Chapter 8: The period from August to December 1971

Government and security structures — 8.2
The relationship between the Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary — 8.29
Internment — 8.35
Legality of the ban on marches — 8.47
The response to internment — 8.49
The period of containment — 8.56
The treatment of internees — 8.66
The tripartite talks — 8.71
General Carver's military appreciation of the security situation — 8.77
The meeting between the British and Northern Irish Prime Ministers on 7th October 1971 — 8.89
Major General Ford's Directive — 8.100
The Northern Ireland Government's Green Paper — 8.106
Brigadier MacLellan's Directive — 8.110
The Yellow Card — 8.121
The GEN 47 meeting on 11th November 1971 — 8.124
Edward Heath's Guildhall speech — 8.126
The visit of Harold Wilson to Northern Ireland — 8.127
Further GEN 47 Committee meetings — 8.132
The end of the containment phase in Londonderry — 8.139
Major General Ford's December 1971 visit to Londonderry — 8.142
Reginald Maudling's meeting at Headquarters Northern Ireland — 8.161
General Carver's visit to Northern Ireland — 8.171
Meeting of the Ministry of Defence's Northern Ireland Policy Group — 8.180
Edward Heath's visit to Londonderry — 8.185
Proposals for a political initiative — 8.186
The resumption of marches — 8.193

¶8.1 The increase in violence led to discussions between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland Governments regarding the possibility of introducing internment without trial. Before examining the debate and the decision that followed, it is necessary to set out the political and security structures then in place in Westminster and Stormont.

Government and security structures

¶8.2 The governance of Northern Ireland rested in the first instance with the Northern Ireland Government and the Parliament at Stormont to which it was responsible. However, as these bodies were created by the Parliament at Westminster, many, including Edward Heath in his written evidence to this Inquiry, felt that the United Kingdom Government (formally known as Her Majesty's Government, or "HMG ") "recognised a responsibility to all the citizens of Northern Ireland ".¹¹ KH4.2 As we consider later in this part of the report, London's interest in, and influence on, the affairs of Northern Ireland increased significantly following the deployment of the Army in August 1969.

¶8.3 The highest decision-making body within the United Kingdom Government was the Cabinet. Although matters concerning Northern Ireland were discussed at meetings of the full Cabinet, the most significant forum for discussion and decision in the weeks and months preceding Bloody Sunday was the Cabinet Committee on Northern Ireland, known as the GEN 47 Committee, or just GEN 47. Like all such Cabinet committees, GEN 47 had delegated authority to take decisions on behalf of the Cabinet, and these decisions engaged the collective responsibility of the Government. At the time relevant to this report, the GEN 47 Committee comprised:

Prime Minister: Rt Hon Edward Heath MP (chairman);
Secretary of State for the Home Department: Rt Hon Reginald Maudling MP;
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs: Rt Hon Sir Alec Douglas-Home MP;
Chancellor of the Exchequer: Rt Hon Anthony Barber MP;
Lord President of the Council: Rt Hon William Whitelaw MP; and
Secretary of State for Defence: Rt Hon Lord Carrington.

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¶8.4 The following senior officer and civil servants also attended meetings regularly:

Chief of the General Staff (CGS): General Sir Michael Carver;
Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign & Commonwealth Office: Sir Stewart Crawford;
Permanent Under Secretary of State, the Home Department: Sir Philip Allen; and
Permanent Under Secretary of State, the Ministry of Defence (MoD): Sir James Dunnett.

¶8.5 Other senior officials, such as Philip Woodfield, Arthur Hockaday and Donald Maitland, whose positions are explained below, were present at some meetings, often in place of their departmental permanent under secretaries.¹¹ The Permanent Under Secretary is the most senior civil servant in a government department. The General Officer Commanding (GOC) Northern Ireland, Lieutenant General Sir Harry Tuzo, and the United Kingdom Government Representative in Northern Ireland, Howard Smith, might also attend when in London. Sir Burke Trend, the Secretary to the Cabinet, and other civil servants provided the secretariat.

¶8.6 In addition to GEN 47, various other inter-departmental committees concerned themselves in whole or in part with the affairs of Northern Ireland. These included the Ministerial Committee on Northern Ireland (which pre-dated GEN 47 and generally comprised the same ministers and departments); the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (which again involved many of the same senior ministers, but had a wider brief than the Northern Ireland committees); the Joint Intelligence Committee (which briefed ministers on intelligence matters relating to Northern Ireland); and the Official Committee on Northern Ireland, which was made up of senior civil servants and some military personnel, who met on a regular basis before GEN 47 meetings in order to discuss the issues that were likely to arise.

¶8.7 The Cabinet Secretary throughout the period that directly concerns this Inquiry was Sir Burke Trend. The Prime Minister's Principal Private Secretary was Robert Armstrong, and his Chief Press Secretary was Donald Maitland. In January 1972, Arthur Hockaday moved from the MoD to the Cabinet Office to become Deputy Head of the Defence and Oversea Division of the Cabinet Secretariat, where his main responsibilities were defence and Northern Ireland.

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¶8.8 Departmental responsibility for Northern Ireland lay at this time with the Home Office, where the Secretary of State was Reginald Maudling. Sir Philip Allen was the Permanent Under Secretary, and he also chaired the Official Committee on Northern Ireland. Philip Woodfield was the Assistant Permanent Under Secretary whose responsibilities included Northern Ireland.

¶8.9 Following the deployment of the Army to Northern Ireland in August 1969, two senior Westminster civil servants were stationed with the Northern Ireland Government in order to "represent the increased concern which the United Kingdom Government had necessarily acquired in Northern Ireland affairs through the commitment of the Armed Forces in the present conditions".¹¹ G0.11 Communiqué accompanying the Downing Street Declaration, 19th August 1969. One of the posts created was that of the United Kingdom Representative. Between April 1971 and March 1973, the post was held by Howard Smith, who succeeded Oliver Wright and Ronald Burroughs. The United Kingdom Representative usually reported to the Home Secretary, but on occasions he would also attend inter-departmental ministerial committee meetings. At the time of Bloody Sunday, Howard Smith's deputy was Frank Steele.

¶8.10 The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs was Sir Alec Douglas- Home. The most significant officials within his department in relation to the events discussed in this report were the Permanent Under Secretary, Sir Stewart Crawford, and the Head of the Republic of Ireland Department, Kelvin White. Sir John Peck was Her Majesty's Ambassador to Ireland from April 1970 until February 1973.

¶8.11 The Armed Forces deployed in Northern Ireland remained under the authority of the MoD in London. This was a matter of great significance to the constitutional and political balance between the governments in Westminster and Stormont. The Secretary of State for Defence, Lord Carrington, was assisted by a number of junior ministers, including the Minister of State for Defence, Lord Balniel, who had responsibility for all three Armed Forces, and the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Army, Geoffrey Johnson- Smith MP. The Permanent Under Secretary at the MoD was Sir James Dunnett. Of the civil servants within the department, the most significant to this Inquiry include: Arthur Hockaday, the Assistant Under Secretary (General Staff) (AUS (GS)) until early January 1972 when he moved to the Cabinet Secretariat; his replacement as AUS (GS), Derek Stephen; and Anthony Stephens, the Head of Defence Secretariat 10 (DS10). The AUS (GS) was the civil service representative on the Chief of the General Staff's management team, whose other members were senior Army personnel. Under the AUS (GS) were three divisions, DS6, DS7 and DS10, the last being a relatively new body established to deal exclusively with Northern Ireland. DS10 was intended to provide policy advice to ministers and military staff within the MoD, and to liaise with the Home Office and Foreign & Commonwealth Office.

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¶8.12 The professional head of the Armed Forces at the time of Bloody Sunday was the Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Peter Hill-Norton. The Chief of the General Staff (CGS), General Sir Michael Carver, was the professional head of the Army, and he sat with Admiral Hill-Norton, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, the First Sea Lord (Chief of the Naval Staff) and the Chief of the Air Staff on the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Under General Carver were the structures of the Army's General Staff, which worked with civilian civil servants in the MoD in the formulation, co-ordination and implementation of policy and operations. Lieutenant Colonel David Ramsbotham served as General Carver's Military Assistant at this time. The Director of Military Operations, who was responsible to the CGS, was Major General Ronald Coaker. Colonel Henry Dalzell-Payne served under him as the Head of Military Operations Branch 4 (MO4), which was the section of the General Staff responsible for Northern Ireland. In this role he worked closely with Arthur Hockaday and Anthony Stephens.

¶8.13 The MoD's Northern Ireland Policy Group (NIPG) brought together the relevant politicians, civil servants and military staff and constituted the department's principal internal forum for discussion on issues relating to Northern Ireland. Relevant discussions also took place among officials at the Permanent Under Secretary's morning meetings.

¶8.14 The Parliament and Government of Northern Ireland were governed by a similar combination of constitutional relationships and conventions as their counterparts in London. Brian Faulkner, who was Prime Minister of Northern Ireland from March 1971, chaired the Cabinet, whose Secretary at the time directly relevant to this report was Sir Harold Black. His deputy was Kenneth Bloomfield. The Prime Minister's Principal Private Secretary was Robert Ramsay, and his most senior press officers were David Gilliland (Chief Press Officer) and Jack McNally.

¶8.15 Until the introduction of direct rule by Westminster in March 1972, the Stormont Government retained responsibility for the internal security of Northern Ireland, and it was the gravity of this issue that led Brian Faulkner to serve as minister for the responsible department, Home Affairs, as well as prime minister. He was assisted in his departmental duties by the Minister of State, John Taylor (later Lord Kilclooney), who also attended the Northern Ireland Cabinet, and after October 1971 by the Londonderry city MP,

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¶Commander Albert Anderson, who was the Senior Parliamentary Secretary. William Stout (a civil servant) was appointed by Brian Faulkner as the Government Security Adviser and head of the Government Security Unit.

¶8.16 The Prime Minister of Northern Ireland chaired the Joint Security Committee (JSC), which in the months before Bloody Sunday comprised:

Prime Minister of Northern Ireland: Rt Hon Brian Faulkner MP;
Minister of State at the Ministry of Home Affairs: Rt Hon John Taylor MP;
Senior Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry of Home Affairs: Commander Albert Anderson MP;
General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland (Army): Lieutenant General Sir Harry Tuzo;
Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC): Sir Graham Shillington;
Secretary to the Northern Ireland Cabinet: Sir Harold Black;
Government Security Adviser: William Stout; and
United Kingdom Government Representative: Howard Smith.

¶8.17 Other prominent figures, such as the Commander Land Forces (CLF) Northern Ireland, received the minutes of the meeting, and attended from time to time. John Taylor would chair the meetings in the Prime Minister's absence. The secretary to the committee was Thomas Cromey, a civil servant.

¶8.18 The JSC had a somewhat ill-defined function, and witnesses to this Inquiry have given differing accounts of its precise role. To some in London it was the body that was responsible for taking executive decisions on security matters within Northern Ireland.¹¹ KC8.7 Statement to this Inquiry of General Carver; KC10.2 Statement to this Inquiry of Lord Crawford; G74.457 "Proposed March in Londonderry ", submission of Anthony Stephens to the Secretary of State for Defence, 26th January 1972 (but see KS3.111-112 Statement to this Inquiry of Anthony Stephens and Day 273/13-14 Oral evidence to this Inquiry of Anthony Stephens). However, the evidence to this Inquiry of many of those who prepared or participated in the meetings suggests that the committee did not so much make decisions as approve them. The JSC provided a forum for discussion, debate and the exchange of information between politicians, officials and the security forces and as such it played an important role in the governance of Northern Ireland. However, on significant operational matters the committee seems to have accepted recommendations that had emerged from earlier meetings between the GOC, the Chief Constable and the Prime Minister. In effect, JSC ratification was the last stage in the security policy process, but as such it was often the only part seen by those, such as politicians and civil servants in London, who had not been directly involved.²² KK3.2 Statement to this Inquiry of John Taylor; Day 196/14-17 Oral evidence to this Inquiry of John Taylor; KB1.3 Statement to this Inquiry of Kenneth Bloomfield; Day 216/46-47 Oral evidence to this Inquiry of Kenneth Bloomfield; KR1.5 Statement to this Inquiry of Robert Ramsay; Day 215/13-14, Day 215/128, Day 215/96-99 Oral evidence to this Inquiry of Robert Ramsay; KC15.10-11 Statement to this Inquiry of Brian Cummings; Day 253/14-16 Oral evidence to this Inquiry of General Ford.Show full note

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¶8.19 The formal constitutional responsibility for internal security matters lay with the Northern Ireland Government, but the most significant of the available forces, the Army, which had been deployed "in support of the constitutional civil authority "¹¹ V58 Extract from Hansard, Oral answers of the Minister of State for Defence, 17th February 1972. remained under the ultimate control of the United Kingdom Government and Parliament. Elsewhere in this report²² Chapters 193–196 we discuss in more detail the process by which security policy in Northern Ireland was made and the constitutional and legal position of the Army in Northern Ireland at the time of Bloody Sunday.

¶8.20 The GOC exercised command of the Army in Northern Ireland and, as we have already noted, Lieutenant General Sir Harry Tuzo filled this post during the period with which we are concerned. He was responsible, through the CGS (General Carver) and the Chief of the Defence Staff (Admiral Hill-Norton), to the MoD and hence to Westminster. In Northern Ireland, the GOC also fulfilled the role of the Director of Operations, in which he was instructed to exercise operational command of all land forces (including the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR)), as well as certain naval and air forces. The GOC's responsibilities with regard to the RUC are discussed below. We consider below and elsewhere in this report¹¹ Chapters 193–196 the GOC's role in the formulation of security policy in Northern Ireland, and his relationship with the governments in London and Stormont.

¶8.21 The GOC chaired the Director of Operations Committee (D Ops Committee), which had responsibility for discussing, planning and co-ordinating security operations. At the time of Bloody Sunday, this comprised:

General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland: Lieutenant General Sir Harry Tuzo;
Commander Land Forces Northern Ireland: Major General Robert Ford;

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Director of Intelligence: David (surname withheld for security reasons);
Chief Constable of the RUC: Sir Graham Shillington;
Assistant Chief Constable (Operations) RUC: David Corbett;
Head of Special Branch: David Johnston; and
Chief of Staff, Headquarters Northern Ireland (HQNI): Brigadier Marston Tickell.

¶8.22 There is some dispute as to whether other figures, such as the Government Security Adviser, William Stout, and the United Kingdom Government Representative, Howard Smith, were permanent members of this committee, or merely attended some meetings, though it seems to us likely that the latter at least was a permanent member.¹¹ G116B.771.11 Annex to JSC report on events in Londonderry, 5th February 1972, Northern Ireland Chain of Command. Major INQ 18692 served as secretary from February 1971. The committee generally met on a Wednesday, before the JSC meetings on Thursday.

¶8.23 The CLF worked closely with, and in effect as deputy to, the GOC, and both were based at HQNI in Lisburn, County Antrim. General Robert Ford replaced General Anthony Farrar-Hockley in this post from 29th July 1971.¹¹ B1208.019 Statement to this Inquiry of General Ford. The CLF had responsibility for the day-to-day conduct of Army operations in Northern Ireland. General Ford and senior staff officers would attend General Tuzo's "morning prayers " (informal discussions which were not minuted)²² Day 244/113 Oral evidence to this Inquiry of Brigadier Tickell; Day 241/199 Oral evidence to this Inquiry of Colonel Tugwell. and, on at least three occasions a week, the GOC and the CLF would meet privately, including for talks before D Ops Committee meetings.³³ Day 253/13 Oral evidence to this Inquiry of General Ford.

¶8.24 The Director of Intelligence, David, was a member of the Security Service who held the equivalent rank of Major General. His role was to co-ordinate the intelligence-gathering efforts of the various elements of the security forces in Northern Ireland. David oversaw a department consisting of other Security Service officers and military personnel, and he liaised closely with the RUC, especially Special Branch.¹¹ KD2.1 Statement to this Inquiry of David. He was in regular contact with General Tuzo and General Ford.²² Day 330/4 Oral evidence to this Inquiry of David.

¶8.25 Beyond HQNI, Northern Ireland was divided into three brigade areas. At the time of Bloody Sunday the three brigades were: 39th Infantry Brigade (39 Inf Bde), based in Belfast under the command of Brigadier Frank Kitson; 5th Airportable Brigade (5 Airptbl

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¶Bde), based in Lurgan, which had replaced 19th Airportable Brigade (19 Airptbl Bde) during the autumn of 1971; and 8th Infantry Brigade, based in Londonderry, under Brigadier Patrick MacLellan, who took up his command on 27th October 1971 in succession to Brigadier Alan Cowan.

¶8.26 Each of the brigades was formed by a number of battalions and regiments and a Brigade Staff. At the time of Bloody Sunday, 8th Infantry Brigade had under its command 2nd Battalion, The Royal Green Jackets (2 RGJ), 1st Battalion, The Royal Anglian Regiment (1 R ANGLIAN), 1st Battalion, The Coldstream Guards (1 CG) and 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment, Royal Artillery (22 Lt AD Regt). 1st Battalion, The Parachute Regiment (1 PARA) was the Reserve Battalion for Brigadier Kitson's 39th Infantry Brigade. In addition to the battalions and regiments that made up each brigade, there was a Province Reserve; 1st Battalion, The King's Own Royal Border Regiment (1 KOB) became operational in this role on 15th January 1972.¹¹ G133A.904.4 Historical Record, 1st Battalion, The King's Own Royal Border Regiment.

¶8.27 The RUC, Northern Ireland's police force, was under the command of the Chief Constable (previously the Inspector-General), a position held between November 1970 and November 1973 by Sir Graham Shillington. At the time of Bloody Sunday, the Assistant Chief Constable (Operations), David Corbett, and the Head of Special Branch, David Johnston, sat with the Chief Constable on the D Ops Committee. Like the Army, the RUC divided Northern Ireland into geographical areas of responsibility, to which were designated letters. Division "N " included Londonderry, and was under the command of Chief Superintendent Frank Lagan.

¶8.28 The Chief Constable reported to the Government of Northern Ireland, and the RUC was part of the civil authority in support of which the Army was deployed from August 1969.

The relationship between the Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary

¶8.29 Elsewhere in this report¹¹ Chapters 193–196 we consider in greater detail the division of responsibilities between the Army and the RUC and the submissions made to this Inquiry on this topic. The following paragraphs provide an overview.

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¶8.30 The relationship between the RUC and the Army was addressed very shortly after the initial deployment of troops to Northern Ireland, at the meeting that took place on 19th August 1969 between the then Prime Ministers, Harold Wilson and Major James Chichester-Clark, and their senior ministers.¹¹ As is described above, it was this meeting that led to the publication of the Downing Street Declaration. The communiqué that was issued after the meeting included the following statement:²² G0.10, G37C.252.6 "Responsibility for Law and Order in Northern Ireland ", a note by the Chairman of the Official Committee, 10th December 1971.

"It was agreed that the GOC Northern Ireland will with immediate effect assume overall responsibility for security operations [emphasis added]. He will continue to be responsible directly to the Ministry of Defence but will work in the closest co-operation with the Northern Ireland Government and the Inspector-General of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [then the chief officer of the RUC]. For all security operations the GOC will have full control of the deployment and tasks of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [emphasis added]. For normal police duties outside the field of security the Royal Ulster Constabulary will remain answerable to the Inspector- General who will be responsible to the Northern Ireland Government. "

¶8.31 In October 1969, as a result of representations by the then chief officer of the RUC, Sir Arthur Young, this arrangement was modified. The Directive that defined the GOC's role as Director of Operations was amended so that he was made responsible, not for full control, but for the "co-ordination of the tasking of the RUC " in relation to "security operations ".¹¹ G37C.252.6

¶8.32 The responsibility of the GOC for such "co-ordination " was reaffirmed in a revised Directive issued by the Acting Chief of the Defence Staff to the GOC in February 1971, which continued to have effect at the time of Bloody Sunday.¹¹ G1AAB.19.1.1.8-10; FS10.342 This Directive defined "security operations " as:²² G1AAB.19.1.1.8

¶"relating to internal and external security and cover[ing]:

a. The execution of operations necessary to counter action, whether covert or overt, aimed at subverting the security of the State.

b. The action necessary for the protection of life and property in case of actual or apprehended civil commotion. "

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¶The Directive also reiterated that: "Outside the security field you will have no responsibility for normal police duties, for which the Chief Constable will remain responsible to the Northern Ireland Government. "³³ G1AAB.19.1.1.10

¶8.33 As we discuss in detail elsewhere in this report,¹¹ Chapters 193 and 194 we broadly accept the following summary of the relationship between the Army and the RUC given by Kenneth Bloomfield, the Deputy Secretary to the Northern Ireland Cabinet at the time of Bloody Sunday, in his oral evidence to this Inquiry:²² Day 216/36

"Q: Can you tell us what that meant in effect: did it mean that the RUC were subject to – I do not know what is the right word – supervision, control, whatever, of the GOC?

A: No, I think it was a more sophisticated situation than that. I think what it meant was that the Army would be in the lead in considering how to handle what you might describe as the security situation, but you know, they would try to treat the RUC as a reasonably equal partner. Clearly, they had a tremendous input to make into that sort of situation from their local knowledge, but at the end of the day it would be for the GOC ultimately, or for officers responsible, to say 'look, we have listened to all of this, we have discussed all of this, now this is how we are going to handle it'. "

¶8.34 There was another aspect of the relationship between the Army and the RUC, namely that relating to the investigation by the Royal Military Police (RMP), rather than the RUC, of possible criminal offences by soldiers in Northern Ireland. We consider this matter elsewhere in this report.¹¹ Paragraphs 194.9–16

Internment

¶8.35 The Northern Ireland Government had the constitutional power to introduce internment without trial and in theory could have done so without the agreement of the United Kingdom Government. However, in view of the involvement of the Army with security in Northern Ireland, and the fact that this force would in all probability be needed to guard internees, it was accepted by both governments that internment would not be introduced without such agreement.¹¹ G4.49 Text of a message from the Home Secretary to Brian Faulkner, 4th August 1971; G4A.49.2-3 GEN 47 minutes, 5th August 1971.

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¶8.36 The question of introducing internment without trial had been under consideration for some time.¹¹ Faulkner, Memoirs, p117; G3A.48.1 Extract from Home Office Memorandum, "Northern Ireland: Political Summary for the Period 16th – 22nd July 1971 ", 23rd July 1971. The United Kingdom Government was initially opposed to the idea, and was minded to wait until after the annual Apprentice Boys' Parade (due to take place in Londonderry on 12th August 1971) before making a decision on the issue.²² G3D.48.18 Minutes of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, 3rd August 1971. However, the increasing terrorist violence in July 1971 put great pressure on Brian Faulkner to introduce this measure, and he sought the agreement of the United Kingdom Government to taking this course.³³ G3BA.48.13.1 Letter from Anthony Stephens to PL Gregson, 21st July 1971; G4A.49.2 GEN 47 minutes, 5th August 1971; G5.50 Note of a Meeting at 10 Downing Street on 5th August 1971; G3D.48.18-20 Minutes of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, 3rd August 1971.

¶8.37 The view expressed in July 1971 by the GOC, General Tuzo, was that the arguments against internment were very strong and that other measures should be tried first.¹¹ G3BA.48.13.1 Letter from Anthony Stephens to PL Gregson, 21st July 1971. The United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, Lord Carrington, was reported to be in agreement with General Tuzo on this point.²² G3BA.48.13.1 Letter from Anthony Stephens to PL Gregson, 21st July 1971. The other measures included continually harassing known leading IRA activists.³³ G3BA.48.13.1-2, G3BC.48.13.8 Letter from Anthony Stephens to PL Gregson, 21st July 1971. The Army had previously planned an operation (code-named Operation Hailstone) to lure out, engage and arrest terrorists and hooligans in the area above the Bligh's Lane Army and police post in Londonderry.⁴⁴ G3.24-41 Operation Hailstone, HQ 8 Infantry Brigade, 16th July 1971. This operation would have involved bringing 1 PARA to Londonderry for the first time. This battalion arrived on the outskirts of the city on 17th July, but the operation was ultimately abandoned and 1 PARA, who had not entered the city, returned to Belfast without incident.⁵⁵ G3.42-48 Operation Hailstone, HQ 8 Infantry Brigade, 16th July 1971; CJ1.1, CJ1.9 Statement to this Inquiry of Captain Mike Jackson.

¶8.38 There was also the problem of deciding what to do about the traditional Apprentice Boys' Parade, due to be held on 12th August 1971. Some senior Army officers in Londonderry were by now expressing the view that the shooting incidents starting on 4th July marked the beginning of a campaign by the IRA intended to pressurise the Stormont Government into banning this march.¹¹ G27.196 8th Infantry Brigade OP Directive 4/71, 10th November 1971. However, an intelligence report for HQNI put a different interpretation on the renewed violence, namely that it was in order to gain support from the nationalist community in Londonderry.²² G2C.23.12 HQNI Intelligence Summary No. 28/71, 15th July 1971. The view expressed by the GOC in early August was that the Army was not recommending on military grounds the banning of the Apprentice Boys' Parade.³³ G4.49 Text of a message from the Home Secretary to Brian Faulkner, 4th August 1971.

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¶8.39 On 5th August 1971 the GEN 47 Committee met to consider the situation. It would appear from the minutes of this meeting that the initial unfavourable view of internment was now changing, in view of the fact that a refusal to agree on the part of the United Kingdom Government would be very likely to render Brian Faulkner's position untenable.¹¹ G4A.49.1-4 By this time, the members of GEN 47 appear to have accepted that the Faulkner administration represented the last chance for Stormont and that if he fell it was almost inevitable that the Northern Ireland Government would have to be replaced with direct rule from Westminster, something that the United Kingdom Government wished to avoid if possible.²² G1AA.19.1.1 Report from H Smith to the Home Secretary, 10th June 1971; G3BB.48.13.5 Minutes of the Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Northern Ireland, 27th July 1971; G3BC.48.13.10 Confidential annex to the minutes of the Ministerial Committee on Northern Ireland, 29th July 1971; KH4.5 Statement to this Inquiry of Edward Heath.

¶8.40 The minutes of the GEN 47 meeting record the following discussion about the merits of introducing internment:¹¹ G4A.49.1-4

"In discussion it was agreed that the current military measures involved a relatively long campaign; internment, if it was effective would bring more immediate results. In deciding whether we should agree to its immediate use, it had to be borne in mind that it was the last action available to us short of direct rule. It could not be argued that internment would enable Mr Faulkner to carry on his Administration indefinitely. On the other hand, it seemed inevitable that internment would have to be used sooner or later. If we agreed to its use before 12 August, it could be accompanied by a prohibition on all processions, and it could then be represented as part of a comprehensive policy for maintaining public order and not directed against any particular section of the community. If Mr Faulkner were at his meeting that afternoon formally to seek our agreement to the use of internment, and we were to refuse it, the fact would become known, and Mr Faulkner's political position would become

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impossible. Direct rule would then almost inevitably follow, and in that event we ourselves were likely to want to use the power of internment; it would be better if we had allowed the Northern Ireland Government to use the power of internment earlier. These were arguments for agreeing at once to the use of internment coupled with a prohibition of all processions before 12 August.

In further discussion it was observed that the use of internment would have international implications. It would involve entering a further derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights, and it was not impossible that the situation in Northern Ireland would be brought before the United Nations. It was also to be expected that retaliatory action by the IRA would not be confined to Ireland; hostages might be taken in Great Britain. "

¶8.41 Prime Minister Edward Heath summed up the conclusion of the meeting in the following terms:

"THE PRIME MINISTER, summing up the discussion, said that, although a refusal to accede to a demand made that afternoon by Mr Faulkner for our agreement to the use of internment would seriously damage his political position, it had at the same time to be borne in mind that the United Kingdom Government would be bearing the effective responsibility for the act. The full implications of a resort to internment ought to be put before Mr Faulkner and it was undesirable that a decision on the use of internment should be taken before the matter had been thoroughly discussed with him. He himself, accompanied by the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence would see Mr Faulkner that afternoon. The fact that the meeting was taking place should not be made public. "

¶8.42 In the afternoon of the same day Edward Heath, together with the Home, Foreign and Defence Secretaries, met Brian Faulkner in London. The upshot of this meeting was that the United Kingdom Government agreed to support internment provided there was a complete ban on all marches.¹¹ G5.50-52 Note of a meeting at 10 Downing Street, 5th August 1971. According to Edward Heath's oral evidence to this Inquiry, Brian Faulkner was reluctant to accept this condition, and only did so because it was clear that, without it, the United Kingdom Government would not agree to internment.²² Day 282/96 Brian Faulkner himself recorded in his memoirs that he "readily accepted " the ban.³³ Faulkner, Memoirs, p120. The view of the United Kingdom Government was that if internment was accompanied with a ban on all marches in Northern Ireland, the measures could be represented as part of a comprehensive policy for maintaining public order and not directed against any particular section of the community.⁴⁴ G3BC.48.13.9 Minutes of the Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Northern Ireland, 29th July 1971; G4A.49.3 GEN 47 minutes, 5th August 1971; G5A.55.1-3 Note of a meeting at 10 Downing Street, 5th August 1971; G5.52 Note of a meeting at 10 Downing Street, 5th August 1971.

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¶8.43 During this meeting the CGS, General Carver, and the GOC, General Tuzo, attended to express their view that internment could not be described as an essential measure in purely military terms, as they considered that the IRA could be defeated by the methods currently being used, though whether the likely timescale for this was acceptable was a political and not a military question. The Chief Constable of the RUC expressed the view that the time for internment had now arrived.¹¹ G5.51 Note of a meeting at 10 Downing Street, 5th August 1971.

¶8.44 The decision to introduce internment was criticised during the present Inquiry. Those representing the family of Jim Wray, one of those killed on Bloody Sunday, submitted that the need for a formal derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights, the possibility of the situation in Northern Ireland being brought before the United Nations and the risk of IRA activity extending to Great Britain "were discussed more as an inconvenient consequence of the action rather than a measure of its gravity". The same representatives described internment as a "monstrous violation of human rights ".¹¹ FS4.18 It was submitted by those representing other families that internment represented an act of British "appeasement " of the Northern Ireland Government.²² FS1.486-491

¶8.45 We have found nothing in the evidence to support the suggestion that internment was regarded as other than a grave step to take; or that its consequences were regarded as inconveniences rather than a measure of its gravity. On the contrary it seems to us that the records of the discussions show that the question of internment and its consequences were carefully and thoroughly considered.¹¹ G3D.48.19 Confidential annex to the minutes of the Defence and Policy Committee, 3rd August 1971; G4A.49.3 GEN 47 minutes, 5th August 1971; G5.51 Note of a meeting at 10 Downing Street, 5th August 1971. The analysis of the United Kingdom Government was that unless internment was introduced Brian Faulkner and his government would fall, and that this would lead to the imposition of direct rule in circumstances where the United Kingdom Government would itself be likely to have to introduce internment.²² G3BB.48.13.4-5 Memorandum by the Home Secretary, 27th July 1971; G4A.49.3 GEN 47 minutes, 5th August 1971; G4AA.49.6 Manuscript notes of GEN 47, 5th August 1971, from Sir Burke Trend's minute book. It was to avoid such an outcome, not to "appease " the Northern Ireland Government, which led the United Kingdom Government to agree to internment.

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¶Furthermore, the attitude of unionists in the face of Provisional and Official IRA campaigns of violence intended to lead to the end of partition was something that could not simply be ignored by the United Kingdom Government.

¶8.46 Internment was introduced under Regulation 12 of the Schedule to the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922.¹¹ LAW2.12 Internment had been used before by both the Northern Ireland Government and the Republic of Ireland during the IRA campaign between 1956 and 1962. By the beginning of August 1971, however, the United Kingdom Government was made aware that, this time, the Republic of Ireland would not introduce a similar measure.²² G3D.48.18 Minutes of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, 3rd August 1971.

Legality of the ban on marches

¶8.47 At the same time as internment was introduced, the Stormont Government imposed a six-month ban on marches under section 2(2) of the Public Order Act (Northern Ireland) 1951.¹¹ LAW6.1 Section 2(4) of that Act, a provision inserted by section 2 of the Public Order (Amendment) Act (Northern Ireland) 1970, made it an offence for a person knowingly to take part in a banned public procession. The Criminal Justice (Temporary Provisions) Act (Northern Ireland) 1970 provided that the minimum penalty for this offence was imprisonment for six months. The Criminal Justice (Temporary Provisions)(Amendment) Act (Northern Ireland) 1970 made certain exceptions to this and there were special provisions for juveniles under the age of 17, such as custody in a remand home, training schools, borstal or attendance centres instead of imprisonment. There had been previous bans on marches, the last of which had covered the period between July 1970 and January 1971.²² Ó Dochartaigh, Civil Rights to Armalites, p190.

¶8.48 At this Inquiry it was submitted that the circumstances in which the Northern Ireland Government came to introduce a ban on marches in August 1971 raised the question of whether the ban fell outside the provisions of the Public Order Act and violated Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, on the grounds that it was introduced by the Government of Northern Ireland, not for genuine security reasons, but as the price to be paid for the agreement of the United Kingdom Government to internment.¹¹ FS10.271-296 Final submissions on behalf of NICRA; FS4.14-18 Final submissions made on behalf of the Wray family; FS1.510-515 Final submissions made by Madden & Finucane. It is neither necessary nor desirable in this report to express a view on these matters, which are essentially questions of law, since we have no evidence to suggest that any of those taking part in, or seeking to stop, the march on Bloody Sunday acted otherwise than in the belief that it had been legally banned, and since it is far from certain that all the relevant evidence, materials and arguments have been put before us.

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The response to internment

¶8.49 It had been intended to introduce internment on 10th August 1971 but fear that news of it might leak led to the operation (code-named Operation Demetrius) starting in the early hours of the previous day,¹¹ Michael Carver, Out of Step: Memoirs of a Field Marshal, London: Hutchinson, 1989, p409. when 342 people were arrested in Northern Ireland as being suspected IRA terrorists or republican activists.²² The Compton Committee, Report of the enquiry into allegations against the Security Forces of physical brutality in Northern Ireland arising out of events on the 9th August, 1971 (London: HMSO, 1971 Cmnd 4823), para 9. In the Londonderry area, 67 or 68 were detained out of 86 sought by the security services, of whom about 20 were arrested in the city itself.³³ G14A.86.003 Brigadier Cowan's notes for the visit of the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister, 30th September 1971; G41.264 "Future Military Policy in Londonderry: An Appreciation by the CLF ", 14th December 1971; Ó Dochartaigh, Civil Rights to Armalites, pp270–271; McCann, War and an Irish Town, p92.

¶8.50 The response to internment was immediate and, in many cases, violent. All but two of those arrested were Catholics, and both the non-Catholics were associated with the civil rights campaign or republican groups.¹¹ G9B.66.13 Minutes of a meeting of the (Northern Ireland) Cabinet, 20th August 1971; Michael Farrell, Northern Ireland: The Orange State (London: Pluto Press, 1976), p282. Although Brian Faulkner maintained that this was because only the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA were then involved in an organised and systematic campaign of violence,²² Faulkner, Memoirs, p119; G5.54 Note of a meeting at 10 Downing Street, 5th August 1971. the perception of many, if not most, of the minority community in Northern Ireland was that this was yet another example of sectarianism and repression by the authorities at Stormont, aided and abetted by the security forces.³³ McKittrick and McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles, pp69–70; Ó Dochartaigh, Civil Rights to Armalites, pp236–238; John Peck, Dublin from Downing Street (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1978), pp127–128. In addition, there was resentment from the fact that the intelligence on which internment was based appeared unimpressive – many of those initially picked up were soon released – and from the feeling that internment was a political move designed to shore up Brian Faulkner's position against attack from right wingers.⁴⁴ McKittrick and McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles, pp67–70. In Londonderry there were many days of renewed rioting, local people erected more barriers in the Bogside and the Creggan and the Provisional and Official IRA both mounted armed patrols in these areas of the city.⁵⁵ Ó Dochartaigh, Civil Rights to Armalites, p236; G7B.60.6 Memorandum attaching report of the Ireland Current Intelligence Group, 10th August 1971; G9BA.66.9.2-3 Memorandum attaching special assessment approved by the JIC.

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¶8.51 Those opposed to internment included moderate Catholics.¹¹ Ó Dochartaigh, Civil Rights to Armalites, pp236–237; Routledge, John Hume, p106. In Londonderry a group of 30 leading Catholic figures (sometimes known as the Committee of 30), including the Chairman of the local RUC Liaison Committee and three members of the Londonderry Development Commission (the body by then administering the city), resigned their public offices in protest, announcing their withdrawal on 19th August 1971.²² G14AA.86.1.5 Extracts from steering brief for the visit of the Prime Ministers of the Irish Republic and of Northern Ireland, 24th September 1971; Ó Dochartaigh, Civil Rights to Armalites, pp236–237. Non-unionist councillors of some 20 local authorities also announced their withdrawal from their councils.³³ Hennessey, History of Northern Ireland, p195.

¶8.52 Moderates and radicals combined in a campaign of civil disobedience aimed at ending internment. Within days, a rent and rates strike had been launched across Northern Ireland, organised primarily by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), but with the support of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) politicians and other opposition and civil rights groups.¹¹ KB2.12 Statement to this Inquiry of Kevin Boyle; Day 123/111-112 Oral evidence to this Inquiry of Kevin Boyle; G14AA.86.1.5 Extracts from steering brief for the visit of the Prime Ministers of the Irish Republic and of Northern Ireland, 24th September 1971; Professor Ian McAllister, The Northern Ireland Social Democratic and Labour Party: Political Opposition in a Divided Society (London: Macmillan, 1977), pp99–100; McKittrick and McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles, p252; Farrell, Northern Ireland: The Orange State, p283.Show full note In Londonderry this was augmented by a one-day industrial strike on 16th August 1971 that was supported by an estimated 8,000 workers.²² CAIN website, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch71. htm.

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¶8.53 In the four days after the introduction of internment, the continuing unrest led to 25 deaths and many injuries in Northern Ireland.¹¹ McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney and Thornton, Lost Lives, pp79–91. In Londonderry Hugh Herron, a Catholic, was shot by a soldier in Long Tower Street in disputed circumstances and Paul Challenor, a bombardier in the Royal Horse Artillery, was shot at the Bligh's Lane Army and police post by republican paramilitaries and died shortly afterwards.²² McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney and Thornton, Lost Lives, p86 and p88; Ó Dochartaigh, Civil Rights to Armalites, p236. Bombardier Challenor was the first person to be shot and killed by Official or Provisional IRA gunfire in Londonderry in the Troubles.³³ McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney and Thornton, Lost Lives, p88; Ó Dochartaigh, Civil Rights to Armalites, p236. Several soldiers were also injured by gunfire in the city.⁴⁴ Ó Dochartaigh, Civil Rights to Armalites, p236.

¶8.54 On 18th August 1971 the Army mounted an operation in Londonderry (code-named Operation Huntsman) to engage republican paramilitaries, arrest rioters and remove the barricades. According to the Army reports, the soldiers came under heavy fire from Thompson sub-machine guns and other weapons, to which they responded. During the exchange the Army killed an IRA gunman, Eamonn Lafferty, the adjutant of the Provisionals' Derry Brigade. The operation also involved widespread use of CS gas and rubber bullets. The Army succeeded in removing nearly all the barricades, but by the following morning most of them had been replaced.¹¹ G8B.63.5 Confirmatory notes to operational orders of Commanding Officer 2 RGJ for Operation Huntsman, 16th August 1971; G9C.66.14 2 RGJ weekly intelligence summary no. 10, 24th August 1971; G3C.48.14-15 2 RGJ Commander's Diary, August 1971; McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney and Thornton, Lost Lives, p.91.

¶8.55 During the course of Operation Huntsman, two Northern Ireland MPs, John Hume and Ivan Cooper, were arrested with others for remaining in an assembly of more than three persons after being ordered to disperse by an Army officer.¹¹ Ó Dochartaigh, Civil Rights to Armalites, pp238–239; G9C.66.14 2 RGJ weekly intelligence summary no. 10, 24th August 1971. They successfully challenged their conviction on the grounds that the regulations in question were invalid, since the Northern Ireland Parliament had no power to make laws in respect of the Armed Forces. The Westminster Parliament in February 1972 passed retrospective legislation (the Northern Ireland Act 1972) validating the regulations. Elsewhere in this report²² Chapter 195 we consider these events and the submissions arising from them in more detail.

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The period of containment

¶8.56 On 20th August 1971 the GOC, after meeting the Committee of 30, decided to adopt a policy of lowering the military profile in Londonderry in the hope that this would give moderates the chance to calm the situation.¹¹ G116.751 "Summary of Events in Londonderry on Sunday 30th January 1972 "; Carver, Out of Step: Memoirs of a Field Marshal, p410; L279.1 Extract from Eastern Daily Press, May 1998; Ó Dochartaigh, Civil Rights to Armalites, pp237–239. This involved abandoning any routine patrolling of the Bogside and the Creggan and the taking of no military initiatives, save in response to aggression or for specific search or arrest operations.²² G116.751 "Summary of Events in Londonderry on Sunday 30th January 1972 ".

¶8.57 General Tuzo took this step, which at the time he described as an experiment that might fail but was worth trying, after being persuaded to do so by moderate middle-class opinion in Londonderry.¹¹ G11.73 Agenda and Conclusions, JSC meeting, 26th August 1971. According to General Ford, General Tuzo was particularly influenced to take this course by Chief Superintendent Lagan, the senior police officer in Londonderry and its environs.²² Day 253/25; Day 253/51-52

¶8.58 The policy had the temporary effect of reducing rioting and similar disturbances in the city, but the moderates in the nationalist community who had persuaded General Tuzo to take this step, and those who worked with and supported them, were unable to deliver a suspension of the republican paramilitary campaign, and in particular the bomb attacks.¹¹ Ó Dochartaigh, Civil Rights to Armalites, pp239–240. Furthermore, it reinforced the view held by many that the Bogside and Creggan had returned to being unacceptable no-go areas ruled by the Official and Provisional IRA, which led in turn to criticism of the Army in unionist circles.²² G11.73-74 Agenda and Conclusions, JSC meeting, 26th August 1971. The Army did occasionally go into these areas, but there was no routine patrolling in the Bogside and Creggan; and in the following months any incursion started to be signalled by an efficient warning system of the banging of dustbin lids, the blowing of car horns, sirens and the like with (at night) the use of searchlights; and was met with rioting crowds as well as armed resistance.³³ G41.264 "Future Military Policy in Londonderry: An Appreciation by the CLF ", 14th December 1971.

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¶8.59 Large-scale rioting, accompanied by bombing and shooting, broke out in the city after Annette McGavigan, a 14-year-old girl, was killed by gunfire in disputed circumstances on 6th September 1971.¹¹ G13AA.82.1 Joint Intelligence Committee, Special Assessment, 16th September 1971; McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney and Thornton, Lost Lives, pp97–98; Ó Dochartaigh, Civil Rights to Armalites, p240. The incident occurred during the disturbances that accompanied the court proceedings brought against John Hume and others following their arrest during Operation Huntsman.²² Ó Dochartaigh, Civil Rights to Armalites, p240; Eamonn McCann, Maureen Shiels and Bridie Hannigan, Bloody Sunday in Derry, reprinted edition (Dingle: Brandon Book Publishers, 1992), p59. Further violent riots followed the death some days later of a 3-year-old boy who had been hit by an Armoured Personnel Carrier.³³ Ó Dochartaigh, Civil Rights to Armalites, pp240–241; G13AA.82.1.2 Joint Intelligence Committee, Special Assessment, 16th September 1971. The historian Niall Ó Dochartaigh wrote that these deaths, and the other civilian casualties in this period, meant that, despite the lower profile adopted by General Tuzo, "huge numbers of Derry Catholics, conservatives, moderates and extremists, [saw] the British army as a dangerous and malevolent force ".⁴⁴ Ó Dochartaigh, Civil Rights to Armalites, p241.

¶8.60 In Londonderry there were a number of Army casualties from republican paramilitary activities between September and November 1971. On 2nd September Major Robin Alers-Hankey was shot (and eventually died on Bloody Sunday) while deploying his troops to protect firemen who were being attacked by stone throwers as they tried to deal with a blaze at a timber yard at the junction of Abbey Street and Frederick Street in the Bogside.¹¹ G107A.652.002 NIRSEC situation report no.31, 21st January 1972; McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney and Thornton, Lost Lives, pp149–150. On 14th September Sergeant Martin Carroll was shot dead outside Bligh's Lane Army and police post.²² McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney and Thornton, Lost Lives, p99. On 27th September Private Roger Wilkins was mortally wounded by machine gun fire while on duty in the Brandywell area of the city.³³ McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney and Thornton, Lost Lives, p105. On 16th October Rifleman Joseph Hill was shot and killed as he stood in Columbcille Court in the Bogside after following up rioters.⁴⁴ McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney and Thornton, Lost Lives, p106. On 27th October Gunner Angus Stevens and Lance Bombardier David Tilbury were killed by a bomb attack on an Observation Post at the back of the police station in the Rosemount area of the city, which lay to the north of the Creggan.⁵⁵ McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney and Thornton, Lost Lives, p111. On 9th November Lance Corporal Ian Curtis was mortally wounded by gunfire near the junction of Foyle Road and Bishop Street while on patrol.⁶⁶ McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney and Thornton, Lost Lives, p117.

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¶8.61 Two civilians, both Catholics, were also killed by gunfire in Londonderry during the same period: William McGreanery on 14th September 1971, and Kathleen Thompson on 6th November. Both died in disputed circumstances, with allegations made that the Army had unjustifiably killed unarmed and uninvolved civilians.¹¹ McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney and Thornton, Lost Lives, pp98–99 and p116; McCann, Shiels and Hannigan, Bloody Sunday in Derry, pp59–60; Ó Dochartaigh, Civil Rights to Armalites, p242.

¶8.62 Throughout Northern Ireland, 108 people were killed and many seriously injured between the introduction of internment in August 1971 and the end of November 1971.¹¹ McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney and Thornton, Lost Lives, pp77–121.

¶8.63 The bombing campaign in Londonderry continued. Between July and December 1971 there were over 200 explosions and an additional 180 nail bombing incidents.¹¹ G41.263 "Future Military Policy in Londonderry: An Appreciation by the CLF ", 14th December 1971. The objective of the Provisional IRA's bombing strategy, according to the evidence of Martin McGuinness who was then a member of the Provisional IRA, was to exert pressure on and stretch the security forces in addition to the direct attacks on the Army.²² Day 390/34; Day 390/52

¶8.64 In addition, rioting by youths in the city had become almost ritualised.¹¹ AK17.7 Noel Kelly's statement to this Inquiry. There were regular riots on Saturday afternoons, the "Saturday matinées", which usually took place at the corner of Rossville Street and William Street, a junction that became known to soldiers and others as Aggro Corner.²² Day 113/123-124 Oral evidence to this Inquiry of William McCormack; Day 420/140 Oral evidence to this Inquiry of Kevin Martin; Day 425/3-4 Oral evidence to this Inquiry of Brian Power. There were also frequent riots on other days,³³ Day 113/123-124 Statement to this Inquiry of William McCormack; WT4.16 Oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry of Fr Daly; WT6.2 Oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry of Raymond Rogan. including on Sunday afternoons after the televised football match.⁴⁴ M79.2 Written statement for the Widgery Inquiry of Nigel Wade.

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¶Aggro

¶8.65 Although one witness described the rioting as "a kind of play ", which he told us the soldiers enjoyed as much as the rioters,¹¹ AH39.2 Statement to this Inquiry of Thomas Harrigan. there is little doubt that it was serious and gave rise to serious injury.²² Day 55/33 Oral evidence to this Inquiry of Fr McIvor. According to Army sources, groups of boys and young men gathered to throw stones, bottles and other objects at the soldiers standing behind barriers. The soldiers would fire rubber bullets and sometimes attempt to snatch rioters from the crowd, but with little success.³³ G116B.771.11-14 Summary of events in Londonderry on Sunday 30th January 1972; G138.920-922 "An Appreciation of the 'Londonderry Hooligan Element' " written by Colonel Jackson, Commanding Officer of 1 R ANGLIAN. On occasion paramilitaries would use these riots or their aftermath as an opportunity to snipe at soldiers (as appears to have been the case with the shooting of Rifleman Hill and Major Alers-Hankey mentioned above) or to throw nail or petrol bombs.⁴⁴ AH67.2 Statement to this Inquiry of Hugh Hegarty; AD26.10 Statement to this Inquiry of Donal Deeney; AC157.7 Statement to this Inquiry of Michael Clarke; WT4.17-19 Oral evidence of Fr Daly to the Widgery Inquiry; G138.920-922; "An Appreciation of the 'Londonderry Hooligan Element'" written by Colonel Jackson, Commanding Officer of 1 R ANGLIAN. We have little doubt that had the crowd isolated a soldier, it is likely that he would have been killed.⁵⁵ Day 68/27 Oral evidence to this Inquiry of Hugh Hegarty. In short, the rioting often carried with it the risk to soldiers of serious injury or even death.

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The treatment of internees

¶8.66 Very shortly after the introduction of internment, public complaints were made about the treatment of internees. In response, on 31st August 1971 the Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling, appointed a committee of inquiry under the chairmanship of Sir Edmund Compton. The committee initially looked into allegations made by 40 people arrested on 9th August. Only one of the complainants appeared before the committee, most others adopting the stance taken by NICRA that the inquiry was unacceptable because of its constitution and the decision to hold its proceedings in private. The Compton report, presented to Parliament in November 1971, cleared the security forces of any acts of "physical brutality", but concluded that in respect of 11 individuals there had been "physical ill-treatment" during interrogation in depth in the form of what became known as the "five techniques". These were: making the internee stand against a wall for long periods; hooding the internee; subjecting the internee to continuous noise; depriving the internee of sleep; and depriving the internee of food other than a bread and water diet. In six other cases not involving these techniques, the report found that complainants had suffered "a measure of ill-treatment". Other individuals also suffered some form of hardship or ill-treatment, although in most of these cases the committee felt that this was unintended.¹¹ Compton Committee, Report of the enquiry into allegations against the Security Forces of physical brutality in Northern Ireland arising out of the events on the 9th August, 1971 (London: HMSO, 1971 Cmnd 4823).

¶8.67 On 16th November 1971 Reginald Maudling announced that another committee would consider whether to amend "the procedures currently authorised for the interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism and for their custody while subject to interrogation ". The three-man committee, which was chaired by Lord Parker of Waddington, presented their findings on 31st January 1972, the day after Bloody Sunday. The majority view, expressed in the report of the chairman and John Boyd-Carpenter, was that there was no reason to rule out the five techniques on moral grounds and that it was "possible to operate them in a manner consistent with the highest standards of our society " provided that certain safeguards were observed. However, in his minority report Lord Gardiner said that he did not believe that such measures were morally justifiable even in emergency or war conditions. After the reports were published on 2nd March 1972, the Prime Minister announced that the five techniques would not be used in future as an aid to investigation.¹¹ Parker Committee, Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors appointed to consider authorised procedures for the interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism (London: HMSO, 1972 Cmnd 4901).

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¶8.68 The treatment of internees was also the subject of a case brought against the United Kingdom Government by the Government of the Republic of Ireland at the European Court of Human Rights. The European Commission of Human Rights unanimously held that the combined use of the five techniques constituted inhuman and degrading treatment and torture. However, the Court ultimately found that they amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment but not torture.¹¹ Ireland v United Kingdom [1978] 2 EHRR 25. On 8th February 1977 the United Kingdom Government undertook to the Court that the five techniques would not in any circumstances be reintroduced as an aid to interrogation.²² Ireland v United Kingdom [1978] 2 EHRR 25, para 102.

¶8.69 It was submitted by the representatives of many of the families that the five techniques were, on the United Kingdom Government's own admission, authorised at "high level ",¹¹ FS1.518 and that they demonstrated that the Government had sacrificed its adherence to the rule of law in "what was, essentially, a war situation ".²² FS1.494-506

¶8.70 Whatever validity (if any) this submission may have with regard to the treatment of internees suspected of terrorist activities (a matter which falls outside the scope of this report), we are not persuaded that the findings of the European Court of Human Rights, or the undertaking of the United Kingdom Government, showed that the United Kingdom Government had departed from the rule of law in its treatment of the nationalist population generally. What is important, however, in the present context, is that the allegations about the treatment of internees further exacerbated the feelings of enmity among many nationalists towards the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland Governments and the security forces.

The tripartite talks

¶8.71 Although the United Kingdom Government had made contingency plans to introduce direct rule from Westminster for Northern Ireland,¹¹ G3BB.48.13.5 Minutes of the Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Northern Ireland, 27th July 1971. it continued throughout the period under consideration to seek to avoid this eventuality if possible.²² See, for example, Sir Philip Allen's summary of the position at G32B.233.17 in his note on "Possible course of action ", 23rd November 1971, which is discussed below. This desire contributed to attempts by the United Kingdom Government to break the political impasse in Northern Ireland in autumn 1971. The primary initiative was to encourage talks among all the parties, including those who had withdrawn from Stormont, under the auspices of the

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¶Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling. The intention was to reach an agreement whereby the minority community would return to Stormont and adopt a significant role in the administration of Northern Ireland.

¶8.72 There were three overlapping difficulties that the United Kingdom Government faced. First was the security situation. Throughout the autumn, the Northern Ireland Government pushed for tougher measures and greater resources, as well as the maintenance of internment.¹¹ G12C.78 Record of a meeting held in the Cabinet Office, Whitehall on 15th September 1971; G12A 78.1, G12B.78.2 Exchange of letters between Brian Faulkner and General Tuzo, 13th and 15th September 1971; G17.120 Record of a discussion with the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland held at 10 Downing Street on 7th October 1971. This led to the second difficulty: the continued absence of the SDLP not only from Stormont, but also from any political talks with the two governments regarding the future of Northern Ireland while internment lasted. Initially, the parties had withdrawn over the deaths of Seamus Cusack and Desmond Beattie, but they subsequently demanded the abolition of internment as a precondition for their return.²² G13B.82.6 Confidential annex to Cabinet minutes, 21st September 1971; McKittrick and McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles, p74; Routledge, John Hume, pp105–106. Neither the United Kingdom nor the Northern Ireland Governments were prepared to accept this, and instead concentrated on trying to entice the SDLP back through reforms of the existing political structures. This developed into a third difficulty. The initiatives put forward by the Northern Ireland Government built on the new committee proposals of the previous June, which had been cautiously welcomed by the SDLP, and Brian Faulkner continued to envisage that the SDLP and others would act as a parliamentary opposition, albeit with greater powers of scrutiny.³³ G8A.63.4 Confidential annex to Cabinet minutes, 16th August 1971; G9A.66.6-7 Note of a meeting held at Chequers, 19th August 1971; G9B.66.11 Northern Ireland Cabinet minutes. However, attitudes had hardened over the summer, and it quickly became apparent that the nationalist parties would not be satisfied with measures that did not allow them a guaranteed role in the executive, and not just the legislative, branch of government, something that was unacceptable (at this stage) to Brian Faulkner.⁴⁴ G10A.70.2 Joint Intelligence Special Assessment, 26th August 1971. The United Kingdom Government had supported the Northern Ireland Government's stance in mid-August,⁵⁵ G9A.66.6-7 Note of a meeting held at Chequers, 19th August 1971; G9B.66.11 Northern Ireland Cabinet minutes, 20th August 1971. but subsequently began to express its desire for talks on ways of establishing "an active, permanent and guaranteed role in the life and public affairs of the Province " for the minority community.⁶⁶ G13B.82.6 Confidential annex to Cabinet minutes, 21st September 1971; G22C.163.7 Minutes of GEN 47, 29th October 1971; G28A.220.3-4 Minutes of GEN 47, 12th November 1971.

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¶8.73 The United Kingdom Government also sought to engage with the Government of the Irish Republic in order to make further efforts to end the conflict in Northern Ireland. Initially, Edward Heath attempted to persuade Jack Lynch, the then Taoiseach of the Republic of Ireland, that his government should encourage the nationalist parties to enter the Home Secretary's talks. To this end, he invited both Jack Lynch and Brian Faulkner to Chequers, his official residence, at the end of September. This too proved problematic. Edward Heath and Jack Lynch had publicly exchanged acrimonious telegrams the previous month following the introduction of internment. This incident heightened the suspicions of hard-line unionists¹¹ G12AA.78.1.1-2 Text of a telephone conversation between Mr Faulkner and the [United Kingdom] Prime Minister, 10th September 1971. and Brian Faulkner himself expressed his reservations about meeting the Taoiseach at this time.²² G9A.66.5-6 Note of a meeting held at Chequers, 19th August 1971; G12AA.78.1.1-2 Text of a telephone conversation between Mr Faulkner and the [United Kingdom] Prime Minister, 10th September 1971.

¶8.74 The tripartite talks took place between 26th and 28th September 1971.¹¹ G14AC.86.1.14 United Kingdom note on the visit of the Prime Ministers of the Irish Republic and of Northern Ireland; G14AC.86.1.48 Communiqué. The talks were wide-ranging, but were predicated on an understanding that there would be no substantive negotiations on the constitutional question.²² G14AAA.86.1.1.1 Memorandum from Sir Burke Trend to the Prime Minister, September 1971; G12AC.78.1.16 Note of a telephone conversation between the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, 11th September 1971. On this, the Taoiseach continued to call for reunification, while the United Kingdom Prime Minister restated his government's adherence to the Ireland Act 1949, which guaranteed that the union with Britain would not be removed without the consent of the Stormont Parliament.³³ G14AC.86.1.26 Record of a discussion between the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, 27th September 1971; G14AC.86.1.22 Record of a discussion between the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, 27th September 1971.

¶8.75 During the talks, Brian Faulkner urged the Government of the Irish Republic to take firmer measures and increase co-operation on security, arguing that the first priority in Northern Ireland was to restore law and order.¹¹ G14AC.86.1.27 Jack Lynch expressed his opinion that internment had been a major error, and stated that it would not be introduced in the Republic, where the conditions for derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights were not met.²² G14AC.86.1.26-28 He considered that the security situation could only be improved by a political solution that allowed the minority community to participate in government, something that had not been envisaged by Brian Faulkner's reforms.³³ G14AC.86.1.26-28; G14AC.86.1.31 Brian Faulkner's position was that there was no possibility of the majority (Unionist) party forming a government with members of the SDLP "because they differed so fundamentally from members of the existing Government on the constitutional position ".⁴⁴ G14AC.86.1.32

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¶8.76 Unsurprisingly, little was agreed between the governments and a somewhat bland communiqué was issued, condemning the use of violence as an instrument of political pressure.¹¹ G14AC.86.1.48 Although the fact that the tripartite talks took place at all was significant, and to some extent an achievement in itself, the event did not lead directly to any political progress in the ensuing months, nor did it reduce the risk of having to introduce direct rule.

General Carver's military appreciation of the security situation

¶8.77 On 7th October 1971 there was a further meeting between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland Prime Ministers. In advance of this meeting Edward Heath requested, and obtained, a full military appreciation of the security situation in Northern Ireland, including an assessment of "what measures the Army would propose, if they were instructed that the primary objective was to bring terrorism in Northern Ireland to an end at the earliest possible moment, without regard to the inconveniences caused to the civilian population, and what forces they would require to carry these measures out ".¹¹ G14AAA.86.9

¶8.78 General Carver, the CGS, provided the assessment, emphasising in his covering memorandum of 4th October 1971 that, in his view, the problem was essentially a politico-military one and that the factors could not be disentangled.¹¹ G14B.86.8 He wrote:²² G14B.86.8

"The history of all previous campaigns against terrorists – and few of them have been wholly successful – proves that a purely military solution is most unlikely to succeed, and that whether it is achieved by military or political means or both, the isolation of the terrorist from the population is a sine qua non of success. "

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¶8.79 The assessment itself painted a picture of a deteriorating security situation, with both the Provisional IRA and the Official IRA supporting a terrorist campaign designed to provoke Protestant anger, to force direct rule and then to influence public opinion in the United Kingdom to abandon the struggle to maintain partition.¹¹ G14B.86.9-15

¶8.80 So far as Londonderry was concerned, the assessment made reference to the Creggan and the Bogside as virtually no-go areas where about 200 extremists and a number of "'hard core' " hooligans operated "unchecked ", and to the clear failure of moderate Catholic opinion in the form of the Committee of 30 to improve matters.¹¹ G14B.86.9.12 General Carver accepted the desirability of reasserting the full range of military and police activity throughout the city, but advised that this would require a strong military presence (possibly as many as five battalions) on the ground for several months. He noted that the timing, political implications and likely reaction to such an operation would have to be carefully judged.²² G14B.86.9.12 He set out the three courses he considered open:³³ G14B.86.9.13

"Course 1. Continuing as we are, controlling the rest of Derry and raiding the [Creggan and Bogside] area for gunmen as our intelligence allows us. We would hope, though without great confidence, that progress in the political field would produce a gradual return to normality.

Course 2. Show our ability to go into the area when we want by establishing regular patrol patterns. This will achieve little except to please the Protestants.

It is a practical course but it will not achieve the removal of the obstructions and certainly will not re-establish law and order throughout the areas. But it could be done with our present force levels.

Course 3. To occupy and dominate the areas, take down the barricades, and, we hope, eventually persuade the RUC to play their full part. This is a practical military operation although it will involve some casualties and, most important, stir up Catholic opposition as much as it will satisfy the Protestants. It is difficult to estimate how great the political reaction would be. This must be a political and not a military decision. However, there is one significant military factor. We could only occupy and dominate these areas by an increase in our force levels by three battalions. "

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¶8.81 The following map shows the two areas of the Creggan and the Bogside.

¶BOGSIDE

¶CREGGAN

¶8.82 So far as Northern Ireland as a whole was concerned, General Carver suggested three general options. The first was to maintain low-intensity operations in the hope of assisting political progress, but at the risk of increasing Protestant reaction, which might lead to the formation of a "third force " of Protestant paramilitaries, the weakening of Brian Faulkner's position and the bringing nearer of direct rule. The second was to abandon all hope of political progress with the minority by adopting a "'tough policy' " which might have short-term benefits and strengthen Brian Faulkner's position, but would be unlikely to eliminate terrorism in the long term and could become a pyrrhic victory within Ireland, within Great Britain and internationally. The third was to continue with the present policy, though removing the restraints on operations motivated by a desire not to disturb current political initiatives, thus allowing intensification of border operations (including the humping and cratering of roads to hamper the surreptitious movement of paramilitaries and their equipment between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland), and "an operation in Londonderry ". General Carver concluded by stating that the third of these options seemed to represent, for the time being, the best reconciliation of all the factors that had to be taken into account.¹¹ G14B.86.15

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¶8.83 General Carver's reference to the possible formation of a "'third force' " reflected the concerns of United Kingdom officials that the actions (or inactions) of the security forces in Northern Ireland might increase resentment in the Protestant community to such an extent that locally raised bodies would be established as defenders of law and order. The local nature of any such force was central to its appeal, as many unionists continued to lament the replacement of the B Specials, who were responsible to Stormont, by the UDR, which came under the control of the Army and the MoD in London and was at this time perceived by many in the unionist community to be less effective at countering the threat posed by republican paramilitaries.¹¹ G16.104 United Kingdom Government brief for the Prime Minister for the meeting with the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, 7th October 1971.

¶8.84 These frustrations were evident in the weeks before General Carver presented his paper. On 6th September 1971 Dr Ian Paisley addressed a mass rally in Victoria Park, Belfast, where he reportedly appealed for the "loyal people of the province " to organise a non-military and non-paramilitary "civil defence corps ", that would, "when the crunch came … offer themselves to a government that would 'chase out the rebels'".¹¹ OS1.473 According to the same report in the Irish Times newspaper, another speaker, the hard-line Ulster Unionist MP and former Cabinet minister William Craig, called for the reorganisation of the RUC and the return, in modernised form, of the B Specials.²² OS1.473 A week later John Taylor, the Minister of State for Home Affairs, publicly spoke of his support for a "third force ".³³ OS1.418 He told this Inquiry that what he meant by this was a legally constituted body under the command of the Northern Ireland Government, which would only be required if the Government would otherwise have insufficient resources to fulfil its obligation to provide law and order in Northern Ireland.⁴⁴ Day 196/47-50; Day 196/159-161

¶8.85 The Irish Times of 15th September 1971 reported that following John Taylor's remarks, the Northern Ireland Government issued a statement setting out its policy, with which John Taylor was said to be "fully in support ". According to the report, the statement set out the position of the United Kingdom Government – that there could be "no question of raising any additional armed force for the security of Northern Ireland except with their agreement and consent " – and noted that the Northern Ireland Government accepted this position "on the understanding that the security needs of Northern Ireland would be fully met ". The statement reportedly warned that "Any encouragement to form a force of any sort other than one lawfully constituted would do the greatest possible damage to the vital interests of Northern Ireland ".¹¹ OS 1.421 John Taylor told us that he thought that the Irish Times report was exaggerated in its account of his discussions with Brian Faulkner on this issue.²² Day 196/159-160

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¶8.86 None of the proposals of Dr Ian Paisley, William Craig or John Taylor resulted in the establishment of any significant unauthorised body, though in themselves they hardly contributed to the easing of tensions in Northern Ireland.

¶8.87 September 1971 is generally considered to be the month in which the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) emerged from an amalgamation of numerous loyalist vigilante groups in Belfast.¹¹ Elliott and Flackes, Political Directory, pp474–481; Hennessey, History of Northern Ireland, pp201–205; Bew and Gillespie, Chronology of the Troubles, pp39–40. Although the organisation was not proscribed until 1992,²² Elliott and Flackes, Political Directory, p474. elements within it rapidly acquired a reputation for paramilitary activity and acts of sectarian violence.

¶8.88 It appears from the documentary evidence that the GOC, General Tuzo, was at the beginning of October 1971 proposing an operation in Londonderry in two weeks time for which he wanted three extra battalions.¹¹ G14C.86.18-19 Memorandum from AUS (GS) (Arthur Hockaday), "Meeting with Northern Ireland Prime Minister ". This operation did not take place at this time, though, as we discuss below, military operations in Londonderry were increased in early December.

The meeting between the British and Northern Irish Prime Ministers on 7th October 1971

¶8.89 On 6th October, the day before the meeting with Brian Faulkner, the GEN 47 Committee considered the approach to be adopted at this meeting. Edward Heath is recorded as saying that a concerted Northern Ireland policy was now needed, with its objects clearly defined in an order of priority, based on the best reconciliation that could be made of conflicting considerations. He expressed the view that Brian Faulkner probably represented the last prospect of maintaining an independent government at Stormont, and that if he fell, direct rule would be a virtual certainty, in the worst case the transfer to direct rule taking place in a situation where the machinery of administration in Northern Ireland had virtually collapsed. As appears from a briefing note prepared for the Prime Minister by Sir Burke Trend, the Cabinet Secretary, there was an increasing concern in London that direct rule might be accompanied by a "withdrawal of labour from all forms of public service ", including the police and civil service.¹¹ G14D.86.23 At the GEN 47 meeting Edward Heath was recorded as saying that "Taking full account of the political dangers of further alienating the minority population in Northern Ireland, and of the risks of strain on our relations with Dublin, he believed that the first priority should be the defeat of the gunmen using military means and that in achieving this we should have to accept whatever political penalties were inevitable ".²² G15.88

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¶8.90 In general discussion those at the meeting recognised that in order to maintain the status quo constitutionally, it was probable that the terrorist problem should be overcome as the first priority, though if the object were to preserve the option of creating a united Ireland sometime in the future, it might be better to seek first for a political solution in which the minority were persuaded to participate in government in Northern Ireland. The meeting considered that if Brian Faulkner could be persuaded to broaden his government to include "non-militant " republicans, the support for the terrorist campaign might be undermined by political action, rendering more severe military measures unnecessary, but that there were few signs of an early political solution.¹¹ G15.88

¶8.91 The minutes of this meeting also reveal that the GEN 47 Committee was agreed that three additional Army battalions should be sent to Northern Ireland¹¹ G15.90 but recognised that major new military initiatives in the Catholic areas of Belfast and Londonderry would alienate Catholics even further without necessarily defeating the IRA campaign.²² G15.88-89 The meeting also recognised that despite the difficulty of reaching a political or military solution, the continuation of the present trends might well lead to a situation in which direct rule would prove to be inevitable.³³ G15.89

¶8.92 The perceived need to keep Brian Faulkner in power as the last chance to avoid direct rule seems to us to have caused a shift in priorities towards a greater effort to defeat the terrorists, evident from the record of this meeting. However, either before or during the meeting, at which both General Carver and General Tuzo were present, it seems that the three battalion operation in Londonderry that the latter had proposed earlier in the month was put off. Instead it was decided in principle that two of the additional three battalions would be sent to Belfast and the other one to the border area, although the GOC was left with discretion with regard to their deployment. 1 G15.89

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¶8.93 At the meeting on the following day, 7th October 1971, Brian Faulkner expressed the view that a solution of the security problem was the key to progress elsewhere and that without an immediate breakthrough in dealing with the terrorists, the administration of government would shortly become impossible.¹¹ G17.120 What was needed, he said, was "an increase in the Army presence, an enlargement of the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), an offensive by the troops against the terrorists in Belfast and Londonderry, and firmer action on the border ".²² G17.120

¶8.94 Edward Heath told Brian Faulkner that it would only be possible to retain British public support for the security operations if there was movement towards a political settlement. It was thus essential, he said, "that any immediate increase in the military effort should be accompanied by parallel political moves ".¹¹ G17.121

¶8.95 Brian Faulkner stated that his government had made concessions to the minority, and pointed to further proposed changes contained in a draft Green Paper that he hoped to publish following approval by his Cabinet.¹¹ G17.121 This draft Green Paper concentrated on reforms to the size and composition of the Northern Ireland Parliament.²² Brian Faulkner complained that the publication of the Green Paper had been delayed by the United Kingdom Government's desire to see it emerge from the proposed multi-party talks that the Home Secretary hoped to establish: G17.121-123. At the meeting, it was agreed that the Northern Ireland Government could go ahead with publication: G17.123; G18A.136.3. However, Reginald Maudling (the United Kingdom Home Secretary) pointed out that many responsible members of the minority would tend largely to dismiss proposals not accompanied by some indication of the willingness of the Northern Ireland Government to move on the central issue of broadening the basis of the government to include minority representatives.³³ G17.121 Brian Faulkner responded by reiterating the position that he had adopted at the tripartite meeting, that he could not contemplate leading or serving in a government of Northern Ireland which included republicans, whether or not (like the SDLP) they eschewed the use of violence in bringing about a unified Ireland.⁴⁴ G17.122; G15A.91.3 He dismissed this notion and the possibility of composing an administration on proportional principles as "unworkable". However, he expressed his hope that discussion of the proposed Green Paper would provide an opportunity to air a proposal for a council comprising representatives of minority community interest groups, such as trade unionists and professional and business organisations. The chairman of such a council might be given a seat in the Cabinet, thereby providing what Brian Faulkner termed a "permanent and guaranteed share in Government".⁵⁵ G17.122

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¶8.96 Edward Heath said that this idea had value, but noted that Brian Faulkner was unwilling to meet the emergency by seeking to form a government that was neutral on the matter of reunification, and repeated that the United Kingdom Government regarded it as essential that tougher security measures should be accompanied by real evidence of determination to proceed with political advance.¹¹ G17.122-123

¶8.97 Later in the meeting Edward Heath stated that it would be necessary to develop further political initiatives in order to sustain the support of British public opinion. To this end, it was agreed that representatives of the two governments would meet at regular intervals – every month at ministerial level, and fortnightly at official level.¹¹ G17.130

¶8.98 The United Kingdom Government was clearly disappointed at the lack of progress on the political front, but nevertheless did agree to the provision of additional security resources, including the despatch of the three additional battalions discussed at the GEN 47 meeting on the previous day. In line with that discussion, the priorities for these troops were decided as: first, an increased effort against terrorists in Belfast; second, the better control of the border; and third, a reassertion of control of all parts of Londonderry. However, the precise method of use of the forces was left to the GOC.¹¹ G17.126

¶8.99 In the event, one additional battalion was sent to Londonderry in December 1971, thereby increasing the force level of 8th Infantry Brigade.¹¹ G41.264 "Future Military Policy in Londonderry: An Appreciation by the CLF ", 14th December 1971.

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Major General Ford's Directive

¶8.100 On 26th October 1971 the CLF, General Ford, issued to all the Brigade Commanders a Directive concerning the future of internal security operations in Northern Ireland.¹¹ G23.165-168

¶8.101 This Directive was influenced by the line taken at the GEN 47 meeting on 6th October and marked the beginning of the end of the policy of low-key containment in Londonderry instituted by General Tuzo in August. In later years General Tuzo described this low-key policy as "the major mistake for me", since in his view the gesture proved "quite futile" and allowed the situation to go from bad to worse.¹¹ L279.1 Extract from Eastern Daily Press, May 1998; Day 253/26-27 Oral evidence to this Inquiry of General Ford. According to General Ford, the fact that it was Chief Superintendent Lagan who was principally responsible for persuading General Tuzo to adopt this policy led the latter to form a low opinion of this police officer and never to trust him again.²² Day 253/51-52 General Ford also said that he himself had never been in favour of the policy.³³ Day 253/23-26

¶8.102 The Directive described the mission to be to restore and maintain law and order throughout each brigade's area, acting in aid of the civil power in conjunction with the RUC. The first priority was stated to be the defeat of the IRA's campaign of violence, and the second to overcome threats to law and order from all other directions, including in particular inter-sectarian violence.¹¹ G23.165-166 The Directive continued:²² G23.166

"However much the first priority task brings us into conflict with one section of the community, we must retain our sectarian impartiality. Furthermore, we must avoid unnecessary alienation of Roman Catholic opinion because the rejection by the Catholics of IRA violence is an essential ingredient of our ultimate success. "

¶8.103 So far as 8th Infantry Brigade (the unit covering the Londonderry area) was concerned, the Directive set out certain additional tasks, including the following instruction:¹¹ G23.166

"Progressively impose the rule of law on the Creggan and Bogside. Hooligan fringe activity is to be vigorously countered: arrest operations are to continue to be mounted: and normal patrols through IRA dominated areas are to be restarted when considered practicable.

Be prepared to occupy and dominate the Creggan and Bogside, when sufficient forces are provided. "

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¶8.104 In a general conclusion, General Ford stated that:¹¹ G23.167

"We should not hesitate to fire whenever events demand it and the law permits. Nevertheless, we must not permit standards of conduct to deteriorate, whatever the provocation. We must ensure that fire discipline is good and discipline generally is of the highest order – particularly now that the rules of engagement themselves are less restrictive – and we must never give an impression of being a repressive Army at war with a large section of the population. "

¶8.105 When giving oral evidence to this Inquiry, General Ford told us that he was unable to remember why he thought it necessary or desirable to say that they should not hesitate to fire whenever events demanded it and the law permitted.¹¹ Day 253/36 It may be, as he told the journalist Desmond Hamill in an interview in 1984, that he considered that the soldiers on the ground were often operating below the level that the law permitted because any perceived over-reaction was immediately seized on by the media.²² B1208.003.012; Day 258/34

The Northern Ireland Government's Green Paper

¶8.106 On 26th October 1971 the Northern Ireland Government's Green Paper on parliamentary reform was published and Basil McIvor, described by Brian Faulkner as a liberal unionist, was appointed as Minister of Community Relations.¹¹ OS4.93 Letter from Brian Faulkner to Edward Heath, 1st November 1971. On the following day Dr Gerard Newe, a respected Catholic community worker who was not attached to any political party, was appointed a Minister of State in the Department of the Prime Minister.²² Bew and Gillespie, Chronology of the Troubles, p40. Brian Faulkner told Edward Heath that he saw Dr Newe's role "primarily as representing the minority viewpoint at the Cabinet table ".³³ OS4.93 Letter from Brian Faulkner to Edward Heath, 1st November 1971.

¶8.107 Dr Newe was the first Catholic to serve as a minister in the Stormont Government,¹¹ McKittrick and McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles, p74; Hennessey, History of Northern Ireland, p187. and he hailed his appointment as evidence that the advocacy of a united Ireland by peaceful means was not inconsistent with holding office in the Stormont Cabinet.²² G28A.220.3 GEN 47 minutes, 11th November 1971. However, it was also significant for what it did not represent. Brian Faulkner had made a personal appointment of a non-party political figure at a time when there was increasing pressure for the abolition of existing structures and the establishment of a system that would allow the representatives of the minority community an active, permanent and guaranteed place in the government of the Province.³³ G28A.220.3 GEN 47 minutes, 11th November 1971; G17.120-121 Record of a discussion with the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, 10 Downing Street, 7th October 1971; Faulkner, Memoirs, pp130–131. The Green Paper reforms, which only concerned the legislature and not the executive, did nothing to alter this, and the SDLP and other major nationalist parties remained outside government, and (through their own choice) absent from any all-party forums and initiatives.

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¶8.108 The reaction of the United Kingdom Home Secretary at the GEN 47 meeting on 29th October was mixed. Reginald Maudling thought that even though the Green Paper and appointment of Dr Newe would have "brought better results if they had taken place some weeks ago ", they had "not been without effect ". However, he warned that the initiatives did not address "the main stumbling block " to political progress. "Reform of Northern Ireland institutions, to be effective, had to be centred on the structure of central Government; Parliamentary reforms would not be enough. "¹¹ G22C.163.7 The minutes also reveal that steps were continuing to be taken to prepare for the possibility of direct rule.²² G22C.163.8

¶8.109 At this meeting, the Prime Minister announced that GEN 47 would meet more frequently: at least once, and possibly twice, a week.¹¹ G22C.163.6 By this stage the meetings of the GEN 47 Committee had already started to become more frequent. Between April and September there had been four meetings. Between October 1971 and January 1972 there were to be 19.²² OS4.197-204 List of GEN 47 meetings, compiled by the representatives of the Wray family.

Brigadier MacLellan's Directive

¶8.110 Following General Ford's Directive of 26th October 1971, Brigadier MacLellan, who, as we have already noted, succeeded Brigadier Cowan as 8th Infantry Brigade Commander on 27th October,¹¹ B1229 Statement to the Widgery Inquiry of Brigadier MacLellan. issued OP Directive 4/71.²² G27.196-218 This document, dated 10th November, set out the mission, means and methods that 8th Infantry Brigade would implement to bring into effect the CLF's Directive.³³ G23.165-168 Although the document was distributed under the Brigadier's name, the first draft was compiled by the Brigade Major, Colonel Michael Steele.⁴⁴ B1315.1 Statement to this Inquiry of Colonel Steele. The following paragraphs summarise this Directive.

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¶8.111 Brigadier MacLellan began by reflecting back on the "cautious optimism " about the security situation in Londonderry contained in the previous 8th Infantry Brigade Directive, signed on 2nd July 1971 by Brigadier Cowan. At that time, there had been no shooting attacks against the security forces, it was felt that the hooligan element had been separated from the majority of the community, and the IRA were described as "quiescent ". Progress had been made towards stability and normality and "there were signs that the policy of restraint, which the Security Forces had been following since June 1970, was at last beginning to succeed ".¹¹ G27.196

¶8.112 Brigadier MacLellan wrote that within two days of the July Directive the situation had changed dramatically. He attributed this to the beginning of what he described as an IRA campaign aimed at disrupting the city and thereby forcing the cancellation of the Apprentice Boys' Parade. According to Brigadier MacLellan, this culminated in the shooting of Seamus Cusack and Desmond Beattie, described in the paper as rioters who were shot in the "first ever return of fire in Londonderry". Brigadier MacLellan wrote that this "instantly turned the Catholic community from benevolent support to complete alienation". The subsequent introduction of internment led to "a situation in which the Security Forces were faced by an entirely hostile Catholic community". In response, on 20th August 1971, it was decided to lower the military profile in the city, in the hope that moderate opinion would win the day. This, Brigadier MacLellan commented, had "proved to be a pious hope". At the time of writing, "neither the RUC nor the military have control of the Bogside and Creggan areas, and law and order is not being effectively maintained". No routine military patrols took place in those areas, and "the mob rule of the gun prevails".¹¹ G27.196-197

¶8.113 After this overview of the security situation, Brigadier MacLellan briefly noted the general political trends in the Province before turning to an assessment of the Official and Provisional IRA. He reported that there was no evidence of liaison between the Officials (described in the paper as the "Goulding Group ") and the Provisionals (the "Brady Group "), and that there were reports that the latter would attack the former when the time was ripe. The Provisionals were claiming responsibility for the wave of violence in the city, as part of their policy of "making Ulster ungovernable ". There were reports of an influx of "a good number " of recruits, and "no shortage of arms, ammunition or explosives ". However, it had also been suggested that the "present rate of attrition by the Security Forces " was beginning to weaken morale, with some Provisional IRA members believing that their relations with the Catholic community were beginning to deteriorate. The

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¶Officials in Londonderry continued to concentrate on political activities "with the emphasis on the continuation and proliferation of the civil resistance campaign ". Although the success of this campaign had heartened the group, there were concerns both about the shortage of arms, ammunition and explosives, and the defection of the younger and more militant members to the Provisionals. Brigadier MacLellan noted the possibility that a more militant line might be adopted by the Officials to halt this flow, and added that it was also the case that the group would take up arms in defence of their own "'liberated' " areas in the event of an "'invasion' " by the security forces.¹¹ G27.198

¶8.114 Brigadier MacLellan concluded his report on these groups by noting that while "We must assume that the present level of IRA activity will continue for some time " there was reason to believe that the security forces could continue to weaken the morale and operational ability of the paramilitaries. This, combined with the continued alienation of those in the Catholic community who were "fed up with the disruption of their lives, with the disorder, and with the gunmen in their midst ", indicated that "if the Security Forces can continue to operate at a high level of intensity, and can re-establish control and stability the IRA will be defeated ".¹¹ G27.199

¶8.115 In terms of Protestant organisations, Brigadier MacLellan wrote that, unlike Belfast, there were no vigilante patrols in the Protestant areas of the city, although a report had been received predicting that 600 people might be available for such groups if a call were made (there being no evidence that it would be). He praised the Orange Order and the Apprentice Boys for their general attitude of patience, restraint and responsibility to the then security situation, adding that there had been no attempt to increase tension by defying the ban on marches.¹¹ G27.199

¶8.116 Turning to his own forces and their role and methods, Brigadier MacLellan defined the mission of 8th Infantry Brigade as being "to restore and maintain law and order throughout the Brigade area, acting in aid of the civil power in conjunction with the RUC ". In accordance with General Ford's Directive, he highlighted and expanded upon the three "simultaneous and inter-related fronts " – intelligence, operational and public relations – on which the battle against the IRA was conducted.¹¹ G27.200 Of particular relevance to this Inquiry were his comments on the second and third of these matters.

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¶8.117 Under the heading of "The Operational Front ", Brigadier MacLellan wrote that: "Our reaction to any incident of rioting or terrorism must be positive, quick, and effective ". In response to gunmen, Brigade soldiers "should not hesitate to return fire whenever events demand it and the law permits ", and such actions should be followed up by arrests and recovery of bodies and weapons when possible. Hooliganism presented a different set of problems, as the perpetrators were "particularly youthful, agile, cunning, and fleet of foot, and any arrest manoeuvre which smacks of ponderousness will not catch them ". Instead, hooligans should be "dispersed by the minimum use of force, and arrested by the use of imaginative tactics ". Brigadier MacLellan concluded this section by telling commanders to ensure that the personal standards of conduct of their soldiers did not deteriorate, stressing that "the soldier must be, and must be seen to be, impartial, humane and courteous ".¹¹ G27.201

¶8.118 On the public information front, Brigadier MacLellan wrote the following:¹¹ G27.202

"In the present situation there must, at times, inevitably be a tendency for our soldiers to become frustrated and angry, and even to regard the entire community of the Bogside and Creggan as supporters, if not actual members, of the IRA. Of course this is not true; it does not automatically follow that because most of them are against the Stormont Government that they actively support the IRA.

Nevertheless, in their desire to see the fall of the Stormont Government they share, to some extent, a common aim with the gunmen and are thus very susceptible to anti- Security Forces propaganda. Our successes against the IRA cannot therefore be seen in isolation and must be balanced against our success in convincing moderate opinion that the defeat of the IRA is in the best interests of the community as a whole.

Our enemies [sic] propaganda machine is both efficient and unscrup[u]lous and is quick to exploit any weakness in our position. It is therefore imperative that we act honourably and, in our relentless pursuit of the IRA, do everything we can to avoid alienating the decent people who are at present being cowed and intimidated by the gunmen and thugs.

We shall defeat the IRA, but if we do not also win the battle on the Public Information Front we shall have gained a Pyrrhic victory. It is vital therefore that not only should the behaviour of troops be impeccable, but also that commanders should exploit every opportunity to gain favourable publicity for our activities. "

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¶8.119 The rest of the Directive set out the concept of different types of operation, the tasks of the specific regiment or battalion areas that comprised the Brigade, and the composition of security committees.¹¹ G27.203-218 In relation to arrest operations, Brigadier MacLellan set out that they were to be continued "at the highest possible intensity ", with the aim of conducting "a never-ending series of small arrest operations and to harass the IRA to such an extent that they do not know where to turn to next for a safe bed for the night ". On patrolling in the Bogside and Creggan, he wrote that 8th Infantry Brigade intended to start such patrols "in strength as soon as the Brigade force levels allow ", which was then predicted to be on 2nd December 1971. These patrols, which would inevitably provoke a hostile response, would be co-ordinated by Brigade HQ, and were intended to re-establish law and order in the Bogside and Creggan. Until then, commanders in the city and Creggan areas were "to carry out limited patrolling in their areas whenever they can do so from within their own resources ".²² G27.202-203

¶8.120 An annex to the Directive set out the regulations to be deployed in using internal security (IS) weapons. The general overarching principle was that the "most appropriate weapon is to be used to ensure that the force used is the minimum necessary to achieve the objective of keeping the peace ". Live-round fire was to be governed by the latest version of the Yellow Card, the purpose and wording of which we consider below. CS Bursting Grenades could be used before small arms if the commander felt that he must open fire to deal with an incident; again the rules laid down in the Yellow Card would have to be observed. CS gas could be employed only if, short of opening fire, there was no other way of dealing with a number of listed situations in which people or property were at risk of being attacked, or (again as a last resort) in dispersing an illegal meeting or demonstration. Water cannons could be used on the orders of a local commander who deemed it necessary in order to achieve control of a crowd or an incident. Baton rounds, which were to be used in preference to CS gas, were best fired in salvoes of not less than six rounds, at a range not exceeding 50m, and from a standing position. Normally, the round should be fired into the ground with the intention of bouncing it into the thighs and shins of a crowd; however, it could be fired directly at a target "if the circumstances warrant it ". Whenever possible, baton rounds were to be fired in conjunction with the deployment of an arrest squad. Batons, which were hand-held and hence a "discriminating weapon ", could be deployed when required in accordance with the doctrine of minimum force. Finally, the use of all IS weapons was to be preceded by a "clear and timely warning to the crowd ".¹¹ G27.217-218

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The Yellow Card

¶8.121 The reference to the Yellow Card was to the (yellow) booklet headed "Instructions by the Director of Operations for Opening Fire in Northern Ireland ". It was issued to every soldier serving in Northern Ireland and contained instructions as to when a soldier could use lethal force. The Yellow Card was first issued in September 1969. It was periodically revised and the fourth version (revised in November 1971)¹¹ G28A.220.2 GEN 47 minutes, 11th November 1971; KH4.4 Written statement to this Inquiry of Edward Heath. was current in January 1972.²² ED71.1-2

¶"RESTRICTED

¶Instructions by the Director of Operations for Opening Fire in Northern Ireland

These instructions are for the guidance of Commanders and troops operating collectively or individually. When troops are operating collectively soldiers will only open fire when ordered to do so by the Commander on the spot.

¶General Rules

Never use more force than the minimum necessary to enable you to carry out your duties.
Always first try to handle the situation by other means than opening fire. If you have to fire:

¶a. Fire only aimed shots.

¶b. Do not fire more rounds than are absolutely necessary to achieve your aim.

Your magazine/belt must always be loaded with live ammunition and be fitted to the weapon. Unless you are about to open fire no live round is to be carried in the breech, and the working parts must be forward. Company Commanders and above may, when circumstances in their opinion warrant such action, order weapons to be cocked, with a round in the breech where appropriate, and the safety catch at safe.
Automatic fire may be used against identified targets in the same circumstances as single shots if, in the opinion of the Commander on the spot, it is the minimum force required and no other weapon can be employed as effectively. Because automatic fire scatters it is not to be used where persons not using firearms are in, or may be close to, the line of fire.

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¶Warning before firing 6. A warning should be given before you open fire. The only circumstances in which you may open fire without giving warning are described in paras 13 and 14 below. 7. A warning should be as loud as possible, preferably by loud-hailer. It must: a. Give clear orders to stop attacking or to halt, as appropriate. b. State that fire will be opened if the orders are not obeyed. You may fire after due warning 8. Against a person carrying what you can positively identify as a firearm,* but only if you have reason to think that he is about to use it for offensive purposes and he refuses to halt when called upon to do so, and there is no other way of stopping him. 9. Against a person throwing a petrol bomb if petrol bomb attacks continue in your area against troops and civilians or against property, if his action is likely to endanger life. 10. Against a person attacking or destroying property or stealing firearms or explosives, if his action is likely to endanger life. 11. Against a person who, though he is not at present attacking has: a. in your sight killed or seriously injured a member of the security forces or a person whom it is your duty to protect and b. not halted when called upon to do so and cannot be arrested by any other means. 12. If there is no other way to protect yourself or those whom it is your duty to protect from the danger of being killed or seriously injured. You may fire without warning 13. Either when hostile firing is taking place in your area, and a warning is impracticable or when any delay could lead to death or serious injury to people whom it is your duty to protect or to yourself; and then only: a. against a person using a firearm* against members of the security forces or people whom it is your duty to protect or b. against a person carrying a firearm* if you have reason to think he is about to use it for offensive purposes.

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At a vehicle if the occupants open fire or throw a bomb at you or others whom it is your duty to protect, or are clearly about to do so.

¶Action by guards and at road blocks/checks

Where warnings are called for they should be in the form of specific challenges, as set out in paragraphs 16 and 17.
If you have to challenge a person who is acting suspiciously you must do so in a firm, distinct, voice saying 'HALT – HANDS UP.'

¶Then a. If he halts you are to say 'STAND STILL AND KEEP YOUR HANDS UP.'

¶b. Ask him why he is there, and if not satisfied call your Commander immediately and hand the person over to him.

If the person does not halt at once, you are to challenge again saying 'HALT – HANDS UP' and, if the person does not halt on your second challenge, you are to cock your weapon, apply the safety catch and shout: 'STAND STILL I AM READY TO FIRE.'
The rules covering the circumstances for opening fire are described in paragraphs 8–14. If the circumstances do not justify opening fire, you will do all you can to stop and detain the person without opening fire.
At a road block/check, you will NOT fire on a vehicle simply because it refused to stop. If a vehicle does not halt at a road block/check, note its description, make, registration number and direction of travel.
In all circumstances where you have challenged and the response is not satisfactory, you will summon your Commander at the first opportunity.

¶*NOTE: 'Firearm' Includes a grenade, nail bomb or gelignite type bomb.

¶Revised November 1971

¶RESTRICTED"

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¶8.122 The contents of the Yellow Card provided guidelines for soldiers but did not have legal force, in the sense that they "did not define the legal rights and obligations of the forces under statute or common law ".¹¹ R v McLaughton [1975] NI 203 at 206 per Sir Robert Lowry LCJ. This meant, among other things, that a soldier firing contrary to the Yellow Card would not necessarily be breaking the law.

¶8.123 The GEN 47 Committee approved this version of the Yellow Card on 11th November 1971.¹¹ G28A.220.1-4 In his written statement to this Inquiry, Edward Heath told us that the main changes were to allow soldiers, when authorised by Company Commanders or officers of higher rank, to have their weapons loaded, cocked and with a bullet in the breech, though with the safety catch on; to allow fire to be opened at terrorists in vehicles; and to allow, in the circumstances stipulated, the use of automatic fire against identified targets.²² KH4.4

The GEN 47 meeting on 11th November 1971

¶8.124 At the same GEN 47 meeting the Home Secretary expressed the view that although Brian Faulkner had put forward a number of far-reaching proposals for reform, they did not go to the root of the problem, the essential feature of which was a system in which, for the foreseeable future, every election would result in a unionist government; so that some means must be found of associating the minority in central government itself. He suggested that in response to the terrorist campaigns in the Province it might be necessary to promote the formation of a "'government of national defence and reconstruction' " comprised of "men of goodwill " and inevitably including members of the SDLP and the Nationalist Party.¹¹ G28A.220.3

¶8.125 The meeting considered that a course of action along these lines stood a greater chance of success if the Opposition at Westminster could be associated with it, and reference was made to the forthcoming visit of Harold Wilson (the Opposition leader) to Northern Ireland.¹¹ G28A.220.3 Further, it was felt that recent security force operations had provided "encouraging signs " that the IRA's resolution was being broken, and had obviated the danger of a violent Protestant backlash. A dramatic initiative, it was argued, would risk alienating one side or the other, and would make the job of the security forces harder. It was therefore agreed to delay any firm approach to Brian Faulkner until the possibility of an all-party approach had been explored, with the possibility of a re-assessment of the security situation "at the end of the year " also being raised.²² G28A.220.3-4 In the meantime, the committee requested a comprehensive analysis of "every line of action that could be taken to deal with the political problem ".³³ G28A.220.4 This request resulted in a paper⁴⁴ G32B.233.7-17 produced by Sir Philip Allen, the Permanent Under Secretary at the Home Office. This paper was discussed at the GEN 47 meeting on 1st December, to which we refer below.⁵⁵ G35A.240.3

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Edward Heath's Guildhall speech

¶8.126 On 15th November 1971 Edward Heath made a speech in the City of London Guildhall where he said that Britain had no selfish interest in Northern Ireland and that should the majority of the people there ever wish to join the Republic, they would be free to do so.¹¹ KH4.1 Statement to this Inquiry of Edward Heath; G32A.233.4 Note of a meeting between Harold Wilson and United Kingdom Government ministers, 22nd November 1971.

The visit of Harold Wilson to Northern Ireland

¶8.127 Harold Wilson, then Leader of the Opposition, visited Northern Ireland in the middle of November 1971. While there, he had a meeting with General Tuzo, who expressed a degree of optimism on the security front, but said that in Londonderry substantial forces would be necessary to eradicate terrorism and that the Army's first priority was Belfast.¹¹ G30AA.226.1.1-2

¶8.128 Harold Wilson also spoke to Brigadier MacLellan. According to our interpretation of Brigadier MacLellan's notes for the meeting, it appears that he told Harold Wilson that the low military profile agreed with the Committee of 30 in August had failed in its object of winning moderate opinion and avoiding alienation, and that the entire Catholic community was now hostile. He went on to say that an occupation of the Bogside and Creggan, which would require troop increases, would be necessary to restore law and order and that this represented the best option both militarily and politically. Although it would be regarded as punitive and repressive, it would enable moderates – who were then cowed, intimidated and fed up – to speak without fear and when the dust settled the majority would be glad.¹¹ G30A.226.001-002

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¶8.129 Brian Faulkner, who met Harold Wilson with members of the Northern Ireland Cabinet, drew attention to the reforms that had been made and stated that a coalition government could not include people who wanted to see a change in the constitutional position. His ministers, like the GOC, expressed some optimism about the security situation in the immediately preceding weeks.¹¹ G30AC.226.1.5-7

¶8.130 Among Harold Wilson's other engagements was a meeting with representatives of the SDLP. They were highly critical of United Kingdom Government policy and suggested the suspension of Stormont and its replacement with an appointed commission as a prelude to the reunification of Ireland.¹¹ G30C.226.5-7 Harold Wilson was also told that the SDLP would not be able to "maintain the confidence of their supporters " if they entered into talks with the Home Secretary while internment lasted.²² G30C.226.7

¶8.131 On his return to London, Harold Wilson discussed his visit with the United Kingdom Prime Minister, the Home Secretary and the Defence Secretary. 1 G32A.233.1-6

Further GEN 47 Committee meetings

¶8.132 There was a GEN 47 meeting on 22nd November 1971, at which the CGS, General Carver, reported on the security situation to the effect that the week's developments continued to give grounds for cautious optimism, that a further large number of men on the wanted list had been arrested and that there were signs that the Provisional IRA were modifying their tactics as a result of successes of the security forces.¹¹ G32.232-233

¶8.133 There were three meetings of GEN 47 over the space of a few days at the end of November 1971. In the first of these, on 26th November, the CGS reported IRA activities as being at a relatively low level, and that across the Province both IRA factions were under pressure and becoming disorganised, to the extent that if the trend continued they would be forced either into a truce or a radical change of tactics, However, in Londonderry the situation was different: "The IRA could still count on the active support of the Roman Catholic population, and a major military operation here could have widespread political consequences. "¹¹ G34.238; G34A.238.1

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¶8.134 In the second meeting, on 29th November 1971, the CGS reported a sharp increase in violence over the weekend, with 30 shootings and 39 explosions in three days.¹¹ G35.240; G35AA.240.1.1 During this time two civilians working at a customs post, Jimmy O'Neill and Ian Hankin, and an off-duty soldier, Robert Benner, were killed by republican paramilitaries in border areas, while Paul Nicholls of the Scots Guards was fatally wounded while on foot patrol in West Belfast.²² McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney and Thornton, Lost Lives, pp120–121. The CGS said that the attacks appeared to be a reaction by republican paramilitaries to reports that the Army was getting the better of them.³³ G35.240 The CGS added that the events of the weekend were a reminder of the virtual impossibility of halting the IRA's activity by security measures alone.⁴⁴ G35.240

¶8.135 In the third meeting, on 1st December 1971, the committee discussed Sir Philip Allen's paper on possible courses of action in Northern Ireland,¹¹ G35A.240.3-5 which had been requested at the GEN 47 meeting of 11th November 1971. In his paper, Sir Philip listed and briefly discussed 16 possibilities:²² G32B.233.7-17

Withdrawing the Army

¶(Withdrawal could either be immediate or after a stated period. It was an option that Sir Philip described as "an abdication of responsibility which might well result in civil war, and an armed intervention from the Republic ".)

No change

¶(A continuation of the policy of seeking agreement as to ways of ensuring an active, permanent and guaranteed role in government for representatives of the minority community.)

Green Paper plus

¶(The exercise by the United Kingdom Government of pressure on the Northern Ireland Government to implement and then expand upon its Green Paper proposals in order to allow a greater, and guaranteed, role for representatives of the minority community in the administration of Northern Ireland.)

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Appointment of a Royal Commission

¶(Sir Philip described this as a "traditional remedy ", but it was one that he doubted would be successful.)

Blocking devices

¶(The implementation of provisions within the Northern Ireland Parliament to ensure that some or all Bills would require more than a plain majority to pass.)

Coalition

¶(Although the United Kingdom Government could not force the formation of a coalition government in Northern Ireland, it could call for one, and support that call with economic and political pressure.)

Transfer of law and order to Westminster

¶(Sir Philip wrote that this would remove the "most ostensible point of disagreement " between the communities in Northern Ireland, and thereby possibly create an opportunity for co-operation between them.)

Government by commission

¶(The appointment, presumably by the United Kingdom Government, of a commission to govern Northern Ireland. This was a proposal that, Sir Philip said, had been suggested by both the SDLP and the Government of the Irish Republic, at least as an interim measure. It was similar conceptually to the appointed Londonderry Development Commission, which had taken over administration of that city from Londonderry Corporation in 1968–1969.)

County Council for Northern Ireland

¶(By downgrading the constitutional structures in Northern Ireland to make them akin to a county council it was hoped that bi-partisan administration might be encouraged. This step, which would involve transfer of responsibilities from Stormont to Westminster, would be done on the basis that the population and area of Northern Ireland were approximate to those of county councils elsewhere in the United Kingdom.)

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Redrawing of the border

¶(The border would be altered with the intention of transferring some predominantly Catholic areas, such as Londonderry, to the Irish Republic, possibly following local plebiscites.)

Reversion to the 1920 Act

¶(In particular, the revival of the concept of a Council of Ireland, which sought to encourage co-operation between the parliaments and governments of Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. The 1920 Act provided for such a council, but it had never been formally constituted.)

Negotiations with Dublin for the reunification of Ireland

¶("It would theoretically be possible to enter into negotiations with the South for the reunification of Ireland. ")

A condominium

¶(One possibility envisaged residents of Northern Ireland registering as either British or Irish and voting in elections to Westminster and the Dáil accordingly. They would also be entitled to vote for an executive council that would administer Northern Ireland, under the guidance of one British and one Irish commissioner.)

Policy of hostility to the Republic

¶(This would be pursued on the basis that "Many Protestants in the North " argued that the IRA campaign would not be defeated until full political and economic pressure was exerted by the United Kingdom on the Republic of Ireland, for example by abrogation of trade agreements, immigration controls and measures restricting the civil liberties of citizens of the Republic within Northern Ireland.)

Bringing in the United Nations

¶(Sir Philip gave no indication as to how this would be done.)

Direct rule

¶(Sir Philip wrote that: "Ministers have already given a good deal of consideration to direct rule and have concluded that it is not a course which they would willingly adopt. It has generally been thought of as an interim measure which would have to be followed sooner or later by some other solution … as a permanent course it really shades off into the solution discussed earlier of combining responsibility at Westminster for the major policies with some kind of county council solution for local issues. ")

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¶8.136 Sir Philip considered the advantages and the (often insurmountable) disadvantages of each of these courses. He indicated that several of the options, notably those involving the withdrawal of the Army, the involvement of the United Nations and negotiations with Dublin on reunification, had been included for the sake of completeness. He also pointed out that some of the initiatives might be combined, and that several would not be possible without an interim period of direct rule.¹¹ G32B.233.7-17

¶8.137 The GEN 47 meeting, which did not adopt any of the options that Sir Philip had discussed, expressed caution over the possibility that major changes in the fundamental policy of the United Kingdom Government on the unification of Ireland and the alignment of the border, as radical alternatives to the status quo, would have a realistic chance of success for the foreseeable future.¹¹ G35A.240.3-4; G35B.240.6-8 Ministers considered the respective positions of Brian Faulkner's government and the SDLP on the question of the representation of the minority in government, and the resulting impasse, and requested that officials prepare a further analysis of the degree to which the present functions of Stormont could be transferred to statutory bodies, on the model of the Housing Authority, which might be so constituted as to embody a formal active role for minority representatives.²² G35A.240.4-5 The committee also requested, as a secondary requirement, an analysis of the ways in which constitutional assurances could be devised to provide a minority community with a role in government, starting with a study of constitutional devices employed to the same end in other countries with substantial minority populations.³³ G35A.240.5 Summing up the meeting, Edward Heath commented that if the military campaign against the IRA proceeded successfully, the right time for pressing forward with plans for political changes could well be very brief. Although ministers had not decided in favour of direct rule, they did recognise that during this crucial period there might come a point where they would have to run the risk of precipitating a situation in which direct rule became inevitable.⁴⁴ G35A.240.4

¶8.138 GEN 47 met again on 13th December 1971.¹¹ G38.253-255; G38A.255.1-3 The CGS told the committee that there had been an increase in shootings and nail and petrol bomb incidents in the previous week. However, most of these were not prolonged engagements and much of the increase could be attributed to greater Army activity in Londonderry.²² G38.254 We consider this activity below. There followed discussions about measures that could be taken to protect off-duty members of the UDR and political figures who were being targeted by the IRA.³³ G38.254-255 The meeting also considered all-party discussions involving the Opposition, and the possibility and desirability of transferring some powers (notably law and order) from Stormont to Westminster.⁴⁴ G38A.255.2-3

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The end of the containment phase in Londonderry

¶8.139 The greater Army activity in Londonderry mentioned at this GEN 47 meeting consisted of a series of battalion-strength operations in the Bogside and Creggan areas of the city in early December, with the object of carrying out arrests, searching premises on specific intelligence and clearing barricades.¹¹ B1279.004-005 Draft statement for the Widgery Inquiry of Brigadier MacLellan; B1279.029 Statement to this Inquiry of Brigadier MacLellan; B1279.003.001 Extract from Desmond Hamill's notes of an interview with Brigadier MacLellan; G41.264 "Future Military Policy in Londonderry: An Appreciation by the CLF ", 14th December 1971; G125B.836.3-4 Memorandum to ADC to CLF, 2nd March 1972; G116.751 "Summary of Events in Londonderry on 30 January 1972 ", 5th February 1972.Show full note The number of routine patrols in these areas also increased.²² G125B.836.5-8 Memorandum to ADC to CLF, 2nd March 1972.

¶8.140 According to Army reports, the reaction to these operations was extremely violent, the soldiers being confronted by large and apparently well-organised hostile crowds, and met with stones and other missiles, including nail bombs and gunfire.¹¹ G37A.252.1 HQNI Intelligence Summary, 9th December 1971; G41.268 "Future Military Policy in Londonderry: An Appreciation by the CLF ", 14th December 1971; G116.751 "Summary of Events in Londonderry on 30 January 1972 ", 5th February 1972; G37B.252.5 Joint Intelligence Committee, Special Assessment, 9th December 1971; B1279.003.001 Extract from Desmond Hamill's notes of an interview with Brigadier MacLellan; B1279.029 Statement to this Inquiry of Brigadier MacLellan.Show full note Two further such operations were carried out at the end of the month.²² G125B.836.4 Memorandum to ADC to CLF, 2nd March 1972.

¶8.141 This more active and confrontational approach, effectively ending the period of passive containment, resulted from the autumn Directives of General Ford and Brigadier MacLellan and the strengthening of 8th Infantry Brigade by the arrival of 1 CG and 22 Lt AD Regt, which allowed for the necessary force levels to be deployed.¹¹ G41.264 "Future Military Policy in Londonderry: An Appreciation by the CLF ", 14th December 1971; Day 258/63-64 Oral evidence to this Inquiry of General Ford; B1229, B1225, B1279.4 Written statement for the Widgery Inquiry of General Ford. These developments had themselves been presaged by the discussions within GEN 47 and between Edward Heath and Brian Faulkner in early October, to which we have already referred.

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Major General Ford's December 1971 visit to Londonderry

¶8.142 General Ford visited Londonderry shortly after the operations in early December, and met representatives of the military, the RUC and local community groups.¹¹ B1208.26 Statement to this Inquiry of General Ford; Day 253/37-38 Oral evidence to this Inquiry of General Ford. Following his visit he wrote a paper entitled "Future Military Policy for Londonderry: An Appreciation of the Situation by CLF ". This document, which was dated 14th December 1971, examined the recent history of operations in the city, considered different courses of action that could be adopted and the advantages and disadvantages of each, and then made recommendations as to which should be implemented.²² G41.263-273

¶8.143 In terms that echoed those of Brigadier MacClellan's OP Directive 4/71 of 4th November,¹¹ G27.196 to which we have already referred, General Ford recounted the change of situation in Londonderry that occurred after the first week of July 1971. Until then, "significant progress towards normality had been made " in the city, notably with the RUC establishing static posts in the Creggan and Bogside for the first time in 12 years, allowing them to extend their influence gradually from these positions. However, the "local IRA campaign " that began on 4th July, the "military reaction to the gunmen ", and the subsequent introduction of internment ended this period of optimism, as "renewed violence on a large scale and the campaign of civil disobedience began ".²² G41.263

¶8.144 General Ford recorded that on 20th August 1971, General Tuzo and Howard Smith (the United Kingdom Representative in Northern Ireland) met with the Committee of 30, the group of moderate and prominent Catholics we have mentioned above. This led to the decision to lower the military profile in the city, initially for about a month, in an attempt to "maintain the hitherto successful policy of minimum pressure … in the hope that moderate opinion would win the day ". This meant that there were no routine military patrols, and no military initiatives other than those demanded in response to aggression or for specific search and arrest operations.¹¹ G41.263

¶8.145 Like Brigadier MacLellan in November 1971, General Ford considered that this policy had not achieved its aims. He wrote that none of the expectations for progress raised at the meeting had materialised, while "neither the RUC nor the military have control of the

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¶Bogside and Creggan areas, law and order are not being effectively maintained, and the Security Forces now face an entirely hostile Catholic community numbering 33,000 in these two areas alone ". During the period of limited military activity an efficient system of alarms, sentries and searchlights had been established by residents of the Bogside and Creggan, meaning that it had become "almost impossible " for the Army and RUC to achieve surprise in their operations in the area. Meanwhile, in the period between 4th July and 13th December, the security forces had suffered 22 casualties inflicted by gunmen, seven of them fatal, from 380 confirmed shooting incidents. A total of 1,932 rounds had been fired at them, with 364 in reply, and 1,741lb of explosives had been used in 211 explosions, in addition to a further 180 recorded nail bomb incidents. At the time General Ford wrote, there were 29 barricades in existence, 16 of which were impassable to 1 ton armoured vehicles.¹¹ G41.263-264

¶8.146 General Ford also considered that the "containment phase " had allowed "the extremists to increase their hold on the Catholic community, and to recruit and train more volunteers ". According to General Ford, the security forces had achieved some successes: 68 men had been arrested when internment was introduced, with a further 84 apprehended subsequently; there were 54 claimed instances where a target had been shot, seven of whom were known to have been killed, but as the casualty or the weapon had only been recovered on five occasions these figures could not be fully substantiated. Bearing such uncertainties in mind, General Ford recorded "our best estimate " was that there were 1,000 "activists ", of whom about half could be counted as "the hooligan element ", half of which again comprised the "hard core ". IRA strength was thought to be 100, "of whom at least 40 are active gunmen ". It is not entirely clear whether General Ford counted these as part of the 1,000 "activists ", although the context of the sentence suggests that this is likely.¹¹ G41.264

¶8.147 General Ford wrote that although the "containment phase " was originally intended to last only for "the order of one month ", it was not until 3rd December 1971 that a significant change of approach occurred. On that date, 8th Infantry Brigade's force level was increased by one battalion, allowing the security forces to pursue a more aggressive policy, carrying out battalion-strength operations in "the hostile areas ". These included "recce and fighting patrols in depth and arrest, search and barricade clearance operations ".¹¹ G41.263-265

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¶8.148 After considering the recent history of the security situation in Londonderry, General Ford turned to the main purpose of his paper: to recommend the adoption of a course of action to be followed in the city in the future. He prefaced his arguments by noting that it was "very unlikely " that moderate leaders of the Catholic community would succeed in overcoming the extremists in the existing circumstances, and hence military action was required "to establish control and stability and enable the political situation to evolve ". He then set out what he saw as the three possible options:¹¹ G41.265

"Course 1. To revert to the previous policy of containment of the Creggan and Bogside from their periphery but adopt a much more offensive attitude than in previous months.

Course 2. To continue the present policy of undertaking major operations within the Creggan and Bogside but without providing a permanent presence in those areas.

Course 3. To establish, on a permanent basis, a full scale military presence in the Creggan and Bogside. "

¶8.149 Expanding on the first of these, General Ford wrote that he would envisage "that operations in the hostile areas are conducted with the minimum forces compatible with safety and the minimum aggravation of the community ". Such operations would include sniping from the periphery, recce and fighting patrols, and ambush, arrest and search actions "whenever intelligence justified them ". Individual operations would be of "short duration and measured in minutes rather than hours ", but the policy would not prohibit the establishment of static positions and permanent roadblocks if force levels allowed. General Ford also foresaw "constant patrolling in the Bogside and to a lesser extent in the Creggan ".¹¹ G41.265

¶8.150 General Ford considered that the advantages of this course were that it would reduce the tension and pressure felt by the Catholic community in response to large-scale military operations, and that this might assist in turning anti-extremist feeling against the IRA and the "activists " instead of towards the Army. The policy would afford some opportunity to the moderate leadership of the community to "wean the people away from the extremists ", although General Ford noted that there was "little evidence " that this was likely to happen, and that it had not done so in the period from 20th August to

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¶3rd December. In military terms, the policy would not lead to force-level problems, and if a political solution were achieved, the need for a military occupation in the Bogside and Creggan would be avoided.¹¹ G41.265-266

¶8.151 There were, however, numerous disadvantages, according to General Ford's paper. Course 1 would not restore law and order, and would make it difficult to deal with gunmen in the area. The IRA and "other revolutionary groups " would be encouraged to increase their influence over the local population, who in turn would be discouraged from submitting to government and providing information to the security forces. Those in the Bogside and Creggan who were "fed up with the IRA, the hooligans, the hardships of their daily existence and conditions of semi siege " would not be offered much hope of quick relief. The policy represented a retreat from the current military position and would have a negative effect on morale in the security forces, as well as being unsatisfactory to Stormont and the local Protestant community. General Ford concluded his list of disadvantages with the comment: "The stalemate continues ."¹¹ G41.266

¶8.152 In relation to Course 2, General Ford reiterated that this policy was the one then being pursued, consisting of battalion-strength operations of the type listed above in the "hostile areas ". On average, the operations required a force level of five companies. The advantage of this option was that it had "broken the stalemate " and demonstrated the military's ability "to go in and out of the area at will ". This had led to a "marked improvement in the morale of the Security Forces ", and had "mollified the local Protestant 'hard-liners' ", who, General Ford wrote, had "behaved responsibly in the face of determined explosive attacks against commercial targets and intimidation of their employees ". The policy had brought "considerable pressure to bear on the gunmen ", and had "achieved a limited initiative comparatively cheaply " in terms of force levels, while also testing the reaction of the local community and the troops to large-scale operations. Finally, it had allowed the "flow of information to restart, albeit with only a trickle at this stage ".¹¹ G41.267

¶8.153 General Ford then listed considerable disadvantages with the policy then being pursued. It had not restored law and order as there was no permanent presence in the Bogside and Creggan. This meant that when the troops withdrew (which they usually did while under pressure from verbal abuse, rioting, nail bombs and sniper fire), the "hostile areas " reverted back to "their state of lawlessness ". Barricades were rebuilt, and when the security forces returned they encountered "well organised opposition ". Due to the "rapid reaction, numerical strength and aggressive tactics " of this opposition, baton rounds and CS gas had to be used in large quantities, although the former were ineffective and the latter indiscriminate (causing "havoc amongst large sections of the community who are not involved, nor intend to be involved in the violence "). General Ford wrote that in the circumstances, the use of live ammunition "becomes more likely, particularly when units of platoon strength are assaulted by organised mobs numbered in hundreds ". This in turn raised "the question of opening fire on 'unarmed' mobs, whose strength lies not in fire- power, but in numbers and brick power ". The policy had, according to the General, "served only to aggravate and alienate the Catholic community further ", without providing the protection required for non-violent moderates to further their influence without fear of intimidation; indeed there were "indications that the hate, fear and distrust felt by the Catholic community for the Security Forces is deeper now than at any time during the current campaign ".¹¹ G41.268

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¶8.154 The final course, the establishment of a permanent military presence and full-scale security coverage in the Creggan and Bogside, offered "the best, perhaps the only prospect of a quick restoration of law and order " that would create the conditions in which a political initiative could be attempted with some chance of success. General Ford acknowledged that the initial response of the local community would be hostile, but he thought that this might subside, and while a military presence would never be welcome it was possible that those disaffected by the existing situation might come to regard the Army as "the lesser of the two evils and cooperate in the destruction of the IRA ". A permanent presence, he felt, offered the greatest chance of this happening, and would also allow the residents of the Bogside and Creggan "to see for themselves that the opposition's propaganda on such matters as brutality are untrue ". A further benefit was that the local Protestant community would be "delighted " by the initiative and would regain confidence in the security forces, which in turn would discourage unilateral action on their part.¹¹ G41.269

¶8.155 The first disadvantage of Course 3 listed by General Ford was the level of force required. The military presence would have to be sufficient to restore and maintain law and order, and prevent the troops from "being submerged by the sheer weight and numbers of a violently hostile community ". The presence would also have to remain tenable, as the failure of the policy would have serious repercussions across the Province. General Ford wrote that a detailed assessment had shown that seven battalions would be required, of which five would need to be infantry. There were concerns about how to accommodate the permanent military presence, and about the danger that this initiative would have a detrimental effect on the campaign of the security forces elsewhere in the Province. Beyond these logistical problems, General Ford considered that the policy would be portrayed as "repressive and punitive " in republican propaganda, and would have a marked effect on what General Ford described as "Catholic opinion throughout the world ", particularly in the Republic of Ireland. Adverse reactions would be expected from the nationalist areas of Belfast, and General Ford noted in particular the possibility that the operation might lead to a rise in support for IRA active service units in Donegal, which in turn could lead to cross-border battles that were unacceptable to the United Kingdom Government. The risk of casualties was high, and "apart from gunmen or bombers, so called unarmed rioters, possibly teenagers, [are] certain to be shot in the initial phase. Much will be made of the invasion of Derry and the slaughter of the innocent. "¹¹ G41.269-271

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¶8.156 In the conclusions to his paper, General Ford wrote that the policy of containment followed from 20th August to 3rd December 1971 had "produced no apparent beneficial result ", and had left the Bogside and Creggan "completely dominated by the extremists ". As a result, a new initiative was required "if the present stalemate is to be broken ". The General had "no doubt " that Course 3 was "the best military solution ", but the difficulty was that "the problem is not entirely a military one ". The political disadvantages of the policy were considerable, not only in terms of the emotive response to an action that would be presented as the repression of one section of the community, but also in the need for further troops, which amounted to a requirement for three additional infantry battalions to be sent to Northern Ireland. These points, and issues concerning the historical and strategic position of Londonderry, led General Ford to conclude that the decision on whether or not to adopt Course 3 was "entirely a political one ".¹¹ G41.271

¶8.157 General Ford felt that there was "little military value " in continuing with the existing Course 2 approach when compared to the antagonism that it created in the community. While some gains could be made, the basic fault of the policy was its temporary nature and its "harmful effect on those who might otherwise be prepared to forsake the IRA cause ". The wisdom of continuing in this way was "in doubt " unless its replacement with the implementation of Course 3 was imminent. In contrast, the best that he could say about Course 1 was that it "does not stir the pot unduly in [the] Creggan and the

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¶Bogside ". Although "some 33,000 citizens of the UK will be allowed to remain in a state of anarchy and revolt ", there was a temptation, especially politically, to adopt this approach until there was a cessation of hostilities elsewhere in the Province. General Ford noted that the containment required "can certainly be achieved ", and that there would be some limited military benefit accruing from the pressure brought to bear on republican paramilitaries if the offensive aspect of the course was given sufficient emphasis.¹¹ G41.272

¶8.158 In summary, General Ford wrote:

"… although Course 3 is the correct military solution to the problem of restoring law and order in Londonderry, the political drawbacks are so serious that it should not be implemented in the present circumstances, The dangers inherent in persisting with Course 2 are in no way balanced by the limited military gain and the right answer in the present circumstances is to adopt Course 1. In order to avoid comparison with the previous Course 1 which was adopted up to mid November and was too defensive and defeatist in concept, it might be best to call it Course 1½. "¹¹ G41.272

¶8.159 Accordingly, General Ford's recommendation was that the "present policy in Londonderry should be abandoned in favour of Course 1 as described in this appreciation ".¹¹ G41.272

¶8.160 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, General Ford accepted that his recommendation amounted to a reversion to a less provocative approach by 8th Infantry Brigade in the Creggan and Bogside.¹¹ Day 253/42

Reginald Maudling's meeting at Headquarters Northern Ireland

¶8.161 On the same day as General Ford dated this appreciation (14th December 1971), there was a meeting between the United Kingdom Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling, and the GOC and other senior officers at HQNI Lisburn. General Ford was among those present.¹¹ G40.259; G40A.262.1-8

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¶8.162 Among other matters this meeting discussed the situation in Londonderry. The GOC told Reginald Maudling that this remained third on the Army's list of priorities after, respectively, Belfast and the border. However, he said that the position there had reached a point where a choice had to be made between accepting that the Creggan and Bogside were areas where the Army were not able to go, except on specific information, or mounting a major operation requiring a force of six or seven battalions to occupy the area. The Army preferred the first course, but it would entail accepting criticism of allowing "no go " areas.¹¹ G40.261; G40A.262.5 The GOC said that the second course would (according to one note of the meeting) "involve, at some stage, shooting at unarmed civilians "²² G40.261 or (according to another note) "almost certainly " doing so.³³ G40A.262.5

¶8.163 These phrases could be read, as a matter of language, as meaning that the GOC contemplated that the Army, if undertaking this second course of action, would as part of it fire at unarmed civilians as a matter of deliberate policy in order to clear the Creggan and Bogside. It could equally mean, as a matter of language, that a major operation would be likely to meet with massive resistance where crowds, backed by gunmen, would engage with or try to overrun the soldiers who might have no option but to fire in order to save their lives.

¶8.164 There is no evidence that the GOC ever had in mind a policy of pre-planned deliberate firing at unarmed civilians as a means of regaining control of the no-go areas, or otherwise. The violence of the previous months had demonstrated the danger to soldiers even during minor operations from gunfire, bombs and hostile crowds, and it was hardly more than common sense to make clear to the politicians that an operation of this kind would be very likely, if not certain, to lead to soldiers firing their weapons and causing casualties among unarmed civilians.

¶8.165 At this point it is convenient to refer to submissions about the attitude of politicians and the military during the period under discussion.

¶8.166 Those representing most of the families submitted that in the period preceding Bloody Sunday, "Within both the military and political establishment there was a lack of respect for human life. The use of lethal force against unarmed civilians was an option considered and discussed with increasing frequency as a legitimate method of law enforcement "¹¹ FS1.631 and that with regard to the period after internment and up to December 1971:²² FS1.659

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"While the use of a shoot to kill policy against unarmed civilians was not adopted during this period, it was regarded as a legitimate tactic for discussion and consideration within senior military or political circles. At no stage was the use of lethal force against unarmed civilians rejected as a legitimate tactic whether for legal or moral reasons. It is certainly not the case, as Sir Arthur Hockaday stated in the course of his evidence³³ Day 271/23 that the prevailing culture was one of 'respect for the law and the doctrine of minimum force'. "

¶8.167 The submission was made that it was this attitude, among other things, that led to the use of lethal force by the Army on Bloody Sunday. 1 FS1.631

¶8.168 We have found nothing that indicates to us that during the period in question either the political or the military establishments considered that the use of lethal force against unarmed civilians was a legitimate tactic or could be used as a legitimate method of law enforcement. It was appreciated that there was a risk that in certain circumstances the Army might find it necessary to fire on crowds assailing them, but this was in the context of soldiers having to defend themselves, not the result of the carrying out of any plan to shoot unarmed civilians as a method of law enforcement.¹¹ We consider later in this report (paragraphs 9.102–114) a memorandum written by General Ford in January 1972 (G48.299), in which he stated that he was coming to the view that the only way to deal with the hooligan problem in Londonderry was to shoot selected ringleaders, using rifles adapted to use .22in ammunition and after giving a warning. However, as will be seen, this method of riot control was not adopted and General Ford acknowledged in his memorandum that it would have required authorisation before it could be put into effect. There is nothing to suggest that any such authorisation was sought or would have been forthcoming.Show full note

¶8.169 In the course of these submissions representatives of the families referred to and relied upon General Ford's appreciation dated 14th December 1971, to which we have referred above.¹¹ FS1.657-659 There is to our minds nothing in that paper that suggests the adoption of a shoot-to-kill policy. Nor is it correct, as another of the submissions put it, that General Ford put forward a "desired " military solution and that his paper disclosed "the tension between the required military solution and the restraints imposed by the political situation ".²² FS4.24 What General Ford did was to put forward what he regarded as the best military solution in the circumstances and recognised that political considerations took precedence. We should add that what General Ford was considering was what could be done about the situation then existing in Londonderry. He was not at this time concerned about how best to deal with a civil rights march in the city or any riots that might then ensue, matters that we discuss later in this report.³³ Chapter 9

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¶8.170 At the meeting of 14th December 1971, the Home Secretary appears to have accepted or decided that there should be no major operation to occupy the Creggan and Bogside, even though this was a tacit acknowledgement that there were areas of Londonderry where the Army was not able to operate normally.¹¹ G40.261; G40A.262.5 According to one of the notes of the meeting, it had become clear during the discussions that the Army favoured this policy, which was therefore in line with General Ford's contemporaneous appreciation.²² G40.261

General Carver's visit to Northern Ireland

¶8.171 The CGS, General Carver, visited Northern Ireland in the middle of December 1971. He went to Londonderry on 17th December and was there briefed by Brigadier MacLellan. According to the Brigadier's briefing notes,¹¹ G44A.282.1-3 the CGS was told that the recent operations in the Creggan and Bogside had worried the IRA, but at the cost of increased violence and the further alienation of the Catholic population, which in turn risked pushing popular opinion away from the moderates in the community and towards the IRA.²² G44A.282.1 Adopting the terminology employed by General Ford in his paper of 14th December, Brigadier MacLellan expressed the view that this policy, "Course 2 ", had been successful militarily, but perhaps not politically.³³ G44A.282.2 However, returning to the previous containment policy, "Course 1 ", would demoralise the troops and Protestants.⁴⁴ G44A.282.2 This left what General Ford had called "Course 1½ " or "Course 3 ". The former would involve quick arrest operations, intelligence-based searches in the Bogside and possibly the Creggan, and the deployment of reconnaissance platoons, all of which would carry the possibility of small fighting incidents in their aftermath.⁵⁵ G44A.282.2 Brigadier MacLellan described such a policy as "difficult " as it would be hard to avoid harassing the innocent while keeping a "GRIP ROUND [the] THROAT OF [the] GUILTY ".⁶⁶ G44A.282.2 "Course 3 " was a full-scale military operation of the Creggan and Bogside, which would require seven battalions, most of which would be deployed there for "SOME MONTHS ".⁷⁷ G44A.282.2 Brigadier MacLellan felt that this was the only chance for demoralising the IRA and restoring law and order to the area, but it would be regarded as a "PUNITIVE AND REPRESSIVE " invasion.⁸⁸ G44A.282.2 The decision was a matter for political judgement, but delay would mean that the IRA would increase their grip on the area and acquire more arms.⁹⁹ G44A.282.2-3

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¶8.172 On 20th December 1971, General Carver completed a report on his visit to Northern Ireland for Lord Carrington, the Secretary of State for Defence.¹¹ G44.281-282; G44.282.1 The central theme of this document was his belief that a window of opportunity was approaching when a political initiative might be put forward with some hope of success. It is notable that his reasoning was based primarily on the situation in Belfast; Londonderry, he wrote, was "totally different ".²² G44.282.1

¶8.173 General Carver felt that the sections of the IRA pursuing terrorist activity in Belfast were now under "considerable pressure " due to the combined effects of internment, the actions of the security forces, and the increasing effectiveness of intelligence operations. He argued that the "time may come very soon when a political move, which the minority could claim as a partial satisfaction of their demands, could tip the scale sufficiently for all those who want an end to tension (which includes a substantial part of the IRA themselves) to put their pressure, also, on the terrorists to call off the campaign ".¹¹ G44.281

¶8.174 General Carver also felt that the timing of such an initiative was good in relation to the majority community. He wrote of an "apparent acceptance by an increasing element of the Protestants, including an influential number of officers in the RUC, that things cannot just return to the previous state of affairs ". At least some of the RUC officers were prepared to accept and even advocate that Westminster should take over responsibility for law and order, a move that would have been welcomed by most Catholics, including "the hierarchy and other influential figures ". However, the period in which a significant section of the majority community would remain conducive to such reforms was likely to be short; if the tension were to come to an end unexpectedly it would not be long before "Protestant opinion " hardened, dissolving the acceptance that change was necessary.¹¹ G44.281

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¶8.175 These observations led General Carver to urge that "swift political action " should not be delayed beyond mid-February 1972, a date towards which the United Kingdom Government should plan unless it became clear that the right moment to proceed had arrived earlier. The initiative would need to be "effective ", while not leading to "an unacceptable Protestant backlash ", and for this to be achieved it would need to be acceptable to the RUC, to Brian Faulkner ("but not necessarily to all of his Party "), to "the Catholic hierarchy ", to Gerry Fitt, then leader of the SDLP, and the Taoiseach, Jack Lynch.¹¹ G44.281

¶8.176 General Carver went on to set out the elements that he believed could lead to a successful solution. Law and order would become the responsibility of Westminster, with the GOC assuming control of all security operations, Army and RUC, which were designed to restore the normal processes of law and order. In public administration, as many as possible of the areas in which there were "inter-sectarian problems " would become the province of public boards on which minority communities would be fully represented. These boards would be responsible to the Northern Ireland Government, but the methods of election and representation at Stormont would be revised by a "further commission " in light of these wider reforms. General Carver recommended that if such a solution did not emerge from inter-party talks then it should be announced, with maximum publicity, as the United Kingdom Government's proposal at these talks, and one which it was prepared to implement as soon as the principals agreed.¹¹ G44.281-282

¶8.177 In support of the framework that he had outlined, General Carver made additional suggestions for action in specific fields. He felt that the RUC lacked "leadership and direction ", and proposed that a Deputy Director of Operations (Police) be selected by the United Kingdom Government as a potential successor to the then Chief Constable, Sir Graham Shillington, adding that if no suitable English, Scottish or Welsh police officer were available, then a general might be appointed. In relation to civil affairs, he drew attention to the practical needs of the civilian population, especially in areas from where the IRA had just been eliminated. He recommended the appointment of Civil Affairs Liaison Officers to each police division of Belfast, whose role it would be to end what General Carver saw as the existing indifference, bureaucracy and even hostility of local and central government to those in the minority community who sought assistance, who would turn to extremists and sectarian organisations if they were not encouraged to deal directly with the proper organs of government. Finally, he warned that a breakdown in the system of internment, perhaps because of a break-out or a riot, could ruin "Our whole policy ". To avoid this, he was convinced that it was necessary for the Northern Ireland Government to employ an Inspector or Director of Internment.¹¹ G44.282-282.1

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¶8.178 In the final three paragraphs of his paper, General Carver addressed the situation outside Belfast. He recommended the continuation of the present policy in relation to the border: "maintaining a non-provocative attitude, but a fairly frequent presence, achieves about the right balance."¹¹ G44.282.1 He wrote that intelligence gathering outside Belfast was "virtually non- existent ", although he hoped that it could be considerably improved if his proposals on future responsibility for law and order were accepted.²² G44.282.1 In relation to Londonderry, his entire paragraph is reproduced below:³³ G44.282.1

"The situation here is totally different to that in Belfast. The Bogside and Creggan are no-go areas. To change this would need a major military operation which would demand large numbers of troops, incur a high level of casualties and inflame the situation not only in Londonderry itself, but in this whole of Northern Ireland and particularly in the Republic. To attempt such an operation either in the near future or soon after making a proposal on the lines of that [outlined earlier in the paper] would wreck any chance of such a proposal succeeding. It is clear that the only policy we can sensibly pursue in Londonderry is to maintain a level of military activity which maintains the morale of the Protestants and of our own soldiers, without provoking the Catholic population to an extent which causes us severe casualties, further antagonises them and brings no dividends. Our recent increased activity has tended in this direction and I recommend, as does the GOC and the Brigade Commander, that we adopt a policy of rather less provocative activity than of recent weeks, although higher than the 'low profile' attitude adopted in September and October. "

¶8.179 General Carver's recommendation, which he said was also that of General Tuzo and Brigadier MacLellan, was effectively the "Course 1½ " outlined and supported by General Ford in his paper of 14th December on future military policy in Londonderry.¹¹ G41.263-273

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Meeting of the Ministry of Defence's Northern Ireland Policy Group

¶8.180 General Carver's views on a possible solution were repeated at a meeting of the MoD's Northern Ireland Policy Group on 22nd December 1971 at which Lord Carrington, the Secretary of State for Defence, was present.¹¹ G44B.282.4-9; KH9.48-53 At this meeting the CGS said that he thought that they should aim at some political initiative about February 1972, when he judged that the security situation would be just right for it.

¶8.181 Lord Carrington considered that there was a choice between an initiative of the kind envisaged by the CGS and waiting in the hope that the Home Secretary's inter-party talks might produce a likely solution.¹¹ KH9.49 The meeting appears to have agreed with the CGS that there would be a window of time when action along the lines envisaged would be opportune, so that it was important that the United Kingdom Government should be ready with appropriate proposals, including a replacement for the existing Stormont system of administration. It was also important to have the support of the RUC and of the senior Northern Ireland civil servants for any imposed solution.²² KH9.49-50

¶8.182 The meeting clearly appreciated that, as a matter of departmental responsibilities, it was really for the Home Office rather than the MoD to put forward possible political solutions.¹¹ KH9.49-50 However, in his summing up, Lord Carrington expressed a desire to raise the matter soon at a GEN 47 meeting and suggested that the department draw up a "general paper " emphasising the importance of timing.²² KH9.50

¶8.183 The point was made at the meeting that, whatever solution was reached, it would be necessary to look at the position of Londonderry separately: "the revival of community and commercial life there would only be possible with the support of the Dublin Government and of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. There was no incentive for the IRA to give up its position there since its control of the Bogside and Creggan areas was based not on physical intimidation but on its generally good administration so that it was the Army which was seen as the cause of any trouble. " It seems clearly to have been common ground that any attempt by the Army to take over control of the remainder of Londonderry would involve a fight against the people and "would set back hopes of a political solution ".¹¹ KH9.49-50

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¶8.184 The contemporary documents¹¹ G45A.285.7 Extract from a brief for the Secretary of State for Defence, 31st December 1971; G45AA.285.19-21 Draft paper for the Secretary of State to present to GEN 47, 23rd December 1971; G46.287 Minutes of the Official Committee on Northern Ireland, 5th January 1972. show that at or very soon after this meeting Lord Carrington accepted the advice of the CGS and the GOC that so far as Londonderry was concerned, the Army should adopt a policy rather less provocative than in recent weeks, though higher than the low profile adopted during September and October. This was an acceptance of "Course 1½ " that General Ford had advocated in his paper of 14th December 1971²² G41.263-273 and which Brigadier MacLellan had outlined to the CGS a few days later.³³ G44A.282.1-3

Edward Heath's visit to Londonderry

¶8.185 On 23rd December 1971 Edward Heath briefly visited Londonderry, and described in his autobiography the situation there as "critical ".¹¹ Edward Heath, The Course of My Life: My Autobiography, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1998, p434; KH4.5 Written statement to this Inquiry of Edward Heath.

Proposals for a political initiative

¶8.186 Also on the 23rd December 1971, Sir Philip Allen wrote a note on constitutional devices to protect the minority. After studying various arrangements made in other countries, he concluded that the only model suitable for Northern Ireland was the provision of guaranteed places for the representatives of the minority community within the executive body of a reformed government. Sir Philip Allen acknowledged that an arrangement of this kind would not emerge unprompted from discussions between the Northern Irish parties, and that Brian Faulkner had made it clear that such a system was unacceptable to him. However, he believed that there were circumstances in which the scheme might be tolerated as a solution imposed from Westminster.¹¹ G44B.282.15-16

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¶8.187 During the closing days of 1971, officials within the MoD sought to take forward the idea of a political initiative. Acting on Lord Carrington's request at the Northern Ireland Policy Group meeting on 22nd December, Arthur Hockaday, the Assistant Under Secretary (General Staff), and Colonel Henry Dalzell-Payne, head of MO4 (the section of the General Staff dealing with Northern Ireland), prepared a draft paper for presentation at GEN 47.¹¹ G45AA.285.20-24 Lord Carrington felt that he could not submit this under his name, presumably because he thought that it encroached too much on the territory of the Home Secretary and his department.²² G45AA.285.19 Instead, he decided to rely on the paper as a speaking brief, and as a result it was modified and re-submitted by Arthur Hockaday on 31st December 1971.³³ G45A.285.1; G45A.285.6-16

¶8.188 Under the heading "Opportunity for political initiative ", Arthur Hockaday wrote:¹¹ G45A.285.8

"Given that the maintenance of pressure in Belfast is having a considerable effect upon the IRA we may, before very long (say within the next two months), reach a point at which, if both the leaders of the Northern Ireland minority (in particular the Roman Catholic hierarchy and Mr Fitt) and the Dublin Government can publicly recognise a political formula as acceptable in providing an active, permanent, and guaranteed role in public life for the minority community, those who want an end to tension (and this may include a substantial part of the IRA itself) will be able to put pressure on the terrorists to call off the campaign. If such a formula included satisfactory reassurances regarding the status of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom, an increasing element of the Protestants (including a number of influential people in the RUC and the Civil Service) might be prepared to accept that there cannot be simply a return to the previous state of affairs. However, the period of time during which both these trends might be propitious for a political initiative could be short – if the level of violence is seen to drop dramatically there must be a risk that Protestant opinion will soon harden again. "

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¶8.189 Arthur Hockaday suggested to Lord Carrington that he might wish to urge his colleagues to consider how they might best exploit "any fleeting but uniquely favourable opportunity of this kind ".¹¹ G45A.285.8 To this end, he set out a "range of possibilities for a political initiative designed to clear the way forward ".²² G45A.285.9 Starting with "the least radical ", these were:³³ G45A.285.9

"a. The transfer to the GOC of operational control of the RUC for security operations (as in August–October 1969).

b. As at a., plus some modification of the Stormont structure in the direction of proportional representation, 'community' or coalition government, and blocking provisions, but no change in the powers of the Northern Ireland Parliament and Government …

c. With greater or less modification of the structure of Stormont, transfer to Westminster of responsibility for the whole apparatus of law and order comprising not only security operations but complete responsibility for the RUC, the prison services, the internment policy, and the administration of justice.

¶d. Direct rule. "

¶8.190 In addition to the speaking brief, Arthur Hockaday also prepared a draft minute for Lord Carrington to consider sending to Edward Heath and other members of GEN 47. This was intended to encourage the Prime Minister to call an early meeting of the committee, as Lord Carrington was due to travel abroad on 7th January 1972.¹¹ G45A.285.2-4 It included the following passage:²² G45A.285.4

"It is, I suggest, important that we should take stock soon of the progress of the Army's operations against the IRA and of how we expect the situation to develop. There is every reason for satisfaction with the amount of pressure which the Army is now exerting on the terrorists; but it is becoming increasingly clear that there is a distinct limit to how far the terrorists can be rendered ineffective – and, in particular, can be isolated from the Catholic community as a whole, which is crucially important – by military means alone. I am not suggesting that the moment for trying fresh lines of approach has arrived now, but I believe that – at the present rate of attrition on the IRA – it may be reached quite soon: and that, when it is, we shall need to be absolutely ready to take prompt advantage of it if we are to retain the initiative. "

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¶8.191 In his written evidence to this Inquiry, Arthur Hockaday gave his recollections about this period:¹¹ KH9.83

"I believe that my feeling at the time was that, whereas the CGS had usefully highlighted the potential for a political initiative, the opportunity was beginning to slip away from us with perhaps insufficient energy being committed to it. There would have been a lot of work to be done on this kind of a political initiative, and all the time we were, to an extent, trespassing on Home Office turf in the sense that they took the lead on political aspects of the situation in Northern Ireland. This submission was an attempt to give added impetus to the move towards the political initiative… "

¶8.192 Subsequent meetings of GEN 47 and the discussions within Whitehall about the "window of opportunity " for a political initiative are discussed at relevant points later in this report.¹¹ Chapter 9

The resumption of marches

¶8.193 During early December 1971 a debate was conducted within NICRA which led to the decision to "'return to the streets' " unless the United Kingdom Government acceded to a number of demands.¹¹ G42A.277.3 HQNI Intelligence Summary, 16th December 1971; KB2.23 Interview given by Kevin Boyle to John Barry of the Sunday Times, 1972. Kevin Boyle, then NICRA's press officer, told this Inquiry that the decision reflected a feeling that the rent and rates strike and other forms of civil disobedience were not having the desired effect, and something more was needed.²² KB2.12; Day 123/119-120 NICRA's demands were set out at a Belfast press conference in mid-December, where the organisation called for an immediate end to internment, the withdrawal of troops from "anti-Unionist " areas, the abolition of the Special Powers Act and the introduction of laws showing that the United Kingdom Government would not stand in the way of peaceful constitutional progress towards a united Ireland. NICRA warned that a negative response would result in an escalation of the civil disobedience campaign, including the resumption in the New Year of organised protest marches, which had not taken place for many months.³³ GEN5.24-25

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¶8.194 Other activists did not wait that long and instead organised a march on Christmas Day, starting from the Falls Road–Beechmount Avenue junction in West Belfast. The intention was to walk along the M1 motorway to the Long Kesh Internment Camp, but the procession was halted by security barriers placed across the road after about four miles. Following a sit-down protest, the marchers, who included Bernadette Devlin and at least one other MP, retraced their steps without serious incident.¹¹ AM77.45 Extract from McCann, War in an Irish Town; G44C.282.11 HQNI Intelligence Summary, 23rd December 1971; G45AA.285.1.2-3 HQNI Intelligence Summary, 30th December 1971; G47.295, G47.290 Minutes of meeting of the JSC, 6th January 1972; G47A.298.8 Special Branch Assessment for the period 16th December 1971 to 4th January 1972.

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