N. The Final Disposition of CIA Detainees and the End of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

N. The Final Disposition of CIA Detainees and the End of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

1. President Bush Publicly Acknowledges the Existence of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

¶After significant discussions throughout 2006 among the National Security Council principals, the Department of Defense ultimately agreed to accept the transfer of a number of CIA detainees to U.S. military custody.⁹⁷²⁹⁷² See Volume I for details on these discussions.

¶On September 6, 2006, President George W. Bush delivered a public speech acknowledging that the United States had held al-Qaida operatives in secret detention, stating that the CIA had employed an "alternative set of procedures" in interrogating these detainees, and describing information obtained from those detainees while in CIA custody⁹⁷³⁹⁷³ September 6, 2006, The White House, President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists. As described later in this summary, the speech, which was based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, contained significant inaccurate statements, especially regarding the significance of information acquired from CIA detainees and the effectiveness of the CIA's interrogation techniques.⁹⁷⁴⁹⁷⁴ See Volume I and Volume II for additional information.

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¶In the speech, the president announced the transfer of 14 detainees to Department of Defense custody at Guantanamo Bay and the submission to Congress of proposed legislation on military commissions⁹⁷⁵⁹⁷⁵ September 6, 2006, The White House, President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists. As all other detainees in the CIA's custody had been transferred to other nations, the CIA had no detainees in its custody at the time of the speech.⁹⁷⁶⁹⁷⁶ See Volume III for additional information.

2. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Gains Access to CIA Detainees After Their Transfer to U.S. Military Custody in September 2006

¶( T [Redacted] f t e r the 14 CIA detainees arrived at the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay, they were housed in a separate building from other U.S. military detainees and remained under the operational control of the CIA.⁹⁷⁷⁹⁷⁷ CIA Background Memo for CIA Director visit to Guantanamo, December [Redacted] 2006, entitled Guantanamo Bay High-Value Detainee Detention Facility. In October 2006, the 14 detainees were allowed meetings with the ICRC and described in detail similar stories regarding their detention, treatment, and interrogation while in CIA custody. The ICRC provided information on these claims to the CIA.⁹⁷⁸⁹⁷⁸ m Email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] C / L G L ; to: John Rizzo, [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] A C T E D ] , [REDACTED], [REDACTEDl [Redacted] . [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [Redacted] subject: 8 November2006 Meeting with ICRC reps; date: November 9, 2006, at 12:25 PM. Acting CIA General Counsel John Rizzo emailed the CIA director and other CIA senior leaders, following a November 8, 2006, meeting with the ICRC, stating:

"[a]s described to us, albeit in summary form, what the detainees allege actually does not sound that far removed from the reality... the ICRC, for its part, seems to find their stories largely credible, having put much stock in the fact that the story each detainee has told about his transfer, treatment and conditions of confinement was basically consistent, even though they had been incommunicado with each other throughout their detention by us."⁹⁷⁹⁹⁷⁹ Email from: John A. Rizzo; to: Michael V. Hayden, Stephen R. Kappes, Michael J. Morell; cc: [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED]; subject; Fw: 8 November 2006 Meeting with ICRC Reps; date: November 9, 2006, at 12:25 PM.

¶I n February 2007 the ICRC transmitted to the CIA its final report on the "Treatment of Fourteen 'High Value Detainees' in CIA Custody." The ICRC report concluded that "the ICRC clearly considers that the allegations of the fourteen include descriptions of treatment and interrogation techniques - singly or in combination - that amounted to torture and/or crucl, inhuman or degrading treatment."⁹⁸⁰⁹⁸⁰ February 14, 2007, Letter to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, from [Redacted] [Redacted] International Committee of the Red Cross, [Redacted] Notwithstanding Rizzo's comments, the CIA disagreed with a number of the ICRC's findings, provided rebuttals to the ICRC in writing, and informed the Committee that "numerous false allegations of physical or threatened abuses and faulty legal assumptions and analysis in the report undermine its overall credibility."⁹⁸¹⁹⁸¹ CIA Comments on the February 2007 ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen "High Value Detainees" in CIA Custody. At a Committee Hearing on April 12, 2007, CIA Director Hayden emphasized die close relationship the CIA had with the ICRC ("I believe our contacts with the ICRC have been very useful. I have met [Redacted] withj [Redacted], die [Redacted] for the Red Cross, on several occasions at CIA. It appears that [Redacted] [Redacted] is a runner and he's promised to bring his gear with him next time he comes to Langley so that we can jog on the compound."), but emphasized the errors in the ICRC report, stating: "While CIA appreciates the time, effort, and good intentions of the ICRC in forming its report, numerous false allegations of physical or threatened abuses and faulty legal assumptions and analysis in the report undermine its overall credibility." (See SSCI Hearing Transcript, dated April 12, 2007 (DTS# 2007-3158).) As is described in more detail in Volume II, Director Hayden's statements to the Committee regarding the ICRC report included significant inaccurate information.Show full note The ICRC report was acquired by The New York Review of Books and posted on the Review's website in April 2009.⁹⁸²⁹⁸² See Assets/nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/022/icrc—report.pdf and detainee reviews and reports in Volume III. The Committee found the ICRC report to be largely consistent with information contained in CIA interrogation records.⁹⁸³⁹⁸³ CIA officers in RDG and OMS prepared a number of documents disputing the ICRC allegations. See document entitled, "CIA Comments on the February 2007 ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen 'High Value Detainees' in CIA Custody." See Volumes I and III for additional information.

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3. The CIA Considers Future of the Program Following the Military Commissions Act

¶As noted, in June 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld prompted the OLC to withdraw a draft legal memorandum on the impact of the Detainee Treatment Act on the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques⁹⁸⁴⁹⁸⁴ Email from: [Redacted] , o : [REDACTED]; cc: [Redacted] John Rizzo; subject: FW: Summary oi Hamdan Decision; date: June 30, 2006, at 4:44 PM. The administration determined that the CIA would need new legislation to continue to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.⁹⁸⁵⁹⁸⁵ Acting Assistant Attorney General Bradbury told the Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) that officials from the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice met with the president and officials from the CIA and the NSC to consider the impact of the Hamdan decision, and that it was clear from die outset that legislation would have to be enacted to address the application of Common Article 3 and the War Crimes Act to the CIA interrogation program. As the OPR report noted, "Hamdan directly contradicted OLC's January 22, 2002 opinion to the White House and the Department of Defense, which had concluded that Common Article 3 did not apply to captured members of al Qaeda." See Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility; Report, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel's Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency's Use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques on Suspected Terrorists, July 29, 2009 (DTS #2010-1058).Show full note The Military Commissions Act addressed the issues raised by the Hamdan decision and provided the president the authority to issue an Executive Order detailing permissible conduct under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The bill passed the Senate on September 28, 2006, and the House of Representatives the following day.⁹⁸⁶⁹⁸⁶ S. 3930 passed the Senate by a vote of 65-34 (Record Vote Number: 259) and the House by a vote of 250-170 (Roll no. 508). It was signed into law on October 17, 2006.

¶On November [Redacted] 2006, when Abd Hadi al-Iraqi was rendered to CIA custody, the draft Executive Order and an updated OLC memorandum had not yet been prepared.⁹⁸⁷⁹⁸⁷ 16361 [Redacted] [Redacted] Although Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi was consistently assessed as being cooperative, interrogators also believed he was withholding information on operational plots and the locations of high-value targets.⁹⁸⁸⁹⁸⁸ See, for example, [Redacted] 1335 (0219462 NOV 06) 1340 (041114Z NOV 06); [Redacted] (041805Z NOV 06); 1370 (071318Z NOV 06) [Redacted] 1574 (230910Z NOV 06) (271250Z NOV 1703 (040918Z DEC 06) 1860(1816222 DEC 06); [Redacted] (081606Z JAN 07); [Redacted] 9 5 6 (151211Z JAN 07); [Redacted] 2007 (251057Z JAN 07). The CIA believed his [Redacted] i n February 2007 supported this conclusion,⁹⁸⁹⁹⁸⁹ [Redacted] 2065 (081633Z FEB 07) prompting discussions at CIA Headquarters about the possible use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against him. By the end of the month, however, the CIA had determined there was "insufficient intelligence...that [Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi] possesses actionable information.. .to justify the use of' the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.⁹⁹⁰⁹⁹⁰ Email [Redacted] [Redacted] T C / L G L ; to: [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: What needs to occur before we ask for EITs on [Redacted]; HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] (272015Z FEB 07); date: February 9,2007.

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¶In October 2006, a panel of CIA interrogators recommended that four CIA enhanced interrogation techniques—the abdominal slap, cramped confinement, nudity, and the waterboard—be eliminated, but that the remainder of the interrogation techniques be retained.⁹⁹¹⁹⁹¹ See October 23, 2006, Memorandum for Director, CIA from [Redacted], Chief, [Redacted] [Redacted] Under this proposal, the CIA would have been authorized to subject detainees to dietary manipulation, sleep deprivation, the facial slap, the facial grasp, the attention grab, walling, stress positions, and water dousing. There are few CIA records describing the panel's deliberations, or the CIA's response to its recommendations. The panel proposed dropping two of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—nudity and the abdominal slap—that the CIA director had proposed retaining in March 2006, while recommending that the CIA retain three other techniques— walling, stress positions, and water dousing—that had not otherwise been requested for retention.⁹⁹²⁹⁹² 5e<?October 23, 2006, Memorandum for Director, CIA [Redacted] Chief, [Redacted] [Redacted] and DCIA Talking Points for 9 March 2006 Principals Committee Meeting

4. The CIA Develops Modified Enhanced Interrogation Program After Passage of the Military Commissions Act

¶In the spring of 2007, the OLC completed a draft of a legal opinion concluding that the use of the CIA's seven proposed enhanced interrogation techniques—sleep deprivation, nudity, dietary manipulation, facial grasp, facial slap, abdominal slap, and the attention grab—would be consistent with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Military Commissions Act. This draft generated significant disagreement between the State Department's legal advisor, John Bellinger, and the Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury, resulting in Secretary of State Rice refusing to concur with the proposed Executive Order.⁹⁹³⁹⁹³ February 9, 2007, letter from John B. Bellinger 111, Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice. At the time, there were internal disagreements within the CIA about whether the CIA should have a detention and interrogation program. An April 2007 Sametime communication between the chief of CTC and another senior CIA leader described these disagreements and how CIA leadership responded to them. According to [Redacted] "[REDACTED] was carping to [REDACTED] and Jose [RodriguezUas^rifo Sulick (!) had a long talk [hearing] is... and what the leaderships [sic] position is from hayden, kappes and jose... in case there is some corrosive, bullshit mumbling and rumblings among comopcnnt |sic - "componenT^hieft^ome of which i am seeing." Sametime communication between [Redacted] a n [Redacted] / 0 7 , 09:50:54 to 09:56:57. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^Show full note

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¶[Redacted] J u n c 2007, in an effort to gain Secretary Rice's support, the CIA asked CIA contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR to brief Secretary Rice on the CIA's interrogation program. During that briefing, Secretary Rice expressed her concern about the use of nudity and a detainee being shackled in the standing position for the purpose of sleep deprivation. According to CIA records, in early July 2007, after the capture of Muhammad Rahim, Secretary Rice indicated that she would not concur with an interrogation program that included nudity, but that she would not continue to object to the CIA's proposed interrogation program if it was reduced to six of the enhanced interrogation techniques listed in the draft OLC memorandum: (1) sleep deprivation, (2) dietary manipulation, (3) facial grasp, (4) facial slap, (5) abdominal slap, and (6) the attention grab.⁹⁹⁴⁹⁹⁴ Email from: [Redacted] to: Jose Rodriguez, John Rizzo etc.; subject: EIT briefing for SecState on June 22, 2007; date: June 22, 2007; July 3, 2007, Steven Bradbury, Handwritten Notes, "John Rizzo"; email from: John A. Rizzo; to: [Redacted] cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Conversation with Bradbury; date: July 3,2007.

5. Muhammad Rahim, the CIA's Last Detainee, is Subjected to Extensive Use of the CIA 's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, Provides No Intelligence

¶On June 25, 2007, al-Qa'ida facilitator Muhammad Rahim was captured in Pakistan.⁹⁹⁵⁹⁹⁵ 11199 [Redacted] (251634Z JUN 07); [Redacted] 6439 [Redacted] [Redacted] 7516 [Redacted] Based on reports of debriefings of Rahim in foreign government custody and other intelligence, CIA personnel assessed that Rahim likely possessed information related to the location of Usama bin Laden and other al-Qa'ida leaders.⁹⁹⁶⁹⁹⁶ CIA memorandum titled, CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammed Rahim - 19 June 2007. The document was unsigned, and the author is unknown. A subsequent version, with identical text, was titled CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammad Rahim - 25 June 2007. See also [Redacted] 2463 (201956Z JUL 07). On July 3, 2007, Acting CIA General Counsel John Rizzo informed Acting Assistant Attorney General Steven Bradbury that the CIA was anticipating a "new guest," and that the CIA "would need the signed DOJ opinion 'in a matter of days.'"⁹⁹⁷⁹⁹⁷ Email front: John A. Rizzo; to: [Redacted] ; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Conversation with Bradbury; date: July 3, 2007.

¶Muhammad Rahim was rendered to CIA custody at DETENTION SITE BROWN in Country [Redacted] on [Redacted] y [Redacted] 2007.⁹⁹⁸⁹⁹⁸ [Redacted] 6439 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] Upon his arrival, CIA interrogators had a single discussion with Rahim during which he declined to provide answers to questions about threats to the United States and the locations of top al-Qa'ida leaders.⁹⁹⁹⁹⁹⁹ [Redacted] 2432 [Redacted] U L 07) Based on this interaction, CIA interrogators reported that Rahim was unlikely to be cooperative. As a and agree the CIA is off the track and rails... that we should not be doing detention, rendition, interrogation." Referring to a CIA leadership meeting that day in which the Committee's April 12, 2007, hearing would be discussed, [Redacted] stated that: "I want to take that [criticism] on by letting all know how importan [sic] this result, CIA Director Michael Hayden sent a letter to the president formally requesting that the president issue the Executive Order interpreting the Geneva Conventions in a manner to allow the CIA to interrogate Rahim using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. A classified legal opinion from OLC concluding that the use of the CIA's six enhanced interrogation techniques proposed for use on Rahim (sleep deprivation, dietary manipulation, facial grasp, facial slap, abdominal slap, and the attention grab) did not violate applicable laws was issued on July 20, 2007. The accompanying unclassified Executive Order was issued the same day.^10001000 July 16, 2007, letter from Michael Hayden, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to President George W. Bush; Executive Order 13440, July 20, 2007; and Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Acting Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.Show full note Although Rahim had been described by the CIA as "one of a handful of al-Qa'ida facilitators working directly for Bin Ladin and Zawahiri,"^10011001 CIA memorandum titled, "CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammed Rahim - 19 June 2007." The document was unsigned, and the author is unknown. A subsequent version, with identical text, was titled "CTC/RDG Planning for Possible Rendition of Mohammad Rahim - 25 June 2007." Rahim remained in a CIA cell without being questioned for a week, while CIA interrogators waited for approval to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against him.^10021002 2445 (181104Z JUL 07); [Redacted] 2463 (201956Z JUL 07); [Redacted] 6 7 (211341Z JUL 07)

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¶CIA interrogators initially expressed optimism about their ability to acquire information from Rahim using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. A cable sent from the CIA detention site stated:

"Senior interrogators on site, with experience in almost every HVD [high-value detainee] interrogation conducted by [CIA], believe the employment of interrogation with measures would likely provide the impetus to shock [Rahim] from his current resistance posture and provide an opportunity to influence his behavior to begin truthful participation."^10031003 2463 (201956Z JUL 07)

¶Four CIA interrogators present at the CIA detention site began applying the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on July 21, 2007.^10041004 [Redacted] 2467 (211341Z JUL 07) According to CIA records, the interrogators "employed interrogation measures of facial slap, abdominal slap, and facial hold, and explained to [Rahim] that his assumptions of how he would be treated were wrong."^10051005 2467 (211341Z JUL 07) looe 2467 (211341Z JUL 07) The interrogators emphasized to Rahim that "his situation was the result of his deception, he would stay in this position until interrogators chose to remove him from it, and he could always correct a previous misstatement."1006 According to the cable describing the interrogation, Rahim then threatened to fabricate information:

"[Rahim] reiterated several times during the session that he would make up information if interrogators pressured him, and that he was at the complete

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mercy of the interrogators and they could even kill him if they wanted. Interrogators emphasized to [Rahim] that they would not allow him to die because then he could not give them information, but that he would, eventually, tell interrogators the truth."^10071007 [Redacted] 2467 (211341Z JUL 07)

¶During the interrogation of Rahim using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Rahim was subjected to eight extensive sleep deprivation sessions,^10081008 Rahim was subjected to 104.5 hours of sleep deprivation from July 21, 2007, to July 25, 2007. Sleep deprivation was stopped when Rahim "described visual and auditory hallucinations." After Rahim was allowed to sleep for eight hours and the psychologist concluded that Rahim had been faking his symptoms, Rahim was subjected to another 62 hours of sleep deprivation. A third, 13 hour session, was halted due to a limit of 180 hours of sleep deprivation during a 30 day period. ( S c [Redacted] 2486 (251450Z J U L 0 7 [Redacted] 2491 (261237Z JUL 0 7 [Redacted] 2496 (261834Z JUL 07); [Redacted] 0 1 (271624Z JUL 07); [Redacted] ( 2 8 1 5 5 7 Z JUL 07); and [Redacted] 2508 (291820Z JUL 07).) On August 20, 2007, Rahim was subjected to a fourth sleep deprivation session. After a session that lasted 104 hours, CIA Headquarters consulted with the Department of Justice and determined that "[tjermi nation at this point is required to be consistent with the DCIA Guidelines, which limit sleep deprivation to an aggregate of 180 hours in any repeat any 30 day period." (See HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] (240022Z AUG 07).) Between August 28, 2007, and September 2, 2007, Rahim was subjected to three additional sleep deprivation sessions of 32.5 hours, 12 hours, and 12 hours. (See [Redacted] 4 ^ 2 9 1 5 5 2 Z AUG 07); [Redacted] 6 1 (311810Z AUG 0 7 ) [Redacted] 6 6 2 (010738Z SEP 0 7 ) ~ a n [Redacted] 2666 (020722Z SEP 07).) As described, CIA interrogators conducted an eighth sleep deprivation session, lasting 138.5 hours, in November 2007.Show full note as well as to the attention grasp, facial holds, abdominal slaps, and the facial slap.^10091009 12467 [Redacted] (211341Z JUL 07)^ [Redacted] 2502 (281557Z JUL 07);J [Redacted] 2554 (071453Z AUG 07); 12558 [Redacted] (081511Z AUG 07); [Redacted] 2654 (301659Z AUG 07); [Redacted] 2671 (061450Z SEP 07) During sleep deprivation sessions, Rahim was usually shackled in a standing position, wearing a diaper and a pair of shorts.^10101010 12496 [Redacted] (261834Z JUL 07); [Redacted] 2508 (291820Z JUL 07); [Redacted] 2554 (071453Z AUG 07); 12558 (081511Z AUG 07); 2626 (241158Z AUG 07); [Redacted] 2644 (281606Z AUG 07); [Redacted] [Redacted] 2645 (29 I552Z AUG 07); 2661 (3118I0Z AUG 07); [Redacted] 2662 (020738Z SEP 07); 12666 (030722Z SEP 07) Rahim's diet was almost entirely limited to water and liquid Ensure meals.^10111011 2467 (211341Z JUL 07) [Redacted] 2570 (101155Z AUG 07); [Redacted]2615 (201528Z AUG 07) CIA interrogators would provide Rahim with a cloth to further cover himself as an incentive to cooperate. For example, a July 27, 2007, cable from the CIA detention site states that when Rahim showed a willingness to engage in questioning about "historical information," he was "provided a large towel to cover his torso" as a "subtle reward."^10121012 [Redacted] 2501 (271624Z JUL 07) CIA interrogators asked Rahim a variety of questions during these interrogations, seeking information about the current location of senior al-Qa'ida leaders, which he did not provide.^10131013 12467 (211341Z JUL 07 [Redacted] 12476 (231419Z JUL 07); [Redacted] 2496 (261834Z JUL 07); 12502 (281557Z JUL 07); [Redacted] [2508 (291820Z JUL 07); [Redacted] \ 2554 (071453Z AUG 07); 2558 (081511Z AUG 07); [Redacted] 2 5 7 0 (101155Z AUG 07); [Redacted] 2626 (241158Z AUG 07); [Redacted] 2644 (281606Z AUG 07) 2645 (29I552Z AUG 07); 2654 (301659Z AUG 07); 2661 (311810Z AUG 07); 12662 (020738Z SEP 07); [Redacted] 2666 (030722Z SEP 07); 12671 (061450Z SEP 07). CIA contractor DUNBAR participated in Muhammad Rahim's interrogation sessions from August 9, 2007, to August 29, 2007. See Volume III for additional details.Show full note

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¶On September 8, 2007, CIA Director Hayden approved an extension of Muhammad Rahim's CIA detention.^10141014 CIA memorandum from [Redacted] Director, Counterterrorism Center, to Director, Central Intelligence Agency, September 7,2007, Subject: Request to Extend Detention of Muhammad Rahim. The Director of the National Clandestine Service Jose Rodriguez disagreed with the approved extension, writing:

"I did not sign because I do not concur with extending Rahim's detention for another 60 days. I do not believe the tools in our tool box will allow us to overcome Rahim's resistance techniques. J.A.R."^10151015 CIA Routing and Record Sheet with Signatures for approval of the Memorandum, "Request to Extend Detention of Muhammad Rahim," September 5, 2007. J.A.R. are the initials of the Director of the NCS, Jose A. Rodriguez.

¶Shortly after the September 2007 extension, CIA personnel were directed to stop the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Rahim. Rahim was then left in his cell with minimal contact with CIA personnel for approximately six weeks.^10161016 [Redacted] 2697 (121226Z SEP 07); CIA memorandum from [Redacted] Director, Counterterrorism Center, to Director, Central Intelligence Agency, October 31, 2007, Subject: Request Approval for the use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques; HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] 1 7 1 0 SEP07). During this period, contractor Grayson SWIGERT recommended two approaches. The first was increasing Rahim's amenities over 8-14 days "before returning to the use of EITs." The second was "switching from an interrogation approach that in effect amounts to a 'battle of wills,' to a 'recruiting* approach that sidesteps the adversarial contest inherent in framing the session as an interrogation." SWIGERT noted, however, that the latter approach "is apt to be slow in producing information" since intelligence requirements would not be immediately serviced, and "it would work best if [Rahim] believe^i^yill be ir^CIA^ustody indefinitely." (See email from: Grayson SWIGERT; to: [REDACTED] and [Redacted] cc: [Redacted] a n c l Hammond DUNBAR; subject: Some thoughts on [Rahim] interrogation next steps; date: September 17,2007, at 4:05 PM.) The CTC's deputy chief of operations replied that, "It's clear that the 'harsh' approach isn't going to work and the more we try variants on it, the more it allows [Rahim] to believe he has won^^iequestion is whether that perception will be conveyed in Scenario 2." See email from [REDACTED] to: [Redacted] |l I ll I II 11| [Redacted] Grayson SWIGERT, Hammond DUNBAR, [ R E D A C T [Redacted] [REDACTED]; subject: Fw: Some thoughts on [Rahim] interrogation next steps; date: September 17, 2007, at 4:28 PM.Show full note On September 10, 2007, Rahim's interrogators reported to CIA Headquarters that Rahim had "demonstrated that the physical corrective measures available to HVDIs^10171017 High Value Detainee Interrogators (HVDI) have become predictable and bearable."^10181018 2691 (101306Z SEP 07) ^ ^ ^ The use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques on Rahim resumed on November 2, 2007, with a sleep deprivation session that lasted until November 8, 2007, for a total of 138.5 hours. This sleep deprivation session, the longest to which Rahim had been subjected, was his eighth and final session. Rahim was also subjected to dietary manipulation during this period.^10191019 [Redacted] 2888 (022355Z NOV 07); [Redacted] 2915 (081755Z NOV 07). Due to the time zone difference, when this sleep deprivation session began it was November 2, 2007, at CIA Headquarters, but November 3, 2007, at the detention site. i m 1 1 1 iii i ' [Redacted] 'NIII i III i'i

¶According to CIA records, intermittent questioning of Rahim continued until December 9, 2007, when all questioning of Rahim ceased for nearly three weeks. During this time, CIA detention site personnel discussed and proposed new ways to encourage Rahim's cooperation. These new proposals included suggestions that Rahim could be told that audiotapes of his interrogations might be passed to his family, or that [Redacted]

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¶[Redacted] Rahim was cooperating with U.S. forces. On December 18, 2007, CIA Headquarters directed the detention site to stand down on the proposals.^10201020 13097 [Redacted] (141321Z DEC [Redacted] 30981 [Redacted] 3144(2704402 DEC 07); 13151 [Redacted] (291607Z DEC 07); [Redacted] [Redacted] 1 [Redacted] 3165 (311016Z DEC 07); 13166 (011404Z JAN 08); HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] (180120ZDEC07)

¶The CIA's detention and interrogation of Mohammad Rahim resulted in no disseminated intelligence reports.^10211021 See Volume II and Volume III for additional information. [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 1 [Redacted] 4 0 8 [Redacted] e c o r d s indicate that Rahim depart [Redacted] his time in nomina[Redacted]stody. See Volume III for additional details on this transfer. On March [Redacted] 2008, Muhammad Rahim was [Redacted] by the CIA to [Redacted] where [Redacted] took custody of Rahim. T h e [Redacted] v e r n m e n t immediately transferred Rahim to the custody of [Redacted] at which point Rahim was transferred back to CIA custody and rendered by the CIA to U.S. military custody at Guantanamo Bay. 1022

6. CIA After-Action Review of Rahim Interrogation Calls for Study of Effectiveness of Interrogation Techniques and Recommends Greater Use of Rapport-Building Techniques in Future CIA Interrogations

¶On April 21, 2008, and April 22, 2008, the CIA's RDG convened an after-action review of the CIA's interrogation of Muhammad Rahim. According to summary documents, the CIA review panel attempted to determine why the CIA had been unsuccessful in acquiring useful information from Rahim. The summary documents emphasized that the primary factors that contributed to Rahim's unresponsiveness were the interrogation team's lack of knowledge of Rahim, the decision to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques immediately after the short "neutral probe" and subsequent isolation period, the lack of clarity about whether the non-coercive techniques described in the Army Field Manual were permitted, the team's inability to confront Rahim with incriminating evidence, and the use of multiple improvised interrogation approaches despite the lack of any indication that these approaches might be effective.^10231023 Undated CIA Memorandum, titled [Redacted] After-Action Review, author (REDACTED); Undated CIA Memorandum, titled [Rahim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerning the Modification of Sleep Deprivation and Reinstatement of Walling as an E1T, and Memorandum from [Redacted] [Redacted] t o Director, CTC, May 9, 2008, Subject: Results of After-Action Review of [Rahim] Interrogation. A document drafted by one of the participants prior to the review suggested that "intense legal/policy scrutiny" was also a negative factor; however, this point was not mentioned in any of the post-review summaries, except in the context of discussing confusion over whether particular interrogation methods were legal. The summary documents state that CIA officers devised and implemented several different strategies, one after another. According to one of the documents, "[t]hese varied strategies were implemented due to frustration and concern regarding the lack of intelligence production."Show full note The summary documents recommended that future CIA interrogations should incorporate rapport-building techniques, social interaction, loss of predictability, and deception to a greater extent.^10241024 Undated CIA Memorandum, titled [Redacted] After-Action Review, author (REDACTED), Undated CIA Memorandum, titled [Rahim] After Action Review: HVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerning the ModificationofSleep Deprivation and Reinstatement of The documents also recommended that the CIA conduct a survey of interrogation techniques used by other U.S. government agencies and other countries in an effort to develop effective interrogation methods.^10251025 - Undated CIA Memorandum, lilted [Redacted] After-Action Review, author (REDACTED), Undated CIA Memorandum, titled [Rahim [ After Action Review: I tVDI Assessment, with attached addendum, [Rahim] Lessons Learned Review Panel Recommendations Concerning the Modification of Sleep Deprivation and Reinstatement of Walling as an EIT.

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¶Muhammad Rahim was the last CIA detainee in the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program."®*

7. CM Contracting Expenses Related to Company Formed by SWIGERT and DUNBAR

¶CIA contractors SWIGERT and DUNBAR, who played a central role in the development of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the summer of 2002, and then used the techniques as contract interrogators, formed a company in 2005 [Redacted] ["Company Y"|.^10271027 For mure information on CIA contracting with [Company Y]. see Volume I ln 8 In addition to providing interrogators for the CIA's interrogation program, Company Y was granted a sole source contract to provide operational psychologists, debriefers, and security personnel at CIA detention sites.^10281028 - Letter t [Redacted] [Company YJ.altn: Hammond DUNBAR from [REDACTED], Contracting Officer, re Confirmation of Verbal Authorization to Proceed Not to Exceed (ATP/NTE): email from: | REDACTED); to: [Redacted] [REDACTED], ]REDACTED), [Redacted] [REDACTED]: subject: Next Contractual Steps with SWIGERT& DUNBAR; date: March 2, 2005; March 18. 2005, Letter from [ KEDACTED|, [Redacted] Y |. re Letter Contract [Redacted]Show full note Under the contract, Company Y was tasked with conducting ongoing conversations with CIA detainees to learn about the terrorist mind set (this project was named the 'Terrorist Think Tank" or "T 1 "), developing [Redacted] strategies, and writing the history of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.^10291029 Email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: [Redacted] dale: June 17, 2005. at 11:08:22 A M ^ m a i H r o [Redacted] to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED!. [REDACTED]: cc: [Redacted] [Redacted] 1 REDACTED[REDACTED], [REDACTED]: subject: PCS CTC officer to [Company Y location] ("One of the primary functions is to develop and set-up what we call the 'Terrorist Think Tank' (previously briefed to the DDO and ADDO) which will be critical as we develop our [Redacted] date: July 12.2005. at 10:25:48 AM: Justification Date: 28 February 2006. Justification For Other Than Full And Open Competition. Contractor: [Company Y],Show full note Later descriptions of their services note that—on behalf of ihc CIA—Company Y officers participated in the interrogations of detainees held in foreign government custody and served as intermediaries between entities of those governments and the CIA.11'"10

¶By 2006, the value of the base contract for their company, with all options exercised, was in excess of $180 million.^10311031 " Justification Date: 25 July 2006, Justification For Other Than Pull and Open Competition, Contractor: [Company YJ. As of May 2007, Company Y had hired [Redacted] former CIA staff officers, many of whom had previously been involved with the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, Company Y's chief operating officer was the former

¶Walling as an BIT, and Memorandum from [Redacted]

¶[Redacted] to Director, CTC, May 9, 2008. SubiectMteults of After-Action Review of [Rahim] Interrogation. I0 5 chief of [Redacted] the division of the CIA supervising the Renditions and Detention Group. In addition, Company Y hired at least [Redacted] CIA security protective officers to work on Company Y's CIA contracts. In March 2006, a list of projected staff and contractors within CIA's Renditions and Detention Group included [Redacted] separate positions.^10321032 D O / C T [Redacted] D G Projected Staff & Contractors, updated as of March 15, 2006. Of those [Redacted] positions, [Redacted] [73%] were for contractors, the majority of whom were contractors from Company Y.^10331033 D O / C T C [Redacted] R D G Projected Staff & Contractors, updated as of March 15, 2006. By June 2007, RDG reported having [Redacted] staff officers and [Redacted] contractors.^10341034 June 4, 2007, RDG, Mission Summary. By 2008, RDG had a total of [Redacted] positions, with [Redacted] staff ofTicersand [Redacted] [85%] contractors, according to the CIA.^10351035 CTC confirmation, received by telephone on November 16, 2012.

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¶The CIA's contract with Company Y was terminated in mid-2009. From the time of the company's creation in 2005 through the close-out of its contract in 2010, the CIA paid Company Y more than $75 million for services in conjunction with the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.^10361036 DTS #2009-1258; DTS #2012-4008. CIA paid Company Y $612,000 in 2010 for contract close-out costs. In a March 2009 notification, the CIA also informed the Committee that, in addition to payments to Company Y, Grayson SWIGERT and Hammond DUNBAR had received $1.5 million and $1.1 million, respectively, as individuals. As noted elsewhere, the notification includes inaccurate representations about the effectiveness of the CIA program. See Congressional Notification, March 18, 2009 (DTS #2009-1258).Show full note The CIA also certified Company Y's office in

¶[Redacted] as a Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), which required a CIA officer to be detailed to [Redacted] and provided Company Y access to CIA internal computer networks at its facility. In 2008, the CIA authorized an additional payment to Company Y of approximately $570,000, after Company Y indicated that it had incurred costs for conducting countersurveillancc of its officers when [Redacted] appeared in the press in conjunction with the program. The CIA agreed to a $5 million indemnification contract for the company that covered, among other expenses, criminal prosecution. 7 Company Y hired a prominent [Redacted] law firm for representation in

¶1038 2007, and billed the CIA $1.1 million for legal expenses from 2007 through 2012 per its indemnification agreement.^10391039 Response from the CIA regarding Contract Costs for [Company Y], October 15, 2012 (DTS #2012-4008). Part of these expenses included legal representation at a Committee staff briefing by SWIGERT and DUNBAR on November [Redacted] 2008.^10401040 See DTS #2009-0572. Under the CIA's indemnification contract, the CIA is obligated to pay Company Y's legal expenses through 2021.^10411041 Response from the CIA regarding Contract Costs for [Company Y], October 15, 2012 (DTS #2012-4008). iiii 11111 [Redacted] 11"111111

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8. The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program Ends

¶On December 5, 2007, fewer than nine months after Director Hayden told the European Union that the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was not a CIA program, but "America's program," the House-Senate conference for the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization Act voted to include an amendment that banned coercive interrogation techniques and established the Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations as the interrogation standard for all U.S. government interrogations.^10421042 DIRECTOR [Redacted] 2 2 2 7 Z MAR 07); House Report 110-478 - Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 110lh Congress (2007-2008), Section 327. The conference report passed both the House and the Senate with bipartisan majorities.^10431043 H.R. 2082 passed the House of Representatives on December 13, 2007, by a vote of 222-197 (Roll No: 1160) and passed the Senate on February 13,2008, by a vote of 51-45 (Record Vote Number: 22).

¶On March 8, 2008, President Bush vetoed the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 that banned coercive interrogations. In a radio address explaining the decision, the president stated "[t]he bill Congress sent me would take away one of the most valuable tools in the war on terror—the CIA program to detain and question key terrorist leaders and operatives." Addressing the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, President Bush stated that the "main reason" the CIA program "has been effective is that it allows the CIA to use specialized interrogation procedures to question a small number of the most dangerous terrorists under careful supervision." The president stated that the CIA program had a "proven track record," and that the CIA obtained "critical intelligence" as a result of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques related to the Camp Lemonier plotting, the Karachi plotting, the Second Wave plotting, and the Heathrow Airport plotting. The president then repeated a warning the CIA had previously provided to the White House, that to "restrict the CIA to [interrogation] methods in the [Army] Field Manual," "could cost American lives."^10441044 See "Text: Bush on Veto of Intelligence Bill," The New York Times, dated March 8, 2008. Located, among other places, at www.nytiines.com/2008/03/08/washington/08cnd-ptext.html. For an example of a previous CIA briefing to the White House with similar assertions, see CIA Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; with briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program." dated July 29, 2003. The CIA document provided to the participants states, "Termination of this program will result in loss of life, possibly extensive." For additional commentary, see "Veto of Bill on CIA Tactics Affirms Bush's Legacy," The New York Times, dated March 9, 2008.Show full note As is described in this summary, and detailed more extensively in the full Committee Study, the CIA's representations to the White House regarding the role of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in the thwarting of the referenced plots were inaccurate.

¶On March 11, 2008, by a vote of 225-188, the House of Representatives failed to override the presidential veto.^10451045 U.S. House of Representatives Roll Call Vote 117 of the 1 i0Lh Congress, Second Session, March 11, 2008, 7:01 PM. "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009." Referenced materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect Barrack [sic] Obama National Security Team Tuesday, 13 January 2009; 8:30 - 11:30 a.m." The briefing book includes the previously mentioned, "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting," dated 15 May 2006, which provided the same intelligence claims found in the document of the same name, but dated April 15, 2005.Show full note

¶I n December 2008 and January 2009, CIA officers briefed the transition team for President-elect Barack Obama on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. CIA Director Hayden prepared a statement that relayed, "despite what you have heard or read in a variety of public fora, these [enhanced interrogation] techniques and this program did work."1046 The prepared materials included inaccurate information on the operation and management of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, as well as the same set of examples of the "effectiveness" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that the CIA had provided to policymakers over several years.^10471047 p o r d e f i e d information, see Volume IT. The examples provided were nearly entirely inaccurate.

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¶C>n January 22, 2009, President Obama issued Executive Order 13491, which required the CIA to "close as expeditiously as possible any detention facilities that it currently operates and... not operate any such detention facility in the future." The Executive Order prohibited any U.S. government employee from using interrogation techniques other than those in the Army Field Manual 2-22.3 on Human Intelligence Collector Operations.^10481048 The Executive Order also stated that the FBI and "other Federal law enforcement agencies" could "continu[e] to use authorized, non-coercive techniques of interrogation that are designed to elicit voluntary statements and do not [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] ioi6 q a Briefing for Obama National Security Team - "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including

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III. Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Multiple Constituencies