The Need for Congressional Awareness and Engagement

The Need for Congressional Awareness and Engagement

In the years between the Exxon Valdez spill and the spring of 2010, Congress, like much of the nation, appears to have developed a false sense of security about the risks of offshore oil and gas development. Congress showed its support for offshore drilling in a number of ways, but did not take any steps to mitigate the increased perils that accompany drilling in ever-deeper water. Until the Deepwater Horizon exploded,¹¹¹¹ Press Release, Transocean, Transocean Ltd. Reports Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2009 Results, February 24, 2010. Pratt, Priest, and Castaneda, Offshore Pioneers, 36–48. E.R. Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy: A Legal and Historical Analysis (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1953); Tyler Priest, "Claiming the Coastal Sea: The Battle for the Tidelands, 1937–1953," History of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana: Vol. 1: Papers on the Evolving Offshore Industry, MMS OCS Study 2004-049 (New Orleans: U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, 2008), 67–90, https://www.gomr.mms. gov/homepg/espis/espisfront.asp. Testimony of Gregory Walz, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, October 7, 2010, 157–59. Council on Environmental Quality, Final Recommendations of the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force (July 19, 2010), 41. 12 43 U.S.C. § 1346.Show full note rig workers lost their lives, and millions of barrels of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico, Congress had not introduced legislation to address the risks of deepwater drilling.

The congressional committee structure makes it much harder to focus on safety and environmental issues associated with offshore oil and gas development. In the 111th Congress, multiple committees in both chambers claimed jurisdiction over offshore energy development. The House Natural Resources Committee, for example, had jurisdiction over "mineral land laws and claims and entries there under" and "mineral resources of public lands." Its Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources was specifically charged with oversight of "conservation and development of oil and gas resources of the Outer Continental Shelf." But the House Committee on Energy and Commerce oversaw "exploration, production, storage, supply, marketing, pricing, and regulation of energy resources, including all fossil fuels," as well "national energy policy generally." Similarly, the jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources included "extraction of minerals from oceans and Outer Continental Shelf lands," and its Subcommittee on Energy was responsible for oversight of "oil and natural gas regulation" generally. By contrast, the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works claimed oversight over "environmental aspects of Outer Continental Shelf lands." Yet, during the 110th and 111th Congresses, none of the subcommittees of environment and public works claimed oversight specifically over OCS lands issues.

In neither the House nor the Senate are any of these committees charged with directly overseeing the safety and environmental impacts of offshore development, separate from the conflicting goal of resource development and royalties. The House Committee on

¶Education and Labor and the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions both emphasize occupational safety and health. But neither committee appears to focus on process safety—the vital approach identified by this Commission's investigation that encompasses procedures for minimizing adverse events such as effective hazard analysis, management of risk, communication, and auditing. Finally, no oversight of any of these matters has been conducted by any of the several House or Senate committees or subcommittees responsible for the nation's tax policies or overall appropriations process, notwithstanding the significant impact those policies and appropriations have on both the extent of energy industry activities on the OCS and the government's ability to oversee that activity effectively.

¶After the Deepwater Horizon explosion and resulting oil spill, numerous committees took an interest in offshore safety and environmental issues and held hearings. In short, it took a catastrophe to attract congressional attention.

¶Recommendation G1: Increase and maintain congressional awareness of the risks of offshore drilling in two ways. First, create additional congressional oversight of offshore safety and environmental risks. Second, require the appropriate congressional committees to hold an annual oversight hearing on the state of technology, application of process safety, and environmental protection to ensure these issues receive continuing congressional attention.

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• The House and Senate Rules Committee should each assign a specific committee or subcommittee to oversee process safety and environmental issues related to offshore energy development. These committees should also be given the task of overseeing the Offshore Safety Authority, the creation of which this Commission has separately recommended.
• Congress should require the Secretary of the Interior to submit an annual public report on energy offshore development activities to the applicable congressional committees. This report should focus on the Department's progress in improving its prescriptive safety regulations; steps taken by industry and the Department to improve facility management; the Department's progress in implementing a stronger environmental assessment program, including developing improved NEPA guidelines; and on any other steps taken by industry or the Department to address safety and environmental concerns offshore. The report should also detail the industry's safety and environmental record during the previous 12 months. Finally, the report should highlight any areas in which the Department believes industry is not doing all that it can to promote safety and the environment and any areas where additional legislation could be helpful to the Department's efforts.
• Congress should require the Department of the Interior's Office of Inspector General to submit an independent annual public report to the applicable congressional committees. The report should provide an independent description of the Offshore

Safety Authority's activities over the previous 12 months, including its efforts to improve offshore safety and to investigate accidents and other significant offshore incidents. The report should also include the Inspector General's evaluation of the Authority's efforts and the Inspector General's recommendations for improvement.