6.5 The New Administration's Approach

¶The Bush administration in its first months faced many problems other than terrorism. They included the collapse of the Middle East peace process and, in April, a crisis over a U.S. "spy plane" brought down in Chinese territory. The new administration also focused heavily on Russia, a new nuclear strategy that allowed missile defenses, Europe, Mexico, and the Persian Gulf.

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¶In the spring, reporting on terrorism surged dramatically. In chapter 8, we will explore this reporting and the ways agencies responded. These increasingly alarming reports, briefed to the President and top officials, became part of the context in which the new administration weighed its options for policy on al Qaeda.

¶Except for a few reports that the CSG considered and apparently judged to be unreliable, none of these pointed specifically to possible al Qaeda action inside the United States—although the CSG continued to be concerned about the domestic threat. The mosaic of threat intelligence came from the Counterterrorist Center, which collected only abroad. Its reports were not supplemented by reports from the FBI. Clarke had expressed concern about an al Qaeda presence in the United States, and he worried about an attack on the White House by "Hizbollah, Hamas, al Qida and other terrorist organizations."¹⁹⁴¹⁹⁴ For threats considered by the CSG, see NSC memo, agenda for March 19 CSG videoconference, Mar. 19, 2001 (agenda item about UBL interest in targeting a passenger plane at Chicago airport); NSC memo, agenda for CSG threat videoconference, May 17, 2001 (agenda item,"UBL: Operation Planned in US"). For Clarke's concern about an al Qaeda presence in the United States, see NSC briefing materials,TNT to Rice, counterterrorism briefing for Bush/Cheney transition team, undated, which noted that al Qaeda had "sleeper cells" in more than 40 countries, including the United States; NSC memo, "Strategy for Eliminating the Threat from the Jihadist Networks of al Qida: Status and Prospects," undated (appears to be Dec. 29, 2000), attached to NSC memo, Clarke to Rice, Jan. 25, 2001, discussing al Qaeda's presence in the United States. For Clarke's concerns about an attack on the White House, see NSC email, Clarke to Rice, briefing on Pennsylvania Ave, Mar. 23, 2001.Show full note

¶In May, President Bush announced that Vice President Cheney would himself lead an effort looking at preparations for managing a possible attack by weapons of mass destruction and at more general problems of national preparedness. The next few months were mainly spent organizing the effort and bringing an admiral from the Sixth Fleet back to Washington to manage it. The Vice President's task force was just getting under way when the 9/11 attack occurred.¹⁹⁵¹⁹⁵ For the President's announcement, see White House press release,"Statement by the President, Domestic Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass Destruction," May 8, 2001 (online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2001/05/print/02010508.html).

¶On May 29, at Tenet's request, Rice and Tenet converted their usual weekly meeting into a broader discussion on al Qaeda; participants included Clarke, CTC chief Cofer Black, and "Richard," a group chief with authority over the Bin Ladin unit. Rice asked about "taking the offensive" and whether any approach could be made to influence Bin Ladin or the Taliban. Clarke and Black replied that the CIA's ongoing disruption activities were "taking the offensive" and that Bin Ladin could not be deterred. A wide-ranging discussion then ensued about "breaking the back" of Bin Ladin's organization.¹⁹⁶¹⁹⁶ CIA memo, summary of weekly Rice/Tenet meeting, May 29, 2001.

¶Tenet emphasized the ambitious plans for covert action that the CIA had developed in December 2000. In discussing the draft authorities for this program in March, CIA officials had pointed out that the spending level envisioned for these plans was larger than the CIA's entire current budget for counterterrorism covert action. It would be a multiyear program, requiring such levels of spending for about five years.¹⁹⁷¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¶The CIA official, "Richard," told us that Rice "got it." He said she agreed with his conclusions about what needed to be done, although he complained to us that the policy process did not follow through quickly enough.¹⁹⁸¹⁹⁸ Richard interview (Dec. 11, 2003). Clarke and Black were asked to develop a range of options for attacking Bin Ladin's organization, from the least to most ambitious.¹⁹⁹¹⁹⁹ CIA memo, summary of weekly Rice/Tenet meeting, May 29, 2001.

¶Rice and Hadley asked Clarke and his staff to draw up the new presidential directive. On June 7, Hadley circulated the first draft, describing it as "an admittedly ambitious" program for confronting al Qaeda.²⁰⁰²⁰⁰ NSC memo, Hadley to Armitage,Wolfowitz, McLaughlin, and O'Keefe,"Next Steps on al-Qida," June 7, 2001. The draft NSPD's goal was to "eliminate the al Qida network of terrorist groups as a threat to the United States and to friendly governments." It called for a multiyear effort involving diplomacy, covert action, economic measures, law enforcement, public diplomacy, and if necessary military efforts. The State Department was to work with other governments to end all al Qaeda sanctuaries, and also to work with the Treasury Department to disrupt terrorist financing. The CIA was to develop an expanded covert action program including significant additional funding and aid to anti-Taliban groups. The draft also tasked OMB with ensuring that sufficient funds to support this program were found in U.S. budgets from fiscal years 2002 to 2006.²⁰¹²⁰¹ NSC memo, draft National Security Presidential Directive, undated; Condoleezza Rice testimony,Apr. 8, 2004.

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¶Rice viewed this draft directive as the embodiment of a comprehensive new strategy employing all instruments of national power to eliminate the al Qaeda threat. Clarke, however, regarded the new draft as essentially similar to the proposal he had developed in December 2000 and put forward to the new administration in January 2001.²⁰²²⁰² See, e.g., Condoleezza Rice testimony,Apr. 8, 2004; Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004). In May or June, Clarke asked to be moved from his counterterrorism portfolio to a new set of responsibilities for cybersecurity. He told us that he was frustrated with his role and with an administration that he considered not "serious about al Qaeda."²⁰³²⁰³ Richard Clarke interview (Jan. 12, 2004). If Clarke was frustrated, he never expressed it to her, Rice told us.²⁰⁴²⁰⁴ Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).

¶In deputies meetings at the end of June, Tenet was tasked to assess the prospects for Taliban cooperation with the United States on al Qaeda. The NSC staff was tasked to flesh out options for dealing with the Taliban. Revisiting these issues tried the patience of some of the officials who felt they had already been down these roads and who found the NSC's procedures slow. "We weren't going fast enough," Armitage told us. Clarke kept arguing that moves against the Taliban and al Qaeda should not have to wait months for a larger review of U.S. policy in South Asia. "For the government," Hadley said to us, "we moved it along as fast as we could move it along."²⁰⁷²⁰⁷ For the Deputies Committee meeting, see NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions of June 29, 2001, Deputies Committee meeting, undated (attached to NSC memo, Biegun to executive secretaries, July 6, 2001). For officials who were impatient with the pace of the Deputies' Committee review, see, e.g., Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004); John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004). For Clarke's arguments, see NSC memo, PCC Chairman's Summary Paper,"Key Issues for Al-Qida Deputies Meeting,"Apr. 19, 2001. See also Richard Armitage testimony, Mar. 24, 2004; Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004).Show full note As all hope in moving the Taliban faded, debate revived about giving covert assistance to the regime's opponents. Clarke and the CIA's Cofer Black renewed the push to aid the Northern Alliance. Clarke suggested starting with modest aid, just enough to keep the Northern Alliance in the fight and tie down al Qaeda terrorists, without aiming to overthrow the Taliban.²⁰⁸²⁰⁸ For Clarke and Black renewing their push, see, e.g., Cofer Black interview (Dec. 9, 2003). For Clarke's suggestion, see NSC email, Cressey to Moran, various matters concerning al Qaeda, Feb. 12, 2001.

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¶Rice, Hadley, and the NSC staff member for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, told us they opposed giving aid to the Northern Alliance alone. They argued that the program needed to have a big part for Pashtun opponents of the Taliban. They also thought the program should be conducted on a larger scale than had been suggested. Clarke concurred with the idea of a larger program, but he warned that delay risked the Northern Alliance's final defeat at the hands of the Taliban.²⁰⁹²⁰⁹ Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004); Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004); Zalmay Khalilzad interview (Nov. 21, 2003). For Clarke's view, see NSC memo, Clarke to Rice, al Qaeda review, Jan. 25, 2001.

¶During the spring, the CIA, at the NSC's request, had developed draft legal authorities—a presidential finding—to undertake a large-scale program of covert assistance to the Taliban's foes. The draft authorities expressly stated that the goal of the assistance was not to overthrow the Taliban. But even this program would be very costly. This was the context for earlier conversations, when in March Tenet stressed the need to consider the impact of such a large program on the political situation in the region and in May Tenet talked to Rice about the need for a multiyear financial commitment.²¹⁰²¹⁰ For the draft authorities, see CIA briefing materials, talking points for DCI meeting with Rice on the draft Afghanistan counterterrorism finding and the draft UBL Memorandum of Notification, Mar. 28, 2001. For the draft explicitly stating that the goal was not to overthrow the Taliban, see Jonathan F. interview (Jan. 19, 2004).

¶By July, the deputies were moving toward agreement that some last effort should be made to convince the Taliban to shift position and then, if that failed, the administration would move on the significantly enlarged covert action program. As the draft presidential directive was circulated in July, the State Department sent the deputies a lengthy historical review of U.S. efforts to engage the Taliban about Bin Ladin from 1996 on. "These talks have been fruitless," the State Department concluded.²¹¹²¹¹ See NSC email, Clarke to Khalilzad, Crawford, and Cressey, "Option for integrated al Qida-Afghan-Pakistan paper," June 30, 2001. For State's view, see DOS memo,"U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Usama Bin Laden," undated (attached to NSC memo, Biegun to executive secretaries, July 16, 2001).

¶Arguments in the summer brought to the surface the more fundamental issue of whether the U.S. covert action program should seek to overthrow the regime, intervening decisively in the civil war in order to change Afghanistan's government. By the end of a deputies meeting on September 10, officials formally agreed on a three-phase strategy. First an envoy would give the Taliban a last chance. If this failed, continuing diplomatic pressure would be combined with the planned covert action program encouraging anti-Taliban Afghans of all major ethnic groups to stalemate the Taliban in the civil war and attack al Qaeda bases, while the United States developed an international coalition to undermine the regime. In phase three, if the Taliban's policy still did not change, the deputies agreed that the United States would try covert action to topple the Taliban's leadership from within.²¹²²¹² For an outline of the policy, see NSC memo,"Afghanistan:A Comprehensive Strategy," undated (attached to NSC memo, Biegun memo to executive secretaries, Sept. 7, 2001). For the September 10 meeting, see NSC memo, Biegun to executive secretaries, Summary of Conclusions for Sept. 10, 2001, Deputies Committee meeting on Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, Sept. 26, 2001.

¶The deputies agreed to revise the al Qaeda presidential directive, then being finalized for presidential approval, in order to add this strategy to it. Armitage explained to us that after months of continuing the previous administration's policy, he and Powell were bringing the State Department to a policy of overthrowing the Taliban. From his point of view, once the United States made the commitment to arm the Northern Alliance, even covertly, it was taking action to initiate regime change, and it should give those opponents the strength to achieve complete victory.²¹³²¹³ For the September 10 meeting, see NSC memo, Biegun to executive secretaries, Summary of Conclusions for Sept. 10, 2001, Deputies Committee meeting on Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, Sept. 26, 2001. For Armitage's view, see Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004).

¶Pakistan. The Bush administration immediately encountered the dilemmas that arose from the varied objectives the United States was trying to accomplish in its relationship with Pakistan. In February 2001, President Bush wrote General Musharraf on a number of matters. He emphasized that Bin Ladin and al Qaeda were "a direct threat to the United States and its interests that must be addressed." He urged Musharraf to use his influence with the Taliban on Bin Ladin and al Qaeda.²¹⁴²¹⁴ Colin Powell prepared statement, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 5. Powell and Armitage reviewed the possibility of acquiring more carrots to dangle in front of Pakistan. Given the generally negative view of Pakistan on Capitol Hill, the idea of lifting sanctions may have seemed far-fetched, but perhaps no more so than the idea of persuading Musharraf to antagonize the Islamists in his own government and nation.²¹⁵²¹⁵ For reviewing the possibility of more carrots, see DOS memo, Hull and Usrey to Grossman, "Deputies Committee Meeting on Terrorism and al Qaida," Apr. 20, 2001. For the possibility of lifting sanctions, see Colin Powell interview (Jan. 21, 2004); Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004); DOS memo,"Engagement with Pakistan: From Negative to Positive," undated (appears to be May 29, 2001).

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¶On June 18, Rice met with the visiting Pakistani foreign minister, Abdul Sattar. She "really let him have it" about al Qaeda, she told us.²¹⁶²¹⁶ Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). Other evidence corroborates her account. But, as she was upbraiding Sattar, Rice recalled thinking that the Pakistani diplomat seemed to have heard it all before. Sattar urged senior U.S. policymakers to engage the Taliban, arguing that such a course would take time but would produce results. In late June, the deputies agreed to review U.S. objectives. Clarke urged Hadley to split off all other issues in U.S.-Pakistani relations and just focus on demanding that Pakistan move vigorously against terrorism—to push the Pakistanis to do before an al Qaeda attack what Washington would demand that they do after. He had made similar requests in the Clinton administration; he had no more success with Rice than he had with Berger.²¹⁷²¹⁷ For Rice's view on Sattar, see Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). For Sattar urging the United States to engage the Taliban, see DOS cable, State 109130,"The Secretary's Lunch With Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar," June 22, 2001. For the deputies agreeing to review objectives, see NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions of June 29, 2001, Deputies Committee meeting, undated (attached to NSC memo, Biegun to executive secretaries, July 6, 2001). For Clarke urging Hadley, see NSC memo, Clarke to Hadley,"DC on Pakistan," June 27, 2001.Show full note

¶On August 4, President Bush wrote President Musharraf to request his support in dealing with terrorism and to urge Pakistan to engage actively against al Qaeda. The new administration was again registering its concerns, just as its predecessor had, but it was still searching for new incentives to open up diplomatic possibilities. For its part, Pakistan had done little. Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca described the administration's plan to break this logjam as a move from "half engagement" to "enhanced engagement." The administration was not ready to confront Islamabad and threaten to rupture relations. Deputy Secretary Armitage told us that before 9/11, the envisioned new approach to Pakistan had not yet been attempted.²¹⁸²¹⁸ See White House letter, President Bush to Musharraf, Aug. 4, 2001. For Rocca's view, see DOS memo, "Engagement with Pakistan: From Negative to Positive," undated (possibly May 29, 2001); Christina Rocca interview (Jan. 29, 2004). For Armitage's comment, see Richard Armitage interview (Jan. 12, 2004).

¶Saudi Arabia. The Bush administration did not develop new diplomatic initiatives on al Qaeda with the Saudi government before 9/11.Vice President Cheney called Crown Prince Abdullah on July 5, 2001, to seek Saudi help in preventing threatened attacks on American facilities in the Kingdom. Secretary of State Powell met with the crown prince twice before 9/11.They discussed topics like Iraq, not al Qaeda. U.S.-Saudi relations in the summer of 2001 were marked by sometimes heated disagreements about ongoing Israeli-Palestinian violence, not about Bin Ladin.²¹⁹²¹⁹ For the Vice President's call, see CIA briefing materials,"Efforts to Counter the Bin Ladin Threat," Sept. 12, 2001. For Powell's meetings, see DOS cable, State 041824,"Secretary's 26 February Meeting With Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah," Mar. 8, 2001; DOS cable, State 117132, "The Secretary's June 29 Meeting With Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah," July 5, 2001.

Military Plans

¶The confirmation of the Pentagon's new leadership was a lengthy process. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz was confirmed in March 2001 and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith in July. Though the new officials were briefed about terrorism and some of the earlier planning, including that for Operation Infinite Resolve, they were focused, as Secretary Rumsfeld told us, on creating a twenty-first-century military.²²⁰²²⁰ Paul Wolfowitz interview (Jan. 20, 2004); Donald Rumsfeld interview (Jan. 30, 2004).

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¶At the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton did not recall much interest by the new administration in military options against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. He could not recall any specific guidance on the topic from the secretary. Brian Sheridan—the outgoing assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict (SOLIC), the key counterterrorism policy office in the Pentagon—never briefed Rumsfeld. He departed on January 20; he had not been replaced by 9/11.²²¹²²¹ For Shelton's recollection, see Hugh Shelton interview (Feb. 5, 2004). For Sheridan's departure, see Austin Yamada interview (Dec. 23, 2003); Brian Sheridan interview (Feb. 24, 2004).

¶Rumsfeld noted to us his own interest in terrorism, which came up often in his regular meetings with Tenet. He thought that the Defense Department, before 9/11, was not organized adequately or prepared to deal with new threats like terrorism. But his time was consumed with getting new officials in place and working on the foundation documents of a new defense policy, the quadrennial defense review, the defense planning guidance, and the existing contingency plans. He did not recall any particular counterterrorism issue that engaged his attention before 9/11, other than the development of the Predator unmanned aircraft system.²²²²²² Donald Rumsfeld interview (Jan. 30, 2004). Rumsfeld had been a member of the Bremer-Sonnenberg Commission on Terrorism, created by Congress in 1998.

¶The commander of Central Command, General Franks, told us that he did not regard the existing plans as serious. To him a real military plan to address al Qaeda would need to go all the way, following through the details of a full campaign (including the political-military issues of where operations would be based) and securing the rights to fly over neighboring countries.²²³²²³ Tommy Franks interview (Apr. 9, 2004).

¶The draft presidential directive circulated in June 2001 began its discussion of the military by reiterating the Defense Department's lead role in protecting its forces abroad. The draft included a section directing Secretary Rumsfeld to "develop contingency plans" to attack both al Qaeda and Taliban targets in Afghanistan. The new section did not specifically order planning for the use of ground troops, or clarify how this guidance differed from the existing Infinite Resolve plans.²²⁴²²⁴ For Annex B, see NSC memo, draft National Security Presidential Directive, undated (attached to NSC email, Biegun to executive secretaries, July 13, 2001).The annex said that Pentagon planning was also to include options to eliminate weapons of mass destruction that the al Qaeda network might acquire or make.

¶Hadley told us that by circulating this section, a draft Annex B to the directive, the White House was putting the Pentagon on notice that it would need to produce new military plans to address this problem.²²⁵²²⁵ Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004). "The military didn't particularly want this mission," Rice told us.²²⁶²²⁶ Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).

¶With this directive still awaiting President Bush's signature, Secretary Rumsfeld did not order his subordinates to begin preparing any new military plans against either al Qaeda or the Taliban before 9/11.

¶President Bush told us that before 9/11, he had not seen good options for special military operations against Bin Ladin. Suitable bases in neighboring countries were not available and, even if the U.S. forces were sent in, it was not clear where they would go to find Bin Ladin.²²⁷²²⁷ President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004).

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¶President Bush told us that before 9/11 there was an appetite in the government for killing Bin Ladin, not for war. Looking back in 2004, he equated the presidential directive with a readiness to invade Afghanistan. The problem, he said, would have been how to do that if there had not been another attack on America. To many people, he said, it would have seemed like an ultimate act of unilateralism. But he said that he was prepared to take that on.²²⁸²²⁸ Ibid.

Domestic Change and Continuity

¶During the transition, Bush had chosen John Ashcroft, a former senator from Missouri, as his attorney general. On his arrival at the Justice Department, Ashcroft told us, he faced a number of problems spotlighting the need for reform at the FBI.²²⁹²²⁹ John Ashcroft interview (Dec. 17, 2003).

¶In February, Clarke briefed Attorney General Ashcroft on his directorate's issues. He reported that at the time, the attorney general acknowledged a "steep learning curve," and asked about the progress of the Cole investigation.²³⁰²³⁰ NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley,"Courtesy call on AG," Feb. 22, 2001. Neither Ashcroft nor his predecessors received the President's Daily Brief. His office did receive the daily intelligence report for senior officials that, during the spring and summer of 2001, was carrying much of the same threat information.

¶The FBI was struggling to build up its institutional capabilities to do more against terrorism, relying on a strategy called MAXCAP 05 that had been unveiled in the summer of 2000.The FBI's assistant director for counterterrorism, Dale Watson, told us that he felt the new Justice Department leadership was not supportive of the strategy. Watson had the sense that the Justice Department wanted the FBI to get back to the investigative basics: guns, drugs, and civil rights. The new administration did seek an 8 percent increase in overall FBI funding in its initial budget proposal for fiscal year 2002, including the largest proposed percentage increase in the FBI's counterterrorism program since fiscal year 1997.The additional funds included the FBI's support of the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah (a onetime increase), enhanced security at FBI facilities, and improvements to the FBI's WMD incident response capability.²³¹²³¹ On the FBI strategy, see FBI report, Counterterrorism Division, International Terrorism Program,"Strategic Program Plan FY 2001–2006," undated (appears to be from summer 2000). On Watson's recollections, see Dale Watson interview (Jan. 6, 2004). On the FBI budget proposal, see statement of Attorney General John Ashcroft, Hearing on U.S. Federal Efforts to Combat Terrorism before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the Senate Appropriations Committee, May 9, 2001. See DOJ memo, Comments on Staff Statement 12, Apr. 7, 2004.Show full note

¶In May, the Justice Department began shaping plans for building a budget for fiscal year 2003, the process that would usually culminate in an administration proposal at the beginning of 2002. On May 9, the attorney general testified at a congressional hearing concerning federal efforts to combat terrorism. He said that "one of the nation's most fundamental responsibilities is to protect its citizens . . . from terrorist attacks." The budget guidance issued the next day, however, highlighted gun crimes, narcotics trafficking, and civil rights as priorities. Watson told us that he almost fell out of his chair when he saw this memo, because it did not mention counterterrorism. Longtime FBI Director Louis Freeh left in June 2001, after announcing the indictment in the Khobar Towers case that he had worked so long to obtain. Thomas Pickard was the acting director during the summer. Freeh's successor, Robert Mueller, took office just before 9/11.²³²²³² Testimony of John Ashcroft, Hearing on U.S. Federal Efforts to Combat Terrorism before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the Senate Appropriations Committee, May 9, 2001. On DOJ's priorities, see DOJ memo, Ashcroft to Heads of Department Components, "Guidance for Preparing FY 2003 Budgets," May 10, 2001. On Watson's reaction, see Dale Watson interview (Jan. 6, 2004).Show full note

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¶The Justice Department prepared a draft fiscal year 2003 budget that maintained but did not increase the funding level for counterterrorism in its pending fiscal year 2002 proposal. Pickard appealed for more counterterrorism enhancements, an appeal the attorney general denied on September 10.²³³²³³ DOJ letter, Ashcroft to Daniels, transmitting the Department of Justice FY 2003 budget request, Sept. 10, 2001;Thomas Pickard interview (Jan. 21, 2004). Pickard told us that he approached Ashcroft and asked him to reconsider DOJ's denial of the FBI's original counterterrorism budget request in light of the continuing threat. It was not uncommon for FBI budget requests to be reduced by the attorney general or by OMB before being submitted to Congress; this had occurred during the previous administration.Show full note

¶Ashcroft had also inherited an ongoing debate on whether and how to modify the 1995 procedures governing intelligence sharing between the FBI and the Justice Department's Criminal Division. But in August 2001,Ashcroft's deputy, Larry Thompson, issued a memorandum reaffirming the 1995 procedures with the clarification that evidence of "any federal felony" was to be immediately reported by the FBI to the Criminal Division. The 1995 procedures remained in effect until after 9/11.²³⁴²³⁴ In chapter 3, we discuss how this problem arose. By 2001, it had become worse. During 2000, the FBI had erred in preparing some of its applications for FISA surveillance, misstating how much information had been shared with criminal prosecutors and the nature of the walls between the intelligence and law enforcement functions within the FBI. In March 2001, Judge Royce Lamberth, chief judge of the FISA Court, chastised the FBI, sending a letter to Ashcroft announcing he was banning an offending supervisory agent from appearing before the court. Judge Lamberth also met personally with Ashcroft and his acting deputy, Robert Mueller, to complain about the performance of the FBI and the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR). Judge Lamberth letter to Ashcroft, Mar. 9, 2001; John Ashcroft interview (Dec. 17, 2003). In May 2001, Ashcroft altered the FISA application process to ensure greater accuracy. See DOJ memo,Ashcroft to Freeh,"The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Process," May 18, 2001. In July 2001, the General Accounting Office criticized the way the 1995 procedures were being applied and criticized OIPR and FBI for not complying with the information-sharing requirements of the 1995 procedures. This was the third report in as many years by a government agency indicating that the procedures were not working as planned. In October 2000, December 2000, and March 2001, proposals for reform to the 1995 procedures were put forth by senior DOJ officials. None resulted in reform. One impediment was that the respective DOJ components could not agree on all the proposed reforms. A second impediment was a concern that such reforms would require a challenge to the FISA Court's position on the matter.This was considered risky because the FISA Court of Review had never convened, and one of the judges had previously voiced skepticism regarding the constitutionality of the FISA statute. Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson did ask the court to accept the modifications described in the text, which were distributed as part of his August 2001 memorandum reaffirming the 1995 procedures. See DOJ memo, Thompson to the Criminal Division, the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, and the FBI,"Intelligence Sharing,"Aug. 6, 2001.Show full note

Covert Action and the Predator

¶In March 2001, Rice asked the CIA to prepare a new series of authorities for covert action in Afghanistan. Rice's recollection was that the idea had come from Clarke and the NSC senior director for intelligence, Mary McCarthy, and had been linked to the proposal for aid to the Northern Alliance and the Uzbeks. Rice described the draft document as providing for "consolidation plus," superseding the various Clinton administration documents. In fact, the CIA drafted two documents. One was a finding that did concern aid to opponents of the Taliban regime; the other was a draft Memorandum of Notification, which included more open-ended language authorizing possible lethal action in a variety of situations. Tenet delivered both to Hadley on March 28. The CIA's notes for Tenet advised him that "in response to the NSC request for drafts that will help the policymakers review their options, each of the documents has been crafted to provide the Agency with the broadest possible discretion permissible under the law." At the meeting, Tenet argued for deciding on a policy before deciding on the legal authorities to implement it. Hadley accepted this argument, and the draft MON was put on hold.²³⁵²³⁵ This tasking may have occurred before Rice's March 15, 2001, meeting with Tenet. See CIA memo,"Talking Points for DCI Meeting with Rice," Mar. 15, 2001. For Rice's recollections, see Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).Attorney General John Ashcroft told us he told Rice on March 7, 2001, that his lawyers had determined that the existing legal authorities for covert action against Bin Ladin were unclear and insufficient, and that he suggested new, explicit kill authorities be developed. John Ashcroft testimony, Apr. 13, 2004. On the CIA draft documents, see CIA memo,"Talking Points for the DCI on the Draft Afghanistan Counterterrorism Finding and the Draft UBL MON," Mar. 27, 2001. For the description of the meeting, see CIA memo, Moseman to Tenet, Mar. 28, 2001.Show full note

¶As the policy review moved forward, the planned covert action program for Afghanistan was included in the draft presidential directive, as part of an "Annex A" on intelligence activities to "eliminate the al Qaeda threat."²³⁶²³⁶ NSC memo, Sturtevant to Griffin, Levin, Krongard,Watson, and others, July 12, 2001. The main debate during the summer of 2001 concentrated on the one new mechanism for a lethal attack on Bin Ladin—an armed version of the Predator drone.

¶In the first months of the new administration, questions concerning the Predator became more and more a central focus of dispute. Clarke favored resuming Predator flights over Afghanistan as soon as weather permitted, hoping that they still might provide the elusive "actionable intelligence" to target Bin Ladin with cruise missiles. Learning that the Air Force was thinking of equipping Predators with warheads, Clarke became even more enthusiastic about redeployment.²³⁷²³⁷ See, e.g., NSC note, Clarke to Berger, Sept. 23, 2000; Richard Clarke interview (Feb. 3, 2004).

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¶The CTC chief, Cofer Black, argued against deploying the Predator for reconnaissance purposes. He recalled that the Taliban had spotted a Predator in the fall of 2000 and scrambled their MiG fighters. Black wanted to wait until the armed version was ready. "I do not believe the possible recon value outweighs the risk of possible program termination when the stakes are raised by the Taliban parading a charred Predator in front of CNN," he wrote. Military officers in the Joint Staff shared this concern.²³⁸²³⁸ CIA memo, Black to Clarke, Jan. 25, 2001. For a Joint Staff view, see, e.g., Scott Gration interview (Mar. 3, 2004).The mission commander for the Predator flights, Air Force Major Mark A. Cooter, had registered his opposition to redeploying the aircraft back in December 2000: "given the cost/benefit from these continued missions it seems senseless." DOD letter, Cooter to Alec B.,"Continued Flight Operations," Nov. 14, 2000 (attached to CIA memo, Black to DCI and others, Predator Operation, Nov. 17, 2000).Show full note There is some dispute as to whether or not the Deputies Committee endorsed resuming reconnaissance flights at its April 30, 2001, meeting. In any event, Rice and Hadley ultimately went along with the CIA and the Pentagon, holding off on reconnaissance flights until the armed Predator was ready.²³⁹²³⁹ See NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee meeting, Apr. 30, 2001.This document noted a consensus in favor of reconnaissance missions commencing in July. But DDCI McLaughlin told us that he and Black believed that no such decision had been made at the meeting. Hadley told us he believed that a decision had been made at the meeting to fly such missions. See John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 2, 2004). See also CIA briefing materials,"Summary of April 30, 2001 Deputies Committee meeting," May 3, 2001; Stephen Hadley meeting (Jan. 31, 2004). For Rice's perspective, see Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).Show full note

¶The CIA's senior management saw problems with the armed Predator as well, problems that Clarke and even Black and Allen were inclined to minimize. One (which also applied to reconnaissance flights) was money. A Predator cost about $3 million. If the CIA flew Predators for its own reconnaissance or covert action purposes, it might be able to borrow them from the Air Force, but it was not clear that the Air Force would bear the cost if a vehicle went down. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz took the position that the CIA should have to pay for it; the CIA disagreed.²⁴⁰²⁴⁰ Allen described the "quibbling" over financing the Predator program as "ridiculous." Charles Allen interview (Jan. 27, 2004). For a CIA senior management perspective, see, e.g., John McLaughlin interview (Jan. 21, 2004). The Defense Department's view is suggested in CIA briefing materials,"Summary of April 30, 2001 Deputies Committee meeting," May 3, 2001.

¶Second, Tenet in particular questioned whether he, as Director of Central Intelligence, should operate an armed Predator. "This was new ground," he told us. Tenet ticked off key questions: What is the chain of command? Who takes the shot? Are America's leaders comfortable with the CIA doing this, going outside of normal military command and control? Charlie Allen told us that when these questions were discussed at the CIA, he and the Agency's executive director, A. B. "Buzzy" Krongard, had said that either one of them would be happy to pull the trigger, but Tenet was appalled, telling them that they had no authority to do it, nor did he.²⁴¹²⁴¹ George Tenet interview (Jan. 28, 2004); Charles Allen interview (Jan. 27, 2004).

¶Third, the Hellfire warhead carried by the Predator needed work. It had been built to hit tanks, not people. It needed to be designed to explode in a different way, and even then had to be targeted with extreme precision. In the configuration planned by the Air Force through mid-2001, the Predator's missile would not be able to hit a moving vehicle.²⁴²²⁴² John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004); Scott Gration interview (Mar. 3, 2004); John Jumper interview (Mar. 3, 2004).

¶White House officials had seen the Predator video of the "man in white." On July 11, Hadley tried to hurry along preparation of the armed system. He directed McLaughlin, Wolfowitz, and Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Richard Myers to deploy Predators capable of being armed no later than September 1. He also directed that they have cost-sharing arrangements in place by August 1. Rice told us that this attempt by Hadley to dictate a solution had failed and that she eventually had to intervene herself.²⁴³²⁴³ On Hadley's efforts and directions, see NSC memo, Hadley to McLaughlin,Wolfowitz, and Myers,"Re: Predator," July 11, 2001. On Rice's intervention, see Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004).

¶On August 1, the Deputies Committee met again to discuss the armed Predator. They concluded that it was legal for the CIA to kill Bin Ladin or one of his deputies with the Predator. Such strikes would be acts of self-defense that would not violate the ban on assassinations in Executive Order 12333.The big issues—who would pay for what, who would authorize strikes, and who would pull the trigger—were left for the principals to settle. The Defense Department representatives did not take positions on these issues.²⁴⁴²⁴⁴ On the Deputies Committee meeting, see NSC memo, Biegun to executive secretaries, July 31, 2001; CIA memo, Campbell to McLaughlin, Pavitt, and others,Aug. 2, 2001.The White House told us that it cannot find a formal Summary of Conclusions for this meeting.

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¶The CIA's McLaughlin had also been reticent. When Hadley circulated a memorandum attempting to prod the deputies to reach agreement, McLaughlin sent it back with a handwritten comment on the cost-sharing: "we question whether it is advisable to make such an investment before the decision is taken on flying an armed Predator." For Clarke, this came close to being a final straw. He angrily asked Rice to call Tenet. "Either al Qida is a threat worth acting against or it is not," Clarke wrote. "CIA leadership has to decide which it is and cease these bi-polar mood swings."²⁴⁵²⁴⁵ NSC memo, Hadley to Armitage,Wolfowitz, Myers, and McLaughlin, resolving Predator issues, Aug. 3, 2001 (including McLaughlin's handwritten comment); NSC email, Clarke to Rice and Hadley, "Need to place a call to Tenet,"Aug. 8, 2001.

¶These debates, though, had little impact in advancing or delaying efforts to make the Predator ready for combat. Those were in the hands of military officers and engineers. General John Jumper had commanded U.S. air forces in Europe and seen Predators used for reconnaissance in the Balkans. He started the program to develop an armed version and, after returning in 2000 to head the Air Combat Command, took direct charge of it.

¶There were numerous technical problems, especially with the Hellfire missiles. The Air Force tests conducted during the spring were inadequate, so missile testing needed to continue and modifications needed to be made during the summer. Even then, Jumper told us, problems with the equipment persisted. Nevertheless, the Air Force was moving at an extraordinary pace. "In the modern era, since the 1980s," Jumper said to us, "I would be shocked if you found anything that went faster than this."²⁴⁶²⁴⁶ John Maher III interview (Apr. 22, 2004); John Jumper interview (Mar. 3, 2004); see also Scott Gration interview (Mar. 3, 2004).

September 2001

¶The Principals Committee had its first meeting on al Qaeda on September 4. On the day of the meeting, Clarke sent Rice an impassioned personal note. He criticized U.S. counterterrorism efforts past and present. The "real question" before the principals, he wrote, was "are we serious about dealing with the al Qida threat? . . . Is al Qida a big deal? . . . Decision makers should imagine themselves on a future day when the CSG has not succeeded in stopping al Qida attacks and hundreds of Americans lay dead in several countries, including the US," Clarke wrote. "What would those decision makers wish that they had done earlier? That future day could happen at any time."²⁴⁷²⁴⁷ NSC memo, Clarke to Rice,"Observations at the Principals Meeting on Al Qida," Sept. 4, 2001 (text italicized here is underlined in the original).

¶Clarke then turned to the Cole. "The fact that the USS Cole was attacked during the last Administration does not absolve us of responding for the attack," he wrote. "Many in al Qida and the Taliban may have drawn the wrong lesson from the Cole: that they can kill Americans without there being a US response, without there being a price.... One might have thought that with a $250m hole in a destroyer and 17 dead sailors, the Pentagon might have wanted to respond. Instead, they have often talked about the fact that there is 'nothing worth hitting in Afghanistan' and said 'the cruise missiles cost more than the jungle gyms and mud huts' at terrorist camps." Clarke could not understand "why we continue to allow the existence of large scale al Qida bases where we know people are being trained to kill Americans."²⁴⁸²⁴⁸ Ibid.

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¶Turning to the CIA, Clarke warned that its bureaucracy, which was "masterful at passive aggressive behavior," would resist funding the new national security presidential directive, leaving it a "hollow shell of words without deeds." The CIA would insist its other priorities were more important. Invoking President Bush's own language, Clarke wrote, "You are left with a modest effort to swat flies, to try to prevent specific al Qida attacks by using [intelligence] to detect them and friendly governments' police and intelligence officers to stop them. You are left waiting for the big attack, with lots of casualties, after which some major US retaliation will be in order[.]"²⁴⁹²⁴⁹ Ibid.

¶Rice told us she took Clarke's memo as a warning not to get dragged down by bureaucratic inertia.²⁵⁰²⁵⁰ Condoleezza Rice testimony, Apr. 8, 2004. While his arguments have force, we also take Clarke's jeremiad as something more. After nine years on the NSC staff and more than three years as the president's national coordinator, he had often failed to persuade these agencies to adopt his views, or to persuade his superiors to set an agenda of the sort he wanted or that the whole government could support.

¶Meanwhile, another counterterrorism veteran, Cofer Black, was preparing his boss for the principals meeting. He advised Tenet that the draft presidential directive envisioned an ambitious covert action program, but that the authorities for it had not yet been approved and the funding still had not been found. If the CIA was reluctant to use the Predator, Black did not mention it. He wanted "a timely decision from the Principals," adding that the window for missions within 2001 was a short one. The principals would have to decide whether Rice, Tenet, Rumsfeld, or someone else would give the order to fire.²⁵¹²⁵¹ CIA memo, Black to Tenet, Sept. 4, 2001.

¶At the September 4 meeting, the principals approved the draft presidential directive with little discussion.²⁵²²⁵² Various interviews with participants, as well as the Maher memo (see note 255 below), make it clear that the meeting focused on Predator, not the presidential directive. Rice told us that she had, at some point, told President Bush that she and his other advisers thought it would take three years or so for their al Qaeda strategy to work.²⁵³²⁵³ Condoleezza Rice meeting (Feb. 7, 2004). They then discussed the armed Predator.

¶Hadley portrayed the Predator as a useful tool, although perhaps not for immediate use. Rice, who had been advised by her staff that the armed Predator was not ready for deployment, commented about the potential for using the armed Predator in the spring of 2002.²⁵⁴²⁵⁴ Ibid.; NSC memo, Cressey to Rice, September 4 PC on counterterrorism, Sept. 3, 2001.

¶The State Department supported the armed Predator, although Secretary Powell was not convinced that Bin Ladin was as easy to target as had been suggested. Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill was skittish, cautioning about the implications of trying to kill an individual.²⁵⁵²⁵⁵ CIA memo, Maher to limited group, "Principals Committee meeting, Sept. 4, 2001," Sept. 4, 2001. We have not found a formal summary of conclusions, which would usually be prepared after a Principals Committee meeting.

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¶The Defense Department favored strong action. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz questioned the United States' ability to deliver Bin Ladin and bring him to justice. He favored going after Bin Ladin as part of a larger air strike, similar to what had been done in the 1986 U.S. strike against Libya. General Myers emphasized the Predator's value for surveillance, perhaps enabling broader air strikes that would go beyond Bin Ladin to attack al Qaeda's training infrastructure.²⁵⁶²⁵⁶ Ibid.

¶The principals also discussed which agency—CIA or Defense—should have the authority to fire a missile from the armed Predator.²⁵⁷²⁵⁷ Ibid.

¶At the end, Rice summarized the meeting's conclusions. The armed Predator capability was needed but not ready. The Predator would be available for the military to consider along with its other options. The CIA should consider flying reconnaissance-only missions. The principals—including the previously reluctant Tenet—thought that such reconnaissance flights were a good idea, combined with other efforts to get actionable intelligence. Tenet deferred an answer on the additional reconnaissance flights, conferred with his staff after the meeting, and then directed the CIA to press ahead with them.²⁵⁸²⁵⁸ Ibid.

¶A few days later, a final version of the draft presidential directive was circulated, incorporating two minor changes made by the principals.²⁵⁹²⁵⁹ NSC memo, Clarke to CSG members, Sept. 7, 2001.

¶On September 9, dramatic news arrived from Afghanistan. The leader of the Northern Alliance, Ahmed Shah Massoud, had granted an interview in his bungalow near the Tajikistan border with two men whom the Northern Alliance leader had been told were Arab journalists. The supposed reporter and camera-man—actually al Qaeda assassins—then set off a bomb, riddling Massoud's chest with shrapnel. He died minutes later.

¶On September 10, Hadley gathered the deputies to finalize their three-phase, multiyear plan to pressure and perhaps ultimately topple the Taliban leadership.²⁶⁰²⁶⁰ On Massoud's assassination, see Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 574–575. On the Sept. 10 meeting, see NSC memo, Biegun to executive secretaries, "Summary of Conclusions for Sept. 10, 2001 Deputies Committee meeting on Afghanistan, India and Pakistan," Sept. 26, 2001. Note that the agenda for this meeting, distributed on September 7, 2001, listed its topics as "Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan"; the Summary of Conclusions, written after 9/11, flipped the order of the topics.Show full note

¶That same day, Hadley instructed DCI Tenet to have the CIA prepare new draft legal authorities for the "broad covert action program" envisioned by the draft presidential directive. Hadley also directed Tenet to prepare a separate section "authorizing a broad range of other covert activities, including authority to capture or to use lethal force" against al Qaeda command-and-control elements. This section would supersede the Clinton-era documents. Hadley wanted the authorities to be flexible and broad enough "to cover any additional UBL-related covert actions contemplated."²⁶¹²⁶¹ NSC memo, Hadley to Tenet, Sept. 10, 2001.

¶Funding still needed to be located. The military component remained unclear. Pakistan remained uncooperative. The domestic policy institutions were largely uninvolved. But the pieces were coming together for an integrated policy dealing with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Pakistan.

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