The 9/11 Commission Report · 2004
HEROISM AND HORROR
HEROISM AND HORROR
9.1 Preparedness as of September 11
¶Emergency response is a product of preparedness. On the morning of September 11, 2001, the last best hope for the community of people working in or visiting the World Trade Center rested not with national policymakers but with private firms and local public servants, especially the first responders: fire, police, emergency medical service, and building safety professionals.
¶Building Preparedness The World Trade Center. The World Trade Center (WTC) complex was built for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Construction began in 1966, and tenants began to occupy its space in 1970.The Twin Towers came to occupy a unique and symbolic place in the culture of New York City and America.
¶The WTC actually consisted of seven buildings, including one hotel, spread across 16 acres of land.The buildings were connected by an underground mall (the concourse).The Twin Towers (1 WTC, or the North Tower, and 2 WTC, or the South Tower) were the signature structures, containing 10.4 million square feet of office space. Both towers had 110 stories, were about 1,350 feet high, and were square; each wall measured 208 feet in length. On any given workday, up to 50,000 office workers occupied the towers, and 40,000 people passed through the complex.1 FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version), p. 16.
¶Each tower contained three central stairwells, which ran essentially from top to bottom, and 99 elevators. Generally, elevators originating in the lobby ran to "sky lobbies" on higher floors, where additional elevators carried passengers to the tops of the buildings.2 The exact number of persons who receive the PDB varies by administration. In the Clinton administration, up to 25 people received the PDB. In the Bush administration, distribution in the pre-9/11 time period was lim- ited to six people. The Commission received access to about four years of articles from the PDB related to Bin Ladin, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and key countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, including all the Commission requested. The White House declined to permit all commissioners to review these sensitive docu- ments.The Commission selected four representatives—the Chair, the Vice Chair, Commissioner Gorelick, and the Executive Director—as its review team.All four reviewed all of the more than 300 relevant articles. Commissioner Gorelick and the Executive Director prepared a detailed summary, reviewed by the White House for constitutional and especially sensitive classification concerns, that was then made available to all Commissioners and designated staff. Except for the August 6, 2001, PDB article, the summary could not include verbatim quotations, for exam- ple the titles of the articles, but could paraphrase the substance.Two of the articles—the December 4, 1998, hijack- ing article (in chapter 4) and the August 6, 2001, article discussing Bin Ladin's plans to attack in the United States (in this chapter)—were eventually declassified.
¶Stairwells A and C ran from the 110th floor to the raised mezzanine level of the lobby. Stairwell B ran from the 107th floor to level B6, six floors below ground, and was accessible from the West Street lobby level, which was one
279¶The World Trade Center Complex as of 9/11 floor below the mezzanine. All three stairwells ran essentially straight up and down, except for two deviations in stairwells A and C where the staircase jut- ted out toward the perimeter of the building. On the upper and lower boundaries of these deviations were transfer hallways contained within the stairwell proper. Each hallway contained smoke doors to prevent smoke from rising from lower to upper portions of the building; they were kept closed but not locked. Doors leading from tenant space into the stairwells were never kept locked; reentry from the stairwells was generally possible on at least every fourth floor.3 President Clinton spoke of the Y2K computer problem in his January 19, 1999, State of the Union address. On Y2K concerns, see John Podesta interview (Jan. 15, 2004). On concerns about extremist groups exploiting mil- lennial opportunities, see, e.g., CIA briefing materials, CTC for the DCI,"Millennium Threat," Dec. 16, 1999.
¶Doors leading to the roof were locked. There was no rooftop evacuation plan. The roofs of both the North Tower and the South Tower were sloped and cluttered surfaces with radiation hazards, making them impractical for helicopter landings and as staging areas for civilians. Although the South Tower roof had a helipad, it did not meet 1994 Federal Aviation Administration guidelines.4 Judith Miller,"Holy Warriors: Dissecting a Terror Plot from Boston to Amman," NewYork Times, Jan. 15, 2001, p.A1; CIA analytic report,"Bin Ladin's Terrorist Operations: Meticulous and Adaptable," CTC 00-400117, Nov. 2, 2000 (appendix B:"Bin Ladin's Role in the Anti-U.S.'Millennial' Plots").
¶The 1993 Terrorist Bombing of the WTC and the Port Authority's Response. Unlike most of America, New York City and specifically the World
280¶Trade Center had been the target of terrorist attacks before 9/11.At 12:18 P.M. on February 26, 1993, a 1,500-pound bomb stashed in a rental van was detonated on a parking garage ramp beneath the Twin Towers.The explosion killed six people, injured about 1,000 more, and exposed vulnerabilities in the World Trade Center's and the city's emergency preparedness.5 See NSC email, Clarke to Rice, Briefing on Pennsylvania Avenue, Mar. 23, 2001.
¶The towers lost power and communications capability. Generators had to be shut down to ensure safety, and elevators stopped.The public-address system and emergency lighting systems failed. The unlit stairwells filled with smoke and were so dark as to be impassable. Rescue efforts by the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) were hampered by the inability of its radios to function in buildings as large as the Twin Towers.The 911 emergency call system was overwhelmed.The general evacuation of the towers' occupants via the stairwells took more than four hours.6 See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley,Terrorism Update, Mar. 30, 2001; NSC email, Clarke to Rice, Terrorist Threat Warning,Apr. 10, 2001.
¶Several small groups of people who were physically unable to descend the stairs were evacuated from the roof of the South Tower by New York Police Department (NYPD) helicopters. At least one person was lifted from the North Tower roof by the NYPD in a dangerous helicopter rappel operation— 15 hours after the bombing. General knowledge that these air rescues had occurred appears to have left a number of civilians who worked in the Twin Towers with the false impression that helicopter rescues were part of the WTC evacuation plan and that rescue from the roof was a viable, if not favored, option for those who worked on upper floors. Although they were considered after 1993, helicopter evacuations in fact were not incorporated into the WTC fire safety plan.7 Saeed Abdullah Saeed ("Jihad") al Ghamdi. He arranged to travel to Afghanistan in March 2000, swore allegiance to Bin Ladin (agreeing to serve as a suicide operative), and was sent to Saudi Ara- bia by KSM with 9/11 hijacker Ahmad al Haznawi to obtain a U.S. visa, but his visa application was denied because he appeared to be intending to immigrate. DOS record, Ghamdi visa application, Nov. 13, 2000. CIA analytic report,"Threat Threads," Sept. 16, 2002, p. 4; Intelligence reports, interrogations of detainee, Apr. 11, 2002; Sept. 11, 2002; Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Feb. 20, 2004.
¶To address the problems encountered during the response to the 1993 bombing, the Port Authority spent an initial $100 million to make physical, structural, and technological improvements to the WTC, as well as to enhance its fire safety plan and reorganize and bolster its fire safety and security staffs.8 Saud al Rashid. Describing him as headstrong and immature, KSM says he disappeared after being sent to Saudi Arabia for a U.S. visa, either because he had second thoughts or because his family interceded and confiscated his passport. Passport photos of Rashid and three 9/11 hijackers—Nawaf al Hazmi, Mih- dhar, and Omari—were found together during a May 2002 raid in Karachi.After discovery of the photos in 2002, Rashid turned himself in to the Saudi authorities, but he has since been released from custody. In a Commission interview, he has admitted training in Afghanistan but denies hearing of al Qaeda before returning from Afghanistan or meeting Bin Ladin, KSM, or any 9/11 hijacker other than Ahmad al Haz- nawi, whom he claims seeing only once or twice at a guesthouse. He has no credible explanation why photos of him were found with those of three other hijackers, or why others identified him as a candidate hijacker. See Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Mar. 27, 2003; June 11, 2003; July 3, 2003; Feb. 20, 2004; Intelligence report, interrogation of Khallad, July 9, 2003; Saud al Rashid interview (Feb. 24, 2004).
¶Substantial enhancements were made to power sources and exits. Fluores- cent signs and markings were added in and near stairwells.The Port Authority also installed a sophisticated computerized fire alarm system with redundant electronics and control panels, and state-of-the-art fire command stations were placed in the lobby of each tower.9 For the FBI source's claims, see FBI letterhead memorandum, Penttbom investigation, Oct. 8, 2002. For Abdullah's recollections, see FBI report of investigation, interview of Mohdar Abdullah, Jan. 15, 2002. Other report- ing indicates that Hazmi and Mihdhar spent time at the King Fahd mosque.A scholar lecturing at the mosque was reportedly approached by either Hazmi or Mihdhar about performing a wedding ceremony. Khalil A. Khalil inter- view (Feb. 24, 2004). On "Khallam," see FBI electronic communication, "Fahad Althumairy," Sept. 4, 2002; FBI electronic communication,"Ziyat Kharfan," Jan. 8, 2002 (giving description of visitor with whom Hazmi and Mih- dhar met at mosque).The Khallam story has never been corroborated.The FBI considered the possibility that Khal- lam might be Khallad, the al Qaeda member whose role in the 9/11 plot and the Cole attack we discussed in chapter 5.This speculation was based on reporting that Khallad was in the United States in June 2000 and was seen in the company of Fahad al Thumairy, an imam at the mosque. FBI electronic communication, investigation of Cole bomb- ing, interview of witness, Mar. 19, 2003; CIA cable, source reporting, Mar. 18, 2003. Neither we nor the FBI have found any travel documentation establishing Khallad's presence in the United States at any time.We doubt that the person allegedly seen with Thumairy actually was Khallad.
¶To manage fire emergency preparedness and operations, the Port Authority created the dedicated position of fire safety director.The director supervised a team of deputy fire safety directors, one of whom was on duty at the fire command station in the lobby of each tower at all times. He or she would be responsible for communicating with building occupants during an emergency.10 Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, Jan. 9, 2004. In another interrogation report, however, KSM downplays the significance of his relationship to Yousef in enabling him to meet with Bin Ladin. Specifically, KSM notes that Yousef was not a member of al Qaeda and that Yousef never met Bin Ladin. Intelligence report, interro- gation of KSM, Feb. 19, 2004.
281¶But during these drills, civilians were not directed into the stairwells, or provided with information about their configuration and about the existence of transfer hallways and smoke doors. Neither full nor partial evacuation drills were held. Moreover, participation in drills that were held varied greatly from tenant to tenant. In general, civilians were never told not to evacuate up.The standard fire drill announcement advised participants that in the event of an actual emergency, they would be directed to descend to at least three floors below the fire. Most civilians recall simply being taught to await the instructions that would be provided at the time of an emergency. Civilians were not informed that rooftop evacuations were not part of the evacuation plan, or that doors to the roof were kept locked.The Port Authority acknowledges that it had no protocol for rescuing people trapped above a fire in the towers.12 FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Khaled Charif, Dec. 4, 2002. After 9/11, arguments arose within the Saudi government over whether to allow reputedly radical imams, including Thumairy, to work for the Saudi government in the United States. FBI letterhead memorandum, investigation of Mohammed bin Suleiman al Muhanna, July 9, 2003. In May 2003, the U.S. government settled the matter, at least in Thumairy's case, by refus- ing to let him back into the country. DOS memo, Karl Hoffman to the Commission, June 8, 2004, and the attached materials.
¶Six weeks before the September 11 attacks, control of the WTC was transferred by net lease to a private developer, Silverstein Properties. Select Port Authority employees were designated to assist with the transition. Others remained on-site but were no longer part of the official chain of command. However, on September 11, most Port Authority World Trade Department employees—including those not on the designated "transition team"— reported to their regular stations to provide assistance throughout the morning.Although Silverstein Properties was in charge of the WTC on September 11, the WTC fire safety plan remained essentially the same.13 For SPI transition, see PANYNJ Interview 11 (Jun. 23, 2004);Alan Reiss prepared statement, May 18, 2004, p. 8. For fire safety plan, see PANYNJ Interview 8 (June 6, 2004).
¶Preparedness of First Responders On 9/11, the principal first responders were from the Fire Department of New York, the New York Police Department, the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD), and the Mayor's Office of Emergency Management (OEM).
282¶The NYPD precincts were divided into 35 different radio zones, with a central radio dispatcher assigned to each. In addition, there were several radio channels for citywide operations. Officers had portable radios with 20 or more available channels, so that the user could respond outside his or her precinct. ESU teams also had these channels but at an operation would use a separate point-to-point channel (which was not monitored by a dispatcher).17
¶The NYPD also supervised the city's 911 emergency call system. Its approximately 1,200 operators, radio dispatchers, and supervisors were civilian employees of the NYPD. They were trained in the rudiments of emergency response.When a 911 call concerned a fire, it was transferred to FDNY dispatch.18 See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and others,Terrorist Alert, June 30, 2001; CIA, SEIB,"Bin Ladin Planning High-Profile Attacks," June 30, 2001; CIA, SEIB,"Planning for Bin Ladin Attacks Continues, Despite Delays," July 2, 2001. The Fire Department of New York. The 11,000-member FDNY was headed by a fire commissioner who, unlike the police commissioner, lacked operational authority. Operations were headed by the chief of department— the sole five-star chief.19 FBI report, National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) message,"National Threat Warning System—Potential Anti-U.S.Terrorist Attacks," July 2, 2001.
¶The FDNY was organized in nine separate geographic divisions. Each division was further divided into between four to seven battalions. Each battalion contained typically between three and four engine companies and two to four ladder companies. In total, the FDNY had 205 engine companies and 133 ladder companies. On-duty ladder companies consisted of a captain or lieutenant and five firefighters; on-duty engine companies consisted of a captain or lieutenant and normally four firefighters. Ladder companies' primary function was to conduct rescues; engine companies focused on extinguishing fires.20 By July 3, DCI Tenet had asked about 20 of his counterparts in friendly foreign intelligence services to detain specific al Qaeda members and to generally harass al Qaeda–affiliated cells. NSC memo, Current U.S.Ter- rorism Alert, July 3, 2001. For specific disruption activities and maintaining alert, see NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley,Threat Updates, July 6, 2001; Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004).
¶The FDNY's Specialized Operations Command (SOC) contained a limited number of units that were of particular importance in responding to a terrorist attack or other major incident.The department's five rescue companies and seven squad companies performed specialized and highly risky rescue operations.21 Trial testimony of Ressam, United States v. Haouari, July 5, 2001 (transcript p. 605); Deposition of Ressam, In re: Letters Rogatory (S.D. N.Y.), Jan. 23, 2002 (transcript p. 23).
283¶The logistics of fire operations were directed by Fire Dispatch Operations Division, which had a center in each of the five boroughs. All 911 calls concerning fire emergencies were transferred to FDNY dispatch.22 FBI electronic communication, interview of Charles Sabah Toma, May 18, 2004.
¶As of September 11, FDNY companies and chiefs responding to a fire used analog, point-to-point radios that had six normal operating channels.Typically, the companies would operate on the same tactical channel, which chiefs on the scene would monitor and use to communicate with the firefighters. Chiefs at a fire operation also would use a separate command channel. Because these point-to-point radios had weak signal strength, communications on them could be heard only by other FDNY personnel in the immediate vicinity. In addition, the FDNY had a dispatch frequency for each of the five boroughs; these were not point-to-point channels and could be monitored from around the city.23 FDNY regulations,"Communications" chapter of "Operational Procedures and Policies," July 1999; FDNY interview 60, HQ (May 11, 2004); FDNY interview 64, HQ (June 30, 2004).
¶The FDNY's radios performed poorly during the 1993 WTC bombing for two reasons. First, the radios signals often did not succeed in penetrating the numerous steel and concrete floors that separated companies attempting to communicate; and second, so many different companies were attempting to use the same point-to-point channel that communications became unintelligible.24 See NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley,Threat Updates, July 6, 2001.
¶Between 1998 and 2000, fewer people died from fires in New York City than in any three-year period since accurate measurements began in 1946.Firefighter deaths—a total of 22 during the 1990s—compared favorably with the most tranquil periods in the department's history.26 For civilian fatalities, see New York City press release, Office of the Mayor Press Release No. 042-01, Feb. 8, 2001. For firefighter fatalities, see Terry Golway, So Others Might Live (Basic Books, 2002), p. 304.
¶Office of Emergency Management and Interagency Preparedness. In 1996, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani created the Mayor's Office of Emergency Management, which had three basic functions. First, OEM's Watch Command was to monitor the city's key communications channels—including radio frequencies of FDNY dispatch and the NYPD—and other data.A second purpose of the OEM was to improve New York City's response to major incidents, including terrorist attacks, by planning and conducting exercises and drills that would involve multiple city agencies, particularly the NYPD and FDNY.Third, the OEM would play a crucial role in managing the city's overall response to an
284¶The World Trade Center Radio Repeater System incident.After OEM's Emergency Operations Center was activated, designated liaisons from relevant agencies, as well as the mayor and his or her senior staff, would respond there. In addition, an OEM field responder would be sent to the scene to ensure that the response was coordinated.27 Trial testimony of Diana Dean and Mark Johnson, United States v. Ressam, Mar. 13, 2001 (transcript pp. 116, 165). On the unraveling of the Ressam case, see Bernton, Carter, Heath and Neff, "The Terrorist Within," June 23–July 7, 2002 (part 15,"Puzzle Pieces").
¶The OEM's headquarters was located at 7 WTC. Some questioned locating it both so close to a previous terrorist target and on the 23rd floor of a building (difficult to access should elevators become inoperable). There was no backup site.28 See CIA, SEIB,"Bin Ladin Plans Delayed but Not Abandoned," July 13, 2001; CIA, SEIB,"One Bin Ladin Operation Delayed, Others Ongoing," July 25, 2001; NSC memo, Cressey to CSG,Threat SVTS, July 23, 2001.
¶In July 2001, Mayor Giuliani updated a directive titled "Direction and Control of Emergencies in the City of New York." Its purpose was to eliminate "potential conflict among responding agencies which may have areas of overlapping expertise and responsibility."The directive sought to accomplish this objective by designating, for different types of emergencies, an appropriate agency as "Incident Commander." This Incident Commander would be "responsible for the management of the City's response to the emergency," while the OEM was "designated the 'On Scene Interagency Coordinator.'"29
285¶Nevertheless, the FDNY and NYPD each considered itself operationally autonomous.As of September 11, they were not prepared to comprehensively coordinate their efforts in responding to a major incident.The OEM had not overcome this problem.