2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988–1992)

¶A decade of conflict in Afghanistan, from 1979 to 1989, gave Islamist extremists a rallying point and training field. A Communist government in Afghanistan gained power in 1978 but was unable to establish enduring control. At the end of 1979, the Soviet government sent in military units to ensure that the country would remain securely under Moscow's influence. The response was an Afghan national resistance movement that defeated Soviet forces.¹⁹¹⁹ "Open resistance flared so quickly that only two months after the invasion . . . almost the entire population of Kabul climbed on their rooftops and chanted with one voice,'God is great.'This open defiance of the Russian generals who could physically destroy their city was matched throughout the countryside." General (Ret.) Mohammed Yahya Nawwroz and Lester W. Grau,"The Soviet War in Afghanistan; History and Harbinger of Future War?" Military Review (Fort Leavenworth Foreign Military Studies Office), Sept./Oct. 1995, p. 2.Show full note

¶Young Muslims from around the world flocked to Afghanistan to join as volunteers in what was seen as a "holy war"-jihad-against an invader. The largest numbers came from the Middle East. Some were Saudis, and among them was Usama Bin Ladin.

¶Twenty-three when he arrived in Afghanistan in 1980, Bin Ladin was the seventeenth of 57 children of a Saudi construction magnate. Six feet five and thin, Bin Ladin appeared to be ungainly but was in fact quite athletic, skilled as a horseman, runner, climber, and soccer player. He had attended Abdul Aziz University in Saudi Arabia. By some accounts, he had been interested there in religious studies, inspired by tape recordings of fiery sermons by Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian and a disciple of Qutb. Bin Ladin was conspicuous among the volunteers not because he showed evidence of religious learning but because he had access to some of his family's huge fortune. Though he took part in at least one actual battle, he became known chiefly as a person who generously helped fund the anti-Soviet jihad.²⁰²⁰ Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Columbia Univ. Press, 2002), pp. 16–23. Regarding UBL's access to his family's fortune, see Rick Newcomb interview (Feb. 4, 2004);William Wechsler interview (Jan. 7, 2004).

¶Bin Ladin understood better than most of the volunteers the extent to which the continuation and eventual success of the jihad in Afghanistan depended on an increasingly complex, almost worldwide organization. This organization included a financial support network that came to be known as the "Golden Chain," put together mainly by financiers in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. Donations flowed through charities or other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Bin Ladin and the "Afghan Arabs" drew largely on funds raised by this network, whose agents roamed world markets to buy arms and supplies for the mujahideen, or "holy warriors."²¹²¹ Government's Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements, United States v. Enaam Arnaout, No. 02-CR-892 (N.D. Ill. filed Jan. 6, 2003).

¶Mosques, schools, and boardinghouses served as recruiting stations in many parts of the world, including the United States. Some were set up by Islamic extremists or their financial backers. Bin Ladin had an important part in this activity. He and the cleric Azzam had joined in creating a "Bureau of Services" (Mektab al Khidmat, or MAK), which channeled recruits into Afghanistan.²²²² Intelligence report,Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin's Historical Links to 'Abdallah Azzam, Apr. 18, 1997. By most accounts, Bin Ladin initially viewed Azzam as a mentor, and became in effect his partner by providing financial backing for the MAK.

¶The international environment for Bin Ladin's efforts was ideal. Saudi Arabia and the United States supplied billions of dollars worth of secret assistance to rebel groups in Afghanistan fighting the Soviet occupation. This assistance was funneled through Pakistan: the Pakistani military intelligence service (Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, or ISID), helped train the rebels and distribute the arms. But Bin Ladin and his comrades had their own sources of support and training, and they received little or no assistance from the United States.²³²³ In his memoir,Ayman al Zawahiri contemptuously rejects the claim that the Arab mujahideen were financed (even "one penny") or trained by the United States. See Zawahiri,"Knights Under the Prophet's Banner," Al Sharq al Awsat, Dec. 2, 2001. CIA officials involved in aiding the Afghan resistance regard Bin Ladin and his "Arab Afghans" as having been militarily insignificant in the war and recall having little to do with him. Gary Schroen interview (Mar. 3, 2003).Show full note

¶April 1988 brought victory for the Afghan jihad. Moscow declared it would pull its military forces out of Afghanistan within the next nine months. As the Soviets began their withdrawal, the jihad's leaders debated what to do next.

¶Bin Ladin and Azzam agreed that the organization successfully created for Afghanistan should not be allowed to dissolve. They established what they called a base or foundation (al Qaeda) as a potential general headquarters for future jihad.²⁴²⁴ See Abdullah Azzam,"Al Qaeda al Sulbah" (The solid foundation), Al Jihad, Apr. 1988, p. 46. Though Azzam had been considered number one in the MAK, by August 1988 Bin Ladin was clearly the leader (emir) of al Qaeda. This organization's structure included as its operating arms an intelligence component, a military committee, a financial committee, a political committee, and a committee in charge of media affairs and propaganda. It also had an Advisory Council (Shura) made up of Bin Ladin's inner circle.²⁵²⁵ A wealth of information on al Qaeda's evolution and history has been obtained from materials seized in recent years, including files labeled "Tareekh Usama" (Usama's history) and "Tareekh al Musadat" (History of the Services Bureau). For descriptions of and substantial excerpts from these files, see Government's Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements, United States v. Arnaout, Jan. 6, 2003. See also Intelligence report, Terrorism: Historical Background of the Islamic Army and bin Ladin's Move from Afghanistan to Sudan, Nov. 26, 1996; DOD document, "Al-Qaeda," AFGP-2002-000080 (translated). For a particularly useful insight into the evolution of al Qaeda—written by an early Bin Ladin associate, Adel Batterjee, under a pseudo-nym—see Basil Muhammad, Al Ansar al Arab fi Afghanistan (The Arab volunteers in Afghanistan) (Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) and World Association of Muslim Youth, 1991).Show full note

¶Bin Ladin's assumption of the helm of al Qaeda was evidence of his growing self-confidence and ambition. He soon made clear his desire for unchallenged control and for preparing the mujahideen to fight anywhere in the world. Azzam, by contrast, favored continuing to fight in Afghanistan until it had a true Islamist government. And, as a Palestinian, he saw Israel as the top priority for the next stage.²⁶²⁶ Government's Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements, United States v.Arnaout, Jan. 6, 2003.

¶Whether the dispute was about power, personal differences, or strategy, it ended on November 24, 1989, when a remotely controlled car bomb killed Azzam and both of his sons. The killers were assumed to be rival Egyptians. The outcome left Bin Ladin indisputably in charge of what remained of the MAK and al Qaeda.²⁷²⁷ See FBI report of investigation, interview of Jamal al Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 23.

¶Through writers like Qutb, and the presence of Egyptian Islamist teachers in the Saudi educational system, Islamists already had a strong intellectual influence on Bin Ladin and his al Qaeda colleagues. By the late 1980s, the Egyptian Islamist movement—badly battered in the government crackdown following President Sadat's assassination—was centered in two major organizations: the Islamic Group and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. A spiritual guide for both, but especially the Islamic Group, was the so-called Blind Sheikh, Omar Abdel Rahman. His preaching had inspired the assassination of Sadat. After being in and out of Egyptian prisons during the 1980s,Abdel Rahman found refuge in the United States. From his headquarters in Jersey City, he distributed messages calling for the murder of unbelievers.²⁸²⁸ Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House, 2002), pp. 6–7, 57–63, 83–85; United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 104–105, 123–124 (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 1996).

¶The most important Egyptian in Bin Ladin's circle was a surgeon, Ayman al Zawahiri, who led a strong faction of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Many of his followers became important members in the new organization, and his own close ties with Bin Ladin led many to think of him as the deputy head of al Qaeda. He would in fact become Bin Ladin's deputy some years later, when they merged their organizations.²⁹²⁹ Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, pp. 25–27; DOD document,"Union Agreement between Jama'at Qaedat Ansar Allah (The Base Group of Allah Supporters) and Jama'at Al-Jihad (Jihad Group)," AFGP-2002-000081, undated; Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, p. 103.

Bin Ladin Moves to Sudan

¶By the fall of 1989, Bin Ladin had sufficient stature among Islamic extremists that a Sudanese political leader, Hassan al Turabi, urged him to transplant his whole organization to Sudan. Turabi headed the National Islamic Front in a coalition that had recently seized power in Khartoum.³⁰³⁰ Trial testimony of Jamal al Fadl, United States v. Usama bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (S.D. N.Y.), Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 218–219, 233); Feb. 13, 2001 (transcript pp. 514–516); Feb. 20, 2001 (transcript p. 890). Fadl says this invitation was delivered by a Sudanese delegation that visited Bin Ladin in Afghanistan. See also CIA analytic report, "Al-Qa'ida in Sudan, 1992–1996: Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths," CTC 200340028CHX, Mar. 10, 2003.Show full note Bin Ladin agreed to help Turabi in an ongoing war against African Christian separatists in southern Sudan and also to do some road building. Turabi in return would let Bin Ladin use Sudan as a base for worldwide business operations and for preparations for jihad.³¹³¹ See Intelligence report,Terrorism: Historical Background of the Islamic Army and bin Ladin's Move from Afghanistan to Sudan, Nov. 26, 1996. While agents of Bin Ladin began to buy property in Sudan in 1990,³²³² Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 220–224). Bin Ladin himself moved from Afghanistan back to Saudi Arabia.

¶In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Bin Ladin, whose efforts in Afghanistan had earned him celebrity and respect, proposed to the Saudi monarchy that he summon mujahideen for a jihad to retake Kuwait. He was rebuffed, and the Saudis joined the U.S.-led coalition. After the Saudis agreed to allow U.S. armed forces to be based in the Kingdom, Bin Ladin and a number of Islamic clerics began to publicly denounce the arrangement. The Saudi government exiled the clerics and undertook to silence Bin Ladin by, among other things, taking away his passport. With help from a dissident member of the royal family, he managed to get out of the country under the pretext of attending an Islamic gathering in Pakistan in April 1991.³³³³ For Bin Ladin's confrontation with the Saudi regime, see, e.g., Peter L. Bergen, Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Ladin (Touchstone, 2001), pp. 80–82. On aid provided by a dissident member of the royal family, see Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Sept. 27, 2003; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, Sept. 26, 2003. See also FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996.Show full note By 1994, the Saudi government would freeze his financial assets and revoke his citizenship.³⁴³⁴ Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda ,p. 34. He no longer had a country he could call his own.

¶Bin Ladin moved to Sudan in 1991 and set up a large and complex set of intertwined business and terrorist enterprises. In time, the former would encompass numerous companies and a global network of bank accounts and nongovernmental institutions. Fulfilling his bargain with Turabi, Bin Ladin used his construction company to build a new highway from Khartoum to Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast. Meanwhile, al Qaeda finance officers and top operatives used their positions in Bin Ladin's businesses to acquire weapons, explosives, and technical equipment for terrorist purposes. One founding member, Abu Hajer al Iraqi, used his position as head of a Bin Ladin investment company to carry out procurement trips from western Europe to the Far East. Two others,Wadi al Hage and Mubarak Douri, who had become acquainted in Tucson, Arizona, in the late 1980s, went as far afield as China, Malaysia, the Philippines, and the former Soviet states of Ukraine and Belarus.³⁵³⁵ Intelligence report, Bin Ladin's business activities in 1992, Mar. 31, 1994; Intelligence report, Terrorism: Historical Background of the Islamic Army and bin Ladin's Move from Afghanistan to Sudan, Nov. 26, 1996; CIA analytic report,"Old School Ties," Mar. 10, 2003.

¶Bin Ladin's impressive array of offices covertly provided financial and other support for terrorist activities. The network included a major business enterprise in Cyprus; a "services" branch in Zagreb; an office of the Benevolence International Foundation in Sarajevo, which supported the Bosnian Muslims in their conflict with Serbia and Croatia; and an NGO in Baku, Azerbaijan, that was employed as well by Egyptian Islamic Jihad both as a source and conduit for finances and as a support center for the Muslim rebels in Chechnya. He also made use of the already-established Third World Relief Agency (TWRA) headquartered in Vienna, whose branch office locations included Zagreb and Budapest. (Bin Ladin later set up an NGO in Nairobi as a cover for operatives there.)³⁶³⁶ Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 6, 2001 (transcript pp. 301–302, 305–306, 315–317, 367–368); Intelligence report,Terrorism: Historical Background of the Islamic Army and bin Ladin's Move from Afghanistan to Sudan, Nov. 26, 1996; CIA analytic report,"Old School Ties," Mar. 10, 2003.

¶Bin Ladin now had a vision of himself as head of an international jihad confederation. In Sudan, he established an "Islamic Army Shura" that was to serve as the coordinating body for the consortium of terrorist groups with which he was forging alliances. It was composed of his own al Qaeda Shura together with leaders or representatives of terrorist organizations that were still independent. In building this Islamic army, he enlisted groups from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Oman, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Somalia, and Eritrea. Al Qaeda also established cooperative but less formal relationships with other extremist groups from these same countries; from the African states of Chad, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Uganda; and from the Southeast Asian states of Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Bin Ladin maintained connections in the Bosnian conflict as well.³⁷³⁷ See Intelligence report, Bin Ladin's business activities in 1992, Mar. 31, 1994; Intelligence report, Shipment of Arms and Boats to Yemen for Use by an Islamic Extremist,Aug. 9, 1996; Intelligence report,Terrorism: Responsibilities and Background of Islamic Army Shura Council, Dec. 19, 1996; CIA analytic report,"Old School Ties," Mar. 10, 2003; FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Nov. 12, 1996; CIA analytic report, "Usama Bin Ladin:Al-Qa'ida's Business and Financial Links in Southeast Asia," CTC 2002-40066CH, June 6, 2002. For Bin Ladin's involvement in the Bosnian conflicts, see Evan F. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe:The Afghan-Bosnian Network (Berg, 2004).Show full note The groundwork for a true global terrorist network was being laid.

¶Bin Ladin also provided equipment and training assistance to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines and also to a newly forming Philippine group that called itself the Abu Sayyaf Brigade, after one of the major Afghan jihadist commanders.³⁸³⁸ Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript p. 354); FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Fadl, Nov. 10, 1996; Dec. 21, 1998;"RP Cops Aware of Long-Term Rightwing Muslim Connection," Manila Times, Apr. 26, 2002. Al Qaeda helped Jemaah Islamiya (JI), a nascent organization headed by Indonesian Islamists with cells scattered across Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. It also aided a Pakistani group engaged in insurrectionist attacks in Kashmir. In mid-1991, Bin Ladin dispatched a band of supporters to the northern Afghanistan border to assist the Tajikistan Islamists in the ethnic conflicts that had been boiling there even before the Central Asian departments of the Soviet Union became independent states.³⁹³⁹ Trial testimony of Fadl, United States v. bin Laden, Feb. 7, 2001 (transcript pp. 354–355); FBI report of investigation, interview of Fadl, Feb. 4, 1998. See also Republic of Singapore, Ministry of Home Affairs, Report to Parliament, "The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism," Jan. 7, 2003.

¶This pattern of expansion through building alliances extended to the United States. A Muslim organization called al Khifa had numerous branch offices, the largest of which was in the Farouq mosque in Brooklyn. In the mid1980s, it had been set up as one of the first outposts of Azzam and Bin Ladin's MAK.⁴⁰⁴⁰ Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 100, 235. Other cities with branches of al Khifa included Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Tucson.⁴¹⁴¹ See CIA analytic report,"Arizona: Long-Term Nexus For Islamic Extremists," CTC 2002-30037H, May 15, 2002; Steven Emerson, American Jihad (Free Press, 2002), pp. 129–137. Al Khifa recruited American Muslims to fight in Afghanistan; some of them would participate in terrorist actions in the United States in the early 1990s and in al Qaeda operations elsewhere, including the 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in East Africa.