Paul Manafort
¶Paul Manafort served on the Trump Campaign, including a period as campaign chairman, from March to August 2016.838 On August 21, 2018, Manafort was convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia on eight tax, Foreign Bank Account Registration (FBAR), and bank fraud charges. On September 14, 2018, Manafort pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia to (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and conspiracy to commit offenses against the United States (money laundering, tax fraud, FBAR, Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), and FARA false statements), and (2) conspiracy to obstruct justice (witness tampering). Manafort also admitted criminal conduct with which he had been charged in the Eastern District of Virginia, but as to which the jury hung. The conduct at issue in both cases involved Manafort's work in Ukraine and the money he earned for that work, as well as crimes after the Ukraine work ended. On March 7, 2019, Manafort was sentenced to 47 months of imprisonment in the Virginia prosecution. On March 13, the district court in D.C. sentenced Manafort to a total term of 73 months: 60 months on the Count 1 conspiracy (with 30 of those months to run concurrent to the Virginia sentence), and 13 months on the Count 1 conspiracy, to be served consecutive to the other two sentences. The two sentences resulted in a total term of 90 months. Manafort had connections to Russia through his prior work for Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and later through his work for a pro-Russian regime in Ukraine. Manafort stayed in touch with these contacts during the campaign period through Konstantin Kilimnik, a longtime Manafort employee who previously ran Manafort's office in Kiev and who the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence.
¶Manafort instructed Rick Gates, his deputy on the Campaign and a longtime employee,839 As noted in Volume I, Section III.D.1.b, supra, Gates pleaded guilty to two criminal charges in the District of Columbia, including making a false statement to the FBI, pursuant to a plea agreement. He has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office has deemed to be reliable. See also Transcript at 16, United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2019), Doc. 514 ("Manafort 2/13/19 Transcript") (court's explanation of reasons to credit Gates's statements in one instance). to provide Kilimnik with updates on the Trump Campaign—including internal polling data, although Manafort claims not to recall that specific instruction. Manafort expected Kilimnik to share that information with others in Ukraine and with Deripaska. Gates periodically sent such polling data to Kilimnik during the campaign.
130¶Manafo1i also twice met Kilimnik in th e United States during the campaign period and conveyed campaign info1mation. The second meeting took place on August 2, 2016, in N ew York City. Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a message from fo1mer Ukrainian President Viktor Y anukovych, who was then living in Russia. The message was about a peace plan for Ukraine that Man afo1i has since acknowledged was a "backdoor" means for Russia to control eastern Ukraine. Several months later, after the presidential election, Kilimnik wrote an email to Man afo1i expressing the view- which Manafo1t later said he shared- that the plan 's success would require U.S . suppo1i to succeed: "all that is required to start the process is a ve1y minor 'wink' (or slight push) from [Donald Trnmp]." 840 The email also stated that if Manafo1t were designated as the U.S . representative and staiied the process, Yanukovych would ensure his reception in Russia "at th e ve1y top level."
¶Manafo1i communicated with Kilimnik about peace plans for Ukraine on at least four occasions after their first discussion of the topic on August 2: December 2016 (the Kilimnik email described above); Januaiy 2017; Febrnaiy 2017; and again in the spring of 2018. The Office reviewed numerous Manafo1i email an d text communications, and asked President Trnmp about the plan in written questions.841 The investigation did not uncover evidence ofManafo1i's passing along info1mation about Ukrainian peace plans to the candidate or anyone else in the Campaign or the Administration . The Office was not, however, able to gain access to all of Man afo1i's electronic communications (in som e instan ces, messages were sent using enc1yption applications). And while Manafort denied that he spoke to members of the Trnmp Campaign or the new Administration about the peace plan , he lied to the Office and the grand jmy about the peace plan and his m eetings with Kilimnik, and his unreliability on this subject was among the reasons that the district judge found that he breached his cooperation agreem ent. 842
¶The Office could not reliably dete1mine Man afo1i's m ose in sharin · olling data with Kilimnik during the campaign period. Man afo11_ . . . id not see a downside to shai·ing campaign info1mation, an d told Gates that his role in the Campaign would be "good for business" and potentially a way to be made whole for work he previously completed in the Ukraine. As to Deripaska, Manafort claimed that by sharing campaign information with him, Deripaska might see value in their relationship and resolve a "disagreement"—a reference to one or more outstanding lawsuits. Because of questions about Manafort's credibility and our limited ability to gather evidence on what happened to the polling data after it was sent to Kilimnik, the Office could not assess what Kilimnik (or others he may have given it to) did with it. The Office did not identify evidence of a connection between Manafort's sharing polling data and Russia's interference in the election, which had already been reported by U.S. media outlets at the time of the August 2 meeting. The investigation did not establish that Manafort otherwise coordinated with the Russian government on its election-interference efforts.
131Paul Manafort's Ties to Russia and Ukraine
¶Manafort's Russian contacts during the campaign and transition periods stem from his consulting work for Deripaska from approximately 2005 to 2009 and his separate political consulting work in Ukraine from 2005 to 2015, including through his company DMP International LLC (DMI). Kilimnik worked for Manafort in Kiev during this entire period and continued to communicate with Manafort through at least June 2018. Kilimnik, who speaks and writes Ukrainian and Russian, facilitated many of Manafort's communications with Deripaska and Ukrainian oligarchs.
Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work
¶In approximately 2005, Manafort began working for Deripaska, a Russian oligarch who has a global empire involving aluminum and power companies and who is closely aligned with Vladimir Putin.843 Pinchuk et al., Russian Tycoon Deripaska in Putin Delegation to China, Reuters (June 8, 2018). A memorandum describing work that Manafort performed for Deripaska in 2005 regarding the post-Soviet republics referenced the need to brief the Kremlin and the benefits that the work could confer on "the Putin Government."844 6/23/05 Memo, Manafort & Davis to Deripaska & Rothchild. Gates described the work Manafort did for Deripaska as "political risk insurance," and explained that Deripaska used Manafort to install friendly political officials in countries where Deripaska had business interests.845 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 7. Manafort's company earned tens of millions of dollars from its work for Deripaska and was loaned millions of dollars by Deripaska as well.846 Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 2-5; Manafort Income by Year, 2005 – 2015; Manafort Loans from Wire Transfers, 2005 – 2015.
¶In 2007, Deripaska invested through another entity in Pericles Emerging Market Partners L.P. ("Pericles"), an investment fund created by Manafort and former Manafort business partner Richard Davis. The Pericles fund was established to pursue investments in Eastern Europe.847 Gates 3/12/18 302, at 5. Deripaska was the sole investor.848 Manafort 12/16/15 Dep., at 157:8-11. Gates stated in interviews with the Office that the venture led to a deterioration of the relationship between Manafort and Deripaska.849 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 9. In particular, when the fund failed, litigation between Manafort and Deripaska ensued. Gates stated that, by 2009, Manafort's business relationship with Deripaska had "dried up."850 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 6. According to Gates, various interactions with Deripaska and his intermediaries over the past few years have involved trying to resolve the legal dispute.851 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 9-10. As described below, in 2016, Manafort, Gates, Kilimnik, and others engaged in efforts to revive the Deripaska relationship and resolve the litigation.
132Political Consulting Work
¶Through Deripaska, Manafort was introduced to Rinat Akhmetov, a Ukrainian oligarch who hired Manafort as a political consultant.852 Manafort 7/30/14 302, at 1; Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 2. In 2005, Akhmetov hired Manafort to engage in political work supporting the Party of Regions,853 Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5-6. a political party in Ukraine that was generally understood to align with Russia. Manafort assisted the Party of Regions in regaining power, and its candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, won the presidency in 2010. Manafort became a close and trusted political advisor to Yanukovych during his time as President of Ukraine. Yanukovych served in that role until 2014, when he fled to Russia amidst popular protests.854 Gates 3/16/18 302, at 1; Davis 2/8/18 302, at 9; Devine 7/6/18 302, at 2-3.
Konstantin Kilimnik
¶Kilimnik is a Russian national who has lived in both Russia and Ukraine and was a longtime Manafort employee.855 Patten 5/22/18 302, at 5; Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18-19; 10/28/97 Kilimnik Visa Record, U.S. Department of State. Kilimnik had direct and close access to Yanukovych and his senior entourage, and he facilitated communications between Manafort and his clients, including Yanukovych and multiple Ukrainian oligarchs.856 Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18-19; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 8; Gates 1/31/18 302, at 4-5; Gates 1/30/18 302, at 2; Gates 2/2/18 302, at 11. Kilimnik also maintained a relationship with Deripaska's deputy, Viktor Boyarkin,857 Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 8. a Russian national who previously served in the defense attaché office of the Russian Embassy to the United States.858 Boyarkin Visa Record, U.S. Department of State.
133¶Manafort told the Office that he did not believe Kilimnik was working as a Russian
¶859 "spy." The FBI, however, assesses that Kilimnik has ties to Russian intelligence.860 The Office has noted Kilimnik's assessed ties to Russian intelligence in public court filings. E.g., Gov't Opp. to Mot. to Modify, United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2017), Doc. 73, at 2 ("Manafort (D.D.C.) Gov't Opp. to Mot. to Modify"). Several pieces of the Office's evidence—including witness interviews and emails obtained through court- authorized search warrants—support that assessment:
¶ Kilimnik was born on April 27, 1970, in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, then of the Soviet Union,
and attended the Military Institute of the Ministry of Defense from 1987 until 1992.861 12/17/16 Kilimnik Visa Record, U.S. Department of State. Sam Patten, a business partner to Kilimnik,862 In August 2018, Patten pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act, and admitted in his Statement of Offense that he also misled and withheld documents from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the course of its investigation of Russian election interference. Plea Agreement, United States v. W. Samuel Patten, 1:18-cr-260 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2018), Doc. 6; Statement of Offense, United States v. W. Samuel Patten, 1:18-cr-260 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2018), Doc. 7. stated that Kilimnik told him that he was a translator in the Russian army for seven years and that he later worked in the Russian armament industry selling arms and military equipment.863 Patten 5/22/18 302, at 5-6.
¶ U.S. government visa records reveal that Kilimnik obtained a visa to travel to the United
¶States with a Russian diplomatic passport in 1997.864 10/28/97 Kilimnik Visa Record, U.S. Department of State.
¶ Kilimnik worked for the International Republican Institute's (IRI) Moscow office, where
he did translation work and general office management from 1998 to 2005.865 Nix 3/30/18 302, at 1-2. While another official recalled the incident differently,866 Nix 3/30/18 302, at 2. one former associate of Kilimnik's at IRI told the FBI that Kilimnik was fired from his post because his links to Russian intelligence were too strong. The same individual stated that it was well known at IRI that Kilimnik had links to the Russian government.867 Lenzi 1/30/18 302, at 2.
¶ Jonathan Hawker, a British national who was a public relations consultant at FTI
134Consulting, worked with DMI on a public relations campaign for Yanukovych. After Hawker's work for DMI ended, Kilimnik contacted Hawker about working for a Russian government entity on a public-relations project that would promote, in Western and Ukrainian media, Russia's position on its 2014 invasion of Crimea.868 Hawker 1/9/18 302, at 13; 3/18/14 Email, Hawker & Tulukbaev.
-
¶
- Gates suspected that Kilimnik was a "spy," a view th at he shar ed with Man afort, Hawker, and Alexander van der Zwaan ,869 an attorney who had worked with DMI on a repo1i for the Ukrainian Ministry ofForeign Affairs.870 Hawker 6/9/18 302, at 4; van der Zwaan 11/3/17 302, at 22. Manafo1t said in an inte1view that Gates had joked with Kilimnik about Kilimnik's going to meet with his KGB handler. Manafo1t 10/16/18 302, at 7.
¶[Redacted: (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)]
Contacts during Paul Manafort's Time with the Trump Campaign
Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign
¶Manafo1i served on the Trnmp Campaign from late March to August 19, 2016. On March 29, 2016, the Campaign announced that Man afo1i would serve as the Campaign's "Convention Manager."871 Press Release - Donald J. Trump Announces Campaign Convention Manager Paul J. Manafort, The Ame1ican Presidency Project - U.C. Santa Barbara (Mar. 29, 2016). sn Gates 1/29/18 302, at 8; Meghan Keneally, Timeline ofManafort's role in the Trump Campaign, ABC News (Oct. 20, 2017). On May 19, 2016, Manafo1i was prom oted to campaign chain nan and chief sti·ategist, and Gates, who had been assisting Manafort on th e Campaign, was appointed deputy campaign chain nan. 872
¶Thom as BaiTa.ck an d Roger Stone both recommended Manafo1i to candidate Trnmp.873 In early 2016, at Manafo1i 's request, Ba1rnck suggested to Tnunp that Manafo1ijoin the Campaign to manage the Republican Convention .874 Stone had worked with Manafort from approximately 1980 until the mid-1990s through vai·ious consulting an d lobbying firms. Man afo1i met Trnmp in 1982 when Trnmp hired the Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly lobbying fnm .875 Over the yeai·s, Manafo1i saw Trnmp at political and social events in New York City and at Stone 's wedding, and Trnmp requested VIP status at the 1988 an d 1996 Republican conventions worked by Manafo1i.876
135¶According to Gates, in March 2016, Manafort traveled to Trump's Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida to meet with Trump. Trump hired him at that time.877 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 10. Manafort agreed to work on the Campaign without pay. Manafort had no meaningful income at this point in time, but resuscitating his domestic political campaign career could be financially beneficial in the future. Gates reported that Manafort intended, if Trump won the Presidency, to remain outside the Administration and monetize his relationship with the Administration.878 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 4.
Paul Manafort's Campaign-Period Contacts
¶Immediately upon joining the Campaign, Manafort directed Gates to prepare for his review separate memoranda addressed to Deripaska, Akhmetov, Serhiy Lyovochkin, and Boris Kolesnikov,879 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 11. the last three being Ukrainian oligarchs who were senior Opposition Bloc officials.880 See Sharon LaFraniere, Manafort's Trial Isn't About Russia, but It Will Be in the Air, New York Times (July 30, 2018); Tierney Sneed, Prosecutors Believe Manafort Made $60 Million Consulting in Ukraine, Talking Points Memo (July 30, 2018); Mykola Vorobiov, How Pro-Russian Forces Will Take Revenge on Ukraine, Atlantic Council (Sept. 23, 2018); Sergii Leshchenko, Ukraine's Oligarchs Are Still Calling the Shots, Foreign Policy (Aug. 14, 2014); Interfax-Ukraine, Kolesnikov: Inevitability of Punishment Needed for Real Fight Against Smuggling in Ukraine, Kyiv Post (June 23, 2018); Igor Kossov, Kyiv Hotel Industry Makes Room for New Entrants, Kyiv Post (Mar. 7, 2019); Markian Kuzmowycz, How the Kremlin Can Win Ukraine's Elections, Atlantic Council (Nov. 19, 2018). The Opposition Bloc is a Ukraine political party that largely reconstituted the Party of Regions. The memoranda described Manafort's appointment to the Trump Campaign and indicated his willingness to consult on Ukrainian politics in the future. On March 30, 2016, Gates emailed the memoranda and a press release announcing Manafort's appointment to Kilimnik for translation and dissemination.881 3/30/16 Email, Gates to Kilimnik. Manafort later followed up with Kilimnik to ensure his messages had been delivered, emailing on April 11, 2016 to ask whether Kilimnik had shown "our friends" the media coverage of his new role.882 4/11/16 Email, Manafort & Kilimnik. Kilimnik replied, "Absolutely. Every article." Manafort further asked: "How do we use to get whole. Has Ovd [Oleg Vladimirovich Deripaska] operation seen?" Kilimnik wrote back the same day, "Yes, I have been sending everything to Victor [Boyarkin, Deripaska's deputy], who has been forwarding the coverage directly to OVD."883 4/11/16 Email, Manafort & Kilimnik.
¶Gates reported that Manafort said that being hired on the Campaign would be "good for business" and increase the likelihood that Manafort would be paid the approximately $2 million he was owed for previous political consulting work in Ukraine.884 Gates 2/2/18 302, at 10. Gates also explained to the Office that Manafort thought his role on the Campaign could help "confirm" that Deripaska had dropped the Pericles lawsuit, and that Gates believed Manafort sent polling data to Deripaska (as discussed fmth er below) so that Deripaska would not move foiward with his lawsuit against Manafoii .885 Gates 2/2/ 18 302, at 11; Gates 9/27/ 18 302 (serial 740), at 2. Gates fmi her stated that Deripaska wanted a visa to the United States, that Deripaska could believe that having Manafoli in a position inside the Campaign or Administration might be helpful to Deripaska, and that Man afoii's relationship with Trnmp could help Deripaska in other ways as well.886 Gates stated, however, that Manafoii never told him anything specific about what, if anything, Manafort might be offering Deripaska.887 Gates 2/2/ 18 302, at 12.
136¶Gates also repoiied that Man afoii instructed him in April 2016 or early May 2016 to send Kilimnik Campaign internal polling data an d other updates so that Kilimnik, in turn, could shar e it with Ukrainian oli archs.888 Gates 1/31/ 18 302, at 17; Gates 9/27/18 302 (serial 740), at 2. In a later inteiview with the Office, Gates stated that Manafoit directed him to send polling data to Kilimnik after a May 7, 2016 meeting between Manafoit and Kilimnik in New York, discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.8.b.iii, infra . Gates 11/7/18 302, at 3. Gates understood that the infon nation would also be shared with
¶889 Deripaska,. . . . Gates repoiied to the Office th at he did not know why Manafort wanted him to send polling infoimation, but Gates thought it was a way to showcase Manafoii's work, and Manafoii wanted to open doors to jobs after the Trnmp Campaign ended.890 Gates 2/ 12/ 18 302, at 10; Gates 1/31/ 18 302, at 17. Gates said that Man afoii's instruction included sending internal polling data prepared for the Tnunp Campaign by pollster Tony Fabrizio.891 Gates 9/27/ 18 302 (seiial 740), at 2; Gates 2/7/ 18 302, at 15. Fabrizio had worked with Man afoii for years and was brought into th e Campaign by Manafoii . Gates stated that, in accordance with Manafort's instruction, he periodically sent Kilimnik polling data via WhatsApp; Gates then deleted the communications on a daily basis. 892 Gates fmi her told the Office that, after Manafoii left the Campaign in mid-August, Gates sent Kilimnik polling data less frequently and that the data he sent was more publicly available information an d less internal data.893 Gates 2/ 12/ 18 302, at 11-12. According to Gates, his access to internal polling data was more limited because Fabrizio was himself distanced from the Campaign at that point. wit mu tip e emai s . at Kilimnik sent to U.S. associates and press contacts between late July an d mid-August of 2016. Those emails referenced "internal polling," described the status of the Trnmp Campaign and
137¶Manafo1i's role in it and assessed Trnmp 's prospects for
¶Gates to send Kilimnik internal data ~~
¶The Office also obtained contemporaneous emails that shed light on the purpose of the communications with Deripaska and that are consistent with Gates 's account. For example, in response to a July 7, 2016, email from a Ukrainian repo1ier about Manafo1i's failed Deripaska backed investment, Manafo1t asked Kilimnik whether there had been any movement on "this issue with our friend."897 7/7/ 16 Email, Manafo1t to Kilimnik. Gates stated that "our friend" likely referred to Deripaska,898 Gates 2/2/ 18 302, at 13. and Manafo1t told the Office that the "issue" (an d "our biggest interest," as stated below) was a solution to the Deripaska-Pericles issue.899 Manafo1t 9/ 11/18 302, at 6. Kilimnik replied:
¶I am carefully optimistic on the question of our biggest interest.
Our friend [Boyarkin] said there is lately significantly more attention to the campaign in his boss ' [Deripaska's] mind, and he will be most likely looking for ways to reach out to you pretty soon, understanding all the time sensitivity. I am more than sure that it will be resolved and we will get back to the original relationship with V. 's boss [Deripaska].900 7/8/ 16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafo1t.
¶Eight minutes later, Manafort replied that Kilimnik should tell Boyarkin's "boss," a reference to Deripaska, "that if he needs private briefings we can accommodate."901 7/8/ 16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafo1t; Gates 2/2/ 18 302, at 13. Manafo1i has alleged to the Office that he was willing to brief Deripaska only on public campaign matters and gave an example: why Trnmp selected Mike Pence as the Vice-Presidential rnnning mate. 902 Manafo1t said he never gave Deripaska a briefing.903 Manafo1t 9/ 11/18 302, at 6. Manafo1t noted that if Trnmp won, Deripaska would want to use Manafo1i to advan ce whatever interests Deripaska had in the United States and elsewhere.904 Manafo1t 9/ 11/18 302, at 6.
138Paul Manafort's Two Campaign-Period Meetings with Konstantin Kilimnik in the United States
¶Manafort twice met with Kilimnik in person during the campaign period—once in May and again in August 2016. The first meeting took place on May 7, 2016, in New York City.905 [Redacted: (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E)] In the days leading to the meeting, Kilimnik had been working to gather information about the political situation in Ukraine. That included information gleaned from a trip that former Party of Regions official Yuriy Boyko had recently taken to Moscow—a trip that likely included meetings between Boyko and high-ranking Russian officials.906 4/26/16 Email, Kilimnik to Purcell, at 2; Gates 2/2/18 302, at 12; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 6-7; Gates 11/7/18 302, at 3. Kilimnik then traveled to Washington, D.C. on or about May 5, 2016; while in Washington, Kilimnik had pre-arranged meetings with State Department employees.907 5/7/16 Email, Kilimnik to Charap & Kimmage; 5/7/16 Email, Kasanof to Kilimnik.
¶Late on the evening of May 6, Gates arranged for Kilimnik to take a 3:00 a.m. train to meet Manafort in New York for breakfast on May 7.908 5/6/16 Email, Manafort to Gates; 5/6/16 Email, Gates to Kilimnik. According to Manafort, during the meeting, he and Kilimnik talked about events in Ukraine, and Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the Trump Campaign, expecting Kilimnik to pass the information back to individuals in Ukraine and elsewhere.909 Manafort 10/11/18 302, at 1. Manafort stated that Opposition Bloc members recognized Manafort's position on the Campaign was an opportunity, but Kilimnik did not ask for anything.910 Manafort 10/11/18 302, at 1. Kilimnik spoke about a plan of Boyko to boost election participation in the eastern zone of Ukraine, which was the base for the Opposition Bloc.911 Manafort 10/11/18 302, at 1. Kilimnik returned to Washington, D.C. right after the meeting with Manafort.
¶Manafort met with Kilimnik a second time at the Grand Havana Club in New York City on the evening of August 2, 2016. The events leading to the meeting are as follows. On July 28, 2016, Kilimnik flew from Kiev to Moscow.912 7/25/16 Email, Kilimnik to katrin@yana.kiev.ua (2:17:34 a.m.). The next day, Kilimnik wrote to Manafort requesting that they meet, using coded language about a conversation he had that day.913 7/29/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort (10:51 a.m.). In an email with a subject line "Black Caviar," Kilimnik wrote:
139I met today with the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar several years ago. We spent about 5 hours talking about his story, and I have several important messages from him to you. He asked me to go and brief you on our conversation. I said I have to run it by you first, but in principle I am prepared to do it. . . . It has to do about the future of his
¶countiy, and is quite interesting .9 14
¶Manafo1t identified "the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar" as Yanukovych. He explained that, in 2010, he an d Yanukovych had lunch to celebrate the recent presidential election. Y anukovych gave Man afo1t a large jar of black caviar that was wo1t h approximately $30,000 to $40,000.915 Manafo1t 9/12/18 302, at 3. Manafort 's identification ofYanukovych as " the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar" is consistent with Kilimnik being in Moscow- where Yanukovych resided- when Kilimnik wrote "I met today with ~a December 2016 em ail in which Kilimnik
¶916 refen ed to Yanukovych as " BG," ~ Manafo1t replied to Kilimnik's July 29 email, "Tuesday [August 2] is best ... Tues or weds in NYC." 9 17
¶Three days later, on July 31 , 2016, Kilimnik flew back to Kiev from Moscow, and on th at same day, wrote to Manafo1t that he needed "about 2 hours" for their meeting "because it is a long caviar sto1y to tell."9 18 Kilimnik wrote that he would anive at JFK on August 2 at 7:30 p .m ., and he and Man afo1t agreed to a late dinner that night.919 7/31/16 Email, Manafo1t to Kilimnik. ° 92 Kilimnik 8/2/16 CBP Record; Call Records of Konstantin KilimniIJmmlllllllllll - Call Records of Rick Gates [Redacted: (b) (3)] ; 8/2-3/16, ~ Receipt. Documenta1y evidence-including flight, phone, and hotel records, and the timing of text m essages exchanged920--confinns th e dinner took place as planned on August 2.921 De1ipaska's p1ivate plane also flew to Teterboro Aiipo1t in New Jersey on the evening ofAugust 2, 2016. According to Customs and Border Protection records, the only passengers on the plane were Deripaska's wife, daughter, mother, and father-in-law, and separate records obtained by our Office confnm that Kilimnik flew on a commercial flight to New York.
¶As to the contents of the meeting itself, the accounts of Man afo1t and Gates- who an ived late to the dinner--<liffer in ce1tain respects. But their versions of events, when assessed alongside available documentaiy evidence and what Kilimnik told business associate Sam Patten, indicate th at at least three principal topics were discussed.
¶First, Manafo1t and Kilimnik discussed a plan to resolve the ongoing political problems in Ukraine by creating an autonomous republic in its more indusu-ialized eastern region of Donbas,922 and having Yanukovych, the Ukrainian President ousted in 2014, elected to head that republic.923 Manafo1t 9/11/18 302, at 4; [Redacted: (b) (3)] That plan, Man afo1i later acknowledged, constituted a "backdoor" means for Russia to control eastern Ukraine. 924 Man afo1i initially said that, if he had not cut offthe discussion, Kilimnik would have asked Man afo1i in the August 2 meeting to convince Trnmp to come out in favor of the peace plan , an d Yanukovych would have expected Manafo1i to use his connections in Europe and Ukraine to suppo1i the plan .925 Manafo1i also initially told the Office that he had said to Kilimnik th at the plan was crazy, that the discussion ended, an d that he did not recall Kilimnik askin Manafo1i to reconsider the lan after their Au ust 2 m eetin .926 Manafo1i said that he reacted negatively to Y anukovych sending- years later -an "urgent" request when Yanukovych needed him.927 When confronted with an email written by Kilimnik on or about December 8, 2016, however, Manafo1i acknowledged Kilimnik raised the peace plan again in that email. 928 Manafo1i ultimately acknowled ed Kilimnik also raised the eace Ian in Januai an d Febrnaiy 2017 meetings with Manafo1i,
140¶Second, Man afo1i briefed Kilimnik on the state of the Trnmp Campaign and Man afo1i's plan to win the election .930 That briefing encompassed the Campaign's messaging and its internal polling data. According to Gates, it also included discussion of "battleground" states, which Manafo1i identified as Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, an d Minnesota. 931 Manafo1i did not refer ex licitl to "battle ·ound" states in his tellin of the Au st 2 discussion prime Illllllster. The plan emphasized that Yanukovych would be an ideal candidate to bring peace to the region as prime minister of the republic, and facilitate the reintegration of the re~ aine with the suppo1t of the U.S. and Russian presidents. As noted above, according to ~ the written documentation describin the Ian, for the Ian to work, both U.S. and Russian suppo1t were necessa1y.
¶2/21/ 18 Email, Manafo1t, Ward, & Fabrizio, at 3-5.
141¶Third, according to Gates and what Kilimnik told Patten, Manafort and Kilimnik discussed two sets of financial disputes related to Manafort's previous work in the region. Those consisted of the unresolved Deripaska lawsuit and the funds that the Opposition Bloc owed to Manafort for his political consulting work and how Manafort might be able to obtain payment.933 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 2-4; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 7.
¶After the meeting, Gates and Manafort both stated that they left separately from Kilimnik because they knew the media was tracking Manafort and wanted to avoid media reporting on his connections to Kilimnik.934 Gates 1/30/18 302, at 5; Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5.
Post-Resignation Activities
¶Manafort resigned from the Trump Campaign in mid-August 2016, approximately two weeks after his second meeting with Kilimnik, amidst negative media reporting about his political consulting work for the pro-Russian Party of Regions in Ukraine. Despite his resignation, Manafort continued to offer advice to various Campaign officials through the November election. Manafort told Gates that he still spoke with Kushner, Bannon, and candidate Trump,935 Gates 2/12/18 302, at 12. and some of those post-resignation contacts are documented in emails. For example, on October 21, 2016, Manafort sent Kushner an email and attached a strategy memorandum proposing that the Campaign make the case against Clinton "as the failed and corrupt champion of the establishment" and that "Wikileaks provides the Trump campaign the ability to make the case in a very credible way – by using the words of Clinton, its campaign officials and DNC members."936 NOSC00021517-20 (10/21/16 Email, Manafort to Kushner). Later, in a November 5, 2016 email to Kushner entitled "Securing the Victory," Manafort stated that he was "really feeling good about our prospects on Tuesday and focusing on preserving the victory," and that he was concerned the Clinton Campaign would respond to a loss by "mov[ing] immediately to discredit the [Trump] victory and claim voter fraud and cyber-fraud, including the claim that the Russians have hacked into the voting machines and tampered with the results."937 NOSC00021573-75 (11/5/16 Email, Manafort to Kushner).
¶Trump was elected President on November 8, 2016. Manafort told the Office that, in the wake of Trump's victory, he was not interested in an Administration job. Manafort instead preferred to stay on the "outside," and monetize his campaign position to generate business given his familiarity and relationship with Trump and the incoming Administration.938 Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 1, 4-5; Gates 1/30/18 302, at 4. Manafort appeared to follow that plan, as he traveled to the Middle East, Cuba, South Korea, Japan, and China and was paid to explain what a Trump presidency would entail.939 Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 1.
¶Manafort's activities in early 2017 included meetings relating to Ukraine and Russia. The first meeting, which took place in Madrid, Spain in Januaiy 2017, was with Georgiy Oganov. Oganov, who had previously worked at the Russian Embassy in the United States, was a senior executive at a Deripaska company and was believed to repo1t directly to Deripaska.940 Manafo1t initially denied attending the meeting . When he later acknowledged it, he claimed that the meeting had been aiTanged by his lawyers and concerned only the Pericles lawsuit.941 Manafo1t 9/ 11/18 302, at 7. Other evidence, however, provides reason to doubt Manafort's statement that the sole topic of the meeting was the Pericles lawsuit. In paiticulai·, text messages to Manafort from a number associated with Kilimnik suggest that Kilimnik and Boyarkin-not Manafo1t's counsel-had airnnged the meeting between Manafo1t and Oganov.942 Text Message, Manafo1t & Kilimnik. Kilimnik's message states that the meeting was supposed to be "not about money or Pericles" but instead "about recreating [the] old friendship"--ostensibly between Manafo1t and Deripaska-"and talking about global politics."943 Text Message, Manafort & Kilimnik; Manafo1t 9/ 12/ 18 302, at 5. Manafo1t also replied by text that he "need[s] this finished before Jan. 20,"944 Text Message, Manafort & Kilimnik. which appears to be a reference to resolving Pericles before the inauguration.
142¶On Janua1y 15, 2017, three days after his return from Madrid, Manafo1t emailed K. T. McFai·land, who was at that time designated to be Deputy N ational Security Advisor and was fo1mally appointed to that position on Januaiy 20, 2017 .945 Manafo1t's Januaiy 15 email to McFai·land stated: "I have some impo1tant info1m ation I want to share that I picked up on my travels over the last month ." 946 Manafo1t told the Office that the email refe1Ted to an issue regarding Cuba, not Russia or Ukraine, and Manafo1t had traveled to Cuba in the past m onth. 947 Either way, McFai·land-who was advised by Flynn not to respond to the Manafo1t inquny appeai·s not to have responded to Manafo1t.948 1/ 15/ 17 Email, Manafo1t, McFarland, & Flynn; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 18-19.
¶Manafo1t told the Office that around the time of the Presidential Inauguration in Januaiy, he met with Kilimnik and Ukrainian oligarch Serhiy Lyovochkin at the Westin Hotel in Alexan dria, Vn·ginia.949 Manafo1t 9/ 11/18 302, at 7; Manafort 9/21/ 18 302, at 3; CBP Recor , Jan. 19 and 22, 2017; 201 6-17 Text Messages, Kilimnik & Patten, at 1-2. 950 [Redacted: (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E)] During this meeting, Kilimnik again discussed the Yanukovych peace plan that he had broached at the August 2 meeting and in a detailed December 8, 2016 message found in Kilimnik's DMP email account. 950 In that December 8 email, which Manafo1t acknowledged having read,951 Manafo1t 9/ 11/18 302, at 6; [Redacted: (b) (3)] Kilimnik wrote, " [a]ll that is required to strut the process is a ve1y minor 'wink' (or slight push) from DT"- an appai·ent reference to President-elect Tmmp--"and a decision to authorize you to be a 'special representative' and manage this process." Kilimnik assured Manafo1t, with that authority, he "could sta1t the process and within 10 days visit Russia [Yanukovych] guai·antees your reception at the ve1y top level," an d that "DT could have peace in Ukraine basically within a few months after inauguration ." 952 As noted above, [Redacted: (b) (3)] and statem ents to the Office, Manafo1t sou • • ,,., •• I •••••• Ian. lD)l~} fill[Redacted: (b) (3)] lil[Redacted: (b) (3)] ill[Redacted: (b) (3)]
143¶On Febm aiy 26, 2017, Manafo1t met Kilimnik in Madrid, where Kilimnik had flown from Moscow.956 2/21/ 17 Email, Zatynaiko to Kilimnik. In his first two interviews with th e Office, Manafo1t denied meeting with Kilimnik on his Madrid trip and then-after being confronted with documenta1y evidence th at Kilimnik was in Madrid at the same time as him-recognized that he met him in Madrid. Manafo1t said that Kilimnik had updated him on a criminal investigation into so-called "black ledger" payments to Manafo1t that was bein conducted b Ukraine's National Anti-Conu tion Bureau .957
¶Manafo1t remained in contact with Kilimnik throughout 2017 and into the spring of 2018.
144Those contacts included matters pertaining to the criminal charges brought by the Office,959 and th e Ukraine peace plan. In early 2018, Manafort retained his longtime polling fnm to craft a draft poll in Ukraine, sent the pollsters a three-page primer on the plan sent by Kilimnik, and worked with Kilimnik to fo1mulate the polling questions.960 The primer sent to the pollsters specifically called for the United States and President Trnmp to suppo1t the Autonomous Republic ofDonbas with Yanukovych as Prime Minister,961 an d a series ofquestions in the draft poll asked for opinions on Yanukovych's role in resolving the conflict in Donbas. 962 (The poll was not solely about Donbas; it also sought paiticipants ' views on leaders apa1t from Y anukovych as they pe1tained to the 2019 Ukraine presidential election.)
The Office has not uncovered evidence that Man afo1t brought the Ukraine peace plan to th e attention of the Trnmp Campaign or the Trnmp Administration. Kilimnik continued his effo1ts to promote the peace plan to the Executive Branch (e.g. , U.S. Depa1tment of State) into the summer of 2018. 963
Post-Election and Transition-Period Contacts
Trnmp was elected President on November 8, 2016. Beginning immediately after the election, individuals connected to the Russian government staited contacting officials on the Trnmp Campaign and Transition Team through multiple channels- sometimes through Russian Ambassador Kislyak and at oth er times through individuals who sought reliable contacts through U.S. persons not fo1mally tied to the Campaign or Transition Team. The most senior levels of the Russian government encouraged these effo1t s. The investigation did not establish that these effo1ts reflected or constituted coordination between the Trnmp Campaign and Russia in its election-interference activities.