ENDNOTES
¶The Commission has reviewed thousands of pages of documents from dozens of government agencies, private companies, and other entities, and interviewed hundreds of witnesses from these same agencies, companies, and entities. When possible, we include all pertinent details in the following endnote citations for those documents and interviews that have contributed to this report. Many documents and interviews, however, were disclosed or given to the Commission on a confidential basis. For these "non-public" sources, our citations include only as much detail as we can comfortably disclose while still respecting the privacy concerns of the source (e.g., "non-public BP document," "interview with government official," "interview with Coast Guard official"). The vast majority of non-public material that we cite in the endnotes below comes from documents and interviews provided by four government agencies—the Chemical Safety Board, the Coast Guard, the Department of Energy, and the Department of the Interior—and ten companies—BP, Cameron, Chevron, Dril-Quip, ExxonMobil, Halliburton, Schlumberger, Shell, Transocean, and Weatherford. In addition, the Commission participated in the Coast Guard's Incident Specific Preparedness Review of the BP Deepwater Horizon spill, through which dozens of officials from a variety of federal and state agencies, federal, state, and local elected officials, and executives and personnel from private companies and other spill response-related entities have been interviewed. All Coast Guard Incident Specific Preparedness Review interviews are also cited as non-public. Finally, the Commission has interviewed many Gulf Coast residents who wish to remain anonymous. These interviews are cited as non-public as well.
¶Chapter One 1 Internal Halliburton document (HAL_0011208); Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 423. This report cites many "Internal documents" that the Commission received from companies, including BP, Halliburton, and Transocean. Those internal documents are identified by their document production serial numbers when available, which were assigned by the entity that provided them.
313¶U.S. Geological Survey, NARA.27 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 24. National Research Council, Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies (The National Academies Press: Washington, DC, 1992), http://www.nap.edu/catalog. php?record_id=2062. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 137367). Kash et al., Energy Under the Oceans, 104.28 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 38, 113; Testimony of Curt Kuchta, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, May 27, 2010, 166, 183, 184. U.S. Department of the Interior, Leasing Oil and Natural Gas Resources: Outer Continental Shelf (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, 2005), 12, http://www.boemre.gov/ld/PDFs/GreenBook-LeasingDocument.pdf. Ibid.; Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 432. Robert E. Kallman and Eugene D. Wheeler, Coastal Crude in a Sea of Conflict (San Luis Obispo: Blake Printery and
¶Publishing, 1984), 63.29 Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 188 and 191. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 70 (listing 18 statutes, and not including several such as the Magnuson Fishery Management and Conservation Act of 1976). Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 137367, 21304). Since the incident, BP has argued that the M-I SWACO models predicted an erroneously high circulation pressure, and that the readings the crew observed were proper. This may ultimately explain the readings, but it does not explain why the BP Macondo team dismissed them as the result of a broken pressure gauge. Riley E. Dunlap and Angela G. Mertig, American Environmentalism: The U.S. Environmental Movement, 1970–1990
¶(Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis, 1992).30 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 113; Testimony of Curt Kuchta, 184. The five laws included the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617, Energy Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 95- 618, National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, Pub. L. No. 95-620, and Natural Gas Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-621. David Izon, E.P. Danenberger, and Melinda Mayes, "Absence of fatalities in blowouts encouraging in MMS study of OCS incidents 1992-2006," Well Control July/August (2007), 84. Russell Wayland, "The New Federal OCS Regulations in the Light of Santa Barbara," (Society of Petroleum Engineers
¶[SPE] Paper 2780, San Francisco, CA, November 1969); Richard B. Krahl and David W. Moody, "Gulf Coast Lease
¶Management Inspection Program" (OTC Paper 1714, Houston, TX, May 1972), 846.31 Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 119. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Testimony of John Guide, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 22, 2010, 87. M.D. Reifel, "Offshore Blowouts and Fires," in The Technology of Offshore Drilling, Completion and Production, ETA
¶Offshore Seminars, Inc. (Tulsa: The Petroleum Publishing Company, 1976), 239–257; "The Wicked Witch is Dead,"
¶Shell News no. 2 (1978): 2–8; and R.C. Visser, "Offshore Platform Accidents, Regulations, and Industry Standards"
¶(OTC Paper 7118, Houston, TX, May 1993).32 Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 23, 2010, 442. Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Program: Hearings before the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). John Gisclair, Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010 (annotations, September 20, 2010). Commission calculation based on internal Halliburton document (HAL_10994). Krahl and Moody, "Gulf Coast Lease Management Program;" Donald Solanas, "Update—OCS Lease Management
¶Program" (OTC Paper 1754, Houston, TX, April/May, 1973); E.W. Standley to Jack W. Boller, February 15, 1972,
¶Central Classified Files, 1969–1972, Box 136, Part 13, RG 48, Records of the Secretary of Interior, NARA.33 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 19, 2010, 29, 33; Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978). 34 43 U.S.C. § 1801. 35 43 U.S.C. § 1802. 36 43 U.S.C. § 1344. 37 43 U.S.C. § 1340. 38 43 U.S.C. § 1351. 39 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3). 40 43 U.S.C. § 1346. 41 43 U.S.C. § 1347(c). 42 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b). 43 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) 44 43 U.S.C. § 1351. 45 43 U.S.C. § 1340. 46 43 U.S.C. § 1351(c)(3). 47 43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1). 48 43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1). 49 43 U.S.C. § 1531(l). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 127537-39); Internal Halliburton document (HAL_11196). 34 30 C.F.R. § 250.421. K. E. Arnold, P. S. Koszela, and J. C. Viles, "Improving Safety of Production Operations in the U.S. OCS" (OTC Paper
¶6079, Houston, TX, May 1989).34 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 275. Peter Lovie, "Classification and Certification of Offshore Drilling Units," in The Technology of Offshore Drilling,
¶Completion and Production, ETA Offshore Seminars, (Tulsa: The Petroleum Publishing Company, 1976), 389–413.35 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 24. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 193549). BP's internal guidelines further specify that centralization should extend 100 feet above any such hydrocarbon-bearing zones. If either the top of cement or centralization requirements are not met, the guidelines require that the actual top of cement should be confirmed by a "proven cement evaluation technique." Ibid. Dunn, "Deepwater Production."36 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, 33. Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 143295, BP-HZN-CEC 22663); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 34. See data in National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Assessment of Safety of OCS Activities, Safety and Offshore
¶Oil (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1981).37 Ibid.; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 280. Document provided to the Commission by Halliburton entitled "Halliburton GoM Foam Jobs 2002–2010." E. P. Danenberger, "Outer Continental Shelf Drilling Blowouts, 1971-1991" (OTC Paper 7248, Houston, TX, May
¶1993).38 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 443. S.L. Pickett and S.W. Cole, "Foamed Cementing Technique for Liners Yields Cost-Effective Results" (Society of Petro- leum Engineers SPE Paper #27679, Midland, Texas, March 1994), 523–24. U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), "Petroleum," Table 5.13.c, in Annual Energy Review 2009 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. EIA, 2010), http://www.eia.gov/emeu/aer/petro.html.39 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, 33–34; Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 443. Halliburton had delivered the slurry blend to the Deepwater Horizon several months earlier. It had developed the blend to match the temperature and pressure profile of the well that Deepwater Horizon had drilled immediately prior to Macondo—another BP well called Kodiak. Jesse Gagliano (Halliburton), interview with Commission staff, September 10, 2010. "Bidders Snub Most Deepwater Tracts," Oil and Gas Journal (April 8, 1974): 36.40 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 281. At this point, it appears that lab personnel replicated the dry blend recipe that was on the rig using off-the-shelf ma- terials from their lab. For later tests, Halliburton sent samples of the cement that was actually on the Horizon back to the lab and directly tested those materials. Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 191–195.41 Ibid. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 109218). Stephen P.J. Cossey, "Celebrations Began with Cognac," AAPG Explorer (September 2004), http://www.aapg.org/ explorer/2004/09sep/gom_history.cfm.42 Ibid. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 68). Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 196–201.43 Ibid. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 36). Pratt, Priest, and Castaneda, Offshore Pioneers, 83–90.44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). "Gulf Lease Sale Shatters Two Records," Oil & Gas Journal (October 6, 1980): 34; Charlie Blackburn, quoted in Priest,
¶The Offshore Imperative, 216; D.A. Holmes, "1970-1986 Lookback of Offshore Lease Sales in the Gulf of Mexico
¶Cenozoic," interoffice memorandum, Shell Offshore Inc., August 24, 1987.45 Ibid., 116–118; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 117. Ibid. Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 209–215.46 John R. Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon in MC252, July 1, 2010, 11–12. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 136946-47). Juan Carlos Boué with Edgar Jones, A Question of Rigs, of Rules, or of Rigging the Rules? Upstream Profits and Taxes in U.S. Gulf Offshore Oil and Gas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 17.47 Testimony of Lee Lambert, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 291; Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-CEC 20347, 20178). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 171151). Rich Sears, "A Brief History of Deepwater" (draft prepared for the National Commission, August 2010).48 Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-CEC 20347, 20178). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 136946-47). Paul Voosen, "Gulf of Mexico's Deepwater Oil Industry Is Built on Pillars of Salt," New York Times, July 28, 2010;
¶Gary Steffens and Neil Braunsdorf, "The Gulf of Mexico Deepwater Play:50 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 364–365, 393. See S. Rep. No. 95-285, at 154–5 (reprinting letter from Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus). Ibid. Years from Concept to Commercial Reality" (AAPG Distinguished Lecture Series, 1997–1998).49 Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 21265). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 20234). Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 218–220.50 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 364–365, 393. See S. Rep. No. 95-285, at 154–5 (reprinting letter from Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus). Ibid. Juan Carlos Boué and Gerardo Lyando, U.S. Gulf Offshore Oil: Petroleum Leasing and Taxation and Their Impact on
¶Industry Structure, Competition, Production, and Fiscal Revenues (Oxford: Oxford Energy Institute, 2002).51 Brian Morel, e-mail message to Richard Miller and Mark Hafle. See S. Rep. No. 95-285, at 50, 62, 82, 144–5. Testimony of Vincent Tabler, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 25, 2010, 22–23, 36. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE), "Gulf of Mexico Oil and Gas Leasing
¶Offerings," http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/lsesale/swiler/swiler.html.52 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 13. Robert Gramling, Oil on the Edge: Offshore Development, Conflict, Gridlock (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 121. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_0011208). Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 221–222.53 BP, Deepwater Horizon Follow Up Rig Audit, Marine Assurance Audit and Out of Service Period, September 2009, 2, 18–48; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 136211). Charles Babcock, "Watt Defies Critics of Plan for Oil Leases," Washington Post, July 7, 1981, A3. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 137370). "The Time to Start Looking is Now," Shell News no. 4 (1984): 16.54 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 364. "Problems with Government," Ocean Industry (April 1982): 21. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 129141). By 1990, Americans consumed less gasoline on a per capita basis (437 gallons per year) than they did in 1979. U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Annual Energy Review, Petroleum, Table 5.13.c, http://www.eia.gov/ emeu/aer/petro.html.55 Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 29, 2010, 172, 313. Commission on Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy Resources, Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy Resources (Washington, D.C.: January 1982), xv, http://www.onrr.gov/Laws_R_D/frnotices/PDFDocs/linowes- rpt1-5.pdf. Internal Transocean document (TRN-USCG_MMS 30422); Internal Schlumberger document (SLB-EC-2). On the forgotten victory of energy conservation and efficiency, see Jay Hakes, A Declaration of Energy Independence:
¶How Freedom from Foreign Oil Can Improve National Security, Our Economy, and the Environment (Hoboken: John
¶Wiley & Sons, 2008), 41–71.
314¶56 Robert Gramling, Oil on the Edge: Offshore Development, Conflict, Gridlock (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1996), 118.57 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 33. "Industry Warning Watt Against Transfer of BLM Leasing Functions to MMS," Inside Energy/with Federal Lands, November 1, 1982, 11. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 143304). "Bullwinkle Takes Shape," Shell News no. 6 (1987): 2–7; "Rising Above the Crowd," Shell News no. 6 (1988): 28–34.58 Ibid., 25; Testimony of Chris Pleasant, 118–119. G. Kevin Jones, "Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development During the Reagan Administration—Part 1," West- ern New England Law Review 12, 1, (1990):8–13. Testimony of John Guide, 298 (the cement plug was "deeper than normal"); Testimony of Ronald Sepulvado, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 145 ("the top of the surface plug is normally at 500 feet below the wellhead"). "How Conoco Developed the Tension-Leg Platform," Ocean Industry, August 1984, 35–46.59 Testimony of John Gisclair, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 8, 2010, 131–132. "Interior Denies Oil Leasing Plan Will Cost $77 Billion," Associated Press, September 28, 1982. 60 43 U.S.C. § 1337. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8574). Tom Curtis, "Lifestyles of the Rich and Bankrupt," Texas Monthly, March 1988, 90.
60 Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment, Oil and Gas Technologies for the Arctic and Deepwater: Summary (Washington: GPO, 1985), 22–23.61 Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 5, 2010, 128–129. Charles Lester, "Contemporary Federalism and New Regimes of Ocean Governance: Lessons from the Case of Outer Continental Shelf Oil Development," Ocean & Coastal Management 23 (1994), 14. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8574). On the struggle over Bristol Bay, see Charles Frederick Lester, "The Search for Dialogue in the Administrative State: The Politics, Policy, and Law of Offshore Development" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1992), 113–146.62 Ibid.; Testimony of Andrea Fleytas, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 5, 2010, 16; Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 296. National Research Council Committee on Marine Area Governance and Management, Striking a Balance: Improving Stewardship of Marine Areas (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1997), 37, http://www.nap.edu/ openbook.php?record_id=5797&page=37. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 21260-279). Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 209–215.63 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 295; Testimony of Pat O'Bryan, 366. President George H.W. Bush, "Statement on Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development," (June 26, 1990), http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2035&year=1990&month=6. 64 30 C.F.R. pt. 250. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126928). Steffens and Braunsdorf, "The Gulf of Mexico Deepwater Play."
64 BOEMRE, "Gulf of Mexico Oil and Gas Leasing Offerings," http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/lsesale/swiler/ swiler.html.65 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 281, 282, 294. U.S. Department of the Interior, Documents pertaining to offshore inspection types and practices produced to the Oil Spill Commission, August 2010. Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 237–251.66 Ibid., 282. Jan Erik Vinnem, Offshore Risk Assessment: Principles, Modelling and Applications of QRA Studies, 2nd ed. (London: Springer Studies in Reliability Engineering, 2007), 91, 100, 102. The blind shear rams closed and sealed as expected during the positive-pressure test. This fact suggests that the rams were capable of sealing the well when the blowout occurred. But the evidence is inconclusive on its own; during the positive-pressure test the crew closed the blind shear rams using a low pressure hydraulic system, rather than the high pressure hydraulic system that would have activated the rams in the event of a blowout. Ibid., 254–255.67 Ibid., 281-282, 311. Petroleum Safety Authority of Norway, "From Prescription to Performance in Petroleum Supervision," March 12, 2010, http://www.ptil.no/news/from-prescription-to-performance-in-petroleum-supervision-article6696-79.html. Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCEC 90). Ibid., 253–261; "Launch Pad into the Deep," Houston Chronicle, August 17, 1997.
68 Bob Horton quoted in Tom Bower, Oil: Money, Politics, and Power in the 21st Century (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 2009), 19.69 Testimony of David Sims, August 26, 2010, 163. E.P. Danenberger et al., Investigation of March 19, 1989 Fire, South Pass Block 60 Platform B, Lease OCS-G 1608, OCS Report MMS 90-0016 (New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, April 1990): 15, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PDFs/1990/90-0016.pdf. Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 204. There were no regulations or industry standards guiding the conduct or interpretation of negative-pressure tests at the time of the Macondo blowout. The absence of any such guidance may have contributed to the failure to conduct and interpret the test correctly here. William A. Schneider, "3-D Seismic: A Historical Note," The Leading Edge (March 1998): 375; "Looking Ahead in Marine and Land Geophysics—A Conversation with Woody Nestvold and Ian Jack," The Leading Edge (October 1995): 1061–1067.70 Ibid., 317; Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 367. Marine Board of the National Research Council Committee on Alternatives for Inspection of Outer Continental Shelf Operations, Alternatives for Inspecting Outer Continental Shelf Operations (Washington: National Academy Press, 1990): 3, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=1517&page=1. This calculation is based on approximate values of the depths and mud weights involved. "Exploring the Ocean's Frontiers," Time, December 17, 1990, 98; "Offshore Oil: How Deep Can They Go?" Popular Science, January 1992): 80–97.71 Testimony of David Sims, August 26, 2010, 174. Minerals Management Service, Final Report, Findings and Recommendations, MMS Task Force on OCS Inspection and Enforcement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, February 1990), 1-3. Testimony of Leo Lindner, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 19, 2010, 297; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, app. Q, 1. "Oil and Gas Technology Development," (Topic Paper #26, National Petroleum Council Global Oil & Gas Study, November 22, 2006), 16. This topic paper was one of 38 working documents used to produce the 2007 National Petroleum Council study, Facing the Hard Truths About Energy http://www.npchardtruthsreport.org/.72 Ibid., 367. Marine Board, Alternatives for Inspecting Outer Continental Shelf Operations, 80. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 83. Susanne S. Pagano, "Offshore Drilling, Production—New Waves of Technology," Sea Technology (April 1991): 19–21; "There's Oil Down There . . . Way Down There," Texas Shores 31, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 14–15.73 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 367. Ibid., 82. Testimony of Leo Lindner, 308–11. The exclusion for "[d]rilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes associated with the exploration, development, or production of crude oil, natural gas or geothermal energy" is found at 40 C.F.R. § 261.4. Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 243–251.
74 "Shell Marks Progress in Deepwater Gulf," Oil & Gas Journal 93, no. 46 (November 13, 1995); "Debottlenecking Removes Auger Production Constraints," Oil & Gas Journal 94, no. 46 (November 11, 1996).75 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 282, 283. E.P. Danenberger, "Changes in the Minerals Management Service Offshore Regulatory Programs Resulting From the Oil Pollution Act of 1990" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 6823, May 1992), 150. Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279–81. Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 251–253.
76 Press Release, Minerals Management Service, Shell to Pay $49 Million in Settlement Agreement with Minerals Management Service, August 5, 2003.77 Ibid., 283–284. Ibid. Testimony of Randy Ezell, 279. Boué and Jones, A Question of Rigs, 130.78 Testimony of Micah Sandell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 29, 2010, 8, 10, 12. Salient differences were, as MMS noted, that "Platforms in the GOM are typically smaller, technically less sophisti- cated, produce fewer hydrocarbons, and operate in less severe environmental conditions [than North Sea platforms]. The number of personnel on OCS platforms is significantly smaller than on North Sea platforms. There is, however, a substantially greater number of OCS platforms in the GOM, over 3,800." Marshall Courtois, William Hauser, and Paul Schneider, "Minerals Management Service Safety and Environmental Management Program: Evolution of the Concept," (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 6822, May 1992), 145. Testimony of Lee Lambert, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 292. Transocean disputes these accounts. It points out that the only individuals who have stated that Anderson advanced the "bladder effect" theory are BP employees. F. Jay Schempf, "New Study Finds Port Fourchon 'Vital' to U.S. Economy," Offshore (March 1, 2008).79 Ibid., 11. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,400 (July 2, 1991). Testimony of Lee Lambert, 292. D.G. Godfrey et al., "The Mars Project Overview" (OTC Paper 8368, Houston, TX, May 1997).80 Internal BP documents (Deepwater Horizon Schematic; BP August 9, 2010 presentation to Oil Spill Commission, slide 5 ). Former senior MMS officials, interviews with Commission staff, August and September 2010; Offshore Operators Committee, "Oil, Gas, and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)—Safety and Environmental Management Systems," Public Comment (May 22, 2006), http://www.boemre.gov/federalregister/PDFs/AD15- OOCcomments5-22-06.pdf. Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 117; Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 127909, BP-HZN-CEC 20189-90). While that may have been Mr. Vidrine's stated reason for running the test on the kill line, the Commission notes that the negative-pressure test performed at Macondo—whether on the drill pipe or kill line—was different from the negative- pressure test described in the Application for Permit to Modify. Testimony of Mark Bly, Hearing before the National Commission, November 8, 2010, 293–95. Ibid.81 Testimony of Douglas Brown, 88–89, 92–93. T.A.F. Powell, "US Voluntary SEMP Initiative: Holy Grail or Poisoned Chalice?" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 8111, May 1996): 828. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 86. Ray Mabus, America's Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan after the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. David Ernst and Andrew M.J. Steinhubl, "Alliances in Upstream Oil and Gas," McKinsey Quarterly 2 (1997).82 Testimony of Paul Meinhart, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 29, 2010, 28 E.O. Redd, Jean Chevallier, and Ian Paterson, "Preparing a Safety Case: A Drilling Contractor's Experience" (Society of Petroleum Engineers [SPE] Paper 27293, January 1994): 799. There are several possible explanations for the inconsistent readings on the drill pipe and kill line. One possibility is that the viscous spacer that had leaked through the annular preventer migrated into and clogged the kill line. John Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon in MC252 (July 1, 2010), 20–21. Another possibility is that a valve was inadvertently closed that should have been open. BP, Deepwater Horizon Acci- dent Investigation Report, 87. A third, more remote, possibility is that hydrocarbons coming up the well formed solid hydrates when they hit the cold seawater and those hydrates clogged the kill line. Guide, interview. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Science Panel, http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/people/sp.cfm. Jeff Ryser, "Hot Play in the Gulf," Texas Business (August 1995): 33.
83 "The Cloning of Mars," Shell News 64, no. 1 (1996): 8–13; Michael Davis, "Shell Oil Goes Deep in Gulf," Houston Chronicle, April 9, 1999; Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 260–262.84 Ibid., 94–95. American Petroleum Institute, Recommended Practices for Development of a Safety and Environmental Management Program for Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Operations and Facilities, Recommended Practice 75, 1st ed. (Dallas, TX: May 15, 1993). For example, a bubble of gas, under ideal conditions, would expand approximately 166-fold. This number differs under actual conditions based on fluid properties and flow. See, e.g., Testimony of Stanley Senner, Director of Conservation Science, Ocean Conservancy, Hearing before the National Commission, September 28, 2010. Mary Judice, "Out of the LOOP," Times Picayune, September 17, 1995; C.G. Steube, "Addressing Transportation Needs for Deepwater Gulf of Mexico" (OTC Paper 13169, Houston, TX, April/May 2001).85 Testimony of Steve Bertone, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 19, 2010, 28, 34. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf, 59 Fed. Reg. 33,779 (June 30, 1994). Mudloggers operate systems that collect and transmit real-time data from sensors on the rig. BP employed mudlog- gers from Sperry Drilling (a Halliburton subsidiary) on the Deepwater Horizon. President Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill" (June 15, 2010), http://www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill. Boué and Jones, A Question of Rigs, 17.
31586 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE), "Installations, Removals, and Cumulative Totals of Offshore Production Facilities in Federal Waters: 1959-2010," www.boemre.gov/stats/PDFs/OCSPlatformActivity.pdf.87 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 35. Ibid. Ibid., 20:28–20:36, 20:58–21:06. NOAA, Damage Assessment, Remediation, and Restoration Program: Glossary, http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/glos- sary/index.htm. Dolly Jorgenson, "An Oasis in a Watery Desert: Discourses on an Industrial Ecosystem in the Gulf of Mexico Rigs-to- Reefs Program," History and Technology 25, no. 4 (November 2009): 343–364.88 Testimony of Gregory Meche, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 198. Patrick Crow, "New slant on safety," Oil & Gas Journal (July 22, 1996): 23. Ibid., 20:20–21:01. Testimony of Stanley Senner. Chapter Eight Press Release, Minerals Management Service, High Bids Total $307 Million in Central Gulf of Mexico Lease Sale 152, May 10, 1995, http://www.boemre.gov/ooc/press/1995/50037.txt.89 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 35–36. TA.F Powell, "US Voluntary SEMP Initiative: Holy Grail or Poisoned Chalice?" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 8111, 1996). Ibid., 21:01. Samuel K. Skinner and William K. Reilly, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: A Report to the President (May 1989), 1. Voosen, "Gulf of Mexico's Deepwater Oil Industry Is Built on Pillars of Salt"; Helen Thorpe, "Oil and Water," Texas
¶Monthly (February 1996): 140–141.90 Ibid. E.P. Danenberger, interview with Commission staff, September 2, 2010; E.P. Danenberger, e-mail message to Commis- sion staff, October 25, 2010. Ibid., 21:01–21:08. Ibid., 27–8. Scott L. Montgomery and Dwight Moore, "Subsalt Play, Gulf of Mexico: A Review," AAPG Bulletin 81, no. 6 (June
¶1997): 875–876.91 Testimony of Andrea Fleytas, 14. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf–Incident Reporting Requirements, 68 Fed. Reg. 40,585 (July 8, 2003). The Commission believes, based on interviews of the mudloggers on the Horizon, that the Hitec system may have shown a more obvious trend because it displays numeric values as opposed to trend lines such as those seen in the Sperry data shown in the text. Joseph Keith (Sperry), interview with Commission staff, October 6, 2010; Cathleenia Willis (Sperry), interview with Commission staff, October 21, 2010. National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation (September 18, 1990), http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/ letters/1990/M90_26_31A.pdf. Rhonda Duey, "Pioneering a Global Play," Hart's E&P (July 1, 2009); Thorpe, "Oil and Water," 142.92 Testimony of Gregory Meche, 235. E.P. Danenberger, interview with Commission staff, September 2, 2010; E.P. Danenberger, e-mail message to Commis- sion staff, October 25, 2010. Testimony of Greg Meche, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 207–09. 93 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.4, 435.11. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, "Settlement," http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/facts/settlement.cfm; Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, "Questions and Answers," http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/facts/qanda.cfm. R.R. Israel et al., "Challenges Evolve for Directional Drilling Through Salt in Deepwater Gulf of Mexico," Drilling
¶Contractor (May/June 2008), http://drillingcontractor.org/challenges-evolve-for-directional-drilling-through-saltin-deepwater-gulf-of-mexico-1622.93 Testimony of Andrea Fleytas, 14. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—Incident Reporting Requirements, 71 Fed. Reg. 19,640 (April 17, 2006). Exxon Mobil, 2009 Corporate Citizenship Report, 15. David Ivanovich, "Gulf is Heart of Deepwater Drilling," Houston Chronicle, May 4, 1997.94 Complaint at 2, Shivers v. BP Plc., No. 10-cv-381 (S.D. Ala. July 20, 2010). Commission staff analysis of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement data. See http:// www.boemre.gov/adm/budget.html. Testimony of Greg Meche, 207–09, 219. Testimony of Rex Tillerson, CEO of Exxon Mobil, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010. Brian Knowlton, "Oil Growth Boomerangs on Houston," International Herald Tribune, April 1, 2002.95 Ibid. Jim Morris, "Lost at Sea/OFFSHORE RISKS/Safety concerns return with rise of oil, gas boom," Houston Chronicle, December 22, 1996, http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id=1996_1384981. Keith, interview. David Townshend, "Golden Triangle Dominates," Petroleum Economist, October 2002.96 Ibid. Commission staff analysis of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement data. See http:// www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/fastfacts/WaterDepth/wdmaster.asp. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 21415). Tim Colton and LaVar Huntziner, A Brief History of Shipbuilding in Recent Times (Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation,
¶2002); Mike Hunt and Lenny Gary, "Gulf of Mexico Fabrication Yards Built 5,500 Platforms Over 50 Years," Offshore
¶(January 2000).97 Ibid. Commission staff analysis of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement data; Minerals Management Service, U.S. Offshore Milestones (as of August 2006): 5. See http://www.boemre.gov/stats/PDFs/ milestonesAUG2006.pdf. Keith, interview. Given what we now know, it is all but impossible that the well was not flowing as of 9:08 p.m. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 25; Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon, 22–23. Other than faulty memory, the only apparent explanations for Mr. Keith's statement are that the crew had already closed off the portion of the flow line Mr. Keith was watching or that Mr. Keith watched for an inadequate period of time. Keith, interview; Darryl Bourgoyne (LSU), interview with Commission staff, No- vember 23, 2010. Exxon Mobil, 2009 Corporate Citizenship Report, 14. Ronald W. Ferrier, The History of the British Petroleum Company, Vol. 1: The Developing Years, 1901–1932 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); J.H. Bamberg, The History of British Petroleum, Vol. 2: The Anglo-Iranian Years, 1928–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and James Bamberg, British Petroleum and
¶Global Oil, 1950–1975: The Challenge of Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).98 Ibid.; Tracey Dalzell Walsh, "Forced To Become Emergency Workers, Fishermen Say BP Never Even Said Thanks," Courthouse News Service, July 22, 2010. Commission staff analysis of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement and U.S. Energy In- formation Administration data. See http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PDFs/2009/2009-016.pdf, 71–72; http://www. eia.gov/oog/info/twip/twiparch/100526/twipprint.html. Testimony of Greg Meche, 207–09. Ibid.,13, 19. Agis Salpukas, "BP Amoco's Leader Remakes An Oil Giant, Again," New York Times, April 1, 1999.99 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 37. Commission staff analysis of MMS yearly budget request and enactments, by nominal and real (2005) dollars. Ibid. "Shell 'Ignored Accident Warning,'" BBC online, June 14, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5077886.stm; Terry Macalister, "Shell Accused Over Oil Rig Safety," The Guardian, June 23, 2006. Kathy Shirley, "Vision Led to Crazy Horse Find," AAPG Explorer, March 2002.100 Ibid., 37–38. Tetrahedron, Inc., Reliability of Blowout Preventers Tested Under Fourteen and Seven Days Time Interval: Study Report, Submitted to Minerals Management Service, Department of the Interior, MMS Technology Assessment & Research Project 253, "Blowout Preventer Study" (December 20, 1996), http://www.boemre.gov/tarprojects/253/ AA.PDF.; Blowout Preventer (BOP) Testing Requirements for Drilling and Completion Operations, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,604 (June 1, 1998). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 21415). "Shell 'Ignored Accident Warning.'" Ibid.101 Ibid., 38. Per Holand, Reliability of Subsea BOP Systems for Deepwater Application, Phase II DW, SINTEF Report STF38 A99426 (November 7, 1999); Per Holand, Deepwater Kicks and BOP Performance, SINTEF Report STF38 A01419 (July 24, 2001); WEST Engineering Services, Inc., Mini Shear Study for U.S. Minerals Management Service, Requisi- tion No. 2-1011-1003 (December 2002); WEST Engineering Services, Inc., Shear Ram Capabilities Study for U.S. Minerals Management Service, Requisition No. 3-4025-1001 (September 2004). Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010, 21:08–21:14. Shell, Sustainability Report 2009, 16–17, http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2009/servicepages/downloads/files/ all_shell_sr09.pdf. Kristen Hays, "After All of Thunder Horse's Problems, BP Looks Ahead To Seeing A Return On Its Enormous Investment In The Platform, Payoff Is A Long Time in Coming," Houston Chronicle, November 18, 2007.102 Ibid., 38–39. WEST Engineering Services, Inc., "Comments by WEST Engineering Services, Houston, Texas, to The National Com- mission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling" (November 12, 2010): 3. Ibid., 21:14–21:15. Testimony of Marvin Odum, Shell, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010. Ibid.103 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 284–285. David Barstow and others, "Regulators Failed to Address Risks in Oil Rig Fail-Safe Device," New York Times, June 20, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/us/21blowout.html. Ibid., 2010, 21:17–21:18. Ibid. Peter Lehner with Bob Deans, In Deep Water: The Anatomy of a Disaster, the Fate of the Gulf, and Ending Our Oil
¶Addiction (New York: The Experiment, 2010), 63.104 Ibid., 285. U.S. Department of the Interior, Outer Continental Shelf Safety Oversight Board, Report to the Secretary of the Interior (September 1, 2010), 6. Testimony of Chad Murray, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 335–36. Ibid. "Deepwater GOM New Focus of BP Growth Strategy," Oil & Gas Journal 100, no. 33 (August 19, 2002): 36.105 Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, 165. Ibid. Ibid., 336. Neela Banerjee,"This Oil's Domestic, but It's Deep and It's Risky," New York Times, August 11, 2002.106 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 285–286. Ibid. Testimony of Randy Ezell, 282. "The Jack-2 Perspective," Oil & Gas Journal 104, no. 34 (September 11, 2006): 17.107 Ibid., 286. U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Inspector General, Survey Report: Offshore Civil Penalties Program, Miner- als Management Service (March 30, 1999), http://www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/pdf/99-I-374.pdf. Testimony of Bill Ambrose, Hearing before the National Commission, November 8, 2010, 381. Responsible Care, Who We Are, http://www.responsiblecare.org/page.asp?p=6406. B.F. Thurmond, D.B.L. Walker, H.H. Banon, A.B. Luberski, M.W. Jones, and R.R. Peters, "Challenges and Decisions in
¶Developing Multiple Deepwater Fields" (OTC Paper 16573, Houston, TX, May 2004).108 Ibid. Commission staff analysis of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement data provided to the Commission by the Department of the Interior of unannounced MMS inspections of MODUs/drilling rigs, 1990 (1,985 inspections) to 2009 (85 inspections). The pivotal change occurs in 1998–1999, as the numbers drop from David Young (Transocean), interview with Commission staff, November 19, 2010. K.L. Marshall and G.H. Smith, "Inspection Management Experience for a Fleet of Spars in the Gulf of Mexico" (OTC
¶Paper 17619, Houston, TX, May 2005); C. Jim Thibodeaux, R. Don Vardeman, and Charles E. Kindel, "Nansen/
¶Boomvang Projects: Overview and Project Management" (OTC Paper 14089, Houston, TX, May 2002).109 Ibid., 286–287. Yearly MMS Incident Summary Reports are available at http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/IncidentStatisticsSum- maries.htm. Testimony of David Young, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 259. Jody Freeman, "Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law" in Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order, ed. David Dyzenhaus (Toronto: Hart Publishing, 1999), 21. Thurmond et al., "Challenges and Decisions in Developing Multiple Deepwater Fields."110 Ibid., 287. "Deepwater Gulf of Mexico production rising," Oil & Gas Journal (November 1, 1999): 34 ("In 1999, 11 more deepwater development production projects in the gulf have already begun producing or are on the verge of doing so"); Michael Davis, "LEARNING THE DRILL/The oil patch rebound brought with it a need for drilling companies to find, train and keep people to work the rigs," Houston Chronicle (February 1, 1998): 1 ("A shortage of qualified personnel has been a nagging problem since the oil patch has come back in the past year. But over the next two years some 50 new offshore jack-up rigs, semi-submersibles and drill ships currently being built or converted will Young, interview. Ibid., 33. Bill Kirton, Gary Wulf, and Bill Henderson, "Thunder Horse Drilling Riser Break—The Road to Recovery" (SPE Paper
¶90628, 2004).111 Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, 152; Testimony of Tyrone Benton, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, July 23, 2010, 250. Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010, 21:08–21:14. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Enti- ties Program, September 26, 2008; Stephen Labaton, "Agency's '04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt," New York Times, October 3, 2008. th Congress (2010). 182 33 U.S.C. § 2702. Simon Todd and Dan Replogle, "Thunder Horse and Atlantis: The Development and Operation of Twin Giants in the
¶Deepwater Gulf of Mexico" (OTC Paper 20395, Houston, TX, May 2010).112 Testimony of Gregory Meche, 209; Testimony of David Young, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, May 27, 2010, 327; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 283; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 65; Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, 153. Bill Ambrose (Transocean), interview with Commission staff, September 21, 2010. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Enti- ties Program. Ibid.113 Testimony of Micah Sandell, 11–13. Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010, 21:38. Edward J. Balleisen and Marc Eisner, "The Promise and Pitfalls of Co-Regulation: How Governments Can Draw on Private Governance for Public Purpose," in New Perspectives on Regulation, ed. David Moss and John Cisternino, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 31. Laurel Brubacker Calkins, "BP Sued by Watchdog Group over Atlantis Platform," Bloomberg, September 13, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-10/bp-sued-over-alleged-safety-gaps-at-atlantis-production-platform.html.114 Testimony of Capt. Alwin Landry, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 98–100. Young, interview. Ibid., 130. Det Norske Veritas, Pipeline Damage Assessment from Hurricane Ivan in the Gulf of Mexico, (Minerals Management
¶Service Report No. 440 38570, May 8, 2006). Includes data on damages from hurricanes through 2005.115 Testimony of Paul Erickson, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 231–232. Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010, 21:38–21:42. Ibid. Lesley D. Nixon et al., Deepwater Gulf of Mexico 2009: Interim Report of 2008 Highlights (OCS Report, MMS 2009016, 2009), https://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/espis/espisfront.asp.116 Testimony of Capt. Alwin Landry, 101–102. Testimony of Randy Ezell, 283; Young, interview. Ibid. "BP Taps Vast Pool of Crude in Deepest Oil Well," Associated Press, September 2, 2009; Brett Clanton, "Shell's Perdido
¶First to Produce in Key Deep Water Gulf Region," Houston Chronicle, March 31, 2010; Brett Clanton, "Chevron
¶Plans New Floating City," Houston Chronicle Energy Watch blog, FuelFix, October 21, 2010, http://fuelfix.com/ energywatch/2010/10/21/chevron-plans-new-floating-city/.117 Ibid., 104–105. Testimony of Micah Sandell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 29, 2010, 10. Testimony of Marvin Fertel, President and CEO of Nuclear Energy Institute, "Three Mile Island—Looking Back on Thirty Years of Lessons Learned," Before the Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety, 111th Congress (2009). Frank Close, Bob McCavitt, and Brian Smith, "Deepwater Gulf of Mexico Development Challenges Overview," (SPE
¶Paper 113011, 2008), 2.118 Testimony of Gregory Meche, 202, 211, 223. Testimony of Christopher Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 173. Testimony of James Ellis, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Hearing before the National Commission, August 25, 2010. Melvyn Whitby, "Design Evolution of a Subsea BOP: Blowout Preventer Requirements Get Tougher as Drilling Goes
¶Ever Deeper," Drilling Contractor (May/June 2007).119 Testimony of Anthony Gervasio, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 173, 187–188. Testimony of Randy Ezell, 283. John G. Kemeny, Report of The President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI (1979), 68. The full subsection of the recommendation reads, "The industry should establish a program that specifies appropriate safety standards including those for management, quality assurance, and operat- ing procedures and practices, and that conducts independent evaluations. The recently created Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, or some similar organization, may be an appropriate vehicle for establishing and implementing this program." Mary C. Boatman and Jennifer Peterson, Oceanic Gas Hydrate Research and Activities Review (OCS Report MMS
3162000-017, U.S. Department of Interior, Minerals Management Service, Gulf of Mexico OCS Region, 2000).120 Ibid., 187; Testimony of Kevin Robb, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 42. Testimony of Bill Ambrose, 244. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, "About Us," http://www.inpo.info/AboutUs.htm. Fergus Addison, Kevin Kennelley, and Fikry Botros, "Future Challenges for Deepwater Developments" (OTC Paper 20404, Houston, TX, May 2010).121 Testimony of Anthony Gervasio, 189. Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon, 14; Testimony of Bill Ambrose, 252–53; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 28. Joseph V. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 50–51. Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of the Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
122 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President in a Discussion on Jobs and the Economy in Charlotte, North Carolina, April 2, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-a- discussion-jobs-and-economy-charlotte-north-carolina.123 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 447–448. Ibid., 123. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 57–58. Gabriel Garcia Marquez, One Hundred Years of Solitude, translated by Gregory Rambassa (New York: Avon Books, 1970), 212.
320Chapter Three 1 Press Release, U.S. Department of the Interior, Salazar Launches Safety and Environmental Protection Reforms to Toughen Oversight of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations, May 11, 2010, http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/ Salazar-Launches-Safety-and-Environmental-Protection-Reforms-to-Toughen-Oversight-of-Offshore-Oil-and-Gas- Operations.cfm.2 Internal BP document (BP, presentation to Commission, August 9, 2010, slides 5 & 12). Quoted in Tom Zoellner, "Oil and Water: The Adventure of Getting One from Deep Beneath the Other," Invention and Technology (Fall 2000): 48. Internal Transocean document (TRN-HEC 90686). Internal documents are identified by their document production serial numbers when available, which were assigned by the entity that provided them. Neil MacFarquhar, "Routine Flights Become Overland Odysseys, Minus Clean Socks," New York Times, April 22, 2010. Campbell Robertson and Clifford Krauss, "Gulf Spill Is the Largest of Its Kind, Scientists Say," New York Times, August 2, 2010. BP, Sustainability Review (2009), 20–21. http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/ e_s_assets/e_s_assets_2009/downloads_pdfs/bp_sustainability_review_2009.pdf. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(6) ("An oil and gas lease issued pursuant to this section shall . . . contain such rental and other provisions as the Secretary may prescribe at the time of offering the area for lease."). Press Release, U.S. Department of the Interior, Salazar Divides MMS's Three Conflicting Missions, May 19, 2010, http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Divides-MMSs-Three-Conflicting-Missions.cfm; Secretary of the Interior, Establishment of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue, No. 3299 (May 19, 2010), http://www.doi.gov/ deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=32475.3 Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, 411; U.S. Department of Energy, Well Configuration (BP document made public by the Department of Energy), http://www.energy.gov/open/documents/3.1_Item_2_Macondo_Well_07_Jun_1900.pdf; Testimony of Natalie Roshto, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 22, 2010, 15. Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 409. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126338). Campbell Robertson, "11 Remain Missing After Oil Rig Explodes Off Louisiana," New York Times, April 22, 2010. EPA, Government Response to the BP Oil Spill: Odors from the BP Spill (June 2010), http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/ reports/odorfactsheet.pdf (announcing help line for residents experiencing oil-related odors); Press Release, NOAA, Administration Launches Dockside Chats to Promote Gulf Seafood Safety Awareness, August 25, 2010, http://www. restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/08/25/administration-launches-dockside-chats-promote-gulf-seafood-safety- awareness; BP, Claims and Government Payments Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Public Report (November 18, 2010). Health and Safety Executive, Major Incident Investigation Report, BP Grangemouth Scotland (29th May – 10th June 2000) (August 18, 2003), 7, http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/bpgrange/images/bprgrangemouth.pdf. These terms are taken directly from the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) NEPA implementing regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28. 4 40 C.F.R. §1508.4. Secretary of the Interior, Change of the Name of the Minerals Management Service to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, No. 3302 (June 18, 2010), http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/ loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=35872.4 Testimony of Michael Williams, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 23, 2010, 35–36. Pratt, Priest, and Castaneda, Offshore Pioneers, 15–52, 137–157. Internal Transocean document (TRN-USCG-MMS 11597). Rick Jervis, "Gulf Blast Appears to be 'Blowout'," USA Today, April 22, 2010; Ben Casselman, Russell Gold, and Angel Gonzalez, "Blast Jolts Oil World," Wall Street Journal, April 22, 2010. Testimony of Timothy Ragen, Executive Director of the U.S. Marine Mammal Commission, "The Short and Long- Term Impacts of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill," Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans, and Wildlife, 111th Congress (June 10, 2010); Kim B. Ritchie and Brian D. Keller, eds., A Scientific Forum on the Gulf of Mexico: The Islands in the Stream Concept (NOAA, January 23, 2008), 6–8; Elliott A. Norse and John Amos, "Impacts, Perception, and Policy Implications of the Deepwater Horizon Oil and Gas Disaster," Environmental Law Reporter 40, no. 11 (2010): 11071; Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Scientific Symposium Meeting Summary (Consortium for Ocean Leadership, June 23, 2010), 15–16. Ibid. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
go into operation. Finding qualified crews to operate these increasingly high tech drilling rigs is a major worry for drilling companies.").111 Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, 152; Testimony of Tyrone Benton, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, July 23, 2010, 250. Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010, 21:08–21:14. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Enti- ties Program, September 26, 2008; Stephen Labaton, "Agency's '04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt," New York Times, October 3, 2008. th Congress (2010). 182 33 U.S.C. § 2702. 33 C.F.R. § 140.1.112 Testimony of Gregory Meche, 209; Testimony of David Young, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, May 27, 2010, 327; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 283; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 65; Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, 153. Bill Ambrose (Transocean), interview with Commission staff, September 21, 2010. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Enti- ties Program. 46 C.F.R. pt. 2.
113 Curry L. Hagerty and Jonathan L. Ramseur, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Selected Issues for Congress, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, July 15, 2010): 37. The Coast Guard proposed new safety rules in 1999, which triggered significant industry opposition, and has not since made those rules final. Outer Continental Shelf Activities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,64 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 295–296. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-OSC 1438). 65 30 C.F.R. § 250.423. Fed. Reg. 68,416 (December 7, 1999).114 Testimony of Capt. Alwin Landry, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 98–100. Young, interview. Ibid., 130. Inspection Under, and Enforcement of, Coast Guard Regulations for Fixed Facilities on the Outer Continental Shelf by the Minerals Management Service,67 Ibid., 281-282, 311. Petroleum Safety Authority of Norway, "From Prescription to Performance in Petroleum Supervision," March 12, 2010, http://www.ptil.no/news/from-prescription-to-performance-in-petroleum-supervision-article6696-79.html. Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCEC 90). Fed. Reg. 5912 (February 7, 2002).115 Testimony of Paul Erickson, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 231–232. Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010, 21:38–21:42. Ibid. The MMS and the United States Coast Guard have signed three governing Memoranda of Understanding (in 1989, 1999, and 2004, with supporting Memoranda of Agreement) in order to clarify roles and responsibilities related to workplace safety and the approval of technical systems and equipment that are applicable to both drilling and marine systems on offshore oil and gas facilities. See http://www.boemre.gov/regcompliance/MOU/MOUindex.htm.116 Testimony of Capt. Alwin Landry, 101–102. Testimony of Randy Ezell, 283; Young, interview. Ibid. S. Elizabeth Birnbaum, interview with Commission staff, August 2010; Randall B. Luthi, interview with Commission staff, August 2010; Thomas R. Kitsos, interview with Commission staff, August 2010.117 Ibid., 104–105. Testimony of Micah Sandell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 29, 2010, 10. Testimony of Marvin Fertel, President and CEO of Nuclear Energy Institute, "Three Mile Island—Looking Back on Thirty Years of Lessons Learned," Before the Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety, 111th Congress (2009). Deepwater Royalty Relief Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-58,109 Ibid., 286–287. Yearly MMS Incident Summary Reports are available at http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/IncidentStatisticsSum- maries.htm. Testimony of David Young, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 259. Jody Freeman, "Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law" in Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order, ed. David Dyzenhaus (Toronto: Hart Publishing, 1999), 21. Stat. 563 (1995).
118 Press Release, U.S. Department of the Interior, Secretary Salazar Launches Ethics Reform Initiative in Meeting with Minerals Management Service Employees, January 29, 2009, http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/2009_01_29_release.cfm.119 Testimony of Anthony Gervasio, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 173, 187–188. Testimony of Randy Ezell, 283. John G. Kemeny, Report of The President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI (1979), 68. The full subsection of the recommendation reads, "The industry should establish a program that specifies appropriate safety standards including those for management, quality assurance, and operat- ing procedures and practices, and that conducts independent evaluations. The recently created Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, or some similar organization, may be an appropriate vehicle for establishing and implementing this program." For example, in 2006, Congress responded to Gulf state demands for greater revenues by enacting the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act, which provides that Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas and the coastal political subdivisions will receive 37.5 percent of all revenue (bonus bids, rentals, and royalty production) for new leases in the 5 million acres in the Eastern Gulf and the 5.8 million acres in the Central Gulf. See http://www.boemre.gov/ ooc/press/2008/FactSheet-MMSGOMSecurityActMARCH202008.htm. The Fiscal Year 2010 allocation to the four Gulf States and their political subdivisions was approximately $866 million. See http://www.boemre.gov/offshore/ PDFs/GOMESAFY2010Final.pdf.120 Ibid., 187; Testimony of Kevin Robb, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 42. Testimony of Bill Ambrose, 244. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, "About Us," http://www.inpo.info/AboutUs.htm. U.S. Department of the Interior, Outer Continental Shelf Safety Oversight Board, Report to the Secretary of the Interior (September 1, 2010), 11.121 Testimony of Anthony Gervasio, 189. Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon, 14; Testimony of Bill Ambrose, 252–53; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 28. Joseph V. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 50–51. U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General, MMS Oil Marketing Group–Lakewood, September 10, 2008.122 Ibid., 105, 190; Testimony of Gergory Meche, 223. Testimony of Christopher Pleasant, 165. Lee Gard, interview with Commission staff, November 8, 2010. U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General, MMS Oil Marketing Group–Lakewood, Report Transmittal Letter, September 9, 2008, 3, http://www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/pdf/RIKinvestigation.pdf.123 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 447–448. Ibid., 123. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 57–58. Department of the Interior Office of the Inspector General, Minerals Management Service, Island Operating Company, et al., (May 25, 2010), 7, http://www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/pdf/IslandOperatingCo.pdf.124 Ibid., 448–449, 452. Ibid. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 143. Ibid.
125 Press Release, U.S. Department of the Interior, Secretary Salazar Launches Ethics Reform Initiative in Meeting with Minerals Management Service Employees, January 29, 2009, http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/2009_01_29_release.cfm.126 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 452; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 287. Interview with industry expert, September 24, 2010. Ibid. U.S. Department of the Interior, Outer Continental Shelf Safety Oversight Board, Report to the Secretary of the Interior (September 1, 2010), 8.127 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 452. After the blowout, some industry CEOs testified they would never have used a long string production casing, sug- gesting there was a causal connection between BP's choice of the long string and the blowout. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Environment, 111th Cong. 104 (June 15, 2010) (statements of John Watson, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Chevron Corporation; and Rex Tillerson, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Exxon- Mobil). Ibid. Ibid., 13.128 Ibid., 449–450, 452; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 289; Testimony of Anthony Gervasio, 190, 199. First, the long string required the cement to travel through a longer stretch of steel casing—roughly 12,000 feet lon- ger—before reaching its final destination, potentially increasing the risk of cement contamination. Second, because it can require higher cement pumping pressure, a long string design can lead to the selection of lower cement volumes, lower densities, and lower pump rates. Third, the cement job at the bottom of a long string is more difficult to remediate than one at the bottom of a liner. Ibid. Ibid., 8, 13.129 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 450; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 123. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 128489); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 64 ("the BP Macondo well team did not ask for the OptiCem model to be re-run"). This may have been because of Mr. Guide's distrust of the OptiCem model. Testimony of John Guide, 275 ("it's wrong a lot"). When Halliburton rig personnel eventually informed Gagliano of BP's decision themselves, he responded by e-mailing BP modeling data suggesting again that more centralizers would be needed to prevent channeling. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 128708). Ibid. Ibid., 13.130 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 450; Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39. Testimony of Jesse Gagliano, 259; Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, 415. Ibid. Ibid., 6.
131 Don E. Kash, Lease Management Activities in the Geological Survey, Commission on Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy Resources: Technical Reports, 1981–1982, RG 48, Entry 998, Box 10, File 239, National Archives and Records Administration, 27.132 Ibid. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 22670). Lee Gard, interview. U.S. Department of the Interior, Outer Continental Shelf Safety Oversight Board, Report to the Secretary of the Interior (September 1, 2010), 11–12.133 Ibid. Ronald Sepulvado (BP), interview with Commission staff, September 1, 2010. Testimony of A. C. Tollison Jr., Executive Vice President, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, "National Energy Policy: Nuclear Energy," Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality, 107th Congress (2001). Ibid., 11.134 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 451; Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 66. Ibid. 43 U.S.C. § 1344.135 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39. Fred Bartlit, letter to the National Commission, October 28, 2010 (reporting the results of cement testing). Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 76. 43 U.S.C. § 1344.136 Ibid. If BP were looking, the one February test actually reported to BP could have prompted BP to question the design as well. BP argues that its failure to do so here is understandable given that it had hired one of the world's leading cementers specifically for purposes of designing and testing the cement slurry. Alice Camp, "Nuclear: In Pursuit of a Renaissance," EPRI Journal (Summer 2007): 20. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3).137 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 368, 396. To the contrary, Halliburton's selection of conditioning time appears to have been haphazard at best. Lab person- nel used different conditioning times (ranging from zero conditioning time to three hours) in each of the four foam stability tests that they conducted. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 81. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
321138 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 ("Effects includes ecological . . ., aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic, social, or health, whether direct, indirect, or cumulative").
¶139 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1891d.140 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 451–452. Moreover, once the BP Well Site Leaders and crew realized that the annular preventer was leaking, they should have circulated out any spacer that had migrated below the annular preventer prior to continuing with the test. Testi- Ibid., 53–54. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.141 Internal BP Document (BP August 9, 2010 presentation to Oil Spill Commission, slide 13). The Commission agrees with others that there is no such thing as a "bladder effect" that could account for the pres- sures the rig crew was observing. There was no apparent explanation for the 1400 psi on the drill pipe other than that the well was flowing. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 1, 2010. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1423h.142 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 454. Transocean asserts that its personnel, including the driller and toolpusher, were not "in any way responsible for interpreting the negative pressure test or making the decision that the well was secure and work could properly pro- ceed." Rachel Clingman, letter to Commission staff, November 16, 2010, 1. As the Commission's staff made clear at the November 8, 2010 hearing, the Commission is not tasked with deciding legal responsibility. Based on available evidence, however, Revette and Anderson agreed the negative-pressure test was a success and did not stop the job before moving on to the remaining temporary abandonment procedures. Testimony of Lee Lambert, 291; Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-CEC 20347, 20178). Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 104. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1445c-1.143 Ibid., 454–455. Guide, interview. Lee Gard, interview. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.144 Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, October 5, 2010, 157. Benjamin Powell, "BP Response to Presidential Commission's Preliminary Technical Conclusions," letter to Commis- sion staff, November 22, 2010, att. 1, 3 (citing Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 111th Cong. (May 11, 2010) (statement of Testimony of Tim Probert, Halliburton President, Global Business Lines, Chief Health, Safety and Environmental Officer)). Michael Golay (MIT), interview with Commission Staff, October 27, 2010. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2762.145 Associated Press, "'The Real Deal': Survivors recall the Deepwater Horizon explosion," Press-Register, May 9, 2010. Testimony of Mark Bly, 213; Testimony of Charlie Williams, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010, 45. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 1, 2010. Exec. Order No. 12,777,56 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 25; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 17621). Don E. Kash, Lease Management Activities in the Geological Survey, Commission on Fiscal Accountability of the Na- tion's Energy Resources: Technical Reports, 1981–1982, RG 48, Entry 998, Box 10, File 239, National Archives and Records Administration, 8, 9, 27. Testimony of John Guide, 44–45. Fed. Reg. 54,757 (October 22, 1991).146 Ibid.; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 103. Testimony of Steve Lewis, 54, 124. BP argues that "[t]he use of additional mechanical plugs would have brought its own additional risks." Powell, letter, att. 1, 6 (citing API, Recommended Practice 65—Part 2 (May 2010), § 3.1); Guide, interview. However, BP does not present any evidence that the Macondo team in fact evaluated those risks or compared them with the risks of setting a single surface cement plug in seawater 3,300 feet below the mud line. Michael Rencheck (AREVA Inc.), interview with Commission staff, November 1, 2010. 43 U.S.C. §1344.147 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39–40. Merrick Kelley (BP), interview with Commission staff, October 22, 2010; Industry expert, interview. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 104. 43 U.S.C. §1340(c)(1).148 Ibid., 40. BP asserts that "[u]sing drill collars would have required unracking the drill pipe on the rig and then locating and re-racking drill collars—a set of additional operations with attendant risks." Powell, letter, att. 1, 5. BP does not provide any evidence to substantiate the extent of such "attendant risks" or whether they outweighed the risks of the procedure BP chose. Most significantly, BP offers no evidence that its Macondo team ever considered such risks or performed a rigorous comparative risk analysis. Michael Golay, interview. 149 33 U.S.C. § 2210. It appears to be understood that the meaning of this language is that an environmental impact statement is not required for the Gulf of Mexico, but it should be pointed out that is not the compelled or obvious reading of the language. The provision can also be fairly read to say no more than at least one impact statement has to be prepared for areas outside the Gulf and not address the issue, one way or another, concerning the application of NEPA within the Gulf. That potentially significant nuance, however, is beyond the scope of this report's inquiry.149 Ibid., 40–41. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8574). National Environmental Policy Act; Revised Implementing Procedures,45 Ibid., 116–118; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 117. Ibid. Fed. Reg. 75336 (proposed Nov. 14, 1980)
¶(proposed NEPA rules); National Environmental Policy Act; Revised Implementing Procedures,46 John R. Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon in MC252, July 1, 2010, 11–12. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 136946-47). Fed. Reg. 7485
¶(Jan. 23, 1981) (final NEPA rules); see 516 Departmental Manual, 2.3.A(2) (1980).150 Ibid., 41–43. Testimony of Mark Bly, 308. BP has suggested that the float valves provided an additional barrier to flow. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 68. The Commission does not agree that float valves, even when converted, constitute a distinct physical barrier to flow, but instead reinforce the cement in the shoe track. Clawson, interview (indicating that Weatherford does not consider the float collar to be a barrier to hydrocarbons); API, Recommended Practice 65—Part 2 (May 2010), §§ 3.4, 4.4.3 (float valves not included in the list of subsurface mechanical barriers; float equipment used to prevent cement from flowing back into the casing). Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 1, 2010. 43 C.F.R. § 46.215
¶151 U.S. Department of the Interior, Outer Continental Shelf Safety Oversight Board, Report to the Secretary of the
¶Interior (September 1, 2010), 20.152 Ibid. Testimony of Charlie Williams, 46–53. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 13, 2010. Ibid.153 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 288. Testimony of Bill Ambrose, 380–84. "Oil Industry Needs Self-Regulation, Says Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. CEO," Forbes Magazine, August 26, 2010. 516 Departmental Manual 15.4.C (providing for exceptions from categorical exclusion in certain "extraordinary circumstances," including when there are highly uncertain and potentially significant environmental effects).154 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 44. Between 8:00 and 9:49 p.m., the crew was performing a number of other activities that may have further con- founded the data or at least distracted the driller. The crew was emptying various tanks on the rig into the active pit system, including "trip tanks" and "sand traps," which may have masked increased flow out of the well into the ac- tive pit system. At 9:18 p.m., a valve on one of the pumps blew, and a number of crew members from the rig floor went to fix it. Finally, the crew was operating one or both of the cranes on the main deck, which could have affected flow-out and volume readings. Lee Gard, interview. 51 Fed. Reg. 15,624 (1986).155 Ibid., 44–46. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-OSC 5420). Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 57. NOAA Fisheries Service, Southeast Regional Office, letter to MMS dated July 1, 1999 (subsequently updated in 2006,
¶2007, and 2008).156 Ibid., 45–46. Guide, interview. Lee Gard, interview. Essential Fish Habitat Assessment for the Minerals Management Service Programmatic Consultation for Gulf of
¶Mexico Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Oil and Gas Activities (June 4, 1999).157 Ibid., 46–47. Ibid.; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 193529-39). Ibid. NOAA Fisheries Service, Southeast Regional Office, letter to MMS dated July 1, 1999 (subsequently updated in 2006,
¶2007, and 2008).158 Ibid., 47–48. It appears that the chain of command and responsibilities at BP during the execute phase were not well-understood by the Macondo Engineering Team Leader. When asked during an interview who was responsible for designing or amending the temporary abandonment procedures, the Macondo Engineering Team Leader said he would need to look at the company's chart of roles and responsibilities. Walz, interview. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 96–97. 30 C.F.R. § 254.21.159 Testimony of Michael Williams, 26. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 117603). Ibid., 116. 30 C.F.R. § 254.23.160 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 48. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 128542). Ibid., 111–117. The Response Group on behalf of ExxonMobil, Gulf of Mexico Regional Oil Spill Response Plan (August 2009), Rev.
¶5; The Response Group on behalf of ConocoPhillips, Gulf of Mexico Regional Oil Spill Response Plan (April 2010),
¶Rev. 6; The Response Group on behalf of Chevron, Gulf of Mexico Regional Oil Spill Response Plan (February 2010),
¶Version 3; The Response Group on behalf of Shell Offshore Inc., Gulf of Mexico Regional Oil Spill Response Plan,
¶(June 2010), Rev. 6.1.161 Testimony of Andrea Fleytas, 15. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-OSC 6224). Testimony of James Ellis, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Hearing before the National Commission, August 25, 2010; Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, 2009 Annual Report; Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, 1994 Annual Report. The Response Group on behalf of BP, Regional Oil Spill Response Plan-Gulf of Mexico (June 30, 2009), App. H: 5, 17, and 32.
¶Chapter Four
324¶Testimony of Randy Ezell, 279.
326¶mony of John Smith, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010, 140–41.
328¶11 40 C.F.R. § 300.305(c).
12 Press Release, White House, Statement by the Press Secretary on the President's Oval Office Meeting to Discuss the Situation in the Gulf of Mexico, April 22, 2010.13 "Contractors ordering offshore rigs on speculation," Drilling Contractor, May/June 2002. Ibid., 95–98. Priest, "Claiming the Coastal Sea: The Battle for the Tidelands, 1937–1953." Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 136937, 136941). Commission staff analysis of MMS yearly budget request and enactments, by nominal and real (2005) dollars. Bu- reau of Ocean Energy Management, Office of Administration and Budget: Budget Division, http://www.boemre.gov/ adm/budget.html; Herbert Kaufman and Cheryl Anderson, Department of the Interior, OCS Environmental Studies Contract Projects—Fiscals Years 1973 through 1983 (DOI Minerals Management Service Branch of Environmental Studies, December 1983), II-8. 14 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D)(i); 40 C.F.R. § 300.211. 15 30 C.F.R. § 254.2(a). 16 30 C.F.R. § 254.126 17 40 C.F.R. § 300.322 18 23 U.S.C. § 125. 40 C.F.R. § 300.175(b).14 "Global 500," CNNMoney.com, July 26, 2010, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/full_ list/index.html. Tyler Priest, "Auctioning the Ocean: The Creation of the Federal Offshore Leasing Program, 1954-1962," History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana: Vol. 1: Papers on the Evolving Offshore Industry (Minerals Management Service OCS Study 2004-049, 2008). Other states petitioned for the 9-nautical-mile boundary in the federal courts, but failed to prevail. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8848-58). Leslie Kaufman, "Search Ends for Missing Oil Rig Workers," New York Times, April 23, 2010.15 Internal Transocean documents (TRN-HCJ 93526, 93528). U.S. Department of Interior, "Petroleum and Sulfur on the U.S. Continental Shelf," internal study, August 1969, box 134, Central Classified Files, 1969–1972, Record Group 48, Records of the Secretary of Interior, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. "Oil Shelf Bill Enacted; President Reaffirms U.S. Title to Outer Offshore Deposits," New York Times, August 8, 1953, 27. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 129238-39). Press Release, Unified Command, Unified Command Continues to Respond to Deepwater Horizon, April 25, 2010.16 Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126338); Internal BP document (BP-HZN-OSC 5378). Priest, "Auctioning the Ocean," 113. Richard Vietor, Energy Policy in America since 1945: A Study of Business-Government Relations (New York: Cam- bridge University Press, 1984), 19. Guide, interview. Indeed, just days before the running of the long string at Macondo, another well drilled by Trans- ocean's DD3 suffered just such a complication. Ibid. Interview with Coast Guard official, August 27, 2010.17 "Brazil Pins Hopes on Massive, untapped Oil Fields," NPR, December 1, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ story.php?storyId=120966523. On Project Mohole and JOIDES, see David K. van Keuren, "Breaking New Ground: The Origins of Scientific Ocean Drilling," in The Machine in Neptune's Garden: Historical Perspectives on Technology and the Marine Environment, eds. Helen M. Rozwadowski and David K. van Keuren (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2004), 183–210. On Shell's Eureka project, see Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 97, 218. E.R. Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy: A Legal and Historical Analysis. Testimony of Jesse Gagliano, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 320. BP, Initial Exploration Plan, Mississippi Canyon Block 252 (February 23, 2009), § 2.6.
18 Doug Suttles, interview with Commission staff, October 13, 2010; Interviews with Minerals Management Service officials, October 15, 2010; Interview with well control expert, October 14, 2010.19 Testimony of Ronald Sepulvado, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 23, 2010, 7, 14, 34. Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 127–130. Diane Austin et al., History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Volume 1: Papers on the Evolving Offshore Industry, OCS Study MMS 2008-042 (New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, September 2008), 97–98, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PI/PDFImages/ESPIS/4/4530.pdf. 20 43 U.S.C § 1334. Guide, interview. BP had special one-piece bolt-on centralizers made for the Thunder Horse project. Ibid. Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 2701,116 Stat. 134, 278-279 (2002). Press Release, BP, Work Begins To Drill Relief Well To Stop Oil Spill, May 4, 2010; White House, Ongoing Response Timeline, May 17, 2010; David Hayes, memo to Commission staff, November 12, 2010.20 Testimony of John Guide, 23. Ibid. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 128379). Department of the Interior, National Notice to Lessees and Operators of Federal Oil and Gas Leases, Outer Continental Shelf No. 2010-N10 (November 8, 2010), http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/regs/ntls/2010NTLs/10- n10.pdf. Joe Stephens and Mary Pat Flaherty, "Oil Industry Cleanup Organization Swamped by BP Spill," Washington Post, June 29, 2010.21 Ibid., 43–44 and 189; Schlumberger, "Oilfield Glossary: cement bond log," accessed November 19, 2010, http:// www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/Display.cfm?Term=cement%20bond%20log. Cliff Hernandez, interview by Andrew Gardner, May 1, 2001, New Iberia, LA, History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Houston History Archives, M.D. Anderson Library Special Collections, University of Houston, Houston, TX. This interview is one of approximately 450 oral histories conducted for History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Minerals Management Service OCS Study 2004-049 (2008). "Oil and Gas Leases Bow to Rare Wildlife Species," New York Times, December 9, 1955. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 22669). The Response Group on behalf of BP, Regional Oil Spill Response Plan-Gulf of Mexico (June 30, 2009), App. H: 40.
22 Jonathan Ramseur, Oil Spills in U.S. Coastal Waters: Background, Governance, and Issues for Congress (Congressional Research Service, 2008), 2.23 Testimony of Douglas Brown, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 26, 2010, 88, 91. Don E. Kash et al., Energy Under the Oceans: A Technology Assessment of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Opera- tions (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973), 104. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370h. Testimony of Steve Lewis, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010, 93–94; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 129226). Prior to conversion, a small ball drops from the top of the float valves to block the main path through the auto-fill tube, leaving only two small holes on the side of the tube through which mud can flow. Ibid. Joint Industry Oil Spill Preparedness and Response Task Force, Joint Industry Recommendations to Improve Oil Spill Preparedness and Response (September 3, 2010), V-3, V-5; Henry Fountain, "Advances in Oil Spill Cleanup Lag Since Valdez," New York Times, June 24, 2010.24 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 77; Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCDC 92). U.S. Geological Survey, Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 128 (December 1958) and Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 144 (February 1960), RG 57, Records of the U.S. Geological Survey, NARA. Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 70. 25 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). The Well Site Leaders—Bob Kaluza and Don Vidrine—would normally have been on the rig. Morel, a relatively junior BP engineer, had flown to the rig out of a professional interest in learning more about the cementing process. Guide, interview. Sarah L. Milton et al., "Obituary Peter L. Lutz," Journal of Experimental Biology 208 (2005): 2817–18; Regional Oil Spill Response Plan-Gulf of Mexico App. F:19, § 11:7, App. E.25 Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCDC 92); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 82. Kash et al., Energy Under the Oceans, 105. Bryan Clawson (Weatherford), interview with Commission staff, October 28, 2010; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (September 8, 2010), 70. Opening Statement of Chairman Edward Markey, "Drilling Down on America's Energy Future: Safety, Security, and Clean Energy," Hearing Before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, 111th Congress (June 15, 2010).26 Testimony of Ross Skidmore, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 264. Neil R. Etson to President Nixon, March 18, 1970, Central Classified Files, 1968-1974, Box 71, RG 57, Records of the Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Testimony of Steve Lewis, 96; Internal Transocean document (TRN-USCG_MMS 11638). Interview with NOAA scientist, August 20, 2010; Interview with NOAA scientist, October 13, 2010.
27 NOAA Scientist, Estimation of the Oil Released from Deepwater Horizon Incident, April 26, 2010; Mark Miller, e-mail to Martha Garcia, June 14, 2010.28 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 38, 113; Testimony of Curt Kuchta, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, May 27, 2010, 166, 183, 184. U.S. Department of the Interior, Leasing Oil and Natural Gas Resources: Outer Continental Shelf (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, 2005), 12, http://www.boemre.gov/ld/PDFs/GreenBook-LeasingDocument.pdf. Ibid.; Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 432. Interview with NOAA scientist, August 30, 2010; Interview with NOAA scientist, October 13, 2010.29 Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 188 and 191. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 70 (listing 18 statutes, and not including several such as the Magnuson Fishery Management and Conservation Act of 1976). Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 137367, 21304). Since the incident, BP has argued that the M-I SWACO models predicted an erroneously high circulation pressure, and that the readings the crew observed were proper. This may ultimately explain the readings, but it does not explain why the BP Macondo team dismissed them as the result of a broken pressure gauge. Press Conference, Admiral Mary Landry and Doug Suttles, New Orleans, LA, April 28, 2010.
30 Press Release, Deepwater Horizon Incident Joint Information Center Update: The Ongoing Administration-Wide Response to the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, July 15, 2010.31 Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 119. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Testimony of John Guide, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 22, 2010, 87. Paul Purpura, "Guard Troops Going Home," Times-Picayune, October 21, 2010.32 Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 23, 2010, 442. Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Program: Hearings before the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). John Gisclair, Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010 (annotations, September 20, 2010). Commission calculation based on internal Halliburton document (HAL_10994). 40 C.F.R. § 300.322(b).33 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 19, 2010, 29, 33; Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978). 34 43 U.S.C. § 1801. 35 43 U.S.C. § 1802. 36 43 U.S.C. § 1344. 37 43 U.S.C. § 1340. 38 43 U.S.C. § 1351. 39 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3). 40 43 U.S.C. § 1346. 41 43 U.S.C. § 1347(c). 42 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b). 43 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) 44 43 U.S.C. § 1351. 45 43 U.S.C. § 1340. 46 43 U.S.C. § 1351(c)(3). 47 43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1). 48 43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1). 49 43 U.S.C. § 1531(l). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 127537-39); Internal Halliburton document (HAL_11196). 34 30 C.F.R. § 250.421. 40 C.F.R. § 300.305(d).34 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 275. Clifford Krauss, "Oil Spill's Blow to BP's Image May Eclipse Its Cost," New York Times, April 29, 2010.35 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 24. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 193549). BP's internal guidelines further specify that centralization should extend 100 feet above any such hydrocarbon-bearing zones. If either the top of cement or centralization requirements are not met, the guidelines require that the actual top of cement should be confirmed by a "proven cement evaluation technique." Ibid. Office of Science and Technology, First Report of the President's Panel on Oil Spills (1969), 9.36 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, 33. Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 143295, BP-HZN-CEC 22663); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 34. Interview with well control expert, October 14, 2010.37 Ibid.; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 280. Document provided to the Commission by Halliburton entitled "Halliburton GoM Foam Jobs 2002–2010." Transcript, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Briefing on the BP Oil Spill in the Gulf Coast, April 29, 2010.38 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 443. S.L. Pickett and S.W. Cole, "Foamed Cementing Technique for Liners Yields Cost-Effective Results" (Society of Petro- leum Engineers SPE Paper #27679, Midland, Texas, March 1994), 523–24. Transcript, State of the Union with Candy Crowley, CNN, May 2, 2010.
39 40 C.F.R. § 300.323; Campbell Robertson, "White House Takes a Bigger Role in the Oil Spill Cleanup," New York Times, April 29, 2010.40 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 281. At this point, it appears that lab personnel replicated the dry blend recipe that was on the rig using off-the-shelf ma- terials from their lab. For later tests, Halliburton sent samples of the cement that was actually on the Horizon back to the lab and directly tested those materials. 40 C.F.R. § 300.5.41 Ibid. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 109218). 40 C.F.R. § 300.323(c).42 Ibid. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 68). Interview with Coast Guard official, November 12, 2010.
32943 Press Release, Deepwater Horizon Incident Joint Information Center, Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Thad Allen Designated National Incident Commandant For Continued Response To BP Oil Spill, May 1, 2010.44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). Thom Shanker, "Commander Accustomed to Scrutiny and Crises," New York Times, September 10, 2005; Matthew L. Wald, "A New, Experienced Protector for Navy in Home Waters," New York Times, November 9, 2001; Elizabeth Bumiller, "Casualty of Firestorm: Outrage, Bush, and FEMA Chief," New York Times, September 10, 2005.45 Ibid., 116–118; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 117. Ibid. Editorial, "Allen Candid About Recovery," Advocate, December 11, 2005.46 John R. Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon in MC252, July 1, 2010, 11–12. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 136946-47). Jim Tankersley, "The Government's 'Rock Star' in Charge of the Oil Spill," Los Angeles Times, June 1, 2010.
¶47 Testimony of Harry Thierens, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 25, 2010,
¶104–5.48 Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-CEC 20347, 20178). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 136946-47). Henry Fountain, "Notes from Wake of Blowout Outline Obstacles and Frustration," New York Times, June 21, 2010;
¶Non-public BP document, May 6, 2010.49 Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 21265). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 20234). Testimony of Harry Thierens, 106.50 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 364–365, 393. See S. Rep. No. 95-285, at 154–5 (reprinting letter from Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus). Ibid. Government science advisor, e-mail to Commission staff, October 7, 2010; Testimony of William Stringfellow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 25, 2010, 352.51 Brian Morel, e-mail message to Richard Miller and Mark Hafle. See S. Rep. No. 95-285, at 50, 62, 82, 144–5. Testimony of Vincent Tabler, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 25, 2010, 22–23, 36. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (September 8, 2010), 150.52 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 13. Robert Gramling, Oil on the Edge: Offshore Development, Conflict, Gridlock (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 121. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_0011208). Non-public BP document, May 7, 2010.53 BP, Deepwater Horizon Follow Up Rig Audit, Marine Assurance Audit and Out of Service Period, September 2009, 2, 18–48; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 136211). Charles Babcock, "Watt Defies Critics of Plan for Oil Leases," Washington Post, July 7, 1981, A3. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 137370). David Barstow et al., "Regulators Failed to Address Risks in Oil Rig Fail-Safe Device," New York Times, June 20, 2010;
¶Interview with senior administration official, November 8, 2010.54 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 364. "Problems with Government," Ocean Industry (April 1982): 21. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 129141). FEMA, "Disasters Declared by Year or State," http://www.fema.gov/news/disaster_totals_annual.fema.55 Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 29, 2010, 172, 313. Commission on Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy Resources, Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy Resources (Washington, D.C.: January 1982), xv, http://www.onrr.gov/Laws_R_D/frnotices/PDFDocs/linowes- rpt1-5.pdf. Internal Transocean document (TRN-USCG_MMS 30422); Internal Schlumberger document (SLB-EC-2). 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206.56 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 25; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 17621). Don E. Kash, Lease Management Activities in the Geological Survey, Commission on Fiscal Accountability of the Na- tion's Energy Resources: Technical Reports, 1981–1982, RG 48, Entry 998, Box 10, File 239, National Archives and Records Administration, 8, 9, 27. Testimony of John Guide, 44–45. 40 C.F.R. § 300.105(c)(3).57 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 33. "Industry Warning Watt Against Transfer of BLM Leasing Functions to MMS," Inside Energy/with Federal Lands, November 1, 1982, 11. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 143304). Interview with government official, August 24, 2010.58 Ibid., 25; Testimony of Chris Pleasant, 118–119. G. Kevin Jones, "Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development During the Reagan Administration—Part 1," West- ern New England Law Review 12, 1, (1990):8–13. Testimony of John Guide, 298 (the cement plug was "deeper than normal"); Testimony of Ronald Sepulvado, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 145 ("the top of the surface plug is normally at 500 feet below the wellhead"). Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Jindal Issues State Declaration of Emergency for Oil Leak, April 29,
¶2010.59 Testimony of John Gisclair, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 8, 2010, 131–132. "Interior Denies Oil Leasing Plan Will Cost $77 Billion," Associated Press, September 28, 1982. 60 43 U.S.C. § 1337. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8574). Press Release, Governor Barbour Issues State of Emergency for Mississippi Gulf Coast, April 30, 2010; Press Release,
¶Gov. Riley Declares State of Emergency to Prepare for Oil Approaching Alabama Coast, April 30, 2010; State of
¶Florida, Office of the Governor, Executive Order Number 10-99 (Emergency Management—Deepwater Horizon), April
¶30, 2010.60 Testimony of Curt Kuchta, 185–186; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 12. Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 118. Interview with government official, August 24, 2010; Interview with government official, September 13, 2010;
¶Interview with government official, September 15, 2010.61 Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 5, 2010, 128–129. Charles Lester, "Contemporary Federalism and New Regimes of Ocean Governance: Lessons from the Case of Outer Continental Shelf Oil Development," Ocean & Coastal Management 23 (1994), 14. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8574). Interview with Coast Guard official, August 31, 2010.62 Ibid.; Testimony of Andrea Fleytas, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 5, 2010, 16; Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 296. National Research Council Committee on Marine Area Governance and Management, Striking a Balance: Improving Stewardship of Marine Areas (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1997), 37, http://www.nap.edu/ openbook.php?record_id=5797&page=37. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 21260-279). Interview with BP official, October 22, 2010; Interview with government official, October 5, 2010; Interview with government official, August 24, 2010; Interview with Coast Guard official, August 25, 2010.63 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 295; Testimony of Pat O'Bryan, 366. President George H.W. Bush, "Statement on Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development," (June 26, 1990), http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2035&year=1990&month=6. 64 30 C.F.R. pt. 250. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126928). La. Rev. Stat. § 29: 727.64 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 295–296. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-OSC 1438). 65 30 C.F.R. § 250.423. Interview with government official, October 8, 2010.65 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 281, 282, 294. U.S. Department of the Interior, Documents pertaining to offshore inspection types and practices produced to the Oil Spill Commission, August 2010. Interview with Coast Guard official, October 20, 2010.66 Ibid., 282. Jan Erik Vinnem, Offshore Risk Assessment: Principles, Modelling and Applications of QRA Studies, 2nd ed. (London: Springer Studies in Reliability Engineering, 2007), 91, 100, 102. The blind shear rams closed and sealed as expected during the positive-pressure test. This fact suggests that the rams were capable of sealing the well when the blowout occurred. But the evidence is inconclusive on its own; during the positive-pressure test the crew closed the blind shear rams using a low pressure hydraulic system, rather than the high pressure hydraulic system that would have activated the rams in the event of a blowout. Interview with government official, October 8, 2010; Interview with government official, October 14, 2010.67 Ibid., 281-282, 311. Petroleum Safety Authority of Norway, "From Prescription to Performance in Petroleum Supervision," March 12, 2010, http://www.ptil.no/news/from-prescription-to-performance-in-petroleum-supervision-article6696-79.html. Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCEC 90). Testimony of Admiral Thad Allen, National Incident Commander, Hearing before the National Commission, September 27, 2010.68 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 219–220. Magne Ognedal, interview with Commission staff, November 10, 2010. Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 360. Press Release, In Precautionary Move, LDWF and DHH Announce Closures Due to Oil Spill, April 30, 2010; Press
¶Release, Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, Some State Waters Closed to Fishing, June 2,
¶2010; Press Release, Mississippi Department of Marine Resources, Revised Precautionary Closure: Portions of Mississippi Marine Waters Reopen to Commercial and Recreational Fishing, June 4, 2010; Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, Order No. EO 10-29, Emergency Closure of State Waters of the Gulf of Mexico in response to the
¶Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, June 13, 2010.69 Testimony of David Sims, August 26, 2010, 163. E.P. Danenberger et al., Investigation of March 19, 1989 Fire, South Pass Block 60 Platform B, Lease OCS-G 1608, OCS Report MMS 90-0016 (New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, April 1990): 15, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PDFs/1990/90-0016.pdf. Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 204. There were no regulations or industry standards guiding the conduct or interpretation of negative-pressure tests at the time of the Macondo blowout. The absence of any such guidance may have contributed to the failure to conduct and interpret the test correctly here. NOAA, Office of Response and Restoration, Oil Forecast Outlook (April 23, 2010).70 Ibid., 317; Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 367. Marine Board of the National Research Council Committee on Alternatives for Inspection of Outer Continental Shelf Operations, Alternatives for Inspecting Outer Continental Shelf Operations (Washington: National Academy Press, 1990): 3, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=1517&page=1. This calculation is based on approximate values of the depths and mud weights involved. Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and South Atlantic; Emergency Fisheries Closure in the Gulf of Mexico Due to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill,75 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 282, 283. E.P. Danenberger, "Changes in the Minerals Management Service Offshore Regulatory Programs Resulting From the Oil Pollution Act of 1990" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 6823, May 1992), 150. Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279–81. Fed. Reg. 24,822 (May 6, 2010); NOAA Fisheries Service, Deepwater Horizon/
¶BP Oil Spill: Size and Percent Coverage of Fishing Closures Due to BP Oil Spill (November 15, 2010), http://sero.nmfs.
¶noaa.gov/ClosureSizeandPercentCoverage.htm.71 Testimony of David Sims, August 26, 2010, 174. Minerals Management Service, Final Report, Findings and Recommendations, MMS Task Force on OCS Inspection and Enforcement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, February 1990), 1-3. Testimony of Leo Lindner, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 19, 2010, 297; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, app. Q, 1. Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and South Atlantic; Amendment to Emergency Fisheries Closure in the
¶Gulf of Mexico Due to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill,75 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 282, 283. E.P. Danenberger, "Changes in the Minerals Management Service Offshore Regulatory Programs Resulting From the Oil Pollution Act of 1990" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 6823, May 1992), 150. Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279–81. Fed. Reg. 26,679 (May 12, 2010); NOAA, Deepwater Horizon/BP Oil Spill: Size and Percent Coverage of Fishing Closures Due to BP Oil Spill.72 Ibid., 367. Marine Board, Alternatives for Inspecting Outer Continental Shelf Operations, 80. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 83. Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, and South Atlantic; Emergency Fisheries Closures in the Southeast Region
¶Due to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill; Amendment 2,75 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 282, 283. E.P. Danenberger, "Changes in the Minerals Management Service Offshore Regulatory Programs Resulting From the Oil Pollution Act of 1990" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 6823, May 1992), 150. Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279–81. Fed. Reg. 27,217 (May 14, 2010).73 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 367. Ibid., 82. Testimony of Leo Lindner, 308–11. The exclusion for "[d]rilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes associated with the exploration, development, or production of crude oil, natural gas or geothermal energy" is found at 40 C.F.R. § 261.4. NOAA, Deepwater Horizon/BP Oil Spill: Size and Percent Coverage of Fishing Closures Due to BP Oil Spill.74 Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 21418, 21420); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 150. Exec. Order No. 12,777, 56 Fed. Reg. 54,757 (October 22, 1991). Testimony of Leo Lindner, 276–79, 297, 359–60; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 47100). Interview with government official, October 12, 2010.75 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 282, 283. E.P. Danenberger, "Changes in the Minerals Management Service Offshore Regulatory Programs Resulting From the Oil Pollution Act of 1990" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 6823, May 1992), 150. Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279–81. BP, "Factsheet on BP Vessels of Opportunity Program" (July 7, 2010), 4, http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/ globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/factsheet_bp_vessels_of_opportunity_program.pdf.76 Ibid., 283. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,400 (July 2, 1991). Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 219; National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Strategy Implementation Plan Version 5.0 (2010),
¶474–75.
330¶77 BP, Factsheet on BP Vessels of Opportunity Program, 2.
78 Bruce Nolan, "Many Vietnamese fishers isolated by language from oil spill aid," Times-Picayune, May 7, 2010; Mireya Navarro, "Spill Takes Toll on Gulf Workers' Psyches," New York Times, June 16, 2010; Jessica Ravitz, "Vietnamese Fishermen in Gulf Fight to Not Get Lost in Translation," CNN, June 25, 2010.79 Ibid., 11. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,400 (July 2, 1991). Testimony of Lee Lambert, 292. BP, Factsheet on BP Vessels of Opportunity Program 5.80 Internal BP documents (Deepwater Horizon Schematic; BP August 9, 2010 presentation to Oil Spill Commission, slide 5 ). Former senior MMS officials, interviews with Commission staff, August and September 2010; Offshore Operators Committee, "Oil, Gas, and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)—Safety and Environmental Management Systems," Public Comment (May 22, 2006), http://www.boemre.gov/federalregister/PDFs/AD15- OOCcomments5-22-06.pdf. Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 117; Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 127909, BP-HZN-CEC 20189-90). While that may have been Mr. Vidrine's stated reason for running the test on the kill line, the Commission notes that the negative-pressure test performed at Macondo—whether on the drill pipe or kill line—was different from the negative- pressure test described in the Application for Permit to Modify. Testimony of Mark Bly, Hearing before the National Commission, November 8, 2010, 293–95. Interview with BP official, October 22, 2010.81 Testimony of Douglas Brown, 88–89, 92–93. T.A.F. Powell, "US Voluntary SEMP Initiative: Holy Grail or Poisoned Chalice?" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 8111, May 1996): 828. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 86. Ray Mabus, America's Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan after the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. 40 C.F.R. § 300.150.
82 Rebecca Bratspies et al., From Ship to Shore: Reforming the National Contingency Plan to Improve Protections for Oil Spill Cleanup Workers (Center for Progressive Reform, September 2010), 8–9.83 Testimony of Douglas Brown, 93–94. L.D. Easley, J.E. Stark, and R.A. Bradford, "Implementing API RP 75 'Recommended Practice for Development of a Safety and Environmental Program for Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Operations and Facilities'" (Offshore Technol- ogy Conference [OTC] Paper 7384, May 1994): 130. Testimony of Christopher Haire, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 247. Joe Hunt, Mission Without a Map: The Politics and Policies of Restoration Following the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: 1989- 2002, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council (Anchorage, 2009): 156-157. Interview with responder, November 17, 2010; Bryan Walsh, "Assessing the Health Effects of the Oil Spill," Time, June 25, 2010.84 Ibid., 94–95. American Petroleum Institute, Recommended Practices for Development of a Safety and Environmental Management Program for Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Operations and Facilities, Recommended Practice 75, 1st ed. (Dallas, TX: May 15, 1993). For example, a bubble of gas, under ideal conditions, would expand approximately 166-fold. This number differs under actual conditions based on fluid properties and flow. See, e.g., Testimony of Stanley Senner, Director of Conservation Science, Ocean Conservancy, Hearing before the National Commission, September 28, 2010. Scott Deitchman, interview with Commission staff, November 29, 2010.85 Testimony of Steve Bertone, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 19, 2010, 28, 34. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf, 59 Fed. Reg. 33,779 (June 30, 1994). Mudloggers operate systems that collect and transmit real-time data from sensors on the rig. BP employed mudlog- gers from Sperry Drilling (a Halliburton subsidiary) on the Deepwater Horizon. President Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill" (June 15, 2010), http://www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill. Nicole Lurie, interview with Commission staff, October 6, 2010.86 Testimony of James Nicholas Wilson, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 13, 2010, 10; Testimony of Steve Bertone, 35. Safety and Environmental Management Program (SEMP) on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), 61 Fed. Reg. 37,493 (July 18, 1996). The driller first sent mud to pits 9 and 10, then switched to pit 7, and then switched to pit 6. Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010, 20:10–21:18. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Gov. Jindal Announces "Agenda For Revitalizing Coastal Louisi- ana," July 15, 2010, http://wwwprd.doa.louisiana.gov/LaNews/PublicPages/Dsp_PressRelease_Display. cfm?PressReleaseID=2550&Rec_ID=1. Ibid.87 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 35. Ibid. Ibid., 20:28–20:36, 20:58–21:06. NOAA, Damage Assessment, Remediation, and Restoration Program: Glossary, http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/glos- sary/index.htm. Deitchman, interview; Lurie, interview; Strategy Implementation Plan, 252.88 Testimony of Gregory Meche, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 198. Patrick Crow, "New slant on safety," Oil & Gas Journal (July 22, 1996): 23. Ibid., 20:20–21:01. Testimony of Stanley Senner. Chapter Eight Molly Reid, "Only One Oil-slicked Bird Rescued so far from Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill," Times-Picayune, April 30, 2010.
89 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, "Cumulative Impacts to Wildlife and Actions to Protect Wildlife in the Gulf of Mexico" (November 25, 2010), http://www.fws.gov/home/dhoilspill/pdfs/CumulativeImpactsBP.pdf.90 Ibid. E.P. Danenberger, interview with Commission staff, September 2, 2010; E.P. Danenberger, e-mail message to Commis- sion staff, October 25, 2010. Ibid., 21:01–21:08. Ibid., 27–8. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, "Oil Spill Response" (May 2010), http://www.fws.gov/home/dhoilspill/pdfs/OilSpill- FactSheet.pdf.91 Testimony of Andrea Fleytas, 14. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf–Incident Reporting Requirements, 68 Fed. Reg. 40,585 (July 8, 2003). The Commission believes, based on interviews of the mudloggers on the Horizon, that the Hitec system may have shown a more obvious trend because it displays numeric values as opposed to trend lines such as those seen in the Sperry data shown in the text. Joseph Keith (Sperry), interview with Commission staff, October 6, 2010; Cathleenia Willis (Sperry), interview with Commission staff, October 21, 2010. National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation (September 18, 1990), http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/ letters/1990/M90_26_31A.pdf. Michele Wilson, "Oil Spill Update: Two More Birds Recovering, BP and Other Execs Point Fingers, and More," Audu- bonmagazine.org, May 12, 2010.92 Testimony of Gregory Meche, 235. E.P. Danenberger, interview with Commission staff, September 2, 2010; E.P. Danenberger, e-mail message to Commis- sion staff, October 25, 2010. Testimony of Greg Meche, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 207–09. 93 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.4, 435.11. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, "Settlement," http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/facts/settlement.cfm; Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, "Questions and Answers," http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/facts/qanda.cfm. Interview with wildlife responder, October 26, 2010; Interview with representatives of wildlife organizations, October 15, 2010.93 Testimony of Andrea Fleytas, 14. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—Incident Reporting Requirements, 71 Fed. Reg. 19,640 (April 17, 2006). Exxon Mobil, 2009 Corporate Citizenship Report, 15. Craig Pittman, "Bird rescue experts kept on sideline after gulf oil spill," St. Petersburg Times, September 5, 2010; Interview with wildlife responder, October 26, 2010.94 Complaint at 2, Shivers v. BP Plc., No. 10-cv-381 (S.D. Ala. July 20, 2010). Commission staff analysis of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement data. See http:// www.boemre.gov/adm/budget.html. Testimony of Greg Meche, 207–09, 219. Testimony of Rex Tillerson, CEO of Exxon Mobil, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010. Testimony of Kevin Costner, "Deluge of Oil Highlights Research and Technology Needs for Effective Cleanup of Oil Spills," Hearing Before the House Committee on Science and Technology, 111th Congress (June 9, 2010); Fountain, "Advances in Oil Spill Cleanup Lag Since Valdez."95 Ibid. Jim Morris, "Lost at Sea/OFFSHORE RISKS/Safety concerns return with rise of oil, gas boom," Houston Chronicle, December 22, 1996, http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id=1996_1384981. Keith, interview. Press Release, Deepwater Horizon Joint Information Center, New Effort to Collect; Review Oil Spill Response Solutions Announced, June 4, 2010.96 Ibid. Commission staff analysis of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement data. See http:// www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/fastfacts/WaterDepth/wdmaster.asp. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 21415). Commander Todd Offutt, e-mail to Commission staff, November 17, 2010.97 Ibid. Commission staff analysis of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement data; Minerals Management Service, U.S. Offshore Milestones (as of August 2006): 5. See http://www.boemre.gov/stats/PDFs/ milestonesAUG2006.pdf. Keith, interview. Given what we now know, it is all but impossible that the well was not flowing as of 9:08 p.m. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 25; Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon, 22–23. Other than faulty memory, the only apparent explanations for Mr. Keith's statement are that the crew had already closed off the portion of the flow line Mr. Keith was watching or that Mr. Keith watched for an inadequate period of time. Keith, interview; Darryl Bourgoyne (LSU), interview with Commission staff, No- vember 23, 2010. Exxon Mobil, 2009 Corporate Citizenship Report, 14. Interview with Coast Guard official, September 2, 2010.
98 White House Office of the Press Secretary, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs and National Incident Commander Thad Allen, July 1, 2010; U.S. Department of State, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Response: International Offers of Assistance from Governments and International Bodies Chart, June 18, 2010.99 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 37. Commission staff analysis of MMS yearly budget request and enactments, by nominal and real (2005) dollars. Ibid. "Shell 'Ignored Accident Warning,'" BBC online, June 14, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5077886.stm; Terry Macalister, "Shell Accused Over Oil Rig Safety," The Guardian, June 23, 2006. 46 U.S.C. § 688.
100 Interview with Coast Guard officials, August 3, 2010; API Joint Oil Spill Preparedness and Response Task Force, interview with Commission staff, October 12, 2010; Scott Segal and Kevin Ewing, interview with Commission staff, October 14, 2010; H. Clayton Cook Jr., Letter to the Editor, "Don't Blame Delays on Jones Act," Wall Street Journal, July 20, 2010; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Jones Act Fact Sheet (July 6, 2010), http://www.deepwa- terhorizonresponse.com/external/content/document/2931/784459/1/USCG-Jones Act.pdf.101 Ibid., 38. Per Holand, Reliability of Subsea BOP Systems for Deepwater Application, Phase II DW, SINTEF Report STF38 A99426 (November 7, 1999); Per Holand, Deepwater Kicks and BOP Performance, SINTEF Report STF38 A01419 (July 24, 2001); WEST Engineering Services, Inc., Mini Shear Study for U.S. Minerals Management Service, Requisi- tion No. 2-1011-1003 (December 2002); WEST Engineering Services, Inc., Shear Ram Capabilities Study for U.S. Minerals Management Service, Requisition No. 3-4025-1001 (September 2004). Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010, 21:08–21:14. Shell, Sustainability Report 2009, 16–17, http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2009/servicepages/downloads/files/ all_shell_sr09.pdf. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Jones Act Fact Sheet; Press Release, Deepwater Horizon Joint Information Center, Admiral Allen Provides Guidance to Ensure Expedited Jones Act Waiver Processing Should It Be Needed, June 15, 2010.102 Ibid., 38–39. WEST Engineering Services, Inc., "Comments by WEST Engineering Services, Houston, Texas, to The National Com- mission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling" (November 12, 2010): 3. Ibid., 21:14–21:15. Testimony of Marvin Odum, Shell, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010. Non-public Coast Guard documents, June 29, 2010, June 30, 2010, and July 9, 2010.
103 Coastal Response Research Center, Research & Development Needs for Making Decisions Regarding Dispersing Oil (April 2006), 1.104 Ibid., 285. U.S. Department of the Interior, Outer Continental Shelf Safety Oversight Board, Report to the Secretary of the Interior (September 1, 2010), 6. Testimony of Chad Murray, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 335–36. Ibid. Ramon Antonia Vargas, "Oil is Leaking from Well at Deepwater Horizon Explosion Site," Times-Picayune, April 24, 2010.105 Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, 165. Ibid. Ibid., 336. Interview with Coast Guard official, October 29, 2010.
331106 National Research Council, Committee on Understanding Oil Spill Dispersants, Oil Spill Dispersants: Efficacy and Effects (2005), 2.107 Ibid., 286. U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Inspector General, Survey Report: Offshore Civil Penalties Program, Miner- als Management Service (March 30, 1999), http://www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/pdf/99-I-374.pdf. Testimony of Bill Ambrose, Hearing before the National Commission, November 8, 2010, 381. Responsible Care, Who We Are, http://www.responsiblecare.org/page.asp?p=6406. Coastal Response Research Center, 1.108 Ibid. Commission staff analysis of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement data provided to the Commission by the Department of the Interior of unannounced MMS inspections of MODUs/drilling rigs, 1990 (1,985 inspections) to 2009 (85 inspections). The pivotal change occurs in 1998–1999, as the numbers drop from David Young (Transocean), interview with Commission staff, November 19, 2010. National Research Council, Oil Spill Dispersants, 196, 274.
¶109 Merv Fingas, A Review of Literature Related to Oil Spill Dispersants, 1997-2008 (September 2008),18 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, Installations, Removals, and Cumulative Totals of Offshore Production Facilities in Federal Waters; 1959–2010, February 2010, http://www.boemre.gov/stats/PDFs/ OCSPlatformActivity.pdf.; Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, OCS Incidents/Spills by Category: 1996–2005, October 19, 2007, http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/Incidents1996-2005.htm; Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, OCS Incidents/Spills by Category: 2006-2010, July 10, 2010, http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/IncidentStatisticsSummaries.htm. F. P. Dunn, "Deepwater Production: 1950-2000" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 7627, Houston, TX, May 1994). "Interior Expects Big Things from . . . Offshore Lease Sale," Oil and Gas Journal, September 13, 1954, 96. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 22433). Walz also noted that the flight carrying centralizers would not increase costs. Ibid. http://www.
¶pwsrcac.org/docs/d0053000.pdf.110 Ibid., 287. "Deepwater Gulf of Mexico production rising," Oil & Gas Journal (November 1, 1999): 34 ("In 1999, 11 more deepwater development production projects in the gulf have already begun producing or are on the verge of doing so"); Michael Davis, "LEARNING THE DRILL/The oil patch rebound brought with it a need for drilling companies to find, train and keep people to work the rigs," Houston Chronicle (February 1, 1998): 1 ("A shortage of qualified personnel has been a nagging problem since the oil patch has come back in the past year. But over the next two years some 50 new offshore jack-up rigs, semi-submersibles and drill ships currently being built or converted will Young, interview. Ibid., 33. Ibid., 25.111 Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, 152; Testimony of Tyrone Benton, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, July 23, 2010, 250. Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010, 21:08–21:14. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Enti- ties Program, September 26, 2008; Stephen Labaton, "Agency's '04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt," New York Times, October 3, 2008. th Congress (2010). 182 33 U.S.C. § 2702. Non-public Coast Guard document, April 23, 2010.112 Testimony of Gregory Meche, 209; Testimony of David Young, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, May 27, 2010, 327; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 283; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 65; Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, 153. Bill Ambrose (Transocean), interview with Commission staff, September 21, 2010. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Enti- ties Program. RRT-6, FOSC Dispersant Pre-Approval Guidelines And Checklist (2001), iii-iv, http://www.losco.state.la.us/pdf_ docs/RRT6_Dispersant_Preapproval_2001.pdf; Region IV Regional Response Team Response and Technology Committee Dispersant Workgroup, Use of Dispersants in Region IV (1996), ii-1, http://www.nrt.org/production/NRT/
¶RRTHome.nsf/Resources/DUP/$file/1-RRT4DISP.PDF.113 Testimony of Micah Sandell, 11–13. Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010, 21:38. Edward J. Balleisen and Marc Eisner, "The Promise and Pitfalls of Co-Regulation: How Governments Can Draw on Private Governance for Public Purpose," in New Perspectives on Regulation, ed. David Moss and John Cisternino, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 31. 40 C.F.R. § 300.910(a).114 Testimony of Capt. Alwin Landry, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 98–100. Young, interview. Ibid., 130. S.L. Ross Environmental Research, Ltd., Technology Assessment of the Use of Dispersants on Spills from Drilling and
¶Production Facilities in the Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental Shelf (December 2000), Summary-1; Robert J. Fiocco and Alun Lewis, "Oil Spill Dispersants,"1 billion barrels of recoverable reserves. That find alone catalyzed yet another rebirth of offshore oil in the Gulf of Mexico.101 The discoveries kept coming. A month later, BP made another oil and gas hit at Horn Mountain (150 million barrels of original reserves) in the Mississippi Canyon. In 2000, BP and Shell discovered a major above-the-salt deposit at Holstein (more than 200 million barrels) near the Mad Dog and Atlantis fields in the Green Canyon. The same year, those two partners announced their Na Kika project, a joint subsea development of five independent fields tied back to a central semi-submersible floating production facility, an industry first for the Gulf of Mexico. In 2001, BP found another giant oilfield, containing Joseph Pratt, Tyler Priest, and Christopher Castaneda, Offshore Pioneers: Brown & Root and the History of Offshore Oil and Gas (Houston: Gulf Publishing, 1997), 7–13; "First Well in Gulf of Mexico Was Drilling Just 25 Years Ago," Offshore (October 1963): 17–19. John Guide (BP), interview with Commission staff, September 17, 2010. Brady Dennis and Shailagh Murray, "GOP Changes Tone on Financial Bill," Washington Post, April 21, 2010; Edward Wyatt and David M. Herszenhorn, "Bill on Finance Wins Approval of Senate Panel," New York Times, April 22, 2010; Jim Puzzanghera, "In N.Y., Obama to Push for Financial Overhaul," Los Angeles Times, April 22, 2010; Adam Liptak, "Justices Reject Ban on Depicting Animal Cruelty," New York Times, April 21, 2010; Joan Biskupic, "High Court Negates Animal Cruelty Law as Too Broad, 8-1" USA Today, April 21, 2010; Jess Bravin, "Court Voids Law on Animal Cruelty," Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2010; Bart Barnes, "A Movement's Matriarch," Washington Post, April 21, 2010; Andrew Zajac and Melissa Healy, "FDA Puts the Pinch on Salt," Los Angeles Times, April 21, 2010. President Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill" (June 15, 2010) http://www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill]. Magne Ognedal, "Thirty years since Kielland – why are major accidents still happening?" (speech, Petroleum Safety Authority of Norway, August 27, 2010) 3, http://www.ptil.no/major-accidents/safety-lunch-at-ons-risk-of-a- major-accident-is-always-present-article7202-144.html. Exec. Order No. 13543, 75 Fed. Reg. 29,397 (May 21, 2010). Pure Applied Chemistry (1999): 31.115 Testimony of Paul Erickson, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 231–232. Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010, 21:38–21:42. Ibid. 40 C.F.R. § 300.910(b).116 Testimony of Capt. Alwin Landry, 101–102. Testimony of Randy Ezell, 283; Young, interview. Ibid. Figures on the volume of dispersant use are either taken directly from, or calculated based on data in, the Operations and Ongoing Response daily reports for the Deepwater Horizon Response, available at www.restorethegulf.gov.117 Ibid., 104–105. Testimony of Micah Sandell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 29, 2010, 10. Testimony of Marvin Fertel, President and CEO of Nuclear Energy Institute, "Three Mile Island—Looking Back on Thirty Years of Lessons Learned," Before the Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety, 111th Congress (2009). 40 C.F.R. § 300.915 (a)(8).118 Testimony of Gregory Meche, 202, 211, 223. Testimony of Christopher Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 173. Testimony of James Ellis, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Hearing before the National Commission, August 25, 2010. David Biello, "Is Using Dispersants on the BP Gulf Oil Spill Fighting Pollution with Pollution?" Scientific American,
¶June 18, 2010.119 Testimony of Anthony Gervasio, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 173, 187–188. Testimony of Randy Ezell, 283. John G. Kemeny, Report of The President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI (1979), 68. The full subsection of the recommendation reads, "The industry should establish a program that specifies appropriate safety standards including those for management, quality assurance, and operat- ing procedures and practices, and that conducts independent evaluations. The recently created Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, or some similar organization, may be an appropriate vehicle for establishing and implementing this program." 40 C.F.R. § 300.915;40 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 281. At this point, it appears that lab personnel replicated the dry blend recipe that was on the rig using off-the-shelf ma- terials from their lab. For later tests, Halliburton sent samples of the cement that was actually on the Horizon back to the lab and directly tested those materials. C.F.R. Part 300 Appendix C.120 Ibid., 187; Testimony of Kevin Robb, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 42. Testimony of Bill Ambrose, 244. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, "About Us," http://www.inpo.info/AboutUs.htm. National Research Council, Oil Spill Dispersants, 68–69; Samuel K. Skinner and William K. Reilly, The Exxon Valdez
¶Oil Spill: A Report to the President (May 1989), 17, App. A.121 Testimony of Anthony Gervasio, 189. Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon, 14; Testimony of Bill Ambrose, 252–53; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 28. Joseph V. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 50–51. David Hammer, "BP Clashes with Critics on Gulf of Mexico Oil Crisis Response," Times-Picayune, May 31, 2010.122 Ibid., 105, 190; Testimony of Gergory Meche, 223. Testimony of Christopher Pleasant, 165. Lee Gard, interview with Commission staff, November 8, 2010. Elana Schor, "BP Continues to Use Surface Dispersants in Gulf Despite EPA Directive," New York Times, June 24,
¶2010.123 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 447–448. Ibid., 123. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 57–58. Ernest Scheyder, "Nalco CEO on Gulf Coast to Defend Dispersant," Reuters, June 3, 2010.124 Ibid., 448–449, 452. Ibid. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 143. Interview with NOAA scientist, October, 21, 2010; Testimony of Lisa Jackson, Hearing before the National Commission, September 27, 2010.125 Testimony of Mark Hay, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 225. Various parties have suggested other causes for the deadman's failure, including leaks, overdue equipment certifica- tion, and improper modifications. Lee Gard, interview. Dana Tulis and Mathy Stanislaus, interview with Commission staff, October 1, 2010.126 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 452; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 287. Interview with industry expert, September 24, 2010. Ibid. Kenneth Meade, e-mail to Commission staff, September 27, 2010.127 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 452. After the blowout, some industry CEOs testified they would never have used a long string production casing, sug- gesting there was a causal connection between BP's choice of the long string and the blowout. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Environment, 111th Cong. 104 (June 15, 2010) (statements of John Watson, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Chevron Corporation; and Rex Tillerson, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Exxon- Mobil). Ibid. Tim Webb, "BP Boss Tony Hayward Admits Job is on the Line Over Deepwater Oil Spill," The Guardian, May 14,
¶2010.128 Ibid., 449–450, 452; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 289; Testimony of Anthony Gervasio, 190, 199. First, the long string required the cement to travel through a longer stretch of steel casing—roughly 12,000 feet lon- ger—before reaching its final destination, potentially increasing the risk of cement contamination. Second, because it can require higher cement pumping pressure, a long string design can lead to the selection of lower cement volumes, lower densities, and lower pump rates. Third, the cement job at the bottom of a long string is more difficult to remediate than one at the bottom of a liner. Ibid. Tulis and Stanislaus, interview.129 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 450; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 123. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 128489); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 64 ("the BP Macondo well team did not ask for the OptiCem model to be re-run"). This may have been because of Mr. Guide's distrust of the OptiCem model. Testimony of John Guide, 275 ("it's wrong a lot"). When Halliburton rig personnel eventually informed Gagliano of BP's decision themselves, he responded by e-mailing BP modeling data suggesting again that more centralizers would be needed to prevent channeling. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 128708). Ibid. EPA, Dispersant Monitoring and Assessment Directive for Subsurface Dispersant Application, May 10, 2010; EPA,
¶Dispersant Monitoring and Assessment Directive for Subsurface Dispersant Application—Addendum 1, May 14,
¶2010; EPA, Dispersant Monitoring and Assessment Directive, May 20, 2010; EPA, Dispersant Monitoring and Assessment Directive—Addendum 3, May 26, 2010.130 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 450; Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39. Testimony of Jesse Gagliano, 259; Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, 415. Ibid. Testimony of Lisa Jackson, September 27, 2010.131 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 35. Mr. Guide disagreed with the BP report's conclusion in an interview with Commission staff. Guide, interview. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 6, 2010. Richard Lynch, interview with Commission staff, October 13, 2010; Suttles, interview.132 Ibid. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 22670). Lee Gard, interview. Press Release, BP, Work Begins to Drill Relief Well to Stop Oil Spill, May 4, 2010.133 Ibid. Ronald Sepulvado (BP), interview with Commission staff, September 1, 2010. Testimony of A. C. Tollison Jr., Executive Vice President, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, "National Energy Policy: Nuclear Energy," Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality, 107th Congress (2001). Press Release, White House, The Ongoing Administration-Wide Response to the Deepwater BP Oil Spill, May 6, 2010;
¶"Deepwater Team Attempts To Put 100-Tonne Box over Blown-out Oil Well," Associated Press, May 7, 2010; Matthew Bigg, "Oil From Gulf Spill Creeps Ashore in Louisiana," Reuters, May 6, 2010.134 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 451; Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 66. Ibid. Ian Urbina, Justin Gillis, and Clifford Krauss, "On Defensive, BP Readies Dome to Contain Spill," New York Times,
¶May 3, 2010.135 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39. Fred Bartlit, letter to the National Commission, October 28, 2010 (reporting the results of cement testing). Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 76. Suttles, interview; Lynch, interview.136 Ibid. If BP were looking, the one February test actually reported to BP could have prompted BP to question the design as well. BP argues that its failure to do so here is understandable given that it had hired one of the world's leading cementers specifically for purposes of designing and testing the cement slurry. Alice Camp, "Nuclear: In Pursuit of a Renaissance," EPRI Journal (Summer 2007): 20. Non-public BP document, May 7, 2010.137 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 368, 396. To the contrary, Halliburton's selection of conditioning time appears to have been haphazard at best. Lab person- nel used different conditioning times (ranging from zero conditioning time to three hours) in each of the four foam stability tests that they conducted. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 81. Interview with well control expert, October 14, 2010; Interview with drilling expert, October 1, 2010.138 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 452. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). Ibid., 53. Lynch, interview.139 Internal BP Document (BP-HZN-MBI 21277). Testimony of Daun Winslow, 209; Guide, interview. Ibid., 53 Campbell Robertson, "New Setback in Attempt to Contain Gulf Oil Spill," New York Times, May 8, 2010.140 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 451–452. Moreover, once the BP Well Site Leaders and crew realized that the annular preventer was leaking, they should have circulated out any spacer that had migrated below the annular preventer prior to continuing with the test. Testi- Ibid., 53–54. Lynch, interview.141 Internal BP Document (BP August 9, 2010 presentation to Oil Spill Commission, slide 13). The Commission agrees with others that there is no such thing as a "bladder effect" that could account for the pres- sures the rig crew was observing. There was no apparent explanation for the 1400 psi on the drill pipe other than that the well was flowing. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 1, 2010. Clifford Krauss, Henry Fountain, and John M. Broder, "Acrimony Behind the Scenes of Gulf Oil Spill," New York
¶Times, August 26, 2010.142 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 454. Transocean asserts that its personnel, including the driller and toolpusher, were not "in any way responsible for interpreting the negative pressure test or making the decision that the well was secure and work could properly pro- ceed." Rachel Clingman, letter to Commission staff, November 16, 2010, 1. As the Commission's staff made clear at the November 8, 2010 hearing, the Commission is not tasked with deciding legal responsibility. Based on available evidence, however, Revette and Anderson agreed the negative-pressure test was a success and did not stop the job before moving on to the remaining temporary abandonment procedures. Testimony of Lee Lambert, 291; Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-CEC 20347, 20178). Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 104. Interview with U.S. Geological Survey official, October 21, 2010.
332¶143 Suttles, interview.
144 Interview with U.S. Geological Survey official, October 21, 2010; Interview with Minerals Management Service official, October 15, 2010; Interview with well control expert, October 14, 2010.145 Associated Press, "'The Real Deal': Survivors recall the Deepwater Horizon explosion," Press-Register, May 9, 2010. Testimony of Mark Bly, 213; Testimony of Charlie Williams, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010, 45. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 1, 2010. Sam Dolnick and Henry Fountain, "Unable to Stanch Oil, BP Will Try To Gather It," New York Times, May 5, 2010.
146 Clifford Krauss and Michael Cooper, "Cap Slows Gulf Oil Leak as Engineers Move Cautiously," New York Times, June 5, 2010.147 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39–40. Merrick Kelley (BP), interview with Commission staff, October 22, 2010; Industry expert, interview. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 104. Lynch, interview.
148 Jeremy Hsu, "Why Don't We Just Drop a Nuclear Bomb on the Gulf Oil Spill?" Christian Science Monitor, May 13, 2010.149 Ibid., 40–41. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8574). Testimony of Richard Camilli, "Sizing up the BP Oil Spill: Science and Engineering Measuring Methods," Briefing Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 111th Congress (May 19, 2010).150 Ibid., 41–43. Testimony of Mark Bly, 308. BP has suggested that the float valves provided an additional barrier to flow. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 68. The Commission does not agree that float valves, even when converted, constitute a distinct physical barrier to flow, but instead reinforce the cement in the shoe track. Clawson, interview (indicating that Weatherford does not consider the float collar to be a barrier to hydrocarbons); API, Recommended Practice 65—Part 2 (May 2010), §§ 3.4, 4.4.3 (float valves not included in the list of subsurface mechanical barriers; float equipment used to prevent cement from flowing back into the casing). Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 1, 2010. John Amos, "Gulf Oil Spill Rate Must Be Much Higher Than Stated—6 Million Gallons So Far?", Skytruth.org, April 27, 2010, http://blog.skytruth.org/2010/04/gulf-oil-spill-rate-must-be-much-higher.html; John Amos, "Gulf Oil Spill—Bigger Than Exxon Valdez," Skytruth.org, April 28, 2010, http://blog.skytruth.org/2010/04/gulf-oilspill-bigger-than-exxon-valdez.html; John Amos, "Gulf Oil Spill—New Spill Calculation—Exxon Valdez Surpassed Today," Skytruth.org, May 1, 2010,http://blog.skytruth.org/2010/05/gulf-oil-spill-new-spill-rate.html.151 Ibid., 43. Testimony of Darryl Bourgoyne, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010, 133. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, November 15, 2010. Richard Harris, "Gulf Spill May Far Exceed Official Estimates," National Public Radio, May 14, 2010, http:// www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126809525.152 Ibid. Testimony of Charlie Williams, 46–53. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 13, 2010. Testimony of Steven Wereley (Professor, Purdue University), "Sizing up the BP Oil Spill: Science and Engineering Measuring Methods," Briefing Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 111th Congress (May 19, 2010).153 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 288. Testimony of Bill Ambrose, 380–84. "Oil Industry Needs Self-Regulation, Says Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. CEO," Forbes Magazine, August 26, 2010. Harris, "Gulf Spill May Far Exceed Official Estimates."154 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 44. Between 8:00 and 9:49 p.m., the crew was performing a number of other activities that may have further con- founded the data or at least distracted the driller. The crew was emptying various tanks on the rig into the active pit system, including "trip tanks" and "sand traps," which may have masked increased flow out of the well into the ac- tive pit system. At 9:18 p.m., a valve on one of the pumps blew, and a number of crew members from the rig floor went to fix it. Finally, the crew was operating one or both of the cranes on the main deck, which could have affected flow-out and volume readings. Lee Gard, interview. Transcript, Marcia McNutt, Deepwater Blowout Containment Conference, September 22, 2010.
155 Press Release, Deepwater Horizon Incident Joint Information Center, Flow Rate Group Provides Preliminary Best Estimate of Oil Flowing From BP Oil Well, May 27, 2010.156 Ibid., 45–46. Guide, interview. Lee Gard, interview. Marcia McNutt, Summary Preliminary Report from the Flow Rate Technical Group (June 2, 2010).157 Ibid., 46–47. Ibid.; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 193529-39). Ibid. Admiral Thad Allen, letter to Honorable Edward J. Markey, October 1, 2010, 12.
158 Press Release, U.S Department of Energy, Secretary Salazar and Secretary Chu To Meet with Scientists and Engineers at BP Houston Command Center, May 11, 2010.159 Testimony of Michael Williams, 26. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 117603). Ibid., 116. Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, November 8, 2010; Interview with government science advisor, October 5, 2010; Interview with government science advisor, October 6, 2010.160 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 48. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 128542). Ibid., 111–117. Kenneth Chang and Andrew Revkin, "At a Sleek Bioenergy Lab, a Lens on a Cabinet Pick," New York Times, December 22, 2008.161 Testimony of Andrea Fleytas, 15. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-OSC 6224). Testimony of James Ellis, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Hearing before the National Commission, August 25, 2010; Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, 2009 Annual Report; Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, 1994 Annual Report. Paul Tooms, interview with Commission staff, October 13, 2010; Interviews with Minerals Management Service officials, October 15, 2010; Interview with Coast Guard official, October 18, 2010.162 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 48. There is a dispute as to whether BP personnel called back to shore that evening to discuss the data observed during the negative-pressure test. The Commission staff has to date seen no direct evidence of such a call. The staff 's inves- tigation is ongoing. Testimony of James Ellis, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Hearing before the National Commission, August 25, 2010. Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, November 8, 2010; Interview with Coast Guard official, October 18, 2010; Interview with government science advisor, October 5, 2010.163 Ibid. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 38354). Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Performance Objectives and Criteria (May 2005); Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Principles for Nuclear Safety Culture (November 2004). Interview with government science advisor, October 1, 2010; Interview with U.S. Department of Energy scientist, October 26, 2010.164 Ibid., 48–49. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 38355). Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 44. "Leno: 'Junk Shot,'" New York Times, June 1, 2010.
165 Campbell Robertson, Clifford Krauss, and John M. Broder, "Oil Hits Home, Spreading Arc of Frustration," New York Times, May 24, 2010.166 Testimony of Curt Kuchta, 219. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 38361). U.S. Department of the Interior, Outer Continental Shelf Safety Oversight Board, Report to the Secretary of the Interior (September 1, 2010), 11–13. Lynch, interview.
167 Non-public U.S. Department of Energy document, May 17, 2010; Non-public U.S. Department of Energy document, May 19, 2010.168 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 50. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 38362). Tooms, interview.169 Ibid. Internal Transocean document (TRN-PC 3227). Testimony of Rex Tillerson, Exxon Mobil, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010. Interview with U.S. Department of the Interior official, October 21, 2010.170 Testimony of Anthony Gervasio, 197. Transocean states that on April 5, 2010, it posted a short, two-page version of this advisory to an internal electronic document platform, which supervisors on the Deepwater Horizon had access to. But the advisory was limited to completion operations, and, as of this writing, Transocean has not offered any evidence that anyone on the rig actu- ally saw or reviewed the advisory. Ibid. Interview with government science advisor, October 6, 2010.171 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 49. The industry and the international community also failed to adequately communicate lessons learned from the Montara blowout, which for ten weeks beginning on August 21, 2009 spewed between 400 and 1500 barrels per day of oil and gas into the Timor Sea approximately 150 miles off the northwest coast of Australia. David Borth- wick, Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry (The Montara Commission of Inquiry, Australia, June 2010), 5, 26. According to the Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry, released on November 24, 2010, many of the technical and managerial causes of the Montara blowout track those at Macondo. For instance, the Commission of Inquiry concluded that the cement job in the "9 5/8" casing shoe failed, that there were numerous risk factors surrounding the cement job that went unheeded, and that the cement job was not properly pressure tested. Ibid., 7. According to the Commission of Inquiry: The multiple problems in undertaking the cement job—such as the failure of the top and bottom plugs to cre- ate a seal after "bumping," the failure of the float valves and an unexpected rush of fluid—should have raised alarm bells. Those problems necessitated a careful evaluation of what happened, the instigation of pressure testing and, most likely, remedial action. No such careful evaluation was undertaken. The problems were not complicated or unsolvable, and the potential remedies were well known and not costly. This was a failure of "sensible oilfield practice 101." Ibid. The Commission of Inquiry went on to conclude that while the "absence of tested barriers was a proximate cause of the Blowout," the deeper failure was a systemic failure of management on the part of the operator, PTTEP Australasia. Ibid., 9. Testimony of Michael Bromwich, Director, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, Department of the Interior, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010, 228. Non-public BP document, May 31, 2010.172 Internal Transocean document (TRN-USCG_MMS 30428). Testimony of Rex Tillerson, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010, 250–52; Testimony of Marvin Odum, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010, 278–79. 173 30 C.F.R. § 250.1721(d). 174 30 C.F.R. § 250.141(a). Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf – Safety and Environmental Management Sys- tems, 75 Fed. Reg. 199 (October 15, 2010). Suttles, interview.173 Testimony of Anthony Gervasio, 224. National Commission Staff, "Response/Clean-Up Technology Research & Development and the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill," (staff working paper, 2010) Interview with government science advisor, October 6, 2010; Suttles, interview; Tooms, interview.
333174 Interview with Minerals Management Service official, October 15, 2010; Interview with well control expert, October 14, 2010.
¶175 Robertson, Krauss, and Broder, "Oil Hits Home, Spreading Arc of Frustration."176 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 51. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 127906). MMS approved a number of other requests by BP for deviations on the Macondo well. None of those other approvals appear to have contributed to the blowout. However, they do sug- gest that the MMS staff did not spend much time deciding whether to grant the requests, which may have been due to the severe funding and staffing shortages in the New Orleans office. Chapter Five Marine Well Containment Company, "About Us," http://www.marinewellcontainment.com/index.php. Mimi Hall, Rick Jervis, and Allen Levin, "Is Oil Spill Becoming Obama's Katrina?," USA Today, May 27, 2010.
334¶ing Plan, May 17, 2010.
338September 8, 2010.7 BP, "GoM Exploration Wells: MC 252 #1—Macondo Prospect Well Information," September 2009, http:// bpoilresponse.markimoore.com/blog/bp-media/docs/Macondo.Prospect.Well.Information.pdf. Alden J. LaBorde, My Life and Times (New Orleans: LaBorde Printing Company, 1996), 174. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976), quoting United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940). Ibid. Three companies own the Macondo well. BP has a 65 percent share, Anadarko Petroleum Corporation has a 25 percent share, and MOEX Offshore has a 10 percent share. BP maintained regular contact with Anadarko and MOEX throughout the drilling of the well. Andrew B. Wilson, "BP's Disaster: No Surprise to Folks in the Know," CBS, June 22, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/ stories/2010/06/22/opinion/main6605248.shtml. Minerals Management Service, MMS 2007-018 Gulf of Mexico OSC Oil and Gas Lease Sales: 2007-2010 Final Environmental Impact Statement (April 2007), Volume I, 2-3 to 2-5. Brian Hamacher, "Wind Keeps Oil From Loop Current & Away From Florida Shores," Associated Press, July 19, 2010.
8 Richard Camilli et al., "Tracking Hydrocarbon Plume Transport and Biodegradation at Deepwater Horizon," Science 330, no. 6001 (2010): 201–204; David Valentine et al., "Propane Respiration Jump-Starts Microbial Response to a Deep Oil Spill," Science 330, no. 6001 (2010): 204–208; Terry Hazen et al., "Deep-Sea Oil Plume Enriches Indigenous Oil-Degrading Bacteria", Science 330, no. 6001 (2010): 208–211.9 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (September 8, 2010), 17. Ben C. Belt, "Louisiana and Texas Offshore Prospects," Drilling (March 1956): 119. United States v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459, 466–68, 474–83 (1915). (Upholding authority of the president to withdraw unilaterally from private disposition valuable energy resources located on public lands in order to protect those resources while Congress considers legislation for their retention in national ownership). Brett Clanton, "New tactic might seal leaking well sooner, BP CEO says," Houston Chronicle, May 5, 2010. Paul Rioux and Chris Kirkham, "Search for 11 Workers Missing After Oil Rig Explosion Is Expected To Be Called Off Friday," Times-Picayune, April 22, 2010. Department of Interior, Department Manual Part 516: National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (September 2009), 3.4. Alan Krupnick et al., "A Framework for Understanding the Costs and Benefits of Deepwater Drilling Regulation" (DRAFT) (Resources for the Future, 2010).10 Transocean, Our Company, http://www.deepwater.com/fw/main/Our-Company-2.html. "Special Offshore Report," World Oil (May 1957): 118; Calvert, "Gulf Offshore Activity Booming," 48. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356a. Gregory Walz (BP), interview with Commission staff, October 6, 2010. Testimony of Captain James Hanzalik, Hearing Before the Deepwater Joint Investigation Team, October 4, 2010, 29- 30. Government Accountability Office, GAO-10-276 Offshore Oil and Gas Development: Additional Guidance Would Help Strengthen the Minerals Management Service's Assessment of Environmental Impacts in the North Aleutian Basin (March 2010), 21. Leslie Kaufman and Shaila Dewan, "Gulf May Avoid Direst Predictions After Oil Spill," New York Times, September 13, 2010.11 Press Release, Transocean, Transocean Ltd. Reports Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2009 Results, February 24, 2010. Pratt, Priest, and Castaneda, Offshore Pioneers, 36–48. E.R. Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy: A Legal and Historical Analysis (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1953); Tyler Priest, "Claiming the Coastal Sea: The Battle for the Tidelands, 1937–1953," History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana: Vol. 1: Papers on the Evolving Offshore Industry, MMS OCS Study 2004-049 (New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, 2008), 67–90, https://www.gomr.mms. gov/homepg/espis/espisfront.asp. Testimony of Gregory Walz, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 7, 2010, 157–59. Council on Environmental Quality, Final Recommendations of the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force (July 19, 2010), 41. 12 43 U.S.C. § 1346. NOAA, Other Significant Oil Spills in the Gulf of Mexico, http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/sf/deepwater_horizon/1890_ HistoricalSpillsGulfofMexico.pdf.12 Press Release, Transocean, Transocean Inc. and GlobalSantaFe Corporation Agree to Combine, July 23, 2007. Tyler Priest, The Offshore Imperative: Shell Oil's Search for Petroleum in Postwar America (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2007), 81–91. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 35 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 143300) (emphasis added). Darryl L. Felder and David K. Camp, Gulf of Mexico Origin, Waters, and Biota: Volume I, Biodiversity (Corpus Christi, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2009).13 "Contractors ordering offshore rigs on speculation," Drilling Contractor, May/June 2002. Ibid., 95–98. Priest, "Claiming the Coastal Sea: The Battle for the Tidelands, 1937–1953." Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 136937, 136941). Commission staff analysis of MMS yearly budget request and enactments, by nominal and real (2005) dollars. Bu- reau of Ocean Energy Management, Office of Administration and Budget: Budget Division, http://www.boemre.gov/ adm/budget.html; Herbert Kaufman and Cheryl Anderson, Department of the Interior, OCS Environmental Studies Contract Projects—Fiscals Years 1973 through 1983 (DOI Minerals Management Service Branch of Environmental Studies, December 1983), II-8. 14 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D)(i); 40 C.F.R. § 300.211. 15 30 C.F.R. § 254.2(a). 16 30 C.F.R. § 254.126 17 40 C.F.R. § 300.322 18 23 U.S.C. § 125. Ibid.
14 Christine Ribic et al., "Distribution of Seabirds in the Northern Gulf of Mexico in Relation to Mesoscale Features: Initial Observations," ICES Journal of Marine Science 54 (1997): 545–551.15 Internal Transocean documents (TRN-HCJ 93526, 93528). U.S. Department of Interior, "Petroleum and Sulfur on the U.S. Continental Shelf," internal study, August 1969, box 134, Central Classified Files, 1969–1972, Record Group 48, Records of the Secretary of Interior, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. "Oil Shelf Bill Enacted; President Reaffirms U.S. Title to Outer Offshore Deposits," New York Times, August 8, 1953, 27. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 129238-39). S. Heileman and N. Rabalais, Gulf of Mexico: Large Marine Ecosystem Brief #5 (NOAA, 2009), http://www.lme. noaa.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51:lme5&catid=41:briefs&Itemid=72.16 Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126338); Internal BP document (BP-HZN-OSC 5378). Priest, "Auctioning the Ocean," 113. Richard Vietor, Energy Policy in America since 1945: A Study of Business-Government Relations (New York: Cam- bridge University Press, 1984), 19. Guide, interview. Indeed, just days before the running of the long string at Macondo, another well drilled by Trans- ocean's DD3 suffered just such a complication. Ibid. David Biello, "The BP Spill's Growing Toll on the Sea Life of the Gulf," Yale Environment 360, June 9, 2010, http:// e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2284.17 "Brazil Pins Hopes on Massive, untapped Oil Fields," NPR, December 1, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ story.php?storyId=120966523. On Project Mohole and JOIDES, see David K. van Keuren, "Breaking New Ground: The Origins of Scientific Ocean Drilling," in The Machine in Neptune's Garden: Historical Perspectives on Technology and the Marine Environment, eds. Helen M. Rozwadowski and David K. van Keuren (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2004), 183–210. On Shell's Eureka project, see Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 97, 218. E.R. Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy: A Legal and Historical Analysis. Testimony of Jesse Gagliano, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 320. Holly K. Ober, Effects of Oil Spills on Marine and Coastal Wildlife (University of Florida, May 2010).
18 International Bird Rescue Research Center, How Oil Affects Birds: Just a little bit of oil can be deadly (2010), http:// www.ibrrc.org/pdfs/IBRRC-How-oil-affects-birds.pdf.19 Testimony of Ronald Sepulvado, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 23, 2010, 7, 14, 34. Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 127–130. Diane Austin et al., History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Volume 1: Papers on the Evolving Offshore Industry, OCS Study MMS 2008-042 (New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, September 2008), 97–98, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PI/PDFImages/ESPIS/4/4530.pdf. 20 43 U.S.C § 1334. Guide, interview. BP had special one-piece bolt-on centralizers made for the Thunder Horse project. Ibid. Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 2701,116 Stat. 134, 278-279 (2002). Camilli et al., "Tracking Hydrocarbon Plume Transport," 201–204.20 Testimony of John Guide, 23. Ibid. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 128379). Department of the Interior, National Notice to Lessees and Operators of Federal Oil and Gas Leases, Outer Continental Shelf No. 2010-N10 (November 8, 2010), http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/regs/ntls/2010NTLs/10- n10.pdf. Oil Budget Calculator Technical Documentation.
21 White House, Ongoing Administration-Wide Response to the Deepwater BP Oil Spill: By the Numbers to Date (August 23, 2010), http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/08/23/ongoing-administration-wide-response-deepwater- bp-oil-spill.22 Testimony of John Guide, 43–44, 189–191. Ken Arnold, interview with Tyler Priest, May 10, 2004, Houston, TX, History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Houston History Archives, M.D. Anderson Library Special Collections, University of Houston, Houston, TX. John C. Whitaker, Striking a Balance: Environment and Natural Resources Policy in the Nixon-Ford Years (Washing- ton, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), 267–268; Russell Wayland, "The New Federal OCS Regulations in the Light of Santa Barbara" (Society of Petroleum Engineers [SPE] Paper 2780, San Francisco, CA, November 1969); Richard B. Krahl and David W. Moody, "Gulf Coast Lease Management Inspection Program," (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 1714, 1972), 846. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 22433). Unified Area Command, Shoreline Clean-up and Assessment Technique (SCAT) Map -- Maximum Oiling by Zone: Florida, November 11, 2010.23 Testimony of Douglas Brown, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 26, 2010, 88, 91. Don E. Kash et al., Energy Under the Oceans: A Technology Assessment of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Opera- tions (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973), 104. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370h. Testimony of Steve Lewis, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010, 93–94; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 129226). Prior to conversion, a small ball drops from the top of the float valves to block the main path through the auto-fill tube, leaving only two small holes on the side of the tube through which mud can flow. Ibid. Audubon Society, Oil and Birds: Too Close for Comfort. Louisiana's Coast Six Months into the BP Disaster (October 2010).24 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 77; Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCDC 92). U.S. Geological Survey, Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 128 (December 1958) and Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 144 (February 1960), RG 57, Records of the U.S. Geological Survey, NARA. Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 70. 25 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). The Well Site Leaders—Bob Kaluza and Don Vidrine—would normally have been on the rig. Morel, a relatively junior BP engineer, had flown to the rig out of a professional interest in learning more about the cementing process. Guide, interview. Dr. Holly Bik (University of New Hampshire), interview with Commission staff, October 28, 2010.
25 NOAA, Environmental Sensitivity Index: Alabama (August 2007), 1, http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/book_ shelf/1458_SampleESI_AL2007.pdf.26 Testimony of Ross Skidmore, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 264. Neil R. Etson to President Nixon, March 18, 1970, Central Classified Files, 1968-1974, Box 71, RG 57, Records of the Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Testimony of Steve Lewis, 96; Internal Transocean document (TRN-USCG_MMS 11638). Joseph Dineen, Tidal Flat Habitats (Smithsonian Institution, 2010), http://www.sms.si.edu/irlspec/Tidal_Flats.htm.
27 V. Grossi et al., "Burial, Exportation and Degradation of Acyclic Petroleum Hydrocarbons Following a Simulated Oil Spill in Bioturbated Mediterranean Coastal Sediments," Chemosphere 48, no. 9 (2002): 947–954.28 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 38, 113; Testimony of Curt Kuchta, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, May 27, 2010, 166, 183, 184. U.S. Department of the Interior, Leasing Oil and Natural Gas Resources: Outer Continental Shelf (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, 2005), 12, http://www.boemre.gov/ld/PDFs/GreenBook-LeasingDocument.pdf. Ibid.; Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 432. Qianxin Lin and Irving Mendelssohn, "Evaluation of Tolerance Limits for Restoration and Phytoremediation with Spartina Alterniflora in Crude Oil-Contaminated Coastal Salt Marshes," in Proceedings of the 2008 International Oil Spill Conference (Washington, D.C.: American Petroleum Institute, 2008), 869-874, http://www.iosc.org/papers/2008 148.pdf.29 Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 188 and 191. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 70 (listing 18 statutes, and not including several such as the Magnuson Fishery Management and Conservation Act of 1976). Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 137367, 21304). Since the incident, BP has argued that the M-I SWACO models predicted an erroneously high circulation pressure, and that the readings the crew observed were proper. This may ultimately explain the readings, but it does not explain why the BP Macondo team dismissed them as the result of a broken pressure gauge. Jeffrey Ball, "Storm-Tossed Boom Complicates Spill Cleanup," Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2010.30 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 113; Testimony of Curt Kuchta, 184. The five laws included the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617, Energy Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 95- 618, National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, Pub. L. No. 95-620, and Natural Gas Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-621. David Izon, E.P. Danenberger, and Melinda Mayes, "Absence of fatalities in blowouts encouraging in MMS study of OCS incidents 1992-2006," Well Control July/August (2007), 84. Dr. Eugene Turner (Professor, Louisiana State University), e-mail to Commission staff, November 24, 2010.31 Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 119. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Testimony of John Guide, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 22, 2010, 87. Dr. Eugene Turner (Professor, Louisiana State University), interview with Commission staff, November 4, 2010.32 Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 23, 2010, 442. Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Program: Hearings before the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). John Gisclair, Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010 (annotations, September 20, 2010). Commission calculation based on internal Halliburton document (HAL_10994). Bob Marshall, "Oysters are uniquely sensitive to Gulf of Mexico oil spill," Times-Picayune, May 25, 2010.
33933 NOAA, MC252 Shoreline Current Oiling Situation Map – LA: As of 8/03/2010; Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, Oil Spill Response: Closure Maps, http://www.wlf.louisiana.gov/oilspill.34 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 275. Nicole Santa Cruz and P.J. Huffstutter, "Effort to Keep Oil Spill at Bay Tips Ecological Balance," Los Angeles Times, August 3, 2010.35 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 24. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 193549). BP's internal guidelines further specify that centralization should extend 100 feet above any such hydrocarbon-bearing zones. If either the top of cement or centralization requirements are not met, the guidelines require that the actual top of cement should be confirmed by a "proven cement evaluation technique." Ibid. L. Scott Mills, Michael E. Soule and Daniel F. Doak, "The keystone-species concept in ecology and conservation," BioScience 43, no. 4 (1993): 219–224.36 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, 33. Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 143295, BP-HZN-CEC 22663); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 34. Mississippi Department of Marine Resources, Rebuilding Mississippi's Oyster Reefs (Fall 2009).37 Ibid.; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 280. Document provided to the Commission by Halliburton entitled "Halliburton GoM Foam Jobs 2002–2010." Scott McMillion, The Reef Makers (Nature Conservancy, 2010).
¶38 "The effect of the oil spill on Gulf fisheries: An Interview with Harriet Perry," Mississippi Public Broadcasting, August
¶17, 2010.39 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, 33–34; Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 443. Halliburton had delivered the slurry blend to the Deepwater Horizon several months earlier. It had developed the blend to match the temperature and pressure profile of the well that Deepwater Horizon had drilled immediately prior to Macondo—another BP well called Kodiak. Jesse Gagliano (Halliburton), interview with Commission staff, September 10, 2010. Harriet Perry, interview with Commission staff, October 28, 2010.40 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 281. At this point, it appears that lab personnel replicated the dry blend recipe that was on the rig using off-the-shelf ma- terials from their lab. For later tests, Halliburton sent samples of the cement that was actually on the Horizon back to the lab and directly tested those materials. Ibid.41 Ibid. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 109218). 16 U.S.C. § 1802(10).42 Ibid. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 68). NOAA, Affected Gulf Resources (2010), http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/oil-spill/affected-gulf-resources/.43 Ibid. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 36). NOAA, Bioaccumulation of Oil Chemicals in Seafood (May 2010).44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). Ibid.45 Ibid., 116–118; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 117. Ibid. Biello, "The BP Spill's Growing Toll On the Sea Life of the Gulf."46 John R. Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon in MC252, July 1, 2010, 11–12. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 136946-47). NOAA, Affected Gulf Resources; National Incident Command Joint Analysis Group, Review of Preliminary Data to
¶Examine Oxygen Levels In the Vicinity of MC252#1: May 8 to August 9, 2010 (August 16, 2010).47 Testimony of Lee Lambert, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 291; Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-CEC 20347, 20178). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 171151). NOAA, Mississippi Canyon 252 Incident: Work Plan for the Collection of Data to Determine Impacts of the Deepwater
¶Horizon Mississippi Canyon 252 Incident on Endangered and Protected Marine Mammals in the Northern Gulf (June
¶14, 2010); NOAA, Mississippi Canyon 252 Incident: Preassessment Plan to Determine Potential Exposure and Injuries of Nesting and Hatchling Loggerhead Sea Turtles (July 28, 2010); NOAA, Mississippi Canyon 252: Preassessment plan to Determine Potential Exposure and Injuries of Nesting and Hatchling Kemp's Ridley Turtles (August 31, 2010;
¶Testimony of Steve Murawski (NOAA Director of Scientific Programs), Hearing before the National Commission,
¶September 28, 2010.48 Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-CEC 20347, 20178). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 136946-47). "Bluefin Tuna Hit Hard by 'Deepwater Horizon' Disaster," European Space Agency News, October 18, 2010, http:// www.esa.int/esaCP/SEM1K4WO1FG_index_0.html.49 Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 21265). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 20234). Mike Soraghan, "As Spill Drifts Toward Gulf Shores, Oil Companies Brace for Political Whirlwind," New York Times,
¶April 29, 2010.50 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 364–365, 393. See S. Rep. No. 95-285, at 154–5 (reprinting letter from Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus). Ibid. Unified Area Command, Deepwater Horizon Response Consolidated Fish and Wildlife Collection Report (November 1,
¶2010).51 Brian Morel, e-mail message to Richard Miller and Mark Hafle. See S. Rep. No. 95-285, at 50, 62, 82, 144–5. Testimony of Vincent Tabler, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 25, 2010, 22–23, 36. Steve Hampton, Estimating Bird Mortality (California Department of Fish and Game, November 2004).52 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 13. Robert Gramling, Oil on the Edge: Offshore Development, Conflict, Gridlock (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 121. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_0011208). Testimony of Jane Lyder, Deputy Assistant Secretary Fish and Wildlife and Parks, Hearing before the National Commission, September 28, 2010.53 BP, Deepwater Horizon Follow Up Rig Audit, Marine Assurance Audit and Out of Service Period, September 2009, 2, 18–48; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 136211). Charles Babcock, "Watt Defies Critics of Plan for Oil Leases," Washington Post, July 7, 1981, A3. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 137370). Our Natural Resources at Risk: The Short and Long-Term Impacts of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Before the
¶House Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans, and Wildlife, 111th Cong. (June 10, 2010) (Statement of Timothy
¶Ragen, Executive Director of the U.S. Marine Mammal Commission).54 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 364. "Problems with Government," Ocean Industry (April 1982): 21. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 129141). NOAA, Affected Gulf Resources.55 Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 29, 2010, 172, 313. Commission on Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy Resources, Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy Resources (Washington, D.C.: January 1982), xv, http://www.onrr.gov/Laws_R_D/frnotices/PDFDocs/linowes- rpt1-5.pdf. Internal Transocean document (TRN-USCG_MMS 30422); Internal Schlumberger document (SLB-EC-2). Unified Area Command, Deepwater Horizon Response Consolidated Fish and Wildlife Collection Report.56 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 25; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 17621). Don E. Kash, Lease Management Activities in the Geological Survey, Commission on Fiscal Accountability of the Na- tion's Energy Resources: Technical Reports, 1981–1982, RG 48, Entry 998, Box 10, File 239, National Archives and Records Administration, 8, 9, 27. Testimony of John Guide, 44–45. NOAA, Sea Turtles, Dolphins, and Whales and the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill (2010), http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/ health/oilspill.htm.57 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 33. "Industry Warning Watt Against Transfer of BLM Leasing Functions to MMS," Inside Energy/with Federal Lands, November 1, 1982, 11. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 143304). Joseph Schuman, "Dead Sperm Whale Found Near BP Oil Spill," AOL News, June 17, 2010.58 Ibid., 25; Testimony of Chris Pleasant, 118–119. G. Kevin Jones, "Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development During the Reagan Administration—Part 1," West- ern New England Law Review 12, 1, (1990):8–13. Testimony of John Guide, 298 (the cement plug was "deeper than normal"); Testimony of Ronald Sepulvado, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 145 ("the top of the surface plug is normally at 500 feet below the wellhead"). NOAA, Sea Turtles, Dolphins, and Whales and the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill.59 Testimony of John Gisclair, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 8, 2010, 131–132. "Interior Denies Oil Leasing Plan Will Cost $77 Billion," Associated Press, September 28, 1982. 60 43 U.S.C. § 1337. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8574). Camilli et al., "Tracking Hydrocarbon Plume Transport"; Valentine et al., "Propane Respiration Jump-Starts Microbial
¶Response to a Deep Oil Spill"; Hazen et al., "Deep-Sea Oil Plume Enriches Indigenous Oil-Degrading Bacteria."60 Testimony of Curt Kuchta, 185–186; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 12. Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 118. National Incident Command Joint Analysis Group, Review of Preliminary Data to Examine Oxygen Levels In the
¶Vicinity of MC252#1: May 8 to August 9, 2010 (August 16, 2010).61 Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 5, 2010, 128–129. Charles Lester, "Contemporary Federalism and New Regimes of Ocean Governance: Lessons from the Case of Outer Continental Shelf Oil Development," Ocean & Coastal Management 23 (1994), 14. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8574). Ibid.62 Ibid.; Testimony of Andrea Fleytas, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 5, 2010, 16; Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 296. National Research Council Committee on Marine Area Governance and Management, Striking a Balance: Improving Stewardship of Marine Areas (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1997), 37, http://www.nap.edu/ openbook.php?record_id=5797&page=37. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 21260-279). Ibid.63 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 295; Testimony of Pat O'Bryan, 366. President George H.W. Bush, "Statement on Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development," (June 26, 1990), http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2035&year=1990&month=6. 64 30 C.F.R. pt. 250. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126928). A. Diercks et al., "Characterization of Subsurface Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons at the Deepwater Horizon Site,"
¶Geophysical Research Letters 37 (2010).64 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 295–296. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-OSC 1438). 65 30 C.F.R. § 250.423. Oil Budget Calculator Technical Documentation.65 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 281, 282, 294. U.S. Department of the Interior, Documents pertaining to offshore inspection types and practices produced to the Oil Spill Commission, August 2010. Cain Burdeau and Seth Borenstein, "Where's the oil? On the Gulf floor, scientists say," Associated Press, September 13,
¶2010; Steve Newborn, "Oil Found Deep in Gulf is Toxic to Tiny Marine Life," WUSF News, August 17, 2010, http:// www.wusf.usf.edu/news/2010/08/17/oil_found_deep_in_gulf_is_toxic_to_tiny_marine_life.66 Ibid., 282. Jan Erik Vinnem, Offshore Risk Assessment: Principles, Modelling and Applications of QRA Studies, 2nd ed. (London: Springer Studies in Reliability Engineering, 2007), 91, 100, 102. The blind shear rams closed and sealed as expected during the positive-pressure test. This fact suggests that the rams were capable of sealing the well when the blowout occurred. But the evidence is inconclusive on its own; during the positive-pressure test the crew closed the blind shear rams using a low pressure hydraulic system, rather than the high pressure hydraulic system that would have activated the rams in the event of a blowout. Mark Schrope, "Oil spill cruise finds field of dead coral: Scientific Expedition Assesses Deep-Sea Damage in the Gulf of
¶Mexico," Nature News, November 5, 2010, http://www.nature.com/news/2010/101105/full/news.2010.589.html.67 Ibid., 281-282, 311. Petroleum Safety Authority of Norway, "From Prescription to Performance in Petroleum Supervision," March 12, 2010, http://www.ptil.no/news/from-prescription-to-performance-in-petroleum-supervision-article6696-79.html. Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCEC 90). NOAA, "10 Famous Spills" (NOAA Incident News), http://www.incidentnews.gov/famous.68 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 219–220. Magne Ognedal, interview with Commission staff, November 10, 2010. Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 360. Kim B. Ritchie and Brian D. Keller, eds., A Scientific Forum on the Gulf of Mexico: The Islands in the Stream Concept
¶(NOAA, January 23, 2008), 6–8; John Farrington and Judith McDowell, "Mixing Oil and Water: Tracking the Sources and Impacts of Oil Pollution in the Marine Environment," Oceanus Magazine 42, no. 3 (2004): 1–4, http://www.
340whoi.edu/cms/files/dfino/2005/4/v42n3-farrington_2285.pdf; Elliott A. Norse and John Amos, "Impacts, Perception, and Policy Implications of the Deepwater Horizon Oil and Gas Disaster," Environmental Law Reporter 40, no. 11 (2010): 11071; Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Scientific Symposium Meeting Summary (Consortium for Ocean Leadership, June 23, 2010), 15–16.69 Testimony of David Sims, August 26, 2010, 163. E.P. Danenberger et al., Investigation of March 19, 1989 Fire, South Pass Block 60 Platform B, Lease OCS-G 1608, OCS Report MMS 90-0016 (New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, April 1990): 15, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PDFs/1990/90-0016.pdf. Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 204. There were no regulations or industry standards guiding the conduct or interpretation of negative-pressure tests at the time of the Macondo blowout. The absence of any such guidance may have contributed to the failure to conduct and interpret the test correctly here. 33 U.S.C. § 2706.
70 15 C.F.R. § 990.30; NOAA, Injury Assessment: Guidance Document for Natural Resource Damage Assessment Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (August 1996).71 Testimony of David Sims, August 26, 2010, 174. Minerals Management Service, Final Report, Findings and Recommendations, MMS Task Force on OCS Inspection and Enforcement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, February 1990), 1-3. Testimony of Leo Lindner, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 19, 2010, 297; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, app. Q, 1. NOAA, Gulf Spill Restoration: Co-Trustees (2010), http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/about-us/co-trustees/.
72 Discharge of Oil From Deepwater Horizon/Macondo Well, Gulf of Mexico; Intent to Conduct Restoration Planning,75 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 282, 283. E.P. Danenberger, "Changes in the Minerals Management Service Offshore Regulatory Programs Resulting From the Oil Pollution Act of 1990" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 6823, May 1992), 150. Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279–81. Fed. Reg. 60,800 (Oct. 1, 2010).73 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 367. Ibid., 82. Testimony of Leo Lindner, 308–11. The exclusion for "[d]rilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes associated with the exploration, development, or production of crude oil, natural gas or geothermal energy" is found at 40 C.F.R. § 261.4. NOAA, Gulf Spill Restoration: Co-Trustees.74 Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 21418, 21420); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 150. Exec. Order No. 12,777, 56 Fed. Reg. 54,757 (October 22, 1991). Testimony of Leo Lindner, 276–79, 297, 359–60; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 47100). 15 C.F.R. § 990.10.75 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 282, 283. E.P. Danenberger, "Changes in the Minerals Management Service Offshore Regulatory Programs Resulting From the Oil Pollution Act of 1990" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 6823, May 1992), 150. Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279–81. 15 C.F.R. § 990.30.76 Ibid., 283. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,400 (July 2, 1991). Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 219; Ritchie and Keller, eds., A Scientific Forum on the Gulf of Mexico: The Islands in the Stream Concept, 6–8.
77 15 C.F.R. § 990.30; NOAA, Injury Assessment: Guidance Document for Natural Resource Damage Assessment Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.78 Testimony of Micah Sandell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 29, 2010, 8, 10, 12. Salient differences were, as MMS noted, that "Platforms in the GOM are typically smaller, technically less sophisti- cated, produce fewer hydrocarbons, and operate in less severe environmental conditions [than North Sea platforms]. The number of personnel on OCS platforms is significantly smaller than on North Sea platforms. There is, however, a substantially greater number of OCS platforms in the GOM, over 3,800." Marshall Courtois, William Hauser, and Paul Schneider, "Minerals Management Service Safety and Environmental Management Program: Evolution of the Concept," (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 6822, May 1992), 145. Testimony of Lee Lambert, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 292. Transocean disputes these accounts. It points out that the only individuals who have stated that Anderson advanced the "bladder effect" theory are BP employees. S.M. Gagliano, "Canals, Dredging, and Land Reclamation in the Louisiana Coastal Zone" in Hydrologic and Geologic Studies of Coastal Louisiana, Report no. 14 (Center for Wetland Studies, Louisiana State University, 1973); Robert A. Morton et al., Rapid Subsidence and Historical Wetland Loss in the Mississippi Delta Plain: Likely Causes and Future Implications (U.S. Geological Survey, 2005); Testimony of Senator Mary Landrieu, Louisiana, Hearing before the National Commission, September 28, 2010.79 Ibid., 11. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,400 (July 2, 1991). Testimony of Lee Lambert, 292. NOAA, Deepwater BP Oil Spill, Natural Resource Damage Assessment: NRDA by the Numbers, November 1, 2010, http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/FINAL-NRDA_by_the_Numbers_11.03. pdf.pdf.80 Internal BP documents (Deepwater Horizon Schematic; BP August 9, 2010 presentation to Oil Spill Commission, slide 5 ). Former senior MMS officials, interviews with Commission staff, August and September 2010; Offshore Operators Committee, "Oil, Gas, and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)—Safety and Environmental Management Systems," Public Comment (May 22, 2006), http://www.boemre.gov/federalregister/PDFs/AD15- OOCcomments5-22-06.pdf. Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 117; Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 127909, BP-HZN-CEC 20189-90). While that may have been Mr. Vidrine's stated reason for running the test on the kill line, the Commission notes that the negative-pressure test performed at Macondo—whether on the drill pipe or kill line—was different from the negative- pressure test described in the Application for Permit to Modify. Testimony of Mark Bly, Hearing before the National Commission, November 8, 2010, 293–95. NOAA, Mississippi Canyon 252 Incident: Work Plan for the Collection of Data to Determine Impacts of the Deepwater Horizon; NOAA, Mississippi Canyon 252 Incident on Endangered and Protected Marine Mammals in the Northern Gulf; NOAA, Mississippi Canyon 252 Incident: Preassessment Plan to Determine Potential Exposure and Injuries of Nesting and Hatchling Loggerhead Sea Turtles; NOAA, Mississippi Canyon 252: Preassessment plan to Determine Potential Exposure and Injuries of Nesting and Hatchling Kemp's Ridley Turtles; Testimony of Steve Murawski, September 28, 2010.81 Testimony of Douglas Brown, 88–89, 92–93. T.A.F. Powell, "US Voluntary SEMP Initiative: Holy Grail or Poisoned Chalice?" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 8111, May 1996): 828. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 86. Ray Mabus, America's Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan after the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. Shaila Dewan, "The Oil Spill's Money Squeeze," New York Times, September 12, 2010.
82 Press Release, National Science Foundation, Gulf Oil Spill: NSF Awards Grant to Study Effects of Oil and Dispersants on Louisiana Salt Marsh Ecosystem, August 16, 2010.83 Testimony of Douglas Brown, 93–94. L.D. Easley, J.E. Stark, and R.A. Bradford, "Implementing API RP 75 'Recommended Practice for Development of a Safety and Environmental Program for Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Operations and Facilities'" (Offshore Technol- ogy Conference [OTC] Paper 7384, May 1994): 130. Testimony of Christopher Haire, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 247. Joe Hunt, Mission Without a Map: The Politics and Policies of Restoration Following the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: 1989- 2002, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council (Anchorage, 2009): 156-157. Phil Taylor (Head, Oceans Section, Division of Ocean Sciences, National Science Foundation), e-mail to Commission staff, December 9, 2010.84 Ibid., 94–95. American Petroleum Institute, Recommended Practices for Development of a Safety and Environmental Management Program for Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Operations and Facilities, Recommended Practice 75, 1st ed. (Dallas, TX: May 15, 1993). For example, a bubble of gas, under ideal conditions, would expand approximately 166-fold. This number differs under actual conditions based on fluid properties and flow. See, e.g., Testimony of Stanley Senner, Director of Conservation Science, Ocean Conservancy, Hearing before the National Commission, September 28, 2010. Dewan, "The Oil Spill's Money Squeeze."
85 Press Release, BP, BP and the Gulf of Mexico Alliance Announce Implementation of BP's $500 Million Independent Research Initiative, September 29, 2010, http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&content Id=7065262.86 Testimony of James Nicholas Wilson, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 13, 2010, 10; Testimony of Steve Bertone, 35. Safety and Environmental Management Program (SEMP) on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), 61 Fed. Reg. 37,493 (July 18, 1996). The driller first sent mud to pits 9 and 10, then switched to pit 7, and then switched to pit 6. Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010, 20:10–21:18. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Gov. Jindal Announces "Agenda For Revitalizing Coastal Louisi- ana," July 15, 2010, http://wwwprd.doa.louisiana.gov/LaNews/PublicPages/Dsp_PressRelease_Display. cfm?PressReleaseID=2550&Rec_ID=1. Sea Grant, Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico: Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Research and Monitoring Activities Database (2010), http://gulfseagrant.tamu.edu/oilspill/database.htm.87 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 35. Ibid. Ibid., 20:28–20:36, 20:58–21:06. NOAA, Damage Assessment, Remediation, and Restoration Program: Glossary, http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/glos- sary/index.htm. "Gulf Seafood Industry Works to Wipe Oil Off Image," National Public Radio, August 20, 2010; Louisiana Office of Tourism, Regional Effects on Perception/BP Oil Spill Survey Wave 1 Results (June 30, 2010); University of Minnesota Food Industry Center, "Continuous Consumer Confidence in Food Safety/Defense Tracking" (presentation, FDA Symposium, September 16, 2010).88 Testimony of Gregory Meche, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 198. Patrick Crow, "New slant on safety," Oil & Gas Journal (July 22, 1996): 23. Ibid., 20:20–21:01. Testimony of Stanley Senner. Chapter Eight U.S. Census Bureau: 2007 Economic Census, 2007 Summary Tables: Selected Statistics by Economic Sector.
89 NOAA, Deepwater Horizon/BP Oil Spill: Federal Fisheries Closure and Other Information (2010), http://sero.nmfs. noaa.gov/deepwater_horizon_oil_spill.htm.90 Ibid. E.P. Danenberger, interview with Commission staff, September 2, 2010; E.P. Danenberger, e-mail message to Commis- sion staff, October 25, 2010. Ibid., 21:01–21:08. Ibid., 27–8. Testimony of Timothy Fitzgerald, Environmental Defense Fund, Hearing before the National Commission, September 28, 2010.91 Testimony of Andrea Fleytas, 14. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf–Incident Reporting Requirements, 68 Fed. Reg. 40,585 (July 8, 2003). The Commission believes, based on interviews of the mudloggers on the Horizon, that the Hitec system may have shown a more obvious trend because it displays numeric values as opposed to trend lines such as those seen in the Sperry data shown in the text. Joseph Keith (Sperry), interview with Commission staff, October 6, 2010; Cathleenia Willis (Sperry), interview with Commission staff, October 21, 2010. National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation (September 18, 1990), http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/ letters/1990/M90_26_31A.pdf. Testimony of Lt. Gov. Scott Angelle, Louisiana, Hearing before the National Commission, September 28, 2010.
34192 Campbell Robertson, "As Claims for Spill Losses Shift to Administrator, Queries Follow," New York Times, August 23, 2010.93 Testimony of Andrea Fleytas, 14. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—Incident Reporting Requirements, 71 Fed. Reg. 19,640 (April 17, 2006). Exxon Mobil, 2009 Corporate Citizenship Report, 15. Rob Shaw, "Clearwater BP Office Shells out for Claims," Tampa Bay Online, August 8, 2010, http://www2.tbo.com/ content/2010/aug/08/na-clearwater-bp-office-shells-out-for-claims/.94 Complaint at 2, Shivers v. BP Plc., No. 10-cv-381 (S.D. Ala. July 20, 2010). Commission staff analysis of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement data. See http:// www.boemre.gov/adm/budget.html. Testimony of Greg Meche, 207–09, 219. Testimony of Rex Tillerson, CEO of Exxon Mobil, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010. David Fahrenthold and Kimberly Kindy, "Six Months After the Spill, BP's Money is Changing the Gulf as Much as the Oil," Washington Post, October 20, 2010.95 Ibid. Jim Morris, "Lost at Sea/OFFSHORE RISKS/Safety concerns return with rise of oil, gas boom," Houston Chronicle, December 22, 1996, http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id=1996_1384981. Keith, interview. Inter-Agency Economic Report: Estimating the Economic Effects of the Deepwater Drilling Moratorium on the Gulf
¶Coast Economy (September 16, 2010), http://www.esa.doc.gov/drilling_moratorium.pdf.96 Ibid. Commission staff analysis of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement data. See http:// www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/fastfacts/WaterDepth/wdmaster.asp. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 21415). Press Release, BP, BP Establishes $20 Billion Claims Fund for Deepwater Horizon Spill and Outlines Dividend Decisions,
¶June 16, 2010, http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7062966; Steven Mufson,
¶"BP Details Plan for $20 Billion Claim Fund for Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico," Washington Post," June 17, 2010.97 Ibid. Commission staff analysis of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement data; Minerals Management Service, U.S. Offshore Milestones (as of August 2006): 5. See http://www.boemre.gov/stats/PDFs/ milestonesAUG2006.pdf. Keith, interview. Given what we now know, it is all but impossible that the well was not flowing as of 9:08 p.m. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 25; Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon, 22–23. Other than faulty memory, the only apparent explanations for Mr. Keith's statement are that the crew had already closed off the portion of the flow line Mr. Keith was watching or that Mr. Keith watched for an inadequate period of time. Keith, interview; Darryl Bourgoyne (LSU), interview with Commission staff, No- vember 23, 2010. Exxon Mobil, 2009 Corporate Citizenship Report, 14. Gulf Coast Claims Facility, GCCF Program Statistics - Overall Summary, November 23, 2010.98 Ibid.; Tracey Dalzell Walsh, "Forced To Become Emergency Workers, Fishermen Say BP Never Even Said Thanks," Courthouse News Service, July 22, 2010. Commission staff analysis of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement and U.S. Energy In- formation Administration data. See http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PDFs/2009/2009-016.pdf, 71–72; http://www. eia.gov/oog/info/twip/twiparch/100526/twipprint.html. Testimony of Greg Meche, 207–09. Ibid.,13, 19. Kenneth Feinberg, Final Report of the Special Master for the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001,
¶Volume 1 (2010).99 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 37. Commission staff analysis of MMS yearly budget request and enactments, by nominal and real (2005) dollars. Ibid. "Shell 'Ignored Accident Warning,'" BBC online, June 14, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5077886.stm; Terry Macalister, "Shell Accused Over Oil Rig Safety," The Guardian, June 23, 2006. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E). The Oil Pollution Act recognizes the following categories of damages: (1) injury to natural resources (recoverable by federal or state trustees); (2) loss of real or personal property and any resultant economic losses (recoverable by an owner of that property); (3) loss of subsistence use of natural resources (recoverable by a subsistence user); (4) loss of revenues resulting from destruction of property or natural resource injury (recoverable by a government claimant); (5) loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity resulting from property loss or natural resource injury (recoverable by any claimant); and (6) costs of providing extra public services during or after spill response (recoverable by a government claimant);33 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 19, 2010, 29, 33; Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978). 34 43 U.S.C. § 1801. 35 43 U.S.C. § 1802. 36 43 U.S.C. § 1344. 37 43 U.S.C. § 1340. 38 43 U.S.C. § 1351. 39 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3). 40 43 U.S.C. § 1346. 41 43 U.S.C. § 1347(c). 42 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b). 43 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) 44 43 U.S.C. § 1351. 45 43 U.S.C. § 1340. 46 43 U.S.C. § 1351(c)(3). 47 43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1). 48 43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1). 49 43 U.S.C. § 1531(l). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 127537-39); Internal Halliburton document (HAL_11196). 34 30 C.F.R. § 250.421. U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2).100 Ibid., 37–38. Tetrahedron, Inc., Reliability of Blowout Preventers Tested Under Fourteen and Seven Days Time Interval: Study Report, Submitted to Minerals Management Service, Department of the Interior, MMS Technology Assessment & Research Project 253, "Blowout Preventer Study" (December 20, 1996), http://www.boemre.gov/tarprojects/253/ AA.PDF.; Blowout Preventer (BOP) Testing Requirements for Drilling and Completion Operations, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,604 (June 1, 1998). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 21415). "Shell 'Ignored Accident Warning.'" David Segal, "Should BP's Money Go Where the Oil Didn't?," New York Times, October 23, 2010 (noting that Kenneth Feinberg has "hired one of the country's foremost scholars on torts . . . to write a memorandum about the validity and value of proximity claims.").101 Ibid., 38. Per Holand, Reliability of Subsea BOP Systems for Deepwater Application, Phase II DW, SINTEF Report STF38 A99426 (November 7, 1999); Per Holand, Deepwater Kicks and BOP Performance, SINTEF Report STF38 A01419 (July 24, 2001); WEST Engineering Services, Inc., Mini Shear Study for U.S. Minerals Management Service, Requisi- tion No. 2-1011-1003 (December 2002); WEST Engineering Services, Inc., Shear Ram Capabilities Study for U.S. Minerals Management Service, Requisition No. 3-4025-1001 (September 2004). Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010, 21:08–21:14. Shell, Sustainability Report 2009, 16–17, http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2009/servicepages/downloads/files/ all_shell_sr09.pdf. John Flesher, "Gold Rush On The Gulf: Researchers Clamor For Cash," ABC News, September 29, 2010.102 Ibid., 38–39. WEST Engineering Services, Inc., "Comments by WEST Engineering Services, Houston, Texas, to The National Com- mission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling" (November 12, 2010): 3. Ibid., 21:14–21:15. Testimony of Marvin Odum, Shell, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010. Mary Rickard, "Gulf Coast oil spill chills seafood industry," Reuters, May 12, 2010; Kat Kinsman and Sarah LeTrent,
¶"Gulf Coast Chefs, Fishermen Fight Tide of Misinformation," CNN, May 12, 2010.103 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 284–285. David Barstow and others, "Regulators Failed to Address Risks in Oil Rig Fail-Safe Device," New York Times, June 20, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/us/21blowout.html. Ibid., 2010, 21:17–21:18. Ibid. NOAA, NOAA's Oil Spill Response: Fish Stocks in the Gulf of Mexico (May 12, 2010), http://www.response.restoration.noaa.gov/book_shelf/1886_Fish-Stocks-Gulf-fact-sheetv2.pdf.104 Ibid., 285. U.S. Department of the Interior, Outer Continental Shelf Safety Oversight Board, Report to the Secretary of the Interior (September 1, 2010), 6. Testimony of Chad Murray, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 335–36. Ibid. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Gulf of Mexico Fact Sheet (October 2010), http://www.eia.doe.gov/special/gulf_of_mexico/index.cfm.105 Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, 165. Ibid. Ibid., 336. EPA, General Facts about the Gulf of Mexico, http://www.epa.gov/gmpo/about/facts.html#resources.106 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 285–286. Ibid. Testimony of Randy Ezell, 282. NOAA, The Gulf of Mexico at a Glance: A Tool for the Gulf of Mexico Alliance and the American Public (June 2008), http://gulfofmexicoalliance.org/pdfs/gulf_glance_1008.pdf.107 Ibid., 286. U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Inspector General, Survey Report: Offshore Civil Penalties Program, Miner- als Management Service (March 30, 1999), http://www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/pdf/99-I-374.pdf. Testimony of Bill Ambrose, Hearing before the National Commission, November 8, 2010, 381. Responsible Care, Who We Are, http://www.responsiblecare.org/page.asp?p=6406. U.S. Census Bureau: 2007 Economic Census, Statistics by Economic Sector. Compiled data from Gulf coast counties using the following industry codes: 451110, 487210, 713990, 114210, 721214, 532292, 721110, 721120,
¶712190, 721199, 114111, 114112, 114119, 311711, 311712, 424490, 445220, 424420, 424460.108 Ibid. Commission staff analysis of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement data provided to the Commission by the Department of the Interior of unannounced MMS inspections of MODUs/drilling rigs, 1990 (1,985 inspections) to 2009 (85 inspections). The pivotal change occurs in 1998–1999, as the numbers drop from David Young (Transocean), interview with Commission staff, November 19, 2010. NOAA, NOAA's Oil Spill Response: Fish Stocks in the Gulf of Mexico (May 12, 2010), http://www.response.restoration.noaa.gov/book_shelf/1886_Fish-Stocks-Gulf-fact-sheetv2.pdf.109 Ibid., 286–287. Yearly MMS Incident Summary Reports are available at http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/IncidentStatisticsSum- maries.htm. Testimony of David Young, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 259. Jody Freeman, "Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law" in Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order, ed. David Dyzenhaus (Toronto: Hart Publishing, 1999), 21. Ibid.110 Ibid., 287. "Deepwater Gulf of Mexico production rising," Oil & Gas Journal (November 1, 1999): 34 ("In 1999, 11 more deepwater development production projects in the gulf have already begun producing or are on the verge of doing so"); Michael Davis, "LEARNING THE DRILL/The oil patch rebound brought with it a need for drilling companies to find, train and keep people to work the rigs," Houston Chronicle (February 1, 1998): 1 ("A shortage of qualified personnel has been a nagging problem since the oil patch has come back in the past year. But over the next two years some 50 new offshore jack-up rigs, semi-submersibles and drill ships currently being built or converted will Young, interview. Ibid., 33. NOAA, Deepwater Horizon/BP Oil Spill: Size and Percent Coverage of Fishing Area Closures Due to BP Oil Spill
¶(2010), http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/ClosureSizeandPercentCoverage.htm.111 Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, 152; Testimony of Tyrone Benton, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, July 23, 2010, 250. Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010, 21:08–21:14. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Enti- ties Program, September 26, 2008; Stephen Labaton, "Agency's '04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt," New York Times, October 3, 2008. th Congress (2010). 182 33 U.S.C. § 2702. NOAA, Protocol for Interpretation and Use of Sensory Testing and Analytical Chemistry Results for Re-Opening Oil-
¶Impacted Areas Closed to Seafood Harvesting (June 18, 2010).112 Testimony of Gregory Meche, 209; Testimony of David Young, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, May 27, 2010, 327; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 283; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 65; Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, 153. Bill Ambrose (Transocean), interview with Commission staff, September 21, 2010. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Enti- ties Program. NOAA, Deepwater Horizon/BP Oil Spill: Size and Percent Coverage of Fishing Area Closures Due to BP Oil Spill.113 Testimony of Micah Sandell, 11–13. Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010, 21:38. Edward J. Balleisen and Marc Eisner, "The Promise and Pitfalls of Co-Regulation: How Governments Can Draw on Private Governance for Public Purpose," in New Perspectives on Regulation, ed. David Moss and John Cisternino, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 31. Rob Holbert, "Spreading the Word about Gulf Seafood," Lagniappe 215, October 5, 2010.114 Testimony of Capt. Alwin Landry, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 98–100. Young, interview. Ibid., 130. Testimony of William Walker, Executive Director Mississippi Department of Marine Resources, Hearing before the
¶National Commission, September 28, 2010.115 Testimony of Paul Erickson, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 231–232. Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010, 21:38–21:42. Ibid. Remarks of Jane Lubchenco, NOAA Administrator, American Bar Association's Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources Law Summit, New Orleans, September 30, 2010, http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2010/20101001_lubchenco_seer.html.116 Testimony of Capt. Alwin Landry, 101–102. Testimony of Randy Ezell, 283; Young, interview. Ibid. Brad Jacobson, "Is Gulf Seafood Really Safe to Eat? Government Withholding Key Data on Seafood Testing, Scientists
¶Say," AlterNet, October 7, 2010, http://www.alternet.org/food/148433/is_gulf_seafood_really_safe_to_eat_government_withholding_key_data_on_seafood_testing,_scientists_say.117 Ibid., 104–105. Testimony of Micah Sandell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 29, 2010, 10. Testimony of Marvin Fertel, President and CEO of Nuclear Energy Institute, "Three Mile Island—Looking Back on Thirty Years of Lessons Learned," Before the Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety, 111th Congress (2009). Travis Pillow, "Low Ball Spill Estimates May Have Hurt Florida Tourism," The Florida Independent, October 7, 2010.118 Testimony of Gregory Meche, 202, 211, 223. Testimony of Christopher Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 173. Testimony of James Ellis, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Hearing before the National Commission, August 25, 2010. Testimony of Timothy Fitzgerald, Environmental Defense Fund, Hearing before the National Commission, September
¶28, 2010.119 Testimony of Anthony Gervasio, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 173, 187–188. Testimony of Randy Ezell, 283. John G. Kemeny, Report of The President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI (1979), 68. The full subsection of the recommendation reads, "The industry should establish a program that specifies appropriate safety standards including those for management, quality assurance, and operat- ing procedures and practices, and that conducts independent evaluations. The recently created Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, or some similar organization, may be an appropriate vehicle for establishing and implementing this program." Jean R. Kinsey et al., "Index of Consumer Confidence in the Safety of the Food System," American Journal of Agricultural Economics 91, No. 5 (2009): 1470–1476 (citing H.G. Zucker, "The Variable Nature of News Media Influence," in Communication Yearbook 2, ed. B.D. Ruben [New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1978], 225–40).120 Ibid., 187; Testimony of Kevin Robb, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 42. Testimony of Bill Ambrose, 244. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, "About Us," http://www.inpo.info/AboutUs.htm. Holbert, "Spreading the Word about Gulf Seafood."121 Testimony of Anthony Gervasio, 189. Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon, 14; Testimony of Bill Ambrose, 252–53; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 28. Joseph V. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 50–51. Wendy Kaufman, "Gulf Seafood Industry Works to Wipe Oil Off Image," National Public Radio, August 20, 2010.122 Ibid., 105, 190; Testimony of Gergory Meche, 223. Testimony of Christopher Pleasant, 165. Lee Gard, interview with Commission staff, November 8, 2010. Press Release, NOAA, NOAA and FDA Announce Chemical Test for Dispersant in Gulf Seafood; All Samples Test Within Safety Threshold, October 29, 2010, http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2010/20101029_seafood.html.
342123 Press Release, BP, Seafood Safety, Tourism and Coastal Restoration Funding Announced, November 1, 2010, http:// www.louisianagulfresponse.com/go/doc/3047/940587/; Press Release, Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Bronson Announces That BP Will Pay $20 Million To Fund Seafood Inspections, Marketing Efforts In Wake Of Oil Spill, October 25, 2010. http://www.doacs.state.fl.us/press/2010/10252010_2.html.124 Ibid., 448–449, 452. Ibid. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 143. Paul Quinlan, "Gulf Spill: Ala., La. fighting over potential billions in BP penalties," Energy & Environment Daily, November 23, 2010.125 Testimony of Mark Hay, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 225. Various parties have suggested other causes for the deadman's failure, including leaks, overdue equipment certifica- tion, and improper modifications. Lee Gard, interview. U.S. Census Bureau: 2007 Economic Census, Statistics by Economic Sector. Compiled data from Gulf coast counties using the following industry codes: 451110, 487210, 713990, 114210, 721214, 532292, 721110, 721120, 712190, 721199.126 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 452; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 287. Interview with industry expert, September 24, 2010. Ibid. Ibid.127 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 452. After the blowout, some industry CEOs testified they would never have used a long string production casing, sug- gesting there was a causal connection between BP's choice of the long string and the blowout. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Environment, 111th Cong. 104 (June 15, 2010) (statements of John Watson, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Chevron Corporation; and Rex Tillerson, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Exxon- Mobil). Ibid. Testimony of Keith Overton, Louisiana Shrimp Association, Hearing before the National Commission, July 12, 2010.
128 Testimony of Michael Hecht, President Greater New Orleans Inc., Hearing before the National Commission, July 12, 2010.129 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 450; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 123. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 128489); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 64 ("the BP Macondo well team did not ask for the OptiCem model to be re-run"). This may have been because of Mr. Guide's distrust of the OptiCem model. Testimony of John Guide, 275 ("it's wrong a lot"). When Halliburton rig personnel eventually informed Gagliano of BP's decision themselves, he responded by e-mailing BP modeling data suggesting again that more centralizers would be needed to prevent channeling. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 128708). Ibid. Louisiana Office of Tourism, Effects on Perception/BP Oil Spill Survey Wave 2 Results (August 16, 2010), http://crt. louisiana.gov/tourism/research/Documents/2010-11/NationalOilSpillReport20100816.pdf.130 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 450; Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39. Testimony of Jesse Gagliano, 259; Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, 415. Ibid. Matthew R. Lee and Troy C. Blanchard, Health Impacts of Deepwater Horizon Oil Disaster on Coastal Louisiana Residents (Louisiana State University, July 2010), http://www.lsu.edu/pa/mediacenter/tipsheets/spill/publichealthre- port_2.pdf.131 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 35. Mr. Guide disagreed with the BP report's conclusion in an interview with Commission staff. Guide, interview. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 6, 2010. Ibid.132 Ibid. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 22670). Lee Gard, interview. Brian Skoloff, "Final Well Sealing Small Comfort to Gulf Residents," ABC News, Sept. 16, 2010.
133 Testimony of Grace Scire, Gulf Coast Regional Director, Boat People SOS, Hearing before the National Commission, July 13, 2010.134 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 451; Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 66. Ibid. Administration health officials (Department of Human Health Services, National Institute of Health, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, and Occupational Safety and Health Administration), interviews with Commission staff, October 5, 2010.135 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39. Fred Bartlit, letter to the National Commission, October 28, 2010 (reporting the results of cement testing). Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 76. Dan Witters, "Gulf Coast Residents Worse Off Emotionally after BP Oil Spill," Gallup, September 28, 2010, http:// www.gallup.com/poll/143240/gulf-coast-residents-worse-off-emotionally-oil-spill.aspx.136 Ibid. If BP were looking, the one February test actually reported to BP could have prompted BP to question the design as well. BP argues that its failure to do so here is understandable given that it had hired one of the world's leading cementers specifically for purposes of designing and testing the cement slurry. Alice Camp, "Nuclear: In Pursuit of a Renaissance," EPRI Journal (Summer 2007): 20. Jonathan White (Program policy Analyst, Administration for Children & Families), e-mail to Commission staff, November 16, 2010.137 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 368, 396. To the contrary, Halliburton's selection of conditioning time appears to have been haphazard at best. Lab person- nel used different conditioning times (ranging from zero conditioning time to three hours) in each of the four foam stability tests that they conducted. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 81. David Abramson et al., Impact on Children and Families of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Preliminary Findings of the Coastal Population Impact Study (National Center for Disaster Preparedness, August 3, 2010).138 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 452. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). Ibid., 53. Matthew Lee et al., Health Impacts of Deepwater Horizon Oil Disaster on Coastal Louisiana Residents, (Louisiana State University, July 2010).139 Internal BP Document (BP-HZN-MBI 21277). Testimony of Daun Winslow, 209; Guide, interview. Ibid., 53 Abramson et al., Impact on Children and Families of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.140 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 451–452. Moreover, once the BP Well Site Leaders and crew realized that the annular preventer was leaking, they should have circulated out any spacer that had migrated below the annular preventer prior to continuing with the test. Testi- Ibid., 53–54. Ibid.,9.
Ibid.142 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 454. Transocean asserts that its personnel, including the driller and toolpusher, were not "in any way responsible for interpreting the negative pressure test or making the decision that the well was secure and work could properly pro- ceed." Rachel Clingman, letter to Commission staff, November 16, 2010, 1. As the Commission's staff made clear at the November 8, 2010 hearing, the Commission is not tasked with deciding legal responsibility. Based on available evidence, however, Revette and Anderson agreed the negative-pressure test was a success and did not stop the job before moving on to the remaining temporary abandonment procedures. Testimony of Lee Lambert, 291; Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-CEC 20347, 20178). Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 104. Testimony of Grace Scire.143 Ibid., 454–455. Guide, interview. Lee Gard, interview. Sharon Cohen, "Vietnamese 'Lost' as Gulf Oil Spill Hits Community Hard," Associated Press, July 11, 2010.
144 Hearing on Ensuring Justice for Victims of the Gulf Coast Oil Disaster, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Kenneth Feinberg, Administrator, Gulf Coast Claims Facility).145 Associated Press, "'The Real Deal': Survivors recall the Deepwater Horizon explosion," Press-Register, May 9, 2010. Testimony of Mark Bly, 213; Testimony of Charlie Williams, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010, 45. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 1, 2010. Hearing before the National Commission, Panel 5: Community and Ecological Impacts, July 13, 2010.146 Ibid.; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 103. Testimony of Steve Lewis, 54, 124. BP argues that "[t]he use of additional mechanical plugs would have brought its own additional risks." Powell, letter, att. 1, 6 (citing API, Recommended Practice 65—Part 2 (May 2010), § 3.1); Guide, interview. However, BP does not present any evidence that the Macondo team in fact evaluated those risks or compared them with the risks of setting a single surface cement plug in seawater 3,300 feet below the mud line. Michael Rencheck (AREVA Inc.), interview with Commission staff, November 1, 2010. Brenda Robichaux (Houma Nation), interview with Commission staff, October 2010.
147 Lawrence Palinkas et al., "Community Patterns of Psychiatric Disorders after the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill," American Journal of Psychiatry 150 (1993): 1517-1523.148 Ibid., 40. BP asserts that "[u]sing drill collars would have required unracking the drill pipe on the rig and then locating and re-racking drill collars—a set of additional operations with attendant risks." Powell, letter, att. 1, 5. BP does not provide any evidence to substantiate the extent of such "attendant risks" or whether they outweighed the risks of the procedure BP chose. Most significantly, BP offers no evidence that its Macondo team ever considered such risks or performed a rigorous comparative risk analysis. Michael Golay, interview. 149 33 U.S.C. § 2210. Ibid.
343149 Catalina Arata et al., "Coping with Technological Disaster: An Application of the Conservation of Resources Model to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill," International Society for Traumatic Stress 13, no. 1 (2000): 23–39.150 Ibid., 41–43. Testimony of Mark Bly, 308. BP has suggested that the float valves provided an additional barrier to flow. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 68. The Commission does not agree that float valves, even when converted, constitute a distinct physical barrier to flow, but instead reinforce the cement in the shoe track. Clawson, interview (indicating that Weatherford does not consider the float collar to be a barrier to hydrocarbons); API, Recommended Practice 65—Part 2 (May 2010), §§ 3.4, 4.4.3 (float valves not included in the list of subsurface mechanical barriers; float equipment used to prevent cement from flowing back into the casing). Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 1, 2010. Stephen Braud and Jack Kruse, eds., Synthesis: Three Decades of Research on Socioeconomic Effects Related to Offshore Petroleum Development in Coastal Alaska (Minerals Management Service, May 2009), 306.151 Ibid., 43. Testimony of Darryl Bourgoyne, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010, 133. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, November 15, 2010. Gina Solomon and Sarah Janssen, "Health Effects of the Gulf Oil Spill," Journal of the American Medical Association 304, no. 10 (2010): 1118–1119.152 Ibid. Testimony of Charlie Williams, 46–53. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 13, 2010. Hearing on Ensuring Justice for Victims of the Gulf Coast Oil Disaster, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Kenneth Feinberg, Administrator, Gulf Coast Claims Facility).153 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 288. Testimony of Bill Ambrose, 380–84. "Oil Industry Needs Self-Regulation, Says Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. CEO," Forbes Magazine, August 26, 2010. SAMSA, "Gulf States Receive $52 Million from BP for Behavioral Health," SAMSA News 18, no. 4 (July/August 2010), http://www.samhsa.gov/samhsanewsletter/Volume_18_Number_4/GulfStates.aspx.
¶154 National Institutes of Health officials, interviews with Commission staff, October 2010.155 Ibid., 44–46. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-OSC 5420). Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 57. Louisiana Office of Public Health, State Narrative for Louisiana: Maternal and Child Health Title V Block Grant,
¶Application for 2008/Annual Report for 2006 (October 4, 2007); See also "Agenda, Interagency Meeting – Gulf Oil
¶Spill Workers' Study" (NIH Campus, Bethesda, Maryland, August 19, 2010), http://www.niehs.nih.gov/about/od/ programs/docs/agenda-aug19-2010.pdf.156 Ibid., 45–46. Guide, interview. Lee Gard, interview. Editorial, "Ruling in Charity Hospital case is a significant victory: An editorial," Times-Picayune, April 4, 2010.157 Ibid., 46–47. Ibid.; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 193529-39). Ibid. Robin Rudowitz, Diane Rowland, and Adele Shartzer, "Health Care In New Orleans Before and After Hurricane Katrina," Health Affairs 25, no. 5 (2006): 393–406.158 Ibid., 47–48. It appears that the chain of command and responsibilities at BP during the execute phase were not well-understood by the Macondo Engineering Team Leader. When asked during an interview who was responsible for designing or amending the temporary abandonment procedures, the Macondo Engineering Team Leader said he would need to look at the company's chart of roles and responsibilities. Walz, interview. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 96–97. Ibid.159 Testimony of Michael Williams, 26. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 117603). Ibid., 116. Louisiana Office of Public Health, State Narrative for Louisiana: Maternal and Child Health Title V Block Grant.160 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 48. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 128542). Ibid., 111–117. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Hurricane Katrina: Federal Grants Have Helped Health Care Organizations
¶Provide Primary Care, but Challenges Remain (July 2009).161 Testimony of Andrea Fleytas, 15. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-OSC 6224). Testimony of James Ellis, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Hearing before the National Commission, August 25, 2010; Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, 2009 Annual Report; Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, 1994 Annual Report. Karen B. DeSalvo, "Community Health Clinics: Bringing Quality Care Closer to New Orleanians," in The New Orleans Index at Five, Amy Liu and Allison Plyer, eds. (Brookings Institution, August 2010).
¶Chapter Seven 1 Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority, Fiscal Year 2011 Annual Plan: Integrated Ecosystem
¶Restoration and Hurricane Protection in Coastal Louisiana (April 2010), 2–3.2 Internal BP document (BP, presentation to Commission, August 9, 2010, slides 5 & 12). Quoted in Tom Zoellner, "Oil and Water: The Adventure of Getting One from Deep Beneath the Other," Invention and Technology (Fall 2000): 48. Internal Transocean document (TRN-HEC 90686). Internal documents are identified by their document production serial numbers when available, which were assigned by the entity that provided them. Neil MacFarquhar, "Routine Flights Become Overland Odysseys, Minus Clean Socks," New York Times, April 22, 2010. Campbell Robertson and Clifford Krauss, "Gulf Spill Is the Largest of Its Kind, Scientists Say," New York Times, August 2, 2010. BP, Sustainability Review (2009), 20–21. http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/ e_s_assets/e_s_assets_2009/downloads_pdfs/bp_sustainability_review_2009.pdf. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(6) ("An oil and gas lease issued pursuant to this section shall . . . contain such rental and other provisions as the Secretary may prescribe at the time of offering the area for lease."). U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Mississippi River Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force, Hypoxia 101, http://www.epa.gov/owow_keep/msbasin/hypoxia101.htm.3 Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, 411; U.S. Department of Energy, Well Configuration (BP document made public by the Department of Energy), http://www.energy.gov/open/documents/3.1_Item_2_Macondo_Well_07_Jun_1900.pdf; Testimony of Natalie Roshto, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 22, 2010, 15. Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 409. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126338). Campbell Robertson, "11 Remain Missing After Oil Rig Explodes Off Louisiana," New York Times, April 22, 2010. EPA, Government Response to the BP Oil Spill: Odors from the BP Spill (June 2010), http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/ reports/odorfactsheet.pdf (announcing help line for residents experiencing oil-related odors); Press Release, NOAA, Administration Launches Dockside Chats to Promote Gulf Seafood Safety Awareness, August 25, 2010, http://www. restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/08/25/administration-launches-dockside-chats-promote-gulf-seafood-safety- awareness; BP, Claims and Government Payments Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Public Report (November 18, 2010). Health and Safety Executive, Major Incident Investigation Report, BP Grangemouth Scotland (29th May – 10th June 2000) (August 18, 2003), 7, http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/bpgrange/images/bprgrangemouth.pdf. These terms are taken directly from the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) NEPA implementing regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28. 4 40 C.F.R. §1508.4. Complaint at ¶ 28, Louisiana v. Triton Asset Leasing GmBH al., No. 2:10-cv-03059 (E.D. La. September 14, 2010).4 Testimony of Michael Williams, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 23, 2010, 35–36. Pratt, Priest, and Castaneda, Offshore Pioneers, 15–52, 137–157. Internal Transocean document (TRN-USCG-MMS 11597). Rick Jervis, "Gulf Blast Appears to be 'Blowout'," USA Today, April 22, 2010; Ben Casselman, Russell Gold, and Angel Gonzalez, "Blast Jolts Oil World," Wall Street Journal, April 22, 2010. Testimony of Timothy Ragen, Executive Director of the U.S. Marine Mammal Commission, "The Short and Long- Term Impacts of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill," Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans, and Wildlife, 111th Congress (June 10, 2010); Kim B. Ritchie and Brian D. Keller, eds., A Scientific Forum on the Gulf of Mexico: The Islands in the Stream Concept (NOAA, January 23, 2008), 6–8; Elliott A. Norse and John Amos, "Impacts, Perception, and Policy Implications of the Deepwater Horizon Oil and Gas Disaster," Environmental Law Reporter 40, no. 11 (2010): 11071; Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Scientific Symposium Meeting Summary (Consortium for Ocean Leadership, June 23, 2010), 15–16. Ibid. Ray Mabus, America's Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan after the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (September 28,
¶2010).5 Testimony of John Guide, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 22, 2010, 260–266; Testimony of James Wilson, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 6, 2010, 176. Ibid., 21–25. U.S. Department of the Interior, "Statement by Secretary of the Interior James Watt Instituting Changes in the Mineral Royalty Management Program – July 21, 1982," Commission on Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy Resources: Subject Files, 1981–1982, RG 48, Entry 994, Box 1 (National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126338). Jervis, "Gulf Blast Appears to be 'Blowout.'" Federal Interagency Solutions Group, Oil Budget Science and Engineering Team, Oil Budget Calculator Technical Documentation (November 2010). Ibid. A "Development Operations Coordination Document" in the Gulf of Mexico is functionally the same as a "Development and Production Plan" in other LES regions. Charles Simenstad et al., "When is Restoration Not? Incorporating Landscape-Scale Processes to Restore Self-Sustaining
¶Ecosystems in Coastal Wetland Restoration," Ecological Engineering 26, no. 1 (2006): 28, 31.6 Brian Morel, e-mail message to Richard Miller and Mark Hafle, April 14, 2010, 13:31, http://energycommerce.house. gov/documents/20100614/BP-April14.Email.calling.Macondo.a.nightmare.well.pdf. Tyler Priest, "Extraction Not Creation: The History of Offshore Petroleum in the Gulf of Mexico," Enterprise & Society 8, no. 2 (June 2007): 240. U.S. Constitution, Art IV, § 3, cl. 2. Ibid. Richard Fausset, "Oil Rig Explodes; 11 Missing," Los Angeles Times, April 22, 2010. 7 40 C.F.R. § 300, Subpart D. Curtis Morgan, "Another sign of oil spill recovery in the Gulf: Oil in the Gulf has dissipated and degraded into barely detectable concentrations, although federal scientists say it's too soon to say the threat is over," Miami Herald, Health and Safety Executive, BP Grangemouth Executive Summary—Findings and Recommendations, http://www. hse.gov.uk/comah/bpgrange/execsumm/findings.htm. Press Release, Department of the Interior, Categorical Exclusions for Gulf Offshore Activity to be Limited While Interior Reviews NEPA Process and Develops Revised Policy, August 16, 2010, For background about "resiliency," see C.S. Holling, "Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems," Annual Review of
¶Ecology and Systematics 24 (1973): 1–23.7 BP, "GoM Exploration Wells: MC 252 #1—Macondo Prospect Well Information," September 2009, http:// bpoilresponse.markimoore.com/blog/bp-media/docs/Macondo.Prospect.Well.Information.pdf. Alden J. LaBorde, My Life and Times (New Orleans: LaBorde Printing Company, 1996), 174. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976), quoting United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940). Ibid. Three companies own the Macondo well. BP has a 65 percent share, Anadarko Petroleum Corporation has a 25 percent share, and MOEX Offshore has a 10 percent share. BP maintained regular contact with Anadarko and MOEX throughout the drilling of the well. Andrew B. Wilson, "BP's Disaster: No Surprise to Folks in the Know," CBS, June 22, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/ stories/2010/06/22/opinion/main6605248.shtml. Minerals Management Service, MMS 2007-018 Gulf of Mexico OSC Oil and Gas Lease Sales: 2007-2010 Final Environmental Impact Statement (April 2007), Volume I, 2-3 to 2-5. Mabus, America's Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan after the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 26.8 Testimony of Richard Tink, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 26, 2010, 392; Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, AFE Summary for the Macondo Well, October 7, 2010, http://www. deepwaterinvestigation.com/external/content/document/3043/914919/1/AFE%20Summary%20for%20the%20 Macondo%20Well.pdf. James W. Calvert, "Gulf Offshore Activity Booming," World Petroleum (January 1957): 48. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 405 (1917); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. at 540 ("Congress exercises the powers of both a proprietor and of a legislature over the public domain."). Internal Transocean documents (TRN-USCG-MMS 11600, 11605, 11609, 11613, 11617, 11621, 11625). Paul Purpura et al., "Search continues for 11 missing in rig blast," Times-Picayune, April 22, 2010. Jan Erik Vinnem, Offshore Risk Assessment: Principles, Modelling and Applications of QRA Studies, Second Edition (London: Springer Studies in Reliability Engineering, 2007), 91, 100, 102. Minerals Management Service, MMS 2007-026 Chukchi Sea Planning Area Oil and Gas Lease Sale 193 and Seismic Surveying Activities in the Chukchi Sea Final Environmental Impact Statement (May 2007), Volume I, 1. U.S. Geological Survey, The Gulf of Mexico Hypoxic Zone, http://toxics.usgs.gov/hypoxia/hypoxic_zone.html.9 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (September 8, 2010), 17. Ben C. Belt, "Louisiana and Texas Offshore Prospects," Drilling (March 1956): 119. United States v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459, 466–68, 474–83 (1915). (Upholding authority of the president to withdraw unilaterally from private disposition valuable energy resources located on public lands in order to protect those resources while Congress considers legislation for their retention in national ownership). Brett Clanton, "New tactic might seal leaking well sooner, BP CEO says," Houston Chronicle, May 5, 2010. Paul Rioux and Chris Kirkham, "Search for 11 Workers Missing After Oil Rig Explosion Is Expected To Be Called Off Friday," Times-Picayune, April 22, 2010. Department of Interior, Department Manual Part 516: National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (September 2009), 3.4. Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force, Gulf Hypoxia Action Plan 2008—For Reducing,
¶Mitigating, and Controlling Hypoxia in the Northern Gulf of Mexico and Improving Water Quality in the Mississippi
¶River Basin (2008).10 Transocean, Our Company, http://www.deepwater.com/fw/main/Our-Company-2.html. "Special Offshore Report," World Oil (May 1957): 118; Calvert, "Gulf Offshore Activity Booming," 48. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356a. Gregory Walz (BP), interview with Commission staff, October 6, 2010. Testimony of Captain James Hanzalik, Hearing Before the Deepwater Joint Investigation Team, October 4, 2010, 29- 30. Government Accountability Office, GAO-10-276 Offshore Oil and Gas Development: Additional Guidance Would Help Strengthen the Minerals Management Service's Assessment of Environmental Impacts in the North Aleutian Basin (March 2010), 21. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, Leasing, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/ homepg/lsesale/lsesale.html.11 Press Release, Transocean, Transocean Ltd. Reports Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2009 Results, February 24, 2010. Pratt, Priest, and Castaneda, Offshore Pioneers, 36–48. E.R. Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy: A Legal and Historical Analysis (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1953); Tyler Priest, "Claiming the Coastal Sea: The Battle for the Tidelands, 1937–1953," History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana: Vol. 1: Papers on the Evolving Offshore Industry, MMS OCS Study 2004-049 (New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, 2008), 67–90, https://www.gomr.mms. gov/homepg/espis/espisfront.asp. Testimony of Gregory Walz, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 7, 2010, 157–59. Council on Environmental Quality, Final Recommendations of the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force (July 19, 2010), 41. 12 43 U.S.C. § 1346. Executive Order 13547, Stewardship of the Ocean, Our Coasts, and the Great Lakes,75 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 282, 283. E.P. Danenberger, "Changes in the Minerals Management Service Offshore Regulatory Programs Resulting From the Oil Pollution Act of 1990" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 6823, May 1992), 150. Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279–81. Fed. Reg. 43023, July 22,
¶2010.12 Press Release, Transocean, Transocean Inc. and GlobalSantaFe Corporation Agree to Combine, July 23, 2007. Tyler Priest, The Offshore Imperative: Shell Oil's Search for Petroleum in Postwar America (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2007), 81–91. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 35 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 143300) (emphasis added). White House Council on Environmental Quality, Final Recommendations of the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force
¶(July 19, 2010).13 "Contractors ordering offshore rigs on speculation," Drilling Contractor, May/June 2002. Ibid., 95–98. Priest, "Claiming the Coastal Sea: The Battle for the Tidelands, 1937–1953." Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 136937, 136941). Commission staff analysis of MMS yearly budget request and enactments, by nominal and real (2005) dollars. Bu- reau of Ocean Energy Management, Office of Administration and Budget: Budget Division, http://www.boemre.gov/ adm/budget.html; Herbert Kaufman and Cheryl Anderson, Department of the Interior, OCS Environmental Studies Contract Projects—Fiscals Years 1973 through 1983 (DOI Minerals Management Service Branch of Environmental Studies, December 1983), II-8. 14 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D)(i); 40 C.F.R. § 300.211. 15 30 C.F.R. § 254.2(a). 16 30 C.F.R. § 254.126 17 40 C.F.R. § 300.322 18 23 U.S.C. § 125. For an overview of issues in Gulf of Mexico marine policy, see Linwood Pendleton, Larry Crowder, Daniel Dunn, Clare
¶Fieseler, Morgan Gopnik, Catherine Latanich, Mike Orbach, Steve Roady, Mary Turnipseed, Cindy van Dover, "Marine
¶Protection in the Gulf of Mexico: Current Policy, Future Options, and Ecosystem Outcomes," Policy Brief, Nicholas
¶Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions, Duke University (October 2010). Elliott Norse (Marine Conservation
¶Biology Institute), interview with Commission staff, October 18, 2010; Larry McKinney (Harte Institute for Gulf of Mexico Studies), interview with Commission staff, October 18; 2010 Sandra Whitehouse (Ocean Conservancy), interview with Commission staff, October 20, 2010; Deerin Babb-Brott (Massachusetts Office of Coastal Zone
¶Management), interview with Commission staff, October 21, 2010; Barry Gold (Moore Foundation), interview with
¶Commission staff, Sept. 13, 2010.14 "Global 500," CNNMoney.com, July 26, 2010, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/full_ list/index.html. Tyler Priest, "Auctioning the Ocean: The Creation of the Federal Offshore Leasing Program, 1954-1962," History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana: Vol. 1: Papers on the Evolving Offshore Industry (Minerals Management Service OCS Study 2004-049, 2008). Other states petitioned for the 9-nautical-mile boundary in the federal courts, but failed to prevail. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8848-58). NOAA, Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning Examples, http://www.msp.noaa.gov/examples/index.html.15 Internal Transocean documents (TRN-HCJ 93526, 93528). U.S. Department of Interior, "Petroleum and Sulfur on the U.S. Continental Shelf," internal study, August 1969, box 134, Central Classified Files, 1969–1972, Record Group 48, Records of the Secretary of Interior, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. "Oil Shelf Bill Enacted; President Reaffirms U.S. Title to Outer Offshore Deposits," New York Times, August 8, 1953, 27. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 129238-39). United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Marine Spatial Planning Initiative: Norway, http://www.unesco-ioc-marinesp.be/spatial_management_practice/norway.16 Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126338); Internal BP document (BP-HZN-OSC 5378). Priest, "Auctioning the Ocean," 113. Richard Vietor, Energy Policy in America since 1945: A Study of Business-Government Relations (New York: Cam- bridge University Press, 1984), 19. Guide, interview. Indeed, just days before the running of the long string at Macondo, another well drilled by Trans- ocean's DD3 suffered just such a complication. Ibid. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, http://www.
¶gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/regs/laws/ocslasht.html.17 "Brazil Pins Hopes on Massive, untapped Oil Fields," NPR, December 1, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ story.php?storyId=120966523. On Project Mohole and JOIDES, see David K. van Keuren, "Breaking New Ground: The Origins of Scientific Ocean Drilling," in The Machine in Neptune's Garden: Historical Perspectives on Technology and the Marine Environment, eds. Helen M. Rozwadowski and David K. van Keuren (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2004), 183–210. On Shell's Eureka project, see Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 97, 218. E.R. Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy: A Legal and Historical Analysis. Testimony of Jesse Gagliano, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 320. For geospatial maps on uses of Gulf resources, see NOAA, Multipurpose Marine Cadastre, http://csc-s-web-p.csc.
¶noaa.gov/MMC.18 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, Installations, Removals, and Cumulative Totals of Offshore Production Facilities in Federal Waters; 1959–2010, February 2010, http://www.boemre.gov/stats/PDFs/ OCSPlatformActivity.pdf.; Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, OCS Incidents/Spills by Category: 1996–2005, October 19, 2007, http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/Incidents1996-2005.htm; Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, OCS Incidents/Spills by Category: 2006-2010, July 10, 2010, http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/IncidentStatisticsSummaries.htm. F. P. Dunn, "Deepwater Production: 1950-2000" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 7627, Houston, TX, May 1994). "Interior Expects Big Things from . . . Offshore Lease Sale," Oil and Gas Journal, September 13, 1954, 96. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 22433). Walz also noted that the flight carrying centralizers would not increase costs. Ibid. Cornelius Hammer et al., "Framework of stock-recovery strategies: analyses of factors affecting success and failure,"
344ICES Journal of Marine Science 67 (2010): 1849–1855.19 Testimony of Ronald Sepulvado, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 23, 2010, 7, 14, 34. Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 127–130. Diane Austin et al., History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Volume 1: Papers on the Evolving Offshore Industry, OCS Study MMS 2008-042 (New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, September 2008), 97–98, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PI/PDFImages/ESPIS/4/4530.pdf. 20 43 U.S.C § 1334. Guide, interview. BP had special one-piece bolt-on centralizers made for the Thunder Horse project. Ibid. Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 2701,116 Stat. 134, 278-279 (2002). For background overview of deltaic science described in this section, see, e.g., Committee on the Restoration and Protection of Coastal Louisiana, Drawing Louisiana's New Map: Addressing Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana (National Research Council, 2006), 29–42; James M. Coleman, Harry H. Roberts, and Gregory W. Stone, "Mississippi River Delta: An Overview," Journal of Coastal Research 14, no. 3 (1998): 698–716; John W. Day Jr. et al., "Restoration of the Mississippi Delta: Lessons from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita," Science 315, no. 5819 (2007): 1679–1684.20 Testimony of John Guide, 23. Ibid. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 128379). Department of the Interior, National Notice to Lessees and Operators of Federal Oil and Gas Leases, Outer Continental Shelf No. 2010-N10 (November 8, 2010), http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/regs/ntls/2010NTLs/10- n10.pdf. "Storm Death Toll at 31 as Floodwaters Recede," CNN, May 6, 2010; Paul Kemp, "Use the Mississippi River to stop the oil," CNN, June 13, 2010. The approximate travel time of water along the Ohio and then Mississippi Rivers can be estimated by noting the sequence of peak water levels along the river, in the National Weather Service's Lower Mississippi River Forecast Center, particularly the summary data for weeks ending in May 5, 2010, and May 12, 2010. River Summary Archives for these dates and the rest of 2010 can be found here: http://www.srh.noaa.gov/ lmrfc/?n=riversummaryarchive.21 Ibid., 43–44 and 189; Schlumberger, "Oilfield Glossary: cement bond log," accessed November 19, 2010, http:// www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/Display.cfm?Term=cement%20bond%20log. Cliff Hernandez, interview by Andrew Gardner, May 1, 2001, New Iberia, LA, History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Houston History Archives, M.D. Anderson Library Special Collections, University of Houston, Houston, TX. This interview is one of approximately 450 oral histories conducted for History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Minerals Management Service OCS Study 2004-049 (2008). "Oil and Gas Leases Bow to Rare Wildlife Species," New York Times, December 9, 1955. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 22669). For description of Atchafalaya diversion, see, e.g., Martin Reuss, Designing the Bayous: The Control of Water in the Atchafalaya Basin, 1800-1995 (Alexandria, VA: Texas A&M University Press, 2004).22 Testimony of John Guide, 43–44, 189–191. Ken Arnold, interview with Tyler Priest, May 10, 2004, Houston, TX, History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Houston History Archives, M.D. Anderson Library Special Collections, University of Houston, Houston, TX. John C. Whitaker, Striking a Balance: Environment and Natural Resources Policy in the Nixon-Ford Years (Washing- ton, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), 267–268; Russell Wayland, "The New Federal OCS Regulations in the Light of Santa Barbara" (Society of Petroleum Engineers [SPE] Paper 2780, San Francisco, CA, November 1969); Richard B. Krahl and David W. Moody, "Gulf Coast Lease Management Inspection Program," (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 1714, 1972), 846. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 22433). U.S. Geological Survey, Northern Gulf of Mexico (NGOM) Ecosystem Change and Hazard Susceptibility Project— Overview (2010), http://ngom.usgs.gov/overview/intro.html.23 Testimony of Douglas Brown, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 26, 2010, 88, 91. Don E. Kash et al., Energy Under the Oceans: A Technology Assessment of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Opera- tions (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973), 104. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370h. Testimony of Steve Lewis, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010, 93–94; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 129226). Prior to conversion, a small ball drops from the top of the float valves to block the main path through the auto-fill tube, leaving only two small holes on the side of the tube through which mud can flow. Ibid. Kevin Kosar, Disaster Response and Appointment of a Recovery Czar: The Executive Branch's Response to the Flood of 1927 (Congressional Research Service, 2005).24 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 77; Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCDC 92). U.S. Geological Survey, Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 128 (December 1958) and Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 144 (February 1960), RG 57, Records of the U.S. Geological Survey, NARA. Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 70. 25 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). The Well Site Leaders—Bob Kaluza and Don Vidrine—would normally have been on the rig. Morel, a relatively junior BP engineer, had flown to the rig out of a professional interest in learning more about the cementing process. Guide, interview. 33 U.S.C. § 702c (1928).
25 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, The Mississippi River & Tributaries (Mr&T) Project (2010), http://www.mvn.usace. army.mil/bcarre/missproj.asp.26 Testimony of Ross Skidmore, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 264. Neil R. Etson to President Nixon, March 18, 1970, Central Classified Files, 1968-1974, Box 71, RG 57, Records of the Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Testimony of Steve Lewis, 96; Internal Transocean document (TRN-USCG_MMS 11638). Testimony of Senator Mary Landrieu, Louisiana, Hearing before the National Commission, September 28, 2010.
27 Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection, And Restoration Act: Summary of Wetland Benefits for Priority List Projects (2010), http://www.lacoast.gov/reports/wva/CWPPRA project benefits 2010-06-18.pdf; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Louisiana Coastal Area Ecosystem Restoration Plan (2010), http://www.lca.gov/.28 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 38, 113; Testimony of Curt Kuchta, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, May 27, 2010, 166, 183, 184. U.S. Department of the Interior, Leasing Oil and Natural Gas Resources: Outer Continental Shelf (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, 2005), 12, http://www.boemre.gov/ld/PDFs/GreenBook-LeasingDocument.pdf. Ibid.; Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 432. Robert H. Meade and John A. Moody. "Causes for the decline of suspended-sediment discharge in the Mississippi River system, 1940-2007," Hydrological Process 24 (2010): 35–49; Robert B. Jacobson, Dale W. Blevins and Chance J. Bitner, "Sediment Regime Constraints on River Restoration—an Example from the Lower Missouri River," Geological Society of America Special Papers 451 (2009): 1–22.29 Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 188 and 191. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 70 (listing 18 statutes, and not including several such as the Magnuson Fishery Management and Conservation Act of 1976). Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 137367, 21304). Since the incident, BP has argued that the M-I SWACO models predicted an erroneously high circulation pressure, and that the readings the crew observed were proper. This may ultimately explain the readings, but it does not explain why the BP Macondo team dismissed them as the result of a broken pressure gauge. Day et al., "Restoration of the Mississippi Delta: Lessons from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita," 1682.
30 Robert Morton et al., Rapid Subsidence and Historical Wetland Loss in the Mississippi Delta Plain: Likely Causes and Future Implications, (U.S. Geological Survey, 2005).31 Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 119. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Testimony of John Guide, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 22, 2010, 87. John Barras et al., Land Area Change in Coastal Louisiana—a Multidecadal Perspective (from 1956 to 2006) (U.S. Geological Survey, 2008).32 Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 23, 2010, 442. Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Program: Hearings before the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). John Gisclair, Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010 (annotations, September 20, 2010). Commission calculation based on internal Halliburton document (HAL_10994). Torbjorn Tornqvist et al., "Mississippi Delta Subsidence Primarily Caused by Compaction of Holocene Strata," Nature Geoscience 1 (2008): 173–176.33 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 19, 2010, 29, 33; Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978). 34 43 U.S.C. § 1801. 35 43 U.S.C. § 1802. 36 43 U.S.C. § 1344. 37 43 U.S.C. § 1340. 38 43 U.S.C. § 1351. 39 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3). 40 43 U.S.C. § 1346. 41 43 U.S.C. § 1347(c). 42 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b). 43 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) 44 43 U.S.C. § 1351. 45 43 U.S.C. § 1340. 46 43 U.S.C. § 1351(c)(3). 47 43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1). 48 43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1). 49 43 U.S.C. § 1531(l). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 127537-39); Internal Halliburton document (HAL_11196). 34 30 C.F.R. § 250.421. Roy Dokka, "Modern-Day Tectonic Subsidence in Coastal Louisiana," Geology 34, no. 4 (2006): 281–84.
34 Robert Morton, "Evidence of Regional Subsidence and Associated Interior Wetland Loss Induced by Hydrocarbon Production, Gulf Coast Region, USA," Environmental Geology 50 (2006): 261–74.35 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 24. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 193549). BP's internal guidelines further specify that centralization should extend 100 feet above any such hydrocarbon-bearing zones. If either the top of cement or centralization requirements are not met, the guidelines require that the actual top of cement should be confirmed by a "proven cement evaluation technique." Ibid. Committee on the Restoration and Protection of Coastal Louisiana, Drawing Louisiana's New Map: Addressing Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana (National Research Council, 2006), 48.36 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, 33. Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 143295, BP-HZN-CEC 22663); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 34. James G. Gosselink, "Comments on 'Wetland Loss in the Northern Gulf of Mexico: Multiple Hardworking Hypoth- eses,'" Estuaries 24, no. 4 (August 2001), 636–651.37 Ibid.; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 280. Document provided to the Commission by Halliburton entitled "Halliburton GoM Foam Jobs 2002–2010." James B. Johnston, Donald R. Cahoon and Megan K. La Peyre, Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)-Related Pipelines and Navigation Canals in the Western and Central Gulf of Mexico: Relative Impacts on Wetland Habitats and Effectiveness of Mitigation (Minerals Management Service, 2009), 157.38 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 443. S.L. Pickett and S.W. Cole, "Foamed Cementing Technique for Liners Yields Cost-Effective Results" (Society of Petro- leum Engineers SPE Paper #27679, Midland, Texas, March 1994), 523–24. Richard Campanella, Time and Place in New Orleans: Past Geographies in the Present Day (Gretna, LA: Pelican Publishing Company, Inc., 2002), 78; Panama Canal Authority, Frequently asked questions, http://www.pancanal.com/ eng/general/canal-faqs/index.html.39 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, 33–34; Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 443. Halliburton had delivered the slurry blend to the Deepwater Horizon several months earlier. It had developed the blend to match the temperature and pressure profile of the well that Deepwater Horizon had drilled immediately prior to Macondo—another BP well called Kodiak. Jesse Gagliano (Halliburton), interview with Commission staff, September 10, 2010. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Integrated Final Report to Congress and Legislative Environmental Impact Statement for the Mississippi River—Gulf Outlet Deep-Draft De-Authorization Study (June 2008), 6.40 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 281. At this point, it appears that lab personnel replicated the dry blend recipe that was on the rig using off-the-shelf ma- terials from their lab. For later tests, Halliburton sent samples of the cement that was actually on the Horizon back to the lab and directly tested those materials. Gary P. Shaffer et al., "The MRGO Navigation Project: A Massive Human-Induced Environmental, Economic, and Storm Disaster," Journal of Coastal Research, Special Issue 54 (2009): 206–224; R.H. Caffey and B. Leblanc, 'Closing' the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet: Environmental and Economic Considerations (LACoast.gov, 2002).41 Ibid. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 109218). Day et al., "Restoration of the Mississippi Delta: Lessons from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita," 1679–1684.
34542 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, MRGO Navigation Channel Closure (2010), http://www.mrgo.gov/MRGO_Closure. aspx.43 Ibid. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 36). James Coleman, "James P. Morgan: Scientific Contributions," Journal of Coastal Research 14, no. 3 (1998): 868–69.
¶44 Avenal v. United States,33 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 19, 2010, 29, 33; Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978). 34 43 U.S.C. § 1801. 35 43 U.S.C. § 1802. 36 43 U.S.C. § 1344. 37 43 U.S.C. § 1340. 38 43 U.S.C. § 1351. 39 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3). 40 43 U.S.C. § 1346. 41 43 U.S.C. § 1347(c). 42 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b). 43 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) 44 43 U.S.C. § 1351. 45 43 U.S.C. § 1340. 46 43 U.S.C. § 1351(c)(3). 47 43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1). 48 43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1). 49 43 U.S.C. § 1531(l). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 127537-39); Internal Halliburton document (HAL_11196). 34 30 C.F.R. § 250.421. Fed. Cl. 778 (1995).45 Ibid., 116–118; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 117. Ibid. National Research Council, Panel on River Basin and Coastal Systems Planning, Committee to Assess the U.S. Army
¶Corps of Engineers Methods of Analysis and Peer Review for Water Resources Project Planning, River Basins and
¶Coastal Systems Planning Within the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (2004): 104.46 John R. Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon in MC252, July 1, 2010, 11–12. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 136946-47). S.M. Gagliano, "Canals, Dredging, and Land Reclamation in the Louisiana Coastal Zone" in Hydrologic and Geologic
¶Studies of Coastal Louisiana, Report no. 14 (Center for Wetland Studies, Louisiana State University, 1973).47 Testimony of Lee Lambert, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 291; Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-CEC 20347, 20178). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 171151). N.J. Craig, R.E. Turner, and J.W. Day Jr., "Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana (U.S.A.)" Environmental Management 3, no. 2 (1979): 133–144.48 Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-CEC 20347, 20178). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 136946-47). Paul Kemp, Vice-President, National Audobon Society, interview with Commission staff, October 7, 2010.49 Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 21265). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 20234). Denise Reed, "Seeing the Future of the Louisiana Coast," in After the Storm: Restoring America's Gulf Coast Wetlands,
¶Sea-Level Rise," Nature Geoscience (June 28, 2009): 489–490.51 Brian Morel, e-mail message to Richard Miller and Mark Hafle. See S. Rep. No. 95-285, at 50, 62, 82, 144–5. Testimony of Vincent Tabler, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 25, 2010, 22–23, 36. U.S. General Accountability Office, Coastal Wetlands: Lessons Learned from Past Efforts in Louisiana Could Help
¶Guide Future Restoration and Protection (December 14, 2007), 10.52 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 13. Robert Gramling, Oil on the Edge: Offshore Development, Conflict, Gridlock (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 121. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_0011208). U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection & Restoration Act (2010), http://www.mvn.
¶usace.army.mil/pd/cwppra_mission.htm.53 BP, Deepwater Horizon Follow Up Rig Audit, Marine Assurance Audit and Out of Service Period, September 2009, 2, 18–48; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 136211). Charles Babcock, "Watt Defies Critics of Plan for Oil Leases," Washington Post, July 7, 1981, A3. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 137370). Mark Schleifstein, "Breaux Act Anniversary Marks 20 Years of Coastal Restoration Progress," Times-Picayune, April
¶8, 2010; Caring for Coastal Wetlands: The Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act (LaCoast.gov,
¶November 2007), http://lacoast.gov/new/Pubs/Report_data/Caring.aspx.54 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 364. "Problems with Government," Ocean Industry (April 1982): 21. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 129141). Louisiana Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Task Force and the Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Authority, Coast 2050: Toward a Sustainable Coastal Louisiana, an Executive Summary (Louisiana Department of Natural
¶Resources, 1998).55 Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 29, 2010, 172, 313. Commission on Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy Resources, Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy Resources (Washington, D.C.: January 1982), xv, http://www.onrr.gov/Laws_R_D/frnotices/PDFDocs/linowes- rpt1-5.pdf. Internal Transocean document (TRN-USCG_MMS 30422); Internal Schlumberger document (SLB-EC-2). Joel Bourne, "Gone with the Water," National Geographic, October 2004; Water Resources Development Act of 2007,
¶Pub. L. No. 110-114, Title VII,121 Testimony of Anthony Gervasio, 189. Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon, 14; Testimony of Bill Ambrose, 252–53; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 28. Joseph V. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 50–51. Stat. 1041, 1270–1283 (2007).56 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 25; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 17621). Don E. Kash, Lease Management Activities in the Geological Survey, Commission on Fiscal Accountability of the Na- tion's Energy Resources: Technical Reports, 1981–1982, RG 48, Entry 998, Box 10, File 239, National Archives and Records Administration, 8, 9, 27. Testimony of John Guide, 44–45. State of Louisiana, Coastal Protection & Restoration: Funding Sources, http://www.coastal.la.gov/index.cfm?md=pa gebuilder&tmp=home&nid=123&pnid=79&pid=82&catid=0&elid=0.57 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 33. "Industry Warning Watt Against Transfer of BLM Leasing Functions to MMS," Inside Energy/with Federal Lands, November 1, 1982, 11. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 143304). Donald T. Resio and Joannes J. Westerink, "Modeling the physics of storm surges," Physics Today 61, no. 9 (September 2008): 32–38.58 Ibid., 25; Testimony of Chris Pleasant, 118–119. G. Kevin Jones, "Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development During the Reagan Administration—Part 1," West- ern New England Law Review 12, 1, (1990):8–13. Testimony of John Guide, 298 (the cement plug was "deeper than normal"); Testimony of Ronald Sepulvado, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 145 ("the top of the surface plug is normally at 500 feet below the wellhead"). Louisiana Office of Coastal Protection and Restoration, Library, Coastal Initiatives & Programs, "http://coastal.la.gov/ index.cfm?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&nid=82&pnid=76&pid=77&catid=0&elid=0 ("Donaldsonville to the Gulf
¶Panel" and "Morganza to the Gulf Project").59 Testimony of John Gisclair, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 8, 2010, 131–132. "Interior Denies Oil Leasing Plan Will Cost $77 Billion," Associated Press, September 28, 1982. 60 43 U.S.C. § 1337. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8574). U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mississippi Coastal Improvement Program (MsCIP) Interim Report (2006).60 Testimony of Curt Kuchta, 185–186; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 12. Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 118. Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009, H.R. 2346, Title IV.61 Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 5, 2010, 128–129. Charles Lester, "Contemporary Federalism and New Regimes of Ocean Governance: Lessons from the Case of Outer Continental Shelf Oil Development," Ocean & Coastal Management 23 (1994), 14. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8574). U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration (LACPR): Final Technical Report (June
¶2009).62 Ibid.; Testimony of Andrea Fleytas, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 5, 2010, 16; Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 296. National Research Council Committee on Marine Area Governance and Management, Striking a Balance: Improving Stewardship of Marine Areas (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1997), 37, http://www.nap.edu/ openbook.php?record_id=5797&page=37. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 21260-279). Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority, Fiscal Year 2008 Annual Plan: Ecosystem Restoration and
¶Hurricane Protection in Coastal Louisiana (April 2007); Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority of Louisiana,
¶Fiscal Year 2011 Annual Plan: Integrated Ecosystem Restoration and Hurricane Protection in Coastal Louisiana, (Baton Rouge, 2010): xiii.63 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 295; Testimony of Pat O'Bryan, 366. President George H.W. Bush, "Statement on Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development," (June 26, 1990), http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2035&year=1990&month=6. 64 30 C.F.R. pt. 250. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126928). Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, Coastal Impact Assistance Program (CIAP), http://www.boemre.gov/offshore/ciapmain.htm.64 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 295–296. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-OSC 1438). 65 30 C.F.R. § 250.423. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act (GOMESA), http://www.boemre.gov/offshore/GOMESARevenueSharing.htm.65 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 281, 282, 294. U.S. Department of the Interior, Documents pertaining to offshore inspection types and practices produced to the Oil Spill Commission, August 2010. White House Council on Environmental Quality, Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/gulfcoast.66 Ibid., 282. Jan Erik Vinnem, Offshore Risk Assessment: Principles, Modelling and Applications of QRA Studies, 2nd ed. (London: Springer Studies in Reliability Engineering, 2007), 91, 100, 102. The blind shear rams closed and sealed as expected during the positive-pressure test. This fact suggests that the rams were capable of sealing the well when the blowout occurred. But the evidence is inconclusive on its own; during the positive-pressure test the crew closed the blind shear rams using a low pressure hydraulic system, rather than the high pressure hydraulic system that would have activated the rams in the event of a blowout. Louisiana-Mississippi Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Working Group, Roadmap for Restoring Ecosystem Resiliency and Sustainability (March 2010).67 Ibid., 281-282, 311. Petroleum Safety Authority of Norway, "From Prescription to Performance in Petroleum Supervision," March 12, 2010, http://www.ptil.no/news/from-prescription-to-performance-in-petroleum-supervision-article6696-79.html. Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCEC 90). Mabus, America's Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan after the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.68 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 219–220. Magne Ognedal, interview with Commission staff, November 10, 2010. Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 360. Executive Order 13554: Establishing the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task Force,75 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 282, 283. E.P. Danenberger, "Changes in the Minerals Management Service Offshore Regulatory Programs Resulting From the Oil Pollution Act of 1990" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 6823, May 1992), 150. Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279–81. Fed. Reg. 62313, October 5,
¶2010.69 Testimony of David Sims, August 26, 2010, 163. E.P. Danenberger et al., Investigation of March 19, 1989 Fire, South Pass Block 60 Platform B, Lease OCS-G 1608, OCS Report MMS 90-0016 (New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, April 1990): 15, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PDFs/1990/90-0016.pdf. Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 204. There were no regulations or industry standards guiding the conduct or interpretation of negative-pressure tests at the time of the Macondo blowout. The absence of any such guidance may have contributed to the failure to conduct and interpret the test correctly here. Frank Donze, "Gulf Coast Restoration Chief Ray Mabus has no Oil Spill Answers Just Yet," Times-Picayune, June 29,
¶2010.70 Ibid., 317; Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 367. Marine Board of the National Research Council Committee on Alternatives for Inspection of Outer Continental Shelf Operations, Alternatives for Inspecting Outer Continental Shelf Operations (Washington: National Academy Press, 1990): 3, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=1517&page=1. This calculation is based on approximate values of the depths and mud weights involved. Estimate based on John Barras, Land Area Change in Coastal Louisiana—a Multidecadal Perspective (from 1956 to
- (U.S.Geological Survey, 2008).71 Testimony of David Sims, August 26, 2010, 174. Minerals Management Service, Final Report, Findings and Recommendations, MMS Task Force on OCS Inspection and Enforcement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, February 1990), 1-3. Testimony of Leo Lindner, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 19, 2010, 297; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, app. Q, 1. Louisiana-Mississippi Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Working Group, Roadmap for Restoring Ecosystem Resiliency and Sustainability, 2–3.
72 Testimony of Brian McPeek, Regional Managing Director for North America, The Nature Conservancy, Hearing before the National Commission, September 28, 2010.73 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 367. Ibid., 82. Testimony of Leo Lindner, 308–11. The exclusion for "[d]rilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes associated with the exploration, development, or production of crude oil, natural gas or geothermal energy" is found at 40 C.F.R. § 261.4. Testimony of James T.B. Tripp, Senior Counsel, Environmental Defense Fund, Hearing before the National Commission, Sept 28, 2010; Testimony of Brian McPeek.74 Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 21418, 21420); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 150. Exec. Order No. 12,777, 56 Fed. Reg. 54,757 (October 22, 1991). Testimony of Leo Lindner, 276–79, 297, 359–60; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 47100). Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-432.75 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 282, 283. E.P. Danenberger, "Changes in the Minerals Management Service Offshore Regulatory Programs Resulting From the Oil Pollution Act of 1990" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 6823, May 1992), 150. Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279–81. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(e).
34776 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7);40 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 281. At this point, it appears that lab personnel replicated the dry blend recipe that was on the rig using off-the-shelf ma- terials from their lab. For later tests, Halliburton sent samples of the cement that was actually on the Horizon back to the lab and directly tested those materials. C.F.R. § 19.4. According to the current official government estimate, the Macondo well released approximately 4.9 million barrels of oil over the course of the spill (±10 percent), roughly 830,000 barrels of which were captured at the wellhead using the top hat and other devices. Deepwater Horizon MC252 Gulf Incident Oil Budget (August 1, 2010), http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2010/PDFs/DeepwaterHorizonOil- Budget20100801.pdf); Joel Achenbach and David Fahrenthold, "Oil spill dumped 4.9 million barrels into Gulf of Mexico, latest measure shows," Washington Post, August 3, 2010 (range is $4.5 billion to $18 billion, based on estimated 4.1 million barrels discharged); Jonathan Tilove, "BP disputes government estimates of volume of Gulf of Mexico oil spill;" Times-Picayune, December 3, 2010 (penalties could be as high as $21 billion, based on estimate of 4.9 million barrels discharged). BP has not released its own estimate for the total release from the well, but it disputes the government's figures on the grounds that, among other things, they fail to take into account "significant flow impediments" and "rely on incomplete or inaccurate information, rest in large part on assumptions that have not been validated, and are subject to far greater uncertainties than have been acknowledged." BP, letter to the National Commission, October 21, 2010, 1, 4.77 Ibid., 283–284. Ibid. Testimony of Randy Ezell, 279. Testimony of Richard Stewart, New York University School of Law, Hearing before the National Commission, September 28, 2010.78 Testimony of Micah Sandell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 29, 2010, 8, 10, 12. Salient differences were, as MMS noted, that "Platforms in the GOM are typically smaller, technically less sophisti- cated, produce fewer hydrocarbons, and operate in less severe environmental conditions [than North Sea platforms]. The number of personnel on OCS platforms is significantly smaller than on North Sea platforms. There is, however, a substantially greater number of OCS platforms in the GOM, over 3,800." Marshall Courtois, William Hauser, and Paul Schneider, "Minerals Management Service Safety and Environmental Management Program: Evolution of the Concept," (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 6822, May 1992), 145. Testimony of Lee Lambert, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 292. Transocean disputes these accounts. It points out that the only individuals who have stated that Anderson advanced the "bladder effect" theory are BP employees. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1).79 Ibid., 11. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,400 (July 2, 1991). Testimony of Lee Lambert, 292. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2).80 Internal BP documents (Deepwater Horizon Schematic; BP August 9, 2010 presentation to Oil Spill Commission, slide 5 ). Former senior MMS officials, interviews with Commission staff, August and September 2010; Offshore Operators Committee, "Oil, Gas, and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)—Safety and Environmental Management Systems," Public Comment (May 22, 2006), http://www.boemre.gov/federalregister/PDFs/AD15- OOCcomments5-22-06.pdf. Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 117; Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 127909, BP-HZN-CEC 20189-90). While that may have been Mr. Vidrine's stated reason for running the test on the kill line, the Commission notes that the negative-pressure test performed at Macondo—whether on the drill pipe or kill line—was different from the negative- pressure test described in the Application for Permit to Modify. Testimony of Mark Bly, Hearing before the National Commission, November 8, 2010, 293–95. 26 U.S.C. § 9509.
¶9 Andrew B. Wilson, "BP's Disaster: No Surprise to Folks in the Know," CBS, June 22, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/ stories/2010/06/22/opinion/main6605248.shtml.10 Transocean, Our Company, http://www.deepwater.com/fw/main/Our-Company-2.html. "Special Offshore Report," World Oil (May 1957): 118; Calvert, "Gulf Offshore Activity Booming," 48. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356a. Gregory Walz (BP), interview with Commission staff, October 6, 2010. Testimony of Captain James Hanzalik, Hearing Before the Deepwater Joint Investigation Team, October 4, 2010, 29- 30. Government Accountability Office, GAO-10-276 Offshore Oil and Gas Development: Additional Guidance Would Help Strengthen the Minerals Management Service's Assessment of Environmental Impacts in the North Aleutian Basin (March 2010), 21. Oberon Houston, email message to Commission staff.11 Press Release, Transocean, Transocean Ltd. Reports Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2009 Results, February 24, 2010. Pratt, Priest, and Castaneda, Offshore Pioneers, 36–48. E.R. Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy: A Legal and Historical Analysis (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1953); Tyler Priest, "Claiming the Coastal Sea: The Battle for the Tidelands, 1937–1953," History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana: Vol. 1: Papers on the Evolving Offshore Industry, MMS OCS Study 2004-049 (New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, 2008), 67–90, https://www.gomr.mms. gov/homepg/espis/espisfront.asp. Testimony of Gregory Walz, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 7, 2010, 157–59. Council on Environmental Quality, Final Recommendations of the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force (July 19, 2010), 41. 12 43 U.S.C. § 1346. The Report of the BP US Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel, (January 2007).12 Press Release, Transocean, Transocean Inc. and GlobalSantaFe Corporation Agree to Combine, July 23, 2007. Tyler Priest, The Offshore Imperative: Shell Oil's Search for Petroleum in Postwar America (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2007), 81–91. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 35 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 143300) (emphasis added). U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, Investigation Report: Refinery Explosion and Fire (March
¶2007),145, http://www.csb.gov/assets/document/CSBFinalReportBP.pdf.13 "Contractors ordering offshore rigs on speculation," Drilling Contractor, May/June 2002. Ibid., 95–98. Priest, "Claiming the Coastal Sea: The Battle for the Tidelands, 1937–1953." Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 136937, 136941). Commission staff analysis of MMS yearly budget request and enactments, by nominal and real (2005) dollars. Bu- reau of Ocean Energy Management, Office of Administration and Budget: Budget Division, http://www.boemre.gov/ adm/budget.html; Herbert Kaufman and Cheryl Anderson, Department of the Interior, OCS Environmental Studies Contract Projects—Fiscals Years 1973 through 1983 (DOI Minerals Management Service Branch of Environmental Studies, December 1983), II-8. 14 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D)(i); 40 C.F.R. § 300.211. 15 30 C.F.R. § 254.2(a). 16 30 C.F.R. § 254.126 17 40 C.F.R. § 300.322 18 23 U.S.C. § 125. Testimony of Carolyn W. Merritt, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, U.S. Chemical Safety Board, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on Transportation Safety, Infrastructure Security, and Water Quality, July 10, 2007.14 "Global 500," CNNMoney.com, July 26, 2010, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/full_ list/index.html. Tyler Priest, "Auctioning the Ocean: The Creation of the Federal Offshore Leasing Program, 1954-1962," History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana: Vol. 1: Papers on the Evolving Offshore Industry (Minerals Management Service OCS Study 2004-049, 2008). Other states petitioned for the 9-nautical-mile boundary in the federal courts, but failed to prevail. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8848-58). Ibid.15 Internal Transocean documents (TRN-HCJ 93526, 93528). U.S. Department of Interior, "Petroleum and Sulfur on the U.S. Continental Shelf," internal study, August 1969, box 134, Central Classified Files, 1969–1972, Record Group 48, Records of the Secretary of Interior, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. "Oil Shelf Bill Enacted; President Reaffirms U.S. Title to Outer Offshore Deposits," New York Times, August 8, 1953, 27. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 129238-39). U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, Investigation Report: Refinery Explosion and Fire, 19-20.16 Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126338); Internal BP document (BP-HZN-OSC 5378). Priest, "Auctioning the Ocean," 113. Richard Vietor, Energy Policy in America since 1945: A Study of Business-Government Relations (New York: Cam- bridge University Press, 1984), 19. Guide, interview. Indeed, just days before the running of the long string at Macondo, another well drilled by Trans- ocean's DD3 suffered just such a complication. Ibid. Ibid.17 "Brazil Pins Hopes on Massive, untapped Oil Fields," NPR, December 1, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ story.php?storyId=120966523. On Project Mohole and JOIDES, see David K. van Keuren, "Breaking New Ground: The Origins of Scientific Ocean Drilling," in The Machine in Neptune's Garden: Historical Perspectives on Technology and the Marine Environment, eds. Helen M. Rozwadowski and David K. van Keuren (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2004), 183–210. On Shell's Eureka project, see Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 97, 218. E.R. Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy: A Legal and Historical Analysis. Testimony of Jesse Gagliano, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 320. Ibid.18 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, Installations, Removals, and Cumulative Totals of Offshore Production Facilities in Federal Waters; 1959–2010, February 2010, http://www.boemre.gov/stats/PDFs/ OCSPlatformActivity.pdf.; Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, OCS Incidents/Spills by Category: 1996–2005, October 19, 2007, http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/Incidents1996-2005.htm; Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, OCS Incidents/Spills by Category: 2006-2010, July 10, 2010, http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/IncidentStatisticsSummaries.htm. F. P. Dunn, "Deepwater Production: 1950-2000" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 7627, Houston, TX, May 1994). "Interior Expects Big Things from . . . Offshore Lease Sale," Oil and Gas Journal, September 13, 1954, 96. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 22433). Walz also noted that the flight carrying centralizers would not increase costs. Ibid. The Report of the BP US Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel.19 Testimony of Ronald Sepulvado, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 23, 2010, 7, 14, 34. Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 127–130. Diane Austin et al., History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Volume 1: Papers on the Evolving Offshore Industry, OCS Study MMS 2008-042 (New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, September 2008), 97–98, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PI/PDFImages/ESPIS/4/4530.pdf. 20 43 U.S.C § 1334. Guide, interview. BP had special one-piece bolt-on centralizers made for the Thunder Horse project. Ibid. Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 2701,116 Stat. 134, 278-279 (2002). Ibid.20 Testimony of John Guide, 23. Ibid. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 128379). Department of the Interior, National Notice to Lessees and Operators of Federal Oil and Gas Leases, Outer Continental Shelf No. 2010-N10 (November 8, 2010), http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/regs/ntls/2010NTLs/10- n10.pdf. Ibid., 224.21 Ibid., 43–44 and 189; Schlumberger, "Oilfield Glossary: cement bond log," accessed November 19, 2010, http:// www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/Display.cfm?Term=cement%20bond%20log. Cliff Hernandez, interview by Andrew Gardner, May 1, 2001, New Iberia, LA, History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Houston History Archives, M.D. Anderson Library Special Collections, University of Houston, Houston, TX. This interview is one of approximately 450 oral histories conducted for History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Minerals Management Service OCS Study 2004-049 (2008). "Oil and Gas Leases Bow to Rare Wildlife Species," New York Times, December 9, 1955. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 22669). Ibid.,165 Ibid., 48. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 38354). Ibid., 64.
¶22 "BP's Alaskan Oil Spill Triggers Lawsuit," 815 TCE: The Chemical Engineer (May 2009): 9.23 Testimony of Douglas Brown, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 26, 2010, 88, 91. Don E. Kash et al., Energy Under the Oceans: A Technology Assessment of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Opera- tions (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973), 104. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370h. Testimony of Steve Lewis, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010, 93–94; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 129226). Prior to conversion, a small ball drops from the top of the float valves to block the main path through the auto-fill tube, leaving only two small holes on the side of the tube through which mud can flow. Ibid. Ibid.24 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 77; Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCDC 92). U.S. Geological Survey, Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 128 (December 1958) and Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 144 (February 1960), RG 57, Records of the U.S. Geological Survey, NARA. Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 70. 25 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). The Well Site Leaders—Bob Kaluza and Don Vidrine—would normally have been on the rig. Morel, a relatively junior BP engineer, had flown to the rig out of a professional interest in learning more about the cementing process. Guide, interview. Ibid.25 Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCDC 92); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 82. Kash et al., Energy Under the Oceans, 105. Bryan Clawson (Weatherford), interview with Commission staff, October 28, 2010; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (September 8, 2010), 70. "BP Faces Lawsuits for 2006 Spills,"32 Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 23, 2010, 442. Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Program: Hearings before the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). John Gisclair, Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010 (annotations, September 20, 2010). Commission calculation based on internal Halliburton document (HAL_10994). Oil Spill Intelligence Report, no. 17 (April 16, 2009); "BP Settles with Royalty
¶Trust,"32 Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 23, 2010, 442. Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Program: Hearings before the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). John Gisclair, Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010 (annotations, September 20, 2010). Commission calculation based on internal Halliburton document (HAL_10994). Oil Spill Intelligence Report, no. 22 (May 21, 2009).26 Testimony of Ross Skidmore, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 264. Neil R. Etson to President Nixon, March 18, 1970, Central Classified Files, 1968-1974, Box 71, RG 57, Records of the Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Testimony of Steve Lewis, 96; Internal Transocean document (TRN-USCG_MMS 11638). The Report of the BP US Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel, 1.27 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 24. National Research Council, Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies (The National Academies Press: Washington, DC, 1992), http://www.nap.edu/catalog. php?record_id=2062. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 137367). Ibid., XVII.28 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 38, 113; Testimony of Curt Kuchta, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, May 27, 2010, 166, 183, 184. U.S. Department of the Interior, Leasing Oil and Natural Gas Resources: Outer Continental Shelf (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, 2005), 12, http://www.boemre.gov/ld/PDFs/GreenBook-LeasingDocument.pdf. Ibid.; Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 432. L. Duane Wilson, Independent Expert Third Annual Report, 2001 covering January-December 2009 (March 2010): 4.29 Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 188 and 191. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 70 (listing 18 statutes, and not including several such as the Magnuson Fishery Management and Conservation Act of 1976). Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 137367, 21304). Since the incident, BP has argued that the M-I SWACO models predicted an erroneously high circulation pressure, and that the readings the crew observed were proper. This may ultimately explain the readings, but it does not explain why the BP Macondo team dismissed them as the result of a broken pressure gauge. Ibid., 25–26.30 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 113; Testimony of Curt Kuchta, 184. The five laws included the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617, Energy Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 95- 618, National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, Pub. L. No. 95-620, and Natural Gas Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-621. David Izon, E.P. Danenberger, and Melinda Mayes, "Absence of fatalities in blowouts encouraging in MMS study of OCS incidents 1992-2006," Well Control July/August (2007), 84. Elmer Danenberger, interview with Commission staff, December 9, 2010.31 Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 119. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Testimony of John Guide, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 22, 2010, 87. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (September 8, 2010).32 Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 23, 2010, 442. Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Program: Hearings before the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). John Gisclair, Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010 (annotations, September 20, 2010). Commission calculation based on internal Halliburton document (HAL_10994). "BP Report Attacked," New Scientist,2 Internal BP document (BP, presentation to Commission, August 9, 2010, slides 5 & 12). Quoted in Tom Zoellner, "Oil and Water: The Adventure of Getting One from Deep Beneath the Other," Invention and Technology (Fall 2000): 48. Internal Transocean document (TRN-HEC 90686). Internal documents are identified by their document production serial numbers when available, which were assigned by the entity that provided them. Neil MacFarquhar, "Routine Flights Become Overland Odysseys, Minus Clean Socks," New York Times, April 22, 2010. Campbell Robertson and Clifford Krauss, "Gulf Spill Is the Largest of Its Kind, Scientists Say," New York Times, August 2, 2010. BP, Sustainability Review (2009), 20–21. http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/ e_s_assets/e_s_assets_2009/downloads_pdfs/bp_sustainability_review_2009.pdf. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(6) ("An oil and gas lease issued pursuant to this section shall . . . contain such rental and other provisions as the Secretary may prescribe at the time of offering the area for lease."). October, 2010, 4.33 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 19, 2010, 29, 33; Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978). 34 43 U.S.C. § 1801. 35 43 U.S.C. § 1802. 36 43 U.S.C. § 1344. 37 43 U.S.C. § 1340. 38 43 U.S.C. § 1351. 39 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3). 40 43 U.S.C. § 1346. 41 43 U.S.C. § 1347(c). 42 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b). 43 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) 44 43 U.S.C. § 1351. 45 43 U.S.C. § 1340. 46 43 U.S.C. § 1351(c)(3). 47 43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1). 48 43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1). 49 43 U.S.C. § 1531(l). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 127537-39); Internal Halliburton document (HAL_11196). 34 30 C.F.R. § 250.421. Richard Sears, e-mail message to Commission staff, November 23, 2010.34 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 275. Consulting Services Lloyd's Register EMEA Aberdeen Energy, North American Division Summary Report (March
¶2010).35 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 24. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 193549). BP's internal guidelines further specify that centralization should extend 100 feet above any such hydrocarbon-bearing zones. If either the top of cement or centralization requirements are not met, the guidelines require that the actual top of cement should be confirmed by a "proven cement evaluation technique." Ibid. Ibid., App. C, 6.36 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, 33. Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 143295, BP-HZN-CEC 22663); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 34. Ibid., App. C, 8, 11.37 Ibid.; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 280. Document provided to the Commission by Halliburton entitled "Halliburton GoM Foam Jobs 2002–2010." Ibid., 10-11.38 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 443. S.L. Pickett and S.W. Cole, "Foamed Cementing Technique for Liners Yields Cost-Effective Results" (Society of Petro- leum Engineers SPE Paper #27679, Midland, Texas, March 1994), 523–24. Ibid., 29.39 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, 33–34; Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 443. Halliburton had delivered the slurry blend to the Deepwater Horizon several months earlier. It had developed the blend to match the temperature and pressure profile of the well that Deepwater Horizon had drilled immediately prior to Macondo—another BP well called Kodiak. Jesse Gagliano (Halliburton), interview with Commission staff, September 10, 2010. Halliburton, History of Halliburton, http://www.halliburton.com/AboutUs/default.aspx?navid=970&pageid=2312.40 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 281. At this point, it appears that lab personnel replicated the dry blend recipe that was on the rig using off-the-shelf ma- terials from their lab. For later tests, Halliburton sent samples of the cement that was actually on the Horizon back to the lab and directly tested those materials. Ibid.41 Ibid. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 109218). Russell Gold and Ben Casselman, "Drilling Process Attracts Scrutiny in Rig Explosion," Wall Street Journal, April 30,
¶2010.42 Ibid. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 68). Montara Commission of Inquiry, Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry, (June 17, 2010), http://www.ret.
¶gov.au/Department/Documents/MIR/Montara-Report.pdf.43 Ibid. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 36). Ibid., 63.44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). Ibid.45 Ibid., 116–118; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 117. Ibid. Commission staff created this map and associated table using loss of well control data available on BOEMRE's Incident Statistics and Summary webpage. Although efforts were made to accurately capture and illustrate every loss of well control from 1996-2009 in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico, the data presented does not purport to be comprehensive, but instead illustrative of the fact that losses of well control, blowouts, potential catastrophes, and near misses are more frequent than commonly reported and publicized.46 John R. Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon in MC252, July 1, 2010, 11–12. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 136946-47). Commission staff analysis of International Regulators Forum International Association of Drilling Contractors and
¶International Association of Oil and Gas Producers data. See http://www.irfoffshoresafety.com/country/performance/, http://www.iadc.org/asp.htm, and http://www.ogp.org.uk/index.asp?main=publications/main.asp.
34847 Testimony of Eric Milito, Upstream Director, American Petroleum Institute, "The Deepwater Horizon Incident: Are The Minerals Management Service Regulations Doing The Job?" Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources of the House Committee on Natural Resources, 111th Congress (2010) ("Since 1924, API has developed industry standards and practices that promote reliability and safety through the use of proven engineering practices. . . . API standards are developed through a collaborative effort among industry experts, technical experts from government, and other interested stakeholders. The industry has helped create more than 500 standards, including some 240 exploration and production standards that address offshore operations.")48 Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-CEC 20347, 20178). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 136946-47). American Petroleum Institute, API 2010 Publics Programs and Services Catalog (March 2010), http://www.api.org/ Standards/upload/2010_Catalog_web.pdf.49 Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 21265). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 20234). American Petroleum Institute, "Certifications recognized around the world," Training and Certifications Program brochure (August 9, 2009), http://www.api.org/certifications/upload/ENGLISH_SUMMARY_BROCH.pdf.50 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 364–365, 393. See S. Rep. No. 95-285, at 154–5 (reprinting letter from Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus). Ibid. Testimony of Eric Milito ("Seventy-eight of these standards are referenced in Minerals Management Service regulations."). For MMS rulemakings that incorporate industry standards into regulations over time, see Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf,61 Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 5, 2010, 128–129. Charles Lester, "Contemporary Federalism and New Regimes of Ocean Governance: Lessons from the Case of Outer Continental Shelf Oil Development," Ocean & Coastal Management 23 (1994), 14. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8574). Fed. Reg. 60,019 (November 26, 1996); Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—Pipelines and Pipeline Rights-of-Way,72 Ibid., 367. Marine Board, Alternatives for Inspecting Outer Continental Shelf Operations, 80. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 83. Fed. Reg. 56,442 (October 3, 2007); Press Release, Minerals Management Service, Minerals Management Service to Adopt the Latest Edition of Industry Standard on Fixed Offshore Production Platforms, April 21, 2003, http://www.boemre.gov/ooc/ press/2003/press4-21.htm.51 Brian Morel, e-mail message to Richard Miller and Mark Hafle. See S. Rep. No. 95-285, at 50, 62, 82, 144–5. Testimony of Vincent Tabler, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 25, 2010, 22–23, 36. Letter from Allen Verret, Offshore Operators Committee, and Tim Sampson, American Petroleum Institute, to the U.S. Minerals Management Service (September 15, 2009), http://www.scribd.com/doc/30588089/Joint-API-OOC-Letter- to-MMS; American Petroleum Institute and Offshore Operators Committee, "Safety and Environmental Management Systems for Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Operations," Public Comment (September 15, 2009), http://www. boemre.gov/federalregister/PublicComments/AD15SafetyEnvMgmtSysforOCSOilGasOperations/OOCAPICom- mentLetter9-15-09.pdf; American Petroleum Institute, "Postlease Operations Safety," Public Comment (July 1, 1998), http://www.boemre.gov/federalregister/PublicComments/Sub_A_Comments/prorule.pdf, http://www.boemre.gov/ federalregister/PublicComments/Sub_A_Comments/subacomm.pdf.52 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 13. Robert Gramling, Oil on the Edge: Offshore Development, Conflict, Gridlock (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 121. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_0011208). Commission staff held several meetings during August and September 2010 with representatives of major oil and gas companies during which the role of API in standard setting processing, including the impact of API's broader advocacy role on those standards, was discussed.53 BP, Deepwater Horizon Follow Up Rig Audit, Marine Assurance Audit and Out of Service Period, September 2009, 2, 18–48; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 136211). Charles Babcock, "Watt Defies Critics of Plan for Oil Leases," Washington Post, July 7, 1981, A3. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 137370). T.A.F. Powell, "US Voluntary SEMP Initiative: Holy Grail or Poisoned Chalice?" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 8111, May 1996).54 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 364. "Problems with Government," Ocean Industry (April 1982): 21. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 129141). Letter from Allen Verret, Offshore Operators Committee, and Tim Sampson, American Petroleum Institute, to the U.S. Minerals Management Service (September 15, 2009), http://www.scribd.com/doc/30588089/Joint-API-OOC-Letter- to-MMS; Offshore Operators Committee and American Petroleum Institute, "Oil, Gas, and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)—Safety and Environmental Management Systems," Public Comment (May 22, 2006).55 Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 29, 2010, 172, 313. Commission on Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy Resources, Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy Resources (Washington, D.C.: January 1982), xv, http://www.onrr.gov/Laws_R_D/frnotices/PDFDocs/linowes- rpt1-5.pdf. Internal Transocean document (TRN-USCG_MMS 30422); Internal Schlumberger document (SLB-EC-2). T.A.F. Powell, "US Voluntary SEMP Initiative: Holy Grail or Poisoned Chalice?"
56 Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—Safety and Environmental Management Systems,75 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 282, 283. E.P. Danenberger, "Changes in the Minerals Management Service Offshore Regulatory Programs Resulting From the Oil Pollution Act of 1990" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 6823, May 1992), 150. Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279–81. Fed. Reg.199 Interview with government official, October 12, 2010. (October 15, 2010).57 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 33. "Industry Warning Watt Against Transfer of BLM Leasing Functions to MMS," Inside Energy/with Federal Lands, November 1, 1982, 11. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 143304). T.A.F. Powell, "US Voluntary SEMP Initiative: Holy Grail or Poisoned Chalice?"58 Ibid., 25; Testimony of Chris Pleasant, 118–119. G. Kevin Jones, "Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development During the Reagan Administration—Part 1," West- ern New England Law Review 12, 1, (1990):8–13. Testimony of John Guide, 298 (the cement plug was "deeper than normal"); Testimony of Ronald Sepulvado, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 145 ("the top of the surface plug is normally at 500 feet below the wellhead"). Elmer Danenberger, interview with Commission staff, December 9, 2010.
59 Testimony of Tad W. Patzek, "Beneath the Surface of the BP Spill: What's Happening Now, What's Needed Next," Briefing Before the Subcommitee on Energy and Environment of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 111th Congess (2010): 4.60 Testimony of Curt Kuchta, 185–186; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 12. Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 118. Ibid.61 Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 5, 2010, 128–129. Charles Lester, "Contemporary Federalism and New Regimes of Ocean Governance: Lessons from the Case of Outer Continental Shelf Oil Development," Ocean & Coastal Management 23 (1994), 14. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8574). Ibid.
62 Testimony of James Ellis, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Hearing before the National Commission, August 25, 2010.63 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 295; Testimony of Pat O'Bryan, 366. President George H.W. Bush, "Statement on Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development," (June 26, 1990), http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2035&year=1990&month=6. 64 30 C.F.R. pt. 250. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126928). Federal Aviation Administration, "Mission," http://www.faa.gov/about/mission/.
64 Federal Aviation Administration, "Delegation and Designee Background," http://www.faa.gov/about/history/del- des_background/.65 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 281, 282, 294. U.S. Department of the Interior, Documents pertaining to offshore inspection types and practices produced to the Oil Spill Commission, August 2010. Federal Aviation Administration, "Designees and Delegations: Designated Engineering Representative (DER)," http:// www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/designees_delegations/designee_types/der/; Nancy Leveson (MIT), interview with Commission staff, October 13, 2010.66 Ibid., 282. Jan Erik Vinnem, Offshore Risk Assessment: Principles, Modelling and Applications of QRA Studies, 2nd ed. (London: Springer Studies in Reliability Engineering, 2007), 91, 100, 102. The blind shear rams closed and sealed as expected during the positive-pressure test. This fact suggests that the rams were capable of sealing the well when the blowout occurred. But the evidence is inconclusive on its own; during the positive-pressure test the crew closed the blind shear rams using a low pressure hydraulic system, rather than the high pressure hydraulic system that would have activated the rams in the event of a blowout. Federal Aviation Administration, "Delegation and Designee Background," http://www.faa.gov/about/history/del- des_background/.67 Ibid., 281-282, 311. Petroleum Safety Authority of Norway, "From Prescription to Performance in Petroleum Supervision," March 12, 2010, http://www.ptil.no/news/from-prescription-to-performance-in-petroleum-supervision-article6696-79.html. Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCEC 90). Leveson, interview.
34968 Ibid.69 Testimony of David Sims, August 26, 2010, 163. E.P. Danenberger et al., Investigation of March 19, 1989 Fire, South Pass Block 60 Platform B, Lease OCS-G 1608, OCS Report MMS 90-0016 (New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, April 1990): 15, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PDFs/1990/90-0016.pdf. Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 204. There were no regulations or industry standards guiding the conduct or interpretation of negative-pressure tests at the time of the Macondo blowout. The absence of any such guidance may have contributed to the failure to conduct and interpret the test correctly here. Nancy Leveson, Safeware: System Safety and Computers 556 (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1995).70 Ibid., 317; Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 367. Marine Board of the National Research Council Committee on Alternatives for Inspection of Outer Continental Shelf Operations, Alternatives for Inspecting Outer Continental Shelf Operations (Washington: National Academy Press, 1990): 3, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=1517&page=1. This calculation is based on approximate values of the depths and mud weights involved. Ibid.
¶71 Nancy Leveson, Engineering A Safer World: Systems Thinking Applied To Safety 376-77 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, forthcoming in 2011), http://sunnyday.mit.edu/safer-world.72 Ibid., 367. Marine Board, Alternatives for Inspecting Outer Continental Shelf Operations, 80. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 83. Ibid., 375.73 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 367. Ibid., 82. Testimony of Leo Lindner, 308–11. The exclusion for "[d]rilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes associated with the exploration, development, or production of crude oil, natural gas or geothermal energy" is found at 40 C.F.R. § 261.4. Ibid., 376.74 Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 21418, 21420); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 150. Exec. Order No. 12,777, 56 Fed. Reg. 54,757 (October 22, 1991). Testimony of Leo Lindner, 276–79, 297, 359–60; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 47100). Ibid., 376, 378.75 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 282, 283. E.P. Danenberger, "Changes in the Minerals Management Service Offshore Regulatory Programs Resulting From the Oil Pollution Act of 1990" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 6823, May 1992), 150. Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279–81. Ibid., 375–6.76 Ibid., 283. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,400 (July 2, 1991). Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 219; Ibid., 375–6.77 Ibid., 283–284. Ibid. Testimony of Randy Ezell, 279. Ibid., 378.78 Testimony of Micah Sandell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 29, 2010, 8, 10, 12. Salient differences were, as MMS noted, that "Platforms in the GOM are typically smaller, technically less sophisti- cated, produce fewer hydrocarbons, and operate in less severe environmental conditions [than North Sea platforms]. The number of personnel on OCS platforms is significantly smaller than on North Sea platforms. There is, however, a substantially greater number of OCS platforms in the GOM, over 3,800." Marshall Courtois, William Hauser, and Paul Schneider, "Minerals Management Service Safety and Environmental Management Program: Evolution of the Concept," (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 6822, May 1992), 145. Testimony of Lee Lambert, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 292. Transocean disputes these accounts. It points out that the only individuals who have stated that Anderson advanced the "bladder effect" theory are BP employees. Ibid., 378.79 Ibid., 11. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,400 (July 2, 1991). Testimony of Lee Lambert, 292. Ibid., 379.80 Internal BP documents (Deepwater Horizon Schematic; BP August 9, 2010 presentation to Oil Spill Commission, slide 5 ). Former senior MMS officials, interviews with Commission staff, August and September 2010; Offshore Operators Committee, "Oil, Gas, and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)—Safety and Environmental Management Systems," Public Comment (May 22, 2006), http://www.boemre.gov/federalregister/PDFs/AD15- OOCcomments5-22-06.pdf. Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 117; Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 127909, BP-HZN-CEC 20189-90). While that may have been Mr. Vidrine's stated reason for running the test on the kill line, the Commission notes that the negative-pressure test performed at Macondo—whether on the drill pipe or kill line—was different from the negative- pressure test described in the Application for Permit to Modify. Testimony of Mark Bly, Hearing before the National Commission, November 8, 2010, 293–95. Ibid., 380–1.81 Testimony of Douglas Brown, 88–89, 92–93. T.A.F. Powell, "US Voluntary SEMP Initiative: Holy Grail or Poisoned Chalice?" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 8111, May 1996): 828. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 86. Ray Mabus, America's Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan after the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. Ibid., 380.82 Testimony of Paul Meinhart, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 29, 2010, 28 E.O. Redd, Jean Chevallier, and Ian Paterson, "Preparing a Safety Case: A Drilling Contractor's Experience" (Society of Petroleum Engineers [SPE] Paper 27293, January 1994): 799. There are several possible explanations for the inconsistent readings on the drill pipe and kill line. One possibility is that the viscous spacer that had leaked through the annular preventer migrated into and clogged the kill line. John Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon in MC252 (July 1, 2010), 20–21. Another possibility is that a valve was inadvertently closed that should have been open. BP, Deepwater Horizon Acci- dent Investigation Report, 87. A third, more remote, possibility is that hydrocarbons coming up the well formed solid hydrates when they hit the cold seawater and those hydrates clogged the kill line. Guide, interview. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Science Panel, http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/people/sp.cfm. Ibid., 380.83 Testimony of Douglas Brown, 93–94. L.D. Easley, J.E. Stark, and R.A. Bradford, "Implementing API RP 75 'Recommended Practice for Development of a Safety and Environmental Program for Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Operations and Facilities'" (Offshore Technol- ogy Conference [OTC] Paper 7384, May 1994): 130. Testimony of Christopher Haire, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 247. Joe Hunt, Mission Without a Map: The Politics and Policies of Restoration Following the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: 1989- 2002, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council (Anchorage, 2009): 156-157. Ibid., 380.84 Ibid., 94–95. American Petroleum Institute, Recommended Practices for Development of a Safety and Environmental Management Program for Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Operations and Facilities, Recommended Practice 75, 1st ed. (Dallas, TX: May 15, 1993). For example, a bubble of gas, under ideal conditions, would expand approximately 166-fold. This number differs under actual conditions based on fluid properties and flow. See, e.g., Testimony of Stanley Senner, Director of Conservation Science, Ocean Conservancy, Hearing before the National Commission, September 28, 2010. Ibid., 381–2.85 Testimony of Steve Bertone, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 19, 2010, 28, 34. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf, 59 Fed. Reg. 33,779 (June 30, 1994). Mudloggers operate systems that collect and transmit real-time data from sensors on the rig. BP employed mudlog- gers from Sperry Drilling (a Halliburton subsidiary) on the Deepwater Horizon. President Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill" (June 15, 2010), http://www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill. Ibid., 385.86 Testimony of James Nicholas Wilson, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 13, 2010, 10; Testimony of Steve Bertone, 35. Safety and Environmental Management Program (SEMP) on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), 61 Fed. Reg. 37,493 (July 18, 1996). The driller first sent mud to pits 9 and 10, then switched to pit 7, and then switched to pit 6. Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010, 20:10–21:18. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Gov. Jindal Announces "Agenda For Revitalizing Coastal Louisi- ana," July 15, 2010, http://wwwprd.doa.louisiana.gov/LaNews/PublicPages/Dsp_PressRelease_Display. cfm?PressReleaseID=2550&Rec_ID=1. Ibid., 385–6.87 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 35. Ibid. Ibid., 20:28–20:36, 20:58–21:06. NOAA, Damage Assessment, Remediation, and Restoration Program: Glossary, http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/glos- sary/index.htm. Ibid., 388.88 Testimony of Gregory Meche, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 198. Patrick Crow, "New slant on safety," Oil & Gas Journal (July 22, 1996): 23. Ibid., 20:20–21:01. Testimony of Stanley Senner. Chapter Eight Alaska Oil Spill Commission, Spill: The Wreck of the Exxon Valdez (Final Report) (February 1990), 1.
353¶21 30 C.F.R. §§ 250.410-418.22 Testimony of John Guide, 43–44, 189–191. Ken Arnold, interview with Tyler Priest, May 10, 2004, Houston, TX, History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Houston History Archives, M.D. Anderson Library Special Collections, University of Houston, Houston, TX. John C. Whitaker, Striking a Balance: Environment and Natural Resources Policy in the Nixon-Ford Years (Washing- ton, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), 267–268; Russell Wayland, "The New Federal OCS Regulations in the Light of Santa Barbara" (Society of Petroleum Engineers [SPE] Paper 2780, San Francisco, CA, November 1969); Richard B. Krahl and David W. Moody, "Gulf Coast Lease Management Inspection Program," (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 1714, 1972), 846. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 22433). 30 C.F.R. § 250.418(j).23 Testimony of Douglas Brown, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 26, 2010, 88, 91. Don E. Kash et al., Energy Under the Oceans: A Technology Assessment of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Opera- tions (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973), 104. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370h. Testimony of Steve Lewis, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010, 93–94; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 129226). Prior to conversion, a small ball drops from the top of the float valves to block the main path through the auto-fill tube, leaving only two small holes on the side of the tube through which mud can flow. Ibid. Transcript, Deepwater Blowout Containment Conference (September 22, 2010), http://www.doi.gov/news/video/
¶Deepwater-Blowout-Containment-Conference.cfm.24 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 77; Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCDC 92). U.S. Geological Survey, Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 128 (December 1958) and Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 144 (February 1960), RG 57, Records of the U.S. Geological Survey, NARA. Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 70. 25 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). The Well Site Leaders—Bob Kaluza and Don Vidrine—would normally have been on the rig. Morel, a relatively junior BP engineer, had flown to the rig out of a professional interest in learning more about the cementing process. Guide, interview. Doug Suttles, interview with Commission staff, October 13, 2010.25 Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCDC 92); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 82. Kash et al., Energy Under the Oceans, 105. Bryan Clawson (Weatherford), interview with Commission staff, October 28, 2010; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (September 8, 2010), 70. Response workers generally must be trained pursuant to the Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response ("HAZWOPER") regulation administered by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.29 Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 188 and 191. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 70 (listing 18 statutes, and not including several such as the Magnuson Fishery Management and Conservation Act of 1976). Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 137367, 21304). Since the incident, BP has argued that the M-I SWACO models predicted an erroneously high circulation pressure, and that the readings the crew observed were proper. This may ultimately explain the readings, but it does not explain why the BP Macondo team dismissed them as the result of a broken pressure gauge. C.F.R. §
¶1910.120. This regulation requires specific training and medical surveillance and monitoring for workers dealing with hazardous materials. While this regulation presumably applied to formal response contractors after the Deepwater Horizon spill, it was not applied consistently to citizen responders who also require its protections.26 Testimony of Ross Skidmore, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 264. Neil R. Etson to President Nixon, March 18, 1970, Central Classified Files, 1968-1974, Box 71, RG 57, Records of the Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Testimony of Steve Lewis, 96; Internal Transocean document (TRN-USCG_MMS 11638). Public information should further be provided in languages and formats that are understandable to individuals with limited English proficiency and individuals with disabilities. ESF #8—Public Health and Medical Services Annex at 7.27 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 24. National Research Council, Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies (The National Academies Press: Washington, DC, 1992), http://www.nap.edu/catalog. php?record_id=2062. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 137367). Indeed, the Public Health and Medical Services Annex provides for long-term monitoring of potentially exposed individuals, requiring the Department of Health and Human Services to "assist[] State, tribal, and local officials in establishing a registry of potentially exposed individuals . . . and conducting long-term monitoring of this population for potential long-term health effects." ESF #8 – Public Health and Medical Services Annex at 9-10; Rebecca Bratspies, et al., From Ship to Shore: Reforming the National Contingency Plan to Improve Protections for Oil Spill Cleanup
¶Workers (Center for Progressive Reform, September 2010).28 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 38, 113; Testimony of Curt Kuchta, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, May 27, 2010, 166, 183, 184. U.S. Department of the Interior, Leasing Oil and Natural Gas Resources: Outer Continental Shelf (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, 2005), 12, http://www.boemre.gov/ld/PDFs/GreenBook-LeasingDocument.pdf. Ibid.; Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 432. Whether or not respirators should be required for cleanup workers emerged as a major controversy in the response.29 Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 188 and 191. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 70 (listing 18 statutes, and not including several such as the Magnuson Fishery Management and Conservation Act of 1976). Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 137367, 21304). Since the incident, BP has argued that the M-I SWACO models predicted an erroneously high circulation pressure, and that the readings the crew observed were proper. This may ultimately explain the readings, but it does not explain why the BP Macondo team dismissed them as the result of a broken pressure gauge. Ray Mabus, America's Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan after the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (September
¶2010); Exec. Order No. 13554,75 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 282, 283. E.P. Danenberger, "Changes in the Minerals Management Service Offshore Regulatory Programs Resulting From the Oil Pollution Act of 1990" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 6823, May 1992), 150. Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279–81. Fed. Reg. 62313–62317 (October 8, 2010).30 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 113; Testimony of Curt Kuchta, 184. The five laws included the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617, Energy Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 95- 618, National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, Pub. L. No. 95-620, and Natural Gas Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-621. David Izon, E.P. Danenberger, and Melinda Mayes, "Absence of fatalities in blowouts encouraging in MMS study of OCS incidents 1992-2006," Well Control July/August (2007), 84. Federal liability for damages is not the only potential liability that could result from an offshore drilling incident.
¶Under the Oil Pollution Act, drillers are strictly liable for removal costs. Companies can also be subject to federal civil and criminal penalties as well as unlimited liability for damages under some state laws. These liabilities presumably drive business to internalize risk and mitigate safety, though not as fully as they might if damages liability were not capped.31 Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 119. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Testimony of John Guide, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 22, 2010, 87. Gulf Coast Claims Facility, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/imported_ pdfs/library/assets/gccf-faqs.pdf.32 Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 23, 2010, 442. Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Program: Hearings before the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). John Gisclair, Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010 (annotations, September 20, 2010). Commission calculation based on internal Halliburton document (HAL_10994). Gulf Coast Claims Facility, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/faq#Q9. Government claims for loss of revenue are being handled by BP: http://www.bp.com/governmentclaims. A $60 million BP fund is in place for real estate claims across the five Gulf states and is being administered by National Catastrophe
¶Adjusters, a claims adjustment firm: www.gulfreclaims.com; Kathy Jumper, "Realtors Tap National Catastrophe
¶Adjusters To Administer Oil Spill Claims," Press-Register, August 24, 2010, http://blog.al.com/live/2010/08/realtors_oil_claims.html. BP has set aside $100 million for rig workers who experience hardship due to the moratorium, to be administered by the Gulf Coast Restoration and Protection Foundation: http://www.gcrpf.org/. Claims for repairs or damage to vessels involved in the Vessel of Opportunity program are being handled by BP.33 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 19, 2010, 29, 33; Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978). 34 43 U.S.C. § 1801. 35 43 U.S.C. § 1802. 36 43 U.S.C. § 1344. 37 43 U.S.C. § 1340. 38 43 U.S.C. § 1351. 39 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3). 40 43 U.S.C. § 1346. 41 43 U.S.C. § 1347(c). 42 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b). 43 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) 44 43 U.S.C. § 1351. 45 43 U.S.C. § 1340. 46 43 U.S.C. § 1351(c)(3). 47 43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1). 48 43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1). 49 43 U.S.C. § 1531(l). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 127537-39); Internal Halliburton document (HAL_11196). 34 30 C.F.R. § 250.421. Letter from Thomas J. Perrelli, Associate Attorney General, Department of Justice, to Kenneth Feinberg, September 17,
¶2010.34 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 275. "Leader on BP Claims Blames Fraud for Slow Payouts", Associated Press, October 5, 2010.35 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 24. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 193549). BP's internal guidelines further specify that centralization should extend 100 feet above any such hydrocarbon-bearing zones. If either the top of cement or centralization requirements are not met, the guidelines require that the actual top of cement should be confirmed by a "proven cement evaluation technique." Ibid. Press Release, Gulf Coast Claims Facility, Feinberg Announces Faster and More Generous Payments from GCCF,
¶September 25, 2010, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/press6.php; Press Release, Gulf Coast Claims Facility,
¶Feinberg Announces Clarification Regarding Geographic Proximity, October 4, 2010, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/press7.php; Editorial, "Are Victims of the Gulf Oil Spill Getting What They Deserve?," Washington Post,
¶November 25, 2010, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/pressA.php; Siobhan Hughes and Ryan December,
¶"Feinberg Softens His Stance on Claims From Spill," Wall Street Journal, November 26, 2010.36 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, 33. Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 143295, BP-HZN-CEC 22663); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 34. Gulf Coast Claims Facility, GCCF Program Statistics—Overall Summary, Gulf Coast Claims Facility, December 11,
¶2010, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/GCCF_Overall_Status_Report.pdf.37 Ibid.; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 280. Document provided to the Commission by Halliburton entitled "Halliburton GoM Foam Jobs 2002–2010." Minerals Management Service, Budget Justifications and Performance Information Fiscal Year 2011.38 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 443. S.L. Pickett and S.W. Cole, "Foamed Cementing Technique for Liners Yields Cost-Effective Results" (Society of Petro- leum Engineers SPE Paper #27679, Midland, Texas, March 1994), 523–24. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(6).
¶Chapter Ten 1 Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2009 (August 19, 2010), Table 5.2, 131, http://www.eia.
¶doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/sec5_7.pdf.2 Internal BP document (BP, presentation to Commission, August 9, 2010, slides 5 & 12). Quoted in Tom Zoellner, "Oil and Water: The Adventure of Getting One from Deep Beneath the Other," Invention and Technology (Fall 2000): 48. Internal Transocean document (TRN-HEC 90686). Internal documents are identified by their document production serial numbers when available, which were assigned by the entity that provided them. Neil MacFarquhar, "Routine Flights Become Overland Odysseys, Minus Clean Socks," New York Times, April 22, 2010. Campbell Robertson and Clifford Krauss, "Gulf Spill Is the Largest of Its Kind, Scientists Say," New York Times, August 2, 2010. BP, Sustainability Review (2009), 20–21. http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/ e_s_assets/e_s_assets_2009/downloads_pdfs/bp_sustainability_review_2009.pdf. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(6) ("An oil and gas lease issued pursuant to this section shall . . . contain such rental and other provisions as the Secretary may prescribe at the time of offering the area for lease."). Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2010 (April, 2010), 75, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ aeo/pdf/0383(2010).pdf.3 Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, 411; U.S. Department of Energy, Well Configuration (BP document made public by the Department of Energy), http://www.energy.gov/open/documents/3.1_Item_2_Macondo_Well_07_Jun_1900.pdf; Testimony of Natalie Roshto, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 22, 2010, 15. Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 409. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126338). Campbell Robertson, "11 Remain Missing After Oil Rig Explodes Off Louisiana," New York Times, April 22, 2010. EPA, Government Response to the BP Oil Spill: Odors from the BP Spill (June 2010), http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/ reports/odorfactsheet.pdf (announcing help line for residents experiencing oil-related odors); Press Release, NOAA, Administration Launches Dockside Chats to Promote Gulf Seafood Safety Awareness, August 25, 2010, http://www. restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/08/25/administration-launches-dockside-chats-promote-gulf-seafood-safety- awareness; BP, Claims and Government Payments Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Public Report (November 18, 2010). Health and Safety Executive, Major Incident Investigation Report, BP Grangemouth Scotland (29th May – 10th June 2000) (August 18, 2003), 7, http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/bpgrange/images/bprgrangemouth.pdf. These terms are taken directly from the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) NEPA implementing regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28. 4 40 C.F.R. §1508.4. Technically recoverable reserves, however, are very different from proven reserves, because the former unlike the latter includes reserves that may well be as a practical manner be too expensive to recover.4 Testimony of Michael Williams, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 23, 2010, 35–36. Pratt, Priest, and Castaneda, Offshore Pioneers, 15–52, 137–157. Internal Transocean document (TRN-USCG-MMS 11597). Rick Jervis, "Gulf Blast Appears to be 'Blowout'," USA Today, April 22, 2010; Ben Casselman, Russell Gold, and Angel Gonzalez, "Blast Jolts Oil World," Wall Street Journal, April 22, 2010. Testimony of Timothy Ragen, Executive Director of the U.S. Marine Mammal Commission, "The Short and Long- Term Impacts of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill," Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans, and Wildlife, 111th Congress (June 10, 2010); Kim B. Ritchie and Brian D. Keller, eds., A Scientific Forum on the Gulf of Mexico: The Islands in the Stream Concept (NOAA, January 23, 2008), 6–8; Elliott A. Norse and John Amos, "Impacts, Perception, and Policy Implications of the Deepwater Horizon Oil and Gas Disaster," Environmental Law Reporter 40, no. 11 (2010): 11071; Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Scientific Symposium Meeting Summary (Consortium for Ocean Leadership, June 23, 2010), 15–16. Ibid. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2008 (June 26, 2009), Table 4.1, 99, http://www.eia.
354gov/FTPROOT/multifuel/038408.pdf.5 Testimony of John Guide, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 22, 2010, 260–266; Testimony of James Wilson, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 6, 2010, 176. Ibid., 21–25. U.S. Department of the Interior, "Statement by Secretary of the Interior James Watt Instituting Changes in the Mineral Royalty Management Program – July 21, 1982," Commission on Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy Resources: Subject Files, 1981–1982, RG 48, Entry 994, Box 1 (National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126338). Jervis, "Gulf Blast Appears to be 'Blowout.'" Federal Interagency Solutions Group, Oil Budget Science and Engineering Team, Oil Budget Calculator Technical Documentation (November 2010). Ibid. A "Development Operations Coordination Document" in the Gulf of Mexico is functionally the same as a "Development and Production Plan" in other LES regions. National Academy of Sciences, Advancing the Science of Climate Change (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2010).6 Brian Morel, e-mail message to Richard Miller and Mark Hafle, April 14, 2010, 13:31, http://energycommerce.house. gov/documents/20100614/BP-April14.Email.calling.Macondo.a.nightmare.well.pdf. Tyler Priest, "Extraction Not Creation: The History of Offshore Petroleum in the Gulf of Mexico," Enterprise & Society 8, no. 2 (June 2007): 240. U.S. Constitution, Art IV, § 3, cl. 2. Ibid. Richard Fausset, "Oil Rig Explodes; 11 Missing," Los Angeles Times, April 22, 2010. 7 40 C.F.R. § 300, Subpart D. Curtis Morgan, "Another sign of oil spill recovery in the Gulf: Oil in the Gulf has dissipated and degraded into barely detectable concentrations, although federal scientists say it's too soon to say the threat is over," Miami Herald, Health and Safety Executive, BP Grangemouth Executive Summary—Findings and Recommendations, http://www. hse.gov.uk/comah/bpgrange/execsumm/findings.htm. Press Release, Department of the Interior, Categorical Exclusions for Gulf Offshore Activity to be Limited While Interior Reviews NEPA Process and Develops Revised Policy, August 16, 2010, Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2009 (August 19, 2010), Figure 2.0, 37, http://www.eia. gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/sec2.pdf. (Most of the remaining transportation fuels came from ethanol and natural gas.)7 BP, "GoM Exploration Wells: MC 252 #1—Macondo Prospect Well Information," September 2009, http:// bpoilresponse.markimoore.com/blog/bp-media/docs/Macondo.Prospect.Well.Information.pdf. Alden J. LaBorde, My Life and Times (New Orleans: LaBorde Printing Company, 1996), 174. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976), quoting United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940). Ibid. Three companies own the Macondo well. BP has a 65 percent share, Anadarko Petroleum Corporation has a 25 percent share, and MOEX Offshore has a 10 percent share. BP maintained regular contact with Anadarko and MOEX throughout the drilling of the well. Andrew B. Wilson, "BP's Disaster: No Surprise to Folks in the Know," CBS, June 22, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/ stories/2010/06/22/opinion/main6605248.shtml. Minerals Management Service, MMS 2007-018 Gulf of Mexico OSC Oil and Gas Lease Sales: 2007-2010 Final Environmental Impact Statement (April 2007), Volume I, 2-3 to 2-5. National Academy of Sciences, America's Energy Future: Technology and Transformation (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2010), xi.8 Testimony of Richard Tink, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 26, 2010, 392; Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, AFE Summary for the Macondo Well, October 7, 2010, http://www. deepwaterinvestigation.com/external/content/document/3043/914919/1/AFE%20Summary%20for%20the%20 Macondo%20Well.pdf. James W. Calvert, "Gulf Offshore Activity Booming," World Petroleum (January 1957): 48. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 405 (1917); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. at 540 ("Congress exercises the powers of both a proprietor and of a legislature over the public domain."). Internal Transocean documents (TRN-USCG-MMS 11600, 11605, 11609, 11613, 11617, 11621, 11625). Paul Purpura et al., "Search continues for 11 missing in rig blast," Times-Picayune, April 22, 2010. Jan Erik Vinnem, Offshore Risk Assessment: Principles, Modelling and Applications of QRA Studies, Second Edition (London: Springer Studies in Reliability Engineering, 2007), 91, 100, 102. Minerals Management Service, MMS 2007-026 Chukchi Sea Planning Area Oil and Gas Lease Sale 193 and Seismic Surveying Activities in the Chukchi Sea Final Environmental Impact Statement (May 2007), Volume I, 1. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2009, Tables 4.2, 5.1, 101,129 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 450; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 123. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 128489); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 64 ("the BP Macondo well team did not ask for the OptiCem model to be re-run"). This may have been because of Mr. Guide's distrust of the OptiCem model. Testimony of John Guide, 275 ("it's wrong a lot"). When Halliburton rig personnel eventually informed Gagliano of BP's decision themselves, he responded by e-mailing BP modeling data suggesting again that more centralizers would be needed to prevent channeling. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 128708). Ibid. (calculated from tables) http://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/pdf/aer.pdf.9 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (September 8, 2010), 17. Ben C. Belt, "Louisiana and Texas Offshore Prospects," Drilling (March 1956): 119. United States v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459, 466–68, 474–83 (1915). (Upholding authority of the president to withdraw unilaterally from private disposition valuable energy resources located on public lands in order to protect those resources while Congress considers legislation for their retention in national ownership). Brett Clanton, "New tactic might seal leaking well sooner, BP CEO says," Houston Chronicle, May 5, 2010. Paul Rioux and Chris Kirkham, "Search for 11 Workers Missing After Oil Rig Explosion Is Expected To Be Called Off Friday," Times-Picayune, April 22, 2010. Department of Interior, Department Manual Part 516: National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (September 2009), 3.4. Ibid., Table 11.5, 315.
10Ibid., Tables 11.4, 11.10, 313,325 Admiral James Watson and Al Armendariz, Recovered Oil, Contaminated Materials and Liquid and Solid Wastes Management Directive (June 29, 2010). (calculated based on tables). "Proved reserves" represent only a small part of can be ultimately recovered and are estimated by different standards around the world.11 Press Release, Transocean, Transocean Ltd. Reports Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2009 Results, February 24, 2010. Pratt, Priest, and Castaneda, Offshore Pioneers, 36–48. E.R. Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy: A Legal and Historical Analysis (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1953); Tyler Priest, "Claiming the Coastal Sea: The Battle for the Tidelands, 1937–1953," History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana: Vol. 1: Papers on the Evolving Offshore Industry, MMS OCS Study 2004-049 (New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, 2008), 67–90, https://www.gomr.mms. gov/homepg/espis/espisfront.asp. Testimony of Gregory Walz, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 7, 2010, 157–59. Council on Environmental Quality, Final Recommendations of the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force (July 19, 2010), 41. 12 43 U.S.C. § 1346. Ibid., Table 5.17, 167, http://www.eia.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/sec5_43.pdf.12 Press Release, Transocean, Transocean Inc. and GlobalSantaFe Corporation Agree to Combine, July 23, 2007. Tyler Priest, The Offshore Imperative: Shell Oil's Search for Petroleum in Postwar America (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2007), 81–91. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 35 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 143300) (emphasis added). Ibid., Table 3.5, 77. http://www.eia.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/sec3_11.pdf
¶13 Stephen Brown and Hillard Huntington, "Estimating U.S. Oil Security Premiums: EMF OP 68," September 2009.
14 Census Bureau, "Trade in Goods (Imports, Exports and Trade Balance) with China 1985-2010," http://www.census. gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2010.15 Internal Transocean documents (TRN-HCJ 93526, 93528). U.S. Department of Interior, "Petroleum and Sulfur on the U.S. Continental Shelf," internal study, August 1969, box 134, Central Classified Files, 1969–1972, Record Group 48, Records of the Secretary of Interior, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. "Oil Shelf Bill Enacted; President Reaffirms U.S. Title to Outer Offshore Deposits," New York Times, August 8, 1953, 27. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 129238-39). Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards,75 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 282, 283. E.P. Danenberger, "Changes in the Minerals Management Service Offshore Regulatory Programs Resulting From the Oil Pollution Act of 1990" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 6823, May 1992), 150. Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279–81. Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010). The joint rulemaking in 2010 by the Department of Transportation and EPA establishing light duty vehicle greenhouse gas emission standards and corporate average fuel economy standards promises to significantly increase fuel efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.16 Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126338); Internal BP document (BP-HZN-OSC 5378). Priest, "Auctioning the Ocean," 113. Richard Vietor, Energy Policy in America since 1945: A Study of Business-Government Relations (New York: Cam- bridge University Press, 1984), 19. Guide, interview. Indeed, just days before the running of the long string at Macondo, another well drilled by Trans- ocean's DD3 suffered just such a complication. Ibid. Jay Hakes, A Declaration of Energy Independence: How Freedom from Foreign Oil Can Improve National Security, Our Economy, and the Environment (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), 68-70, 87-88; Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2009 (August 19, 2010), Figure 5.1, 129, http://www.eia.gov/ emeu/aer/pdf/pages/sec5_5.pdf.17 "Brazil Pins Hopes on Massive, untapped Oil Fields," NPR, December 1, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ story.php?storyId=120966523. On Project Mohole and JOIDES, see David K. van Keuren, "Breaking New Ground: The Origins of Scientific Ocean Drilling," in The Machine in Neptune's Garden: Historical Perspectives on Technology and the Marine Environment, eds. Helen M. Rozwadowski and David K. van Keuren (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2004), 183–210. On Shell's Eureka project, see Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 97, 218. E.R. Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy: A Legal and Historical Analysis. Testimony of Jesse Gagliano, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 320. National Research Council, America's Energy Future: Technology and Transformation (Washington D.C.: National Academies Press, 2009); National Research Council, Limiting the Magnitude of Future Climate Change (Washington D.C.: National Academies Press, 2010).18 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, Installations, Removals, and Cumulative Totals of Offshore Production Facilities in Federal Waters; 1959–2010, February 2010, http://www.boemre.gov/stats/PDFs/ OCSPlatformActivity.pdf.; Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, OCS Incidents/Spills by Category: 1996–2005, October 19, 2007, http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/Incidents1996-2005.htm; Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement, OCS Incidents/Spills by Category: 2006-2010, July 10, 2010, http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/IncidentStatisticsSummaries.htm. F. P. Dunn, "Deepwater Production: 1950-2000" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 7627, Houston, TX, May 1994). "Interior Expects Big Things from . . . Offshore Lease Sale," Oil and Gas Journal, September 13, 1954, 96. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 22433). Walz also noted that the flight carrying centralizers would not increase costs. Ibid. President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Report to the President on Accelerating the Pace of Change in Energy Technologies through an Integrated Federal Energy Policy (Washington D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 2010).19 Testimony of Ronald Sepulvado, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 23, 2010, 7, 14, 34. Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 127–130. Diane Austin et al., History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Volume 1: Papers on the Evolving Offshore Industry, OCS Study MMS 2008-042 (New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, September 2008), 97–98, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PI/PDFImages/ESPIS/4/4530.pdf. 20 43 U.S.C § 1334. Guide, interview. BP had special one-piece bolt-on centralizers made for the Thunder Horse project. Ibid. Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 2701,116 Stat. 134, 278-279 (2002). "Shares," Gazprom, http://www.gazprom.com/investors/stock/.
20 "The Other Way Out," Economist, November 19, 2010; Energy Information Administration, "Country Analysis Briefs: Mexico," June 2010.21 Ibid., 43–44 and 189; Schlumberger, "Oilfield Glossary: cement bond log," accessed November 19, 2010, http:// www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/Display.cfm?Term=cement%20bond%20log. Cliff Hernandez, interview by Andrew Gardner, May 1, 2001, New Iberia, LA, History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Houston History Archives, M.D. Anderson Library Special Collections, University of Houston, Houston, TX. This interview is one of approximately 450 oral histories conducted for History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Minerals Management Service OCS Study 2004-049 (2008). "Oil and Gas Leases Bow to Rare Wildlife Species," New York Times, December 9, 1955. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 22669). There are also massive natural gas resources in and off Alaska, but until a pipeline is built to the lower 48 states, the gas cannot be brought to market and used.22 Testimony of John Guide, 43–44, 189–191. Ken Arnold, interview with Tyler Priest, May 10, 2004, Houston, TX, History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Houston History Archives, M.D. Anderson Library Special Collections, University of Houston, Houston, TX. John C. Whitaker, Striking a Balance: Environment and Natural Resources Policy in the Nixon-Ford Years (Washing- ton, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), 267–268; Russell Wayland, "The New Federal OCS Regulations in the Light of Santa Barbara" (Society of Petroleum Engineers [SPE] Paper 2780, San Francisco, CA, November 1969); Richard B. Krahl and David W. Moody, "Gulf Coast Lease Management Inspection Program," (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 1714, 1972), 846. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 22433). Department of the Interior, "Estimated Undiscovered, Economically Recoverable Resources," http://www.doi.gov/ whatwedo/energy/ocs/upload/UERR-map-2012-2017-80-NoYear-Note.pdf.23 Testimony of Douglas Brown, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 26, 2010, 88, 91. Don E. Kash et al., Energy Under the Oceans: A Technology Assessment of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Opera- tions (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973), 104. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370h. Testimony of Steve Lewis, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010, 93–94; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 129226). Prior to conversion, a small ball drops from the top of the float valves to block the main path through the auto-fill tube, leaving only two small holes on the side of the tube through which mud can flow. Ibid. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, "Lease Sales," December 2, 2010, http://alaska.boemre.gov/lease/hlease/ LeasingTables/lease_sales.pdf; Minerals Management Service, "Summary of Company Bids," February 7, 2008, http://alaska.boemre.gov/cproject/Chukchi193/193Saleday/Sale 193 Sum of Co Bids by Co%20Code.pdf.24 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 77; Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCDC 92). U.S. Geological Survey, Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 128 (December 1958) and Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 144 (February 1960), RG 57, Records of the U.S. Geological Survey, NARA. Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 70. 25 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). The Well Site Leaders—Bob Kaluza and Don Vidrine—would normally have been on the rig. Morel, a relatively junior BP engineer, had flown to the rig out of a professional interest in learning more about the cementing process. Guide, interview. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2009, Table 5.2, 131.25 Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCDC 92); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 82. Kash et al., Energy Under the Oceans, 105. Bryan Clawson (Weatherford), interview with Commission staff, October 28, 2010; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (September 8, 2010), 70. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2011, Table A14.26 Testimony of Ross Skidmore, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 264. Neil R. Etson to President Nixon, March 18, 1970, Central Classified Files, 1968-1974, Box 71, RG 57, Records of the Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Testimony of Steve Lewis, 96; Internal Transocean document (TRN-USCG_MMS 11638). Unpublished information provided to the Commission by the Energy Information Administration.
27 Northern Economics, Economic Analysis of Future Offshore Oil and Gas Development: Beaufort Sea, Chukchi Sea, North Aleutian Basin (March 2009), ES-7, 9.28 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 38, 113; Testimony of Curt Kuchta, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, May 27, 2010, 166, 183, 184. U.S. Department of the Interior, Leasing Oil and Natural Gas Resources: Outer Continental Shelf (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, 2005), 12, http://www.boemre.gov/ld/PDFs/GreenBook-LeasingDocument.pdf. Ibid.; Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 432. Audobon Alaska, "Chukchi Sea," http://ak.audubon.org/issues-action/chukchi-sea.
29 Press Release, Department of the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Announces Final Designation of Polar Bear Critical Habitat, November 24, 2010.30 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 113; Testimony of Curt Kuchta, 184. The five laws included the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617, Energy Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 95- 618, National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, Pub. L. No. 95-620, and Natural Gas Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-621. David Izon, E.P. Danenberger, and Melinda Mayes, "Absence of fatalities in blowouts encouraging in MMS study of OCS incidents 1992-2006," Well Control July/August (2007), 84. Lori Quakenbush, "Bowhead Whale," Alaska Department of Fish & Game, September 22, 2010.31 Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 119. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Testimony of John Guide, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 22, 2010, 87. Ibid.
35532 Ronald O'Rourke, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress (Congressional Research Service, October 15, 2010),31 Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 119. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Testimony of John Guide, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 22, 2010, 87. ("On June 25, 2010, the Coast Guard announced that Polar Sea had suffered an unexpected engine casualty and consequently will likely be unavailable for operation until at least January 2011.").33 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 19, 2010, 29, 33; Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978). 34 43 U.S.C. § 1801. 35 43 U.S.C. § 1802. 36 43 U.S.C. § 1344. 37 43 U.S.C. § 1340. 38 43 U.S.C. § 1351. 39 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3). 40 43 U.S.C. § 1346. 41 43 U.S.C. § 1347(c). 42 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b). 43 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) 44 43 U.S.C. § 1351. 45 43 U.S.C. § 1340. 46 43 U.S.C. § 1351(c)(3). 47 43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1). 48 43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1). 49 43 U.S.C. § 1531(l). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 127537-39); Internal Halliburton document (HAL_11196). 34 30 C.F.R. § 250.421. The Arctic Council is a multinational and intergovernmental group. Members include the governments of Canada,
¶Denmark (including the Faroe Islands and Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States of America. The Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council are: Aleut International Association (AIA), Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Gwich'in Council International (GCI), Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), and the Saami Council.
¶356 Appendix A
¶Appendix A
¶Commission Members
SENATOR BOB GRAHAM, Co-Chair, is the former two-term governor of Florida and served for 18 years in the United States Senate. After retiring from public life in January 2005, Senator Graham served for a year as a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. There he commenced writing America, the Owner's Manual, published in 2009 as a guide to participatory citizenship. From May 2008 to February 2010, he served as chairman of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, and currently serves as a member of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission and the CIA's Executive Advisory Board.
WILLIAM K. REILLY, Co-Chair, is a founding partner of Aqua International Partners, LP, a private equity fund dedicated to investing in companies engaged in water and renewable energy, and a senior advisor to TPG Capital, LP, an international investment partnership. He co-chaired the National Commission on Energy Policy. Mr. Reilly served as Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1989-1993) and president of World Wildlife Fund (1985-1989). He also served as the head of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Earth Summit at Rio in 1992. Mandel Ngan/AFP/Getty Images
FRANCES G. BEINECKE, Member, is the President of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a non-profit corporation that works to advance environmental policy in the United States and across the world. In addition, Ms. Beinecke currently serves on the Board of the World Resources Institute and the steering committees of the U.S. Climate Action Partnership. She is a member of the Aspen Institute's Commission on Arctic Climate Change, and on the advisory boards of the Yale School of Management and the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Science.
-
¶
- Appendix A 357 — 357
¶DONALD F. BOESCH, Member, is President of the University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science, where he is also a Professor of Marine Science and Vice Chancellor for Environmental Sustainability for the University System of Maryland. He is a biological oceanographer who has conducted research on coastal ecosystems along the Atlantic Coast, the Gulf of Mexico, Australia and the East China Sea. A native of Louisiana, he has assessed the long-term environmental effects of offshore oil and gas development and multiple environmental problems of the Gulf Coast.
¶TERRY D. GARCIA, Member, is currently Executive Vice President for Mission Programs for the National Geographic Society, responsible for the Society's core programs that manage more than 400 scientific field research, conservation and exploration projects annually. From 1994 to 1996, he was General Counsel at NOAA and led the implementation of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Restoration Plan for Prince William Sound and the Gulf of Alaska. From 1997 to 1999, he was Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and Deputy Administrator of NOAA.
¶CHERRY A. MURRAY, Member, is Dean of the Harvard School of Engineering and Applied Sciences and John A. and Elizabeth S. Armstrong Professor of Engineering and Applied Sciences. She is currently the Past President of the American Physical Society. She was formerly Senior Vice President of Physical Science & Wireless Research at Bell Labs and past Principal Associate Director for Science & Technology at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. A member of the National Academy of Engineering and the National Academy of Sciences, she has served on more than 80 national and international scientific advisory committees, governing boards, and National Research Council panels, including chairing the Council's Division of Engineering and Physical Science.
¶FRAN ULMER, Member, is Chancellor of the University of Alaska Anchorage, Alaska's largest public university. Ms. Ulmer has served as Mayor of Juneau and Lieutenant Governor of Alaska. As a state legislator, she served on the Special Committee on the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Claims Settlement. She has been a member of the North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission, the Alaska Coastal Policy Council, the Alaska Nature Conservancy, the National Parks Conservation Association, the Aspen Institute's Commission on Arctic Climate Change, among many others.
¶358 Appendix B
¶Appendix B
¶List of Acronyms
API American Petroleum Institute BOEMRE Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement CWA Clean Water Act DOI Department of the Interior EA Environmental Assessment EIS Environmental Impact Statement FDA Food and Drug Administration HPSA Health Professional Shortage Area IADC International Association of Drilling Contractors INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations MMS Minerals Management Service NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NEPA National Environmental Policy Act NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRDA Natural Resource Damage Assessment OPA Oil Pollution Act of 1990 OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OCS Outer Continental Shelf OCSLA Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act SEMP Safety and Environmental Management Program SEMS Safety and Environmental Management Systems
-
¶
- Appendix C 359 — 359
¶Appendix C
¶Executive Order-- National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling
¶Section 1. Establishment. There is established the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (the "Commission").
¶Sec. 2. Membership. (a) The Commission shall be composed of not more than 7 members who shall be appointed by the President. The members shall be drawn from among distinguished individuals, and may include those with experience in or representing the scientific, engineering, and environmental communities, the oil and gas industry, or any other area determined by the President to be of value to the Commission in carrying out its duties.
¶(b) The President shall designate from among the Commission members two members to serve as Co Chairs.
¶Sec. 3. Mission. The Commission shall:
¶(a) examine the relevant facts and circumstances concerning the root causes of the
¶Deepwater Horizon oil disaster;
¶(b) develop options for guarding against, and mitigating the impact of, oil spills associated with offshore drilling, taking into consideration the environmental, public health, and economic effects of such options, including options involving:
¶(1) improvements to Federal laws, regulations, and industry practices applicable to
offshore drilling that would ensure effective oversight, monitoring, and response capabilities; protect public health and safety, occupational health and safety, and the environment and natural resources; and address affected communities; and
¶(2) organizational or other reforms of Federal agencies or processes necessary to ensure such improvements are implemented and maintained.
¶(c) submit a final public report to the President with its findings and options for consideration within 6 months of the date of the Commission's first meeting.
¶Sec. 4. Administration. (a) The Commission shall hold public hearings and shall request information including relevant documents from Federal, State, and local officials, nongovernmental organizations, private entities, scientific institutions, industry and
¶360 Appendix C
workforce representatives, communities, and others affected by the Deepwater Horizon oil disaster, as necessary to carry out its mission.
(b) The heads of executive departments and agencies, to the extent permitted by law and consistent with their ongoing activities in response to the oil spill, shall provide the Commission such information and cooperation as it may require for purposes of carrying out its mission.
(c) In carrying out its mission, the Commission shall be informed by, and shall strive to avoid duplicating, the analyses and investigations undertaken by other governmental, nongovernmental, and independent entities.
(d) The Commission shall ensure that it does not interfere with or disrupt any ongoing or anticipated civil or criminal investigation or law enforcement activities or any effort to recover response costs or damages arising out of the Deepwater Horizon explosion, fire, and oil spill. The Commission shall consult with the Department of Justice concerning the Commission's activities to avoid any risk of such interference or disruption.
¶(e) The Commission shall have a staff, headed by an Executive Director.
¶(f) The Commission shall terminate 60 days after submitting its final report.
Sec. 5. General Provisions. (a) To the extent permitted by law, and subject to the availability of appropriations, the Secretary of Energy shall provide the Commission with such administrative services, funds, facilities, staff, and other support services as may be necessary to carry out its mission.
(b) Insofar as the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App.) (the "Act"), may apply to the Commission, any functions of the President under that Act, except for those in section 6 of the Act, shall be performed by the Secretary of Energy in accordance with guidelines issued by the Administrator of General Services.
(c) Members of the Commission shall serve without any additional compensation for their work on the Commission, but shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, to the extent permitted by law for persons serving intermittently in the Government service (5 U.S.C. 5701-5707).
¶(d) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(2) functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
-
¶
- Appendix C 361 — 361
¶(e) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
BARACK OBAMA
¶THE WHITE HOUSE,
¶May 21, 2010.
¶362 Appendix D
¶Appendix D
¶Commission Staff and Consultants
Richard Lazarus, Executive Director Tracy Terry, Deputy Director Fred Bartlit, Chief Counsel Jay Hakes, Director of Policy & Research
Priya Aiyar David Greenberg Deputy Chief Counsel Senior Policy Advisor Felicia Barnes Brent Harris Analyst Counsel Adam Benthem Lisa K. Hemmer Analyst Senior Legal Advisor Gordon Binder Joe Hernandez Senior Policy Advisor Analyst Paul Bledsoe Joel Hewett Senior Policy Advisor Analyst Jed J. Borghei Christiana James Counsel Staff Assistant
Hobson Bryan Jill Jonnes
Analyst Senior Researcher Edwin H. Clark, II Nancy Kete Director of Operations Senior Analyst Kate Clark Caitlin Klevorick Senior Analyst Policy Advisor Dave Cohen Emily Lindow Press Secretary Senior Analyst Cindy Drucker Claire Luby Director of Public Engagement Assistant to the Executive Director Katherine Duncan Bethany Mabee Analyst Communications Coordinator