Executive Summary

Approved December 13, 2012 Updated for Release April 3, 2014 Declassification Revisions December 3, 2014

I. Background on the Committee Study — 8
II. Overall History and Operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program — 11
A. September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification (MON) Authorizes the CIA to Capture and Detain a Specific Category of Indi viduals — 11
1. After Considering Various Clandestine Detention Locations, the CIA Determines That a U.S. Military Bas^^ht^" Best Option "; the CIA Delegates "Blanket " Detention Approvals to CIA Officers in [Redacted] — 11
2. The CIA Holds at Least 21 More Detainees Than ft Has Represented; At Least 26 CIA Detainees Wrongly Detained — 14
B. The Detention of Abu Zubaydah and the Development and Authorization of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques — 17
1. Past Experience Led the CIA to Assess that Coercive Interrogation Techniques Were "Counterproductive " and "Ineffective "; After Issuance of the MON, CIA Attorneys Research Possible Legal Defense for Using Techniques Considered Torture; the CIA Conducts No Research on Effective Interrogations, Relies on Contractors with No Relevant Experience — 17
2. The CIA Renders Abu Zubaydah to a Covert Facility, Obtains Presidential Approval Without Inter- Agency Deliberation — 21
3. Tensions with Host Country Leadership and Media Attention Foreshadow Future Challenges — 23
4. FBI Officers Are the First to Question Abu Zubaydah, Who States He Intends to Cooperate; Abu Zubaydah is Taken to a Hospital Where He Provides Information the CIA Later Describes as "Important" and "Vital" — 24
5. While Abu Zubaydah is Hospitalized, CIA Headquarters Discusses the Use of Coercive Interrogation Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah — 25
6. New CIA Interrogation Plan Focuses on Abu Zubaydah's "Most Important Secret"; FBI Temporarily Barred from the Questioning of Abu Zubaydah; Abu Zubaydah then Placed in Isolation for 47 Days Without Questioning — 27
7. Proposal by CIA Contract Personnel to Use SERE-Based Interrogation Techniques Leads to the Development of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; The CIA Determines that "the Interrogation Process Takes Precedence Over Preventative Medical Procedures" — 31
8. The CIA Obtains Legal and Policy Approval for Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; The CIA Does Not Brief the President — 37
9. The CIA Uses the Waterboard and Other Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Abu Zubaydah 40 — 40
10. A CIA Presidential Daily Brief Provides Inaccurate Information on the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah — 47
11. The CIA Does Not Brief the Committee on the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah — 48
C. Interrogation in Country [Redacted] and the January 2003 Guidelines — 49
1. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE COBALT, Places Inexperienced First-Tour Officer in Charge 49 — 49
2. CIA Records Lack Information on CIA Detainees and Details of Interrogations in Country [Redacted] — 50
3. CIA Headquarters Recommends That Untrained Interrogators in Country [Redacted] Use the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques on Ridha al-Najjar — 51
4. Death ofGul Rahman Leads CIA Headquarters to Learn of Unreported Coercive Interrogation Techniques at DETENTION SITE COBALT; CIA Inspector General Review Reveals Lack of Oversight of the Detention Site — 54
5. The CIA Begins Training New Interrogators; Interrogation Techniques Not Reviewed by the Department of Justice Included in the Training Syllabus — 57
6. Despite Recommendation from CIA Attorneys, the CIA Fails to Adequately Screen Potential Interrogators in 2002 and 2003 — 58
7. Bureau of Prisons "WOW'ed" by Level of Deprivation at CIA's COBALT Detention Site — 59

8. The CIA Places CIA Detainees in Country [Redacted] Facilities Because They Did Not Meet the MON Standard for Detention — 61
9. DC I Tenet Establishes First Guidelines on Detention Conditions and Interrogation; Formal Consolidation of Program Administration at CIA Headquarters Does Not Resolve Disagreements Among CIA Personnel — 62
D. The Detention and Interrogation of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri — 66
1. CIA Interrogators Disagree with CIA Headquarters About Al-Nashiri's Level of Cooperation; Interrogators Oppose Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques — 66
2. CIA Headquarters Sends Untrained Interrogator to Resume Al-Nashiri's Interrogations; Interrogator Threatens al-Nashiri with a Gun and a Drill — 68
3. CIA Contractor Recommends Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Al-Nashiri; Chief Interrogator Threatens to Quit Because Additional Techniques Might "Push [Al- NashiriJ Over The Edge Psychologically, " Refers to the CIA Program /4s a "Train Wreak I sic] Waiting to Happen " — 70
E. Tensions with Country [Redacted] Relating to the CIA Detention Facility and the Arrival of New Detainees — 73
F. The Detention and Interrogation of Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh — 75
1. Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Provides Information While in Foreign Government Custody, Prior to Rendition to CIA Custody — 75
2. Interrogation Plan for Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Proposes Immediate Use of Nudity and Shackling with Hands Above the Head; Plan Becomes Template for Future Detainees — 76
3. CIA Headquarters Urges Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Despite Interrogators' Assessment That Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh Wins Cooperative — 78
4. Information Already Provided by Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh in the Custody of a Foreign Government Inaccurately Attributed to CIA Interrogations; Interrogators Apply the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Bin Al-Shibh When Not Addressed As "Sir" and When Bin Al-Shibh Complains of Stomach Pain — 79
G. The Detention and Interrogation of Khalid Shaykli Muhammad — 81
1. KSM Held in Pakistani Custody, Provides Limited Information; Rendered to CIA Custody at DETENTION SITE COBALT, KSM Is Immediately Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques — 81
2. The CIA Transfers KSM to DETENTION SITE BLUE, Anticipates Use of the Waterboard Prior to His Arrival — 83
3. The CIA Waterboards KSM at Least 183 Times; KSM's Reporting Includes Significant Fabricated Information — 85
4. After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against KSM Ends, the CIA Continues to Assess That KSM Is Withholding and Fabricating Information — 93
H. The Growth of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program — 96
1. Fifty-Three CIA Detainees Enter the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003 — 96
2. The CIA Establishes DETENTION SITE BLA CK in Country [Redacted] and DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Country| [Redacted] — 97
3. At Least 17 CIA Detainees Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Without CIA Headquarters Authorization — 99
4. CIA Headquarters Authorizes Water Dousing Without Department of Justice Approval; Application of Technique Reported as Approximating Waterboarding — 105
5. Hambali Fabricates Information While Being Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques — 108
6. After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, CIA Headquarters Questions Detention of Detainee and Recommends Release; Detainee Transferred to U.S. Military Custody and Held for An Additional Four Years — 109

7. A Year After DETENTION SITE COBA LT Opens, the CIA Reports '' Unsettling Discovery That We Are Holding a Number of Detainees About Whom We Know Very Little" — 110
8. CIA Detention Sites in Country [Redacted] Lack Sufficient Personnel and Translators to Support the Interrogations of Detainees Ill I. Other Medical, Psychological, and Behavioral Issues Ill 1. CIA Interrogations Take Precedence Over Medical Care Ill 2. CIA Detainees Exhibit Psychological and Behavioral Issues — 113
J. The CIA Seeks Reaffirmation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003 — 115
1. Administration Statements About the Humane Treatment of Detainees Raise Concerns at the CIA About Possible Lack of Policy Support for CIA Interrogation Activities — 115
2. The CIA Provides Inaccurate Information to Select Members of the National Security Council, Represents that "Termination of This Program Will Result in Loss of Life, Possibly Extensive"; Policymakers Reauthorize Program — 117
K. Additional Oversight and Outside Pressure in 2004: ICRC, Inspector General, Congress, and the U.S. Supreme Court — 119
2. CIA Leadership Calls Draft Inspector General Special Review of the Program "Imbalanced and Inaccurate. " Responds with Inaccurate Information; CIA Seeks to Limit Further Review of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program by the Inspector General — 121
3. The CIA Does Not Satisfy Inspector General Special Review Recommendation to Assess the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques — 124
4. The CIA Wrongfully Detains Khalid Al-Masri; CIA Director Rejects Accountability for Officer Involved — 128
5. Hassan Ghul Provides Substantial Information—Including Information on a Key UBL Facilitator- Prior to the CIA's Use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques — 130
6. Other Detainees Wrongfully Held iti 2004; CIA Sources Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; CIA Officer Testifies that the CIA Is "Not Authorized" "to Do Anything Like What You Have Seen " in Abu Ghraib Photographs — 133
7. The CIA Suspends the Use of its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Resumes Use of the Techniques on an Individual Basis; Interrogations are Based on Fabricated, Single Source Information — 134
8. Country |Detains Individuals on the CIA's Behalf — 139
9. U.S. Supreme Court Action in the Case of Rasul v. Bush Forces Transfer of CIA Detainees from Guantanamo Bay to Country [Redacted] — 140
L. The Pace of CIA Operations Slows; Chief of Base Concerned About "Inexperienced, Marginal, Underperforming" CIA Personnel; Inspector General Describes Lack of Debriefers As "Ongoing Problem" 143 — 143
M. Legal and Operational Challenges in 2005 — 145
1. Department of Justice Renews Approval for the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques in May 2005 — 145
2. Abu Faraj Al-Libi Subjected to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Prior to Department of Justice Memorandum on U.S. Obligations Under the Convention Against Torture; CIA Subjects Abu Faraj Al-Libi to the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques When He Complains of Hearing Problems — 146
3. CIA Acquires Two Detcunees from the U.S. Military — 148
4. The CIA Seeks "End Game" for Detainees in Early 2005 Due to Limited Support From Liaison Partners — 149
5. Press Stories and the CIA's Inability to Provide Emergency Medical Care to Detainees Result in the Closing of CIA Detention Facilities in Countries [Redacted] andj[Redacted] — 151

6. The CIA Considers Changes to the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program Following the Detainee Treatment Act, Hanulan v. Rumsfeld — 157
N. The Final Disposition of CIA Detainees and the End of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program — 159
1. President Bush Publicly Acknowledges the Existence of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program — 159
2. The In ternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Gains Access to CIA Detainees After Their Transfer to U.S. Military Custody in September 2006 — 160
3. The CIA Considers Future of the Program Following the Military Commissions Act — 161
4. The CIA Develops Modified Enhanced Interrogation Program After Passage of the Military Commissions Act — 162
5. Muhammad Rahim, the CIA's Last Detainee, is Subjected to Extensive Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Provides No Intelligence — 163
6. CIA After-Action Review of Rahim Interrogation Calls for Study of Effectiveness of Interrogation Techniques and Recommends Greater Use of Rapport-Building Techniques in Future CIA Interrogations — 167
7. CIA Contracting Expenses Related to Company Formed by SWIGERT and DUNBAR — 168
8. The CIA's Detention and In terrogation Program Ends — 170
III. Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Multiple Constituencies — 172
A. Background on CIA Effectiveness Representations — 172
B. Past Efforts to Review the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques — 178
C. The Origins of CIA Representations Regarding the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques As Having "Saved Lives," "Thwarted Plots," and "Captured Terrorists" — 179
D. CIA Representations About the Effectiveness of Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Specific CIA Detainees — 204
1. Abu Zubaydah — 204
2. Khalid Sliaykli Muhammad (KSM) — 210
E. CIA Effectiveness Claims Regarding a "High Volume of Critical Intelligence" — 216
F. The Eight Primary CIA Effectiveness Representations—the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques "Enabled the CIA to Disrupt Terrorist Plots" and "Capture Additional Terrorists" — 217
1. The Thwarting of the Dirty Bomb/Tall Buildings Plot and the Capture of Jose Padilla — 225
2. The Thwarting of the Karachi Plots — 239
3. The Thwarting of the Second Wave Plot and the Discovery of the Al-Ghuraba Group — 246
4. The Thwarting of the United Kingdom Urban Targets Plot and the Capture of Dliiren Barot, aka Issa til-Hindi — 258
5. The Identification, Capture, and Arrest oflyman Paris — 276
6. The Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Sajid Badat — 284
7. The Thwarting of the Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf Plotting — 294
8. The Capture of Hambali — 301
G. CIA Secondary Effectiveness Representations—Less Frequently Cited Disrupted Plots, Captures, and Intelligence that the CIA Has Provided As Evidence for the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques — 311
1. The Identification of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) as the Mastermind of the September 11. 2001. Attacks — 312
2. The Identification of KSM's "Mukhtar" Alias — 315
3. The Capture ofRamzi bin al-Shibh — 316
4. The Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) — 326
5. The Capture ofMajid Khan — 334

6. The Thwarting of the Camp Lemonier Plotting — 336
7. The Assertion that CIA Detainees Subjected to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Help Validate CIA Sources — 342
8. The Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha — 352
9. Critical Intelligence Alerting the CIA to Jaffar al-Tayyar — 358
10. The Identification and Arrest ofSaleh al-Marri — 366
11. The Collection of Critical Tactical Intelligence on Shkai, Pakistan — 368
12. Information on the Facilitator that Led to the UBL Operation — 378
IV. Overview of CIA Representations to the Media While the Program Was Classified — 401
A. The CIA Provides Information on the Still-Classified Detention and Interrogation Program to Journalists Who then Publish Classified Information; CIA Does Not File Crimes Reports in Connection with the Stories 401 — 401
B. Senior CIA Officials Discuss Need to "Put Out Our Story" to Shape Public and Congressional Opinion Prior to the Full Committee Being Briefed — 402
C. CIA Attorneys Caution that Classified Information Provided to the Media Should Not Be Attributed to the CIA — 404
D. The CIA Engages with Journalists and Conveys an Inaccurate Account of the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah — 405
V. Review of CIA Representations to the Department of Justice — 409
A. August 1, 2002, OLC Memorandum Relies on Inaccurate Information Regarding Abu Zubaydah — 409
B. The CIA Interprets the August 1, 2002, Memorandum to Apply to Other Detainees, Despite Language of the Memorandum; Interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and Other Detainees Diverge from the CIA's Representations to the OLC — 411
C. Following Suspension of the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, the CIA Obtains Approval from the OLC for the Interrogation of Three Individual Detainees — 413
D. May 2005 OLC Memoranda Rely on Inaccurate Representations from the CIA Regarding the Interrogation Process, the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, and the Effectiveness of the Techniques — 419
E. After Passage of the Detainee Treatment Act, OLC Issues Opinion on CIA Conditions of Confinement, Withdraws Draft Opinion on the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques After the U.S. Supreme Court Case of Haindan v. Rumsfeld — 428
F. July 2007 OLC Memorandum Relies on Inaccurate CIA Representations Regarding CIA Interrogations and the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; CIA Misrepresents Congressional Views to the Department of Justice — 431
VI. Review of CIA Representations to the Congress — 437
A. After Memorandum of Notification, the CIA Disavows Torture and Assures the Committee Will Be Notified of Every Individual Detained by the CIA — 437
B. The CIA Notifies Committee of the Detention of Abu Zubaydah, but Makes No Reference to Coercive Interrogation Techniques; the CIA Briefs Chairman and Vice Chairman After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; the CIA Discusses Strategy to Avoid the Chairman's Request for More Information — 437
C. No Detailed Records Exist of CIA Briefings of Committee Leadership; the CIA Declines to Answer Questions from Committee Members or Provide Requested Materials — 439
D. Vice Chairman Rockefeller Seeks Committee Investigation — 441
E. In Response to Detainee Treatment Act, the CIA Briefs Senators Not on the Committee; Proposal from Senator Levin for an Independent Commission Prompts Renewed Calls Within the CIA to Destroy Interrogation Videotapes — 443

F. CIA Director Goss Seeks Committee Support for the Program After the Detainee Treatment Act; CIA Declines to Answer Questions for the Record — 444
G. Full Committee First Briefed on the CIA's Interrogation Program Hours Before It Is Publicly Acknowledged on September 6, 2006 — 446
H. The CIA Provides Additional Information to the Full Committee and Staff, Much of It Inaccurate; Intelligence Authorization Act Passes Limiting CIA Interrogations to Techniques Authorized by the Army Field Manual — 449
I. President Vetoes Legislation Based on Effectiveness Claims Provided by the CIA; CIA Declines to Answer Committee Questions for the Record About the CIA Interrogation Program — 452
VII. CIA Destruction of Interrogation Videotapes Leads to Committee Investigation; Committee Votes 14-1 for Expansive Terms of Reference to Study the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program 45S VIII. Appendix 1: Terms of Reference — 457
IX. Appendix 2: CIA Detainees from 2002 - 2008 — 458
X. Appendix 3: Example of Inaccurate CIA Testimony to the Committee- April 12,2007 — 462