The 9/11 Commission Report

Contents

• REPORT Read →
• Appendix C: Commission Hearings Read →
• PREFACE p. 1 Read →
• 1.1 INSIDE THE FOUR FLIGHTS p. 2 Read →
• (NEADS) p. 16 Read →
• 1.3 NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT p. 36 Read →
• THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 2.1 A DECLARATION OF WAR p. 48 Read →
• 2.2 BIN LADIN'S APPEAL IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD p. 49 Read →
• 2.4 BUILDING AN ORGANIZATION, DECLARING WAR p. 60 Read →
• 2.5 AL QAEDA'S RENEWAL IN AFGHANISTAN p. 64 Read →
• THE FIRST WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING p. 72 Read →
• 3.2 ADAPTATION—AND NONADAPTATION—IN THE LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY p. 74 Read →
• 3.3 . . .AND IN THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION p. 83 Read →
• 3.4 . . .AND IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY p. 87 Read →
• 3.5 . . .AND IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT p. 94 Read →
• RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 4.1 BEFORE THE BOMBINGS IN KENYA AND TANZANIA p. 109 Read →
• 4.2 CRISIS:AUGUST p. 116 Read →
• 4.3 DIPLOMACY p. 122 Read →
• 4.4 COVERT ACTION p. 127 Read →
• 4.5 SEARCHING FOR FRESH OPTIONS p. 135 Read →
• AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND 5.1 TERRORIST ENTREPRENEURS p. 146 Read →
• 5.2 THE "PLANES OPERATION" p. 154 Read →
• 5.3 THE HAMBURG CONTINGENT p. 161 Read →
• 5.4 A MONEY TRAIL? p. 170 Read →
• 6.1 THE MILLENNIUM CRISIS p. 175 Read →
• 6.2 POST-CRISIS REFLECTION:AGENDA FOR p. 183 Read →
• 6.3 THE ATTACK ON THE USS COLE p. 191 Read →
• 6.4 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY p. 199 Read →
• 6.5 THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH p. 204 Read →
• THE ATTACK LOOMS 7.1 FIRST ARRIVALS IN CALIFORNIA p. 216 Read →
• 7.2 THE 9/11 PILOTS IN THE UNITED STATES p. 224 Read →
• 7.3 ASSEMBLING THE TEAMS p. 232 Read →
• 7.4 FINAL STRATEGIES AND TACTICS p. 242 Read →
• "THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED" 8.1 THE SUMMER OF THREAT p. 255 Read →
• HEROISM AND HORROR 9.1 PREPAREDNESS AS OF SEPTEMBER p. 279 Read →
• 9.3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE AT THE PENTAGON p. 312 Read →
• 9.4 ANALYSIS p. 316 Read →
• WARTIME p. 326 Read →
• 10.1 IMMEDIATE RESPONSES AT HOME p. 327 Read →
• 10.2 PLANNING FOR WAR p. 331 Read →
• 10.3 "PHASE TWO"AND THE QUESTION OF IRAQ p. 335 Read →
• 11.1 IMAGINATION p. 340 Read →
• 11.3 CAPABILITIES p. 351 Read →
• 11.4 MANAGEMENT p. 354 Read →
• A GLOBAL STRATEGY 12.1 REFLECTING ON A GENERATIONAL CHALLENGE p. 362 Read →
• 12.2 ATTACK TERRORISTS AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONS p. 366 Read →
• 12.3 PREVENT THE CONTINUED GROWTH OF ISLAMIST TERRORISM p. 375 Read →
• 12.4 PROTECT AGAINST AND PREPARE FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS p. 384 Read →
• 13.1 UNITY OF EFFORT ACROSS THE FOREIGN-DOMESTIC DIVIDE p. 401 Read →
• 13.2 UNITY OF EFFORT IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY p. 408 Read →
• POTUS p. 414 Read →
• 13.3 UNITY OF EFFORT IN SHARING INFORMATION p. 417 Read →
• 13.4 UNITY OF EFFORT IN THE CONGRESS p. 420 Read →
• 13.5 ORGANIZING AMERICA'S DEFENSES IN THE UNITED STATES p. 424 Read →
• Cofer Black Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center, 1999–2002 p. 432 Read →
• OTHERS p. 434 Read →
• APPENDIX C COMMISSION HEARINGS p. 440 Read →
• NOTES p. 450 Read →
• Government's Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements, United States p. 468 Read →
• PDD-62, "Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas," May p. 506 Read →
• Notes not linked in the text Read →

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