INDEX
¶Page numbers in italics refer to figures and illustrations.
accidents, offshore drilling. See safety, offshore drilling active pit system, definition of,109 Ibid., 286–287. Yearly MMS Incident Summary Reports are available at http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/IncidentStatisticsSum- maries.htm. Testimony of David Young, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 259. Jody Freeman, "Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law" in Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order, ed. David Dyzenhaus (Toronto: Hart Publishing, 1999), 21. Adair, Red,167 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 28, 2010, 467. Ibid. Ibid., 13–14. 168 10 C.F.R. Parts 1–171. Administration for Children and Families,193 Non-public Coast Guard document, October 12, 2010. Administrative Procedure Act,152 Ibid. Testimony of Charlie Williams, 46–53. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 13, 2010. Agenda for Revitalizing Coastal Louisiana,212 Press Release, Army Corps of Louisiana, Corps Decision on State's Emergency Permit Request, May 27, 2010; Army Corps of Engineers, "New Orleans District Emergency Permit Request Action," June 1, 2010, http://www.mvn. usace.army.mil/pao/MVNIPR1June2010Final.pdf. Alabama, effects of Macondo oil spill on, 131, 138, 140, 150, 153, 155, 172, 176–77, 185, 188, 278-79 Alaska, oil and gas industry in: Exxon Valdez spill, 36, 70, 130n, 132–33, 144, 189, 194, 211–12, 231-32; future of, 294, 299, 301–5; history of, 2, 31, 35–36, 40, 45, 46, 52, 63, 67, 78, 220, 301; recommendations for reforms in, 252, 253, 254, 261, 263n,265 Interview with U.S. Geological Survey official, October 21, 2010; Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, October 25, 2010; Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, October 26, 2010. Alaska Natives, 194,303 Deepwaer Horizon MC252 Gulf Incident Oil Budget (August 4, 2010); Jane Lubchenco et al., BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Budget: What Happened to the Oil? (August 4, 2010). Alexander Kjelland (rig), 68–69 Allen, Thad, 136–39, 137, 147, 151, 156–57, 161, 164–67,169 Ibid. Internal Transocean document (TRN-PC 3227). Testimony of Rex Tillerson, Exxon Mobil, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010. Alonso, Dan,142 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 454. Transocean asserts that its personnel, including the driller and toolpusher, were not "in any way responsible for interpreting the negative pressure test or making the decision that the well was secure and work could properly pro- ceed." Rachel Clingman, letter to Commission staff, November 16, 2010, 1. As the Commission's staff made clear at the November 8, 2010 hearing, the Commission is not tasked with deciding legal responsibility. Based on available evidence, however, Revette and Anderson agreed the negative-pressure test was a success and did not stop the job before moving on to the remaining temporary abandonment procedures. Testimony of Lee Lambert, 291; Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-CEC 20347, 20178). Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 104. Amerada Hess Corporation,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. American Chemistry Council,233 Tooms, interview. American Exploration Company,226 Glenn Thrush, "Carville Doesn't Regret Ripping W.H.," Politico, June 2, 2010. American Petroleum Institute (API), 30, 71, 225, 228-29, 241-42 Amoco, 32, 40, 43, 43, 45, 221, 226-27. See also BP Anadarko Petroleum, 2, 43, 48, 51, 90, 94,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. Anderson, Jason, 5–6, 7–8, 17, 107, 109, 112–14 Andrus, Cecil, 62–63 annular preventers, for Macondo well, 93, 107, 108, 114, 274,275 Interview with U.S. Geological Survey official, October 20, 2010; Non-public government science advisor document, July 2, 2010; Interview with industry expert, October 14, 2010. Apache Corporation,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. Arco, 43, 45,70 Ibid., 317; Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 367. Marine Board of the National Research Council Committee on Alternatives for Inspection of Outer Continental Shelf Operations, Alternatives for Inspecting Outer Continental Shelf Operations (Washington: National Academy Press, 1990): 3, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=1517&page=1. This calculation is based on approximate values of the depths and mud weights involved. Arctic, oil and gas industry in, 35–36, 44, 250, 252, 253, 254, 262, 263n, 265, 294, 301–5. See also Alaska, oil and gas industry in Arctic Council,304 Deepwater Horizon MC252 Gulf Incident Oil Budget, 1. Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Operation Guidelines,304 Deepwater Horizon MC252 Gulf Incident Oil Budget, 1. Area Committees, 265-66,268 Tooms, interview. Area Contingency Plans, 265–66, 268,271 Interview with U.S. Geological Survey official, October 21, 2010. Argo,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S., 154, 156-57, 169, 204, 206–08 Asian immigrant populations, in Gulf of Mexico region, 179, 192,193 Non-public Coast Guard document, October 12, 2010. Atchafalaya River, 199,204 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Summary of Ineligible PWs for Barrier Islands (November 11, 2010); Tod Wells, e-mail to Commission staff, November 8, 2010; Tim Padgett, "Dredge, Baby, Dredge: Can Sand Stop the Oil?," Time, June 1, 2010. Atlantic Richfield. See Arco Atlantis site, 46–50 ATP Oil & Gas Corporation,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. Audrey, Hurricane (1957),25 Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCDC 92); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 82. Kash et al., Energy Under the Oceans, 105. Bryan Clawson (Weatherford), interview with Commission staff, October 28, 2010; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (September 8, 2010), 70. Audubon Society,141 Internal BP Document (BP August 9, 2010 presentation to Oil Spill Commission, slide 13). The Commission agrees with others that there is no such thing as a "bladder effect" that could account for the pres- sures the rig crew was observing. There was no apparent explanation for the 1400 psi on the drill pipe other than that the well was flowing. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 1, 2010. Auger site, 23, 36, 38-40, 39,42 Ibid. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 68). Australia, offshore oil and gas industry in, 44,224 National Incident Command, Summary of NIC Barrier Island Berm Meeting, June 1, 2010.
369Baker, James III, 221-22 Baker Hughes, 38,44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). Bankston (supply vessel), 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 16–19,130 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 450; Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39. Testimony of Jesse Gagliano, 259; Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, 415. Ibid. barrier islands, along Gulf of Mexico coast, 154, 193–94, 199, 203, 206–07 beaches, effects of Macondo oil spill on, 155, 175–77, 185–91 Berger, Jonah,188 Ibid., 125–126. Mike Allen, "Gulf Commander to Begin Solo Briefings," Politico, May 31, 2010. Graeme Wearden, "BP oil spill costs to hit $40bn," The Guardian, November 2, 2010 ($39.9 billion estimated costs); 33 U.S.C. §2716 (maximum required financial responsibility for offshore facilities is $150 million). berms, use of after Macondo oil spill, 151–57, 169; recommendations for reforms affecting, 265,271 Interview with U.S. Geological Survey official, October 21, 2010. Bertone, Steve, 5, 9–11, 13–17 Betsy, Hurricane (1965),27 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 24. National Research Council, Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies (The National Academies Press: Washington, DC, 1992), http://www.nap.edu/catalog. php?record_id=2062. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 137367). Bhopal (India), chemical leak in, 231-34 BHP Billiton, 46, 51, 226-27 Bik, Holly,177 Testimony of Kevin Robb, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 44. Matthew Daly, "Month After Oil Spill, Why Is BP Still in Charge?," ABC News, May 21, 2010, http://abcnews. go.com/Business/wireStory?id=10713257. Helix Energy Solutions Group, "Spill Containment: Fast Response to GOM Subsea Oil Spills" (unpublished document provided to Commission staff by Helix Energy Solutions Group). birds, in Gulf of Mexico region, 141, 142, 143, 175–77, 181,183 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 52; Ibid., 48–53. Jeffrey Ball and Jonathan Weisman, "Slippery Start: U.S. Response to Spill Falters," Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2010. Ibid. 184 33 U.S.C. § 2704. 185 33 U.S.C. § 2704; 33 U.S.C § 1321 (Clean Water Act civil and criminal penalties); Jonathan Ramseur, Oil Spills in U.S. Coastal Waters: Background, Governance, and Issues for Congress (Congressional Research Service, updated September 2, 2008), 26 ("A 2003 study identified 16 states that impose unlimited liability for oil spills."). Birnbaum, Elizabeth,151 Ibid., 43. Testimony of Darryl Bourgoyne, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010, 133. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, November 15, 2010. Blanchard, Dean,171 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 49. The industry and the international community also failed to adequately communicate lessons learned from the Montara blowout, which for ten weeks beginning on August 21, 2009 spewed between 400 and 1500 barrels per day of oil and gas into the Timor Sea approximately 150 miles off the northwest coast of Australia. David Borth- wick, Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry (The Montara Commission of Inquiry, Australia, June 2010), 5, 26. According to the Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry, released on November 24, 2010, many of the technical and managerial causes of the Montara blowout track those at Macondo. For instance, the Commission of Inquiry concluded that the cement job in the "9 5/8" casing shoe failed, that there were numerous risk factors surrounding the cement job that went unheeded, and that the cement job was not properly pressure tested. Ibid., 7. According to the Commission of Inquiry: The multiple problems in undertaking the cement job—such as the failure of the top and bottom plugs to cre- ate a seal after "bumping," the failure of the float valves and an unexpected rush of fluid—should have raised alarm bells. Those problems necessitated a careful evaluation of what happened, the instigation of pressure testing and, most likely, remedial action. No such careful evaluation was undertaken. The problems were not complicated or unsolvable, and the potential remedies were well known and not costly. This was a failure of "sensible oilfield practice 101." Ibid. The Commission of Inquiry went on to conclude that while the "absence of tested barriers was a proximate cause of the Blowout," the deeper failure was a systemic failure of management on the part of the operator, PTTEP Australasia. Ibid., 9. Testimony of Michael Bromwich, Director, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, Department of the Interior, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010, 228. blowout preventer (BOP), 92; attempts to seal at Macondo well, 131–32, 137–38, 146, 149–50, 159–67, 159n, 253n, 273; and causes of Macondo well blowout, 115, 120, 121–22; engineering challenges of, 28, 49, 52; on Macondo well, 7, 13, 14, 19, 92–93, 103, 114–15, 121–22; recommendations for reforms affecting, 274-75; safety regulations for, 73–74,152 Ibid. Testimony of Charlie Williams, 46–53. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 13, 2010. Blue Water 1 (drilling barge), 23,25 Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCDC 92); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 82. Kash et al., Energy Under the Oceans, 105. Bryan Clawson (Weatherford), interview with Commission staff, October 28, 2010; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (September 8, 2010), 70. Boeing,230 "Shaw Group Wins Contract to Build Barrier Island Temporary Berms," Times-Picayune, June 4, 2010; Jeffrey Ball, "Accusations Fly in Sand-Berm Project," Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2010. Bonnie, Tropical Storm (2010),154 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 44. Between 8:00 and 9:49 p.m., the crew was performing a number of other activities that may have further con- founded the data or at least distracted the driller. The crew was emptying various tanks on the rig into the active pit system, including "trip tanks" and "sand traps," which may have masked increased flow out of the well into the ac- tive pit system. At 9:18 p.m., a valve on one of the pumps blew, and a number of crew members from the rig floor went to fix it. Finally, the crew was operating one or both of the cranes on the main deck, which could have affected flow-out and volume readings. Lee Gard, interview.
¶boom, use of after Macondo oil spill, 132, 140–41, 151–54, 153, 170, 177,179 Internal BP Document (BP-HZN-MBI 143366). Frank McCormack, "Privateer Perfection," Plaquemines Gazette, June 7, 2010. "Moody's Offshore drilling insurance rates to jump," BusinessWeek, June 4, 2010. BP: and causes of Macondo well blowout, 90, 115–27, 125, 221; compensation of victims of Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 179, 185–86, 189, 193, 278, 283, 284, 287; containment initiatives after Macondo well blowout and oil spill,
¶241–43; corporate revenue of, 2, 284; and drilling of Macondo well, 2–4, 42, 82–85, 89–90, 92–115, 132, 273, 274;
¶engineering innovations of, 31–32; expenditures on Macondo well blowout and oil spill response, 135n, 179, 184–85,
¶188, 189, 194, 238, 244, 278, 283, 284, 287; history of drilling in Gulf of Mexico, 23, 36–37, 40–41, 43, 45–53;
¶lawsuits against after Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 279; response to Macondo well blowout and oil spill,
¶16–17, 130–70, 174, 184–85, 188, 189, 194, 272, 274; risk-management processes of, 216–21; and safety issues, 2,
¶6, 216–21, 224–25,295 Transcript, Press Briefing by National Incident Commander Admiral Thad Allen and NOAA Administrator Dr. Jane Lubchenco, July 24, 2010. BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Budget: What Happened to the Oil?, 167–69, 167n, 168n Brazil, offshore oil and gas industry in,44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). Breaux, John,207 Kristi Cantu, letter to Pete J. Serio, May 11, 2010. Breaux Act (1990). See Coastal Wetlands, Planning, Protection and Restoration Act (1990). Brice-O'Hara, Sally,136 Ibid. If BP were looking, the one February test actually reported to BP could have prompted BP to question the design as well. BP argues that its failure to do so here is understandable given that it had hired one of the world's leading cementers specifically for purposes of designing and testing the cement slurry. Alice Camp, "Nuclear: In Pursuit of a Renaissance," EPRI Journal (Summer 2007): 20. Bromwich, Michael,241 Interview with U.S. Geological Survey official, October 21, 2010; Interview with U.S. Department of Energy of- ficial, September 17, 2010. Brown, Douglas, 4,9 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (September 8, 2010), 17. Ben C. Belt, "Louisiana and Texas Offshore Prospects," Drilling (March 1956): 119. United States v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459, 466–68, 474–83 (1915). (Upholding authority of the president to withdraw unilaterally from private disposition valuable energy resources located on public lands in order to protect those resources while Congress considers legislation for their retention in national ownership). Brett Clanton, "New tactic might seal leaking well sooner, BP CEO says," Houston Chronicle, May 5, 2010. Paul Rioux and Chris Kirkham, "Search for 11 Workers Missing After Oil Rig Explosion Is Expected To Be Called Off Friday," Times-Picayune, April 22, 2010. Department of Interior, Department Manual Part 516: National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (September 2009), 3.4. Brown, Michael,137 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 368, 396. To the contrary, Halliburton's selection of conditioning time appears to have been haphazard at best. Lab person- nel used different conditioning times (ranging from zero conditioning time to three hours) in each of the four foam stability tests that they conducted. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 81. Brown, Stephen,297 Pat Campbell, letter to Richard Lynch, July 28, 2010; Henry Fountain, "Expert is Confident about Sealing Oil Well," New York Times, May 24, 2010; Interview with industry expert, October 14, 2010. Brown & Root, 21, 24,32 Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 23, 2010, 442. Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Program: Hearings before the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). John Gisclair, Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010 (annotations, September 20, 2010). Commission calculation based on internal Halliburton document (HAL_10994). Browne, John, 45,47 Testimony of Lee Lambert, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 291; Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-CEC 20347, 20178). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 171151). Browner, Carol, 161, 165, 167–68, 167n Bullwinkle site, 33, 34, 36–38,40 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 281. At this point, it appears that lab personnel replicated the dry blend recipe that was on the rig using off-the-shelf ma- terials from their lab. For later tests, Halliburton sent samples of the cement that was actually on the Horizon back to the lab and directly tested those materials. Bureau of Indian Affairs,63 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 295; Testimony of Pat O'Bryan, 366. President George H.W. Bush, "Statement on Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development," (June 26, 1990), http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2035&year=1990&month=6. 64 30 C.F.R. pt. 250. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126928). Bureau of Land Management, 26, 63, 76–77 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE), 55, 131n, 241, 255, 255n, 257, 261,
¶266, 273,290 Interview with Coast Guard official, October, 18, 2010; Interview with U.S. Geological Survey official, October 21, 2010. Burkeen, Dale,17 "Brazil Pins Hopes on Massive, untapped Oil Fields," NPR, December 1, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ story.php?storyId=120966523. On Project Mohole and JOIDES, see David K. van Keuren, "Breaking New Ground: The Origins of Scientific Ocean Drilling," in The Machine in Neptune's Garden: Historical Perspectives on Technology and the Marine Environment, eds. Helen M. Rozwadowski and David K. van Keuren (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2004), 183–210. On Shell's Eureka project, see Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 97, 218. E.R. Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy: A Legal and Historical Analysis. Testimony of Jesse Gagliano, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 320. burning of surface oil, after Macondo oil spill, 143, 159, 168–69, 168n,168 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 50. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 38362). Bush, George H. W., 24,67 Ibid., 281-282, 311. Petroleum Safety Authority of Norway, "From Prescription to Performance in Petroleum Supervision," March 12, 2010, http://www.ptil.no/news/from-prescription-to-performance-in-petroleum-supervision-article6696-79.html. Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCEC 90). Bush, George W., 52,137 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, 368, 396. To the contrary, Halliburton's selection of conditioning time appears to have been haphazard at best. Lab person- nel used different conditioning times (ranging from zero conditioning time to three hours) in each of the four foam stability tests that they conducted. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 81.
¶California, oil and gas industry in, 20, 23, 26, 28–29, 29, 31, 56, 58, 63, 67, 135, 181, 297,301 Statement by National Incident Commander Admiral Thad Allen, August, 4 2010. Callon Petroleum Operating Company,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. Camardelle, David,151 Ibid., 43. Testimony of Darryl Bourgoyne, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010, 133. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, November 15, 2010. Cameron International Corporation,131 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 35. Mr. Guide disagreed with the BP report's conclusion in an interview with Commission staff. Guide, interview. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 6, 2010. Camille, Hurricane (1969),27 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 24. National Research Council, Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies (The National Academies Press: Washington, DC, 1992), http://www.nap.edu/catalog. php?record_id=2062. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 137367). Campbell, Pat,167 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 28, 2010, 467. Ibid. Ibid., 13–14. 168 10 C.F.R. Parts 1–171. Canada, offshore oil and gas industry in, 69,302 Face the Nation, CBS News, August 8, 2010. capping stack, 162–67 Carden, Stan, 11, 13, 15,16 Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126338); Internal BP document (BP-HZN-OSC 5378). Priest, "Auctioning the Ocean," 113. Richard Vietor, Energy Policy in America since 1945: A Study of Business-Government Relations (New York: Cam- bridge University Press, 1984), 19. Guide, interview. Indeed, just days before the running of the long string at Macondo, another well drilled by Trans- ocean's DD3 suffered just such a complication. Ibid. Carla, Hurricane (1961),27 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 24. National Research Council, Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies (The National Academies Press: Washington, DC, 1992), http://www.nap.edu/catalog. php?record_id=2062. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 137367). Carter, Jimmy, 59–63 casing, offshore well, 91, 95; and attempts to seal Macondo well after blowout, 158, 162; in Macondo well, 4, 92–99,
¶102–6, 113, 115; safety regulations for, 30, 43,152 Ibid. Testimony of Charlie Williams, 46–53. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 13, 2010. cement evaluation tools, definitions of,102 Ibid., 38–39. WEST Engineering Services, Inc., "Comments by WEST Engineering Services, Houston, Texas, to The National Com- mission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling" (November 12, 2010): 3. Ibid., 21:14–21:15. Testimony of Marvin Odum, Shell, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010. cementing, in offshore wells, 91, 99; and attempts to seal Macondo well after blowout, 132, 167, 169; and causes of
¶Macondo well blowout, 115–18, 125; in Macondo well, 1, 3–4, 7, 94, 96, 98–103; safety regulations for, 152,228 Mark Kaufman, "BP Says More La. Barrier Island Berms Will Cost $360 Million," Washington Post, June 3, 2010. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,141 Internal BP Document (BP August 9, 2010 presentation to Oil Spill Commission, slide 13). The Commission agrees with others that there is no such thing as a "bladder effect" that could account for the pres- sures the rig crew was observing. There was no apparent explanation for the 1400 psi on the drill pipe other than that the well was flowing. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 1, 2010. centralizers, offshore well, 96; in Macondo well, 96–97, 116, 118, 123; safety regulations for,77 Ibid., 283–284. Ibid. Testimony of Randy Ezell, 279. C. F. Bean,157 Ibid., 46–47. Ibid.; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 193529-39). Ibid. CGG Veritas,44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). Chaisson, Nathaniel,102 Ibid., 38–39. WEST Engineering Services, Inc., "Comments by WEST Engineering Services, Houston, Texas, to The National Com- mission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling" (November 12, 2010): 3. Ibid., 21:14–21:15. Testimony of Marvin Odum, Shell, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010. chemical industry, safety issues in,233 Tooms, interview. Chemical Safety Board, 219, 221-22 Chet Morrison Contractors,44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). Chevron: containment initiatives after Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 243-45; history of drilling in Gulf of Mexico,
¶21, 24, 29, 32, 42, 43, 46, 47, 50, 51, 84n; oil-spill response plans of, 133; and safety issues, 226-27 Chu, Steven, 138, 148–50, 148, 161–65, 253n civil aviation, safety issues in,229 William Grawe, e-mail to Admiral Thad Allen, June 2, 2010. Clark, Donald, 17,109 Ibid., 286–287. Yearly MMS Incident Summary Reports are available at http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/IncidentStatisticsSum- maries.htm. Testimony of David Young, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 259. Jody Freeman, "Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law" in Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order, ed. David Dyzenhaus (Toronto: Hart Publishing, 1999), 21. Clean Gulf Associates,30 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 113; Testimony of Curt Kuchta, 184. The five laws included the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617, Energy Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 95- 618, National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, Pub. L. No. 95-620, and Natural Gas Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-621. David Izon, E.P. Danenberger, and Melinda Mayes, "Absence of fatalities in blowouts encouraging in MMS study of OCS incidents 1992-2006," Well Control July/August (2007), 84. Clean Water Act, 80, 84, 200, 211, 245, 265,280 Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, November 8, 2010; Non-public government science advisor document, July 13, 2010. climate change, 295, 298, 300,305 Heather Zichal, e-mail to Jane Lubchenco, July 29, 2010. Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana,207 Kristi Cantu, letter to Pete J. Serio, May 11, 2010. coastal and marine spatial planning, 201, 262–63, 281–82 Coastal Impact Assistance Program,208 Colonel Alvin Lee, interview with Commission staff, October 28, 2010. Coastal Studies Institute (Louisiana State University),206 Interview with Coast Guard official, August 30, 2010; Mark Schleifstein, "Barrier Berm Advocates Not Deterred by Environmental Regulators' Misgivings," Times-Picayune, September 20, 2010. Coastal Wetlands, Planning, Protection and Restoration Act (1990),207 Kristi Cantu, letter to Pete J. Serio, May 11, 2010. Coast Guard, U.S.: recommendations for reforms in, 251, 256, 257, 266–74, 276; and regulation of offshore drilling,
¶62, 68n, 75–76, 301, 304; response to Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 17–19, 129–61, 163,170 Testimony of Anthony Gervasio, 197. Transocean states that on April 5, 2010, it posted a short, two-page version of this advisory to an internal electronic document platform, which supervisors on the Deepwater Horizon had access to. But the advisory was limited to completion operations, and, as of this writing, Transocean has not offered any evidence that anyone on the rig actu- ally saw or reviewed the advisory. Ibid. Coast Guard-Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation
¶Team, 130n
370Coast 2050,207 Kristi Cantu, letter to Pete J. Serio, May 11, 2010. Cocales, Brett, 97,116 Testimony of Capt. Alwin Landry, 101–102. Testimony of Randy Ezell, 283; Young, interview. Ibid. cofferdam (containment dome), use of after Macondo oil spill, 145–46,159 Testimony of Michael Williams, 26. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 117603). Ibid., 116. Cognac site, 23, 31–32 Commerce, Department of,255 Captain James Hanzalik, e-mail to Captain Anthony Lloyd, June 8, 2010. Commission on Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy Resources (1981–82), 63–64 Commission on Ocean Policy, U.S. (2004),281 Statement from National Incident Commander Admiral Thad Allen on Well Integrity Test, July 13, 2010. Concept Safety Evaluation program (Norway),71 Testimony of David Sims, August 26, 2010, 174. Minerals Management Service, Final Report, Findings and Recommendations, MMS Task Force on OCS Inspection and Enforcement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, February 1990), 1-3. Testimony of Leo Lindner, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 19, 2010, 297; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, app. Q, 1. Congress, role of in regulation of oil and gas industry: history of, 56, 58–60, 62–63, 65–67, 70, 76, 79–82, 85, 269, 298, 301; overlapping committees, 288–89; recommendations for reforms in, 249–91, 299, 304,306 Jane Lubchenco, e-mail to Sean Smith and others, August 4, 2010. ConocoPhillips, 31, 34, 40, 42–43, 68–69, 84n, 133, 244-45 Constitution, and environmental protection, 57,67 Ibid., 281-282, 311. Petroleum Safety Authority of Norway, "From Prescription to Performance in Petroleum Supervision," March 12, 2010, http://www.ptil.no/news/from-prescription-to-performance-in-petroleum-supervision-article6696-79.html. Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCEC 90). contracting, in offshore oil and gas industry: history of, 24, 37–38, 40, 43–44, 74; and liability issues, 245-46; recommendations for reforms in, 251–54; and safety issues, 221–22 Cook, Kevin, 157,166 Testimony of Curt Kuchta, 219. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 38361). U.S. Department of the Interior, Outer Continental Shelf Safety Oversight Board, Report to the Secretary of the Interior (September 1, 2010), 11–13. Cooper, Anderson, 139, 150, 157,187 Testimony of Capt. Alwin Landry , 121–122. Gardner Harris, "Minerals Management Service Director Resigns Over Spill," New York Times, May 27, 2010. Testimony of Charles Anderson, SKULD North America, "Liability and Financial Responsibility for Oil Spills under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and Related Statutes," Hearing Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 111th Congress (2010), 9. Cooper, George,149 Ibid., 40–41. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8574). corals, in Gulf of Mexico, 174–75, 182,183 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 52; Ibid., 48–53. Jeffrey Ball and Jonathan Weisman, "Slippery Start: U.S. Response to Spill Falters," Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2010. Ibid. 184 33 U.S.C. § 2704. 185 33 U.S.C. § 2704; 33 U.S.C § 1321 (Clean Water Act civil and criminal penalties); Jonathan Ramseur, Oil Spills in U.S. Coastal Waters: Background, Governance, and Issues for Congress (Congressional Research Service, updated September 2, 2008), 26 ("A 2003 study identified 16 states that impose unlimited liability for oil spills."). Corexit (dispersant),144 Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, October 5, 2010, 157. Benjamin Powell, "BP Response to Presidential Commission's Preliminary Technical Conclusions," letter to Commis- sion staff, November 22, 2010, att. 1, 3 (citing Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 111th Cong. (May 11, 2010) (statement of Testimony of Tim Probert, Halliburton President, Global Business Lines, Chief Health, Safety and Environmental Officer)). Michael Golay (MIT), interview with Commission Staff, October 27, 2010. Costner, Kevin,142 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 454. Transocean asserts that its personnel, including the driller and toolpusher, were not "in any way responsible for interpreting the negative pressure test or making the decision that the well was secure and work could properly pro- ceed." Rachel Clingman, letter to Commission staff, November 16, 2010, 1. As the Commission's staff made clear at the November 8, 2010 hearing, the Commission is not tasked with deciding legal responsibility. Based on available evidence, however, Revette and Anderson agreed the negative-pressure test was a success and did not stop the job before moving on to the remaining temporary abandonment procedures. Testimony of Lee Lambert, 291; Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-CEC 20347, 20178). Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 104. Council on Environmental Quality, 210, 260–62 Cox, Christopher,234 Interview with Coast Guard official, October 18, 2010; Interview with Minerals Management Service official, Octo- ber 15, 2010. crabs, in Gulf of Mexico, 175, 177–78, 186–87 Creole site, 21–22,23 Testimony of Douglas Brown, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 26, 2010, 88, 91. Don E. Kash et al., Energy Under the Oceans: A Technology Assessment of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Opera- tions (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973), 104. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370h. Testimony of Steve Lewis, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010, 93–94; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 129226). Prior to conversion, a small ball drops from the top of the float valves to block the main path through the auto-fill tube, leaving only two small holes on the side of the tube through which mud can flow. Ibid. Crist, Charlie, 150,151 Ibid., 43. Testimony of Darryl Bourgoyne, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010, 133. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, November 15, 2010. Crone, Timothy, 167n Cuba, offshore oil and gas industry in, 254,300 Press Release, BP, MC252 Well Reaches Static Condition; Well Monitoring Underway, August 4, 2010. Curtis, Stephen, 8, 17, 109, 113–14
371Danciger Oil & Refining Co.,2 Internal BP document (BP, presentation to Commission, August 9, 2010, slides 5 & 12). Quoted in Tom Zoellner, "Oil and Water: The Adventure of Getting One from Deep Beneath the Other," Invention and Technology (Fall 2000): 48. Internal Transocean document (TRN-HEC 90686). Internal documents are identified by their document production serial numbers when available, which were assigned by the entity that provided them. Neil MacFarquhar, "Routine Flights Become Overland Odysseys, Minus Clean Socks," New York Times, April 22, 2010. Campbell Robertson and Clifford Krauss, "Gulf Spill Is the Largest of Its Kind, Scientists Say," New York Times, August 2, 2010. BP, Sustainability Review (2009), 20–21. http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/ e_s_assets/e_s_assets_2009/downloads_pdfs/bp_sustainability_review_2009.pdf. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(6) ("An oil and gas lease issued pursuant to this section shall . . . contain such rental and other provisions as the Secretary may prescribe at the time of offering the area for lease."). dead zone. See hypoxia DeepStar consortium,38 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 443. S.L. Pickett and S.W. Cole, "Foamed Cementing Technique for Liners Yields Cost-Effective Results" (Society of Petro- leum Engineers SPE Paper #27679, Midland, Texas, March 1994), 523–24. deepwater drilling: changing definitions of, 25–27, 31, 41–43, 41, 46, 52–53; engineering challenges of, 2, 24, 26–28, 31–34, 35, 36–38, 46, 52–53, 90–92, 94; future of, 293–306; history of, 21–53, 49; moratorium on after Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 151–52, 185; recommendations for reforms in, 249–91, 299–300; safety issues with, 35–36, 72–76, 216–45; size of reservoirs, 31–33, 36–45, 46–48, 51, 91; spill containment options for, 135–36, 145- 46,149 Ibid., 40–41. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8574). Deepwater Horizon (rig), 1; blowout events of April 20, 8–19, 18, 88, 102–15; causes of blowout, 90, 115–27, 125; crew of, 1–6, 191, 198, 223; and drilling of Macondo well, 2–4, 53, 92–115; history of, 1–3, 23, 44, 51, 53; oil spill, 127, 129–70; safety issues on, 6, 223; sinking of, 55, 130–32. See also Macondo well Deepwater Horizon MC252 Gulf Incident Oil Budget, 167–69, 168n Deepwater Royalty Relief Act, 23, 42,76 Ibid., 283. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,400 (July 2, 1991). Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 219; Defense, Department of, 183, 208, 255. See also Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Dekle, Scott,187 Testimony of Capt. Alwin Landry , 121–122. Gardner Harris, "Minerals Management Service Director Resigns Over Spill," New York Times, May 27, 2010. Testimony of Charles Anderson, SKULD North America, "Liability and Financial Responsibility for Oil Spills under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and Related Statutes," Hearing Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 111th Congress (2010), 9. Deltares,154 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 44. Between 8:00 and 9:49 p.m., the crew was performing a number of other activities that may have further con- founded the data or at least distracted the driller. The crew was emptying various tanks on the rig into the active pit system, including "trip tanks" and "sand traps," which may have masked increased flow out of the well into the ac- tive pit system. At 9:18 p.m., a valve on one of the pumps blew, and a number of crew members from the rig floor went to fix it. Finally, the crew was operating one or both of the cranes on the main deck, which could have affected flow-out and volume readings. Lee Gard, interview. Dennis, Hurricane (2005), 48,50 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 364–365, 393. See S. Rep. No. 95-285, at 154–5 (reprinting letter from Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus). Ibid. Denny, Patricia,189 Ibid., 126. Chapter Two Interview with government official, October 8, 2010. Rawle King, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Disaster: Risk, Recovery, and Insurance Implications (Congressional Re- search Service, July 12, 2010), 16–18. Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 2006,208 Colonel Alvin Lee, interview with Commission staff, October 28, 2010. departments, U.S. See specific departments under the first key term in their names (e.g., Interior, Department of the) Designated Engineering Representatives, 230,234 Interview with Coast Guard official, October 18, 2010; Interview with Minerals Management Service official, Octo- ber 15, 2010. Devon Energy, 47,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. Diamond Offshore,43 Ibid. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 36). Dickey, Bob,187 Testimony of Capt. Alwin Landry , 121–122. Gardner Harris, "Minerals Management Service Director Resigns Over Spill," New York Times, May 27, 2010. Testimony of Charles Anderson, SKULD North America, "Liability and Financial Responsibility for Oil Spills under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and Related Statutes," Hearing Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 111th Congress (2010), 9. Discoverer Enterprise, 46, 49, 145, 159,159 Testimony of Michael Williams, 26. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 117603). Ibid., 116. Discoverer Seven Seas, 33,37 Ibid.; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 280. Document provided to the Commission by Halliburton entitled "Halliburton GoM Foam Jobs 2002–2010." dispersants, use of: after Macondo oil spill, 133, 143–45, 147, 160–61, 169–70, 168, 174-76, 180, 181–82, 187; recommendations for reforms affecting, 265, 269, 270–71,278 Admiral Thad Allen, letter to Bob Dudley, July 12, 2010. diverter system, definition of,114 Testimony of Capt. Alwin Landry, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 98–100. Young, interview. Ibid., 130. Dodd, Mark,176 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 51. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 127906). MMS approved a number of other requests by BP for deviations on the Macondo well. None of those other approvals appear to have contributed to the blowout. However, they do sug- gest that the MMS staff did not spend much time deciding whether to grant the requests, which may have been due to the severe funding and staffing shortages in the New Orleans office. Chapter Five Marine Well Containment Company, "About Us," http://www.marinewellcontainment.com/index.php. dolphins. See marine mammals Dominion Exploration & Production,225 Admiral Thad Allen, interview with Commission staff, November 2, 2010; Denise Reed, interview with Commission staff, November 16, 2010; Interview with Coast Guard official, November 12, 2010. Drake, Edwin,296 Bob Dudley, letter to Admiral Thad Allen, July 19, 2010. Dresser Industries,44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). drilling terminology, definitions of,91 Testimony of Andrea Fleytas, 14. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf–Incident Reporting Requirements, 68 Fed. Reg. 40,585 (July 8, 2003). The Commission believes, based on interviews of the mudloggers on the Horizon, that the Hitec system may have shown a more obvious trend because it displays numeric values as opposed to trend lines such as those seen in the Sperry data shown in the text. Joseph Keith (Sperry), interview with Commission staff, October 6, 2010; Cathleenia Willis (Sperry), interview with Commission staff, October 21, 2010. National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation (September 18, 1990), http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/ letters/1990/M90_26_31A.pdf. drill pipe, 74, 91; in Macondo well, 4, 5, 6–7, 92–93, 104-08, 110-14, 111, 113, 120–21 Duplessis, Bonnie,209 Colonel Lee, interview; Press Release, Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Gover- nor Jindal & Coastal Parish Leaders Meet with Army Corps of Engineers to Stress Importance of Approving Dredg- Duplessis, Clarence R.,209 Colonel Lee, interview; Press Release, Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Gover- nor Jindal & Coastal Parish Leaders Meet with Army Corps of Engineers to Stress Importance of Approving Dredg-
¶East Cameron Partners,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. economy, effects of Macondo oil spill on, 173–74, 179, 185-91, 200; compensatory damages related to, 174, 179,
¶185–86, 189, 193, 278, 283, 284, 287; fishing and seafood industry, 139–41, 163, 170, 171, 179, 185–88, 188,
¶193–94, 197, 209; health problems of local population, 191–95; local businesses, 155, 163; oil and gas industry,
¶151–52, 185–86, 197; ports of, 186, 197; recommendations for reforms related to, 275–82; tourism, 155, 177,
¶185–86, 188–91,197 Interview with government official, October 13, 2010. Effective Daily Recovery Capacity regulations,270 Interview with industry expert, October 14, 2010. Eisenhower, Dwight,58 Ibid., 25; Testimony of Chris Pleasant, 118–119. G. Kevin Jones, "Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development During the Reagan Administration—Part 1," West- ern New England Law Review 12, 1, (1990):8–13. Testimony of John Guide, 298 (the cement plug was "deeper than normal"); Testimony of Ronald Sepulvado, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 145 ("the top of the surface plug is normally at 500 feet below the wellhead"). El Paso E&P Company,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. emergency disconnect system, and Macondo well blowout, 13–15, 114–15 Endangered Species Act, 80, 84,181 Urbina and Gillis, "Workers On Oil Rig Recall a Terrible Night of Blasts." Paul Rioux, "President Barack Obama Promises No Retreat from Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Response," Times-Picauyne, May 28, 2010. Aspen Re interview with Commission staff, October 19, 2010; Testimony of Dr. Robert Hartwig, President and Economist, Insurance Information Institute, "Liability and Financial Responsibility for Oil Spills under the Oil Pollu- tion Act of 1990 and Related Statutes," Hearing Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Energy, Department of, 59; recommendations for reforms in, 253, 253n, 264, 267, 270, 272; response to Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 148–50 Energy Information Administration,302 Face the Nation, CBS News, August 8, 2010. Energy Partners, Ltd.,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. energy policy: future of, 294–306; goal of energy independence, 56, 59–60,294 Interview with U.S. Geological Survey official, October 21, 2010. Energy Resource Technology,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. engineering: contracting for, 24, 44; for deepwater drilling, 2, 31–32, 35, 36–38, 53, 90–92, 94; of Mississippi River,
¶177, 194, 197, 204, 206, 210; recommendations for reforms in, 243, 269–70, 272–75; and response to Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 135–37, 143–50, 154, 156-62, 164-70 Eni US Operating Co.,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. environment, effects of Macondo oil spill on, 172-73, 173–95, 175, 176, 196-97, 202; deepwater oil plumes, 175,
¶181–82; marine ecosystems, 174–82; Natural Resource Damage Assessment, 182–85, 276; recommendations for reforms related to, 275–82; waste from response effort, 170; wildlife health, 139–43, 153–54, 174–82 Environmental Defense Fund,187 Testimony of Capt. Alwin Landry , 121–122. Gardner Harris, "Minerals Management Service Director Resigns Over Spill," New York Times, May 27, 2010. Testimony of Charles Anderson, SKULD North America, "Liability and Financial Responsibility for Oil Spills under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and Related Statutes," Hearing Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 111th Congress (2010), 9. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 235; recommendations for reforms in, 257, 262, 266, 267–72, 274, 278, 282;
¶and regulation of offshore drilling, 68n, 219, 255; response to Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 133, 143–45, 160,
¶167n, 170,187 Testimony of Capt. Alwin Landry , 121–122. Gardner Harris, "Minerals Management Service Director Resigns Over Spill," New York Times, May 27, 2010. Testimony of Charles Anderson, SKULD North America, "Liability and Financial Responsibility for Oil Spills under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and Related Statutes," Hearing Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 111th Congress (2010), 9. environmental protection movement, 29–30, 33, 56, 58–60, 63, 79–85, 197–213 Environmental Studies Program (Department of the Interior), 59, 259,263 Matthew L. Wald, "Despite Directive, BP Used Dispersant Often, Panel Finds," New York Times, July 31, 2010; "Allen 'Satisfied' with Dispersant Use in Gulf Oil Disaster," CNN, August 2, 2010. equivalent circulating density (ECD), definition of,94 Complaint at 2, Shivers v. BP Plc., No. 10-cv-381 (S.D. Ala. July 20, 2010). Commission staff analysis of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement data. See http:// www.boemre.gov/adm/budget.html. Testimony of Greg Meche, 207–09, 219. Testimony of Rex Tillerson, CEO of Exxon Mobil, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010. erosion, in Gulf of Mexico region, 197–213,205 Van Oord and Deltares, Save the Delta, The Dutch Perspective, May 6, 2010; Chris Kirkham, "Gov. Bobby Jindal and Plaquemines Officials Float Plan to Rebuild Barrier Islands to Stop Encroaching Oil," Times-Picayune, May 8, 2010. Eureka (drillship),27 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 24. National Research Council, Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies (The National Academies Press: Washington, DC, 1992), http://www.nap.edu/catalog. php?record_id=2062. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 137367). explosions, history of in oil and gas industry, 8–19, 29–30, 69, 102–15, 217–20, 216,220 Press Release, Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Governor Jindal: President Promised Sand-Boom Plan Progress in Days, Need Swift Action, May 28, 2010. ExxonMobil: containment initiatives after Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 240, 243-45; history of drilling in
¶Gulf of Mexico, 25, 36, 40, 42, 42n, 45, 46, 84n; oil-spill response plans of, 133; Operations Integrity Management
¶System (OIMS), 231-32; role in response to Macondo well blowout and oil spill,164 Ibid., 48–49. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 38355). Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 44. Exxon Valdez (vessel), oil spill from, 36, 70, 130n, 132–33, 144, 189, 194, 211–12, 230, 232, 270, 277n, 280,288 Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, October 26, 2010; Interview with Minerals Management Service official, October 15, 2010; Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, October 21, 2010; Non-public gov- ernment science document, July 15, 2010. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council,280 Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, November 8, 2010; Non-public government science advisor document, July 13, 2010. Exxon Valdez Trustee Council Science Panel,211 Senator David Vitter, letter to President Barack Obama, May 21, 2010. Ezell, Randy, 5–8, 11, 15–16, 18, 112,114 Testimony of Capt. Alwin Landry, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 98–100. Young, interview. Ibid., 130.
¶Fairways Offshore Exploration, Inc.,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (2002),270 Interview with industry expert, October 14, 2010. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 230, 253n Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 257,290 Interview with Coast Guard official, October, 18, 2010; Interview with U.S. Geological Survey official, October 21, 2010. Federal On-Scene Coordinator, 130–31, 134–36, 135n, 138, 142–44, 150, 153, 160–62, 170, 270,276 Admiral Thad Allen, letter to Bob Dudley, July 9, 2010. Feinberg, Kenneth, 189, 194,287 Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, November 8, 2010; Non-public U.S. Department of Energy document, July 16, 2010; Non-public government science advisor document, July 15, 2010. Fina Oil & Chemical Company,45 Ibid., 116–118; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 117. Ibid. fish, in Gulf of Mexico, 139–40, 174–75, 178–81, 185–88, 193–94 Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S., 58, 206, 262,303 Deepwaer Horizon MC252 Gulf Incident Oil Budget (August 4, 2010); Jane Lubchenco et al., BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Budget: What Happened to the Oil? (August 4, 2010). fishing and seafood industry, 30; effects of Macondo oil spill on, 139–43, 163, 171, 179, 183, 185–88, 188, 193–94,
¶197, 209, 278–79; overfishing by, 199,201 Liz Robbins and Campbell Robertson, "Tension Among Officials Grows as Storm Nears," New York Times, July 23, 2010. Fitzgerald, Timothy,187 Testimony of Capt. Alwin Landry , 121–122. Gardner Harris, "Minerals Management Service Director Resigns Over Spill," New York Times, May 27, 2010. Testimony of Charles Anderson, SKULD North America, "Liability and Financial Responsibility for Oil Spills under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and Related Statutes," Hearing Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 111th Congress (2010), 9. Flex Trend site, 31–32 Fleytas, Andrea, 7, 10, 15,16 Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126338); Internal BP document (BP-HZN-OSC 5378). Priest, "Auctioning the Ocean," 113. Richard Vietor, Energy Policy in America since 1945: A Study of Business-Government Relations (New York: Cam- bridge University Press, 1984), 19. Guide, interview. Indeed, just days before the running of the long string at Macondo, another well drilled by Trans- ocean's DD3 suffered just such a complication. Ibid. float valves, in Macondo well, 98, 102, 116–19 Flood Control Act (1928),204 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Summary of Ineligible PWs for Barrier Islands (November 11, 2010); Tod Wells, e-mail to Commission staff, November 8, 2010; Tim Padgett, "Dredge, Baby, Dredge: Can Sand Stop the Oil?," Time, June 1, 2010. Florida, 208; effects of Macondo oil spill on, 131, 138, 140, 150, 153, 174, 177, 188–89, 191, 278; offshore oil and gas industry in, 67, 67n, 254,297 Pat Campbell, letter to Richard Lynch, July 28, 2010; Henry Fountain, "Expert is Confident about Sealing Oil Well," New York Times, May 24, 2010; Interview with industry expert, October 14, 2010. Florida Department of Environmental Protection,153 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 288. Testimony of Bill Ambrose, 380–84. "Oil Industry Needs Self-Regulation, Says Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. CEO," Forbes Magazine, August 26, 2010. Florida Restaurant and Lodging Association,191 Interview with Coast Guard official, August 24, 2010; Interview with Coast Guard official, August 30, 2010. RESPOND Act, S. 3763, 111th Cong. § 7 (2010). flow-rate estimates, Macondo oil spill, 132, 133, 146–47, 149–50, 158, 166, 167, 167n,274 Daniel Squire, letter to Commission staff, November 2, 2010, att. 3; Lynch, interview; Tooms, interview; Non-pub- lic U.S. Department of Energy document, July 6, 2010. Flow Rate Technical Group, 147, 167n Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 170,187 Testimony of Capt. Alwin Landry , 121–122. Gardner Harris, "Minerals Management Service Director Resigns Over Spill," New York Times, May 27, 2010. Testimony of Charles Anderson, SKULD North America, "Liability and Financial Responsibility for Oil Spills under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and Related Statutes," Hearing Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 111th Congress (2010), 9. food safety, concerns about after Macondo oil spill, 170, 185–88, 278–79 Forcenergy,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. Ford, Gerald,63 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 295; Testimony of Pat O'Bryan, 366. President George H.W. Bush, "Statement on Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development," (June 26, 1990), http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2035&year=1990&month=6. 64 30 C.F.R. pt. 250. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126928). Forest Oil Corporation,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. Formal Safety Assessment program (United Kingdom),71 Testimony of David Sims, August 26, 2010, 174. Minerals Management Service, Final Report, Findings and Recommendations, MMS Task Force on OCS Inspection and Enforcement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, February 1990), 1-3. Testimony of Leo Lindner, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 19, 2010, 297; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, app. Q, 1. Forties Alpha platform (BP),219 Interview with Coast Guard official, November 12, 2010.
372fracture pressure, definition of,90 Ibid. E.P. Danenberger, interview with Commission staff, September 2, 2010; E.P. Danenberger, e-mail message to Commis- sion staff, October 25, 2010. Ibid., 21:01–21:08. Ibid., 27–8. Frank's Casing Crew and Rental Tools,44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). Freeport McMoRan,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010.
Gagliano, Jesse, 96–97, 101,102 Ibid., 38–39. WEST Engineering Services, Inc., "Comments by WEST Engineering Services, Houston, Texas, to The National Com- mission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling" (November 12, 2010): 3. Ibid., 21:14–21:15. Testimony of Marvin Odum, Shell, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010. García Márquez, Gabriel,53 BP, Deepwater Horizon Follow Up Rig Audit, Marine Assurance Audit and Out of Service Period, September 2009, 2, 18–48; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 136211). Charles Babcock, "Watt Defies Critics of Plan for Oil Leases," Washington Post, July 7, 1981, A3. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 137370). Garwin, Richard, 149,165 Ibid., 48. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 38354). Ibid., 64. Gauthe, Sharon,192 Interview with Coast Guard official, August 24, 2010; Interview with Coast Guard official, August 31, 2010. Graeme Wearden, "BP oil spill costs to hit $40bn," The Guardian, November 2, 2010. Chapter Nine Gazprom (company),300 Press Release, BP, MC252 Well Reaches Static Condition; Well Monitoring Underway, August 4, 2010. Geological Survey, U.S., 25–26, 28–30, 63–65, 79; recommendations for reforms in, 253, 263, 264, 270, 272, 274; response to Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 147, 161, 166, 168n geology, subsurface, 52–53; Lower Miocene deposits, 47; Lower Tertiary (Paleogene) deposits, 23, 47, 51, 52; at Macondo site, 2, 3, 89; Middle Miocene deposits, 3; role of salt in, 22, 24, 32–33, 39, 41-43, 45, 49, 52; technology for surveying, 27, 32–34, 37–38; Upper Jurassic deposits,39 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, 33–34; Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 443. Halliburton had delivered the slurry blend to the Deepwater Horizon several months earlier. It had developed the blend to match the temperature and pressure profile of the well that Deepwater Horizon had drilled immediately prior to Macondo—another BP well called Kodiak. Jesse Gagliano (Halliburton), interview with Commission staff, September 10, 2010. Geophysical Services Inc. (GSI),37 Ibid.; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 280. Document provided to the Commission by Halliburton entitled "Halliburton GoM Foam Jobs 2002–2010." Gervasio, Antonio,12 Press Release, Transocean, Transocean Inc. and GlobalSantaFe Corporation Agree to Combine, July 23, 2007. Tyler Priest, The Offshore Imperative: Shell Oil's Search for Petroleum in Postwar America (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2007), 81–91. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 35 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 143300) (emphasis added). Glasscock Drilling Company,25 Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCDC 92); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 82. Kash et al., Energy Under the Oceans, 105. Bryan Clawson (Weatherford), interview with Commission staff, October 28, 2010; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (September 8, 2010), 70. Global Industries,44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). Global Marine, 36,44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). GlobalSantaFe,2 Internal BP document (BP, presentation to Commission, August 9, 2010, slides 5 & 12). Quoted in Tom Zoellner, "Oil and Water: The Adventure of Getting One from Deep Beneath the Other," Invention and Technology (Fall 2000): 48. Internal Transocean document (TRN-HEC 90686). Internal documents are identified by their document production serial numbers when available, which were assigned by the entity that provided them. Neil MacFarquhar, "Routine Flights Become Overland Odysseys, Minus Clean Socks," New York Times, April 22, 2010. Campbell Robertson and Clifford Krauss, "Gulf Spill Is the Largest of Its Kind, Scientists Say," New York Times, August 2, 2010. BP, Sustainability Review (2009), 20–21. http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/ e_s_assets/e_s_assets_2009/downloads_pdfs/bp_sustainability_review_2009.pdf. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(6) ("An oil and gas lease issued pursuant to this section shall . . . contain such rental and other provisions as the Secretary may prescribe at the time of offering the area for lease."). Glomar Challenger (drillship),27 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 24. National Research Council, Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies (The National Academies Press: Washington, DC, 1992), http://www.nap.edu/catalog. php?record_id=2062. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 137367). Gonzalez, Elian,136 Ibid. If BP were looking, the one February test actually reported to BP could have prompted BP to question the design as well. BP argues that its failure to do so here is understandable given that it had hired one of the world's leading cementers specifically for purposes of designing and testing the cement slurry. Alice Camp, "Nuclear: In Pursuit of a Renaissance," EPRI Journal (Summer 2007): 20. Gordon, Wayne,163 Ibid. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 38354). Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Performance Objectives and Criteria (May 2005); Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Principles for Nuclear Safety Culture (November 2004). GovernanceMetrics International, 231, 232n government, role of in oil and gas industry. See regulation of oil and gas industry, federal and specific departments and agencies by name Government Accountability Office,261 Admiral Paul Zukunft, e-mail to Mathy Stanislaus, July 14, 2010. Grangemouth Complex (BP), 218–19 Greater New Orleans,191 Interview with Coast Guard official, August 24, 2010; Interview with Coast Guard official, August 30, 2010. RESPOND Act, S. 3763, 111th Cong. § 7 (2010). Great Flood of 1927, 197,204 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Summary of Ineligible PWs for Barrier Islands (November 11, 2010); Tod Wells, e-mail to Commission staff, November 8, 2010; Tim Padgett, "Dredge, Baby, Dredge: Can Sand Stop the Oil?," Time, June 1, 2010. Great Lakes,263 Matthew L. Wald, "Despite Directive, BP Used Dispersant Often, Panel Finds," New York Times, July 31, 2010; "Allen 'Satisfied' with Dispersant Use in Gulf Oil Disaster," CNN, August 2, 2010. Green Canyon, oil and gas drilling in, 40, 46–48 Greenland, offshore oil and gas industry in,302 Face the Nation, CBS News, August 8, 2010. Guide, John, 4, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102,116 Testimony of Capt. Alwin Landry, 101–102. Testimony of Randy Ezell, 283; Young, interview. Ibid. Gulf Coast Claims Facility, 185–86, 189, 193, 283,287 Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, November 8, 2010; Non-public U.S. Department of Energy document, July 16, 2010; Non-public government science advisor document, July 15, 2010. Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council, recommendation for, 280–81 Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Science and Technology Program, recommendation for,281 Statement from National Incident Commander Admiral Thad Allen on Well Integrity Test, July 13, 2010. Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task Force, 210,279 Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, October 26, 2010; Interview with industry expert, October 28, 2010. Gulf Island Fabricators,44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). Gulf of Mexico: economic impact of Macondo oil spill on, 139–43, 173–95; environmental impact of Macondo oil spill on, 139–43, 173–95; environmental recovery and restoration of, 197–213; future of, 293–306; history of drilling in, 2, 21–53; recommendations for reforms affecting, 249–91; regulation of drilling in, 55–57, 62, 65–67, 71, 72–76, 80–85 Gulf of Mexico Alliance,185 Testimony of Alwin Landry, 120–121. Executive Order No. 13543, National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 75 Fed. Reg. 29,397, May 21, 2010. Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act (2006), 208,210 Senator Mary Landrieu et al., letter to Colonel Alvin Lee and Admiral Thad Allen, May 20, 2010. Gulf of Mexico Integrated Ocean Observing System,282 Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, November 8, 2010. Guns of Navarone, The,162 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 48. There is a dispute as to whether BP personnel called back to shore that evening to discuss the data observed during the negative-pressure test. The Commission staff has to date seen no direct evidence of such a call. The staff 's inves- tigation is ongoing. Testimony of James Ellis, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Hearing before the National Commission, August 25, 2010. Gustav, Hurricane (2008), 197–98,203 Interview with Coast Guard official, August 25, 2010; Interview with Coast Guard official, October 24, 2010; Non- public Coast Guard document, June 14, 2010.
373Hafle, Mark, 2,97 Ibid. Commission staff analysis of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement data; Minerals Management Service, U.S. Offshore Milestones (as of August 2006): 5. See http://www.boemre.gov/stats/PDFs/ milestonesAUG2006.pdf. Keith, interview. Given what we now know, it is all but impossible that the well was not flowing as of 9:08 p.m. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 25; Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon, 22–23. Other than faulty memory, the only apparent explanations for Mr. Keith's statement are that the crew had already closed off the portion of the flow line Mr. Keith was watching or that Mr. Keith watched for an inadequate period of time. Keith, interview; Darryl Bourgoyne (LSU), interview with Commission staff, No- vember 23, 2010. Exxon Mobil, 2009 Corporate Citizenship Report, 14. Haire, Chris,109 Ibid., 286–287. Yearly MMS Incident Summary Reports are available at http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/IncidentStatisticsSum- maries.htm. Testimony of David Young, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 259. Jody Freeman, "Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law" in Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order, ed. David Dyzenhaus (Toronto: Hart Publishing, 1999), 21. Hall-Houston Oil Company,226 Glenn Thrush, "Carville Doesn't Regret Ripping W.H.," Politico, June 2, 2010. Halliburton Company, 38, 44, 74; and causes of Macondo well blowout, 90, 115–18, 123-25, 125, 223; and cementing of Macondo well, 1, 2–4, 90, 94–103; and safety issues, 222-24,295 Transcript, Press Briefing by National Incident Commander Admiral Thad Allen and NOAA Administrator Dr. Jane Lubchenco, July 24, 2010. Hanzalik, James,130 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 450; Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39. Testimony of Jesse Gagliano, 259; Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, 415. Ibid. Harrell, Jimmy, 4–5, 11, 13, 17, 92,107 Ibid., 286. U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Inspector General, Survey Report: Offshore Civil Penalties Program, Miner- als Management Service (March 30, 1999), http://www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/pdf/99-I-374.pdf. Testimony of Bill Ambrose, Hearing before the National Commission, November 8, 2010, 381. Responsible Care, Who We Are, http://www.responsiblecare.org/page.asp?p=6406. Hay, Mark,19 Testimony of Ronald Sepulvado, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 23, 2010, 7, 14, 34. Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 127–130. Diane Austin et al., History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Volume 1: Papers on the Evolving Offshore Industry, OCS Study MMS 2008-042 (New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, September 2008), 97–98, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PI/PDFImages/ESPIS/4/4530.pdf. 20 43 U.S.C § 1334. Guide, interview. BP had special one-piece bolt-on centralizers made for the Thunder Horse project. Ibid. Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 2701,116 Stat. 134, 278-279 (2002). Hayward, Tony, 135, 144, 150, 157,159 Testimony of Michael Williams, 26. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 117603). Ibid., 116. health, effects of Macondo oil spill on human, 141, 144, 170, 174, 185–88, 190, 192, 191–95, 277–78 Health and Human Services, Department of,141 Internal BP Document (BP August 9, 2010 presentation to Oil Spill Commission, slide 13). The Commission agrees with others that there is no such thing as a "bladder effect" that could account for the pres- sures the rig crew was observing. There was no apparent explanation for the 1400 psi on the drill pipe other than that the well was flowing. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 1, 2010. Hecht, Michael,191 Interview with Coast Guard official, August 24, 2010; Interview with Coast Guard official, August 30, 2010. RESPOND Act, S. 3763, 111th Cong. § 7 (2010). Heerema Marine Contractors,44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). Helis Oil & Gas Corporation,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. Helix Energy Solutions Group, 244-45 Herbst, Lars, 135,157 Ibid., 46–47. Ibid.; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 193529-39). Ibid. Hess Corporation,51 Brian Morel, e-mail message to Richard Miller and Mark Hafle. See S. Rep. No. 95-285, at 50, 62, 82, 144–5. Testimony of Vincent Tabler, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 25, 2010, 22–23, 36. Hickel, Walter,29 Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 188 and 191. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 70 (listing 18 statutes, and not including several such as the Magnuson Fishery Management and Conservation Act of 1976). Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 137367, 21304). Since the incident, BP has argued that the M-I SWACO models predicted an erroneously high circulation pressure, and that the readings the crew observed were proper. This may ultimately explain the readings, but it does not explain why the BP Macondo team dismissed them as the result of a broken pressure gauge. Hilda, Hurricane (1964),27 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 24. National Research Council, Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies (The National Academies Press: Washington, DC, 1992), http://www.nap.edu/catalog. php?record_id=2062. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 137367). Hitec system, 110, 110n,112 Testimony of Gregory Meche, 209; Testimony of David Young, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, May 27, 2010, 327; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 283; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 65; Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, 153. Bill Ambrose (Transocean), interview with Commission staff, September 21, 2010. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Enti- ties Program. Holloway, Caleb,113 Testimony of Micah Sandell, 11–13. Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010, 21:38. Edward J. Balleisen and Marc Eisner, "The Promise and Pitfalls of Co-Regulation: How Governments Can Draw on Private Governance for Public Purpose," in New Perspectives on Regulation, ed. David Moss and John Cisternino, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 31.
¶Holstein site, 46–49 Homeland Security, Department of, 62, 131, 255. See also Coast Guard, U.S. Hormuz, Straits of,296 Bob Dudley, letter to Admiral Thad Allen, July 19, 2010. Houston, Oberon,219 Interview with Coast Guard official, November 12, 2010. Houston Exploration Company, 226-27 Hsieh, Paul,166 Testimony of Curt Kuchta, 219. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 38361). U.S. Department of the Interior, Outer Continental Shelf Safety Oversight Board, Report to the Secretary of the Interior (September 1, 2010), 11–13. Humble Oil, 24,27 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 24. National Research Council, Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies (The National Academies Press: Washington, DC, 1992), http://www.nap.edu/catalog. php?record_id=2062. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 137367). Hunt Oil Company,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. Hunter, Tom, 148, 149, 161–62,165 Ibid., 48. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 38354). Ibid., 64. Huntington, Hillard,297 Pat Campbell, letter to Richard Lynch, July 28, 2010; Henry Fountain, "Expert is Confident about Sealing Oil Well," New York Times, May 24, 2010; Interview with industry expert, October 14, 2010. hurricanes. See specific hurricanes by name (e.g., Katrina, Hurricane) hypoxia, in Gulf of Mexico, 198–200 Hyundai Heavy Industries,44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43).
¶Ida, Hurricane (2009), 2,92 Testimony of Gregory Meche, 235. E.P. Danenberger, interview with Commission staff, September 2, 2010; E.P. Danenberger, e-mail message to Commis- sion staff, October 25, 2010. Testimony of Greg Meche, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 207–09. 93 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.4, 435.11. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, "Settlement," http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/facts/settlement.cfm; Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, "Questions and Answers," http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/facts/qanda.cfm. Ike, Hurricane (2008), 198,296 Bob Dudley, letter to Admiral Thad Allen, July 19, 2010. Incident Command Posts, 130–31. See also Unified Command Inglis, Andy,146 Ibid.; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 103. Testimony of Steve Lewis, 54, 124. BP argues that "[t]he use of additional mechanical plugs would have brought its own additional risks." Powell, letter, att. 1, 6 (citing API, Recommended Practice 65—Part 2 (May 2010), § 3.1); Guide, interview. However, BP does not present any evidence that the Macondo team in fact evaluated those risks or compared them with the risks of setting a single surface cement plug in seawater 3,300 feet below the mud line. Michael Rencheck (AREVA Inc.), interview with Commission staff, November 1, 2010. injuries, offshore drilling. See safety, offshore drilling Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), 234–42, 239n, 240n Interagency Alternative Technology Assessment Program,142 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 454. Transocean asserts that its personnel, including the driller and toolpusher, were not "in any way responsible for interpreting the negative pressure test or making the decision that the well was secure and work could properly pro- ceed." Rachel Clingman, letter to Commission staff, November 16, 2010, 1. As the Commission's staff made clear at the November 8, 2010 hearing, the Commission is not tasked with deciding legal responsibility. Based on available evidence, however, Revette and Anderson agreed the negative-pressure test was a success and did not stop the job before moving on to the remaining temporary abandonment procedures. Testimony of Lee Lambert, 291; Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-CEC 20347, 20178). Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 104. Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force, 262,281 Statement from National Incident Commander Admiral Thad Allen on Well Integrity Test, July 13, 2010. Interior, Department of the, 54; changes in after Macondo well blowout, 250; and environmental recovery and restoration of Gulf of Mexico, 181-83; history of regulation by, 29, 33, 55–85, 228-29, 239-240; recommendations for reforms in, 249–91, 299, 304; response to Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 55, 78n, 131, 131n, 143, 145,
¶152, 181, 183. See also Minerals Management Service (MMS) and other specific agencies by name International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC),72 Ibid., 367. Marine Board, Alternatives for Inspecting Outer Continental Shelf Operations, 80. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 83. International Organization for Standardization (ISO), 252,304 Deepwater Horizon MC252 Gulf Incident Oil Budget, 1. International Regulators' Forum, 252,254 Admiral James Watson, e-mail to Dana Tulis, et al., June 7, 2010; Dana Tulis, e-mail to Admiral James Watson, June 7, 2010. Iran: oil and gas industry in, 36, 45, 296; Revolution of 1979, 31,63 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 295; Testimony of Pat O'Bryan, 366. President George H.W. Bush, "Statement on Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development," (June 26, 1990), http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2035&year=1990&month=6. 64 30 C.F.R. pt. 250. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126928). Iraq, oil and gas industry in,296 Bob Dudley, letter to Admiral Thad Allen, July 19, 2010. Ivan, Hurricane (2004),50 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 364–365, 393. See S. Rep. No. 95-285, at 154–5 (reprinting letter from Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus). Ibid. Ixtoc oil spill, 225,244 Non-public BP document, May 31, 2010; Non-public BP document, May 29, 2010.
¶Jackson, Lisa, 145, 160–61, 167n Jack 2 site, 23,47 Testimony of Lee Lambert, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 291; Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-CEC 20347, 20178). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 171151). Jindal, Bobby, 138–39, 150–51, 151, 153, 154, 156–57, 169,212 Press Release, Army Corps of Louisiana, Corps Decision on State's Emergency Permit Request, May 27, 2010; Army Corps of Engineers, "New Orleans District Emergency Permit Request Action," June 1, 2010, http://www.mvn. usace.army.mil/pao/MVNIPR1June2010Final.pdf. Johnfroe, Donald Jr.,192 Interview with Coast Guard official, August 24, 2010; Interview with Coast Guard official, August 31, 2010. Graeme Wearden, "BP oil spill costs to hit $40bn," The Guardian, November 2, 2010. Chapter Nine Joint Oceanographic Institutions for Deep Earth Sampling project,27 BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 24. National Research Council, Assessment of the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Studies Program: III. Social and Economic Studies (The National Academies Press: Washington, DC, 1992), http://www.nap.edu/catalog. php?record_id=2062. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 137367). Jones, Gordon,17 "Brazil Pins Hopes on Massive, untapped Oil Fields," NPR, December 1, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ story.php?storyId=120966523. On Project Mohole and JOIDES, see David K. van Keuren, "Breaking New Ground: The Origins of Scientific Ocean Drilling," in The Machine in Neptune's Garden: Historical Perspectives on Technology and the Marine Environment, eds. Helen M. Rozwadowski and David K. van Keuren (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2004), 183–210. On Shell's Eureka project, see Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 97, 218. E.R. Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy: A Legal and Historical Analysis. Testimony of Jesse Gagliano, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 320. Jones Act, 142–43 J. Ray McDermott, 24, 31-32,44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). junk shot, 148–49 Justice, Department of, 30,287 Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, November 8, 2010; Non-public U.S. Department of Energy document, July 16, 2010; Non-public government science advisor document, July 15, 2010.
¶Kaluza, Robert, 3, 6, 14, 98, 105, 107,124 Ibid., 448–449, 452. Ibid. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 143. Kash, Don, 64–65 Katrina, Hurricane (2005), 50, 136–37, 145, 163, 191–93, 195, 198, 203, 206, 208–9, 212,296 Bob Dudley, letter to Admiral Thad Allen, July 19, 2010. Keith, Joseph, 109,112 Testimony of Gregory Meche, 209; Testimony of David Young, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, May 27, 2010, 327; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 283; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 65; Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, 153. Bill Ambrose (Transocean), interview with Commission staff, September 21, 2010. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Enti- ties Program. Kelley, Merrick,120 Ibid., 187; Testimony of Kevin Robb, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 42. Testimony of Bill Ambrose, 244. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, "About Us," http://www.inpo.info/AboutUs.htm. Kemp, Roy Wyatt, 17,112 Testimony of Gregory Meche, 209; Testimony of David Young, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, May 27, 2010, 327; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 283; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 65; Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, 153. Bill Ambrose (Transocean), interview with Commission staff, September 21, 2010. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Enti- ties Program. Keplinger, Yancy, 7, 11, 15,16 Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126338); Internal BP document (BP-HZN-OSC 5378). Priest, "Auctioning the Ocean," 113. Richard Vietor, Energy Policy in America since 1945: A Study of Business-Government Relations (New York: Cam- bridge University Press, 1984), 19. Guide, interview. Indeed, just days before the running of the long string at Macondo, another well drilled by Trans- ocean's DD3 suffered just such a complication. Ibid. Kermac 16 site, 23,24 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 77; Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCDC 92). U.S. Geological Survey, Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 128 (December 1958) and Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 144 (February 1960), RG 57, Records of the U.S. Geological Survey, NARA. Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 70. 25 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). The Well Site Leaders—Bob Kaluza and Don Vidrine—would normally have been on the rig. Morel, a relatively junior BP engineer, had flown to the rig out of a professional interest in learning more about the cementing process. Guide, interview. Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, 22, 24, 48,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. kick detection, in Macondo well, 91, 109–14, 120-21 Kleppinger, Karl Dale, Jr.,17 "Brazil Pins Hopes on Massive, untapped Oil Fields," NPR, December 1, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ story.php?storyId=120966523. On Project Mohole and JOIDES, see David K. van Keuren, "Breaking New Ground: The Origins of Scientific Ocean Drilling," in The Machine in Neptune's Garden: Historical Perspectives on Technology and the Marine Environment, eds. Helen M. Rozwadowski and David K. van Keuren (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2004), 183–210. On Shell's Eureka project, see Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 97, 218. E.R. Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy: A Legal and Historical Analysis. Testimony of Jesse Gagliano, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 320. Kuchta, Curt, 4–5, 7-8, 13, 14–17 Kuwait, oil fires in during first Gulf War,149 Ibid., 40–41. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8574).
¶Lambert, Lee,107 Ibid., 286. U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Inspector General, Survey Report: Offshore Civil Penalties Program, Miner- als Management Service (March 30, 1999), http://www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/pdf/99-I-374.pdf. Testimony of Bill Ambrose, Hearing before the National Commission, November 8, 2010, 381. Responsible Care, Who We Are, http://www.responsiblecare.org/page.asp?p=6406. Landrieu, Mary, 150, 152,204 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Summary of Ineligible PWs for Barrier Islands (November 11, 2010); Tod Wells, e-mail to Commission staff, November 8, 2010; Tim Padgett, "Dredge, Baby, Dredge: Can Sand Stop the Oil?," Time, June 1, 2010. Landrieu, Mitch, 150,151 Ibid., 43. Testimony of Darryl Bourgoyne, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010, 133. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, November 15, 2010. Landry, Alwin J., 12,14 "Global 500," CNNMoney.com, July 26, 2010, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/full_ list/index.html. Tyler Priest, "Auctioning the Ocean: The Creation of the Federal Offshore Leasing Program, 1954-1962," History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana: Vol. 1: Papers on the Evolving Offshore Industry (Minerals Management Service OCS Study 2004-049, 2008). Other states petitioned for the 9-nautical-mile boundary in the federal courts, but failed to prevail. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8848-58).
374Landry, Mary, 130-31, 133-34, 134,143 Ibid., 454–455. Guide, interview. Lee Gard, interview. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory,148 Ibid., 40. BP asserts that "[u]sing drill collars would have required unracking the drill pipe on the rig and then locating and re-racking drill collars—a set of additional operations with attendant risks." Powell, letter, att. 1, 5. BP does not provide any evidence to substantiate the extent of such "attendant risks" or whether they outweighed the risks of the procedure BP chose. Most significantly, BP offers no evidence that its Macondo team ever considered such risks or performed a rigorous comparative risk analysis. Michael Golay, interview. 149 33 U.S.C. § 2210. Leasing and Environmental Science Office, recommendation for, 258–59, 261, 262,264 Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, October 25, 2010; Interview with Coast Guard official, October 18, 2010. leasing of offshore drilling sites, federal, 61; and environmental considerations, 29, 59–63, 79–82; history of, 24, 26, 31, 33, 52-52, 58–63; recommendations for reforms in, 249–91; royalties from, 56, 58, 63–67, 64, 76–78,295 Transcript, Press Briefing by National Incident Commander Admiral Thad Allen and NOAA Administrator Dr. Jane Lubchenco, July 24, 2010. Lee, Alvin,156 Ibid., 45–46. Guide, interview. Lee Gard, interview. Leno, Jay,149 Ibid., 40–41. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8574). levees, on Mississippi River, 197, 204, 206, 208,210 Senator Mary Landrieu et al., letter to Colonel Alvin Lee and Admiral Thad Allen, May 20, 2010. Lili, Hurricane (2002),50 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 364–365, 393. See S. Rep. No. 95-285, at 154–5 (reprinting letter from Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus). Ibid. Lindsay, Sheryl,155 Ibid., 44–46. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-OSC 5420). Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 57. LLOG Exploration Offshore, Inc.,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. lockdown sleeve, on Macondo well, 104, 120, 123,127 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 452. After the blowout, some industry CEOs testified they would never have used a long string production casing, sug- gesting there was a causal connection between BP's choice of the long string and the blowout. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Environment, 111th Cong. 104 (June 15, 2010) (statements of John Watson, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Chevron Corporation; and Rex Tillerson, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Exxon- Mobil). Ibid. Louisiana: effects of Macondo oil spill on, 138–40, 150–54, 156-57, 161, 163, 171, 174–81, 187–88, 191–95, 271, 276, 278; environmental recovery and restoration of, 197–213; oil and gas industry in, 21–53, 58, 60, 78, 292, 292-93,
Louisiana Act 6 (1989),207 Kristi Cantu, letter to Pete J. Serio, May 11, 2010. Louisiana Coastal Area Comprehensive Coastwide Ecosystem Restoration report,207 Kristi Cantu, letter to Pete J. Serio, May 11, 2010. Louisiana Coastal Area Ecosystem Restoration Program,207 Kristi Cantu, letter to Pete J. Serio, May 11, 2010. Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority,208 Colonel Alvin Lee, interview with Commission staff, October 28, 2010. Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Fund,208 Colonel Alvin Lee, interview with Commission staff, October 28, 2010. Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals,140 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 451–452. Moreover, once the BP Well Site Leaders and crew realized that the annular preventer was leaking, they should have circulated out any spacer that had migrated below the annular preventer prior to continuing with the test. Testi- Ibid., 53–54. Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries,140 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 451–452. Moreover, once the BP Well Site Leaders and crew realized that the annular preventer was leaking, they should have circulated out any spacer that had migrated below the annular preventer prior to continuing with the test. Testi- Ibid., 53–54. Louisiana-Mississippi Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Working Group,210 Senator Mary Landrieu et al., letter to Colonel Alvin Lee and Admiral Thad Allen, May 20, 2010. Louisiana National Guard,133 Ibid. Ronald Sepulvado (BP), interview with Commission staff, September 1, 2010. Testimony of A. C. Tollison Jr., Executive Vice President, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, "National Energy Policy: Nuclear Energy," Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality, 107th Congress (2001). Louisiana Office of Coastal Protection and Restoration,154 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 44. Between 8:00 and 9:49 p.m., the crew was performing a number of other activities that may have further con- founded the data or at least distracted the driller. The crew was emptying various tanks on the rig into the active pit system, including "trip tanks" and "sand traps," which may have masked increased flow out of the well into the ac- tive pit system. At 9:18 p.m., a valve on one of the pumps blew, and a number of crew members from the rig floor went to fix it. Finally, the crew was operating one or both of the cranes on the main deck, which could have affected flow-out and volume readings. Lee Gard, interview. Louisiana State University Charity Hospital,195 Campbell Robertson, "Louisiana Officials Threaten Action if Spill Response Proves Inadequate," New York Times, May 23, 2010. Lubchenco, Jane, 167n, 168–69 Lutz, Peter,133 Ibid. Ronald Sepulvado (BP), interview with Commission staff, September 1, 2010. Testimony of A. C. Tollison Jr., Executive Vice President, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, "National Energy Policy: Nuclear Energy," Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality, 107th Congress (2001). Lyder, Jane,181 Urbina and Gillis, "Workers On Oil Rig Recall a Terrible Night of Blasts." Paul Rioux, "President Barack Obama Promises No Retreat from Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Response," Times-Picauyne, May 28, 2010. Aspen Re interview with Commission staff, October 19, 2010; Testimony of Dr. Robert Hartwig, President and Economist, Insurance Information Institute, "Liability and Financial Responsibility for Oil Spills under the Oil Pollu- tion Act of 1990 and Related Statutes," Hearing Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Lynch, Richard, 146,160 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 48. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 128542). Ibid., 111–117.
375Mabus, Ray, 210, 211, 279–80 MacDonald, Ian, 186,187 Testimony of Capt. Alwin Landry , 121–122. Gardner Harris, "Minerals Management Service Director Resigns Over Spill," New York Times, May 27, 2010. Testimony of Charles Anderson, SKULD North America, "Liability and Financial Responsibility for Oil Spills under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and Related Statutes," Hearing Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 111th Congress (2010), 9. Macondo well: attempts to seal after blowout, 131–32, 137–38, 149–50, 159n, 162, 164-67; blowout events of April 20, 8–19, 88, 102–15; causes of blowout, 89, 115–27, 125; drilling of, 2–4, 23, 53, 89–115, 93; geology of site, 3, 89; naming of,53 BP, Deepwater Horizon Follow Up Rig Audit, Marine Assurance Audit and Out of Service Period, September 2009, 2, 18–48; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 136211). Charles Babcock, "Watt Defies Critics of Plan for Oil Leases," Washington Post, July 7, 1981, A3. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 137370). oil spill from, 127, 129–70; Oil Spill Response Plan for, 84, 133; permit process for, 77, 82–84, 104, 108, 127, 132; relief wells, 132, 135, 157, 158, 166–67,169 Ibid. Internal Transocean document (TRN-PC 3227). Testimony of Rex Tillerson, Exxon Mobil, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010. Mad Dog site, 46–49 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 80, 81, 83–84 mangroves, effects of Macondo oil spill on, 175, 177,186 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 28, 2010, 44–45. Peter Baker, "Obama Extends Moratorium; Agency Chief Resigns," New York Times, May 27, 2010. CLEAR Act, H.R. 3534, 111th Cong. § 702 (2010) (as passed by House); S. 3663, 111th Cong. §102 (2010)("Reid Clean Energy bill"); RESPOND Act, S. 3763, 111th Cong. § 6 (2010)("Landrieu bill"); Big Oil Bailout Prevention Act, H.R. 5214, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010). Mansfield, Brent, 10–11,17 "Brazil Pins Hopes on Massive, untapped Oil Fields," NPR, December 1, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ story.php?storyId=120966523. On Project Mohole and JOIDES, see David K. van Keuren, "Breaking New Ground: The Origins of Scientific Ocean Drilling," in The Machine in Neptune's Garden: Historical Perspectives on Technology and the Marine Environment, eds. Helen M. Rozwadowski and David K. van Keuren (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2004), 183–210. On Shell's Eureka project, see Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 97, 218. E.R. Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy: A Legal and Historical Analysis. Testimony of Jesse Gagliano, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 320. Manti Operating Company,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. Manuel, Blair,17 "Brazil Pins Hopes on Massive, untapped Oil Fields," NPR, December 1, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ story.php?storyId=120966523. On Project Mohole and JOIDES, see David K. van Keuren, "Breaking New Ground: The Origins of Scientific Ocean Drilling," in The Machine in Neptune's Garden: Historical Perspectives on Technology and the Marine Environment, eds. Helen M. Rozwadowski and David K. van Keuren (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2004), 183–210. On Shell's Eureka project, see Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 97, 218. E.R. Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy: A Legal and Historical Analysis. Testimony of Jesse Gagliano, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 320. Marathon Oil Corporation,51 Brian Morel, e-mail message to Richard Miller and Mark Hafle. See S. Rep. No. 95-285, at 50, 62, 82, 144–5. Testimony of Vincent Tabler, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 25, 2010, 22–23, 36. Marianas (rig), 2, 92–93 Marine Board (National Research Council), 70–71 marine ecosystems, effects of Macondo oil spill on, 174-78, 180-182 Marine Mammal Commission,181 Urbina and Gillis, "Workers On Oil Rig Recall a Terrible Night of Blasts." Paul Rioux, "President Barack Obama Promises No Retreat from Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Response," Times-Picauyne, May 28, 2010. Aspen Re interview with Commission staff, October 19, 2010; Testimony of Dr. Robert Hartwig, President and Economist, Insurance Information Institute, "Liability and Financial Responsibility for Oil Spills under the Oil Pollu- tion Act of 1990 and Related Statutes," Hearing Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Marine Mammal Protection Act,80 Internal BP documents (Deepwater Horizon Schematic; BP August 9, 2010 presentation to Oil Spill Commission, slide 5 ). Former senior MMS officials, interviews with Commission staff, August and September 2010; Offshore Operators Committee, "Oil, Gas, and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)—Safety and Environmental Management Systems," Public Comment (May 22, 2006), http://www.boemre.gov/federalregister/PDFs/AD15- OOCcomments5-22-06.pdf. Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 117; Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 127909, BP-HZN-CEC 20189-90). While that may have been Mr. Vidrine's stated reason for running the test on the kill line, the Commission notes that the negative-pressure test performed at Macondo—whether on the drill pipe or kill line—was different from the negative- pressure test described in the Application for Permit to Modify. Testimony of Mark Bly, Hearing before the National Commission, November 8, 2010, 293–95. marine mammals: in Arctic oil regions, 303; in Gulf of Mexico, 174–75, 178, 180, 181,183 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 52; Ibid., 48–53. Jeffrey Ball and Jonathan Weisman, "Slippery Start: U.S. Response to Spill Falters," Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2010. Ibid. 184 33 U.S.C. § 2704. 185 33 U.S.C. § 2704; 33 U.S.C § 1321 (Clean Water Act civil and criminal penalties); Jonathan Ramseur, Oil Spills in U.S. Coastal Waters: Background, Governance, and Issues for Congress (Congressional Research Service, updated September 2, 2008), 26 ("A 2003 study identified 16 states that impose unlimited liability for oil spills."). Marine Protected Areas,282 Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, November 8, 2010. Mariner Energy, 51,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. Marine Spill Response Corporation, 132–33,243 Non-public BP document, May 31, 2010; Non-public BP document, May 29, 2010. Marine Well Containment Company (MWCC), 243-45 marshes: effects of Macondo oil spill on, 139, 143, 154, 174-75, 177, 181, 186, 202; and environmental recovery and restoration of Gulf of Mexico, 202, 205–8 Mars site, 36–37, 40, 45,50 Testimony of Patrick O'Bryan, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 364–365, 393. See S. Rep. No. 95-285, at 154–5 (reprinting letter from Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus). Ibid. Martinez, Dennis,17 "Brazil Pins Hopes on Massive, untapped Oil Fields," NPR, December 1, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ story.php?storyId=120966523. On Project Mohole and JOIDES, see David K. van Keuren, "Breaking New Ground: The Origins of Scientific Ocean Drilling," in The Machine in Neptune's Garden: Historical Perspectives on Technology and the Marine Environment, eds. Helen M. Rozwadowski and David K. van Keuren (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2004), 183–210. On Shell's Eureka project, see Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 97, 218. E.R. Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy: A Legal and Historical Analysis. Testimony of Jesse Gagliano, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 320. Massachusetts, coastal and marine spatial planning in,201 Liz Robbins and Campbell Robertson, "Tension Among Officials Grows as Storm Nears," New York Times, July 23, 2010. Matrix Oil & Gas,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. Matterhorn (rig),19 Testimony of Ronald Sepulvado, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 23, 2010, 7, 14, 34. Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 127–130. Diane Austin et al., History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Volume 1: Papers on the Evolving Offshore Industry, OCS Study MMS 2008-042 (New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, September 2008), 97–98, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PI/PDFImages/ESPIS/4/4530.pdf. 20 43 U.S.C § 1334. Guide, interview. BP had special one-piece bolt-on centralizers made for the Thunder Horse project. Ibid. Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 2701,116 Stat. 134, 278-279 (2002). Max Chouest (vessel),19 Testimony of Ronald Sepulvado, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 23, 2010, 7, 14, 34. Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 127–130. Diane Austin et al., History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Volume 1: Papers on the Evolving Offshore Industry, OCS Study MMS 2008-042 (New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, September 2008), 97–98, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PI/PDFImages/ESPIS/4/4530.pdf. 20 43 U.S.C § 1334. Guide, interview. BP had special one-piece bolt-on centralizers made for the Thunder Horse project. Ibid. Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 2701,116 Stat. 134, 278-279 (2002). McKay, Douglas,58 Ibid., 25; Testimony of Chris Pleasant, 118–119. G. Kevin Jones, "Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development During the Reagan Administration—Part 1," West- ern New England Law Review 12, 1, (1990):8–13. Testimony of John Guide, 298 (the cement plug was "deeper than normal"); Testimony of Ronald Sepulvado, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 145 ("the top of the surface plug is normally at 500 feet below the wellhead"). McNutt, Marcia, 147–49, 161, 165,274 Daniel Squire, letter to Commission staff, November 2, 2010, att. 3; Lynch, interview; Tooms, interview; Non-pub- lic U.S. Department of Energy document, July 6, 2010. Meche, Gregory, 12,112 Testimony of Gregory Meche, 209; Testimony of David Young, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, May 27, 2010, 327; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 283; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 65; Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, 153. Bill Ambrose (Transocean), interview with Commission staff, September 21, 2010. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Enti- ties Program. media coverage of Macondo well blowout and oil spill: effects of on food safety concerns and tourism, 187–88; initial, 129–30; of response to oil spill, 139, 141, 142–43, 142n, 149, 150, 167–68 Meinhart, Paul,15 Internal Transocean documents (TRN-HCJ 93526, 93528). U.S. Department of Interior, "Petroleum and Sulfur on the U.S. Continental Shelf," internal study, August 1969, box 134, Central Classified Files, 1969–1972, Record Group 48, Records of the Secretary of Interior, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. "Oil Shelf Bill Enacted; President Reaffirms U.S. Title to Outer Offshore Deposits," New York Times, August 8, 1953, 27. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 129238-39). Melancon, Charlie,150 Ibid., 41–43. Testimony of Mark Bly, 308. BP has suggested that the float valves provided an additional barrier to flow. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 68. The Commission does not agree that float valves, even when converted, constitute a distinct physical barrier to flow, but instead reinforce the cement in the shoe track. Clawson, interview (indicating that Weatherford does not consider the float collar to be a barrier to hydrocarbons); API, Recommended Practice 65—Part 2 (May 2010), §§ 3.4, 4.4.3 (float valves not included in the list of subsurface mechanical barriers; float equipment used to prevent cement from flowing back into the casing). Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 1, 2010. Merritt, Carolyn W.,219 Interview with Coast Guard official, November 12, 2010. Meshkati, Najmedin,223 Bigad Shaban, "Upset Nungesser Walks Out on Coast Guard Meeting," www.ltv.com, June 1, 2010.
¶Mexico, oil and gas industry in, 21, 254,300 Press Release, BP, MC252 Well Reaches Static Condition; Well Monitoring Underway, August 4, 2010. microbes. See oil-degrading microbes Minerals Management Service (MMS), 54, 73, 75; and causes of Macondo well blowout, 126–27; corruption and mismanagement in, 77–79, 250, 251, 254–55; creation and early history of, 23, 33, 36, 38–39, 42, 56, 63–69; environmental protection role of, 55–57, 79–85, 206, 254–55; permit process for Macondo well, 82–85, 126–27, 273; permitting role of, 55–57, 254–55; reorganization of after Macondo well blowout, 55, 131n, 255; response to Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 19, 131, 131n, 133, 135–36, 145, 149–50, 152, 157, 161; revenue collection role of, 55–57, 63–67, 64, 76–78, 254–55; and safety issues, 67–76, 75. See also Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE) Mississippi, 208: effects of Macondo oil spill on, 131, 138, 140, 170, 177, 187, 191,193 Non-public Coast Guard document, October 12, 2010. Mississippi Canyon, oil and gas drilling in, 2, 3, 31, 42, 46, 47-48, 53,89 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 35–36. TA.F Powell, "US Voluntary SEMP Initiative: Holy Grail or Poisoned Chalice?" (Offshore Technology Conference [OTC] Paper 8111, 1996). Ibid., 21:01. Samuel K. Skinner and William K. Reilly, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: A Report to the President (May 1989), 1. Mississippi Canyon Block 252, 2, 53, 89,92 Testimony of Gregory Meche, 235. E.P. Danenberger, interview with Commission staff, September 2, 2010; E.P. Danenberger, e-mail message to Commis- sion staff, October 25, 2010. Testimony of Greg Meche, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 207–09. 93 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.4, 435.11. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, "Settlement," http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/facts/settlement.cfm; Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, "Questions and Answers," http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/facts/qanda.cfm. Mississippi River: agricultural pollution in, 198–200; effects of Macondo oil spill on, 177, 178; environmental recovery and restoration of, 197–213; geology of, 22, 27, 202, 204; in history of oil and gas industry, 22, 24, 27, 31, 37, 50; re-engineering of, 194, 197, 204, 206,210 Senator Mary Landrieu et al., letter to Colonel Alvin Lee and Admiral Thad Allen, May 20, 2010. Mississippi River and Tributaries Project,204 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Summary of Ineligible PWs for Barrier Islands (November 11, 2010); Tod Wells, e-mail to Commission staff, November 8, 2010; Tim Padgett, "Dredge, Baby, Dredge: Can Sand Stop the Oil?," Time, June 1, 2010. Mississippi River Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force,200 Interview with Coast Guard official, August 30, 2010; Interview with government official, August 24, 2010. Mississippi River Gulf Outlet,206 Interview with Coast Guard official, August 30, 2010; Mark Schleifstein, "Barrier Berm Advocates Not Deterred by Environmental Regulators' Misgivings," Times-Picayune, September 20, 2010. M-I SWACO, 3, 98,106 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 285–286. Ibid. Testimony of Randy Ezell, 282. MMS. See Minerals Management Service (MMS) mobile drilling, history of, 24–26,44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). Mobil Oil. See ExxonMobil MOEX, 2, 90,94 Complaint at 2, Shivers v. BP Plc., No. 10-cv-381 (S.D. Ala. July 20, 2010). Commission staff analysis of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement data. See http:// www.boemre.gov/adm/budget.html. Testimony of Greg Meche, 207–09, 219. Testimony of Rex Tillerson, CEO of Exxon Mobil, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010. Montara (platform),224 National Incident Command, Summary of NIC Barrier Island Berm Meeting, June 1, 2010. Monterey Bay Marine Sanctuary,67 Ibid., 281-282, 311. Petroleum Safety Authority of Norway, "From Prescription to Performance in Petroleum Supervision," March 12, 2010, http://www.ptil.no/news/from-prescription-to-performance-in-petroleum-supervision-article6696-79.html. Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCEC 90). moratoriums, offshore drilling, 36, 52, 58, 67; in response to Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 151–52, 185,247 Helene Cooper and Peter Baker, "U.S. Opens Criminal Inquiry into Oil Spill," New York Times, June 1, 2010. Morel, Brian, 2, 3, 4, 96, 97, 98, 102, 104, 116,123 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 447–448. Ibid., 123. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 57–58. Mr. Charlie (drilling barge), 23,24 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 77; Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCDC 92). U.S. Geological Survey, Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 128 (December 1958) and Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 144 (February 1960), RG 57, Records of the U.S. Geological Survey, NARA. Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 70. 25 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). The Well Site Leaders—Bob Kaluza and Don Vidrine—would normally have been on the rig. Morel, a relatively junior BP engineer, had flown to the rig out of a professional interest in learning more about the cementing process. Guide, interview. Mr. Gus (drilling barge),25 Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCDC 92); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 82. Kash et al., Energy Under the Oceans, 105. Bryan Clawson (Weatherford), interview with Commission staff, October 28, 2010; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (September 8, 2010), 70. mud, use of in offshore wells, 91, 105, 106; and causes of Macondo well blowout, 115, 120–24, 125; in Macondo well, 7, 8, 92–94, 96, 98–99, 103-07, 109-14; in top kill and static kill efforts at Macondo well, 149–50, 158, 166–67 mudflats, effects of Macondo oil spill on, 175,177 Testimony of Kevin Robb, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 44. Matthew Daly, "Month After Oil Spill, Why Is BP Still in Charge?," ABC News, May 21, 2010, http://abcnews. go.com/Business/wireStory?id=10713257. Helix Energy Solutions Group, "Spill Containment: Fast Response to GOM Subsea Oil Spills" (unpublished document provided to Commission staff by Helix Energy Solutions Group). Munich Re,246 Deepwater Horizon Response Joint Information Center, Ongoing Administration-Wide Response to the Deepwater BP Oil Spill, May 29, 2010; Press Release, BP, Update on Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, May 29, 2010. Murphy Exploration & Production Company,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. Murray, Chad, 11, 13, 15,16 Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126338); Internal BP document (BP-HZN-OSC 5378). Priest, "Auctioning the Ocean," 113. Richard Vietor, Energy Policy in America since 1945: A Study of Business-Government Relations (New York: Cam- bridge University Press, 1984), 19. Guide, interview. Indeed, just days before the running of the long string at Macondo, another well drilled by Trans- ocean's DD3 suffered just such a complication. Ibid.
¶Na Kika project, 46,48 Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-CEC 20347, 20178). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 136946-47). Nalco,144 Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, October 5, 2010, 157. Benjamin Powell, "BP Response to Presidential Commission's Preliminary Technical Conclusions," letter to Commis- sion staff, November 22, 2010, att. 1, 3 (citing Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 111th Cong. (May 11, 2010) (statement of Testimony of Tim Probert, Halliburton President, Global Business Lines, Chief Health, Safety and Environmental Officer)). Michael Golay (MIT), interview with Commission Staff, October 27, 2010. Napolitano, Janet, 131,136 Ibid. If BP were looking, the one February test actually reported to BP could have prompted BP to question the design as well. BP argues that its failure to do so here is understandable given that it had hired one of the world's leading cementers specifically for purposes of designing and testing the cement slurry. Alice Camp, "Nuclear: In Pursuit of a Renaissance," EPRI Journal (Summer 2007): 20. National Academy of Engineering, 223,253 Captain James Hanzalik, e-mail to Captain Anthony Lloyd, June 8, 2010. National Academy of Sciences, 264, 296,303 Deepwaer Horizon MC252 Gulf Incident Oil Budget (August 4, 2010); Jane Lubchenco et al., BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Budget: What Happened to the Oil? (August 4, 2010). National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 151, 192, 225, 249–50, 291, 295,
¶305–6 National Contingency Plan, 130-32, 134-36, 138-39, 141, 144, 265-69, 271-72, 274, 277–78,304 Deepwater Horizon MC252 Gulf Incident Oil Budget, 1. National Domestic Violence Hotline,193 Non-public Coast Guard document, October 12, 2010. National Energy Act (1978),59 Testimony of John Gisclair, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 8, 2010, 131–132. "Interior Denies Oil Leasing Plan Will Cost $77 Billion," Associated Press, September 28, 1982. 60 43 U.S.C. § 1337. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8574). National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (1970), 29, 56, 59, 60, 62, 80–82; and Macondo well blowout, 81n, 82–84,
¶83n; recommendations for reforms in, 258–62, 265, 267,289 Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, October 25, 2010; Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, October 26, 2010; Interview with U.S. Geological Survey official, October 21, 2010. National Incident Commander, 136–37, 141, 143, 156, 267, 268,270 Interview with industry expert, October 14, 2010. National Marine Fisheries Service, 140,141 Internal BP Document (BP August 9, 2010 presentation to Oil Spill Commission, slide 13). The Commission agrees with others that there is no such thing as a "bladder effect" that could account for the pres- sures the rig crew was observing. There was no apparent explanation for the 1400 psi on the drill pipe other than that the well was flowing. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 1, 2010. National Marine Sanctuaries, 80, 81,282 Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, November 8, 2010. National Ocean Council, 201, 276, 281–82 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); and environmental recovery and restoration of Gulf of
¶Mexico, 201, 212; recommendations for reforms in, 253, 256, 257, 262–68, 270-71, 274, 282; and regulation of offshore drilling, 68n, 81, 84, 84n; response to Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 131, 133, 140–41, 143, 145, 153,
¶157, 168–70, 178, 181, 183, 187,189 Ibid., 126. Chapter Two Interview with government official, October 8, 2010. Rawle King, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Disaster: Risk, Recovery, and Insurance Implications (Congressional Re- search Service, July 12, 2010), 16–18. National Oceanographic Partnership Program,264 Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, October 25, 2010; Interview with Coast Guard official, October 18, 2010. National Research Council,298 Transcript, Press Briefing by National Incident Commander Admiral Thad Allen, August 2, 2010. National Response Framework,278 Admiral Thad Allen, letter to Bob Dudley, July 12, 2010. National Response Team, 131, 141, 268, 269, 272,274 Daniel Squire, letter to Commission staff, November 2, 2010, att. 3; Lynch, interview; Tooms, interview; Non-pub- lic U.S. Department of Energy document, July 6, 2010. National Science Foundation, 28, 184,276 Admiral Thad Allen, letter to Bob Dudley, July 9, 2010. National Wildlife Federation,141 Internal BP Document (BP August 9, 2010 presentation to Oil Spill Commission, slide 13). The Commission agrees with others that there is no such thing as a "bladder effect" that could account for the pres- sures the rig crew was observing. There was no apparent explanation for the 1400 psi on the drill pipe other than that the well was flowing. Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 1, 2010. Natural Resource Damage Assessment, 182–85, 186, 264, 276–77, 276n Natural Resources Revenue, Office of (ONRR), recommendation for, 256-60 Naval Petroleum Reserve, 58,296 Bob Dudley, letter to Admiral Thad Allen, July 19, 2010. Navy, U.S., 22–24, 58, 228–30,234 Interview with Coast Guard official, October 18, 2010; Interview with Minerals Management Service official, Octo- ber 15, 2010. negative-pressure tests, 105; and causes of Macondo well blowout, 118, 119, 121, 123–24, 125, 126; on Macondo well,
¶4-7, 104-09, 112; safety regulations for,228 Mark Kaufman, "BP Says More La. Barrier Island Berms Will Cost $360 Million," Washington Post, June 3, 2010. Neptune site, 23,43 Ibid. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 36). Newfield Exploration Company, 51,226 Glenn Thrush, "Carville Doesn't Regret Ripping W.H.," Politico, June 2, 2010. Nguyen, Ve Van,179 Internal BP Document (BP-HZN-MBI 143366). Frank McCormack, "Privateer Perfection," Plaquemines Gazette, June 7, 2010. "Moody's Offshore drilling insurance rates to jump," BusinessWeek, June 4, 2010.
376Nigeria, oil and gas industry in, 36,45 Ibid., 116–118; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 117. Ibid. Nixon, Richard M., 29, 31, 59, 63,135 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39. Fred Bartlit, letter to the National Commission, October 28, 2010 (reporting the results of cement testing). Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 76. NOAA. See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) NOAA Catch Share policy (2010),201 Liz Robbins and Campbell Robertson, "Tension Among Officials Grows as Storm Nears," New York Times, July 23, 2010. Norcen Explorer,226 Glenn Thrush, "Carville Doesn't Regret Ripping W.H.," Politico, June 2, 2010. North Sea, oil and gas industry in, 23, 31, 34, 38, 45, 68–69, 71–72, 124, 218, 225,252 Dana Tulis, e-mail to Admiral James Watson, June 7, 2010. Norway, offshore oil and gas industry in, 68–69, 71, 201, 218,302 Face the Nation, CBS News, August 8, 2010. Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL),237 Non-public BP document, May 29, 2010. nuclear power, safety issues in, 229-31, 235-41 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 235-37, 239, 253n,258 Stanislaus, interview. Nungesser, Billy, 150–51, 151, 154, 156–57
377Obama, Barack: address on Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 173, 212; commissioning of studies after Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 249, 279-80, 291; creation of BP escrow fund, 185; environmental policies of, 201, 210, 212, 262–63, 281; plan to expand offshore leasing, 53, 84n, 301; response to Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 131, 136, 148, 150–51, 151, 156, 162,191 Interview with Coast Guard official, August 24, 2010; Interview with Coast Guard official, August 30, 2010. RESPOND Act, S. 3763, 111th Cong. § 7 (2010). O'Bryan, Patrick, 5-8, 14,105 Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, 165. Ibid. Ibid., 336. Occidental Petroleum, 69,219 Interview with Coast Guard official, November 12, 2010. Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), 68n, 141, 144,234 Interview with Coast Guard official, October 18, 2010; Interview with Minerals Management Service official, Octo- ber 15, 2010. occupational safety, definition of,218 Mark Schleifstein, "Sand Berm to Protect Barataria Bay Wetlands Gets Federal OK," Times-Picayune, May 27, 2010. Oceaneering, 3,38 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 443. S.L. Pickett and S.W. Cole, "Foamed Cementing Technique for Liners Yields Cost-Effective Results" (Society of Petro- leum Engineers SPE Paper #27679, Midland, Texas, March 1994), 523–24. Ocean Endeavor (rig),19 Testimony of Ronald Sepulvado, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 23, 2010, 7, 14, 34. Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 127–130. Diane Austin et al., History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Volume 1: Papers on the Evolving Offshore Industry, OCS Study MMS 2008-042 (New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, September 2008), 97–98, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PI/PDFImages/ESPIS/4/4530.pdf. 20 43 U.S.C § 1334. Guide, interview. BP had special one-piece bolt-on centralizers made for the Thunder Horse project. Ibid. Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 2701,116 Stat. 134, 278-279 (2002). Ocean Energy,226 Glenn Thrush, "Carville Doesn't Regret Ripping W.H.," Politico, June 2, 2010. Ocean Energy Safety Institute,272 Secretary Steven Chu, e-mail to Arun Majumdar and others, June 18, 2010; Admiral James Watson, letter to Doug Suttles, June 19, 2010. Ocean Foundation,181 Urbina and Gillis, "Workers On Oil Rig Recall a Terrible Night of Blasts." Paul Rioux, "President Barack Obama Promises No Retreat from Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Response," Times-Picauyne, May 28, 2010. Aspen Re interview with Commission staff, October 19, 2010; Testimony of Dr. Robert Hartwig, President and Economist, Insurance Information Institute, "Liability and Financial Responsibility for Oil Spills under the Oil Pollu- tion Act of 1990 and Related Statutes," Hearing Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Ocean Ranger (rig),69 Testimony of David Sims, August 26, 2010, 163. E.P. Danenberger et al., Investigation of March 19, 1989 Fire, South Pass Block 60 Platform B, Lease OCS-G 1608, OCS Report MMS 90-0016 (New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, April 1990): 15, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PDFs/1990/90-0016.pdf. Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 204. There were no regulations or industry standards guiding the conduct or interpretation of negative-pressure tests at the time of the Macondo blowout. The absence of any such guidance may have contributed to the failure to conduct and interpret the test correctly here. OCS Group,3 Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, 411; U.S. Department of Energy, Well Configuration (BP document made public by the Department of Energy), http://www.energy.gov/open/documents/3.1_Item_2_Macondo_Well_07_Jun_1900.pdf; Testimony of Natalie Roshto, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 22, 2010, 15. Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 409. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126338). Campbell Robertson, "11 Remain Missing After Oil Rig Explodes Off Louisiana," New York Times, April 22, 2010. EPA, Government Response to the BP Oil Spill: Odors from the BP Spill (June 2010), http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/ reports/odorfactsheet.pdf (announcing help line for residents experiencing oil-related odors); Press Release, NOAA, Administration Launches Dockside Chats to Promote Gulf Seafood Safety Awareness, August 25, 2010, http://www. restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/08/25/administration-launches-dockside-chats-promote-gulf-seafood-safety- awareness; BP, Claims and Government Payments Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Public Report (November 18, 2010). Health and Safety Executive, Major Incident Investigation Report, BP Grangemouth Scotland (29th May – 10th June 2000) (August 18, 2003), 7, http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/bpgrange/images/bprgrangemouth.pdf. These terms are taken directly from the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) NEPA implementing regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28. 4 40 C.F.R. §1508.4. Odum, Marvin,233 Tooms, interview. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 72, 210,251 EPA, Dispersant Monitoring and Assessment Directive—Addendum 3, May 26, 2010. Office of Natural Resources Revenue,55 Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 29, 2010, 172, 313. Commission on Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy Resources, Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy Resources (Washington, D.C.: January 1982), xv, http://www.onrr.gov/Laws_R_D/frnotices/PDFDocs/linowes- rpt1-5.pdf. Internal Transocean document (TRN-USCG_MMS 30422); Internal Schlumberger document (SLB-EC-2). offshore drilling. See deepwater drilling; oil and gas industry, offshore; and specific aspects of the offshore oil and gas industry by name Offshore Drilling and Exploration Company,24 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 77; Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCDC 92). U.S. Geological Survey, Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 128 (December 1958) and Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 144 (February 1960), RG 57, Records of the U.S. Geological Survey, NARA. Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 70. 25 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). The Well Site Leaders—Bob Kaluza and Don Vidrine—would normally have been on the rig. Morel, a relatively junior BP engineer, had flown to the rig out of a professional interest in learning more about the cementing process. Guide, interview. Offshore Operators Committee, 28, 30,72 Ibid., 367. Marine Board, Alternatives for Inspecting Outer Continental Shelf Operations, 80. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 83. Offshore Safety and Anti-Pollution Equipment Committee,30 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 113; Testimony of Curt Kuchta, 184. The five laws included the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617, Energy Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 95- 618, National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, Pub. L. No. 95-620, and Natural Gas Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-621. David Izon, E.P. Danenberger, and Melinda Mayes, "Absence of fatalities in blowouts encouraging in MMS study of OCS incidents 1992-2006," Well Control July/August (2007), 84. Offshore Safety Authority, recommendation for, 256, 257–58, 289–90 Offshore Technology Conference, 30,52 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 13. Robert Gramling, Oil on the Edge: Offshore Development, Conflict, Gridlock (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 121. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_0011208). Ognedal, Magne, 69,218 Mark Schleifstein, "Sand Berm to Protect Barataria Bay Wetlands Gets Federal OK," Times-Picayune, May 27, 2010. oil and gas industry, offshore: corporate safety culture of, 215–47; future of, 293–306; history of, 21, 21–53, 55–85; recommendations for reforms in, 215–16, 239–45, 249–91, 293, 306; regulatory history of, 55–85; and supply and demand for oil in U.S. history, 22, 25, 31–33, 34, 46, 52, 63, 293–306. See also specific companies and aspects of the industry by name Oil Budget report, 167–69, 168n oil-degrading microbes,174 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 50. Angel Gonzalez, "Oil Firms Plan Rapid-Response Force," Wall Street Journal, July 22, 2010; Daniel Squire, e-mail message to Commission staff, December 1, 2010. Oil Pollution Act (1990), 70, 80, 83–84, 130n, 132, 182–85, 191, 212, 232, 245; recommendations for reforms in, 268–70, 276, 279, 283, 286–87 Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, 134, 135n, 141, 211, 283–87,304 Deepwater Horizon MC252 Gulf Incident Oil Budget, 1. Oil Spill Response Plans, 83–84 oil spills: history of, 2, 23, 28–29, 29, 31, 36, 53, 56, 58–59, 63, 71, 130n, 132–33, 135, 144, 174, 181, 189, 194, 211–12, 216–20, 223–25, 230–31, 232, 241, 243, 270, 277n, 280, 288; after Macondo well blowout, 127, 129–70,
¶Perry, Harriet,178 Ian Urbina and Justin Gillis, "Workers On Oil Rig Recall a Terrible Night of Blasts," New York Times, May 7, 2010. Interview with Coast Guard official, November 12, 2010. Independent Deepwater Exploration Coalition, meeting with Commission staff, November, 29, 2010. Petrobras, 44, 51,226 Glenn Thrush, "Carville Doesn't Regret Ripping W.H.," Politico, June 2, 2010. Petroleum Geo-Services,44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). Philadelphia Electric,238 Tooms, interview. Phillips Petroleum Company. See ConocoPhillips Pillow, Travis,187 Testimony of Capt. Alwin Landry , 121–122. Gardner Harris, "Minerals Management Service Director Resigns Over Spill," New York Times, May 27, 2010. Testimony of Charles Anderson, SKULD North America, "Liability and Financial Responsibility for Oil Spills under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and Related Statutes," Hearing Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 111th Congress (2010), 9. pipelines, oil and gas, 25, 30, 35, 49, 296,302 Face the Nation, CBS News, August 8, 2010. Pipeline Safety Act,256 Dana Tulis, e-mail to Admiral James Watson, June 8, 2010. Piper Alpha (platform), 23, 69–70, 217,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. Placid Oil,34 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 275. platforms, offshore oil and gas, 22, 24–25, 28, 30, 34–35, 35, 39, 41–42 Pleasant, Christopher, 6, 13, 19, 114–15 Pompano (U.S. Coast Guard cutter), 17,130 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 450; Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39. Testimony of Jesse Gagliano, 259; Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, 415. Ibid. pore pressure, definition of,90 Ibid. E.P. Danenberger, interview with Commission staff, September 2, 2010; E.P. Danenberger, e-mail message to Commis- sion staff, October 25, 2010. Ibid., 21:01–21:08. Ibid., 27–8. positive-pressure tests, on Macondo well, 4, 104,105 Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, 165. Ibid. Ibid., 336. President's Council of Advisors in Science and Technology,298 Transcript, Press Briefing by National Incident Commander Admiral Thad Allen, August 2, 2010. President's Council on Environmental Quality, 81n, 83, 84n Price-Anderson Act,237 Non-public BP document, May 29, 2010. Primary Care Access Stabilization Grants,195 Campbell Robertson, "Louisiana Officials Threaten Action if Spill Response Proves Inadequate," New York Times, May 23, 2010. process safety, definition of,218 Mark Schleifstein, "Sand Berm to Protect Barataria Bay Wetlands Gets Federal OK," Times-Picayune, May 27, 2010. Project Independence,31 Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 26, 2010, 119. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Testimony of John Guide, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 22, 2010, 87. Project Mohole,26 Testimony of Ross Skidmore, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 264. Neil R. Etson to President Nixon, March 18, 1970, Central Classified Files, 1968-1974, Box 71, RG 57, Records of the Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Testimony of Steve Lewis, 96; Internal Transocean document (TRN-USCG_MMS 11638). Prudhoe Bay pipeline (BP), 2,222 Transcript, Press Briefing by National Incident Commander Admiral Thad Allen, June 2, 2010. Pure Oil,21 Ibid., 43–44 and 189; Schlumberger, "Oilfield Glossary: cement bond log," accessed November 19, 2010, http:// www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/Display.cfm?Term=cement%20bond%20log. Cliff Hernandez, interview by Andrew Gardner, May 1, 2001, New Iberia, LA, History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Houston History Archives, M.D. Anderson Library Special Collections, University of Houston, Houston, TX. This interview is one of approximately 450 oral histories conducted for History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Minerals Management Service OCS Study 2004-049 (2008). "Oil and Gas Leases Bow to Rare Wildlife Species," New York Times, December 9, 1955. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 22669).
¶Q4000 (vessel), 159–60,159 Testimony of Michael Williams, 26. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 117603). Ibid., 116.
¶R&B Falcon,44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). Ragen, Tim,181 Urbina and Gillis, "Workers On Oil Rig Recall a Terrible Night of Blasts." Paul Rioux, "President Barack Obama Promises No Retreat from Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Response," Times-Picauyne, May 28, 2010. Aspen Re interview with Commission staff, October 19, 2010; Testimony of Dr. Robert Hartwig, President and Economist, Insurance Information Institute, "Liability and Financial Responsibility for Oil Spills under the Oil Pollu- tion Act of 1990 and Related Statutes," Hearing Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Rainey, Dave,45 Ibid., 116–118; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 117. Ibid. Ramblin' Wreck (boat), 10,17 "Brazil Pins Hopes on Massive, untapped Oil Fields," NPR, December 1, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ story.php?storyId=120966523. On Project Mohole and JOIDES, see David K. van Keuren, "Breaking New Ground: The Origins of Scientific Ocean Drilling," in The Machine in Neptune's Garden: Historical Perspectives on Technology and the Marine Environment, eds. Helen M. Rozwadowski and David K. van Keuren (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2004), 183–210. On Shell's Eureka project, see Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 97, 218. E.R. Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy: A Legal and Historical Analysis. Testimony of Jesse Gagliano, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 320. rams, in offshore well blowout preventer, 52, 74: and causes of Macondo well blowout, 122; in drilling of Macondo well, 92–93, 114; and oil spill after Macondo well blowout, 131, 137–38, 149,275 Interview with U.S. Geological Survey official, October 20, 2010; Non-public government science advisor document, July 2, 2010; Interview with industry expert, October 14, 2010. Randolph, Charlotte,150 Ibid., 41–43. Testimony of Mark Bly, 308. BP has suggested that the float valves provided an additional barrier to flow. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 68. The Commission does not agree that float valves, even when converted, constitute a distinct physical barrier to flow, but instead reinforce the cement in the shoe track. Clawson, interview (indicating that Weatherford does not consider the float collar to be a barrier to hydrocarbons); API, Recommended Practice 65—Part 2 (May 2010), §§ 3.4, 4.4.3 (float valves not included in the list of subsurface mechanical barriers; float equipment used to prevent cement from flowing back into the casing). Lee Gard, e-mail message to Commission Staff, December 1, 2010. Rapid Response Research (RAPID) Program,184 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 330. Interview with Coast Guard official, November 12, 2010. Reagan, Ronald, 63,66 Ibid., 282. Jan Erik Vinnem, Offshore Risk Assessment: Principles, Modelling and Applications of QRA Studies, 2nd ed. (London: Springer Studies in Reliability Engineering, 2007), 91, 100, 102. The blind shear rams closed and sealed as expected during the positive-pressure test. This fact suggests that the rams were capable of sealing the well when the blowout occurred. But the evidence is inconclusive on its own; during the positive-pressure test the crew closed the blind shear rams using a low pressure hydraulic system, rather than the high pressure hydraulic system that would have activated the rams in the event of a blowout. Regional Citizens' Advisory Councils, 268–69 Regional Contingency Plans,265 Interview with U.S. Geological Survey official, October 21, 2010; Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, October 25, 2010; Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, October 26, 2010. Regional Response Teams, 143, 145, 265, 268,271 Interview with U.S. Geological Survey official, October 21, 2010. regulation of oil and gas industry, federal: and causes of Macondo well blowout, 126–27; changes in after Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 55, 72, 152, 211–12, 228, 255; compared to other nations, 69–72; compared to other risky industries, 229–41; conflicting priorities in, 28, 55–60, 65, 68–76, 80–82, 200–201, 228–29, 254–55; congressional role in, 56, 58–60, 62–63, 65–68, 71, 72, 76, 79–82, 85, 269, 298, 299, 301, 304, 306; Constitutional authority for,
¶57, 67; definition of lands under federal control, 58, 239; failure to respond to changes in industry, 72–74, 228, 239;
¶history of, 29, 55–85; and industry self-policing, 234-35, 237–42; liability issues, 243–46; recommendations for reforms in, 215–16, 239–45, 249–91, 293, 299, 306. See also specific regulatory agencies by name relief wells, at Macondo site, 132, 135, 158, 159, 166–67,169 Ibid. Internal Transocean document (TRN-PC 3227). Testimony of Rex Tillerson, Exxon Mobil, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010. remotely operated vehicles (ROV), 38; in drilling of Macondo well, 3, 93; in response to Macondo well blowout, 19,
¶131–32, 146,164 Ibid., 48–49. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 38355). Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 44. renewable energy sources, 256–59, 264, 294–95 Repsol (company),300 Press Release, BP, MC252 Well Reaches Static Condition; Well Monitoring Underway, August 4, 2010. Resource and Conservation Recovery Act, 106–7 response to Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 129–70; attempts to seal blowout preventer, 131–32, 137–38, 146,
¶149–50, 159–67, 159n; boom and berms, 151–57, 169–70; capping stack, 162–67; cofferdam (containment dome),
¶145–46, 150, 159; compensation of victims, 179, 185–86, 189, 194, 278, 283, 284, 287; confusion of authority in, 130, 135–36, 138–39, 149, 151, 160–61 dispersant use, 133, 143–45, 147, 160–61, 169–70, 174, 180, 181–82,
¶187; firefighting, 130–31, 130n; flow-rate estimates, 132, 133, 146–47, 149–50, 158, 166, 167, 167n, 274; local population and, 139–43, 152–55, 170; moratorium on offshore deepwater drilling, 151–52, 185; nuclear option, 146;
¶oil removal efforts, 132–33, 140–45, 151–57, 168–69; plumes controversy, 181–82; recommendations for reforms related to, 249–91; relief wells, 132, 135, 157, 158, 166–67, 169; search and rescue efforts, 12–19, 129–32; top kill and junk shot, 148–50, 158–59, 161–62, 166. See also specific companies, government agencies, and individuals by name Responsible Care initiative (American Chemistry Council),233 Tooms, interview. Revette, Dewey, 5, 17, 107–9, 112–13 Rhode Island, coastal and marine spatial planning in,201 Liz Robbins and Campbell Robertson, "Tension Among Officials Grows as Storm Nears," New York Times, July 23, 2010. Rickover, Hyman,230 "Shaw Group Wins Contract to Build Barrier Island Temporary Berms," Times-Picayune, June 4, 2010; Jeffrey Ball, "Accusations Fly in Sand-Berm Project," Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2010. Riley, Bob, 150,153 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 288. Testimony of Bill Ambrose, 380–84. "Oil Industry Needs Self-Regulation, Says Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. CEO," Forbes Magazine, August 26, 2010. riser, offshore well: engineering challenges of, 37, 49, 51; and Macondo well, 7, 14, 18, 103–11, 103n, 114, 115, 120,
¶121, 124; and oil spill at Macondo well, 132–33, 132, 145-47, 159, 159n,164 Ibid., 48–49. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 38355). Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 44.
378Riser Insertion Tube Tool,146 Ibid.; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 103. Testimony of Steve Lewis, 54, 124. BP argues that "[t]he use of additional mechanical plugs would have brought its own additional risks." Powell, letter, att. 1, 6 (citing API, Recommended Practice 65—Part 2 (May 2010), § 3.1); Guide, interview. However, BP does not present any evidence that the Macondo team in fact evaluated those risks or compared them with the risks of setting a single surface cement plug in seawater 3,300 feet below the mud line. Michael Rencheck (AREVA Inc.), interview with Commission staff, November 1, 2010. risk management, offshore oil and gas industry, 217-47, 251–54. See also safety, offshore drilling Rita, Hurricane (2005), 50, 136–37, 145, 197–98, 208, 212,296 Bob Dudley, letter to Admiral Thad Allen, July 19, 2010. Robichaux, Brenda Dardar, 193,203 Interview with Coast Guard official, August 25, 2010; Interview with Coast Guard official, October 24, 2010; Non- public Coast Guard document, June 14, 2010. Rooster Petroleum,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. Roshto, Shane, 17,112 Testimony of Gregory Meche, 209; Testimony of David Young, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, May 27, 2010, 327; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 283; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 65; Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, 153. Bill Ambrose (Transocean), interview with Commission staff, September 21, 2010. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Enti- ties Program. Royal Dutch Shell. See Shell Oil rupture disks, in Macondo well, 158–59, 162,274 Daniel Squire, letter to Commission staff, November 2, 2010, att. 3; Lynch, interview; Tooms, interview; Non-pub- lic U.S. Department of Energy document, July 6, 2010. Russia, offshore oil and gas industry in,302 Face the Nation, CBS News, August 8, 2010.
379safety, offshore drilling: accident and injury rates, 3, 27-28, 30, 55, 69, 217-28, 226, 228, 232, 251, 254; changes in regulation of after Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 55, 72, 227, 243; compared to other risky industries, 229-42; conflict with revenue generation, 56, 254–55; corporate culture and, 215–47; with deepwater drilling, 35–36, 90–91; in hurricanes, 22, 25, 27, 50–51; inspections for, 68–76, 75, 78–79; insurance for, 245-46; recommendations for reforms in, 215–17, 239–45, 249–91, 293–95; regulation of, 28–30, 56, 68–76. See also explosions; oil spills Safety and Environmental Enforcement, Bureau of,55 Testimony of David Sims, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 29, 2010, 172, 313. Commission on Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy Resources, Fiscal Accountability of the Nation's Energy Resources (Washington, D.C.: January 1982), xv, http://www.onrr.gov/Laws_R_D/frnotices/PDFDocs/linowes- rpt1-5.pdf. Internal Transocean document (TRN-USCG_MMS 30422); Internal Schlumberger document (SLB-EC-2). Safety and Environmental Management Program (SEMP), 71–72,242 Non-public BP document, May 23, 2010; Non-public BP document, May 25, 2010; Daniel Squire, letter to Commis- sion staff, November 2, 2010, att. 1, 2. Safety and Environmental Management System (SEMS), 228, 251, 253,257 Mathy Stanislaus, e-mail to Admiral James Watson, July 9, 2010, att. safety case approach, 68–69, 227, 252, 252n,258 Stanislaus, interview. safety culture, definition of,218 Mark Schleifstein, "Sand Berm to Protect Barataria Bay Wetlands Gets Federal OK," Times-Picayune, May 27, 2010. Salazar, Ken, 55, 78, 78n, 131–32, 131n, 136, 147–48, 148, 151–52, 161, 165, 255, 260,301 Statement by National Incident Commander Admiral Thad Allen, August, 4 2010. salt, role of in offshore oil and gas reservoirs, 22, 24, 32–33, 39, 41–43, 45, 49,52 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 13. Robert Gramling, Oil on the Edge: Offshore Development, Conflict, Gridlock (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 121. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_0011208). Salvin, Bill,147 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39–40. Merrick Kelley (BP), interview with Commission staff, October 22, 2010; Industry expert, interview. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 104. Sandell, Micah, 9,12 Press Release, Transocean, Transocean Inc. and GlobalSantaFe Corporation Agree to Combine, July 23, 2007. Tyler Priest, The Offshore Imperative: Shell Oil's Search for Petroleum in Postwar America (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2007), 81–91. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 35 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 143300) (emphasis added). Sandia National Laboratories,149 Ibid., 40–41. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8574). Santa Barbara Channel, oil spill in (1969), 23, 26, 28–29, 29, 31, 56, 58–59, 63, 135,181 Urbina and Gillis, "Workers On Oil Rig Recall a Terrible Night of Blasts." Paul Rioux, "President Barack Obama Promises No Retreat from Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Response," Times-Picauyne, May 28, 2010. Aspen Re interview with Commission staff, October 19, 2010; Testimony of Dr. Robert Hartwig, President and Economist, Insurance Information Institute, "Liability and Financial Responsibility for Oil Spills under the Oil Pollu- tion Act of 1990 and Related Statutes," Hearing Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Saucier, Mike,135 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39. Fred Bartlit, letter to the National Commission, October 28, 2010 (reporting the results of cement testing). Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 76. Saudi Arabia, oil and gas industry in,21 Ibid., 43–44 and 189; Schlumberger, "Oilfield Glossary: cement bond log," accessed November 19, 2010, http:// www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/Display.cfm?Term=cement%20bond%20log. Cliff Hernandez, interview by Andrew Gardner, May 1, 2001, New Iberia, LA, History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Houston History Archives, M.D. Anderson Library Special Collections, University of Houston, Houston, TX. This interview is one of approximately 450 oral histories conducted for History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Minerals Management Service OCS Study 2004-049 (2008). "Oil and Gas Leases Bow to Rare Wildlife Species," New York Times, December 9, 1955. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 22669). Schlumberger, 3–4, 38, 44, 103, 118,129 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 450; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 123. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 128489); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 64 ("the BP Macondo well team did not ask for the OptiCem model to be re-run"). This may have been because of Mr. Guide's distrust of the OptiCem model. Testimony of John Guide, 275 ("it's wrong a lot"). When Halliburton rig personnel eventually informed Gagliano of BP's decision themselves, he responded by e-mailing BP modeling data suggesting again that more centralizers would be needed to prevent channeling. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 128708). Ibid. Scire, Grace,192 Interview with Coast Guard official, August 24, 2010; Interview with Coast Guard official, August 31, 2010. Graeme Wearden, "BP oil spill costs to hit $40bn," The Guardian, November 2, 2010. Chapter Nine Sears, Richard,223 Bigad Shaban, "Upset Nungesser Walks Out on Coast Guard Meeting," www.ltv.com, June 1, 2010. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),234 Interview with Coast Guard official, October 18, 2010; Interview with Minerals Management Service official, Octo- ber 15, 2010. Sedco-Forex,44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks of, 75,136 Ibid. If BP were looking, the one February test actually reported to BP could have prompted BP to question the design as well. BP argues that its failure to do so here is understandable given that it had hired one of the world's leading cementers specifically for purposes of designing and testing the cement slurry. Alice Camp, "Nuclear: In Pursuit of a Renaissance," EPRI Journal (Summer 2007): 20. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 185,287 Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, November 8, 2010; Non-public U.S. Department of Energy document, July 16, 2010; Non-public government science advisor document, July 15, 2010. Sepulvado, Ronald,3 Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, 411; U.S. Department of Energy, Well Configuration (BP document made public by the Department of Energy), http://www.energy.gov/open/documents/3.1_Item_2_Macondo_Well_07_Jun_1900.pdf; Testimony of Natalie Roshto, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 22, 2010, 15. Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 409. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 126338). Campbell Robertson, "11 Remain Missing After Oil Rig Explodes Off Louisiana," New York Times, April 22, 2010. EPA, Government Response to the BP Oil Spill: Odors from the BP Spill (June 2010), http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/ reports/odorfactsheet.pdf (announcing help line for residents experiencing oil-related odors); Press Release, NOAA, Administration Launches Dockside Chats to Promote Gulf Seafood Safety Awareness, August 25, 2010, http://www. restorethegulf.gov/release/2010/08/25/administration-launches-dockside-chats-promote-gulf-seafood-safety- awareness; BP, Claims and Government Payments Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Public Report (November 18, 2010). Health and Safety Executive, Major Incident Investigation Report, BP Grangemouth Scotland (29th May – 10th June 2000) (August 18, 2003), 7, http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/bpgrange/images/bprgrangemouth.pdf. These terms are taken directly from the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) NEPA implementing regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28. 4 40 C.F.R. §1508.4. Shaw Group,157 Ibid., 46–47. Ibid.; Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 193529-39). Ibid. Shell America (vessel),33 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 19, 2010, 29, 33; Testimony of Randy Ezell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 279. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978). 34 43 U.S.C. § 1801. 35 43 U.S.C. § 1802. 36 43 U.S.C. § 1344. 37 43 U.S.C. § 1340. 38 43 U.S.C. § 1351. 39 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3). 40 43 U.S.C. § 1346. 41 43 U.S.C. § 1347(c). 42 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b). 43 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) 44 43 U.S.C. § 1351. 45 43 U.S.C. § 1340. 46 43 U.S.C. § 1351(c)(3). 47 43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1). 48 43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1). 49 43 U.S.C. § 1531(l). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 127537-39); Internal Halliburton document (HAL_11196). 34 30 C.F.R. § 250.421. Shell Oil, 301–2; containment initiatives after Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 243-45; history of drilling in Gulf of Mexico, 21, 23, 24, 25–26, 30–30, 31–34, 36–41, 45, 48, 51, 84n; oil-spill response plans of, 133; role in response to Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 164; and safety issues, 226, 231-33 Shivers, Bradley,10 Transocean, Our Company, http://www.deepwater.com/fw/main/Our-Company-2.html. "Special Offshore Report," World Oil (May 1957): 118; Calvert, "Gulf Offshore Activity Booming," 48. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356a. Gregory Walz (BP), interview with Commission staff, October 6, 2010. Testimony of Captain James Hanzalik, Hearing Before the Deepwater Joint Investigation Team, October 4, 2010, 29- 30. Government Accountability Office, GAO-10-276 Offshore Oil and Gas Development: Additional Guidance Would Help Strengthen the Minerals Management Service's Assessment of Environmental Impacts in the North Aleutian Basin (March 2010), 21. shoe track, in Macondo well, 97–98, 97, 102, 120,121 Testimony of Anthony Gervasio, 189. Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon, 14; Testimony of Bill Ambrose, 252–53; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 28. Joseph V. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 50–51. shrimp, in Gulf of Mexico, 140, 144, 175, 179, 186–87 Sierra Club,65 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 281, 282, 294. U.S. Department of the Interior, Documents pertaining to offshore inspection types and practices produced to the Oil Spill Commission, August 2010. Sims, David, 4–8, 14, 17, 19,97 Ibid. Commission staff analysis of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement data; Minerals Management Service, U.S. Offshore Milestones (as of August 2006): 5. See http://www.boemre.gov/stats/PDFs/ milestonesAUG2006.pdf. Keith, interview. Given what we now know, it is all but impossible that the well was not flowing as of 9:08 p.m. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 25; Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon, 22–23. Other than faulty memory, the only apparent explanations for Mr. Keith's statement are that the crew had already closed off the portion of the flow line Mr. Keith was watching or that Mr. Keith watched for an inadequate period of time. Keith, interview; Darryl Bourgoyne (LSU), interview with Commission staff, No- vember 23, 2010. Exxon Mobil, 2009 Corporate Citizenship Report, 14. Skidmore, Ross,4 Testimony of Michael Williams, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 23, 2010, 35–36. Pratt, Priest, and Castaneda, Offshore Pioneers, 15–52, 137–157. Internal Transocean document (TRN-USCG-MMS 11597). Rick Jervis, "Gulf Blast Appears to be 'Blowout'," USA Today, April 22, 2010; Ben Casselman, Russell Gold, and Angel Gonzalez, "Blast Jolts Oil World," Wall Street Journal, April 22, 2010. Testimony of Timothy Ragen, Executive Director of the U.S. Marine Mammal Commission, "The Short and Long- Term Impacts of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill," Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans, and Wildlife, 111th Congress (June 10, 2010); Kim B. Ritchie and Brian D. Keller, eds., A Scientific Forum on the Gulf of Mexico: The Islands in the Stream Concept (NOAA, January 23, 2008), 6–8; Elliott A. Norse and John Amos, "Impacts, Perception, and Policy Implications of the Deepwater Horizon Oil and Gas Disaster," Environmental Law Reporter 40, no. 11 (2010): 11071; Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Scientific Symposium Meeting Summary (Consortium for Ocean Leadership, June 23, 2010), 15–16. Ibid. skimming, use of after Macondo oil spill, 129, 132, 140, 143, 154, 161, 167n, 168,169 Ibid. Internal Transocean document (TRN-PC 3227). Testimony of Rex Tillerson, Exxon Mobil, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010. Slocum, Alexander,149 Ibid., 40–41. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 8574). Smit Salvage Americas,130 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 450; Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39. Testimony of Jesse Gagliano, 259; Testimony of Nathaniel Chaisson, 415. Ibid. Sole, Mike,153 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 288. Testimony of Bill Ambrose, 380–84. "Oil Industry Needs Self-Regulation, Says Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. CEO," Forbes Magazine, August 26, 2010. Sonat Offshore Drilling, 33,37 Ibid.; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 280. Document provided to the Commission by Halliburton entitled "Halliburton GoM Foam Jobs 2002–2010." spacer, in Macondo well, 7, 7n, 106–9, 106, 111–12, 119,121 Testimony of Anthony Gervasio, 189. Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon, 14; Testimony of Bill Ambrose, 252–53; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 28. Joseph V. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 50–51. Sperry Sun, 109–11, 110n, 112,121 Testimony of Anthony Gervasio, 189. Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon, 14; Testimony of Bill Ambrose, 252–53; BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 28. Joseph V. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 50–51. Spill of National Significance designation, 136–37, 155, 267–68, 278–79, 283,287 Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, November 8, 2010; Non-public U.S. Department of Energy document, July 16, 2010; Non-public government science advisor document, July 15, 2010. Sport Fish Restoration and Boating Trust Fund,207 Kristi Cantu, letter to Pete J. Serio, May 11, 2010. Stafford Act (1988), 138, 268–69 Standard Oil of California,21 Ibid., 43–44 and 189; Schlumberger, "Oilfield Glossary: cement bond log," accessed November 19, 2010, http:// www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/Display.cfm?Term=cement%20bond%20log. Cliff Hernandez, interview by Andrew Gardner, May 1, 2001, New Iberia, LA, History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Houston History Archives, M.D. Anderson Library Special Collections, University of Houston, Houston, TX. This interview is one of approximately 450 oral histories conducted for History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Minerals Management Service OCS Study 2004-049 (2008). "Oil and Gas Leases Bow to Rare Wildlife Species," New York Times, December 9, 1955. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 22669). Standard Oil of New Jersey,24 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 77; Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCDC 92). U.S. Geological Survey, Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 128 (December 1958) and Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 144 (February 1960), RG 57, Records of the U.S. Geological Survey, NARA. Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 70. 25 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). The Well Site Leaders—Bob Kaluza and Don Vidrine—would normally have been on the rig. Morel, a relatively junior BP engineer, had flown to the rig out of a professional interest in learning more about the cementing process. Guide, interview. Stanislaus, Mathy,161 Testimony of Andrea Fleytas, 15. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-OSC 6224). Testimony of James Ellis, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Hearing before the National Commission, August 25, 2010; Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, 2009 Annual Report; Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, 1994 Annual Report. State On-Scene Coordinators,138 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 452. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). Ibid., 53. static kill, 166–68 Statoil, 44, 47,51 Brian Morel, e-mail message to Richard Miller and Mark Hafle. See S. Rep. No. 95-285, at 50, 62, 82, 144–5. Testimony of Vincent Tabler, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 25, 2010, 22–23, 36. Stone Energy Corporation,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, 296–97 Strickland, Tom,136 Ibid. If BP were looking, the one February test actually reported to BP could have prompted BP to question the design as well. BP argues that its failure to do so here is understandable given that it had hired one of the world's leading cementers specifically for purposes of designing and testing the cement slurry. Alice Camp, "Nuclear: In Pursuit of a Renaissance," EPRI Journal (Summer 2007): 20. Submerged Lands Act (1953), 23,58 Ibid., 25; Testimony of Chris Pleasant, 118–119. G. Kevin Jones, "Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development During the Reagan Administration—Part 1," West- ern New England Law Review 12, 1, (1990):8–13. Testimony of John Guide, 298 (the cement plug was "deeper than normal"); Testimony of Ronald Sepulvado, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 20, 2010, 145 ("the top of the surface plug is normally at 500 feet below the wellhead"). SUBSAFE system, 230-31,234 Interview with Coast Guard official, October 18, 2010; Interview with Minerals Management Service official, Octo- ber 15, 2010. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration,194 Holbrook Mohr, Justin Pritchard, and Tamara Lush, "BP's Gulf Oil Spill Response Plan Lists the Walrus as a Local Species. Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal Is Furious.," Christian Science Monitor, June 9, 2010; Interview with Coast Guard official, Aug. 31, 2010. Sunseri, Al,163 Ibid. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 38354). Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Performance Objectives and Criteria (May 2005); Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Principles for Nuclear Safety Culture (November 2004). Sunseri, Blake,163 Ibid. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 38354). Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Performance Objectives and Criteria (May 2005); Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Principles for Nuclear Safety Culture (November 2004). Sunseri, Sal,163 Ibid. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 38354). Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Performance Objectives and Criteria (May 2005); Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Principles for Nuclear Safety Culture (November 2004).
¶Superior Energy Services,167 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 28, 2010, 467. Ibid. Ibid., 13–14. 168 10 C.F.R. Parts 1–171. Superior Oil,21 Ibid., 43–44 and 189; Schlumberger, "Oilfield Glossary: cement bond log," accessed November 19, 2010, http:// www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/Display.cfm?Term=cement%20bond%20log. Cliff Hernandez, interview by Andrew Gardner, May 1, 2001, New Iberia, LA, History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Houston History Archives, M.D. Anderson Library Special Collections, University of Houston, Houston, TX. This interview is one of approximately 450 oral histories conducted for History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Minerals Management Service OCS Study 2004-049 (2008). "Oil and Gas Leases Bow to Rare Wildlife Species," New York Times, December 9, 1955. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 22669). Suttles, Doug, 133, 134, 145, 146, 159,164 Ibid., 48–49. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 38355). Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 44.
¶Tabler, Vincent,102 Ibid., 38–39. WEST Engineering Services, Inc., "Comments by WEST Engineering Services, Houston, Texas, to The National Com- mission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling" (November 12, 2010): 3. Ibid., 21:14–21:15. Testimony of Marvin Odum, Shell, Hearing before the National Commission, November 9, 2010. Taffaro, Craig,140 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 451–452. Moreover, once the BP Well Site Leaders and crew realized that the annular preventer was leaking, they should have circulated out any spacer that had migrated below the annular preventer prior to continuing with the test. Testi- Ibid., 53–54. Tana Oil and Gas Corporation,226 Glenn Thrush, "Carville Doesn't Regret Ripping W.H.," Politico, June 2, 2010. Taylor, Sharon,142 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 454. Transocean asserts that its personnel, including the driller and toolpusher, were not "in any way responsible for interpreting the negative pressure test or making the decision that the well was secure and work could properly pro- ceed." Rachel Clingman, letter to Commission staff, November 16, 2010, 1. As the Commission's staff made clear at the November 8, 2010 hearing, the Commission is not tasked with deciding legal responsibility. Based on available evidence, however, Revette and Anderson agreed the negative-pressure test was a success and did not stop the job before moving on to the remaining temporary abandonment procedures. Testimony of Lee Lambert, 291; Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-CEC 20347, 20178). Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 104. Technip,44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). temporary abandonment procedures, 4n, 77, 103; at Macondo well, 4, 6, 103–6, 109, 119–20, 123, 126–27 Tenneco,32 Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 23, 2010, 442. Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Program: Hearings before the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). John Gisclair, Sperry Sun data, April 20, 2010 (annotations, September 20, 2010). Commission calculation based on internal Halliburton document (HAL_10994). Texaco, 21, 27,38 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 443. S.L. Pickett and S.W. Cole, "Foamed Cementing Technique for Liners Yields Cost-Effective Results" (Society of Petro- leum Engineers SPE Paper #27679, Midland, Texas, March 1994), 523–24. Texas: effects of Macondo oil spill on, 177; oil and gas industry in, 2, 21–53, 58, 217–20,297 Pat Campbell, letter to Richard Lynch, July 28, 2010; Henry Fountain, "Expert is Confident about Sealing Oil Well," New York Times, May 24, 2010; Interview with industry expert, October 14, 2010. Texas City refinery (BP), 2, 218–22 Thierens, Harry,138 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 23, 2010, 452. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). Ibid., 53. 3-D seismic imaging, for offshore drilling, 27, 33, 37–38, 42–45 Three Mile Island meltdown (1979), 229, 235, 239, 240n Thunder Horse site, 23, 46-47,49 Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 21265). Internal BP document (BP-HZN-CEC 20234). Tiber site,51 Brian Morel, e-mail message to Richard Miller and Mark Hafle. See S. Rep. No. 95-285, at 50, 62, 82, 144–5. Testimony of Vincent Tabler, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 25, 2010, 22–23, 36. Tillerson, Rex, 232,240 Interview with U.S. Geological Survey official, October 21, 2010; Non-public government document, June 1, 2010. Tolstoy, Maya, 167n Tooms, Paul, 150,161 Testimony of Andrea Fleytas, 15. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-OSC 6224). Testimony of James Ellis, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Hearing before the National Commission, August 25, 2010; Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, 2009 Annual Report; Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, 1994 Annual Report. top kill, 148–50, 158–59, 161–62,166 Testimony of Curt Kuchta, 219. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 38361). U.S. Department of the Interior, Outer Continental Shelf Safety Oversight Board, Report to the Secretary of the Interior (September 1, 2010), 11–13. Total (oil company), 43, 44,52 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 13. Robert Gramling, Oil on the Edge: Offshore Development, Conflict, Gridlock (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 121. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_0011208). tourism, effects of Macondo oil spill on, 155, 185–86, 188–91,197 Interview with government official, October 13, 2010. Trahan, Buddy, 5, 7, 11, 13,17 "Brazil Pins Hopes on Massive, untapped Oil Fields," NPR, December 1, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ story.php?storyId=120966523. On Project Mohole and JOIDES, see David K. van Keuren, "Breaking New Ground: The Origins of Scientific Ocean Drilling," in The Machine in Neptune's Garden: Historical Perspectives on Technology and the Marine Environment, eds. Helen M. Rozwadowski and David K. van Keuren (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2004), 183–210. On Shell's Eureka project, see Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 97, 218. E.R. Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy: A Legal and Historical Analysis. Testimony of Jesse Gagliano, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 320. Trans-Alaska Pipeline, 35,302 Face the Nation, CBS News, August 8, 2010. Transocean, 44, 74; and causes of Macondo well blowout, 90, 115–27, 124, 223; and drilling of Macondo well, 2–4, 90,
¶92–115 response to Macondo well blowout and oil spill, 130–31, 137–38; and safety issues, 223-23,295 Transcript, Press Briefing by National Incident Commander Admiral Thad Allen and NOAA Administrator Dr. Jane Lubchenco, July 24, 2010. Transportation, Department of, 68n,255 Captain James Hanzalik, e-mail to Captain Anthony Lloyd, June 8, 2010. tribal communities, in Gulf of Mexico region, 193–94 Tri-Union Development Corporation,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. Truman, Harry, 58, 296,298 Transcript, Press Briefing by National Incident Commander Admiral Thad Allen, August 2, 2010. Trustees for Natural Resources, 277,282 Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, November 8, 2010. tuna, in Gulf of Mexico, 83n, 175, 178,180 Testimony of Alwin Landry, 115. Paul Rioux, "President Barack Obama in Grand Isle after Touring Beach in Port Fourchon," Times-Picayune, May 28, 2010. Julia Kollewe, "Oil Industry Set for Surge in Insurance Premiums after Deepwater Disaster," The Guardian, Septem- ber 20, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/sep/20/deepwater-oil-rigs-insurance-costs. Turner, Eugene,177 Testimony of Kevin Robb, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 44. Matthew Daly, "Month After Oil Spill, Why Is BP Still in Charge?," ABC News, May 21, 2010, http://abcnews. go.com/Business/wireStory?id=10713257. Helix Energy Solutions Group, "Spill Containment: Fast Response to GOM Subsea Oil Spills" (unpublished document provided to Commission staff by Helix Energy Solutions Group). turtles, in Gulf of Mexico, 175, 180–81, 180, 183,184 Testimony of Randy Ezell, 330. Interview with Coast Guard official, November 12, 2010.
¶Ultra-Deepwater and Unconventional Natural Gas and Other Petroleum Resources Program,253 Captain James Hanzalik, e-mail to Captain Anthony Lloyd, June 8, 2010. Unified Area Command, 131, 135, 139, 161,181 Urbina and Gillis, "Workers On Oil Rig Recall a Terrible Night of Blasts." Paul Rioux, "President Barack Obama Promises No Retreat from Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Response," Times-Picauyne, May 28, 2010. Aspen Re interview with Commission staff, October 19, 2010; Testimony of Dr. Robert Hartwig, President and Economist, Insurance Information Institute, "Liability and Financial Responsibility for Oil Spills under the Oil Pollu- tion Act of 1990 and Related Statutes," Hearing Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Unified Command, 131–33, 135, 138–41, 143–46, 149,154 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 44. Between 8:00 and 9:49 p.m., the crew was performing a number of other activities that may have further con- founded the data or at least distracted the driller. The crew was emptying various tanks on the rig into the active pit system, including "trip tanks" and "sand traps," which may have masked increased flow out of the well into the ac- tive pit system. At 9:18 p.m., a valve on one of the pumps blew, and a number of crew members from the rig floor went to fix it. Finally, the crew was operating one or both of the cranes on the main deck, which could have affected flow-out and volume readings. Lee Gard, interview. Union of Concerned Scientists, 239n Union Oil Company, 28, 32, 58,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. Union Pacific Resources Company,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. United Houma Nation, 193–94,203 Interview with Coast Guard official, August 25, 2010; Interview with Coast Guard official, October 24, 2010; Non- public Coast Guard document, June 14, 2010. United Kingdom, offshore oil and gas industry in, 69–72, 218-19, 228-29 United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive, 218-19 U.S. departments and services. See specific departments and services under the first key term in their names (e.g., Coast Guard, U.S.; Interior, Department of the) USS Thresher (submarine), 229, 230,231 Shaw's Environmental & Infrastructure Group, Shaw Barrier Berm Project—Daily Report Day 43, July 14, 2010. Utilities Solid Wastes Activities Group,235 Internal BP document (BP-HZN-MBI 143338-50).
¶Valdez, oil spill from See Exxon Valdez (vessel), oil spill from Van Oord,154 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 44. Between 8:00 and 9:49 p.m., the crew was performing a number of other activities that may have further con- founded the data or at least distracted the driller. The crew was emptying various tanks on the rig into the active pit system, including "trip tanks" and "sand traps," which may have masked increased flow out of the well into the ac- tive pit system. At 9:18 p.m., a valve on one of the pumps blew, and a number of crew members from the rig floor went to fix it. Finally, the crew was operating one or both of the cranes on the main deck, which could have affected flow-out and volume readings. Lee Gard, interview. Vastar Resources,226 Glenn Thrush, "Carville Doesn't Regret Ripping W.H.," Politico, June 2, 2010. Vessels of Opportunity program, 129, 140–41, 170,287 Interview with U.S. Department of Energy official, November 8, 2010; Non-public U.S. Department of Energy document, July 16, 2010; Non-public government science advisor document, July 15, 2010. Vidrine, Don, 6, 8, 13, 107–8,112 Testimony of Gregory Meche, 209; Testimony of David Young, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, May 27, 2010, 327; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 283; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 65; Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, 153. Bill Ambrose (Transocean), interview with Commission staff, September 21, 2010. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Enti- ties Program. Virginia, offshore oil and gas industry in,301 Statement by National Incident Commander Admiral Thad Allen, August, 4 2010. Vitter, David, 150,156 Ibid., 45–46. Guide, interview. Lee Gard, interview.
¶W & T Offshore,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010. Walter Oil & Gas Corporation,227 Press Release, National Incident Command, National Incident Commander Admiral Allen Directs BP to Pay for Five Additional Barrier Island Projects in Louisiana, June 2, 2010.
380Walz, Gregory,97 Ibid. Commission staff analysis of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement data; Minerals Management Service, U.S. Offshore Milestones (as of August 2006): 5. See http://www.boemre.gov/stats/PDFs/ milestonesAUG2006.pdf. Keith, interview. Given what we now know, it is all but impossible that the well was not flowing as of 9:08 p.m. BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 25; Smith, Review of Operational Data Preceding Explosion on Deepwater Horizon, 22–23. Other than faulty memory, the only apparent explanations for Mr. Keith's statement are that the crew had already closed off the portion of the flow line Mr. Keith was watching or that Mr. Keith watched for an inadequate period of time. Keith, interview; Darryl Bourgoyne (LSU), interview with Commission staff, No- vember 23, 2010. Exxon Mobil, 2009 Corporate Citizenship Report, 14. Washington, offshore oil and gas industry in, 26, 67,297 Pat Campbell, letter to Richard Lynch, July 28, 2010; Henry Fountain, "Expert is Confident about Sealing Oil Well," New York Times, May 24, 2010; Interview with industry expert, October 14, 2010. Water Resources Development Act (2007),207 Kristi Cantu, letter to Pete J. Serio, May 11, 2010. Watson, James, 160,162 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 48. There is a dispute as to whether BP personnel called back to shore that evening to discuss the data observed during the negative-pressure test. The Commission staff has to date seen no direct evidence of such a call. The staff 's inves- tigation is ongoing. Testimony of James Ellis, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Hearing before the National Commission, August 25, 2010. Watt, James, 56, 63–67, 66,76 Ibid., 283. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,400 (July 2, 1991). Testimony of Daun Winslow, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, August 24, 2010, 219; Weatherford International, 96,98 Ibid.; Tracey Dalzell Walsh, "Forced To Become Emergency Workers, Fishermen Say BP Never Even Said Thanks," Courthouse News Service, July 22, 2010. Commission staff analysis of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement and U.S. Energy In- formation Administration data. See http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PDFs/2009/2009-016.pdf, 71–72; http://www. eia.gov/oog/info/twip/twiparch/100526/twipprint.html. Testimony of Greg Meche, 207–09. Ibid.,13, 19. Weise, Adam, 17,112 Testimony of Gregory Meche, 209; Testimony of David Young, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Inves- tigation Team, May 27, 2010, 327; Testimony of Randy Ezell, 283; Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, 65; Testimony of Yancy Keplinger, 153. Bill Ambrose (Transocean), interview with Commission staff, September 21, 2010. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Enti- ties Program. Well Integrity Team, 162,164 Ibid., 48–49. Internal BP document (BP-HZN-BLY 38355). Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 44. Wereley, Steve,147 Testimony of Steve Bertone, 39–40. Merrick Kelley (BP), interview with Commission staff, October 22, 2010; Industry expert, interview. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island, 104. West Africa, offshore oil and gas industry in,44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). Western-Geco,44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). wetlands, in Gulf of Mexico region, 173, 175, 194, 197-208, 210-13 whales. See marine mammals Wheeler, Wyman, 5–6, 11, 15–16,107 Ibid., 286. U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Inspector General, Survey Report: Offshore Civil Penalties Program, Miner- als Management Service (March 30, 1999), http://www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/pdf/99-I-374.pdf. Testimony of Bill Ambrose, Hearing before the National Commission, November 8, 2010, 381. Responsible Care, Who We Are, http://www.responsiblecare.org/page.asp?p=6406. wildlife, in Gulf of Mexico. See specific types of wildlife by name Wild Well Control,167 Testimony of Daun Winslow, August 28, 2010, 467. Ibid. Ibid., 13–14. 168 10 C.F.R. Parts 1–171. Williams, Mike, 9, 10, 15–16 Winslow, Daun, 5, 6, 7, 12–14, 17,19 Testimony of Ronald Sepulvado, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, July 23, 2010, 7, 14, 34. Priest, The Offshore Imperative, 127–130. Diane Austin et al., History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana, Volume 1: Papers on the Evolving Offshore Industry, OCS Study MMS 2008-042 (New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, September 2008), 97–98, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PI/PDFImages/ESPIS/4/4530.pdf. 20 43 U.S.C § 1334. Guide, interview. BP had special one-piece bolt-on centralizers made for the Thunder Horse project. Ibid. Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 2701,116 Stat. 134, 278-279 (2002). Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, 146–47, 147n workforce, offshore oil and gas industry: effects of Macondo oil spill on, 152, 185; logistical challenges of, 3, 22, 34; and safety issues, 3, 6, 28, 30, 69, 152, 215-29, 232-34, 239-42, 251; whistleblowers in,254 Admiral James Watson, e-mail to Dana Tulis, et al., June 7, 2010; Dana Tulis, e-mail to Admiral James Watson, June 7, 2010. Worley Parsons,44 Testimony of Chris Pleasant, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 28, 2010, 115, 281. Internal Halliburton document (HAL_DOJ 43). wrack zone,177 Testimony of Kevin Robb, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 11, 2010, 44. Matthew Daly, "Month After Oil Spill, Why Is BP Still in Charge?," ABC News, May 21, 2010, http://abcnews. go.com/Business/wireStory?id=10713257. Helix Energy Solutions Group, "Spill Containment: Fast Response to GOM Subsea Oil Spills" (unpublished document provided to Commission staff by Helix Energy Solutions Group).
¶Young, David, 16, 112–13
Zane Barnes (vessel),36 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, 33. Internal BP documents (BP-HZN-MBI 143295, BP-HZN-CEC 22663); BP, Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, 34. Zapata Offshore Company,24 Testimony of Jimmy Harrell, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, May 27, 2010, 77; Internal Transocean document (TRN-HCDC 92). U.S. Geological Survey, Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 128 (December 1958) and Monthly Engineering Reports Vol. 144 (February 1960), RG 57, Records of the U.S. Geological Survey, NARA. Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 70. 25 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). The Well Site Leaders—Bob Kaluza and Don Vidrine—would normally have been on the rig. Morel, a relatively junior BP engineer, had flown to the rig out of a professional interest in learning more about the cementing process. Guide, interview. Zukunft, Paul, 161,170 Testimony of Anthony Gervasio, 197. Transocean states that on April 5, 2010, it posted a short, two-page version of this advisory to an internal electronic document platform, which supervisors on the Deepwater Horizon had access to. But the advisory was limited to completion operations, and, as of this writing, Transocean has not offered any evidence that anyone on the rig actu- ally saw or reviewed the advisory. Ibid.
¶Current Affairs/Environment
¶ISBN: 978-0-16-087371-3