Reports that Matter

The Report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel

SHAME OF BOOZY YOBS'.50

Section 9 of 9

SHAME OF BOOZY YOBS'.50

2.12.125 Over a period of 35 days of evidence from witnesses, the proportion of daily coverage given by national newspapers was: police evidence – 17 days; other professionals

  1. Reported in The Times, 15 May 1989. 47. The Times; The Independent; Daily Telegraph, 31 May 1989. 48. Daily Mail, 7 June 1989. 49. Daily Express, 8 June 1989. 50. The Sun,9 August 1991, SPA000000600001. 140. Letter from ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, to Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, 28 March 1991, SYP000123570001, p98. 141. Letter from Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, to ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, 10 April 1991, SYP000123570001, pp91-92. 142. Letter from ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, to Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, 10 April 1991, SYP000123570001, p95. 143. Letter from Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, to ACC Moore, South Yorkshire Police, 7 May 1991, SYP000123570001, pp75-78. June 1989.
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or agencies – 12 days; and injured supporters, bereaved family members and civilian eye-witnesses – six days. 2.12.126 Andrew Collins, QC to the Taylor Inquiry, provided a note of caution regarding the oral evidence. The Times reported his comment that 'it was impossible to accept that the crushing was caused by fans without tickets' and while some had arrived at the stadium 'in a condition affected by alcohol, increasing selfish and stupid behaviour, which was inexcusable ... it did not cause the trouble'.51

Statements released to White's News Agency and forwarded to Irvine Patnick MP 2.12.127 On 12 July 1989, a month before publication of LJ Taylor's Interim Report, Peter Moxon at White's News Agency wrote to Irvine Patnick MP enclosing 'extracts from the sworn statements made by witnesses to the Hillsborough Disaster'.52

2.12.128 The covering letter stated that White's had been 'prevented from using the contents of these statements and told it would be regarded as contempt if we ignored the ruling by Lord Justice Taylor'.

2.12.129 The six attached statements had been made by stewards, police officers and an ambulance officer. Single pages had been extracted from the statements and allegations highlighted. A Detective Sergeant who had entered pen 3 stated he had been 'kicked in the back' while rescuing an unconscious young fan, then 'someone behind me picked up a length of broken crush barrier and threw it over the [pen] fence at the Police [on the perimeter track]'. Further, 'some [officers] alleged that [fans] had been running forward and picking up property from the front terracing. I was in the pen but had not seen this'.

2.12.130 In another abridged statement a different Detective Sergeant stated that several fans who had 'clambered over the perimeter fence [to escape the pens] had been drinking heavily and smelled strongly of intoxicants'. He alleged that 'some of these supporters' were 'spitting and kicking officers who were in the process of attempting resuscitation'. He was called a 'murderer'.

2.12.131 An ambulance officer's statement noted that he had 'received kicks and punches from the Liverpool supporters ... I believe out of sheer frustration'. A steward claimed he saw another steward 'grabbed' by fans and called a 'BASTARD'. He had seen 'urine ... falling from the West Stand' because fans 'too lazy to go to the toilet … were urinating from the back of the stand'. Further, he alleged that a snack bar was 'looted' for 'pies and other food' while the attendant was helping with the rescue.

2.12.132 In another extract a police officer on the pitch stated that he had helped to lift a young woman onto a board to carry her to the gymnasium: 'she was in a state of undress and fans were jeering but I couldn't tell what they were shouting'. He 'assisted in making her decent' before she was carried away.

2.12.133 Mr Patnick replied briefly to Mr Moxon, commenting that the enclosed statements 'actually confirm everything you stated'.53 He was grateful to Mr Moxon 'for taking the trouble to send these on and I shall remember it and it was appreciated'. There is no indication in the exchange of letters as to how White's News Agency had come by the

  1. The Times, 15 July 1989. 52. Letter from Peter Moxon, White's News Agency, to Irvine Patrick MP, 12 July 1989, SYP000046060001, pp25-38. 53. Letter from Irvine Patnick MP to Peter Moxon, White's News Agency, 27 July 1989, SYP000046060001, p26.
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statements taken initially by SYP, at this time held as part of the West Midlands Police (WMP) investigation.

The Taylor Interim Report, August 1989 2.12.134 As stated in Part 1, LJ Taylor's Interim Report was unambiguous in finding that 'although there were other causes, the main reason for the disaster was the failure in police control'.54 Although there were 'notable exceptions' LJ Taylor considered that 'senior officers in command were defensive and evasive witnesses' and 'neither their handling of problems on the day nor their account of it in evidence showed the qualities of leadership to be expected of their rank'.

2.12.135 LJ Taylor went on to criticise C/Supt Duckenfield and Superintendent Bernard Murray for misjudging the congestion at the turnstiles, the monitoring of turnstile entry, the management of the crowd and not delaying the kick-off. 2.12.136 C/Supt Duckenfield's 'capacity to take decisions and give orders seemed to collapse' and he 'failed to give necessary consequential orders or exert any control when the disaster occurred'. Finally, he was 'untruthful' in giving information 'that there had been an inrush due to Liverpool fans forcing open a gate'. 2.12.137 More generally, it was 'a matter of regret that at the hearing, and in their submissions, the South Yorkshire Police were not prepared to concede they were in any respect at fault in what had occurred'. While C/Supt Duckenfield had apologised for 'blaming the Liverpool fans for causing the deaths', the SYP 'case was to blame the fans for being late and drunk, and to blame the Club for failing to monitor the pens'. 2.12.138 LJ Taylor noted that some officers had 'described a high proportion' of Liverpool fans 'as drunk, as "lager-louts" or even as "animals"' while others noted an 'unco-operative minority who had drunk too much'.55 2.12.139 He 'was satisfied on the evidence, however, that the great majority were not drunk or even the worse for drink'. It was his view that 'some officers, seeking to rationalise their loss of control, over-estimated the drunken element in the crowd'. 2.12.140 Further, LJ Taylor found no evidence to demonstrate that there was a 'very significant body of ticketless fans in the crowd which built up'. He also dismissed the 'slender evidence' on which the 'suggestion that fans without tickets conspired to arrive late and create such trouble as would force the police to admit them to the match' was based. 2.12.141 Apart from the failure to manage the crowd at the turnstiles, LJ Taylor considered that as the central pens on Leppings Lane terrace were visibly full at 2.50pm, 'the tunnel should have been closed off whether Gate C was to be opened or not' – a 'simple' procedure previously carried out. 2.12.142 Whether or not the procedure was known to senior officers, 'it should have been clear in the control room [Police Control Box inside the stadium] where there was a clear view of the pens and of the crowd at the turnstiles that the tunnel had to be closed'. The 'failure' to order the closing of the tunnel 'was a blunder of the first magnitude'.

  1. The Rt Hon Lord Justice Taylor The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, 15 April 1989, Interim Report. Cm 765, London:

Her Majesty's Stationery Office, pp49-50. 55. The Rt Hon Lord Justice Taylor The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster, 15 April 1989, Interim Report. Cm 765, London:

Her Majesty's Stationery Office, pp34-40.

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The Police Federation responds to the Taylor Interim Report 2.12.143 A month after the Taylor Interim Report was published Michael Shersby MP, who represented the Police Federation's interests in Parliament, met with the Home Secretary to discuss a range of issues, one of which was the 'Hillsborough Disaster'.56 2.12.144 In a document recording the meeting disclosed to the Panel, Mr Shersby reported that 'morale in South Yorkshire [SYP] had taken a great knock as a result of Lord Justice Taylor's interim report'. The police officers on duty 'felt they had been shouldered with an unfair portion of the blame'.

2.12.145 There was also concern that the SYP solicitor had decided 'to eliminate some material from the police evidence to the inquiry'. This included 'emotional matters such as the alleged theft of items which had fallen from victims' pockets, and instances of those in the ground pouring urine on the police'. According to Mr Shersby the solicitor considered 'that these pieces of evidence were not relevant to the purpose of the Inquiry'.

2.12.146 With the exception of the removal of intemperate and unsubstantiated material during the review and alteration of statements (see Chapter 11), the Panel has not found evidence of such material being excluded from police statements.

2.12.147 Further, Mr Shersby stated that there 'was a feeling in South Yorkshire that the police investigation led by the West Midlands force was proceeding with a determination to produce prosecutions just to show that justice was being done'.

2.12.148 While he considered that the Taylor Interim Report was 'not a good one', failing 'to reflect the problems the police faced nationally', the Home Secretary replied that the 'Federated ranks did not come out of the interim report badly'.

2.12.149 A month later, Mr Shersby met with the South Yorkshire Police Federation. It was a day-long meeting held in two sessions. The morning session was attended by representatives of the Police Federation, DCC Hayes (attending on behalf of the Chief Constable), Chief Superintendent John Nesbit, Chief Superintendent Brian Mole, Chief Inspector Norman Bettison ('Hillsborough Inquiry Team'), Tony Judge (Publicity Director, Police Federation and editor of Police, the Federation journal) and two representatives of the Federation's solicitors, Russell Jones and Walker.57

2.12.150 The Chairman of the South Yorkshire Police Federation opened the meeting stating that its purpose 'was to draw out information that would be helpful for Michael Shersby when parliament came to debate the Hillsborough Disaster'.

2.12.151 DCC Hayes considered that the meeting had two focuses: '1. To try and enable us to have a better understanding of what happened at Hillsborough by way of video presentation and photographs. 2. The afternoon session would be spent listening to police officers who had two things to say, namely they felt at risk and they felt frustrated'. The Chief Constable's 'unequivocal' acceptance of the Taylor Interim Report had been made to 'get on with [its] recommendations'.

2.12.152 CI Bettison introduced the video material. He commented on the stadium's age and its location: 'Officers were forced to police a ground that today would have greater

  1. Meeting with Mr Michael Shersby MP on 6 September, Private Office, 7 September 1989, CJ Walters, Principal Private

Secretary HOM000011510001, p2. 57. Meeting at South Yorkshire Police Federation Headquarters, Tuesday 3 October 1989, Morning session, strictures on how it was built, access roads etc'. He noted where the deaths occurred and the collapsed barrier in pen 3. He stated that the pens were estimated, from a headcount on a photograph taken at 3.05pm, to be 'at least 50% over capacity' and proposed that overcrowding contributed to the collapsed barrier.

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2.12.153 Fans 'went in the pen because they came down the tunnel' and they 'went down the tunnel because they came through Emergency Gate C'.

2.12.154 The gates had been opened 'on the instructions of the police' but the 'view of the Police Federation is that there was such a crowd of people outside, there was no realistic alternative to opening the gate'.

2.12.155 The video presented was 29 minutes long, 'culled' by CI Bettison from 65 hours of video footage. The minutes of the meeting record what presumably was CI Bettison's commentary: 'Perimeter fences were the result of hooliganism – walls demolished, missile attacks on police officers, supporters climbing perimeter fences, pitch invasion'. The last was 'thought to be the case at Hillsborough'.

2.12.156 What followed was a description of the Hillsborough Stadium layout including Gate C, the tunnel and the pens: 'Signs were a club responsibility'. CCTV footage of the 1988 Semi-Final was contrasted with footage from 1989. The comment is made that the 'normality of the 1988 match influenced the planning of the 1989 semi final'.

2.12.157 The video showed the build-up of fans at the turnstiles, estimated at 2.39pm as between 2,000 and 6,000. The meeting was informed that the crowd was 'massively uncooperative' and the '44 officers plus mounted officers (17)' were 'reliant on some co-operation on [sic] the 6,000 people around them'. It was alleged by C/Supt Nesbit that ticketless fans were trying to 'barter with the stewards' to gain entry.

2.12.158 DCC Hayes stated that there had been a steadier flow of fans in 1988 but in 1989 'they all came in the last 20 minutes', most 'from licensed premises'. The video showed the period immediately before Gate C was opened. Its opening did not result in a 'mad rush or stampede as press referred to'.

2.12.159 Asked about 'guidance' of fans entering through Gate C and communications, CI Bettison stated that no announcements were made. Communications 'broke down at 14.42' and 'remained difficult'. DCC Hayes noted that 'Ground control could see all the cameras'.

2.12.160 CI Bettison stated that as crushing increased in the central pens there 'was plenty of room in Pen 2'. There were available '[m]ore policemen than could do any good'. He described C/Supt Nesbit's organisation of the evacuation of the pens. C/Supt Nesbit commented that the '[collapsed] barrier was rusted and corroded ... 63 years old'. CI Bettison remarked that a newspaper 'from the 1940s was found stuffed in one part of the barrier'.

2.12.161 C/Supt Nesbit stated that the police allowed fans to help to carry the bodies to the gymnasium 'otherwise they might have turned their frustration on the police'. He reflected that while there had been 'criticism that the police did not react as quickly as they should ... most people thought it was a pitch invasion'.

2.12.162 The notes of the meeting recorded C/Supt Mole commenting that the '[m]en involved in football matches were thoroughly experienced' but what was different 'in this instance, what changed was the fans'. He claimed that one public house 'sold 69 barrels of beer'. Fans had urinated in private gardens and their behaviour 'was the worst seen'.

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2.12.163 C/Supt Nesbit considered that Liverpool fans had been determined to 'get into the stadium' and that officers 'do not feel this was brought to Lord Justice Taylor's notice'. He hoped that 'Michael Shersby can in Parliament redress the balance'. C/Supt Mole stated that the Superintendents' Association considered the 'report was done in haste'.

2.12.164 Mr Judge considered the Taylor Interim Report was 'over the top'. According to the notes of the meeting he stated: 'The idea that a peaceful crowd went into a trap created by the South Yorkshire Police should not go down in history' and evidence 'not given in the Taylor Report should come out'.

2.12.165 C/Supt Nesbit commented that '[a]ll officers do feel the report is imbalanced. But if we challenge, we look as though we are going on the offensive'. Dick Coyles, Vice-Chairman of the Police Federation, stated that SYP 'have been made a scapegoat and officers feel inadequate and condemned by that'.

2.12.166 Mr Shersby reported that in discussions with government ministers (and reflecting what had been said to him by the Home Secretary) 'the very strong impression is that Police Federation members do not come badly out of the report and they are seen to have done a good job at Hillsborough'. He continued:

However, I think that the view needs to be greatly amplified and that the general public need to understand that because they only read what they see in the popular daily newspapers. Important to bring out that the police did behave magnificently on this occasion in very difficult circumstances.

2.12.167 Mr Judge commented that morale in the SYP rank and file was high 'and they repudiate the [Taylor] judgement'. He felt that it 'should come across in a debate and we should plan with Michael Shersby a counter attack'.

The rank and file 2.12.168 The afternoon session of the meeting was introduced by Bob Lax, Chairman of the South Yorkshire Police Federation, and was attended by the Federation solicitors, CI Bettison, Inspector Gordon Sykes and many unnamed SYP officers. Opening the meeting, CI Bettison stated that the morning session had agreed that officers on duty at Hillsborough 'were the most professional experienced men in the service'. He quoted Superintendent Roger Greenwood's comments to the Sheffield Star in which he had stated his 'greatest admiration' for the 'heroics' of the police on duty at Hillsborough.

2.12.169 He then referenced the Taylor Interim Report: 'Most officers did all they could. Many supporters paid tribute'. Further: 'Over many years the South Yorkshire Police have given excellent service to the public'. The minutes of the meeting record CI Bettison as stating:

You have the opportunity to present more balance to the Report: fit those paragraphs much more in context. Removal of certain items of evidence that were presented to the Hillsborough Inquiry Team ... For example, Liverpool fans 'they were all animals' – matters of conjecture and opinion were removed from those statements ... Officers who felt aggrieved by this were asked to let me know.

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2.12.170 Insp Sykes stated that he 'wanted to protect the people I represent i.e. the federated ranks' so that Mr Shersby could 'put our point of view in Parliament'. He had been prevented from giving some of his evidence to LJ Taylor. He continued:

When we were rescuing people, we cleared a passageway and took the injured and the dead away. Whilst I was there, there were three police officers trying to carry a young girl who was unconscious and had stopped breathing. They dragged her into the main concourse. Her T shirt came over her head and her breasts were exposed.

Someone shouted: 'Throw her up here. I'll fuck her'. When I came to that part of the evidence, I was told not to say that part, to go on about the rescue. It is that type of thing that we should look to Michael Shersby to put a proper balance back into this Report.

2.12.171 In response, individual police officers addressed the meeting, often in extreme and emotive terms. Spectators were described as 'stoned paralytic' and 'pissed out of their minds'. There was 'senseless drinking', 'Leppings Lane … was full of idiots with ale' and 'you could smell alcohol in the air outside the football ground'.

2.12.172 Yet in the documents disclosed to the Panel there is no evidence from other sources that drinking before the match was excessive, and the objective evidence suggests that alcohol consumption was reasonable and unexceptional for a major sporting event.

2.12.173 References were made to a 'sea' or a 'tide' of fans arriving at the stadium at approximately 2.45pm and a police officer stated that a '[n]oticeable number ... did not have tickets'. Another stated that at '2.45pm when the mob arrived, I have never seen anything like it'. He felt 'ashamed to be English' and had the police 'tried to arrest them, I dread to think what would have happened'.

2.12.174 Another officer considered the Taylor Interim Report a 'whitewash' that had portrayed the police as 'scapegoats'. He believed that there had been a conspiracy among Liverpool fans who 'were intent on staying away until the last minute and then forcing entry at any cost'.

2.12.175 Documentary evidence considered in Chapter 2 does not confirm a significant number of ticketless fans, and CI Bettison responded to the meetings that 'Inspector King of Scotland Yard was asked to find out whether there was a conspiratorial effort – he could not find any direct evidence that Liverpool supporters held this conspiratorial view, apart from three isolated statements … in the pub'. Nor is there any evidence in the disclosed documents to confirm that there was a surge of badly behaved late arrivals, with or without tickets.

Police officers' reactions to the Taylor Inquiry 2.12.176 Police officers present at the meeting were critical of the Taylor Inquiry, regarded repeatedly as a 'whitewash'. According to one, LJ Taylor 'knew that if the truth came out about Liverpool fans it would be the death of Liverpool [Football] Club' and the Interim Report had given 'Liverpool a carte blanche to do what they want'. The minutes record that his comments drew 'applause from the audience'.

2.12.177 Another officer asserted that 'Lord Justice Taylor was not prepared to hear any criticisms of the Liverpool supporters'. South Yorkshire Police Federation Chairman Bob Lax stated that a WMP investigating officer had told him that LJ Taylor was determined to 'rush' his Interim Report against the wishes of the WMP team because 'they had not collated all the evidence collected about drinking'. Mr Judge was 'astounded' that evidence in police officers' statements 'was simply passed over by Counsel' and by LJ Taylor.

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2.12.178 In drawing the meeting to a close the Police Federation solicitor commented that there was no 'realistic judicial challenge' to the Taylor Interim Report, but he hoped 'that some balance can be restored through the public channels'. Further, there would be 'obviously an opportunity at the Inquest to redress the balance'.

2.12.179 Mr Shersby addressed the audience: 'No-one could listen to what you have said without being impressed by the clearness of your evidence'. He would 'consider carefully' how it could be used 'to get your views across'. To applause, Mr Shersby concluded:

We have listened to 50 Police Officers. I am very unhappy and disturbed about what

I have heard, not only about the events you had to deal with but that so many Police

Officers feel so strongly about the Inquiry which has been set up by Parliament. It is a very unsatisfactory state of affairs and you have my assurance that I will remedy it.

2.12.180 The final contribution recorded in the minutes came from Mr Judge who had never attended 'a gathering where you can say these things'. He stated that PC Middup, Secretary of the South Yorkshire Police Federation, had been vindicated. Although 'crucified in the press' it was PC Middup 'who spoke the truth'.

Promoting the 'counter-attack' 2.12.181 Within weeks Mr Judge published a two-page review of the Shersby meetings. Under the banner headline 'Hillsborough – the police who dispute Taylor's verdict' the sub- heading read 'the anger still felt by ordinary police men and women who consider the inquiry report has whitewashed the hooligan element among Liverpool followers'.58

2.12.182 The article reported that the Police Federation Vice-Chairman, Mr Coyles, and Mr Shersby had described the Sheffield meeting as 'distressing and disturbing'. Mr Coyles was quoted as stating: 'These men and women have been through a hellish experience and they are labouring under a terrible sense of injustice'.

2.12.183 According to Mr Judge, there was 'no doubt at all that their recovery is being hampered, not just by understandable, if unfounded, feelings of guilt and inadequacy, but their resentment of the Taylor version of events leading up to the kick off at 3pm that day'. In fact the Police Federation solicitor had written to LJ Taylor stating that 'his report had failed to take account of the true significance of events preceding the kick-off, and asking for the evidence of rank and file to be reassessed'. Mr Judge stated that LJ Taylor declined the request.

2.12.184 The article stated that the Taylor Interim Report 'suggests that the junior police officers exaggerated the level of drunkenness and general disorderliness ...'. Officers had responded by claiming that LJ Taylor 'was not told the full truth because of the way in which their statements were edited, or because they were not allowed to give evidence which they considered to be of the utmost importance'.

2.12.185 What followed in Mr Judge's account were synopses of the allegations about drunkenness, 'urinating in the streets' and fans without tickets. It continued: 'As to the precise actions of some of the fans that day, the allegations made by the officers are as

  1. Article by Tony Judge in The Police Magazine, SCC000002600001, pp214-215.
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specific as they are sickening, but it would be pointless and unnecessarily offensive to recount them here'.

2.12.186 According to Mr Judge, the 'picture that emerges from all these officers is quite different from Lord Taylor's portrayal of a "normal" big match crowd'. Rather, 'a large section of Liverpool fans ... had been drinking to excess, many of whom were ticketless, but all of whom were determined to get into the ground before kick off'.

2.12.187 Among the 'majority of Liverpool fans' who had 'behaved with total propriety' was a 'large contingent of drink sodden louts whose general behaviour had shocked experienced police officers'. LJ Taylor and his assessors had 'rejected this interpretation of events' yet 'if the police version is indeed, the unpalatable truth, the Hillsborough Inquiry's interim report has ignored a major cause for concern'.

2.12.188 The article's publication coincided with Liverpool returning to Hillsborough to play Sheffield Wednesday in a league match. On the evening of the match the Sheffield Star published the headline 'NEW "LOUTS" TAG FOR LIVERPOOL FANS'.59 2.12.189 Given the severity of SYP officers' allegations published in the Tony Judge article, the Star considered it 'essential that Lord Taylor responds to these charges as soon as possible'. The following day the national press repeated SYP officers' accusations. There had been 'mass drunkenness', with fans 'stoned paralytic' and 'drink sodden' while the real issues had been 'whitewashed' by the Taylor Inquiry.60

Superintendent Bettison visits Parliament 2.12.190 A memorandum disclosed to the Panel and written by recently promoted Superintendent Bettison to the SYP Chief Constable in early November noted that at the October Police Federation meeting Mr Shersby had invited him to repeat his video presentation and commentary to an invited group of MPs in London.61 The Chief Constable had agreed and of the 40-plus MPs invited, 12 met with Supt Bettison on 8 November. 2.12.191 Supt Bettison reported that the ' "public" response' to his 'presentation was devalued by posturing and rhetoric on all sides' but 'individually' five MPs had 'warmly welcomed the input'. He had faced 'invective' and the 'monotonous persistence' of a Labour MP had 'caused' a Conservative MP 'to throw down his papers and storm out of the Committee Room'. 2.12.192 He considered that the meeting had divided on party lines. Another Labour MP 'had already made up his mind where the blame for the disaster lies – with the South Yorkshire Police'. Conservative MPs took an opposing view and one 'confided that in his view Taylor had got it all wrong and, as far as he was concerned, he intended to put the record straight'. 2.12.193 Supt Bettison reminded the Chief Constable that the Parliamentary debate on LJ Taylor's Interim Report had been postponed. Two Conservative MPs 'expressed disappointment that the debate was not more imminent as they believed the passage of time will diminish the impact of their "promised" attack upon the findings of the Interim Report'.

  1. Sheffield Star, 29 November 1989. 60. The Guardian; The Times; Daily Express; Daily Mirror; The Sun, 30 November 1989. 61. Memo on Presentation to Members of Parliament on the subject of the Hillsborough disaster, from Superintendent NG

Bettison to Chief Constable, SYP,9 August 1991, SPA000000600001. 140. Letter from ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, to Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, 28 March 1991, SYP000123570001, p98. 141. Letter from Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, to ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, 10 April 1991, SYP000123570001, pp91-92. 142. Letter from ACC Anderson, South Yorkshire Police, to Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, 10 April 1991, SYP000123570001, p95. 143. Letter from Brigadier Pownall, Police Complaints Authority, to ACC Moore, South Yorkshire Police, 7 May 1991, SYP000123570001, pp75-78. November 1989, SYP000097010001, pp 349-351.

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2.12.194 Finally, Supt Bettison noted that Mr Shersby 'mentioned privately that he had taken the opportunity to discuss the Hillsborough disaster presentation with the Home Secretary who expressed interest in seeing the video tape'. Mr Shersby would meet with the Chief Constable at the Police Federation dinner when 'he intends to raise this matter with you'.

The Chief Constable responds to the Interim Report 2.12.195 Prior to the inquests, in February 1990 the allegation of fans' drunkenness was taken further by the SYP Chief Constable, Peter Wright. Under the Daily Mail headline 'HILLSBOROUGH CHIEF ATTACKS JUDGE', CC Wright expressed 'difficulty' in understanding how drink was of no consequence. He stated that 'there were other factors ... which he hoped would emerge at the coroner's inquest and give people a different view of what happened'.62

2.12.196 Following an 'exclusive interview' with 'tough-talking' CC Wright the Sheffield Star published a story headlined 'Coroner will reveal the true story'.63 The accompanying strap line was 'Hillsborough Disaster Inquiry'. He noted the 'very strong feeling of resentment and injustice' among SYP officers, not least because 'nobody seems to have grasped the full picture'.

2.12.197 The Star reported that CC Wright 'thought some of Lord Justice Taylor's comments were "harsh" and "savage"' but he was confident that a 'different picture' would emerge at the inquests. There were 'a lot of comments' he 'would like to make on Lord Justice Taylor's report, but in the circumstances I can't'.

2.12.198 As discussed in Chapter 6, following complaints by bereaved families,64 CC Wright's comments were investigated by WMP.65 The issue was whether he had sought to impose undue pressure on the inquests. Complaints that had been made against CC Wright were found to be unsubstantiated and the decision was that no breach of discipline had occurred.

Irvine Patnick MP – a further intervention 2.12.199 In the same month that CC Wright made his criticisms of the Taylor Interim Report Mr Patnick wrote to Detective Superintendent Stanley Beechey who had a significant role in the WMP investigation.66 According to the letter D/Supt Beechey had visited the House of Commons on Monday 19 February. At the meeting Mr Patnick had agreed to 'supply ... further particulars'. He enclosed copies of the record of the Police Federation meeting with Mr Shersby and his correspondence with White's News Agency.

2.12.200 Mr Patnick had already provided the WMP investigation with his personal account of events, previously sent to LJ Taylor. In his covering letter to D/Supt Beechey he stated: 'I do think that the South Yorkshire police's evidence was not fully taken into account at the Inquiry and as a common thread runs through the three reports [his own, the Police Federation meeting and the exchange with White's] I do so hope something can be done to rectify this'.

  1. Daily Mail, 6 February 1990. 63. Sheffield Star, 6 February 1990, SYP000123600001, p126. 64. Letter from Mr Devonside to South Yorkshire Police Authority, 3 March 1990, SYP000123600001, p131; Letter from

Mr and Mrs Hicks to South Yorkshire Police Authority, 7 February 1990, SYP000123600001, p129. 65. Complaint against CC Peter Wright, Investigating Officer's Report, 23 April 1990, SYP000123600001, from p213. 66. Letter from Irvine Patnick MP to Detective Superintendent S Beechey 'Hillsborough Stadium Disaster 15th April 1989',

21 February 1990, SYP000046060001, p2.

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  • As the severity of the disaster was becoming apparent, SYP Match Commander, Chief Superintendent David Duckenfield, told a falsehood to senior officials that Liverpool fans had broken into the stadium and caused an inrush into the central pens thus causing the fatal crush. While later discredited, this unfounded allegation was broadcast internationally and was the first explanation of the cause of the disaster to enter the public domain.
  • Within days, further serious allegations emerged from unnamed sources, a Police Federation spokesperson and a local Conservative MP, Irvine Patnick. These were that Liverpool fans had conspired to arrive late, many were without tickets, were exceptionally drunk and aggressive and determined to force entry into the stadium.
  • On 19 April, four days after the disaster, The Sun newspaper published a front-page story under the banner headline, 'THE TRUTH', alleging that Liverpool fans had assaulted and urinated on police officers resuscitating the dying, stolen from the dead and verbally sexually abused an unconscious young woman. Although less prominently, and often with a lesser degree of certainty, other regional and national newspapers published similar allegations.
  • In a letter revealed to the Panel, within days of The Sun's article its Managing Editor wrote to people, including bereaved families, who had complained about the allegations. While regretting the presentation of the article, he refused to apologise for its 'substance', claiming it was factually accurate. Subsequently the coverage was condemned by the Press Council.
  • Given the broader press reporting of the allegations, the Panel sought to establish their origins. Documents disclosed to the Panel show that the allegations were filed by White's News Agency, a Sheffield-based company. They were based on meetings over three days between agency staff and several police officers, together with interviews with Irvine Patnick MP and the South Yorkshire Police Federation Secretary, Paul Middup.
  • From the documents, it is clear that Mr Patnick based his comments on a conversation with police officers on the evening of the disaster while the officers were in considerable distress. Mr Patnick submitted a detailed account of this meeting and his overall involvement that evening to the Taylor Inquiry.
  • Months after the disaster White's News Agency confirmed to the London Evening Standard that its filed stories originated from 'unsolicited' allegations made by 'high ranking' SYP officers to agency 'partners'. There were four separate police sources plus the interview with Mr Patnick. Together these sources were considered sufficient verification for the story to be considered factually accurate and it was distributed accordingly.
  • A document disclosed to the Panel shows that while the Taylor Inquiry was in session White's News Agency received copies of several SYP officers' sworn statements alleging drunken and violent behaviour by Liverpool fans. The agency forwarded the statements to Mr Patnick.
  • A further document records a meeting in Sheffield of Police Federation members on the morning of the publication of the controversial story in The Sun. The Police Federation Secretary, Mr Middup, confirmed that 'putting our side of the story over to the press and media' had been his priority. He told the meeting that the Chief Constable had stated that 'the truth could not come from him' but he had given the Police Federation a 'free hand' and his support.
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  • At the meeting police officers repeated many of the allegations published in the media. The Chief Constable joined the meeting and advised that the SYP case had to be pulled together and given to the Inquiry. A 'defence' had to be prepared and a 'rock solid story' presented. He believed that the Force would be 'exonerated' by the Taylor Inquiry and considered that 'blame' should be directed towards 'drunken ticketless individuals'.
  • Lord Justice Taylor's Interim Report condemned the evidence and testimony of senior police officers and rejected as exaggerated the allegations made against Liverpool fans. He stated categorically that fans' behaviour played no part in the disaster. The South Yorkshire Police Federation held a meeting in Sheffield attended by its Parliamentary representative, Michael Shersby MP. Records of the meeting disclosed to the Panel show that the Police Federation considered the Interim Report was unfair and unbalanced. Mr Shersby was invited to assist in the development of a 'counter attack' to 'repudiate' Lord Justice Taylor's findings.
  • The meeting's afternoon session heard from unnamed police officers who repeated the allegations of exceptional levels of abuse, drunkenness and violence. The Interim Report was dismissed as a 'whitewash' and the meeting would provide the basis for promoting the police version of events through 'public channels'. The meeting's content, particularly the allegations, directly informed an article published subsequently in the Police Federation magazine. It was written by its editor who attended and contributed to the meetings.
  • In a press interview the South Yorkshire Chief Constable, Peter Wright, also criticised the findings of the Interim Report and expressed confidence that a 'different picture' would emerge at the inquests. His comments drew many complaints and were investigated by WMP. It was decided that no breach of discipline had occurred.
  • Consistent with Lord Justice Taylor's findings, the Panel found no evidence among the vast number of disclosed documents and many hours of video material to verify the serious allegations of exceptional levels of drunkenness, ticketlessness or violence among Liverpool fans. There was no evidence that fans had conspired to arrive late at the stadium and force entry and no evidence that they stole from the dead and dying. Documents show that fans became frustrated by the inadequate response to the unfolding tragedy. The vast majority of fans on the pitch assisted in rescuing and evacuating the injured and the dead.

The Permanent Archive for the Hillsborough Disaster

Assembled and proposed to be held permanently for the benefit of the families and the public by the Hillsborough Independent Panel

Introduction 3.1 The Hillsborough Independent Panel's remit, set out in its terms of reference, provides that it should 'in line with established practice, work with the Keeper of Public Records in preparing options for establishing an archive of Hillsborough documentation, including a catalogue of all central governmental and local public agency information and a commentary on any information withheld for the benefit of the families or on legal or other grounds'. 3.2 Accordingly, Part 3 of this Report describes the present position regarding the documents provided to the Panel and outlines its recommendations for the Permanent Archive.1 The proposed Permanent Archive for the Hillsborough Disaster covers the period leading up to the events of 15 April 1989 until the private prosecutions in 2000, as assembled by the work of the Hillsborough Independent Panel 2010–12. 3.3 It comprises the master catalogue and the documents in digital form (these provide the foundation for the Panel's Report and are disclosed on the Panel's website) and the records discovered in their original format (hard copy and audio-visual). Provision has been made to ensure that all material disclosed to the Panel is preserved permanently. It is accessible, digitally or in original copy, to bereaved families, survivors and the public. 3.4 Given the unified digital access for the public via the web, the Panel considers there is no requirement to hold original documents and other material in a single place, provided they are catalogued and are available. 3.5 The main access is digital. The Permanent Archive of documents and other materials in hard copy is proposed as a Distributed Archive combining central government records transferred to The National Archives at Kew, and local records transferred to Sheffield or to Liverpool as appropriate.

  1. The protocol accompanying the Panel's terms of reference says: 'The scope of the disclosure process is intended to cover all documentation held by central government, local government and other public agencies which relates directly to events surrounding the Hillsborough tragedy up to and including the Taylor report, the Lord Stuart-Smith review of Hillsborough papers in 1998-99 and the private prosecution in 2000. The relevant agencies include the police, ambulance service, fire service, coroner and Sheffield City Council.'
  • Part 3 The Permanent Archive for the Hillsborough Disaster — 369
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3.6 The digital and hard-copy documents and materials form a lasting national memorial to those who died, survived or were affected by the tragedy. They provide the most complete record of events available, disclosing the decisions taken and actions progressed by those involved throughout an extended period before and since the disaster.

The Permanent Archive 3.7 The material disclosed to the Panel has been provided from an extensive range of sources, including central government departments, wider public authorities, non-governmental organisations, charities and individuals involved with the context, circumstances and aftermath of the disaster. Sources also include national and local media.

3.8 The Panel has catalogued and digitised over 25,000 documents that have directly informed the Report in order to add to public understanding of the context, circumstances and consequences of the disaster and why no satisfactory resolution of the issues raised by the families and survivors has been achieved.

Development and content 3.9 The development of the Permanent Archive, both digital and hard copy, has been achieved by identifying the organisations involved before, during and after the disaster, and obtaining information not revealed to the families or to the public from those organisations and by the previous inquiries and other processes.

3.10 On 17 April 1989 Lord Justice Taylor was appointed by the Home Secretary to conduct an Inquiry into what happened at Hillsborough and to make recommendations regarding crowd control and crowd safety at sports events. Following evidence gathering by the investigating police force (West Midlands Police), written submissions, commissioned reports and oral hearings, LJ Taylor published an Interim Report on 1 August 1989, less than four months after the disaster. This was followed by a more generic Final Report, with minimal focus on the events at Hillsborough, published on 18 January 1990.

3.11 The documents and other material relied on by LJ Taylor, particularly in writing the Interim Report, have been disclosed to the Panel. Using this range of evidence the Panel sought and accessed further material relating to the period 1981 to 1989, focusing particularly on the condition of the stadium and structural modifications following serious overcrowding and injury in 1981.

3.12 The Panel also accessed further documents concerning the investigation and Inquiry conducted by LJ Taylor and the range of legal and inquisitorial processes that followed: civil actions; inquests; criminal investigations; disciplinary inquiries; judicial reviews; and judicial scrutiny.

3.13 Over 80 organisations, and a number of individuals, have disclosed documents and materials to the Archive. These include: central government departments (including the Cabinet Office, the Attorney General's Office and the Crown Prosecution Service); the South Yorkshire Police; the West Midlands Police; the Coroners' Offices; the emergency services; the health authorities; and the local authorities in Liverpool and Sheffield. Bereaved families and survivors have also made documents available to the Panel (see the master catalogue and Appendix 2 of this Report).

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3.14 The Archive is the product of an active search process conducted by the Panel. This required negotiation with the organisations and individuals concerned, including central government departments whose records are classed as public records.2

Public access 3.15 Before public records are 30 years old, they should be destroyed if not suitable for permanent preservation or, alternatively, they should be transferred to The National Archives or a Place of Deposit (PoD),3 normally a local Record Office. At this time they become open to the public, unless retention/closure of complete or partial records is agreed by the Lord Chancellor's Advisory Council on National Records and Archives.

3.16 Organisations can transfer and disclose records before 30 years but they are under no obligation to do so. At the time of the Panel's appointment, documents relating to Hillsborough were within the 30-year period.

3.17 Coroners' records are court records and subject to the Coroners Rules 1984. They are defined as public records and undergo selection for permanent preservation at PoDs appointed under Section 4(1) of the Public Records Act 1958. Currently, they should be transferred by 30 years to a PoD and then become subject to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA). Coroners' records are outside freedom of information (FOI) requests until they are deposited in a PoD at 30 years, when they come within FOIA.

3.18 In practice and by convention, PoDs always refer back to depositing organisations, particularly if the material sought under FOIA is less than 30 years old. In summary, therefore, coroners' records should be deposited by 30 years. If they are deposited prior to that time they may be closed because they are subject to the court records exemption under Section 32 of FOIA.4

Recommendation 1

The Panel considers that the implementation of the Coroners and Justice Act 20095 should bring about a more consistent approach to the archiving and availability of transferred records and encourages the newly appointed Chief Coroner of England and

Wales to issue guidance in consultation with the Keeper of Public Records.

3.19 Other records disclosed to the Panel, including the South Yorkshire Police records, are not subject to legislation in respect of archiving obligations; nor are privately owned records. At the outset of the Panel's work, the South Yorkshire Police stated that records held by the Force relevant to Hillsborough would be disclosed for public access. These hard-copy records are deposited in Sheffield Archives and are publicly accessible online.

  1. The Public Records Acts 1958 and 1967. Subsequent legislation such as the Freedom of Information Act 2000 has superseded the access provisions of the Acts and a reduced 20-year period (instead of 30 years) for transferring records to the Public Record System is also being introduced from 2013. See www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ information-management/legislation/public-records-act.htm. 3. PoDs are repositories authorised by the Keeper of Public Records as suitable for the permanent archiving of records, usually created locally and of regional or local importance, considered to be of national significance such as records relating to Hillsborough. 4. The Freedom of Information Act 2000 has provision for access to 'historical' records, i.e. those older than 30 years when many of the exemptions fall away. It is at present under review. 5. The Coroners and Justice Act 2009, www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/25/contents. For the appointment of the

Chief Coroner of England and Wales, see www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-18156598, reported 22 May 2012.

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3.20 Most documents sought for disclosure by the Panel were produced within the 30-year period of transfer. In normal circumstances, organisations subject to the Public Records Acts would not be obliged to disclose or make them accessible except through the provisions of FOIA and other relevant Access to Information legislation.

3.21 At 30 years FOI legislation deems records to be historical and many of the exemptions to disclosure are lifted.

3.22 For historical research, wholesale disclosure is critical, enabling the full context of the history of a matter to be known. This applies to the Panel's proposed Distributed Permanent Archive, both digital and hard copy.

3.23 Unlike the regulatory framework under which central government and other designated public records bodies operate, there is no official archival legislation requiring the provision of archive services at local and regional level for records that have been created by an administrative body, or for other records in its custody. There are a number of Acts and Statutory Instruments that, to an extent, safeguard historical records, but the wording is often open to interpretation and archiving may be incomplete. This has been an issue for the Panel and, on occasion, has made the work of the Panel difficult.

Public authorities 3.24 Public authorities, including the police forces and Ambulance Service involved, have disclosed a significant amount of documents and material to the Panel. As public authorities, they have statutory obligations to keep and maintain records for operational (and perhaps historical) reasons and may make arrangements to preserve important records.

3.25 They can 'warehouse' records with a suitable commercial organisation while retaining ownership and accountability for responding to FOI requests or, at an appropriate time, donate the material formally to an archive (such as Sheffield Archives, an appointed PoD) for preservation. FOI responsibility then passes to the archive. The Sheffield Archive maintains high standards in storage and curatorial care, and has in its collection various coroners' records, and court, probate and council records.

3.26 In summary, varying obligations are established in legislation affecting the eventual disposition of differently sourced records to any Distributed Permanent Archive. In the case of private records, they may never be deposited. Regarding Hillsborough, they will be accessible via the Panel's website. Thus the website becomes a critical part of the Permanent Archive as it holds material digitally which might not be accessible in its original form elsewhere.

Records of police forces in England and Wales 3.27 It has been a concern to the Panel that, with the exception of the Metropolitan Police, police forces in England and Wales are not subject to the Public Records Acts. Neither are police force documents part of the record of local government. In many cases the documentary evidence they hold is poor.6

  1. Chris A Williams and Clive Emsley, 'British Police forces' Archiving Policies in 2003'. In: Chris Williams (ed.) Giving the

Past a Future – Preserving the heritage of the UK's Criminal Justice System (London: Francis Boutle, 2003).

See also Archives at the Millennium p16, www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/information-management/archmill.pdf.

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3.28 Although there have been initiatives to improve their record keeping and archiving, a survey in 20037 found that only approximately one-third of police forces had archiving policies. Most indicated that contact with a local record office or archive was rare. Consequently, provision made by individual forces for publicly accessible archives has been, and remains, voluntary. This has led to wide variations in the preservation and availability of historic records in local record offices or national and local museums.

Recommendation 2

The Panel recommends that police force records are brought under legislative control and that police forces are added to Part II of the First Schedule to the Public Records Act

1958, thereby making them subject to the supervision of the Keeper of Public Records.

Main locations for the Distributed Permanent Archive 3.29 The Panel was asked to consider options for providing a Permanent Archive for the Hillsborough documents. It proposes a Distributed Archive approach for the hard-copy material with the digital form being archived at The National Archives.

3.30 The digital archive will provide the primary means of access to the Hillsborough Archive. Via the Panel's website, it will be the sole coherent source of all material disclosed to the Panel and should be considered as part of the Permanent Archive, not just as a website.

3.31 In the Panel's view there are three main possibilities for the Distributed Permanent Archive of original, hard-copy documents and material: The National Archives, Sheffield Archive and Liverpool Record Office. Each is involved in archiving Hillsborough material already. The Panel therefore proposes that they should become the main centres of the Distributed Permanent Archive.

3.32 Other public records are distributed throughout the UK according to the nature of the records and the suitability and locality of the repositories under the PoD arrangements. This well-established process has operated since the Public Records Act 1958 came into force and the Panel considers it should obtain in holding additional Hillsborough material.

Recommendation 3

The Panel recommends that central government documents relating to Hillsborough which were disclosed to the Panel be transferred to The National Archives at Kew in due course, with redactions agreed by the Panel retained.

3.33 Regarding non-central government public records, only the Keeper of Public Records has the power to transfer public records from The National Archives to an appointed PoD, and from one PoD to another should they be more appropriately held elsewhere (Public Records Act 1958, Section 4(3)).

3.34 A PoD cannot be compelled to accept transfers but it must agree to receive them if the records are outside its existing collecting remit and PoD schedule.

  1. www.acpo.police.uk/ProfessionalPractice/InformationManagement.aspx.
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3.35 Removal of locally created public records (e.g. coroners' records) relating to Hillsborough from Sheffield to another location would be contrary to The National Archives' published disposition strategy and would give rise to several presentational issues locally. This would not serve to assist the making of a Permanent Archive and could disrupt the archiving process.

Amount of original material involved 3.36 Including central government material, the documents disclosed to the Panel amount to approximately 735 linear metres of archive boxes. Assuming that central government material is excluded, since it will be absorbed by The National Archives, approximately up to 700 linear metres of material will need to be accommodated by the PoDs. 3.37 Given the pressure on space at archives and their modest future acquisition rates, such a volume could be very difficult for one archive to absorb as a new deposit. Thus it would be economical to share the burden. 3.38 Irrespective of costs which might be incurred in moving original records from one location to another, there are complicating issues relating to the relocation of records. Without the consent of the owners or relevant statutory authority, records cannot be removed from the custody of the creators of records or the repository in which they have been deposited in accordance with legislation and archival practice.

Sheffield Archives 3.39 Sheffield Archives is the records repository and archive service for the city of Sheffield and the South Yorkshire area, operated by Sheffield City Council under the Local Government (Records) Act 1962, the Local Government Act 1974 and other relevant legislation. Sheffield Archives also has been appointed as a PoD under Section 4(1) of the Public Records Act 1958 to hold locally created public records, including those of the NHS and Her Majesty's Coroner. 3.40 It provides the full range of services expected from a local archive and local studies collection as well as a conservation studio and records management service for Sheffield City Council. A formal inspection by The National Archives in 2005 and subsequent monitoring of the service, together with the results of The National Archives' self- assessment exercise for local authority archive services, indicate that Sheffield Archives provides a high standard of service meeting the requirements of The National Archives' Standard for Record Repositories (2004). This is the recognised national benchmark for archive services. 3.41 Normally, costs associated with preservation and provision of access to the local records relating to the Hillsborough disaster would be borne by Sheffield Archives but they may require additional funding to absorb the deposits. This would unite the material disclosed to the Panel, as a large proportion of the records created by official and other bodies in connection with the Hillsborough disaster is held in Sheffield Archives.

Liverpool Record Office 3.42 Liverpool Record Office is the principal archive repository for the City of Liverpool and the Merseyside area, operated by Liverpool City Council. It fulfils functions similar to those of Sheffield Archives and has many important official and deposited private collections relating to the city and Merseyside sub-region. It is also a PoD under Section 4(1) of the Public Records Act 1958.

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3.43 Refurbishment of the Liverpool Record Office is expected to be completed in late 2012. Liverpool City Council and the Record Office would need to make additional financial and accommodation provision to absorb part of the Distributed Permanent Archive.

3.44 The Record Office can provide a digital service and professional support close to where many families, survivors and others affected by the disaster live. Liverpool Football Club and other organisations have indicated that they are prepared to deposit documents and records relating to Hillsborough at the Record Office.

Recommendation 4 The Panel proposes a Distributed Permanent Archive of the original material at Sheffield Archives and Liverpool Record Office and for central government records at The National Archives at Kew. Such a Distributed Archive is in keeping with the nature of the records and the services which the three archives can best provide and which they are willing to do.

Recommendation 5 Private owners of documents and other material made available to the Panel, especially where those records have been disclosed on the Hillsborough website, should be encouraged to deposit their records in the archives.

From active digital archive to Permanent Archive 3.45 The Distributed Archive of original, hard-copy documents and other material should be accessible through the catalogue and digitised documents on the website. These need to be permanently archived to complete the Distributed Permanent Archive. The digital archive will provide the main form of access for most people.

3.46 The Panel's website brings together all documents and other records (for example, some audio-visual) disclosed to the Panel in digital form with a master catalogue. It will be disclosed to the families first and then to the public.

3.47 The digital website will be permanently archived and will remain easier to access than the physical archive, which will be distributed across repositories and, in some cases, may even be retained by the owners. The digital archive will also have the benefit of eliminating issues of ownership of original records and their physical location.

3.48 A robust model for continued funding for the website must be agreed. Statistics indicate that 25 per cent of National Lottery-funded digitisation projects have failed and it would be unacceptable for this to occur with the Hillsborough Archive. It will provide the primary method of consulting the archive and a record of what the Panel achieved.

3.49 Online and hard-copy access will be supported by archivists and social service assistance in Liverpool for families beyond the launch of the website and the Panel's Report. Liverpool will have an additional archivist funded to assist with access until the end of 2012. Sheffield, The National Archives and any other repositories will incorporate the website into their normal services.

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3.50 The audio-visual material in high resolution for permanent archival purposes will be preserved at The National Archives.

3.51 For sustainability and funding, the website will remain active for the foreseeable future, hosted by the Home Office. There may also be a need to add material to the digital archive and to process, manage and technically facilitate requests for personal data to be removed from the digital archive.

Recommendation 6 An Editor-in-Chief should be appointed to be responsible for the policy and implementation of the digital archive post-disclosure and continuing technical support should be provided to manage existing and new material.

Recommendation 7 A protocol for allowing additional material to be incorporated into the digital archive and for taking down material is recommended.

Recommendation 8 The digital archive and the audio-visual material should remain available for the foreseeable future at Liverpool and Sheffield with advisory and support staff as necessary; it should be accessible according to the access protocol agreed by the Panel.

Recommendation 9 The digital archive, including audio-visual material, eventually should be permanently archived at The National Archives.

Hillsborough Independent Panel terms of reference

The Hillsborough disaster was a personal tragedy for hundreds of people and an event of major national and international significance in the subsequent minimisation of safety risks at football matches and similar sporting events.

As such, Government and local agencies in South Yorkshire are committed to maximum possible public disclosure of governmental and other agency documentation on events surrounding the disaster.

The Hillsborough Independent Panel has been appointed to oversee this disclosure process, consulting with the Hillsborough families and statutory agencies where necessary, and to carry out the associated activities outlined in the panel remit below.

Exceptionally, the independent panel will be provided with access to Hillsborough documentation held by Government and local agencies relevant to events surrounding the tragedy in advance of the normal 30-year point for public disclosure.

The fundamental principles will be full disclosure of documentation and no redaction of content, except in the limited legal and other circumstances outlined in a disclosure protocol.

The remit of the independent panel will be to:

  • oversee full public disclosure of relevant government and local information within the limited constraints set out in the accompanying protocol;

  • consult with the Hillsborough families to ensure that the views of those most affected by the tragedy are taken into account;

  • manage the process of public disclosure, ensuring that it takes place initially to the Hillsborough families and other involved parties, in an agreed manner and within a reasonable timescale, before information is made more widely available;

  • in line with established practice, work with the Keeper of Public Records in preparing options for establishing an archive of Hillsborough documentation, including a catalogue of all central Governmental and local public agency information and a commentary on any information withheld for the benefit of the families or on legal or other grounds;

  • produce a report explaining the work of the panel. The panel's report will also illustrate how the information disclosed adds to public understanding of the tragedy and its aftermath.

  • Appendix 1 Hillsborough Independent Panel terms of reference — 377

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Protocol on Disclosure of Information 1. This protocol sets out the disclosure arrangements for information relating to the Hillsborough disaster.

Scope of information 2. The scope of the disclosure process is intended to cover all documentation held by central government, local government and other public agencies which relates directly to events surrounding the Hillsborough tragedy up to and including the Taylor report, the Lord Stuart-Smith review of Hillsborough papers in 1998-99 and the private prosecution in 2000. The relevant agencies include the police, ambulance service, fire service, coroner and Sheffield City Council.

Archiving and Cataloguing 3. In order to assist the work of the panel and in view of the volume of documentation, each agency holding relevant documentation will make arrangements for all papers in their possession to be archived and catalogued, prior to disclosure to the panel.

Principle of full disclosure 4. The fundamental aim is to provide full disclosure of documentation to the panel and, subsequently, to the Hillsborough families and then the wider public, taking into account legal and other considerations set out below.

Pre-1997 Government information 5. Some information held by central government is covered by the convention on the release of papers of a previous administration (as set out by the Prime Minister on 24 January 1980). This does not apply to all information from before May 1997, but to documents indicating the views of ministers, such as Cabinet material or policy advice to ministers. The convention requires that such information cannot be disclosed without first consulting representatives of that administration.

  1. The Government will consult representatives of the previous administration about the release of information covered by the convention, and will release such information only in accordance with that convention.

Exceptions to public disclosure 7. The vast majority of information held by central and local government and other public agencies will be disclosed. A limited number of exceptions will apply, which for example are expected to include:

(b) information which public bodies are legally prohibited from disclosing (including information provided in confidence by third parties);

(c) information indicating the views of ministers, where release would prejudice the convention of Cabinet collective responsibility.

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  1. In all of the above cases, the decision to withhold information will be considered on a case-by-case basis by the holding agency. Wherever possible, information that cannot be disclosed to the public will be disclosed on a closed and confidential basis to the panel and a description of the information provided for public disclosure. Where disclosure to the panel is not possible (which will be the case for a very small number of documents), the holding agency will be asked if they could provide a description of the information for the panel which can be made available to the public in the same form.

Redaction of individuals' identities 9. Where it is appropriate and necessary, it is expected that the Panel will recommend that the identities of certain categories of individuals will be redacted from information prior to disclosure to the public. These are expected to include the identities of:

(a) members of the public who have provided written observations on events associated with the tragedy;

(b) civil servants who were not members of the Senior Civil Service at the time the document was produced;

(c) police officers who were constables or other ranks up to and including sergeant at the time the document was produced;

(d) other junior public employees who were not in a position to determine their agency's response to events prior to, during or in the aftermath of the tragedy.

  1. Where individual identities are redacted, an indication of the individual's position or status will be given to the public. In addition, where it is necessary to achieve consistency of identification, it is expected that the panel will recommend that individuals are given anonymised identifiers (for example, "officer A" or "official C").

Lord Chancellor's Advisory Council 11. In any cases where the independent panel believes there to be a public interest in obtaining access to any withheld or redacted information, and where the holding agency disagrees, the matter will be referred to the Lord Chancellor's Advisory Council on National Records and Archives (an independent body tasked to oversee decisions on the release of public documents). The Advisory Council will then provide independent, impartial advice on the reasons given by departments or agencies for retention of information.

Consultation with Hillsborough families 12. The independent panel should consult and reflect the views of the Hillsborough families when co-ordinating the publication of distressing or personal information regarding those who died.

Public disclosure process 13. The independent panel should ensure that disclosure takes place initially to the Hillsborough families and other involved parties, in an agreed manner and within a reasonable timescale, before information is made more widely available. No disclosure should take place to any other involved party before disclosure is made to the Hillsborough families.

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  1. It is expected that the disclosure process will take place on an incremental basis over a period of at least two years.

Report on the work of the independent panel 15. The independent panel will be responsible for producing a report on its work. The detailed content of the report will be a matter for the independent panel, but the government envisages that it will cover:

(a) a description of the terms of reference and work of the panel;

(b) an overview of the information reviewed by the panel and publicly disclosed;

(c) an overview of the information provided to the independent panel on a closed basis, based on the summary description provided to the independent panel;

(d) an overview of the withheld information, based on the summary description provided to the independent panel;

(e) how the information disclosed adds to public understanding of the tragedy and its aftermath.

Hillsborough Archive 16. The independent panel should liaise closely with the Keeper of Public Records (who holds statutory responsibility to authorise a place of deposit as suitable for housing public archives) in making recommendations regarding options for establishing a designated Hillsborough document archive, including such matters as the location, conservation and format of records to be retained in the archive.

Confidentiality of closed information 17. Information that is provided to the independent panel on a closed basis shall remain confidential to members of the independent panel and the secretariat and shall not be made public. Members of the independent panel will be required to sign a confidentiality agreement regarding disclosure of that information.

Secretariat and practicalities 18. The work of the independent panel will be supported by a secretariat consisting of officials from the Home Office, Ministry of Justice and The National Archives. The costs of the secretariat will be met by the Government.

  1. The independent panel is expected to meet in London, Sheffield and Liverpool. Frequency of meetings will be for the independent panel to determine, but it is initially expected to meet monthly.

  2. Members of the independent panel will receive a daily allowance at rates to be published, and repayment of actual travel and subsistence expenses in accordance with Home Office rules for senior civil servants.

Disclosure process

When the Home Secretary announced the establishment of the Hillsborough Independent Panel on 15 December 2009 he also published the terms of reference and a protocol which would govern its work (see Appendix 1).

Based on the protocol, this appendix sets out how the Panel approached its task, the issues relating to the process that arose during the Panel's work and how issues were addressed.

The Panel and the secretariat The members of the Hillsborough Independent Panel were announced by Alan Johnson, then Home Secretary, on 26 January 2010.1 They were: The Right Reverend James Jones, the Bishop of Liverpool (Chairman), Raju Bhatt, Christine Gifford, Katy Jones, Dr Bill Kirkup CBE, Paul Leighton CBE, QPM, Professor Phil Scraton, Peter Sissons, Sarah Tyacke CBE.

All members of the Panel signed confidentiality agreements. A Panel secretariat was established and met with interested parties including the families of the deceased and other victims. Following these early discussions with the families, work started on identifying potential contributing organisations including local agencies in Sheffield, other public authorities, private companies and individuals and bodies corporate.

The Panel met for the first time in Liverpool on 4 February 2010 and on 35 occasions between then and 12 September 2012. Most Panel meetings took place in Liverpool but the Panel also met in Sheffield and in London. At its first meeting, anticipating the volume of work and the timescale within which it was required to report, the Panel established sub-groups to focus on the key elements of its task. These sub-groups were:

Task 1: Disclosure Task 2: Research and report

The Bishop of Liverpool Professor Phil Scraton

Christine Gifford Dr Bill Kirkup

Professor Phil Scraton Paul Leighton

Paul Leighton Katy Jones

Dr Bill Kirkup Raju Bhatt 1. www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmhansrd/cm100126/wmstext/100126m0001.htm

  • Appendix 2 Disclosure process — 381
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Task 3: Permanent Archive Task 4: Consulting families

Sarah Tyacke The Bishop of Liverpool

Christine Gifford Katy Jones

Dr Bill Kirkup Paul Leighton (as required) Peter Sissons (as required)

Consultation with Hillsborough families The terms of reference oblige the Panel to disclose documents and other material 'initially to the Hillsborough families and other involved parties ... before information is made more widely available'. This is the principle of 'families first'.

From the outset the Panel committed to consultation with bereaved families throughout its work. Contact has been made with at least one family member of all who died at Hillsborough, including families not affiliated to any of the representative groups.

At its first meeting in February 2010, Panel members met with representatives of the three representative groups: the Hillsborough Family Support Group (HFSG); the Hillsborough Justice Campaign; and Hope for Hillsborough. In April 2012, Panel members also met with members of some families not affiliated to the groups. Regular contact has been maintained with the groups and with individual families while the Panel has continued its work. The Panel has continued its commitment to meeting the representative groups.

Disclosure process Scope Disclosure includes all documentation held by central government, local government and other public agencies relating to the context, circumstances and aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster.

The Panel has also accessed documents and other material from private individuals, corporate bodies and non-governmental organisations.

In total, the Panel reviewed over 450,000 pages of documentation from 84 organisations and individuals, in addition to audio-visual material.

Audio-visual material The Panel has digitised a significant volume of audio-visual material from the time of the disaster. The Panel has recommended, in Part 3, that this material is permanently preserved at The National Archives. Two edited video clips – one illustrating the layout of the Leppings Lane end of Hillsborough Stadium and one showing the events leading to the opening of Gate C – have been published in Part 1 of the online version of this Report.

Duplicated material In a project of this complexity it is inevitable that some documents provided by contributing organisations will duplicate those provided by others. In such cases duplicated material is referenced once, but it will be inevitable that some references are duplicated.

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Documents discovered as part of the Panel process but not published on the Panel's website To ensure transparency, the Panel has maintained a full audit of documents and material considered relevant for publication. Descriptions of all this material can be found in the master catalogue.

Extremely sensitive personal data The Panel recognises that the disclosure of material relating to the deaths of 96 people necessarily involves sensitive personal data. The Panel discussed this issue with bereaved families within the HFSG, and their view was that all such information should be disclosed. While the Panel acknowledges the wishes of the bereaved families represented within the HFSG, a view which we believe to be shared by most of the bereaved families, some very sensitive personal data has not been disclosed to the public out of respect for those who died. Arrangements are in place, however, for individual families to receive unredacted information relevant to their family member(s) should they wish to do so on an individual basis after the publication of the Report.

The Panel required access to sensitive personal data that belonged to others involved in the disaster, including members of the emergency services, survivors and those who assisted at the scene. To access this material, an order was sought under the Data Protection Act 1998. The order was laid before Parliament on 20 May 2012 and formally 'made' on 25 July 2012.

Where disclosure does not 'add to public understanding', such sensitive personal data has been redacted from the disclosed documents.

Contributing organisations Relevant contributing organisations and individuals were identified by the Panel and asked to undertake detailed searches for documents and other material concerning the disaster. There were several occasions when organisations were asked to conduct a second search and on a number of occasions this resulted in further information.

Some bereaved families responded to a request from the Panel for information.

In accessing for disclosure the significant amount of information not previously in the public domain, contributing organisations were asked to waive any entitlement to confidentiality and legal professional privilege. All public sector organisations approached by the Panel allowed unrestricted access to their documents and other material. The Panel is able to commend their response. In contrast, one private sector organisation, the Royal Sun Alliance Insurance Company (which was the insurer for Sheffield Wednesday Football Club in 1989) refused to waive its entitlement to privilege, thus denying the Panel access to its material. Strenuous efforts were made to persuade the company to allow the Panel confidential access to the relevant material, but it maintained its refusal. This is a matter of considerable regret to the Panel.

The Liverpool Law Society was the only other organisation that considered itself unable to provide unrestricted access to all the material it held for the Hillsborough Solicitors' Group Steering Committee. Legal advice provided to the Law Society and to the Panel confirmed that the legal professional privilege which was said to attach to some of the material was not theirs to waive, and despite considerable efforts the Panel was unable to assist them to find a way round the obstacle. The Law Society did however provide access to and arrange for the disclosure of other material held by them to which such privilege did not apply.

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In keeping with the Panel's terms of reference and protocol, contributing organisations holding relevant documents and information were expected to arrange for that material to be archived and catalogued prior to disclosure to the Panel. In practice this did not happen and much of the material received by the Panel was neither archived nor catalogued. This task was carried out by a team of archivists working with the Panel.

Redaction Processing agreements were developed with all major contributing organisations. All were asked to work within a redaction framework which established the expectations of the Panel regarding the protection of information from disclosure into the public domain. The principles established in the redaction framework held for the duration of the project. Redaction was minimal and only applied when considered necessary by the Panel. The Panel has redacted names to ensure the appropriate and necessary protection of identities of:

  • members of the public who provided written observations on events associated with the tragedy
  • civil servants who were not members of the Senior Civil Service at the time a particular document was produced
  • police officers who were constables or other ranks up to and including sergeant at the time a particular document was produced
  • junior public employees who were not in a position to determine their agency's response to events prior to, during or in the aftermath of the disaster.

The Panel accepts that inconsistencies might occur, for example where identities may have been redacted in one document and disclosed in another. This is a consequence of processing such a large volume of documents and other material.

Individual members of the Panel reviewed all redactions made by contributing organisations to ensure that they conformed to the principle of full public disclosure within the law and protocols established in the Panel's own redaction framework.

The Panel's terms of reference and protocol committed central and local government and other public agencies to the full disclosure of their documents and information relating to the Hillsborough disaster. Limited exceptions, however, were recognised:

Decisions to withhold information from the Panel have been considered on a case-by-case basis by the holding agency.

No information held by government has been withheld. This includes full, unredacted disclosure of Cabinet minutes.

In all but two cases, information that could be disclosed to the public has been disclosed on a closed and confidential basis to the Panel and a description of the information is provided by the Panel for public disclosure. Where, exceptionally, disclosure to the Panel has not been possible, the holding agency has been asked to provide a description of the information for the Panel to be made available to the public.

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All redactions have been reviewed and agreed by an individual Panel member. Additional sampling of those decisions was carried out by other Panel members. Minimal material was redacted by donating organisations on the grounds of legal professional privilege or confidentiality. It has not been necessary to refer any decisions on redaction by public sector organisations to the Advisory Council on National Records and Archives (as outlined in Section 11 of the Protocol on Disclosure of Information).

Parallel disclosure To progress the volume of material provided by the contributing organisations it was essential to digitise all documents deemed to be relevant. Donating organisations (restricted to their material only), Panel members, the Panel's researchers and members of the secretariat were given access to a secure online database of digitised material in order to facilitate the Panel's work.

Our report The Panel's obligations regarding publishing a report were established in its terms of reference as follows:

  • a description of the terms of reference and work of the Panel
  • an overview of the information reviewed by the Panel and publicly disclosed
  • an overview of the information provided to the Panel on a closed basis, based on the summary description provided to the Panel
  • an overview of the withheld information, based on the summary description provided to the Panel
  • how the information disclosed adds to public understanding of the tragedy and its aftermath.

The research and analysis underpinning the Panel's report has been led by Panel member Professor Phil Scraton and a team of researchers. All documents and other material disclosed to the Panel have been available to the research team. Individual Panel members have provided expert support to the researchers in their specialist areas. Appendix 3 provides an account of the research process and the methodology adopted.

Research process and method

In terms of the broader context and immediate circumstances in which they occur and their short-term and longer-term aftermath, disasters involving multiple deaths and injuries are complex events impacting on the bereaved, survivors, rescuers, their families and their communities. To understand that complexity, in terms of causation and investigation, it has been suggested that disasters and their consequences should be considered as a sequence of distinct but inter-related 'phases'.

A three-part medical analogy is often used: 'incubation' phase; 'acute' or 'crisis' phase; 'recovery' phase. 'Incubation' considers the build-up during which the potential for disaster grows and develops, often hidden from view yet inevitable once certain circumstances coincide. The 'acute' or 'crisis' phase occurs as that potential, often quickly and irretrievably, becomes reality. The 'recovery' phase extends from rescue through to resignation.

While it is helpful to consider the progression of a disaster, its context and its aftermath as self-contained time periods, these periods cannot be precisely delimited, since human actions and reactions, involving the dynamics of personal, group and organisational responses, are not straightforward. Identifying phases that encompass a definable timespan, nevertheless, helps in analysing, planning for and responding to disasters.

Previous research into the context and consequences of the Hillsborough disaster considered eight phases: the historical context; the immediate context; the immediate circumstances; the 'moment'; rescue and evacuation; the immediate aftermath; the short-term aftermath; the long-term aftermath. This enabled an analytical approach to the key factors that contributed to the disaster, to what happened on the day and in the immediate aftermath, and to the investigations and inquiries that followed. As a framework this approach was adopted by the Panel in its analysis of the disclosed documents and other material and is reflected in the structure of the Report.

Terms of reference and scope Within its terms of reference (see Appendix 1) the Panel was obliged to write a report demonstrating 'how the information disclosed adds to public understanding of the tragedy and its aftermath'. To achieve that end the Panel negotiated access to documents held by a diverse range of organisations and individuals (see Appendix 2).

  • Appendix 3 Research process and method — 387
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The scope of material sought and disclosed covered: the decade prior to the disaster, focusing on the condition of the stadium and the arrangements for crowd safety and crowd management; the circumstances leading up to the FA Cup Semi-Final being held at Hillsborough in 1989; the 'moment' of the disaster; the immediate aftermath; the investigations and inquiries that followed.

Once accessed, the documents and other material were catalogued and processed within the digital archive. While hard copies remained in key sites (The National Archive; the Sheffield Archives; the Liverpool Record Office) or with their rightful owners, the digital archive provides a single, coherent repository of all disclosed documents.

The cataloguing process was time-consuming because many of the documents provided by the contributing organisations or individuals had not previously been catalogued or filed.

Research process Within the first months of the Panel's work it became apparent that the sheer volume of documents would require a fully developed programme of research to provide an analytical review on which the Panel's Report could be based.

The research team was Dr Janet Clark, Dr Jo Doody, Dr Shaun McDaid and Ms Gemma Ní Chaoimh. Appointed by the Panel, the team was managed by Panel member Professor Phil Scraton and based at the School of Law, Queen's University Belfast. Other Panel members also contributed significantly to the research process in accord with their specialist knowledge and professional expertise. The team was supported by members of the Panel's secretariat.

Research methodology As stated above, a priority for the Panel's work was to show how the disclosed documents contribute to public understanding of the disaster. It was important, therefore, to review 'what was known' in the public domain, from previous investigations, inquiries and research into and publications about the disaster. This review forms Part 1 of the Report.

Part 2 is concerned with 'what the disclosed documents add to public understanding', reflecting the context, circumstances and consequences of the disaster and its investigation. It also responds to the questions asked and issues raised by bereaved families in consultation with the Panel.

Having established the key focuses for the research, the Panel accessed, digitised and researched the documents accordingly. This involved a methodical content analysis of all documents and other material disclosed to the Panel. The documents, therefore, provided the foundation for the extensive, cross-referenced data that then formed the detail of the Report.

The Panel read all the disclosed documents in unredacted form. Redaction of documents, or their removal from public access, has been agreed by the Panel only in exceptional circumstances (see Appendix 2). The main reason for redaction or non-disclosure is privacy relating to personal information, particularly medical records. Names of junior members of staff within organisations have also been redacted.

Extensive primary data was drawn from the documents, then further analysed and cross-referenced to present a detailed narrative within each chapter. Inevitably the chapters also rely on documents and material already in the public domain in order to provide a coherent, analytical narrative.

Regarding the circumstances and immediate aftermath of the disaster, cross-referencing of content was developed chronologically to construct a comprehensive sequence of events, reflecting the exchange of information between organisations prior to and after the disaster. This included detailed consideration of the decisions taken by relevant organisations regarding crowd management, crowd safety and structural modifications within the stadium throughout the 1980s.

The Panel also focused on issues concerning rescue and the emergency response. In examining the emergency response to the disaster, the Panel's approach was consistent with the analysis of disclosed documents as conducted for other chapters. Cross-referencing of a wide variety of sources in chronological order constructed a comprehensive sequence of events as the disaster unfolded. This enabled eye-witness accounts to be located in context.

Occasionally, timings of events in statements or other documents conflict with timings derived from radio transcripts. In these instances the transcripts, which are timed verbatim records of every telephone call and radio transmission, were considered definitive.

Disclosure and access to documents The initial phase of the research was conducted on hard-copy original or photocopied documents held in Sheffield or at the Home Office. The next phase of the content analysis was conducted by accessing the digitised versions of documents held on a secure site.

While all documents disclosed to the Panel are not referenced specifically in the Report, each document has been reviewed and analysed as part of the research process. The Panel is aware that some documents include personal opinions of individuals, and statements about individuals, where those concerned have not had the oppportunity to respond to comments or criticism. In reading the disclosed documents it is important to be sensitive to this situation.

Medical evidence The assessment of the evidence on causation of death, central to the preliminary hearings or mini-inquests, was based primarily on the records of the post mortem examinations carried out on the deceased. These records are personal medical records, and as such have been treated as confidential by the Panel.

Because of the significance of this evidence and the concerns raised by bereaved families, the Panel's medically qualified member scrutinised the records, summarising their content in aggregate. This scrutiny revealed features previously the subject of comment in individual cases but that had not been assessed. The Panel received the helpful advice of a highly experienced and senior professor of forensic pathology.

The disclosed post mortem reports revealed a broad pattern of evidence of prolonged survival in a substantial proportion of the deceased (see Chapter 5). The outcome for those alive but unconscious due to partial asphyxiation was dependent on what happened to them during this period, including the prompt availability of properly equipped first-aid personnel and correct positioning.

  • Appendix 3 Research process and method — 389
390

The material disclosed to the Panel included the schedule of original data that had been used for an analysis which resulted in a claim that there was a link between later arrival in the ground and a raised blood alcohol level amongst the deceased. Initially, the Panel replicated the original analysis. Prompted by the results it carried out further analysis of the original data, the results of which are described in detail in Chapter 5.

Factual accuracy checking A process of factual accuracy checking was conducted with South Yorkshire Police, the South Yorkshire West District Coroner, Yorkshire Ambulance Service and Sheffield City Council as the main contributing organisations. Each organisation was provided with sections of text showing extracts from the documents it provided to ensure that the text was a factually accurate representation.

The contributing organisations met with Panel members to discuss the text, but were not given hard copy or online access outside the meetings. In keeping with the principle of 'families first', under which the bereaved families are the first to access the Panel's Report, the contributing organisations were not provided with the Panel's interpretations of the documents.

Where appropriate, and based only on factual accuracy rather than interpretation, modifications were made to the text. Objections raised that were considered as matters of interpretation were discounted. The Panel is grateful to the main contributing organisations for their participation in this process.

Retained tissue following post mortem examination

During the Panel's scrutiny of documents relating to evidence from the pathologists who carried out the post mortem examinations, it became clear that in ten cases tissue had been removed for further examination. This is an essential part of any post mortem in which the findings are not immediately clear and microscopic examination is necessary for confirmation or clarification.

In accordance with standard practice at the time, relatives were not informed that tissue removal could form part of the post mortem examination, nor were they offered the choice of what should be done with removed tissue material after examination. Under the Human Tissue Act 2004 this is no longer permissible, and as a consequence to remove and dispose of tissue without informing relatives is unlawful.

Guidance for those responsible for such repositories stressed that, following widespread publicity about the practice, it was for relatives to approach hospitals to enquire whether any material had been retained. This guidance was followed correctly in the case of each of these ten Hillsborough post mortems.

Several bereaved families enquired under this process, and all were given correct information. In two cases this was to the effect that small amounts of tissue had been retained. One family was told initially that no organs had been retained, because the enquiry was understood as relating to whole organs and not to small blocks of tissue. Subsequently, this family was given correct information that some blocks had been retained. The Panel has read the correspondence and it is clear that the initial response resulted from a misunderstanding by the pathologist concerned.

It should be noted that this sequence of events occurred in many hospitals throughout the UK when the 'organ retention' scandal first broke. Invariably, relatives' enquiries were understood to apply only to whole organs. Initial responses to bereaved relatives' enquiries then had to be corrected when it became clear that many relatives were also concerned about the retention of blocks of tissue.

After careful consideration, the Panel took the view that in the particular circumstances of Hillsborough, and bearing in mind the manifest previous failures to communicate fully and sympathetically with families, it should contact each family concerned to enquire if they would like any further information that the Panel had concerning the post mortem examination. Further information was not provided unless it was requested.

  • Appendix 4 Retained tissue following post mortem examination — 391
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The Panel also considered that there were pressing reasons to offer families this information as soon as it had been confirmed, and not to wait until completion of the Panel disclosure process. Whatever the standards in force in 1989, the Panel considered that by current standards it was essential to contact families immediately. While sharing this information with families potentially presented them with a decision on what to do with remaining tissue material, not providing the opportunity for disclosure would amount to a failure in a duty of care.

The Panel's contact with the families concerned was on an individual and confidential basis. Regrettably, information was leaked to the media before the process was completed and the Panel was obliged to issue a statement to clarify the situation. Nine families were contacted and provided with full information on their relative's post mortem examination. Information on tissue retention was provided to those who made a request for further information. The retained material has been treated in accordance with their wishes.

A tenth set of tissue samples was more complicated. It was not identified, being labelled only as 'Hillsborough X'. It is not clear from the documentation why this occurred, because all the deceased had been positively identified at the time of the post mortem examinations. The retention of an unidentified sample was a failure of process. Because of the location of this material it is clear that it originated from one of ten post mortem examinations carried out by one pathologist, now deceased.

After careful consideration the Panel decided to approach the ten families concerned, to offer further information if requested and, if so, to offer them the possibility of a test to see if their DNA matched that in the retained material. Legal guidance was sought on the provisions of the Human Tissue Act 2004, and the Panel was advised that sampling of the retained material would be lawful as long as at least half of the families involved agreed, because on the balance of probabilities the material was more likely to relate to one of those families than not.

More than half of the families requested testing for themselves, and several of those who did not wish to be tested indicated that they had no objection to the material being used to seek a match with those who were tested. All samples were tested in parallel, and none matched the DNA in the retained material. This material will be retained for a period after the completion of the Panel's work and, in the absence of any further information, will be respectfully destroyed.

The Panel will make no further comment concerning this issue, which remains a confidential matter for the bereaved families directly involved.

Freedom of information and Parliamentary debate

Freedom of information request Prior to the appointment of the Hillsborough Independent Panel, the BBC had made a freedom of information (FOI) request to access Cabinet papers covering the days following the Hillsborough disaster. This had been refused and the BBC appealed to the Information Commissioner. In July 2011 the Commissioner, Christopher Graham, ruled that 'the specific content of the information in question would add to public knowledge and understanding about the reaction of various parties to that event, including the government of the day, in the early aftermath'. His ruling provoked concern that information had been purposefully withheld from public scrutiny. He considered it irrelevant that the Panel was engaged in negotiating disclosure of documents, noting that the initial request had been made before the Panel's appointment. The Cabinet Office appealed the Commissioner's ruling, stating 'the government's view is that it is in the public interest for the process that is under way through the Hillsborough Independent Panel be allowed to take its course', including the established principle 'to disclose information to the Hillsborough families first'. Given that it was negotiating the disclosure of all Cabinet and government documents relating to Hillsborough, the Panel was concerned to safeguard the principle of researching all disclosed documents in context. Whereas the BBC's application covered a period of less than a month, the Panel's commitment to disclosure extended over two decades. The Panel issued the following statement on 20 August 2011:

Following recent media coverage of the Cabinet Office's decision to appeal the release of Cabinet Office papers concerning the Hillsborough disaster, the

Hillsborough Independent Panel affirms its independence of government in carrying out its research, publishing an analytical report and establishing a comprehensive public archive of documents and other materials. The Panel is grateful for the continuing support of the Hillsborough families in taking forward its unique and important work. The statement also included the following explanatory note:

The Panel's terms of reference commit to maximum public disclosure of all documents and materials relating to the context, circumstances and aftermath of the disaster and to providing direction on the establishment of a public archive of those documents and materials. A guiding principle within the Panel's Terms of Reference

  • Appendix 5 Freedom of information and Parliamentary debate — 393
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is that full disclosure will be made first to the Hillsborough families followed by release to the wider public. This principle has been applied to all documents received by the Panel from organisations.

The Panel is responsible for publishing a Report that will 'illustrate how the information disclosed adds to public understanding of the tragedy and its aftermath'.

At present the Panel has received the cooperation of all organisations believed to hold relevant material, including the Cabinet Office, in securing access to documents and materials. The documents are undergoing detailed analysis by the Panel's researchers under the direction of a Panel sub-group and led by Professor Phil Scraton, a member of the Panel.

The Cabinet Office documents are one element of a highly complex range of material accessed from organisations and digitised for eventual release into the public domain as part of the comprehensive archive. They will be analysed in that context and will form an essential foundation to the Panel's Report scheduled for Spring 2012.

On 24 August Professor Phil Scraton commented on the Panel's collective position:

The Panel is not a gatekeeper. Our role is not to determine what is or is not published, our responsibility is full public disclosure. Our role is not to filter information but to secure access to documents that otherwise would have been restricted for years to come. We are engaged in an unprecedented process and our priorities are the families, the survivors and the broader public interest.

In response to a letter from Andy Burnham MP, the Prime Minister affirmed the Coalition Government's support for the work of the Hillsborough Independent Panel. He stated that 'the Government is wholly committed to full disclosure of the Hillsborough information that it holds', and further that 'Cabinet papers, along with other relevant government papers, have been released to the Hillsborough independent panel'.

He continued:

I am keen to ensure that the panel and indeed the families were treated with the utmost respect in this process. We have therefore proposed that the panel will ensure that disclosure takes place initially to the Hillsborough families, prior to wider publication. There seems to me to be complete agreement on the need for full and public disclosure, initially to the families, and helping the Panel complete its important work.

E-petition and Parliamentary debate Meanwhile, an e-petition was launched requesting 'Full government disclosure and publication of all documents, discussions and reports relating to the 1989 Hillsborough disaster'. It received well over 100,000 signatures and Steve Rotheram, MP for Liverpool Walton, introduced a Backbench Business debate in the House of Commons on 17 October 2011.1

  1. Hansard,17 December 1997, HOM000030920001, p1. October 2011, Col 662-724.
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In her reply the Home Secretary, Theresa May, stated that the Government 'firmly believe that the right way to release the papers is through the Hillsborough independent panel – to the families first and then to the public'. She stated:

The families should have the papers, and they should not have them filtered through politicians or the media. We therefore support the Hillsborough independent panel and today's motion. We want full disclosure to the panel of all documents relating to

Hillsborough, including Cabinet minutes. Those documents should be uncensored and unredacted. Indeed, the full unredacted Cabinet Office papers on Hillsborough have already been made available to the panel. That includes minutes of the meetings of the Cabinet immediately following the disaster.

She stated further that the 'principle is clear: full publication and minimal redaction, and the panel seeing all of the papers, uncensored and unredacted – as the families have rightly demanded: the whole loaf, not snippets. I stand ready to do anything I can to aid the independent panel in completing its task'.

Following an extensive and moving debate the motion was carried without opposition:

That this House calls for the full disclosure of all Government-related documents, including Cabinet minutes, relating to the 1989 Hillsborough disaster; requires that such documentation be uncensored and without redaction; and further calls for the families of the 96 and the Hillsborough Independent Panel to have unrestricted access to that information.

BBC disclosure of Cabinet papers On 15 March 2012, soon after the Panel announced that it would be presenting its Report in the Autumn of 2012, the BBC disclosed documents it had initially sought. It appears that the documents were leaked and their contents limited to the immediate aftermath, the period covered by the BBC's initial FOI request.

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