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⁷ The Attack Looms 1. FBI report,"Summary of Penttbom Investigation," Feb. 29, 2004 (classified version), p. 16. 2. Intelligence report, interrogation of KSM, May 19, 2003.Although KSM's stated reasons for sending Hazmi and Mihdhar to California do not seem especially compelling, we have uncovered no evidence tending to estab- lish any more plausible explanation for the California destination.The possibility that the two hijackers were pur- suing another al Qaeda mission on the West Coast, while certainly conceivable—see, e.g., CIA analytic report,
⁸⁸ th, and 89th floors, see Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls. 88. For the callers, see Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls.There are many variables to consider in deter- mining whether, and to what extent, stairwell A was actually a viable exit. Knowing that the stairway was initially passable from at least the 91st floor down, we can conclude that it was likely open from top to bottom, on floors farther removed from the impact. However, in areas near the impact zone some doors leading to the stairwell may have jammed.We know that access to stairway A was possible from at least the 81st and 84th floors, and from sev- eral other floors between the 84th and 91st floor. It is likely that access was possible from floors higher up as well. It is not known, however, whether 911 callers had a clear path to the stairwell entrance from their locations. Dam- age caused by the impact of the plane, and the resulting smoke and heat, may have prevented some from being able to reach the entrance to the staircase; but the stated locations of at least some callers indicate that they were near stairwell A on their floor. Based on conditions described by civilians who descended stairwell A from at or above the impact zone, we conclude that stairwell A may have become effectively impassable as the morning progressed. 89. Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls. 90. Brian Clark testimony, May 18, 2004 (videotaped); Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Commission analy- sis of 911/PAPD calls. 91. Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls. 92. Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian interview 8 (Mar. 23, 2004); Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004); Commission analysis of 911/PAPD calls. 93. OEM interview 1 (Feb. 12, 2004); PANYNJ interview 7 (June 2, 2004); Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian interview 8 (Mar. 23, 2004). 94. Civilian interview 8 (Mar. 23, 2004); Civilian interview 1 (Mar. 2, 2004); Civilian interview 4 (Mar. 16, 2004); Civilian interview 13 (Mar. 25, 2004); NYPD interview 15, ESU (Mar. 11, 2004). 95. Civilian interview 6 (Mar. 22, 2004); Civilian interview 7 (Mar. 22, 2004) (quotation); Civilian interview