Front matter — The Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Volume I

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Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry – Volume I dated 15 June 2010 for the

Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry The Rt Hon The Lord Saville of Newdigate (Chairman) The Hon William Hoyt OC The Hon John Toohey AC

Volume I Outline Table of Contents General Introduction Glossary Principal Conclusions and Overall Assessment

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¶Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry The Rt Hon The Lord Saville of Newdigate (Chairman) The Hon William Hoyt OC The Hon John Toohey AC

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¶Volume I Outline Table of Contents General Introduction Glossary Principal Conclusions and Overall Assessment The Background to Bloody Sunday

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¶Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry The Rt Hon The Lord Saville of Newdigate (Chairman) The Hon William Hoyt OC The Hon John Toohey AC

¶VOLUME I

¶Page

¶Outline Table of Contents 1

¶General Introduction 15

¶Principal Conclusions and Overall Assessment 43

¶The Background to Bloody Sunday 101

¶Outline Table of Contents This outline table of contents sets out the volumes and parts into which the report is divided, with the chapter numbers and titles within those parts, and also lists the appendices. In the cases where it is necessary, the parts and chapters themselves contain further, more detailed, tables of contents. The electronic version of the report contains a search facility, enabling the report to be searched for words and phrases.

¶VOLUME I

¶General Introduction 15 Glossary 19

¶Principal Conclusions and Overall Assessment 43

Chapter 1: Introduction — 45
Chapter 2: Outline of events before the day — 48
Chapter 3: The events of the day — 52

¶Chapter 4: The question of responsibility for the deaths and injuries on

Bloody Sunday — 90
Chapter 5: The overall assessment — 99

¶The Background to Bloody Sunday 101

Chapter 6: Introduction — 103

¶VOLUME II

The Division into Sectors — 1
Chapter 10: The five sectors — 1

¶Sector 1: Military Dispositions, the Civil Rights March and Events

in William Street — 3
Chapter 11: The layout of this part of the city — 7
Chapter 12: Military dispositions — 38
Chapter 13: The organisation of the civil rights march — 72
Chapter 14: The beginning of the march — 74
Chapter 15: Rioting at Barrier 14 — 81
Chapter 16: Rioting at other locations — 111
Chapter 17: Machine Gun Platoon and Abbey Taxis — 129
Chapter 18: The shooting of Damien Donaghey and John Johnston — 138
Chapter 19: Other shooting in Sector 1 — 204
Chapter 20: Army orders relating to the arrest operation — 255
Chapter 21: Sectors 2 to 5 — 347

¶VOLUME III Sector 2: The Launch of the Arrest Operation and Events in the Area

of the Rossville Flats (Chapters 22–54) — 1
Chapter 22: General introduction — 7
Chapter 23: The layout of this area of the city — 8

Chapter 24: The movement of Mortar Platoon Armoured Personnel Carriers into the Bogside — 27
Chapter 25: The arrival of Lieutenant N's Armoured Personnel Carrier — 50

¶Chapter 26: The evidence of the soldiers in Lieutenant N's Armoured

Personnel Carrier — 53
Chapter 27: The use of baton guns by Private 013 and Private 019 — 73
Chapter 28: The incident concerning Rosemary Doyle — 74
Chapter 29: The incident concerning Patrick "Barman" Duffy — 85
Chapter 30: Soldiers at the entrance to the Eden Place alleyway — 91
Chapter 31: Other incidents on the Eden Place waste ground — 131
Chapter 32: The arrival of Sergeant O's Armoured Personnel Carrier — 137
Chapter 33: The arrest of William John Dillon — 140

¶Chapter 34: The movement of other soldiers who disembarked from Sergeant O's

Armoured Personnel Carrier in Rossville Street — 160
Chapter 35: The arrest of Charles Canning — 163

¶Chapter 36: Summary of the movements of the soldiers who disembarked from

Sergeant O's Armoured Personnel Carrier in Rossville Street — 170
Chapter 37: The remaining soldiers in Sergeant O's Armoured Personnel Carrier — 171
Chapter 38: The incident concerning Alana Burke — 180
Chapter 39: The incident concerning Thomas Harkin — 186
Chapter 40: The arrest of William John Doherty — 193
Chapter 41: The incident concerning Pat Cashman — 204
Chapter 42: The arrest of James Charles Doherty — 207
Chapter 43: The treatment of Duncan Clark and William John Doherty after arrest — 216

Chapter 44: Conclusions on the treatment of those arrested in Sector 2 — 229

¶Chapter 45: The situation in the Eden Place waste ground and the car park of the

Rossville Flats — 230
Chapter 46: Rioting in the Rossville Flats car park — 233
Chapter 47: The question of nail and blast bomb explosions — 255
Chapter 48: The cocking of rifles by Mortar Platoon soldiers — 269
Chapter 49: The question of gunfire directed at the soldiers — 277

¶Chapter 50: The question of low velocity gunfire directed at Major Loden

and others — 305
Chapter 51: Firing by the soldiers in Sector 2 — 340

¶Chapter 52: Summary of the shots and targets claimed by the soldiers of

Mortar Platoon — 484
Chapter 53: Summary of the firing soldiers' evidence of incoming fire — 490

¶Chapter 54: General summary and consideration of the evidence of the soldiers

of Mortar Platoon in Sector 2 — 497

¶VOLUME IV Sector 2: The Launch of the Arrest Operation and Events in the Area

of the Rossville Flats (Chapters 55–66) — 1
Chapter 55: The casualties in Sector 2 — 5
Chapter 56: The order and position of the known casualties in Sector 2 — 122
Chapter 57: Evidence from the soldiers concerning the known casualties — 125
Chapter 58: Other evidence of paramilitary gunmen in Sector 2 — 134
Chapter 59: When the Support Company vehicles moved forward — 192

Chapter 60: The question of unidentified casualties — 196
Chapter 61: Firing by a soldier in Sector 2 observed by Corporal INQ 444 — 209
Chapter 62: The shooting posture of the soldiers who fired in Sector 2 — 210

¶Chapter 63: Civilian evidence relating to the position on the ground of the

soldiers who shot those hit by gunfire — 220
Chapter 64: The soldiers responsible for the Sector 2 casualties — 249
Chapter 65: C Company — 284
Chapter 66: Arrests at 33 Chamberlain Street — 360

¶VOLUME V

Sector 3: Events in Rossville Street — 1
Chapter 67: Introduction — 5
Chapter 68: The layout of this part of the city — 7
Chapter 69: The movement of the soldiers — 33

¶Chapter 70: The actions of civilians in Rossville Street on and after the arrival

of the Army vehicles — 60
Chapter 71: Rioters coming from the Columbcille Court alleyway — 69
Chapter 72: The high velocity shots heard by Corporal P and Private 017 — 73
Chapter 73: The initial firing by Corporal P — 74
Chapter 74: Private 017's gunman — 92
Chapter 75: Other evidence of a man with a handgun in Rossville Street — 97
Chapter 76: Other firing of baton rounds in Sector 3 — 108
Chapter 77: The injury to Seamus Liddy — 113

Chapter 78: The injury to Mary Smith — 116
Chapter 79: Joseph Lynn and the incident in the derelict building — 122
Chapter 80: The initial movements of the soldiers in Sector 3 — 131

¶Chapter 81: Firing by Anti-Tank Platoon soldiers from the low walls of the

Kells Walk ramp — 137
Chapter 82: Evidence of soldiers of gunmen at or firing from the rubble barricade — 169
Chapter 83: Nail and petrol bombs — 196

¶Chapter 84: Firing by Composite Platoon soldiers from the low walls of the

Kells Walk ramp — 199
Chapter 85: Other shooting by soldiers in Sector 3 — 271
Chapter 86: The casualties in Sector 3 — 311
Chapter 87: The question of unidentified gunfire casualties in Sector 3 — 537

¶Chapter 88: The damage to the south end of the eastern block of Glenfada

Park North — 604
Chapter 89: The soldiers responsible for the Sector 3 casualties — 625

¶VOLUME VI

Sector 4: Events in Glenfada Park North and Abbey Park — 1
Chapter 90: Introduction — 7
Chapter 91: The layout of this part of the city — 12

¶Chapter 92: Civilian evidence of the situation immediately before and as soldiers

entered Glenfada Park North — 18
Chapter 93: The movement of soldiers into Glenfada Park North — 32
Chapter 94: The route of the soldiers into Glenfada Park North — 47

¶Chapter 95: The arrival of Corporal E, Lance Corporal F, Private G and Private H

in Glenfada Park North — 61
Chapter 96: The movements and actions of other members of Anti-Tank Platoon — 63
Chapter 97: The situation in Glenfada Park North on the arrival of the soldiers — 69
Chapter 98: Other military evidence of firing in Glenfada Park North — 96
Chapter 99: Summary of the military evidence — 102
Chapter 100: Consideration of the soldiers' evidence — 105

¶Chapter 101: Civilian evidence of the situation in Glenfada Park North as the

soldiers arrived and opened fire — 112
Chapter 102: Civilian evidence of soldiers firing in Glenfada Park North — 145
Chapter 103: Consideration of civilian evidence — 161
Chapter 104: The casualties in Glenfada Park North — 166
Chapter 105: The movements of the soldiers after the initial shooting — 334
Chapter 106: Abbey Park – the layout of this part of the city — 353
Chapter 107: The shooting and casualties in Abbey Park — 356
Chapter 108: Events following the shooting in Glenfada Park North and Abbey Park — 402
Chapter 109: Accounts of other shooting at civilians in the area of Sector 4 — 445
Chapter 110: The question of unidentified casualties in the area of Sector 4 — 455
Chapter 111: Paramilitary activity in Sector 4 — 491
Chapter 112: The soldiers responsible for the Sector 4 casualties — 573
Chapter 113: Arrests in Sector 4 — 591
Chapter 114: Patrick O'Donnell and the incident at City Cabs — 617

¶VOLUME VII Sector 5: Events in the Area South of the Rossville Flats 1

Chapter 115: Introduction — 3
Chapter 116: The layout of this part of the city — 5

¶Chapter 117: The movement of people through the gap between Blocks 2 and 3

of the Rossville Flats — 30
Chapter 118: The casualties in Sector 5 — 50
Chapter 119: The shooting from Glenfada Park North — 162
Chapter 120: Conclusions on the shooting of the casualties in Sector 5 — 267

¶Later Events in Sector 3 273

Chapter 121: Introduction — 275
Chapter 122: The bodies of Michael McDaid, John Young and William Nash — 276
Chapter 123: Further firing in Sector 3 — 357
Chapter 124: The arrival of the ambulances and other firing — 458

¶Gerald Donaghey and the Nail Bombs 511

Chapter 125: Introduction — 515
Chapter 126: Gerald Donaghey's background — 523
Chapter 127: Gerald Donaghey's movements on the day — 525
Chapter 128: The sighting of nail bombs — 534

¶Chapter 129: Civilian evidence about the aftermath of the shooting of

Gerald Donaghey — 540

Chapter 130: Barrier 20 in Barrack Street — 555
Chapter 131: The Regimental Aid Post at Craigavon Bridge — 566

¶Chapter 132: The arrival of Corporal 150 and Gerald Donaghey at the Regimental

Aid Post — 568

¶Chapter 133: Events after the arrival of Corporal 150 and Gerald Donaghey at

the Regimental Aid Post — 570
Chapter 134: Evidence from Royal Ulster Constabulary officers — 579
Chapter 135: The Ammunition Technical Officer, Captain 127 — 607
Chapter 136: Royal Ulster Constabulary and Royal Military Police photographers — 612
Chapter 137: Other witnesses — 617
Chapter 138: Scientific evidence — 621
Chapter 139: The explosives — 627
Chapter 140: The features of the nail bombs — 631
Chapter 141: The bullet hole in Gerald Donaghey's left jacket pocket — 639
Chapter 142: Means of igniting the nail bombs — 645
Chapter 143: The stocking hose in Gerald Donaghey's jeans pocket — 646
Chapter 144: Other alleged indications that the nail bombs had been planted — 647
Chapter 145: Conclusions — 652

¶VOLUME VIII

Paramilitary Organisations and Activities on Bloody Sunday — 1
Chapter 147: The Provisional IRA — 27

Chapter 148: The Official IRA — 136
Chapter 149: The Fianna — 202
Chapter 150: Paramilitary firing — 252
Chapter 151: Other incidents of paramilitary firing and the response of soldiers — 253
Chapter 152: Other evidence said to show paramilitary firing within the five sectors — 322
Chapter 153: The question of automatic gunfire — 328
Chapter 154: Conclusions on paramilitary activities on Bloody Sunday — 360

¶Fort George 361

Chapter 155: Introduction — 363
Chapter 156: The detention centre at Fort George — 365
Chapter 157: The arrestees taken to Fort George — 370
Chapter 158: The William Street arrests — 375
Chapter 159: The transfer of arrestees from the Bogside to Fort George — 387

¶Chapter 160: The treatment of the arrestees escorted to Fort George by the

Provost Detachment — 399

¶Chapter 161: The treatment of the arrestees escorted to Fort George by members

of C Company — 453
Chapter 162: Identification of arrestees by soldiers at Fort George — 465
Chapter 163: Allegations of complicity on the part of the Royal Ulster Constabulary — 467
Chapter 164: Conclusions — 468

Other Events and Matters — 469
Chapter 165: The Loden List of Engagements — 471
Chapter 166: The live ammunition count, spare rounds and modified rounds — 483
Chapter 167: Firing from the City Walls — 522
Chapter 168: The firing incident concerning Gunner INQ 1255 — 539
The Senior Officers — 541
Chapter 169: Major General Ford — 543
Chapter 170: Brigadier MacLellan — 556
Chapter 171: Lieutenant Colonel Wilford — 558
Chapter 172: Major Loden — 580

¶VOLUME IX

Evidential Matters — 1
Chapter 173: The Royal Military Police statements and maps — 3
Chapter 174: The trajectory photographs — 67
Chapter 175: Missing photographs and other materials — 86

¶Chapter 176: The provenance of the photograph of the scene in Glenfada Park North 100 Chapter 177: The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association statements and the

Keville tapes — 105
Chapter 178: Psyops and military information activity — 117
Chapter 179: Private 027 — 137

¶Army and Police Communications 147

Chapter 181: The hierarchical nature of Army communications — 150
Chapter 182: Signal instructions — 157
Chapter 183: Radio nets operated by the Army in Londonderry — 160
Chapter 184: Observers on the 8th Infantry Brigade net on 30th January 1972 — 164
Chapter 185: The Army monitoring of radio nets on 30th January 1972 — 166

¶Chapter 186: Civilian monitoring of Army and Royal Ulster Constabulary radio

transmissions on 30th January 1972 — 176
Chapter 187: Call signs — 181
Chapter 188: Code words and nicknames — 189
Chapter 189: The BID 150 radio link — 190
Chapter 190: Other means of communication used by the Army — 196
Chapter 191: Interception of Army communications recorded on Bloody Sunday — 200
Chapter 192: Royal Ulster Constabulary communications — 205

¶The Constitutional and Legal Position of the Army in Northern Ireland 209

Chapter 193: The constitutional position of the Army in Northern Ireland — 211
Chapter 194: The legal position of soldiers in Northern Ireland — 231

¶Chapter 195: The validity of regulations concerning soldiers made under the

Northern Ireland Special Powers legislation — 237
Chapter 196: The lawfulness of the arrests on Bloody Sunday — 247

¶VOLUME X

Appendix 1: Matters Relating to the Inquiry — 1
A1.1: The conduct of the Inquiry — 3
A1.2: Representation before the Inquiry — 27

¶Appendix 2: Opening Statement, Principal Rulings of the Tribunal

and the Decisions of Various Courts — 37
Bibliography — 539

¶General Introduction On 29th January 1998 the House of Commons resolved that it was expedient that a tribunal be established for inquiring into a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely "the events on Sunday, 30 January 1972 which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day, taking account of any new information relevant to events on that day". On 2nd February 1998 the House of Lords also passed this resolution. With the exception of the last 12 words, these terms of reference are virtually identical to those for a previous Inquiry held by Lord Widgery (then the Lord Chief Justice) in 1972. Both inquiries were conducted under the provisions of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921.

¶In his statement to the House of Commons on 29th January 1998 the Prime Minister (The Rt Hon Tony Blair MP) said that the timescale within which Lord Widgery produced his report meant that he was not able to consider all the evidence that might have been available. He added that since that report much new material had come to light about the events of the day. In those circumstances, he announced:

¶"We believe that the weight of material now available is such that the events require re-examination. We believe that the only course that will lead to public confidence in the results of any further investigation is to set up a full-scale judicial inquiry into Bloody Sunday."

¶The Prime Minister made clear that the Inquiry should be allowed the time necessary to cover thoroughly and completely all the evidence now available. The collection, analysis, hearing and consideration of this evidence (which is voluminous) have necessarily required a substantial period of time.

¶The Tribunal originally consisted of The Rt Hon the Lord Saville of Newdigate, a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, The Hon William Hoyt OC, formerly the Chief Justice of New Brunswick, Canada, and The Rt Hon Sir Edward Somers, formerly a member of the New Zealand Court of Appeal. Before the Tribunal began hearing oral evidence, Sir Edward Somers retired through ill health. The Hon John Toohey AC, formerly a Justice of the High Court of Australia, took his place. Lord Saville acted throughout as the Chairman of the Inquiry.

¶The footnotes The footnotes provide, among other matters, references to the evidence and submissions on which we have based our views and findings. In the electronic version of this report, references are hypertext-linked, so that by clicking on a reference the reader can refer directly to the evidence or submission under consideration. Where photographs are reproduced in the report, we have in most instances considered it unnecessary to give the reference. The referencing system is the same as that used during the course of the Inquiry to identify the particular matter in question from the materials that were collected, considered and published, so that the reader can follow the references contained in that material. The Tribunal is of the view that with few exceptions the evidence and submissions relating to Bloody Sunday that were made publicly available during the course of the Inquiry should continue to be available, so that the report can be read in conjunction with those materials, which to that end form part of this report. The electronic version of the report provides direct access to these materials, which are also available through the Inquiry website.¹¹ www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org Cross-references within the report to other parts of the report are also footnoted and hypertext-linked. Cross-references are to chapters or to paragraphs within chapters. Thus, for example, a cross-reference to paragraphs 75–100 in Chapter 9 appears as paragraphs 9.75–100.

¶The ranks and titles of witnesses It should be noted that many of the soldiers who gave evidence to this Inquiry had achieved over the years higher rank than that which they had held in January 1972. A number of civilians (for example, Bishop Daly and Sir Edward Heath) were also known at the time of the Inquiry by different titles from those by which they had been known in 1972. During the course of the Inquiry, all witnesses were addressed by the titles that they held at the time at which they gave their evidence. However, in this report we refer to all such witnesses by the rank that they held or the title by which they were known in January 1972.

¶For the reasons that we give below, many witnesses were given ciphers in order to preserve their anonymity and that of their families. We have preserved that anonymity in this report.

General Introduction — 17

¶Legal representatives In the course of the Inquiry, the families of those who were killed, the surviving casualties, and the families of those injured on Bloody Sunday who have since died were represented by various different combinations of counsel and solicitors. Separate teams of counsel instructed by the Treasury Solicitor appeared on behalf of one large group and three smaller groups of former and serving officers and soldiers, while other military witnesses chose not to be represented. In order to avoid undue complication, we have often referred in this report to submissions made by "representatives of the families" or "representatives of soldiers", without distinguishing between the different groups, although where necessary we have been more specific. Further details of the families, surviving casualties, military witnesses and other parties represented in the Inquiry, and of their counsel and solicitors, are given in Appendix 1.

¶Anonymity With the exception of a number of senior officers who gave evidence under their own names, military witnesses who gave evidence to the Widgery Inquiry were granted anonymity in order to protect them and their families. They gave their evidence under ciphers, which were alphabetical for those who said that they had fired live rounds on Bloody Sunday (the "lettered soldiers"), and numerical for the others (the "numbered soldiers"). Some police witnesses were also granted anonymity for the purposes of the Widgery Inquiry.

¶At the outset of this Inquiry there was controversy over whether military witnesses, other than those whose identities were already in the public domain, should be granted anonymity. Rulings of the Tribunal that in general they should not, save where special reasons applied, were quashed on judicial review. The Court of Appeal in London held that the Tribunal was obliged to grant anonymity to those who had fired live rounds. The Tribunal considered that the Court's reasoning applied also to other military witnesses, unless their identities were already clearly in the public domain, and ruled accordingly. Where appropriate, the ciphers used in the Widgery Inquiry were retained, with the addition of the soldier's rank at the time of Bloody Sunday (for example, Corporal A or Sergeant 001). Military witnesses who had been given no cipher in 1972 were identified by a number preceded by their rank and the letters INQ (for example, Sergeant INQ 1). Military witnesses sometimes referred in their statements to another soldier by an incomplete name, a nickname, or a name that otherwise could not be matched to an individual identifiable from official records. In these cases the Inquiry replaced the name with a numerical cipher preceded by the letters UNK (for example, UNK 1).

¶Some of the military witnesses in 1972 were given more than one cipher. While this had the potential to cause confusion, this Inquiry had access to unredacted copies of the witness statements and was able to ensure that they were all attributed to the correct witness.

¶No police officers were granted anonymity in this Inquiry, although some were permitted to give their evidence screened from the view of all but the Tribunal and the lawyers participating in the hearings.

¶Successful applications for anonymity were also made on behalf of a number of other witnesses, including certain Security Service and Army intelligence officers, whose ciphers were alphabetical (for example, Officer A), and certain witnesses who had formerly been members of the Official or Provisional Irish Republican Army (OIRA or PIRA) or otherwise had connections with the republican movement, whose ciphers consisted of numbers preceded by the letters OIRA, PIRA or RM as appropriate (for example, OIRA 1, PIRA 1 or RM 1).

¶The Tribunal had access in all cases to the names of the witnesses who gave evidence to this Inquiry.

¶Glossary In this glossary we provide brief explanations of some of the abbreviations and terminology used in the report, or which appear in some of the documents and other evidence to which we refer. Where necessary, in the report itself we provide further details of, in particular, some of the sources of evidence and the issues to which they gave rise. At the end of the glossary we set out a list showing the hierarchy of Army ranks and the abbreviations sometimes used for them. Cross-references within the glossary to other entries in the glossary appear in italics.

¶Acid bombs These were bottles filled with acid or another corrosive substance, used as anti-personnel weapons.

¶Actuality footage We have used this expression to refer to film footage taken while the events of Bloody Sunday were in progress. The actuality footage available to the Inquiry includes material filmed by two cameramen from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), two from Independent Television News (ITN), one from the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) and one from Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), as well as a film taken from an Army helicopter. There is also a small quantity of actuality footage taken by amateur cameramen, including William McKinney, who was shot dead on Bloody Sunday. Some of the film footage was edited for broadcasting purposes, with the result that the surviving material is not complete and does not necessarily show events in chronological order.

¶Aggro Corner This was a slang name, used mainly by the Army, which referred to the junction of William Street, Rossville Street and Little James Street, where trouble had often occurred in the past.

¶Anti-riot gun See Baton gun.

¶APC Armoured Personnel Carrier. The Humber armoured car was employed routinely as an APC by the Army in Northern Ireland. Several of these vehicles were used on Bloody Sunday. They were often called "Pigs", mainly by soldiers, either on account of their appearance or because they were awkward to drive and uncomfortable to sit in. They were also frequently described, usually by civilians, as "Saracens". However, that term was applied inaccurately, since a Saracen was another type of military vehicle, which was not used on Bloody Sunday.

¶The following photograph, taken by Robert White on Bloody Sunday, shows a Humber APC.

¶The following photograph, taken from David Barzilay, The British Army in Ulster (Belfast: Century Books, 1978 reprint), shows a Saracen.

¶Army units 8 Inf Bde 8th Infantry Brigade.

¶39 Inf Bde 39th Infantry Brigade.

¶1 CG 1st Battalion, The Coldstream Guards.

¶1 PARA 1st Battalion, The Parachute Regiment.

¶1 R ANGLIAN 1st Battalion, The Royal Anglian Regiment.

¶2 RGJ

¶2nd Battalion, The Royal Green Jackets.

¶22 Lt AD Regt

¶22nd Light Air Defence Regiment, Royal Artillery.

¶Arrest report forms When a civilian who had been arrested by a soldier came into the custody of the Royal Military Police (RMP), details of the arrest, including the names of the soldier, the arrested civilian and any witnesses, and the nature of the offence alleged to have been committed, were recorded on what was known as an arrest report form. The form also included space in which to record the date, time and place at which the arrested person was handed over to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and for the RUC to record, where appropriate, the date and time at which the arrested person was charged and whether he or she was kept in custody or released on bail.

¶Barry interviews See Sunday Times interviews.

¶Baton gun A baton gun was a weapon used to fire baton rounds, otherwise known as rubber bullets, for riot control purposes. On Bloody Sunday many of the soldiers were equipped with baton guns. The baton gun was also known by a variety of other names, including "anti-riot gun", "RUC gun", "rubber bullet gun" and "Greener gun".

¶The following photographs show a baton gun.

¶BID 150 In 1972 the Army in Northern Ireland had access to a secure radio system. Secure communications between a brigade and a battalion under its command could be achieved using an adapted military radio together with a piece of encryption equipment called a BID 150. In this Inquiry the term "BID 150" was often used to refer to the radio and the encryption device together. Whether a BID 150 link was in use between Brigade HQ and the Tactical Headquarters of 1 PARA on Bloody Sunday was a matter of dispute, which we consider in the course of the report.

¶Blast bombs Blast bombs were improvised devices that consisted of a detonator and explosive material. They were described by some witnesses as being crude anti-personnel devices and like large fireworks or nail bombs but without the nails. We also heard evidence that they could be made with a larger quantity of explosives in order to be used to damage buildings.

¶Bloody Sunday Inquiry statements In the course of this Inquiry, written statements were obtained from a large number of witnesses, including civilians, former and serving soldiers, priests, journalists, civil servants, politicians and former members of the IRA. The vast majority of these statements (sometimes called "BSI statements") were taken by the solicitors Eversheds, who were retained by this Inquiry for this purpose. For this reason some are also sometimes referred to as "Eversheds statements". The Solicitor to the Inquiry and his assistants also took a number of written statements, and a few were submitted by witnesses or their solicitors.

¶Brigade HQ The headquarters of 8th Infantry Brigade, located at Ebrington Barracks, Londonderry.

¶Brigade net This was the radio network used to provide communications between Brigade HQ and the headquarters of the battalions and other units under its command. Separate radio networks were used for communications between the headquarters of each battalion and its constituent companies. See also Ulsternet.

¶Capper tapes David Capper was a BBC Radio reporter who covered the march on Bloody Sunday. He carried a reel-to-reel tape recorder on which he recorded his commentary on the march. Other voices and sounds are also audible on the recording. The Inquiry obtained a copy of the recording and arranged for a transcript to be made.

¶CS gas This is a type of tear gas, which could be fired in grenades or cartridges as a riot control agent.

¶DIFS The Department of Industrial and Forensic Science. This department, which formed part of the Ministry of Commerce of the Government of Northern Ireland, was responsible for the forensic tests carried out shortly after Bloody Sunday on hand swabs and clothing obtained from those who had been killed. It was also responsible for matching two bullets, recovered from the bodies of Gerald Donaghey and Michael Kelly, to rifles fired by soldiers on that day.

¶Donagh Place The seventh, eighth and ninth floors of the Rossville Flats were known as Donagh Place.

¶Embassy Ballroom The Embassy Ballroom was located on the west side of Strand Road, close to the northern corner of Waterloo Place. In January 1972 the Army occupied the top floor of the building. Two Observation Posts (OPs) were sited on the roof. OP Echo gave views of William Street, Little James Street, Chamberlain Street, the waste ground north of the Rossville Flats, and the Rossville Flats themselves, including the roofs. OP Foxtrot overlooked Strand Road and Waterloo Place. On Bloody Sunday members of 11 Battery 22 Lt AD Regt manned both these OPs.

¶Eversheds statements See Bloody Sunday Inquiry statements.

¶Ferguson and Thomson interviews Lena Ferguson and Alexander Thomson were ITN journalists who interviewed a number of former soldiers for the purposes of a Channel 4 News investigation of Bloody Sunday, which resulted in a series of broadcasts transmitted in 1997 and 1998.

¶Ferret scout car The Ferret was a lightly armoured scout car which had a two-man crew. On Bloody Sunday, Support Company, 1 PARA used one Ferret scout car, on which a Browning machine gun was mounted. This weapon was not used on Bloody Sunday.

¶The photograph below, taken by Colman Doyle on Bloody Sunday, shows the Ferret scout car used on that day.

¶Garvan Place The first, second and third floors of the Rossville Flats were known as Garvan Place.

¶Gin Palace The vehicle in which the tactical headquarters of 1 PARA was located was colloquially known as the Gin Palace.

¶Greener gun See Baton gun.

¶Grimaldi tape See North tape.

¶HQNI Headquarters of the Army in Northern Ireland, located in Lisburn, County Antrim.

¶Humber armoured car See APC.

¶IRA Irish Republican Army. By 1972 this had split into two separate organisations, the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA. In many cases witnesses and documents referred simply to the IRA, without differentiating between these two organisations.

¶Jacobson interviews See Sunday Times interviews.

¶Keville interviews Kathleen Keville was in Londonderry in January 1972 as a researcher for a film crew making a documentary about Northern Ireland. She had met members of the local civil rights organisation on a previous visit to the city. She took part in the march on 30th January 1972. On the evening of that day and into the next, she recorded the accounts of a number of civilian witnesses on audio tape. Many of these recordings were used to prepare typed statements, which were not always verbatim transcripts of the recordings and were not generally signed by the witnesses. The Inquiry received all the original tape recordings from Kathleen Keville and arranged for them to be fully transcribed. In this report, when referring to what a witness said as recorded by Kathleen Keville, we usually describe this as the witness's "Keville interview".

¶Keville tapes See Keville interviews.

¶Knights of Malta The Order of Malta Ambulance Corps is an ambulance and first aid organisation administered by the Irish Association of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta. Several members of the Derry Unit of the Ambulance Corps were on duty at the march on 30th January 1972 and provided first aid services. They were readily identifiable in that they wore either the dress uniform of the Ambulance Corps (a grey coat and trousers with cap) or its medical uniform (a white coat). They were often, although inaccurately, described by witnesses as Knights of Malta.

¶L1A1 This was the technical designation for the 7.62mm self-loading rifle. See SLR.

¶L42A1 This was the technical designation for the bolt-action .303in rifle converted to take 7.62mm ammunition. See Sniper rifle.

¶L2A2 This was the technical designation for standard issue 7.62mm NATO ball ammunition, which was used in the L1A1 SLR and the L42A1 sniper rifle.

¶M1 carbine The M1 carbine is a semi-automatic or self-loading weapon that, in its standard form, comes with a fixed wooden stock. It was calibrated for a .30in cartridge. The weapon is sometimes described as being of medium velocity although some witnesses to the Inquiry referred to it as a high velocity weapon. There is evidence before the Inquiry to suggest that in Londonderry on 30th January 1972 the Official IRA possessed at least one M1 carbine and the Provisional IRA at least two. The weapon was not issued to any soldiers.

¶The following photographs show an M1 carbine.

¶Mahon interviews Paul Mahon is a former member of Liverpool City Council who completed an academic dissertation on the events of Bloody Sunday in 1997. Thereafter he undertook further substantial research into the subject with the benefit of funding from an English businessman. In the course of this research he conducted a large number of recorded interviews of witnesses. He also co-operated with some of the solicitors acting for the families of the deceased and for the wounded, and for a time was employed by those acting for two of the wounded, Michael Bradley and Michael Bridge. The great majority of those interviewed by Paul Mahon were civilian witnesses.

¶Paul Mahon provided the Inquiry with both audiotapes and video recordings. The Inquiry arranged for the transcription of these recorded interviews.

¶McGovern interviews Jimmy (James) McGovern was the scriptwriter of Sunday, a dramatisation of some of the events of Bloody Sunday. The programme was co-produced by Gaslight Productions Ltd and Box TV Ltd. It was broadcast on Channel 4 on 28th January 2002 to mark the 30th anniversary of Bloody Sunday. In preparing for the programme, Jimmy McGovern and Stephen Gargan of Gaslight Productions Ltd conducted a series of interviews with civilian witnesses to the events of Bloody Sunday. These interviews were recorded on audio tape. We were supplied with transcripts of these interviews together with the recordings. In addition, members of the production team conducted a number of interviews with civilians and former soldiers, which were not recorded. The notes of these interviews, where available, were also provided to the Inquiry.

¶Mura Place The fourth, fifth and sixth floors of the Rossville Flats were known as Mura Place.

¶Nail bombs These were improvised explosive devices containing nails as shrapnel. In Northern Ireland in the early 1970s, the use of nail bombs was associated particularly with the Provisional IRA. The typical nail bomb used at that time was a small cylindrical anti-personnel device, designed to be thrown by hand, which contained a fuse, a high explosive charge and a quantity of nails. These were sometimes inserted into an empty food or drink can, but by 1972 it had become more common for the components to be bound together with adhesive tape than for a can to be used.

¶The photograph below, which was obtained from the Regimental Headquarters of the Parachute Regiment, shows an unexploded nail bomb recovered during or after a riot in 1971.

¶NCCL National Council for Civil Liberties. NCCL, now known as Liberty, is a civil rights organisation based in London, to which NICRA was affiliated.

¶NICRA Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association. NICRA was founded in 1967. The organisation campaigned for civil rights and social justice.

¶NICRA statements Over a period that began on the evening of Bloody Sunday and continued for several days thereafter, statements were taken from a large number of civilian witnesses in a process coordinated by NCCL and NICRA. The statement takers were volunteers. They interviewed witnesses and prepared handwritten statements, which were usually signed by both the witness and the statement taker. Typed versions of these statements were then produced. The statements gathered by NICRA and NCCL also included unsigned typed statements prepared from the recordings made by Kathleen Keville (see Keville interviews). We have referred to the statements collected by NICRA and NCCL either as "NICRA statements", the term by which they were generally known during the Inquiry, or, where appropriate, as "Keville interviews".

¶North tape Susan North was the assistant of Fulvio Grimaldi, an Italian photographer and journalist. She and Fulvio Grimaldi both took part in the civil rights march on Bloody Sunday. Susan North carried a tape recorder, which she used to record some of the events that occurred on that day. The Inquiry obtained a copy of her recording and arranged for it to be transcribed. The tape is sometimes referred to as the "Grimaldi tape".

¶Observer galley proofs The Observer newspaper had intended to publish a substantial article about Bloody Sunday in its edition of 6th February 1972, but did not proceed because of a concern that publication might be regarded as contempt of the Widgery Inquiry. However, the article existed in draft form and the galley proofs have survived.

¶OIRA Official Irish Republican Army. See IRA.

¶OP Observation Post.

¶Petrol bombs These were improvised devices consisting of a bottle filled with petrol (gasoline), with a fuse of cloth or similar material, which was lit before the bottle was thrown.

¶Pig See APC.

¶PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army. See IRA.

¶Porter tapes James Porter was an electrical engineer and radio enthusiast who had been recording Army and Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) radio communications in Londonderry since 1969. He provided the Inquiry with copies of a number of his tapes, including his recordings of transmissions on the Brigade net and on the RUC radio network on Bloody Sunday. The Inquiry made transcripts of these recordings.

¶Praxis interviews Praxis Films Ltd, a film and television production company, made a documentary entitled Bloody Sunday which was broadcast as part of Channel 4's Secret History series on 5th December 1991, a few weeks before the 20th anniversary of Bloody Sunday. In the course of researching and making the programme, the producer John Goddard, the director and scriptwriter Tony Stark and the researcher Neil Davies interviewed a large number of civilian and military witnesses. Neil Davies is a former member of Support Company, 1 PARA, although he left the Army in 1969 and never served in Northern Ireland. It appears that not all of the research material for the programme survived, but the Inquiry obtained notes and transcripts of many of the interviews.

¶Pringle interviews See Sunday Times interviews.

¶RMP Royal Military Police. The RMP are the Army's specialists in investigations and policing and are responsible for policing the United Kingdom military community worldwide.

¶RMP maps The RMP statements taken from each of the soldiers who fired live ammunition on Bloody Sunday were accompanied by a map marked in typescript to show the position of that soldier at the time he fired and the location of his target or targets. In some cases the RMP statements of soldiers who did not fire live ammunition were also accompanied by maps marked to show relevant locations.

¶It appears that the RMP maps were prepared after the statements were taken, from the information given in the statements. It also appears that the RMP maps were neither checked nor signed by the soldiers making the statements.

¶RMP statements It was normal procedure in 1972 for the RMP to conduct an investigation following an incident in which a soldier had fired live ammunition. Beginning on the evening of Bloody Sunday, statements were taken from those soldiers who admitted firing shots. In addition a number of statements were taken from other soldiers. These statements were taken predominantly by members of the Special Investigation Branch (SIB) of the RMP. The statements were handwritten on standard statement forms from which typed versions were then made.

¶Rodgers film Michael Rodgers, an amateur cameraman, took part in the march on 30th January 1972 and used a cine camera to film some of the events that occurred on that day. His film footage was later transferred to a video recording, a copy of which was provided to the Inquiry.

¶Rubber bullet gun See Baton gun.

¶RUC Royal Ulster Constabulary. This was the civilian police force in Northern Ireland. The present police force is called the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).

¶RUC gun See Baton gun.

¶RUC statements On and after Bloody Sunday, RUC officers took statements from a number of witnesses, including several of those who had been wounded. RUC officers who had been on duty in Londonderry also submitted reports to their superiors of what they had themselves seen and heard.

¶Saracen See APC.

¶Sayle Report Harold Evans was editor of the Sunday Times newspaper in January 1972. He informed this Inquiry that immediately after the events of Bloody Sunday he sent general reporters Murray Sayle and Derek Humphry, along with Peter Pringle of the Sunday Times Insight Team, to Londonderry. At some stage that week Murray Sayle, Derek Humphry and (he thought) Peter Pringle telephoned in their findings. Harold Evans told us that these findings ran into two difficulties. In the first place, those in charge of the Insight Team were concerned as to whether the sources had been exposed to close enough scrutiny. They were strongly against publishing what came to be known as the Sayle Report as it stood. The second consideration in Harold Evans' mind regarding the Sayle Report was that Lord Widgery, the Lord Chief Justice, had made it clear that he would regard publication during his inquiry as a serious handicap, so much so that he would regard such publication as a contempt of court. These two considerations Ied Harold Evans to decide not to publish the article, but to conduct another investigation, using the Sunday Times Insight Team, led by John Barry. The Sunday Times provided this Inquiry with a copy of the Sayle Report. See also Sunday Times interviews.

¶SLR The L1A1 self-loading rifle (SLR) was the standard issue high velocity rifle in general infantry service in the Army in 1972. It was used with 7.62mm L2A2 ammunition. On Bloody Sunday the majority of soldiers carried SLRs.

¶The following photographs show an SLR.

¶SMG Sub-machine gun. See Sterling sub-machine gun and Thompson sub-machine gun.

¶Sniper rifle The L42A1 sniper rifle was a bolt action .303in rifle converted to take 7.62mm L2A2 ammunition. On Bloody Sunday a small number of soldiers carried sniper rifles.

¶The photographs below show a sniper rifle.

¶Sterling sub-machine gun The Sterling was a low velocity 9mm SMG. A small number of soldiers carried Sterling SMGs on Bloody Sunday. The Derry Brigade of the Official IRA may also have possessed a Sterling SMG.

¶The following photographs show a Sterling SMG.

¶Sunday Times interviews In the week following Bloody Sunday, journalists from the Insight Team of the Sunday Times newspaper began a major investigation of the events of that day. The investigation continued while the Widgery Inquiry was sitting, and culminated in the publication of a substantial article in the Sunday Times on 23rd April 1972, four days after the report of the Widgery Inquiry had been presented to Parliament. The Insight editor, John Barry, led the investigation. He and two other Insight journalists, Philip Jacobson and Peter Pringle, interviewed a large number of witnesses in Londonderry, including members of the Official IRA and Provisional IRA. The Sunday Times provided this Inquiry with such material from the Insight investigation, including notes and transcripts of the interviews conducted by John Barry and his colleagues, as has survived in the newspaper's archive.

¶Taylor interviews Peter Taylor is a broadcaster and author who has made many documentaries and written several books about the conflict in Northern Ireland since his first visit there on Bloody Sunday. He conducted on-the-record filmed interviews of a number of civilian and military witnesses in the course of making a documentary entitled Remember Bloody Sunday, which was broadcast by the BBC on 28th January 1992 to mark the 20th anniversary of Bloody Sunday. Transcripts of these interviews were supplied to the Inquiry.

¶Thompson sub-machine gun The Thompson SMG is a low velocity automatic weapon also capable of firing single shots. There is evidence before the Inquiry to suggest that on 30th January 1972 the Official IRA in Londonderry possessed at least one Thompson SMG and the Provisional IRA at least two. The weapon was not issued to any soldiers.

¶The photograph below shows a Thompson SMG.

¶Trajectory photographs At the request of the Widgery Inquiry, a series of aerial photographs of the relevant area of Londonderry was created in February 1972 to illustrate the trajectories of the shots that soldiers claimed to have fired on Bloody Sunday. Each photograph was marked to show the positions of the soldier and of his target, as the soldier had described them; the line of fire between those positions; and in some cases the number of shots that the soldier claimed to have fired. One or more of these photographs was created for each soldier of 1 PARA who acknowledged that he had fired his rifle on Bloody Sunday.

¶Ulsternet The Ulsternet was a radio network used by the Army throughout Northern Ireland at the time of Bloody Sunday. It provided the main radio link between the headquarters of each brigade and the units under its command. Transmissions on the Ulsternet could be monitored at HQNI but the system was not used as the primary means of communication between HQNI and 8th Infantry

¶Brigade headquarters. The Ulsternet was in use on Bloody Sunday as the Brigade net, providing communications between 8th Infantry Brigade Headquarters at Ebrington Barracks and the units under its command, including 1 PARA. Virtual reality model This was a computer simulation of the Bogside as it was in 1972, which was developed for use by this Inquiry in order to assist witnesses in giving their accounts of what they had heard and seen on Bloody Sunday. This was of particular assistance because the area has changed since 1972.

¶Widgery Inquiry Following resolutions passed on 1st February 1972 in both Houses of Parliament at Westminster and in both Houses of the Parliament of Northern Ireland, the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Widgery, was appointed to conduct an Inquiry under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 into "the events on Sunday, 30th January which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day". Lord Widgery was the sole member of the Tribunal. He sat at the County Hall, Coleraine, for a preliminary hearing on 14th February 1972 and for the main hearings from 21st February 1972 to 14th March 1972. He heard closing speeches on 16th, 17th and 20th March 1972 at the Royal Courts of Justice in London. The Report of the Widgery Inquiry was presented to Parliament on 19th April 1972.

¶Widgery statements The Deputy Treasury Solicitor, Basil Hall (later Sir Basil Hall), was appointed as the Solicitor to the Widgery Inquiry. For the purposes of that Inquiry, he and his assistants interviewed a large number of witnesses and prepared written statements from the interviews. A smaller number of witnesses submitted their own statements to the Widgery Inquiry, either directly or through solicitors. This Inquiry obtained copies of all the Widgery Inquiry statements.

¶Widgery transcripts Transcripts are available of all the oral hearings of the Widgery Inquiry. During those hearings, witnesses were often asked to illustrate their evidence by reference to a model of the Bogside area which had been made for that purpose. It is occasionally not possible to follow the explanation recorded in the transcripts without knowing to which part of the model the witness was pointing.

¶This Inquiry tried unsuccessfully to locate the model used at the Widgery Inquiry. Although the original model appears not to have survived, it can be seen in the following photograph.

¶Widgery Tribunal See Widgery Inquiry.

¶Yellow Card Every soldier serving in Northern Ireland was issued with a copy of a card, entitled "Instructions by the Director of Operations for Opening Fire in Northern Ireland", which defined the circumstances in which he was permitted to open fire. This card was known as the Yellow Card. All soldiers were expected to be familiar with, and to obey, the rules contained in it. The Yellow Card was first issued in September 1969 and was revised periodically thereafter. The fourth edition of the Yellow Card, issued in November 1971, was current on 30th January 1972.

¶List of Army ranks The list below shows, in order of seniority, the Army ranks to which we refer in this report, together with the abbreviations sometimes used for them. Lieutenant Generals and Major Generals are both commonly referred to and addressed simply as General, and similarly Lieutenant Colonels as Colonel.

¶Officers Field Marshal FM General Gen Lieutenant General Lt Gen Major General Maj Gen Brigadier Brig Colonel Col Lieutenant Colonel Lt Col Major Maj Captain Capt Lieutenant Lt Second Lieutenant 2 Lt

¶Warrant Officers Warrant Officer Class I WOI Warrant Officer Class II WOII

¶Senior non-commissioned officers Equivalent ranks Colour Sergeant C/Sgt Staff Sergeant S/Sgt Sergeant Sgt

¶Junior non-commissioned officers Equivalent ranks Corporal Cpl Lance Sergeant L/Sgt

¶Bombardier Bdr Lance Corporal L/Cpl Lance Bombardier L/Bdr

¶Soldiers Equivalent ranks Private Pte Guardsman Gdsm

Gunner Gnr Rifleman Rfn

¶Principal Conclusions and Overall Assessment

¶Page

Chapter 1: Introduction — 45
Chapter 2: Outline of events before the day — 48
Chapter 3: The events of the day — 52
Events before the arrest operation — 3.1
The arrest operation — 3.14
The casualties in the Bogside — 3.27
The soldiers who shot the casualties — 3.43
Why the soldiers shot the casualties — 3.67
Other firing by soldiers on Bloody Sunday — 3.114
The arrest of civilians — 3.120

¶Chapter 4: The question of responsibility for the deaths

and injuries on Bloody Sunday — 90
The United Kingdom and Northern Ireland Governments and the Army — 4.2
Major General Ford — 4.8
Brigadier MacLellan — 4.13
Lieutenant Colonel Wilford — 4.15
Major Loden — 4.26
Lieutenant N — 4.30
Lieutenant 119 — 4.31
Captain 200 and Sergeant INQ 441 — 4.32
The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association — 4.33
Chapter 5: The overall assessment — 99