F. CIA Director Goss Seeks Committee Support for the Program After the Detainee Treatment Act; CIA Declines to Answer Questions for the Rccord

¶In March 2006, three months after passage of the Detainee Treatment Act, the CIA provided a briefing for five Committee staffers that included limited information on the interrogation process, as well as the effectiveness of the CIA interrogation program.²⁴⁹¹²⁴⁹¹ A review of the Committee record of this briefing indicates much of the information provided by the CIA was inaccurate. For example, according to the Committee's Memorandum for the Record, CIA briefers stated "the plan divorces questioning from coercive measures." CIA records indicate, however, that questioning and the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were combined in practice. According to Committee records, CIA officials stated that Khalid al-Masri had and maintained connections to al-Qa'ida, and that he was released "when the CIA reached a point in debriefings that required [foreign government] assistance," which was not forthcoming. The CIA Inspector General would later determine that when CIA officers questioned al-Masri, "they quickly concluded that he was not a terrorist," and that there was "insufficient basis to render and detain al-Masri." CIA officers referenced the captures of Hambali, Sajid Badat, Jose Padilla, and Iyman Faris, as well as the disruption of the West Coast/Second Wave plotting, the Heathrow Airport plotting, and the Karachi plotting. As detailed in this summary, the CIA consistently provided inaccurate representations regarding the plotting and the capture of the referenced individuals. CIA briefers also compared the program to U.S. military custody, stating that "the CIA can bring far more resources - debriefers, analysts, psychologists, etc. - per detainee than is possible at large scale facilities such as Guantanamo Bay, Cuba." As described, the chief of Base at DETENTION SITE BLACK complained of "problem, underperforming" and "totally inexperienced" debriefers almost a year prior to this briefing. As further described, an inspector general audit completed three months after the briefing described the lack of debriefers at CIA detendon facilities as "an ongoing problem." (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Memorandum for the Record, "CIA Briefing on Detention Program," March 8, 2006 (DTS #2006-1182).)Show full note The briefings did not include information on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques or the location of CIA detention sites.²⁴⁹²²⁴⁹² Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Memorandum for the Record, "CIA Briefing on Detention Program " March 8, 2006 (DTS #2006-1182). A week later, on March 15, 2006, CIA Director Porter Goss briefed the full Committee on CIA detention matters, but did not provide the locations of the CIA's detention facilities, or a list or briefing on the CIA's enhanced to surface the tapes' existence." Rizzo then added that "I think I need to be the skunk at the party again and see if the Director is willing to let u ^ t ^ m ^ r i o r e time to get the right people downtown on board with the notion of our [sic] destroying the tapes." [Redacted] a senior CIA attome^who had viewed the videotapes, responded, "You are correct. The sooner we resolve this the better." [Redacted] T C Legal, [Redacted] also agreed that "[a]pproaching the DCIA is a good idea," adding, "]c]ommissions tend to make very broad document production demands, which might call for these videotapes that should have been destroyed in the normal course of b u s i n e s ^ y e a r s ago." See email from: John A. Rizzo; to: [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] interrogation techniques.²⁴⁹³²⁴⁹³ By the time of the briefing, press disclosures had resulted in widespread public discussion about some of the CIA's reported enhanced interrogation techniques, including the waterboard. Goss was thus asked by a member of the Committee whether the CIA had undertaken a "technique by technique" analysis of the effectiveness of the program. Goss responded that the problem with such an analysis is that the techniques were used "in combination." Asked by the member for a comparison of "waterboarding versus sleep deprivation," Goss responded that "waterboarding is not used in conjunction with anything else." As detailed elsewhere, this testimony was inaccurate. Goss then referred to sleep deprivation, dietary manipulation, and "environment control" as "alleged techniques." See transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006- 1308).Show full note At this hearing Director Goss explained to the Committee that "we cannot do it by ourselves," and that "|w]e need to have the support of our oversight committee."²⁴⁹⁴²⁴⁹⁴ Director Goss stated: "I've had to seriously consider whether passage of the McCain amendment was a congressional disapproval of the CIA use of EITs. I don't think it was, and I don't think that was the message you sent me. But 1 have to at least get that assurance, that that's not what you were saying to me." See transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308).Show full note Goss then described challenges to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program as a result of the Detainee Treatment Act, as well as strained relations with countries hosting CIA detention sites after significant press revelations.²⁴⁹⁵²⁴⁹⁵ Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308). Director Goss described the program as follows:

¶[Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: principals want PR plan to publicly roll the CTC program in some fashion; date: October 31, 2005, at 10:37 AM; email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] to John A. Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] subject: Re: principals want PR plan to publicly roll the CTC program in some fashion; date: October 31, 2005, at 12:32 PM; email from: [Redacted] to: John A. Rizzo; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: principals want PR plarU™ublicl^x>ll the CTC program in some fashion; date: October 31, 2005, at 11:45 AM. See also interview of [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, June 17,2003.

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"This program has brought us incredible information. It's a program that could continue to bring us incredible information. It's a program that could continue to operate in a very professional way. It's a program that I think if you saw how it's operated you would agree that you would be proud that it's done right and well, with proper safeguards."²⁴⁹⁶²⁴⁹⁶ Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308).

¶Contrasting the CIA program to the abuse of prisoners in U.S. military detention at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, Director Goss stated that the CIA program:

"is a professionally-operated program that we operate uniquely.... We are not talking military, and I'm not talking about anything that a contractor might have done... in a prison somewhere or beat somebody or hit somebody with a stick or something. That's not what this is about."²⁴⁹⁷²⁴⁹⁷ Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, March 15, 2006 (DTS #2006-1308).

¶Addressing CIA interrogations, Director Goss testified that "we only bring in certain selected people that we think can give us intelligence information, and we treat them in certain specific ways" such that "they basically become psychologically disadvantaged to their interrogator." Explaining that the key to a successful interrogation was "getting a better psychological profile and knowing what makes someone tick," Director Goss stated, "just the simplest thing will work, a family photograph or something." Goss then represented that the CIA's interrogation program is "not a brutality. It's more of an art or a science that is refined."²⁴⁹⁸²⁴⁹⁸ Transcript of Senate Select Committef ' " "106 (DTS #2006-1308).

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¶After the hearing, the Committee submitted official Questions for the Record related to the history, legality, and the effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. The CIA did not respond.²⁴⁹⁹²⁴⁹⁹ Letter from Vice Chairman Rockefeller to Director Goss, containing Questions for the Record, May 10,2006 (DTS #2006-1949); Letter from Chairman Roberts to Director Goss, May 4, 2006 (DTS #2006-1876).

¶In May 2006, the Committee approved legislation requiring the CIA to provide reports on the CIA's detention facilities (including their locations), the CIA's interrogation techniques, the impact of the Detainee Treatment Act on the CIA program, CIA renditions, and the CIA's plans for the disposition of its detainees. The legislation also called for full Committee access to the CIA May 2004 Inspector General Special Review, as well as expanded member and Committee staff access to information on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.²⁵⁰⁰²⁵⁰⁰ Classified Annex to Report No. S. 109-259, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (DTS #2006-2208). Compartmented annex (DTS #2006-2209). In July 2006, the new CIA director, General Michael Hayden, provided a briefing for the chairman and vice chairman in which he described the Detainee Treatment Act as a "safehaven" that potentially permitted the CIA to use its enhanced interrogation techniques.²⁵⁰¹²⁵⁰¹ Hayden stated that Hamdan v. Rumsfeld had effectively prohibited the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. He then described an "action" that would define Common Article 3 according to the Detainee Treatment Act, which was in turn "anchored" in the Convention Against Torture to "which the Senate expressfed] reservation." As described, two months later, the President sought Congressional approval of the Military Commissions Act. Based on handwritten notes by the Committee minority staff director.Show full note