMP's Assistant Chief Constable Mervyn Jones of SYP's 'intention to obtain self-serving [i.e. self-taken] statements down to the rank of inspector and from all officers involved at the Leppings Lane end of the ground'.7 DCC Hayes reported that ACC Jones 'saw no problem with that whatsoever, understands that we need to be getting on with this quickly, has no worries over this but thanked us for informing him of our intended action'.

¶2.11.15 The process of gathering 'recollections', also noted in the documents as 'self-prepared' or 'self-taken' statements, began on 26 April. Chief Superintendent Terry Wain, in charge of putting together SYP's 'proof of evidence', briefed officers at 9am.8 Recollections would follow a template suggested by Hammond Suddards to produce a full account of the events on the day.

¶2.11.16 Regarding their collection from officers, 'that's where you fellows [those present at the meeting] come in'. Accounts would be obtained from 'as many as possible of the officers who were deployed in the vicinity of the Leppings Lane end of the ground that day' including 'not just those in the ground but those in the terraces at the turnstiles and outside the ground at Leppings Lane'.

¶2.11.17 The initial template was narrow, requesting details of officers' actions. It was soon revised to request information on 'the mood of fans', 'actions of stewards', 'any breakdown in radio transmissions' and whether officers had dealt with any of the deceased, as well as information as to their 'fears, feelings and observations'.9

¶2.11.18 C/Supt Wain stated that SYP's task was 'not to examine the policing arrangements on that day or to investigate actions or to establish blame in any way'. The 'job' was 'merely to collate what evidence South Yorkshire Police officer [sic] can provide to their Chief Constable in order that we can present a suitable case, on behalf of the force, to the subsequent inquiries'.10 Consistent with legal advice given to SYP, officers' accounts were to 'be self-written on plain paper and will not be taken under CJA [Criminal Justice Act] rules'.

¶2.11.19 Later on 26 April a meeting of senior police officers, including DCC Hayes and C/Supt Mole, and their legal Counsel, Bill Woodward QC, was held at which the process was confirmed.11 DCC Hayes informed Mr Woodward that the 'main players in this are doing their own accounts'. He asked, 'is that O.K. or would you rather someone take their statement'. Mr Woodward replied, 'It couldn't be better. They can put all the things in that they want and we will sort them out'.

¶2.11.20 At this point, 'self-taken' statements were intended to inform a submission to the Taylor Inquiry, the contents of which would be controlled by SYP.12 The statements were not intended to be shared but this changed within days as a consequence of requests from WMP.

Note of conversation between DCC Hayes and ACC Jones, 25 April 1989, SYP000097140001, p3. 8. 'Briefing for officers co-ordinating the collation of self-prepared statements from Police Officers on duty at the FA Cup semi-final at Hillsborough – 15 April 1989', 26 April 1989, SYP000097200001, p7. 9. Police Officer's recollection with copy proforma, 28 April 1989, SYP000111860001, p16. 10. 'Briefing for officers co-ordinating the collation of self-prepared statements from Police Officers on duty at the FA Cup semi-final at Hillsborough – 15 April 1989', 26 April 1989, SYP000097200001, p7. 11. Minutes of Meeting with Counsel, 26 April 1989, SYP000097210001, p90. 12. The report ultimately produced as a result of this process is 'SYP submission to Taylor', SYP000096740001.

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¶2.11.21 On 29 April, ACC Jones wrote to CC Wright, inviting a number of senior officers to 'submit evidence' to be 'pass[ed] on to Lord Justice Taylor's Inquiry'.13 From the documents disclosed this was the first formal indication that WMP did not intend to interview SYP officers, but would be content to rely on written evidence.

¶2.11.22 According to a note written on the same day by Mr Metcalf of Hammond Suddards, the WMP request gave 'rise to some concern'.14 Given the various roles assigned to WMP, Mr Metcalf initially had felt 'it might not be fair on the Officers' if self-taken statements were to be used at the inquests or in disciplinary proceedings, rather than being restricted to the Taylor Inquiry.

¶2.11.23 CC Wright, however, 'was satisfied that the West Midlands inquiry had a duty to report only to the Judge [i.e. LJ Taylor]'. He considered that 'there was no practical difficulty because there was not going to be anything in the self-taken statements which would not have been in CJA [Criminal Justice Act] statements if taken'.

¶2.11.24 Even so, it was agreed 'that it would be sensible for [Peter Metcalf] to see these statements before they went out to the West Midlands inquiry and to have some time to go through them with the men involved'. In doing so, Mr Metcalf 'made various suggestions for alterations'. This included the statement of Assistant Chief Constable Walter Jackson, who 'had not included any of the details of the planning of the match'.

¶2.11.25 On 7 May, ACC Jones wrote to CC Wright submitting a request from LJ Taylor for written recollections from more SYP officers.15 Officers had been selected because of the SYP 'operation order which identifies those police officers who were likely to be at Leppings Lane end, both inside and outside the ground'. Counsel to the Inquiry was keen to obtain 'as many written submissions as possible' prior to the opening of the hearings on 15 May 1989.

¶2.11.26 ACC Jones wrote that the 'invitation to submit written recollections follows the same criteria as for the senior officers before, in that there will be no interviews just requests to which the officer will be free to decide what he or she wishes to do'.

¶2.11.27 On 9 May, C/Supt Denton consulted Mr Metcalf.16 Mr Metcalf's note of the conversation recorded that WMP's request for statements concerned 120 officers of whom 100 had already provided an account to SYP. Outstanding accounts would be provided specifically for WMP, while 'for the others, there would need to be some scrutiny of the existing documents'. Many 'might be suitable to be handed on without further ado' but 'those which included comment or matters of speculation would probably have to be redone'.

¶2.11.28 A letter from C/Supt Denton to Mr Metcalf recorded that the solicitor had 'agreed to vet' the requested recollections.17 A note from C/Supt Wain to the SYP Incident Room confirmed the process: 'Nothing currently in our possession will be released to W/Mids until it has been vetted by our legal representatives'.18

ACC Jones, WMP, to CC Wright, SYP, 29 April 1989, SYP000096900001, p11. 14. Notes written by Peter Metcalf on conversations with SYP officers, 29 April 1989 to 2 May 1989, attached to letter to

¶Lord Justice Stuart-Smith, 11 November 1997, HOM000037560001, pp4-7. 15. Letter from ACC Jones to CC Wright, 7 May 1989, SYP000096900001, p39. 16. Attendance notes written by Peter Metcalf on discussions with SYP held on 9 May 1989, attached to letter to Lord

¶Justice Stuart-Smith, 11 November 1997, HOM000037560001, p9. 17. Letter from C/Supt Denton to Peter Metcalf,⁹⁹ August 1991, SPA000000600001. 140. Letter from ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, to Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, 28 March 1991, SYP000123570001, p98. 141. Letter from Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, to ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, 10 April 1991, SYP000123570001, pp91-92. 142. Letter from ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, to Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, 10 April 1991, SYP000123570001, p95. 143. Letter from Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, to ACC Moore, South Yorkshire Police, 7 May 1991, SYP000123570001, pp75-78.Show full note May 1989, HOM000030840001, p29. 18. Note from C/Supt Wain to the Incident Room, 10 May 1989, HOM000030840001, p30.

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¶2.11.29 Hundreds of officers' recollections were vetted, continuing into June. For SYP, the process was led by C/Supt Denton. Mr Metcalf undertook the key role on behalf of Hammond Suddards. The correspondence between SYP and Hammond Suddards concerning individual officers' recollections was substantial and conducted primarily by fax.19

¶The consolidation of the review and alteration process 2.11.30 The process of allowing self-taken statements was expanded to include officers from other forces on duty at Hillsborough, including those from Merseyside Police. A letter from ACC Jones of the WMP investigation team to the Chief Constable of Merseyside, Sir Kenneth Oxford, stated that the invitation to 'submit written recollections is based on criteria that I have already adopted with South Yorkshire Police officers'.20

¶2.11.31 There would be 'no interviews just simple requests to which the officer will be free to decide what he or she wishes to say'. ACC Jones noted that CC Wright had requested copies of the recollections, and Counsel for the Taylor Inquiry had 'no objections'.

¶2.11.32 On 23 May, SYP Assistant Chief Constable Stuart Anderson circulated two updates on the progress of inquiries into Hillsborough.21 The first focused on the Taylor Inquiry. The second was in response to SYP officers' concerns 'about alterations being made to their original statements prior to submission to West Midlands Police'.

¶2.11.33 ACC Anderson described the process: Hammond Suddards 'initially requested that all officers directly concerned should, as soon as possible, prepare a note of their recollections, in the form of a statement, including matters of comment and impression, whether or not this amounted to evidence'.

¶2.11.34 He stated that SYP had been advised subsequently by WMP that 'it would be appreciated if South Yorkshire Police officers, who were at Hillsborough, could effectively prepare their own factual statements for submission to the Inquiry'. This was agreed.

¶2.11.35 The 'obvious way of proceeding' was to 'look at the statements which had been initially prepared at our request, on the basis that if matters of hearsay and comment could be removed, these would be suitable as the factual statements requested by the West Midlands Police'.

¶2.11.36 ACC Anderson wrote that 'statements for submission to our own Counsel were intended to have an entirely different purpose to those submitted to West Midlands Police'. Initial recollections had 'contained a mixture of fact, conjecture and opinion'. Thus 'editing them for use as a factual statement by the Inquiry' necessitated the removal by the solicitors of 'conjecture and opinion', leaving 'only matters of fact'.

¶2.11.37 As all statements 'submitted to the Inquiry may be taken into account in reaching conclusions, whether or not the officer making the statement is called as a witness', it 'follows that the statements must contain only direct factual observations, as opposed to matters of impression'. ACC Anderson's note concluded: 'No amended statement will be submitted to the West Midlands Police until it has been seen, approved and signed by the officer making it'.

For example, at HOM000030840001 from p34. 20. Letter from ACC Jones to CC Oxford, 11 May 1989, SYP000017680001, p4. 21. 'The Hillsborough Inquiry – Update I', by ACC Anderson, 23 May 1989, SYP000097520001, pp11-14 and 'The

¶Hillsborough Inquiry – Update II' by ACC Anderson, 23 May 1989, SYP000097540001, p8.

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¶2.11.38 An early version of ACC Anderson's note, drafted by Mr Metcalf of solicitors Hammond Suddards, sheds additional light on the likely focus of the vetting process. Statements could be taken into account by LJ Taylor in reaching his conclusions, 'whether or not the Officer making that statement is called as a witness'.22

¶2.11.39 This could mean that criticisms made of 'other Officers, senior or junior' might be accepted by the Inquiry without being challenged in cross-examination. To prevent this from occurring, Mr Metcalf proposed that any statements containing such criticism 'should not be allowed to stand'.

¶2.11.40 Documents relating to a breakdown in the vetting process demonstrate that WMP and the Treasury Solicitor's Department were aware that alterations were being made to police recollections prior to their submission as formal statements.23

¶2.11.41 A letter from WMP's ACC Jones reminded David Brummell, an official at the Treasury Solicitor's Department, that 'because of the slowness of the supply of written recollections from South Yorkshire Police Officers, it was agreed that we would take from them their initial submissions which would be later superseded by their signed final versions, after they had been checked by their appropriate legal advice'.24

¶2.11.42 ACC Jones stated that he had 'personally made an undertaking with the Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police that only the final versions would be the ones used in the Public Inquiry and this was after discussion with you'. At the Inquiry, however, an officer had been 'referred to his initial submission which contained opinion that had subsequently been removed from his final account'. Given the undertaking made by ACC Jones to SYP that only amended statements would be submitted, he 'would hope that this would not happen in the future'.

¶2.11.43 In reply, Mr Brummell wrote that the main difference between the 'initial and final versions' of SYP officers' statements was that 'expressions of opinion were (as I understand it, on the advice of [SYP Counsel] Mr Woodward) removed from the final version'.25

¶2.11.44 Yet it was the view of Andrew Collins QC, Counsel to the Inquiry, that 'there is absolutely no reason for excluding such expressions of opinion' where they touched on 'matters relevant to the Public Inquiry'. The Inquiry had in fact 'no objection in principle to written statements containing such opinion being submitted'.

¶2.11.45 Despite this view, and following the undertaking given by ACC Jones to the SYP Chief Constable, it was agreed that it would be inappropriate to use an 'original statement for the purpose of the Inquiry when this has been superseded by a subsequent statement'. Regarding the specific case, the final version of the statement had not been received in time and the original had been used. Mr Brummell wrote that 'I trust that this problem will not recur in the future'.

¶2.11.46 This exchange of letters demonstrates that the team supporting LJ Taylor was aware that SYP statements were reviewed and altered to remove 'expressions of opinion'. Mr Brummell's letter, however, indicated that the Inquiry considered there was 'absolutely no reason' for amendments. Yet the process was clearly not considered improper and no objections were raised.

Draft 'Hillsborough Update', SYP000160270001, p5. 23. The section below related to the Stuart-Smith Scrutiny, however, suggests that WMP may not have been aware of the extent of the changes made. 24. Letter from ACC Jones to David Brummell, Treasury Solicitor, 7 June 1989, SYP000096900001, p44. 25. Letter from David Brummell to ACC Jones, 7 June 1989, SYP000096900001, p46.

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¶The form of amendments 2.11.47 The full extent of the review and alteration process can be appreciated only through consideration of all statements disclosed to the Panel and placed in the Hillsborough Archive. While there are numerous examples of statements that underwent review and alteration, what follows considers the reasons adopted by SYP and their solicitors for the process and its significance.

¶2.11.48 It uses illustrative examples drawn from the statements presented under collective headings: grammatical clarification, redundant language and jargon; informal or coarse language; criticisms of the police response or inadequate leadership; poor communications or inadequate radio contact; deletion of references to 'chaos', 'fear', 'panic' or 'confusion'; and abusive criticism of supporters.

¶Grammatical clarification, redundant language and jargon 2.11.49 These amendments included incorrect grammar, syntax, redundant words, removal of parts of the text using Police Force 'jargon' or informal or coarse language to describe particular processes, punctuation, omission of obvious words, and rectification of mistakes (e.g. correction of an officer's mistaken reference to the game between 'Sheffield Wednesday and Liverpool').26

¶2.11.50 There appear to be a total of 194 statements identified for amendment. In 30 cases, changes related solely to this category. In these cases, the amendments did not alter the material content nor change the meaning of the statement.

¶2.11.51 For example the statement: 'I was approached by reporters from Radio Sheffield & Hallam that the then Lord Mayor Mrs Smith had requested that they attend the directors suit [sic] in order to speak to her and that she was to give an interview to them on what had taken place' was amended to read: 'I was informed by two reporters from Radio Sheffield & Hallam that the then Lord Mayor Mrs Smith had requested that they attend the directors suite in order to speak to her and that she was to give an interview to them on what had taken place'.27

¶2.11.52 The following amendment is a typical example of the elimination of 'redundant' words: 'Further to the [my] account given by me regarding my involvement' (deletions in text).28 Force jargon was clarified for the lay-reader, for example a reference to 'C & C' was amended to 'Command and Control'.29 Similarly 'via XS' was amended to 'via force control'.30

¶Informal or coarse language 2.11.53 A total of 164 statements were marked for amendments more substantial than simple corrections. Of these, 22 were amended to remove coarse or informal language.31

Statement of Sergeant David Batty (unamended),¹⁷¹⁷ December 1997, HOM000030920001, p1. May 1989, SYP000101600001, p1. 27. Statement of PC June Kirk (unamended), undated, SYP000104450001, p2. Amended version: SYP000108290001, p3. 28. Statement of CI Malcolm Edmundson (unamended), 29 April 1989, SYP000117780001, p6. Amended version:

¶SYP000100430001. 29. Statement of CI Malcolm Edmundson (unamended), 29 April 1989, SYP000117780001, p1. Amended version:

¶SYP000100430001. 30. Additional Statement of CI Malcolm Edmundson (unamended), 7 July 1989, SYP000117780001, p4. Amended version: SYP000100430001. 31. Note that in many cases statements were amended for a number of reasons.

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¶2.11.54 An officer's statement referred to a fan who had been drinking: 'He had a can of beer in his hand. It was open and he was shaking it causing the contents to spray about. I took it off him and binned it. He then started to insult and abuse me and relate circumstances to the miners [sic] strike. I bollocked him and he was dragged away [deletion in text]'.

¶2.11.55 The final sentence was replaced by: 'I remonstrated with him, and he was taken away by his fellow supporters'.32 Similarly, expletives were removed: 'The gym was to put it bluntly fucking awful and I'll never forget the sight of the bodies dumped all over'.33

¶Police response or inadequate leadership 2.11.56 Beyond the issues of language, more significant alterations were made changing the meaning or balance of statements. Some 116 of the 164 substantially amended statements removed or altered comments unfavourable to SYP. These included 41 statements in which alterations downplayed or removed criticisms made by officers of their leadership and of the police response to the disaster. These commonly included any indication or impression that senior officers had lost control of events, or that they were ill-equipped to respond to the unfolding tragedy. The amendments also frequently included deletions of references relevant to the failure to effectively monitor the pens and close the tunnel once Gate C was opened, as discussed in Chapter 3 from paragraph 2.3.121.

¶2.11.57 The following account had the first sentence deleted:

¶I at no time heard any directions being given in terms of leadership. The only messages I heard were those requesting assistance of one sort or another, and where appropriate, their acknowledgements.34

¶2.11.58 Similarly, an observation about the role of senior management was deleted:

¶I have to state that even at this stage and this location and with a number of higher ranks in the area nobody seemed to be organising the injured.35

¶2.11.59 Police Constable John Hood was critical of sergeants and inspectors and the following was deleted from his original statement:

¶Sergeants and Inspectors appeared to be aimlessly milling about and direct radio control appeared to be lost. There did not appear to be any leadership.36

¶2.11.60 Police Constable Maxwell Groome's observation that 'The Control Room seemed to have been hit by some sort of paralysis' was deleted.37 Concerned by what he identified as poor management overall, he considered the decision to replace C/Supt Mole as match commander shortly before the match should be scrutinised. The following material was deleted:

Statement of PC Kevin Smallman (unamended), 30 April 1989, SYP000118000001, p3. Amended version:

¶SYP000100530001. 33. Statement of PC Gary Cammock (unamended), 8 May 1989, SYP000119990001, p10. Amended version:

¶SYP000101040001, p9. 34. Statement of PC Stephen Mercer (unamended), 27 April 1989, SYP000116760001, p7. Amended version:

¶SYP000100140001, p5. 35. Statement of PC Kenneth Frost (unamended), 28 April 1989, SYP000117100001, p5. Amended version:

¶SYP000100220001, p5. 36. Statement of PC John Hood (unamended),¹⁷¹⁷ December 1997, HOM000030920001, p1. May 1989, SYP000120660001, p2. Amended version: 37. Statement of PC Maxwell Groome (unamended),⁴⁴ March 1988, SYP000096970001, p600. May 1989, SYP000113620001, p4. Amended version:

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¶(7) The decision to replace Chief Superintendent Mole before the semi-final needs to come under some scrutiny. This man had many years experience of policing big matches at Hillsborough.

¶(8) Compared to other semi-finals held at Hillsborough, the organisation of this event was poor, as has been the case for most of the season. Too little notice had been taken of current trends and football intelligence and too much reliance has been placed upon previous information held.

¶(9) Too many non-operational supervisory officers were in charge of important and critical parts of the football ground.

¶(10) The deployment of officers around the crucial time needs to come under scrutiny, too many were sat around in the gymnasium whilst others were rushed off their feet.38

¶2.11.61 His statement was one of those most extensively altered. In his initial version he stated:

¶It was noticeable that the only supervisory officers above the rank of Inspector on the pitch were Chief Inspectors Beal and Sumner and Superintendent Greenwood.

¶Certain supervisory officers were conspicuous by their absence. It was utter chaos.

¶2.11.62 Altered, this read 'On the pitch were Chief Inspectors Beal and Sumner and Superintendent Greenwood'.39 A three-paragraph deletion included PC Groome's comments regarding the overcrowding in the central pens, the failure to delay the kick-off, the reduction in police numbers compared with the 1988 Semi-Final and the pressures on Control Room staff.

¶2.11.63 While these latter concerns reflected his broader opinion of events on the day and policing Hillsborough, his commentary on senior officers' presence or absence was his observation of appropriate police leadership and response.

¶2.11.64 Alterations to Police Constable Alan Wadsworth's original recollection also removed criticism of senior officers. The following passage was deleted:

¶There was no leadership at the Leppings Lane end following the disaster either in person or on the radio. The only officer I heard on the radio with any form of organisation and method was Ch Supt Nesbit who did not arrive until later.40

¶2.11.65 References made by five officers to disorganisation in the police response were altered or removed from their recollections. The following deletion is indicative:

¶Through out [sic] the time I was on the pitch or at the rear of the stand I saw no officer above the rank of sergeant other than Ch Insp Beal who was attempting to organise action on the playing area.41

Statement of PC Maxwell Groome (unamended),⁴⁴ March 1988, SYP000096970001, p600. May 1989, SYP000113620001, pp6-7. Amended version:

¶SYP000078330001, p8. 39. Statement of PC Maxwell Groome (unamended),⁴⁴ March 1988, SYP000096970001, p600. May 1989, SYP000113620001, pp4-5. Amended version:

¶SYP000078330001, p7. 40. Statement of PC Alan Wadsworth (unamended), undated, SYP000101960001, p7. Amended version: 41. Statement of PC Morledge (unamended), undated, SYP000102770001, p3. Amended version: SYP000108180001, p5.

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¶2.11.66 Several officers explicitly criticised the lack of coordination in the police response to the emergent crisis. References to senior officers' failure to coordinate the response were removed from these statements, including those of Inspector Derek Burgess who stated that, although urgent assistance had been requested, there was no officer 'of senior rank … co-ordinating such assistance'.42

¶2.11.67 Police Constable Philip Foster noted: 'No one was co-ordinating what we should do or saying where to go'.43 His original recollection was altered to read: 'I could not see anyone co-ordinating what we should do or saying where to go'.44 This change in emphasis was, in fact, a change in meaning.

¶2.11.68 Police Constable David Frost's emotional and graphic account was heavily edited, including the following deletion:

¶Notice for the first time the gaffers are now about. Where have they been. Why was the organisation so late. Thought. Anyway, good to see them in with the lads.45

¶Poor communications or inadequate radio contact 2.11.69 In managing the safety and regulation of large crowds, effective and efficient communication between police officers, including contact with others involved in stewarding, is imperative. This is particularly significant in the event of an emergency and the mobilisation of a previously agreed and rehearsed incident plan. In the aftermath of the disaster, poor communication between officers, the inadequate number of police radios available to those on duty, and the ineffectiveness of the radios that were working were frequently cited in officers' recollections. Such comments were regularly altered, amended or deleted.

¶2.11.70 These alterations minimised the difficulties officers experienced in communicating with one another and with match commanders as the emergency unfolded. In 48 instances, officers' statements were amended to remove or alter comments about the unavailability or inadequacy of police radios, and/or poor communication between senior SYP officers and the lower ranks deployed inside and outside the stadium.

¶2.11.71 In his initial account, Police Constable Keith Bradley referred to problems with radio communication and lack of direction from senior management. It was altered substantially. His original recollection read:

¶As it became obvious what had happened those of us attempting to keep some sort of order outside the ground, and keep the way clear for emergency vehicles, were subjected to a non stop torrent of vehement verbal abuse and threats from a good proportion of the crowd by now leaving the ground, this was a frightening situation as we were by now vastly outnumbered by a potentially hostile mass of distressed people. No officer senior or otherwise, came to inform us of what had happened, we were deflecting the insults, threats and abuse, basically still being unaware of what exactly had happened. Radio traffic was non existent all through this time, as was a lack of direction from supervisory officers.46

Statement of Insp Derek Burgess (unamended), 3 May 1989, SYP000119100001, p6. Amended version:

¶SYP000075060001, p8. 43. Statement of PC Philip Foster (unamended), 3 May 1989, SYP000118880001, p6. 44. Statement of PC Philip Foster (amended version), 3 May 1989, SYP000100700001, p6. 45. Statement of PC David Frost (unamended),⁹⁹ August 1991, SPA000000600001. 140. Letter from ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, to Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, 28 March 1991, SYP000123570001, p98. 141. Letter from Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, to ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, 10 April 1991, SYP000123570001, pp91-92. 142. Letter from ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, to Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, 10 April 1991, SYP000123570001, p95. 143. Letter from Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, to ACC Moore, South Yorkshire Police, 7 May 1991, SYP000123570001, pp75-78.Show full note May 1989, SYP000120140001, p5. 46. Statement of PC Keith Bradley (unamended), 28 April 1989, SYP000111360001, p3.

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¶2.11.72 The altered version read:

¶As it became obvious what had happened those of us attempting to keep some sort of order outside the ground, and keep the way clear for emergency vehicles, were subjected to a non stop torrent of vehement verbal abuse and threats from a good proportion of the crowd by now leaving the ground, this was a frightening situation as we were by now vastly outnumbered by a potentially hostile mass of distressed people. We were deflecting the insults, threats and abuse, still being unaware of what exactly had happened. Radio messages being passed were more difficult to understand all through this time.47

¶2.11.73 The original recollection was unequivocal, asserting that radio traffic was 'non existent'. Yet this was deleted and the amended version altered the meaning by stating that radio messages were sent but difficult to understand. The amended version also removed reference to the 'lack of direction from supervisory officers'.

¶2.11.74 Reproducing these paragraphs in full demonstrates a further significant issue in the process – the removal of conjecture or opinion was highly selective and officers' comments on the hostility of the crowd remained as a statement of fact.

¶2.11.75 Police Constable Philip Dexter's recollections affirmed a breakdown in the command structure inside the stadium. Instructions and directions were not passed from management to officers:

¶I have only one observation to make on the events on the game, and that was the lack of communication whilst inside the ground. I did not know what was going on.48

¶2.11.76 This observation was deleted. Police Constable James Grant considered the rescue operation could have been carried out more effectively if 'more radios had been issued to officers – communication was very poor and consequently supervision of officers near impossible'.49 This was deleted.

¶2.11.77 Police Constable Kevin Bennett made several references to the lack of instruction from management and the poor state of radio communications, each of which was removed from his initial recollections. He referred to the build-up of the crowd at approximately 2.45pm, 15 minutes before the kick-off scheduled for 3pm. He described the scene as follows (deletions in text):

¶At around 2.45 p.m. the crowding became intense and shoulder to shoulder pushing and heaving was taking place. Still no one appeared to know what they were heading for and little, if any, instructions were coming from senior officers.50

¶2.11.78 He stated that, during this time, his personal radio was operational, but few instructions from senior management were forthcoming. His comment was amended significantly: 'I had with me my personal radio but very little instruction was coming from the control room within the ground'. The amended version of his recollection stated only that 'it was difficult to hear transmissions'. Yet this reference was not in the original.51

Statement of PC Keith Bradley (amended version), SYP000085350001, p5. 48. Statement of PC Philip Dexter (unamended), 28 April 1989, SYP000117400001, p5. Amended version:

¶SYP000082190001, p6. 49. Statement of PC James Grant (unamended), 28 April 1989, SYP000117490001, p8. Amended version: 50. Statement of PC Kevin Bennett (unamended),⁹⁹ August 1991, SPA000000600001. 140. Letter from ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, to Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, 28 March 1991, SYP000123570001, p98. 141. Letter from Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, to ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, 10 April 1991, SYP000123570001, pp91-92. 142. Letter from ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, to Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, 10 April 1991, SYP000123570001, p95. 143. Letter from Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, to ACC Moore, South Yorkshire Police, 7 May 1991, SYP000123570001, pp75-78.Show full note May 1989, SYP000120000001, p7. 51. Statement of PC Kevin Bennett (amended version), SYP000082950001, p7.

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¶2.11.79 Inspector John Townend's initial recollection was highly critical of communications and the following passage was deleted from his statement:

¶Feeling of frustration of not being aware of what was happening. Radio useless.

¶P. A. announcements not utilised at all. Information and full extent learned from coach parties who were listening to local radio and then informing us. (Serial 34/35).52

¶2.11.80 It was replaced by the following, deleting his direct criticisms:

¶It was difficult to ascertain exactly what was happening within the ground. There was a lot of noise and confusion in the ground and Police Radio messages were indecipherable. I did not hear any announcements over the Public Address System at the ground.53

¶2.11.81 Police Constable Peter Finnerty's statement included comments regarding inadequate communications and leadership and was marked up for amendment. But a handwritten note by Police Constable Ken Greenway referred to difficulties in persuading PC Finnerty to change his statement.

¶2.11.82 The SYP process, as it had developed by August 1989 when more statements were subjected to review, was clear from the following lengthy account written by PC Greenway:

¶He appeared reluctant to change any part of the statement stating that if we had not wanted opinion and comment in we should have made that point early on ...

¶I explained to Finnerty that we had the only copies of his report and these did not go to W/Mids or anywhere else until they had been checked and signed by the officer making the statement and a supervisory [sic] checking the contents. He asked for his federation representative to be present. [Name redacted – Police Federation representative] ... accepts ... we should not be handing ammunition to our opponents.

¶I have given Finnerty a few days to mull this over in his mind.54

¶Deletion of references to 'chaos', 'fear', 'panic' or 'confusion' 2.11.83 Twenty-three officers had references to 'chaos', 'fear', 'panic' and 'confusion' altered or deleted from their original recollections. Five officers had references to 'chaos' deleted. Nine officers' statements were amended to remove the word 'panic' and there were 11 deletions of the word 'confusion'.55

¶2.11.84 A brief, undated, note to officers with guidance on how to complete statements illustrates the policy underpinning these alterations. The note states that 'no CRITICISMS' should be 'levelled at anyone in the text of your summary'. Further, there 'should be no mention of the word CHAOTIC or any of its derivatives which would give rise to the assumption that complete control had been lost at the ground ... All these items come from the express wish of DI King'.56

Statement of Inspector John Townend (unamended),¹⁷¹⁷ December 1997, HOM000030920001, p1. April 1989 in text, 29 April 1989 as completed statement,

¶SYP000117950001, pp6-7. 53. Statement of Inspector John Townend (amended version), SYP000100500001, p5. 54. Undated handwritten note by PC Ken Greenway, SYP000096870001, pp33-35. 55. Note that statements are frequently amended multiple times. This explains why the sum of these numbers is greater than the 23 quoted above. 56. Undated note on statement gathering, SYP000096870001, p448.

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¶2.11.85 Police Constable Glyn Dunn had a significant section of his initial account deleted as follows:

¶It appeared to me this year that one single senior officer appeared to be attempting to take control of the situation, that could at times be only called chaotic. I am also surprised that from the position of the ground control room, that no one in there could see what was happening inside the Leppings Lane stand and that officers on the perimeter of the pitch were unable to assess the situation correctly and out swiftly from it.57

¶2.11.86 The following sentence was deleted from Police Constable Martin McLoughlin's original recollection: 'As time went on this became thousands of people leaving the ground, streaming onto Penistone Road, which was full of ambulances etc. Basically it was chaos'.58

¶2.11.87 The following passage was deleted from an officer's statement, including sentences that had already been edited:

¶The messages being passed became more and more frantic and Repeated requests were made to have the gates in that area opened to avoid what the officer making this request called 'a disaster'. It was shortly after this [sic] after the requests were becoming more and more urgent. and a note of real fear and panic was in the voice of the officer requesting this that We started to travel from where we were ...59

¶2.11.88 References to 'panic' were also removed or altered, many of which pertained specifically to panic among the senior officers on duty. The following paragraph was deleted:

¶The thing that strikes in my mind about those first few minutes is the state of panic that appeared to set in and apparently overcame senior officers. The command structure of the force totally broke down for several minutes and no one appeared to grasp the severity of the situation and take command. Everyone was busy doing his own thing and that didn't help or anything.60

¶2.11.89 A reference to Superintendent Roger Marshall's request to the Control Box to open exit gates was removed from an officer's statement: 'Once outside, rear of South Stand, heard Supt. Marshall on radio requesting permission to open gates. Voice full of panic'.61

¶2.11.90 Similarly, another officer's account was altered: 'It became apparent to me that something serious was happening at the Leppings Lane end of the ground because what transmissions I could hear on the radio now had a real feeling of urgency and sometimes panic in them'.62 The emphasis shifted from 'panic' to 'urgency'.

Statement of PC Glyn Dunn (unamended),⁹⁹ August 1991, SPA000000600001. 140. Letter from ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, to Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, 28 March 1991, SYP000123570001, p98. 141. Letter from Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, to ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, 10 April 1991, SYP000123570001, pp91-92. 142. Letter from ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, to Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, 10 April 1991, SYP000123570001, p95. 143. Letter from Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, to ACC Moore, South Yorkshire Police, 7 May 1991, SYP000123570001, pp75-78.Show full note May 1989, SYP000101060001, p6. Amended version:

¶SYP000101060001, p14. 58. Statement of PC Martin McLoughlin (unamended), undated, SYP000101420001, p2. Amended version:

¶SYP000107890001, p3. 59. Statement of PC Mark Hone (unamended), undated, SYP000103240001, p1. Amended version: SYP000083940001, p4. 60. Statement of PC SR Smith (unamended),¹⁷¹⁷ December 1997, HOM000030920001, p1. May 1989, SYP000120650001, pp6-7. Amended version:

¶SYP000101220001, p5. 61. Statement of Inspector Trevor Harvey (unamended), 3 May 1989, SYP000118840001, p3. Amended version: 62. Statement of PC Joy Dearden (unamended), undated, SYP000102570001, p3. Amended version: SYP000108140001,

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¶2.11.91 References to confusion were also deleted. The following deletion, from PC Stephen Sapsford's account, is indicative:

¶My overwhelming reaction to the incident is one of utter confusion I personally did not hear any radio communication regarding any orders. I can also recall that I did not see any of the Sheffield Wednesday stewards during the incident.63

¶Removal or amendment of material critical of fans 2.11.92 As noted previously, 116 of 164 substantially amended statements had comments unfavourable to SYP removed or altered. In 33 cases officers' statements which criticised Liverpool fans were amended.

¶2.11.93 For example, Police Constable Hemsworth's account made derogatory references to Liverpool fans, which were deleted. He stated: 'One could not communicate with these animals as they continued to push'.64 The word 'animals' was replaced by 'people'.65 Liverpool fans, he claimed, were uncooperative: '... it was hopeless; the louts would not cooperate' [deletions in text]66 Altered, the sentence read: '... it was hopeless; the hooligan element amongst the supporters would not cooperate'.67

¶2.11.94 Occasionally, references to fans who had been drinking were removed. Sergeant Michael Long, for example, had the following comment removed and altered from his original recollection:

¶I asked what was the matter, and the St John's man said he [a supporter] was upset by what he had seen. I remember feeling very angry, because it was drunken rabble like him that was responsible for causing trouble at matches and would no doubt have been a primary cause of this tragedy. I remember picking him up and ejecting him from the ground.68

¶2.11.95 Altered, this read:

¶I asked what was the matter, and the St John's man said he [a supporter] was upset by what he had seen. I found this hard to believe.69

¶Comment and opinion 2.11.96 The stated rationale for the review and alteration of police statements was the removal of comment and opinion in order to provide 'factual' accounts of police officers' experiences. While many amendments related to 'comment and opinion', the deletion of such material was inconsistent and selective.

¶2.11.97 As part of the vetting process, Mr Metcalf named several officers who had made 'comments about the severity of the crushing outside the turnstiles in 1988'.70 He stated that the comments were 'not particularly helpful to our case, but if they represent factual recollections then they will probably have to stay in'.

Statement of PC Stephen Sapsford (unamended), undated, SYP000102970001, pp2-3. 64. Statement of PC Hemsworth (unamended),¹⁶¹⁶ April 1989. The Prime Minister's Press Secretary later revealed, however, that he had been informed on the day that drunkenness and violent crowd behaviour were significant causes of the disaster. • The disclosed documents show that in the immediate aftermath of the disaster SYP prioritised an internal investigation and the collection of self-taken, handwritten statements in preparation for the imminent external inquiries and investigations. SYP Counsel advised that the police should approach its information-gathering exercise by considering themselves 'the accused'. • A subsequent internal report ('the Wain Report') informed the SYP submission to the Taylor Inquiry. Key elements of the SYP submission emphasised exceptional, aggressive and unanticipated crowd behaviour: large numbers of ticketless, drunk and obstinate fans involved in a concerted action, even 'conspiracy', to enter the stadium. 172. South Yorkshire Police press release, 13 January 1992, SYP000123580001, pp7-8. 173. Press clipping from unidentified newspaper, undated, SYP000123580001, p3.Show full note May 1989, SYP000120600001, p5. 65. Statement of PC Hemsworth (amended version), SYP000101210001, p3. 66. Statement of PC Hemsworth (unamended),¹⁶¹⁶ April 1989. The Prime Minister's Press Secretary later revealed, however, that he had been informed on the day that drunkenness and violent crowd behaviour were significant causes of the disaster. • The disclosed documents show that in the immediate aftermath of the disaster SYP prioritised an internal investigation and the collection of self-taken, handwritten statements in preparation for the imminent external inquiries and investigations. SYP Counsel advised that the police should approach its information-gathering exercise by considering themselves 'the accused'. • A subsequent internal report ('the Wain Report') informed the SYP submission to the Taylor Inquiry. Key elements of the SYP submission emphasised exceptional, aggressive and unanticipated crowd behaviour: large numbers of ticketless, drunk and obstinate fans involved in a concerted action, even 'conspiracy', to enter the stadium. 172. South Yorkshire Police press release, 13 January 1992, SYP000123580001, pp7-8. 173. Press clipping from unidentified newspaper, undated, SYP000123580001, p3.Show full note May 1989, SYP000120600001, p5. 67. Statement of PC Hemsworth (amended version), SYP000101210001, p3. 68. Statement of Sergeant Michael Long (unamended), undated, SYP000102750001, p5. 69. Statement of Sergeant Michael Long (amended version), SYP000108170001, p3. 70. Hammond Suddards (referenced PCM [Mr Metcalf]) to D Denton, 12 June 1989, SYP000096870001, p71.

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¶2.11.98 But they could be 'qualified in one or more of the following ways'. First could be a 'clear comment to the effect that the ingress of mounted officers eased the problem'. Second, an 'indication that the problem was relatively short-lived, e.g. by 2.45 p.m. the crush had eased, if this is the case'; and finally, 'an indication that the Officers have watched the 1988 and 1989 videos and that the 1988 situation was clearly not as bad as that in 1989'.

¶2.11.99 In another example, Inspector John Harvey's statement was reviewed and the following deletion requested:

¶Many many officers, some of whom I have mentioned, carried out acts worthy of the highest praise. If I may be allowed to select one individual officer whose actions were outstanding for his command of the situation, organisation and physical effort, then

¶I select Chief Supt Nesbit, Operations and Traffic Division.71

¶2.11.100 In another officer's statement, however, the following personal observation and opinion remained untouched:

¶From what I witnessed inside the terraced end of the West Stand, I can only visualise as mass hysteria. I am positive that many of these fans were not aware of being trampled, crushed or killed OR if aware, did not care. Perhaps on reflection they became animals, fighting for survival in the heavy atmosphere being created by body heat.72

¶2.11.101 In PC Grant's recollection, the following was retained:

¶I am aware that it is inevitable that there will be criticism of various aspects of the incident at Hillsborough. I feel, however, that given the circumstances, the decisions taken, particularly in relation to opening gates were correct. I fully support them and feel it was the only course of action to take.

¶There is little point in 'iffing' and 'butting' about Police action. The circumstances were something that could never have been prepared for and I am sure if it happened tomorrow, most officers would behave in the same manner. Very little, if anything, could have been done to prevent the tragedy.73

¶2.11.102 Yet the following sentence was deleted:

¶However I feel that the rescue operation may have flowed more smoothly if more radios had been issued to officers – communication was very poor and consequently supervision of officers near impossible.

¶2.11.103 In the recollection provided by PC Robert Burkinshaw, the following paragraph was marked for deletion:

¶Again I have heard other officers' comments about the policing outside the ground which include statements that there was no other option open to Mr Marshall but to open the gate and relieve the pressure on the wall. Others have commented that there were not enough officers outside the ground at that point to cope with the numbers arriving. These were no doubt depleted by the taking of prisoners. The general feeling is that the …74 71. Recollection of Inspector John Harvey, 3 May 1989, SYP000118840001, p10. 72. Statement of PS Robert Burns, 23 May 1989, SYP000068510001, p14. 73. Recollection of PC Grant, 28 April 1989, SYP000117490001, pp7-8. 74. Recollection of PC Robert Burkinshaw,⁴⁴ March 1988, SYP000096970001, p600. May 1989, SYP000119290001, p10.

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¶2.11.104 Yet part of the final sentence was retained and reconstructed as a discrete sentence:

¶The fans arrived too late, and a lot of them under the influence of drink, to get into the ground in time for the kick off.

¶2.11.105 Thus his 'general feeling' was transformed into a factual statement. Finally, Police Constable Anthony Lang's recollection was amended as follows:

¶From what I could see throughout the incident the problem seemed to stem from the large number of people attending outside the ground at the same time. But when the gate was opened I felt at the time that we had transferred the problem into the ground and we would need a lot more PC's to control it.75

¶The Stuart-Smith Scrutiny 2.11.106 As discussed in Part 1 of this Report, the terms of reference of the Scrutiny of Evidence committed Lord Justice Stuart-Smith to 'ascertain whether any evidence exists relating to the disaster' that was not made available to the Taylor Inquiry, the Director of Public Prosections (DPP) or the Attorney General, or to the SYP Chief Constable (concerning 'disciplinary matters'). He was asked to advise whether any such evidence might provide grounds for a further public inquiry, for prosecution or disciplinary action or 'any other action which should be taken in the public interest'.76

¶2.11.107 In the course of his Scrutiny, LJ Stuart-Smith considered the 'facts surrounding the obtaining of statements from South Yorkshire police officers', establishing that over a period of five weeks from May to June 1989 'in excess of 400 statements written by South Yorkshire officers were submitted to the solicitors'.77 LJ Stuart-Smith commented that the process adopted initially was 'confidential'; an 'evidence gathering operation for the information of the legal advisers' who 'would choose what they wanted to leave in or out'.

¶2.11.108 Aware of the process, therefore, LJ Stuart-Smith wrote to Peter Metcalf of Hammond Suddards on 18 October 1997, concerning his role:

¶It appears that individual police officers were asked to write out in their own words on plain paper their recollections of events of the day, including comment and impressions. When statements were required by the West Midlands Police for the purpose of Lord Justice Taylor's Inquiry, these original statements were forwarded to your firm and certain amendments were made, excluding in the main comment and impressions. These amended statements were intended to form the basis of Criminal

¶Justice Act statements for submission to Lord Justice Taylor's Inquiry.78

¶2.11.109 He questioned 'why this approach was adopted':

¶Who considered it desirable to have police officers' comments and impressions, and why? It has been suggested to me that this was a departure from the usual procedure whereby police officers would make up their note books, then draft a CJA [Criminal

¶Justice Act] statement. Could you also let me know if any police officers refused to sign amended statements or the CJA statements based on them.

Recollection of PC Anthony Lang, 5 May 1989, SYP000119720001, p5. 76. The Rt Hon. Lord Justice Stuart-Smith Scrutiny of Evidence Relating to the Hillsborough Football Stadium Disaster

¶Cm 3878 London: The Stationery Office (copy at HOM000045010001), pp6-7. 77. The Rt Hon. Lord Justice Stuart-Smith Scrutiny of Evidence Relating to the Hillsborough Football Stadium Disaster

¶Cm 3878 London: The Stationery Office (copy at HOM000045010001), pp85-86. 78. Letter from Lord Justice Stuart-Smith to Peter Metcalf, 28 October 1997, SYP000096290001, p6.

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¶2.11.110 Mr Metcalf replied on 11 November 1997, informing LJ Stuart-Smith that he believed the process originated from a meeting held by SYP officers on 17 April 1989, the minutes of which have been disclosed to the Panel. Mr Metcalf stressed that he was 'not present' at the meeting and could not 'say whether officers were specifically asked to include comment and impression'.79 He wrote:

¶It is correct that when the West Midlands Police asked for statements from particular officers the self taken statements for those officers were forwarded to me. I read through the statements and made comments by fax to Chief Superintendent Denton.

¶I did not amend any statements. Where my comments suggested changes, these were principally removal of comment and impression. They also included suggestions to re-address apparent contradictions or ambiguities, to consider removal of evidence about events after the officers had gone off duty and, on occasions, to reconsider intemperate language.

¶2.11.111 Mr Metcalf stated that he was unaware of the procedure adopted by SYP on receipt of such advice, nor was he aware of officers who had refused to sign amended statements. He assumed that officers had signed amended statements, or they 'went to West Midlands in their original form'.80

¶2.11.112 The Scrutiny also sought the views of the WMP investigation, and wrote to Detective Chief Superintendent Nick Foster, who had a senior role within the criminal investigation. Det C/Supt Foster confirmed that he, the Treasury Solicitor and Lord Justice Taylor's team within the Home Office had been aware that SYP statements were being considered by their legal advisers and that it 'was accepted that Counsel representing SYP would advise the Force on the removal of expression of opinions to keep statements factual'.81

¶2.11.113 He stated that 'West Midlands Police were not party to the 'vetting' of the SYP statements but would have expected all factual evidence to be retained in the final version'. To his knowledge, however, WMP had not undertaken any 'dip check or sample to ensure this was the case'.

¶2.11.114 The Scrutiny provided Det C/Supt Foster with six sample amended statements, and in his letter he provided comments on the alterations. In five of the six cases, Det C/Supt Foster considered that alterations were inappropriate.82 For example, the following paragraph was removed from Police Constable Powell's statement:

¶The first thing I said was 'Where are all the bobbies, there's hardly anybody there.'

¶I saw numerous people climbing over the tops of the turnstiles and the few Police

¶Officers that I saw appeared to be doing nothing about it. My main observation at this point was the lack of Police presence. I couldn't understand how such a large crowd could have possibly gathered. I recall in previous games there was usually a large

¶Police presence concentrated on this part of the ground usually forming some sort of cordon.83

Letter from Peter Metcalf to Lord Justice Stuart-Smith, 11 November 1997, SYP000096290001, p9. 80. Letter from Peter Metcalf to Lord Justice Stuart-Smith, 11 November 1997, SYP000096290001, p11. 81. Letter from Det C/Supt Foster to Mr C Bone,¹⁷¹⁷ December 1997, HOM000030920001, p1. December 1997, HOM000030920001, pp1-2. 82. In the sixth he offered no comment, since West Midlands Police had originally received both the amended and unamended versions of the statement. 83. PC Powell's recollection, 30 April 1989, SYP000112300001, pp3-4.

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¶2.11.115 Det C/Supt Foster commented on this deletion as follows:

¶I would have expected this to be left in especially where it refers to previous games and the forming of the cordon.84

¶2.11.116 Police Constable John Woodcock's statement was subject to an extensive deletion, including the following text:

¶I saw Inspector Harry White at the de-brief. He told me that his serial usually got the job of putting the crowd in the different pens at the rear of the goal mouth, working from the outside to the centre, but for some reason he'd been told to let the fans find their own level, on this occasion, resulting in too many going into the area immediately behind the goal. I could tell he was distressed by what had happened.85

¶2.11.117 Det C/Supt Foster commented as follows:

¶I can understand this being seen as opinion and hearsay, but of course it may have been valuable to the Investigation team in respect of Inspector White and his observation if that were not already known. I question the objectivity here of the person vetting. In fairness, a legal representative would not look at this as I would.86

¶2.11.118 In the conclusion to his letter to LJ Stuart-Smith, Det C/Supt Foster wrote that:

¶On reflection, it seems to me the original 'vetting' was focused on producing factual statements although from the examples sent, the omissions generally centre on police officers and their actions or lack of action. I imagine this was based upon Counsel for

¶SYP representing the best interests of the Force and individuals.

¶a. As far as the [West Midlands] Investigating Team were concerned, the objective of the Investigation was to seek the truth about how the disaster happened. Few officers have experienced such investigations but ALL relevant information can be of value, whether it is factual or opinion …

¶2.11.119 LJ Stuart-Smith's report did not reflect these comments. Yet it echoed another view presented by Det C/Supt Foster: 'I am confident not only from examining these sample statements, but from the thoroughness of the investigation, that [t]his has not had any bearing on the evidence gathered and presented to the Coroner, the DPP or the Police Complaints Authority'.

¶2.11.120 This view – that the amendment of the statements had not affected the outcome of the investigation and all relevant issues had been considered fully – closely reflected LJ Stuart-Smith's eventual conclusions.

¶Discussions with South Yorkshire Police 2.11.121 The Stuart-Smith Scrutiny team also contacted individual SYP officers to obtain further information about the review and alteration process. On 7 January 1998, Chris Bone, the Scrutiny Secretary, wrote to a SYP Police Constable enquiring about the circumstances in which SYP statements were reviewed and altered. The Scrutiny was interested particularly

Letter from Det C/Supt Foster to Mr C Bone,¹⁷¹⁷ December 1997, HOM000030920001, p1. December 1997, HOM000030920001, p2. 85. Statement of PC John Woodcock, 5 May 1989, SYP000119850001. 86. Letter from Det C/Supt Foster to Mr C Bone,¹⁷¹⁷ December 1997, HOM000030920001, p1. December 1997, HOM000030920001, p3.

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¶in 'the extent to which officers … were reluctant/and or put under pressure' to change their statements.87

¶2.11.122 Mr Bone stated that his was an 'unusual request' which could put the officer in 'some difficulty especially given that we have unavoidably had to contact you via South Yorkshire Police'. The officer replied, referring to his original statement. He had 'wished' his 'final statement to be the exact copy of the original recollection (except for the item where I mistakenly stated seeing Chief Supt. Duckenfield running onto the pitch. This was of course Supt. Greenwood)'.88 2.11.123 Due to ill-health in the aftermath of the disaster, however, the officer had agreed to the alterations. With hindsight he considered that statements should not have been altered. He wrote:

¶However, since I (like most others) was suffering from post traumatic stress and depression, I agreed to the deletions to my final statement under the conditions I was placed under. My personal view is that a police officer should be able to freely make an honest and truthful statement of facts and opinion and it was an injustice for statements to have been 'doctored' to suit the management of the South

¶Yorkshire Police. 2.11.124 Mr Bone also contacted Police Constable Brian Huckstepp, who recalled being told:

¶... alterations were made to exclude personal opinion, to leave the document as a factual piece, similar to a statement. This seemed a satisfactory explanation to me.

¶At the time I accepted the removal of my personal opinions, especially as they were based on the hundreds of times I'd been to Hillsborough as a football supporter and not from police experience of working at the stadium.89 2.11.125 While PC Huckstepp did not remember being 'pressured to sign the typed amended version', he could not 'recall being given the opportunity to compare the original and amended versions'. Having been sent the original by Mr Bone, he 'didn't appreciate at the time how much had been removed'. 2.11.126 Concerning deletions and alterations to his recollections, he affirmed that it remained his 'firmly held belief that the key to the whole incident was the lack of direction of the fans once they were allowed into the stadium following the crush outside' and 'adequate planning or preparation for the influx was not carried out'. 2.11.127 LJ Stuart-Smith also met personally with SYP Chief Constable Richard Wells and former Chief Superintendent Donald Denton. In his meeting with CC Wells, LJ Stuart- Smith said that he regarded the majority of the vetting to be 'quite proper', but noted the imbalance in removing 'opinion and intemperate language' directed towards senior police officers while retaining 'similar material about misbehaviour of Liverpool fans'. He commented that this was a 'pattern'.90 2.11.128 LJ Stuart-Smith's meeting with former C/Supt Denton91 included the following exchange:

Letter from Mr Bone to Police Constable, 7 January 1998, HOM000031080001, pp1-2. 88. Letter from Police Constable to Mr Bone, 13 January 1998, HOM000031110001, p1. 89. Letter from PC Brian Huckstepp to Mr Bone, undated, HOM000031110001, p2. 90. Note of meeting between LJ Stuart-Smith and CC Richard Wells, 25 November 1997, HOM000039450001, p1. 91. Transcript of proceedings on 1 December 1997 before LJ Stuart-Smith, HOM000049140001, pp10-11.

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¶LORD JUSTICE STUART-SMITH: One of the things that strikes me about the alterations that I have looked at – and I have not looked at all of them – is that there tends to be a removal of criticisms of senior officers but no corresponding removal of criticism of the fans.

¶A [Donald Denton]: I think one has to look at the light in which this was being done, sir.

¶Q [LJ Stuart-Smith]: In what light is that?

¶A [Donald Denton]: This, as you say, was in fact being done in a way which anticipated an Inquiry and anticipated actions against the Club, against the Police, and I think it would be fair to say that throughout the whole of this exercise – whilst there was nothing distinctly deliberate about it – the South Yorkshire Police at that time had their backs to the wall a little bit with public opinion against them. I think it was absolutely natural for them to concern themselves with defending themselves.

¶Lord Justice Stuart-Smith's findings 2.11.129 LJ Stuart-Smith examined 'approximately 100 amended statements'. He found that in '74 instances the amendment is of no consequence', and in 'some cases' the 'solicitor's recommendation was not adopted and the suggested amendments were not made'.92

¶2.11.130 In 26 recollections 'comment and opinion' were deleted. He made further comments on ten cases. In five, 'factual matters were excluded when arguably they should not have been'. In four, matters of fact were included in the deleted comment. He wrote that it 'might have been better to elucidate these rather than simply exclude the comment'.

¶2.11.131 Noting that 'solicitors were under severe time constraints in giving their advice since the statements were urgently required for Lord Taylor's Inquiry', LJ Stuart-Smith accepted the legitimacy of the process. He concluded:

¶In no case does what is excluded render the rest of the statement misleading. In those cases where factual matter has been excluded I accept that the solicitors had to exercise judgement as to whether material unhelpful to the police case should have been excluded ... at least in some cases it would have been better if it had not been. But I would categorise this at worst as an error of judgement. I certainly do not think the solicitors were guilty of anything that could be regarded as unprofessional conduct.

¶2.11.132 LJ Stuart-Smith had 'no doubt that in the days following Hillsborough the South Yorkshire police perceived themselves to be on the defensive' with 'an understandable desire not to give anything away'. Yet while 'it would have been preferable if the deletion' in some cases 'had not been made', the amendments were 'unexceptionable' and the process was 'well known to Lord Taylor's Inquiry team'.

¶2.11.133 Quoting LJ Taylor's criticism of SYP for failing to 'concede that they were in any respect at fault in what occurred', LJ Stuart-Smith concluded that LJ Taylor's Inquiry had 'in no way been inhibited or impeded by the exclusion of material from the original statements'. Nor did he consider that the 'material excluded' would 'have influenced the jury

The Rt Hon. Lord Justice Stuart-Smith Scrutiny of Evidence Relating to the Hillsborough Football Stadium Disaster

¶Cm 3878 London: The Stationery Office (copy at HOM000045010001), pp88-93.

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¶at the Inquests to bring a different verdict'. Consequently he rejected the 'allegation ... of irregularity and malpractice'.

¶2.11.134 As discussed in Chapter 6, however, the process of review and alteration of statements did impact upon both the criminal and disciplinary investigations into SYP officers. See paragraphs from 2.6.198 and 2.6.293.

¶The South Yorkshire Metropolitan Ambulance Service 2.11.135 Review and alteration of statements was not confined to SYP. A similar process was also adopted by the South Yorkshire Metropolitan Ambulance Service (SYMAS) and South Yorkshire Fire Service prior to the Taylor Inquiry.

¶2.11.136 According to files from the WMP investigation, statements from SYMAS and Fire Service staff 'were not taken by West Midlands Police Officers' but 'were made to solicitors for the respective services who in turn provided them to the West Midlands Police for use at the Judicial Inquiry by Lord Justice Taylor'.93 Subsequently some ambulance staff were interviewed by WMP to supplement their statements.

¶2.11.137 No documents were provided to the Panel regarding the internal processes adopted within the Fire Service, but Yorkshire Ambulance Service (as it now is) provided relevant documents. Statements were reviewed and stylistic changes – corrections to grammatical or spelling errors – were made. Amended statements were signed by their authors. As with SYP, however, some amendments were substantial. These included the insertion or deletion of sentences or paragraphs.

¶2.11.138 Statements taken by SYMAS solicitors from 101 ambulance personnel were submitted to WMP. Of these, 54 staff members' formal statements were predated by earlier handwritten versions. There is no record of an earlier version of the remaining 47 statements. The early statements were taken within days of the disaster and the final, formal versions were produced two weeks later.

¶2.11.139 There are no records describing the SYMAS statement-taking process, but the quote above from the WMP investigation suggests that statements were produced after discussion with legal advisers and senior SYMAS staff.

¶2.11.140 Separately, a letter from an anonymous complainant noted that 'ambulance personnel are being interviewed individually by a panel of senior officers'.94 The complaint alleged that ambulance staff were being 'intimidated' and were 'withholding information in case of reprisals'. The documents contain no other evidence of staff intimidation.

¶2.11.141 Analysis of the statements indicates that internal discussions between ambulance personnel, senior SYMAS staff and solicitors occurred after initial handwritten statements had been produced, and it is possible that the initial statements were also the product of interviews.

¶2.11.142 Details added to initial statements, and the regularity with which particular issues were highlighted, are recurrent features within final statements. It is possible that final statements were written and agreed in response to questioning or prompting.

WMP Report to the Director of Public Prosecutions: Part VI, SYP000038830001, p4. 94. Anonymous letter, YAS000002400001, p19.

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¶2.11.143 The principal differences between initial handwritten statements and subsequent final versions were the addition of significant commentary and points of clarification, as well as grammatical corrections and the addition of timings. Further details were added in all 54 statements where handwritten original versions had been provided.

¶2.11.144 In addition to expanding their original statements, ambulance personnel appear to have responded to questions or prompts relating to their role and training history, as well as their knowledge of the SYMAS major incident plan and Hillsborough emergency plan.

¶2.11.145 In 17 cases, the statements contain amendments to material which might have been perceived as negative towards SYMAS. For example:

¶We did not see any Ambulance Officers at the Royal Hallamshire and Ambulances were stopping at the normal casualty entrance, preventing further Ambulances getting through to the Major Incident Entrance.95

¶2.11.146 As with the SYP amendments, in these 17 cases direct or implied criticisms of the SYMAS organisational response or decisions were downplayed or deleted. For example, the following comment relating to organisation of ambulances at the stadium was made in the officer's handwritten statement, yet it was absent from the final version:

¶From my position at the rear of all the parked vehicles [waiting to enter Hillsborough] it appeared that there was some problem at the front of the line as no vehicles were moving off.96

¶2.11.147 In the same statement, a comment that 'a [leading ambulance man] told me there were more casualties and it was chaotic' was removed and the description of an ambulance as 'abandoned' was amended to read 'parked'.

¶2.11.148 In another example, the following comment made in the handwritten version was deleted:

¶On arrival at the Northern General Hospital Casualty Department there was a lot of confusion and it took several minutes to locate trollies [sic] for the patients. We quickly arrived back at the Leppings Lane end of the Ground which seemed to be blocked by Fire Tenders and a large crowd.97

¶2.11.149 Another officer's comments about poor radio communications – '[w]e could only contact control with extreme difficulty ... equipment was inadequate' – was excluded from his final statement.98

¶2.11.150 In eight cases critical material was added to the initial versions. One statement, for example, contained the following additional comment: 'there was no [ambulance] officer in charge'.99

¶2.11.151 Another included an observation on communications: 'I had been given no information whatsoever and [name redacted] had not told me which part of the ground to go

Typed version of original statement, YAS000000700001. Final version of statement, YAS000001350001. 96. Typed version of original statement, YAS000001000001. Final version of statement, YAS000001810001. 97. Typed version of original statement, YAS000000790001. Final version of statement, YAS000001480001. 98. Typed version of original statement, YAS000000890001. Final version of statement, YAS000001620001. 99. Typed version of original statement, YAS000000670001. Final version of statement, YAS000001290001.

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¶to. I set the radio automatically onto ERC [emergency response] channel because I regarded it as a major incident, even though this had not actually been specified'.100

¶2.11.152 A comment was added to an ambulance officer's statement about 'initial difficulties' with radio communications, 'presumably because of the number of crews transmitting at the same time'.101 Another officer added that the scene was 'chaos', with 'casualties lying all over the place'.102

¶2.11.153 Some common alterations concerned the strength of presumption of death amongst those who appeared to be beyond help during the initial process of evacuation from the pens. A comment from one officer was amended from 'I presume he was dead' to 'I believe he was already dead'.103 There had been suggestions that not all may have been dead at this early stage. 2.11.154 Other insertions were critical of the intervention, or non-intervention, of SYP's response: 'I was staggered at the number of fatalities. Most of the bodies that I saw had clearly been dead for some time and I could not understand why their condition had not been noticed earlier'.104 2.11.155 A statement made by an ambulance officer concerning his ignorance of the Hillsborough emergency plan had the following comment deleted: 'At this stage I did not realise that the casualty clearing point was in the gym. I was not aware of any Hillsborough plan prior to this emergency'.105 2.11.156 Comments were inserted into some statements regarding checking victims for potential signs of life. An officer's statement had the following sentence inserted: 'Although some of the bodies had coats pulled over their heads we checked every single body for signs of life'.106

¶Further changes to SYMAS statements 2.11.157 Although the precise process of review and alteration remains unclear from the documents, it appears that further alterations were made to some statements that had already been amended. The Panel was unable to determine from the disclosed documents who had suggested these changes. 2.11.158 While records are incomplete, unamended 'final' statements were collected by the WMP investigation team, dated early May 1989.107 Amended versions, dated early June, were located within the Taylor Inquiry papers at the Home Office.108 2.11.159 Of the SYMAS statements disclosed to the Panel, 49 had alterations to 'final' statements, 33 of which related solely to correction or clarification. The remaining 16 had more substantial deletions or details added, five of which were more significant.109 The following section was removed from one statement: 100. Typed version of original statement, YAS000000950001. Final version of statement, YAS000001730001. 101. Typed version of original statement, YAS000001010001. Final version of statement, YAS000001820001. 102. Typed version of original statement, YAS000000980001. Final version of statement, YAS000001790001. 103. Preliminary Statement of [name redacted], 7 May 1989, YAS000001480001, p3. 104. Preliminary Statement of [name redacted], 7 May 1989, YAS000001480001, p5. 105. Preliminary Statement of [name redacted], 5 May 1989,YAS000001540001, p4. 106. Preliminary Statement of [name redacted], 5 May 1989, YAS000001570001, p4. 107. For example, SYP000065630001. Statements included within West Midlands Police's report to the Director of Public

¶Prosecutions, produced in March 1990, are also the unamended versions. 108. For example, HOM000000860001. 109. Two are quoted below. The others are at references YAS000001810001, YAS000001940001 and YAS000001900001.

¶These include deletions of descriptions of 'chaos' and radio problems.

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¶The access for the ambulances onto the pitch was pitifully inadequate. The access was narrow and the angle of approach difficult with obstructions on either side which, compounded by the number of fans in the area, made access to the pitch extremely difficult and hazardous. The ambulances needed to use their sirens and two tone horns simply to get from the arrival area onto the pitch and it was not a safe area for fans or the ambulances … [On arrival back at the ground in the evening] … most of the equipment of the Ambulance service had been exhausted.110

¶2.11.160 In another statement, deletion of six separate references to an ambulance crew member being unaware of the location of the 'casualty clearing point' for Hillsborough was advised. These included:

¶At this stage I did not realise that the casualty clearing point was in the gym. I was not aware of any Hillsborough plan prior to the emergency …

¶I asked [Control] where the casualty clearing point was. There was a pause and then

¶I was told to go to the Leppings Lane end. Ray Clarke was at control. I think he was telling me where to go and I do not think he knew where the casualty clearing point was ...

¶… and asked [name redacted] where the casualty clearing point was as I thought

¶Control had told us it was in Leppings Lane. He said that he did not know but that the vehicles in front were being loaded and would be moving shortly.111

¶2.11.161 The rationale underpinning the process adopted for making the initial alterations, the further amendments to the 'final' statements, and whether LJ Taylor and others were aware of the process, was not evident from the disclosed documents.

¶Conclusion: what is added to public understanding • From the documents disclosed to the Panel it is apparent that the decision to gather self-taken recollections from SYP officers, rather than following the standard procedure of contemporaneous pocket-book entries as the foundation for formal Criminal Justice Act statements, originated in the immediate aftermath of the disaster on 16 and 17 April.

¶The initial justification was to provide SYP and the Force solicitors with candid,

¶'warts-and-all' accounts from officers that would be used to inform SYP's submission to the Taylor Inquiry. • What followed, however, was an extensive process of review and alteration of the recollections and their transition to multi-purpose statements. The disclosed documents reveal confusion about the purpose of recollections, initially taken for SYP 'internal' purposes, and their subsequent use by the WMP investigation. It was brought into stark relief in the confusion surrounding the status of statements presented to the Taylor Inquiry and the Inquiry's acceptance of the 'final versions' of the reviewed and altered statements. • It was the Taylor Inquiry's understanding that the 'final versions' of SYP statements differed from the initial 'recollections' only with regard to the removal of officers' opinions.

¶The Inquiry team considered there to be 'absolutely no reason' why opinion should be removed, but did not consider the process improper and did not raise any objection.

Ambulance Service version with amendments proposed, YAS000001910001. Taylor Inquiry version with amendments made, HOM000001740001. West Midlands Police version with amendments not made, SYP000014020001. 111. Ambulance Service version with amendments proposed, YAS000001540001. Taylor Inquiry version with amendments made, HOM000000860001. West Midlands Police version with amendments not made, SYP000065630001.

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The process of transition from self-taken recollections to formal Criminal Justice Act statements was presented as removing 'conjecture' and 'opinion' from the former, leaving only matters of 'fact' within the latter. Disclosed correspondence between SYP and the Force solicitors reveals that comments within officers' statements 'unhelpful to the Force's case' were altered, deleted or qualified (rewritten by the SYP team).
A significant number of SYP officers were uncomfortable with the methodology adopted in reviewing and altering their initial accounts and with the role of the SYP solicitors in this process. Senior SYP officers, including the Chief Constable, were aware of these concerns and the disclosed 'Hillsborough updates' demonstrate their attempts to assuage these concerns. An SYP inquiry liaison team was available to provide junior officers with 'necessary information and assistance' prior to giving evidence to the Taylor Inquiry.
Examination of officers' statements shows that officers were discouraged from making criticisms of senior officers' responses, their management and deficiencies in the SYP operational response: 'key' words and descriptions such as 'chaotic' were counselled against and, if included, were deleted.
Some 116 of the 164 statements identified for substantive amendment were amended to remove or alter comments unfavourable to SYP.
Lord Justice Stuart-Smith raised concerns about the derivation and operation of the process of review and alteration with SYP's Chief Superintendent Donald Denton and Peter Metcalf (Hammond Suddards, SYP solicitors).
Lord Justice Stuart-Smith also wrote directly to a number of officers to investigate the extent to which they were 'pressurised' into making alterations to original statements.
One officer stated he had accepted the changes only because he was suffering from depression and post-traumatic stress. He considered it an 'injustice for statements to have been "doctored" to suit the management of South Yorkshire Police'. Another officer had accepted the process, but had not realised how much of his statement had been removed.
Detective Chief Superintendent Nick Foster of the WMP investigation team informed the Stuart-Smith Scrutiny that in five out of a sample of six amended statements material should not have been removed. In one case he 'question[ed] the objectivity … of the person vetting'. He considered that the investigation had not been affected by the deletions made.
The disclosed documents demonstrate that the role played by the Force solicitors was more significant and directive than was understood by Lord Justice Stuart-Smith.
Lord Justice Stuart-Smith accepted that SYP edited those statements that were 'unhelpful to the police case' but 'at worst this was an error of judgement' as there were only a few examples 'where matters of fact were excluded'. The process reflected an 'understandable desire' to protect the interests of a Force on the 'defensive'. Yet Lord Justice Stuart-Smith found no 'irregularity or malpractice'. There had been no negative consequences for the Taylor Inquiry, the criminal investigations, the disciplinary proceedings or the coronial inquiry.
The documents disclosed to the Panel show that the review and alteration of statements extended to the South Yorkshire Metropolitan Ambulance Service (SYMAS) and its solicitors. While there is variation in the amendments, in a number of cases they deflected criticisms and emphasised the efficiency of the SYMAS response.

¶Behind the headlines: the origins, promotion and reproduction of unsubstantiated allegations

¶Introduction 2.12.1 This chapter responds to bereaved families' and survivors' concerns to demonstrate how the documents disclosed to the Panel add to public understanding of the background to, and sources of, the initial media coverage. The Panel has also researched the documents to trace how unproven and unsubstantiated allegations, rejected by Lord Justice Taylor, persisted after the publication of his Interim Report and gained wide public acceptance. 2.12.2 As it became increasingly evident that people were trapped, dying and injured in the central pens, Chief Superintendent David Duckenfield told Football Association (FA) representatives that Liverpool fans had broken into the stadium and rushed down the tunnel into the packed central pens causing the fatal crush. 2.12.3 His untruthful allegation was broadcast internationally, establishing the immediate portrayal of the unfolding disaster as a further example of soccer-related crowd violence. Indeed, as the previous chapters have shown, the immediate South Yorkshire Police (SYP) reaction was to view through a lens of hooliganism the fans attempting to escape the fatal crush. 2.12.4 The media coverage on the evening of the disaster, and in the morning press on Sunday 16 April, was a confused mix of allegation and counter-allegation alongside controversial pictures of fans' faces, distorted and lifeless, pressed against the perimeter fence while others lay motionless on the pitch. 2.12.5 Jacques Georges, President of UEFA (European football's governing body), condemned Liverpool fans as 'beasts'. Survivors recounted a different story, emphasising overcrowding, lack of stewarding and inadequate emergency response. 2.12.6 On 18 and 19 April, however, more serious allegations against Liverpool fans were made from seemingly reliable sources, first in Sheffield newspapers and then in the nationals. Unnamed sources, supported by the South Yorkshire Police Federation Secretary, Police Constable Paul Middup, and a local Conservative MP, Irvine Patnick, claimed that many Liverpool fans had deliberately arrived late at the stadium. 2.12.7 They were portrayed as predominantly ticketless, drunk, aggressive and determined to force entry. In the throes of the disaster it was alleged that they had assaulted police officers, urinated on officers and the dying, stolen from the dead and verbally sexually abused a lifeless young woman.

Chapter 12 Behind the headlines: the origins, promotion and reproduction of unsubstantiated allegations — 341

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¶2.12.8 While these allegations were found to be unsubstantiated by the Taylor Inquiry and the reporting was criticised subsequently by the Press Council, the allegations persisted throughout the inquiries and investigations.

¶2.12.9 Further, and much to the bereaved families' and survivors' dismay, the allegations remained prominent and have since been repeated as factually accurate in academic texts, broadcast documentaries, political debate and popular discourse, including fiction writing.

¶Reporting the unfolding disaster 2.12.10 In his Interim Report LJ Taylor recorded that at approximately 3.15pm Graham Kelly, the FA's Chief Executive, and Graham Mackrell, the Sheffield Wednesday Football Club Secretary, spoke to C/Supt Duckenfield in the Police Control Box. They were told that there were deaths and the match would be abandoned; a 'gate had been forced and there had been an inrush of Liverpool supporters'.1 Pointing to Gate C on a Control Box monitor he stated: 'That's the gate that's been forced: there's been an inrush'.

¶2.12.11 Soon after, Mr Kelly presented this as the police version of events on radio. At 3.40pm BBC's Alan Green reported live from Hillsborough that there were 'unconfirmed reports that a door was broken down at the end that was holding Liverpool supporters'.2

¶2.12.12 At approximately 4.30pm Mr Green reported on information obtained from Mr Mackrell, who had spoken to 'the police officer in charge'. Mr Green stated that 'at ten to three there was a surge of fans at the Leppings Lane end of the ground ... the surge composed of about 500 Liverpool fans and the police say that a gate was forced and that led to a crush in the terracing area – well under capacity I'm told, there was still plenty of room inside that area'.3

¶2.12.13 Later in the bulletin it was stated that the gates had been 'broken down' following the arrival of 'large numbers of ticketless fans'.

¶2.12.14 By early evening the allegations had consolidated. BBC Radio 4 reported that it was 'clear' that many fans had no tickets and had entered through an exit gate: 'One report says the gate was kicked down another that it was opened by ground staff'.4

¶2.12.15 Later in the evening, however, the SYP Chief Constable, Peter Wright, stated that the gate had been opened on the instruction of a police officer to relieve the crush outside the stadium caused by the late arrival of thousands of Liverpool fans, many without tickets.5

¶The immediate aftermath 2.12.16 The following morning's newspapers presented contrasting accounts. The theme of an aggressive, late-arriving crowd determined to gain entry persisted, with the Sunday Mirror, for example, reporting that between three and four thousand 'Liverpool fans pushed seemingly uncontrolled into Hillsborough'.6

The Rt Hon Lord Justice Taylor The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, 15 April 1989, Interim Report. Cm 765, London:

¶Her Majesty's Stationery Office, p17. 2. 'Sport on Two', BBC Radio, 15 April 1989. 3. 'Sport on Two', BBC Radio, 15 April 1989. 4. 6pm News, BBC Radio 4, 15 April 1989. 5. Special News Report, 9pm, Radio Merseyside, 15 April 1989. 6. Sunday Mirror,¹⁶¹⁶ April 1989. The Prime Minister's Press Secretary later revealed, however, that he had been informed on the day that drunkenness and violent crowd behaviour were significant causes of the disaster. • The disclosed documents show that in the immediate aftermath of the disaster SYP prioritised an internal investigation and the collection of self-taken, handwritten statements in preparation for the imminent external inquiries and investigations. SYP Counsel advised that the police should approach its information-gathering exercise by considering themselves 'the accused'. • A subsequent internal report ('the Wain Report') informed the SYP submission to the Taylor Inquiry. Key elements of the SYP submission emphasised exceptional, aggressive and unanticipated crowd behaviour: large numbers of ticketless, drunk and obstinate fans involved in a concerted action, even 'conspiracy', to enter the stadium. 172. South Yorkshire Police press release, 13 January 1992, SYP000123580001, pp7-8. 173. Press clipping from unidentified newspaper, undated, SYP000123580001, p3.Show full note April 1989, PRE000000420001, p1.

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¶2.12.17 The Observer attributed the three to four thousand estimate to CC Wright, stating that their 'late arrival' had 'threatened danger to life'.7 It also noted Mr Mackrell's comment that the disaster had been caused by a 'surge' as Liverpool fans arrived late.

¶2.12.18 On Monday 17 April while press coverage remained mixed, the assumed culpability of Liverpool fans was central to many reports. The Sheffield Star described a 'crazed surge' of Liverpool fans. It claimed that as a consequence 'up to 40 people died in the tunnel, the rest trampled underfoot'. Some fans were the 'worse for drink, others without tickets' had 'raced to the stadium'.8

¶2.12.19 The Yorkshire Post reported that 'thousands of latecomers tried to force their way into the ground' having set off a 'fatal charge'.9 The Manchester Evening News alleged that fans, 'foolishly late getting to the game and furious at the prospect of missing the start, kicked and hammered on the steel [exit] gates'.10

¶2.12.20 Thus gates were opened and the 'Anfield Army charged onto the terrace behind the goal, many without tickets'. Late arrival, forced entry, ticketless fans, drunkenness and a 'charge' into the stadium were allegations common to most national and regional newspapers.

¶2.12.21 One of the earliest comment articles was written by the Evening Standard's Peter McKay who concluded that the 'catastrophe was caused first and foremost by violent enthusiasm for soccer, in this case the tribal passions of Liverpool supporters' who 'literally killed themselves and others to be at the game'.11

¶2.12.22 As the focus on fans' behaviour consolidated, Jacques Georges, the UEFA President, stated:

¶One can talk of people's frenzy to enter the stadium come what may, whatever the risk to the lives of others ... One had the impression that they were beasts waiting to charge into the arena.12

¶2.12.23 An alternative view was put forward by Simon Barnes, writing in The Times. His comment article, 'Why the dead are the victims of contempt', was strongly critical of the state of football. 'Why make the football grounds pleasant? Cram them in, take as much money as you dare to charge, that's the way. Spend a million quid on a player, spend the legal minimum on ground safety and spend next to nothing on comfort'.13

¶2.12.24 On Tuesday 18 April, writing in the Liverpool Daily Post, John Williams noted that 'the gatecrashers wreaked their fatal havoc', their 'uncontrolled fanaticism and mass hysteria ... literally squeezed the life out of men, women and children'.14 It was 'yobbism at its most base' as 'Scouse killed Scouse for no better reason than 22 men were kicking a ball'.

The Observer,¹⁶¹⁶ April 1989. The Prime Minister's Press Secretary later revealed, however, that he had been informed on the day that drunkenness and violent crowd behaviour were significant causes of the disaster. • The disclosed documents show that in the immediate aftermath of the disaster SYP prioritised an internal investigation and the collection of self-taken, handwritten statements in preparation for the imminent external inquiries and investigations. SYP Counsel advised that the police should approach its information-gathering exercise by considering themselves 'the accused'. • A subsequent internal report ('the Wain Report') informed the SYP submission to the Taylor Inquiry. Key elements of the SYP submission emphasised exceptional, aggressive and unanticipated crowd behaviour: large numbers of ticketless, drunk and obstinate fans involved in a concerted action, even 'conspiracy', to enter the stadium. 172. South Yorkshire Police press release, 13 January 1992, SYP000123580001, pp7-8. 173. Press clipping from unidentified newspaper, undated, SYP000123580001, p3.Show full note April 1989. 8. Sheffield Star,¹⁷¹⁷ December 1997, HOM000030920001, p1. April 1989, PRE000000020001, p1. 9. Yorkshire Post,¹⁷¹⁷ December 1997, HOM000030920001, p1. April 1989. 10. Manchester Evening News,¹⁷¹⁷ December 1997, HOM000030920001, p1. April 1989. 11. Evening Standard,¹⁷¹⁷ December 1997, HOM000030920001, p1. April 1989. 12. Reported in Liverpool Echo,¹⁷¹⁷ December 1997, HOM000030920001, p1. April 1989. 13. The Times,¹⁷¹⁷ December 1997, HOM000030920001, p1. April 1989, PRE000000480001, p16. 14. Liverpool Daily Post, 18 April 1989.

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¶2.12.25 Other reports, primarily from fans' eye-witness accounts, challenged the dominant themes that directed responsibility towards Liverpool fans. These alternative accounts focused on the lack of crowd management in the approach to the stadium, the bottleneck at the turnstiles, the absence of stewarding once Gate C was opened and the failure to direct the incoming crowd once inside the stadium. They also denied that there was an exceptional level of drunkenness or that fans had rushed the turnstiles or the terrace.

¶2.12.26 PC Middup, Secretary of the South Yorkshire branch of the Police Federation, was unequivocal about where responsibility lay. He was reported as stating: 'I am sick of hearing how good the crowd were ... They were arriving tanked up on drink and the situation faced by the officers trying to control them was quite simply terrifying'.15 The Sun carried allegations that ticketless fans had arrived and had caused the disaster 'either by forcing their way in or by blackmailing the police into opening the gates'.16

¶'The Truth' 2.12.27 Also on 18 April a more sinister story emerged. The Sheffield Star published allegations that Liverpool fans had attacked police officers and rescue workers and had stolen from the dead.17

¶2.12.28 The front page headline was 'Fans in Drunken Attacks on Police: Ticketless thugs staged crush to gain entry'. The police, it claimed, were 'piecing together' a 'sickening story' focusing on how 'yobs' had 'attacked an ambulance man, threatened firemen and punched and urinated on policemen as they gave the kiss of life to stricken victims'.18 The report also quoted PC Middup. Along with Irvine Patnick, Conservative MP for Sheffield Hallam, PC Middup reiterated allegations of drunkenness on BBC News.19

¶2.12.29 Later in the evening of 18 April, Mr Patnick echoed the allegations made earlier in the day in the Sheffield Star: 'I was speaking to those officers [who] said they had been trying to save lives, that they'd been attacked by some of the fans, they'd been kicked and punched even when giving mouth-to mouth resuscitation and people were urinating on them from the balcony above where they were working'.20

¶2.12.30 The following morning most newspapers carried the story: 'Dead Fans Robbed by Drunk Fans';21 'They were drunk and violent and their actions were vile';22 'Police Accuse Drunken Fans: Police saw "sick spectacle of pilfering from the dying'' ';23 'Fury as police claim fans robbed victims';24 'Fans 'made sex jibes at body';25 'Police tell MP of attacks on them as they helped injured'.26

Reported in Daily Mail, 18 April 1989, PRE000000430001, p3. 16. The Sun, 18 April 1989, PRE000000380001, p6. 17. Sheffield Star, 18 April 1989, PRE000000030001, p7. 18. The Evening Standard ran a similar story, headlined 'Police attack the "vile" fans', 18 April 1989, YAS000003090001, p97. 19. BBC News, 9pm, 18 April 1989. 20. News at Ten, ITN, 10pm, 18 April 1989. 21. Daily Star, 19 April 1989. 22. Daily Mail, 19 April 1989, PRE000000610001. 23. Daily Express, 19 April 1989, PRE000000560001, p1. 24. Daily Mirror, 19 April 1989, PRE000000400001, p2. 25. Sheffield Star, 19 April 1989, PRE000000010001, p3. 26. Daily Telegraph, 19 April 1989.

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¶2.12.31 The greatest prominence given to the story was in The Sun whose editor, Kelvin MacKenzie, cleared the front page and under the banner headline 'THE TRUTH' published three bullet points: 'Some fans picked pockets of victims; Some fans urinated on the brave cops; Some fans beat up PC giving life kiss'.27

¶2.12.32 The Sun's coverage was unequivocal:

¶Drunken Liverpool fans viciously attacked rescue workers as they tried to revive victims of the Hillsborough soccer disaster, it was revealed last night.

¶Police officers, firemen and ambulance crew were punched, kicked and urinated upon by a hooligan element in the crowd.

¶Some thugs rifled the pockets of injured fans as they were stretched out unconscious on the pitch.

¶In one shameful episode a gang of Liverpool fans noticed that the blouse of a girl trampled to death had risen above her breasts. As a policeman struggled in vain to revive her, the mob jeered: 'Throw her up here and we will **** her' ...

¶One furious policeman who witnessed the disaster on Saturday stormed: 'To paint all the Liverpool fans lily-whites is wrong.

¶'As we struggled in appalling conditions to save lives, fans standing further up the terrace were openly urinating on us and the bodies of the dead.'28

¶2.12.33 According to a 'high ranking police officer', the 'fans were just acting like animals. My men faced a double hell – the disaster and the fury of the fans who attacked us'.

¶The Sun's response 2.12.34 The Sun's publication was immediately condemned at many levels, particularly on Merseyside. Bereaved families and survivors wrote letters to the newspaper challenging the veracity of the story and its presentation as the definitive version of events. Within days the Managing Editor, William Newman, replied to bereaved families.29 His letter was neither personalised nor signed.

¶2.12.35 Mr Newman stated that the newspaper had 'received many letters from Liverpool regarding our follow up story to the Hillsborough tragedy'. He continued:

¶We are sorry that, possibly clouded by grief, many have not understood that it is

¶The Sun's duty as a newspaper to publish information, however hurtful and unpalatable it may be at the time.

¶On reflection, we accept the way in which the article was displayed could have given cause for offence. For that we apologise. For the substance we do not.

¶We cannot possibly apologise for facts and to do so would be an abdication of our responsibility to a wider public beyond the city of Liverpool. If the price of a free press is a boycott of our newspaper, then it is a price we will have to pay.

The Sun, 19 April 1989, PRE000000340001, pp1-2. 28. The Sun, 19 April 1989, PRE000000340001, pp1-2. 29. Unsigned letter from William Newman, no addressee, no reference, dated 28 April 1989, NGN000000090001, p1.

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¶2.12.36 Mr Newman stated that 'not for the first time' The Sun had been 'singled out' and he referred to 'identical reports' in three other newspapers. Claiming the moral high ground he stated that 'only by revealing the full truth ... we can try to make sure that such a terrible tragedy never happens again' thus ensuring that '95 innocent men women and children will not have died in vain'.

¶2.12.37 He offered 'heartfelt sympathy' to the bereaved and the injured, noting that the Press Council was investigating newspaper coverage of Hillsborough and The Sun would 'accept and publish their findings'.

¶2.12.38 Mr Newman's letter arrived at the homes of the bereaved as funerals were being arranged. It defended the 'substance' of the published allegations as factual, patronised the judgement of the bereaved as 'clouded by grief' and presented the newspaper as a truth seeker with a public interest 'responsibility ... beyond the city of Liverpool'. There was no apology other than a dismissive comment that the presentation of the story could have caused offence.

¶2.12.39 On Tuesday 9 May 1989 The Sun published a brief commentary from its Ombudsman, Ken Donlan, under the heading 'Ombudsman raps The Sun'.30 This followed what it claimed had been 'a major inquiry into the coverage of the Hillsborough disaster after complaints from readers'.

¶2.12.40 Mr Donlan had inquired into the 'circumstances of the reporting and presentation of the story', finding against its presentation. His report stated:

¶The Editor is on record as saying that the newspaper had a duty to publish the facts about supporters' misbehaviour, no matter how hurtful and unpalatable at the time.

¶This is accepted, but it must be pointed out that the report – similar material appeared in other papers – did not justify the headline The Truth. Allegations can never be projected as facts. It is for Lord Justice Taylor's inquiry to examine the evidence and decide what happened at Hillsborough.

¶It should not have been published in the form that it appeared.

¶2.12.41 Mr Donlan's report, while accepting the 'form' of the coverage and challenging the use of 'The Truth' banner headline, did not comment on the factual accuracy of the allegations, nor their origins. Mr Newman sent a photocopy of its Ombudsman's adjudication as published in the newspaper to the Press Council.31

¶The Press Council 2.12.42 The 36th Annual Report of the Press Council, The Press and the People, provided a seven-page review of coverage of the disaster under the broad heading 'Pictures of Grief and Tragedy'.32

¶2.12.43 This followed a 'general inquiry into the photographic coverage of the tragedy in the press' derived from '349 written complaints from a total of 3651 signatories' naming '35 newspapers', national and regional. There were also complaints from MPs and five organisations including the FA and Liverpool City Council. 30. The Sun 'Ombudsman raps The Sun',⁹⁹ August 1991, SPA000000600001. 140. Letter from ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, to Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, 28 March 1991, SYP000123570001, p98. 141. Letter from Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, to ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, 10 April 1991, SYP000123570001, pp91-92. 142. Letter from ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, to Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, 10 April 1991, SYP000123570001, p95. 143. Letter from Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, to ACC Moore, South Yorkshire Police, 7 May 1991, SYP000123570001, pp75-78.Show full note May 1989, p2. 31. Letter from William Newman, Managing Editor, The Sun, to Raymond Swingler, Assistant Director, The Press Council,⁹⁹ August 1991, SPA000000600001. 140. Letter from ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, to Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, 28 March 1991, SYP000123570001, p98. 141. Letter from Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, to ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, 10 April 1991, SYP000123570001, pp91-92. 142. Letter from ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, to Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, 10 April 1991, SYP000123570001, p95. 143. Letter from Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, to ACC Moore, South Yorkshire Police, 7 May 1991, SYP000123570001, pp75-78.Show full note May 1989, NGN000000040001, p1. 32. The Press and the People, 36th Annual Report of the Press Council, London: The Press Council, 1989,

¶PCC000000010001, p3.

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¶2.12.44 The Press Council extended the scope of its inquiry to 'embrace all press coverage', responding particularly to the coverage in The Sun. Editors were informed of the complaint to solicit replies. The Press Council 'accept[ed] the assurance of many editors that they considered carefully how far it was right to publish photographs that might serve the public interest ... but would also distress survivors and the families and friends of those who were killed and were likely to be offensive to other readers'. In most cases, however, 'editors were justified in publishing' the photographs.

¶2.12.45 While acknowledging that many fans compressed against the perimeter fence 'were recognisable and in attitudes of distress', and there was 'no means of telling how many of those shown died', the publication of these photographs was 'justifiable' on the basis that 'serious public interest was served by their publication ... despite the added distress it would cause'.

¶2.12.46 Photographs that focused on 'a single individual or a very small group crushed against the fence' were an 'intrusion into personal agony and grief too gross to be justifiable'. There was no justification 'for publishing individual pictures of men or women who were known or thought to be dead or dying'.

¶2.12.47 In a section of the report entitled 'On TRUTH' the Press Council addressed the multiple complaints received about the 19 April edition of The Sun. It found the coverage 'generally one-sided, offering no counter to the allegations it included'. It was 'unbalanced and its general effect misleading'.

¶2.12.48 The front page, 'THE TRUTH was insensitive, provocative and unwarranted. The Sun's own ombudsman declared that the article should not have been published in the form in which it appeared'. The Press Council condemned its publication.

¶2.12.49 Given The Sun's unwavering defence of the facts on which its 'Truth' edition relied, and the comparable coverage in other newspapers, the Panel sought access to documents that would add to public understanding of the origins and presentation of the severe, generalised allegations made against Liverpool fans.

¶The source of the story 2.12.50 Documents disclosed to the Panel show that on the morning of 18 April 1989 White's News Agency filed a story entitled 'Hillsborough'.33 It stated: 'Angry police hit back ... at Liverpool fans who hampered life saving attempts after the Hillsborough horror'.

¶2.12.51 SYP officers had been 'stung by savage criticism' and by the representation of Liverpool fans as 'blameless'.

¶2.12.52 It continued: 'The shocked bobbies revealed how they were kicked and punched as they gave victims the kiss of life. And others were horrified to see Liverpool fans urinating on policemen and victims as they fought to haul them out of the killer crush'.

¶2.12.53 The story quoted a 'senior officer who was in the battle to save lives':

¶We are as sorry and shocked as anyone about these tragic deaths but to paint all the

¶Liverpool fans as lilly whites [sic] is wrong. As we struggled in appalling conditions to save lives, fans standing up the terrace were openly urinating on us and the bodies of the dead. As policemen on the pitch tried to save lives they were hampered by other

¶Liverpool fans running and kicking and punching them. 33. Document: 'Hillsborough', 'Pocket 1' and 'Patnick 1', 18 April 1989, NGN000000010001, p1.

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¶2.12.54 White's News Agency quoted another officer whose colleague was unable to resuscitate a young fan. He stated that when he stopped, 'Immediately he was attacked by his mate who threw punches'. The officer 'did not retaliate although he was dazed', but 'simply went on to help the next victim'. As 'another officer gave the kiss of life and heart massage he was abused and then given a savage kick by another lout'.

¶2.12.55 A third officer stated:

¶Even when it became apparent we were dealing with a tragic situation police were harassed as they tried to get on with the job of saving lives and helping victims. We know a lot of questions will be asked about the opening of the gates – a decision taken because it was feared lives were at risk outside the ground. The fact remains that had Liverpool fans entered the ground in an orderly and civilised manner the crushing that led to the deaths would not have happened.

¶2.12.56 The officer also stated that a police request to delay the kick-off to 'allow fans to enter the ground' had been refused because 'the players had already come out so the match had to start on time. A lot of us felt that simply wasn't good enough'.

¶2.12.57 On the afternoon of 18 April White's circulated a further story quoting a police officer who claimed that before bodies were taken to the gymnasium their pockets were picked by other fans:

¶There was a lot of pilfering going on while the bid to save lives was taking place.

¶Personal possessions were missing as well as cash and other articles.

¶People were picking up coins which had fallen from victim's [sic] pockets as they lay on the floor. It was a sickening spectacle.

¶2.12.58 A 'high ranking officer' was reported as stating that some fans 'were like animals, they were drunk and violent and their actions were vile'. Another 'senior policeman' claimed that the police could not criticise fans' behaviour 'for fear of being accused of being insensitive'. He continued: 'the fact is, some of my officers went through a double hell – a disaster and the fury of drunken fans impeding rescue attempts'.

¶2.12.59 According to the filed story, South Yorkshire Metropolitan Ambulance Service (SYMAS) Chief Ambulance Officer Albert ('Don') Page34 'revealed one ambulanceman needed hospital treatment after being attacked as he treated an injured fan' while other ambulancemen were occupied with fans injured from fighting.

¶2.12.60 The statement noted earlier, made by PC Middup, the Police Federation Secretary for SYP, also originated with White's:

¶I am sick of hearing how good the crowd were. Some arrived tanked up and the situation faced by officers trying to control them was terrifying. People were diving under the bellies of the police horses and between their legs and the only people who would do that are either mental or have been drinking heavily.

¶2.12.61 PC Middup conceded that 'it was a small element who behaved so badly'.

CAO Albert Page was also known as Don.

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¶2.12.62 In a section entitled 'Patnick 1' White's noted that Irvine Patnick 'backed up police claims that Liverpool fans attacked and urinated on them as they tended to the injured and dying'. Mr Patnick was quoted as saying:

¶I spoke to many policemen in the makeshift mortuary afterwards. They told me they were hampered, harassed, punched, kicked and urinated on by Liverpool fans.

¶2.12.63 Mr Patnick claimed he had 'kept quiet about this' because he 'did not want to inflame a delicate situation'. He continued:

¶But it is a fact that these are the stories they told me and they had no reason to lie.

¶I saw the bruising on their bodies and the state they were in and there is no doubt in my mind it is true. All this happened to them and yet they carried on doing their job trying to save lives and now they are being blamed. One important question that must be answered is what part alcohol played in this whole tragic business.

¶2.12.64 These were the statements underpinning the coverage of 18 and 19 April, including The Sun's coverage that resulted in so much opprobrium.

¶What do the disclosed documents reveal about the basis for these allegations? 2.12.65 In scrutinising disclosed documents the Panel sought evidence that would corroborate these allegations. As discussed in detail in Chapter 5 there was no evidence of excessive or unusual levels of alcohol consumption by fans. The objective evidence available, in fact, indicates pre-match drinking that was not out of the ordinary. As with most situations at sporting or leisure events, there were exceptions, but there is no support for the notion that alcohol had an undue influence on crowd behaviour or contributed to the disaster. This is consistent with LJ Taylor's findings in his Interim Report in August 1989.

¶2.12.66 The documents considered in Chapter 4 regarding fans' behaviour in the immediate aftermath of the disaster provide a few examples of inappropriate behaviour, including hostility directed towards police and in some cases allegations of physical assault as people 'tended to take out their anger and frustration on those in uniform'.35

¶2.12.67 It is clear, however, from eye-witness accounts that this was prompted both by anger at the delay in official recognition of, and reaction to, the plight of those trapped in the pens and by a desperate desire to rescue and treat seriously injured and unconscious friends and relatives. It is also clear from eye-witness accounts and from the video footage of the aftermath that such incidents were exceptional.

¶2.12.68 Dr John Ashton, a Liverpool fan who took part in the rescue, stated:

¶During this whole period the public were fantastic, although shocked and angry. On one occasion at the end a group of young men came past the dead and one of them expressed his anger at police who were standing there. I told him to 'cool it', that it was not helpful, and he stopped. I saw no other episodes like this at all, although there was a general atmosphere of anger at what had been happening. I remember thinking how restrained everybody was.36

Statement of Station Officer Paul Eason, 5 May 1989, YAS000001490001, p5. 36. Statement of Dr John Ashton, 19 April 1989, SYP000096240001, p28.

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¶2.12.69 From the documents disclosed to the Panel there is no evidence to support any of the other allegations. There were no other accounts of stealing from the dead.

¶2.12.70 An eye-witness account of a police horse lifted from the ground was clear that this occurred as fans were forced beneath the horse as a result of severe congestion and excessive pressure outside the stadium.

¶2.12.71 Several statements referred to fans urinating at the rear of the stands rather than leaving via the stairs to use the toilets.37 One police officer alleged that fans had deliberately urinated on police officers.38

¶2.12.72 A most disturbing and repeated allegation, made by a police inspector, concerned verbal abuse of a sexual nature directed at an unconscious young woman by a Liverpool fan. Whatever the accuracy of the officer's statement, and from the documents provided to the Panel there is no verification of this serious allegation, the publicity it received was extensive and presented as an example of the bad behaviour of Liverpool fans in general.

¶2.12.73 With the exception of isolated examples of anger, frustration and inappropriate behaviour in the immediate aftermath the statements disclosed to the Panel do not substantiate the serious allegations published in the press and attributed to police spokespeople, most of which relied on hearsay.

¶The interventions of Irvine Patnick MP 2.12.74 Within five days of the disaster, and having featured extensively in local and national media coverage, Irvine Patnick wrote to LJ Taylor enclosing 'rough notes'. He wrote that it had become 'clear' to him 'that matters reported to me' on the evening of 15 April, and in the days that followed, 'would have to be considered' by the Judge.39 He had 'resisted the temptation to edit and redraft my notes as I hope you will agree that they may be more valuable as an almost instant recollection'.

¶2.12.75 Given that the media coverage had included controversial comments attributed to Mr Patnick, he 'emphasis[ed] that I myself did not sensationalise what I was told'. That had come, 'as with so many other bad things, from the media'.

¶2.12.76 The four pages of recollections described how he became aware of the disaster via television coverage; it was 'compulsive viewing'. He went to the Royal Hallamshire Hospital and from there drove to Hammerton Road Police Station.

¶2.12.77 He diverted to the Boys' Club where the bereaved and survivors were gathered. From there he visited the police station and drove to the stadium, only to find that the Chairman of Sheffield Wednesday Football Club had left.

¶2.12.78 He was interviewed by Radio Sheffield, discovering that Colin Moynihan, the Minister for Sport, was flying to Sheffield by helicopter. He drove to SYP headquarters and following a brief discussion with Deputy Chief Constable Peter Hayes he was interviewed by Radio Hallam and went to the SYP Transport Department where the Minister was landing.

For example, statement of a Hillsborough Steward, quoted at SYP000046060001, p28. 38. Statement of Police Constable Ball, SYP000082890001, p6. 39. Letter from Irvine Patnick MP to The Rt Hon Lord Justice Taylor, 'Hillsborough Stadium Disaster 15th April 1989',

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¶2.12.79 Here Mr Patnick met 'Chief Superintendent Duckworth' who 'asked if I would go and speak with the officers that had been on duty at the stadium' as they were 'down in the dumps'. Entering the building, 'it was very quiet and my reception I would describe as "frosty"'.

¶2.12.80 While he was talking with an off-duty Sergeant whom he knew, another officer approached and asked if he wanted 'to know the truth'. Mr Patnick recalled then being told the following:

¶'Some of the supporters were pissed out of their minds. They were pissing on us while we were pulling the dead and injured out [sic] they were swearing at us kicking and punching us and hampering our work'. One seated showed me the marks of the kicks on his left trouser leg and the marks on his skin. Another one informed how the crowd had lifted up a Police horse how the fans had been crawling beneath the horses ...

¶One said, 'I picked up a girl she was dead she was in my arms her blouse was torn and she had no bra on her breasts were exposed [sic] when someone shouted at me

¶"throw her over here we'll fuck her". It was booze that did it – you speak up for us tell them in Parliament what happened'.

¶2.12.81 Witnessing this exchange 'senior officers' advised Mr Patnick to take what he had heard 'with a pinch of salt'.

¶2.12.82 His account recorded that by Monday 17 April he was being telephoned by the press 'with "stories" they had heard and on Tuesday 18th April the media were on to the story of looting, violence and drink'. He was asked if he could confirm such allegations. He claimed he did 'not speak to some newspapers' but they published 'a garbled tale'.

¶2.12.83 On Wednesday 19 April, the day The Sun published its controversial edition 'The Truth', Graham Boon of White's News Agency asked if Mr Patnick 'could confirm the police had found dead bodies outside the ground'. He had replied that he could not. In the course of the conversation he asked Mr Boon 'why after a telephone conversation' with another White's reporter, Peter Moxon, 'comments had been attributed' to him 'the day before which I had not made'. He claimed that 'Mr Boon had apologised', adding that 'it had been garbled by others that had used it'.

¶2.12.84 In another letter disclosed to the Panel and written to Mr Boon four days after the telephone conversation, Mr Patnick noted that the call had been made 'regarding allegations that dead people had been discovered outside the Leppings Lane entrance' of the stadium.40

¶2.12.85 In the letter he 'pointed out that press reports which must have come from your colleague Peter Moxon the day before stated I had spoken to police officers in the mortuary'. He continued: 'You agreed that the story had been mixed up and my comments had been re-arranged but not at your end'. This suggested that the newspapers had altered the facts.

¶2.12.86 He claimed he had told Mr Moxon that he 'had visited the mortuary and was shocked, but had not spoken to the police officers there'. Finally, having read The Sun's coverage which had quoted him, he did 'not recollect naming Liverpool fans but [had] said "people"'.

Letter from Irvine Patnick MP to Graham Boon, White's News Agency, 23 April 1989, SYP000046060001, p24.

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¶2.12.87 In his submission to LJ Taylor, Mr Patnick commented that 'after being sickened by the "myths" that had sprung up about the disaster' he had 'repeated [to the media] the story' told to him by police officers on the night of the disaster.41 He had believed their allegations about the behaviour of Liverpool fans. A few days later Mr Patnick wrote again to LJ Taylor stating: 'After reading again my recollections ... I wish to point out the comments to "take with a pinch of salt" was [sic] my way of summing up the gist of the Senior Officers' comments'.42

¶White's News Agency and the 'authenticity' of the story 2.12.88 In the wake of public outrage that followed the publication of the allegations and the lack of substantiating evidence from independent witnesses or CCTV coverage, White's News Agency was under considerable pressure to confirm its sources. White's detailed the background in a memorandum to the Evening Standard, one of the first newspapers to break the story.43

¶2.12.89 It stated that '[a]ll the allegations in the stories we filed were made, unsolicited, by ranking officers in the South Yorkshire force to three different experienced senior journalists who are partners in this agency'. The officers 'had been on duty at Hillsborough'.

¶2.12.90 However, the 'first claims of bad behaviour came on the night of Saturday April 15th a few hours after the tragedy when one reporter met by chance a senior police officer he has known for many years':

¶Without prompting the officer told him he had been punched and urinated on as he tried to save a dying victim at Hillsborough. The following day there was another chance meeting with [sic] second officer who again without prompting said he had seen some fans behaving badly including attacking police and urinating on officers.

¶2.12.91 White's noted: 'At this stage we felt it was not enough confirmation to send a story making such serious claims'. This changed on Monday 17 April when 'another reporter met a third officer who volunteered information and reiterated similar stories saying he had seen police attacked and had been told of fans urinating down the terraces as police pulled away the dead and injured'. The third interview gave White's corroboration and confidence to file the initial story on the morning of 18 April.

¶2.12.92 Later in the day, however, 'a third reporter met a fourth officer he has known for many years who repeated the allegations and added that Liverpool supporters had been stealing from the dead'.

¶2.12.93 This officer 'had not seen it [stealing] personally' yet 'despite fingertip searches of the terracing a lot of personal property belonging to the dead was missing and other officers had told him of pilfering'. Consequently White's filed the further details along with the comment from the SYMAS Chief Ambulance Officer.

Letter from Irvine Patnick MP to The Rt Hon Lord Justice Taylor, 'Hillsborough Stadium Disaster 15th April 1989',²⁰²⁰ April 1989, HOM000016460001, pp1-5. April 1989, HOM000016460001, pp1-5. 42. Letter from Irvine Patnick MP to The Rt Hon Lord Justice Taylor, '15th April 1989 Hillsborough Stadium Disaster',

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¶2.12.94 The memorandum continued:

¶Further quotes were sent in a later story after we spoke to the Tory MP for Sheffield

¶Hallam Irvine Patnick. He said he had spoken to police officers on Saturday night who said they had been attacked and urinated on. He had not volunteered the information previously because he felt it would inflame a very sensitive situation.

¶2.12.95 White's stated that they had 'watered down' allegations 'which included a report to us that Liverpool fans, seeing the uncovered breasts of a dead girl shouted "pass her over here and we'll f... [sic] her" '.The news agency concluded that they 'felt we did as much as we could to check the authenticity of the story in the time available and reported faithfully what we were told'.

¶The Police Federation: 'Putting our side of the trauma over to the press and media' 2.12.96 On the morning The Sun and other newspapers published the serious allegations against Liverpool fans members of the SYP branch of the Police Federation met in a Sheffield restaurant.44 2.12.97 The branch Secretary, PC Middup, addressed the meeting stating that the 'Chief Constable had been most grateful for the support we had given as he had been in a difficult position' and 'it was a measure of the immense esteem in which the Chief Constable held this Board' that he would be joining the meeting later in the morning. 2.12.98 As spokesperson PC Middup 'wanted to tell the J.B.B. members and the people he represented what he had tried to do, putting our side of the trauma over to the press and media'. 2.12.99 He presented a chronology of events from 6.15pm on Saturday 15 April when he first became aware of the disaster. He had attended a press briefing at 7pm with the Chief Constable and then visited the stadium. He found officers 'in a terribly distressed state'. The minutes recorded:

¶Some officers were injured and some stories were told to the Secretary [Middup] which were horrific. One story being that a policewoman who was giving resuscitation was urinated on. Other police officers were verbally abused and had stuff thrown at them and spat on. Some officers saw people picking coins up from the floor which had obviously come from the victims. Mr Middup said that was how it was portrayed to him that night by individuals under tremendous strain. 2.12.100 PC Middup had responded to the 'immense' interest from the media. He had been 'proud to put the members' case forward' and had received a first abusive call the previous night. Another officer noted that while PC Middup had responded, 'senior officers had been lacking and abysmal, as if they had something to hide'. 2.12.101 The meeting discussed officers' reaction to negative media coverage, to the stress they had been under and the offer of counselling. PC Middup 'stated that the Chief Constable had said the truth could not come from him but had given the Secretary a totally free hand and supported him', as had many senior officers.

Detailed minutes, dated 27 April 1989, of a Special Joint Branch Board Meeting, Police Federation, South Yorkshire

¶Police, held at the 'Pickwick' Restaurant, High Green, Sheffield, 10am, 19 April 1989, TPF000000010001, pp1-12.

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¶2.12.102 In recounting the day's events a police officer (name redacted) reported that fans had been arrested 'early on Saturday morning' having thrown 'empty whisky bottles out of their vans'. He claimed 'some of the fans had been drunk from early morning when they arrived and some had been at Midland station all night'.

¶Mr [name redacted] said he had taken some of the brunt of wrath, as he had been abused and kicked by Liverpool supporters. The supporters had been spitting in officers' faces ... he did not react he just took it. This had been after, when the bodies were removed and when the fans were coming out.

¶Mr [name redacted] stated that the policewoman who had been urinated on had supposedly rung the 'Star', saying this welfare aspect had not been adequate and as a result of this she was going to be interviewed. Unfortunately, no-one knew who she was.

¶2.12.103 Another officer (name redacted) stated that while he was 'attending to the injured people, he was verbally abused and the supporters were shouting, "Murderers"'. Mr (name redacted) was not at Hillsborough but had discussed the disaster with his shift 'who had been right in the thick of it, getting people off the terraces, giving the kiss of life and whilst the officers were carrying this out, they were kicked and punched'. The officers had alleged that fans 'even ripped the cover off one of the victim's [sic] faces and shouted an obscenity at the dead person'.

¶2.12.104 Inspector Gordon Sykes stated that two quotes published in newspapers were from him. The first was 'about the police horses and the supporters diving underneath the bellies and through the legs of horses'. The second was 'when supporters were called into the Ground and were at the back of the terracing, then they all got booted out at the back'.

¶Mr Sykes said that is when he was carrying a young girl out who was virtually dead. Her 'T' shirt had come over her head and her breast was hanging out, when some supporters shouted, 'Throw her over here, let us ...' and then added another obscenity.

¶2.12.105 He stated that he had been kicked while attempting to resuscitate dying fans. While he had not seen 'the looting of bodies ... he and other colleagues ended up with ten bodies and the bodies had nothing on them at all, not even a handkerchief'.

¶2.12.106 PC Middup considered that there were two issues requiring clarification: 'they were that he was told the supporters were seen to be picking up items from the floor and the policewoman was urinated on'. Mr Booth 'stated that one of his men said he had witnessed people picking stuff up from the floor around the dead bodies'. (Name redacted) commented that other officers had been 'urinated on'.

¶2.12.107 The meeting criticised senior officers and raised the issue of junior and inexperienced officers, including special constables, having to deal with dead bodies. Soon after, the Chief Constable, Peter Wright, joined the meeting. He noted the continuing criticisms of the police published in the media, the 'trauma' that had been inflicted on the 'Force itself', and all that had happened 'has to be said' as there 'would be a Judicial Inquiry'. He then discussed his statements to the media:

¶Mr. Wright stated he had to say on Saturday night we opened a gate to save lives outside. He said he had received all sorts of horrendous stories ... he had made a conscious decision not to talk about these things – the behaviour of the fans. The mass of the crowd was the reason for opening the gate. He added he did not think there was any purpose or merit to respond in this way. Although Mr. Wright admitted he would have liked to have been able to make the comments which Mr. Middup had made.

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¶2.12.108 The Chief Constable advised the meeting to make 'notes on paper from recollections of events ... giving an indication of what happened on that day', for the 'only people to influence were the Judicial Inquiry' and SYP 'had to look at it ourselves'.

¶2.12.109 He had invited 'officers who were on duty at the Leppings Lane end to come and talk about it today' to gather 'evidence collectively from the officers who were there'. He stated that all officers were 'in it together'.

¶2.12.110 CC Wright counselled against talking to the media. He praised the officers who had dealt with the temporary mortuary, recounting the procedure that had been adopted. He was questioned about the visibility of senior officers in the immediate aftermath of the disaster and about the 'cut in manpower' because 'this information could be dangerous if someone outside became aware of it'.

¶2.12.111 The meeting then reverted to informing the Chief Constable about the behaviour of Liverpool fans, particularly allegations of heavy drinking.

¶2.12.112 The Chairman, Bob Lax, told the Chief Constable that 'fans who had travelled across the Woodhead [Pass] had left a trail of beer cans' and a 'video car had been sent round the whole route and he likened it to driving through confetti, driving through the beer cans'. In fact, the video material disclosed to the Panel suggests this was a gross exaggeration.

¶2.12.113 Discussion also focused on secondary accounts of the unfolding disaster including an allegation that Liverpool always had 'a hard core of 2000 supporters who never have a ticket, who go down at the last minute, smash their way through the turnstiles and blast through to the terraces'. CC Wright stated that if this was the case the information should have been given to SYP.

¶2.12.114 According to another officer, on the 'pro-formas circulated throughout the Force [to gather officers' recollections] there were corroborated accounts of vile, repulsive behaviour from Liverpool fans – hundreds of them'. In fact there were a few accounts of inappropriate behaviour among the large crowd before the match, but also references to the good-natured behaviour of most.45

¶2.12.115 CC Wright informed the meeting that 'we had got to catch it whilst it is hot' and 'we must pull our case together and present our case to the Inquiry team'. He 'felt a tremendous responsibility to get ourselves moving' and 'anyone who acts in good faith would get as much support as possible'. They were engaged in 'preparing a defence and we had got to prepare a rock solid story'. He was 'delighted the Inquiry had started and believed we would be exonerated'.

¶2.12.116 He stated further that 'the Inquiry team could be directed but if we sit back and let them collect the evidence, we would lose it. We have to do it ourselves'. It was vital to

For example, statement of Tim Cooke, Professor of Surgery, Glasgow, SYP000065110001, p4 and statement of Dr

¶John Ashton, 19 April 1989, SYP000096240001, p28.

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¶ensure that the information regarding fans' behaviour was logged, for 'if anybody should be blamed, it should be the drunken ticketless individuals'.

¶2.12.117 The Chairman thanked the Chief Constable for presenting to Police Federation members 'a positive way to deal with it'. The minutes concluded: 'It was agreed by everyone we had to get the message – togetherness – across to the Force'.

¶The Taylor Inquiry 2.12.118 As the Taylor Inquiry entered its initial stages of oral evidence The Times reported an editorial published in the Police Federation's journal, Police, in which an unequivocal connection to football hooliganism had been made. It had stated:

¶Within days of Hillsborough the hooligan was being rehabilitated faster than the oxyacetylene torches were toppling fences. It is as though all the years of mayhem, all the fighting, kicking, destruction, stabbings and deaths linked to soccer violence have been expunged from people's consciousness by one mind numbing tragedy.46 2.12.119 Following C/Supt Duckenfield's evidence claiming that he had lied about fans forcing entry into the stadium to prevent a riot, three newspapers headlined one phrase in Superintendent Roger Marshall's evidence regarding fans' behaviour: 'selfish brutality'.47 2.12.120 Each report stated that Supt Marshall, the officer responsible for crowd management outside the stadium at the Leppings Lane end who had requested the opening of Gate C, had never experienced 'such scenes of chaos and mindless determination as supporters cried out and fought each other to get through the turnstiles'. The 'blind necessity' to gain entry was fuelled by alcohol. He alleged that he had been spat on and a fan had tried to push him from a bridge into the river. 2.12.121 Supt Marshall's evidence was endorsed by Chief Inspector Robert Creaser whose comment that Liverpool fans 'behaved like lager louts' was also widely reported. A police officer, Police Constable Graham Duffy, alleged that the crush at the turnstiles was planned, reported in the Daily Mail as a 'storming' of the stadium.48 2.12.122 Superintendent Morgan was reported as stating that Liverpool fans had been 'painted whiter than white' and that the 'riot' at the turnstiles 'would have been sorted' had the police 'had 20 support units in riot gear' available.49 2.12.123 Although it is clear that there was serious overcrowding in the immediate approaches to the Leppings Lane end, the view that this was caused by fighting, brutality or riotous behaviour is not supported by the statements of others present nor by the CCTV footage. 2.12.124 Another SYP Sergeant added to the conspiracy theory that fans had planned an 'invasion' at Hillsborough and his comment that they behaved like 'animals' was widely and prominently reported. The Sun's headline was '"ANIMALS STAMPED ON HURT FANS"