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¹ When these minority views were initially written in response to the original Study approved by the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on December 13, 2012, the following members of the Committee signed on to them: Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Blunt, and Rubio. [[Please note that the double-bracketed text in this document is new explanatory text necessitated by substantive modifications to the Study's Executive Summary and Findings and Conclusions that were made after our June 20, 2014, Minority Views were submitted to the Central Intelligence Agency for the declassification review. We also note that these Minority Views are in response to, and at points predicated upon, the research and foundational work that underlie the Study's account of the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. These Views should not be treated as an independent report based upon a separate investigation, but rather our evaluation and critique of the Study's problematic analysis, factual findings, and conclusions.]]
³ Transcript of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence briefing, September 6, 2006.
⁴ This episode was not described in CIA cables, but was described in internal emails sent by personnel in the CIA Office of Medical Services and the CIA Office of General Counsel. A review of the videotapes of the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah by the CIA Office of Inspector General (OIG) did not note the incident. A review of the catalog of videotapes, however, found that recordings of a 21-hour period, which included two waterboarding sessions, were missing. from [Redacted] to [Redacted] cc: [Redacted] r e More. Throughout the Committee Study, last names in all capitalized letters are pseudonyms.
⁵ ALEC [Redacted] (182321Z JUL 02)
⁵ Central Intelligence Agency's Response to the SSCI's Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, June 27, 2013, Response to Conclusion 10, p. 25. Page 2 o f 3
⁶ At the time, confining a detainee in a box with the dimensions of a coffin was an approved CIA enhanced interrogation technique.
⁷ [ R E D A C T E D U 3 2 ^ 1 6 1 7 5 0 Z SEP 03), referring to Hambali.
⁸ Interview of [Redacted] ty [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, June 17,
⁸ Attachment 5 to May 14, 2002, letter from Stanley Moskowitz, CIA Office of Congressional Affairs, to A1 Cumming, Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, transmitting t h e [Redacted] Memoranda of Notification (DTS #2002-2175). ^ ^ ^
¹⁰ In one case, interrogators informed a detainee that he could earn a bucket if he cooperated.
¹¹ Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, [Redacted] April 7, 2003, p. 12.
¹² Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, [Redacted] May 8, 2003, p. 9.
¹³ November 26, 2001, Draft of Legal Appendix, Paragraph 5, "Hostile Interrogations: Legal Considerations tor CIA Officers," at 1.
¹⁴ May 30, 2005, Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees. July 20,2007, Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, re: Application of War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
¹⁵ The CIA's June 27, 2013, Response to the Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program states that these limitations were dictated by the White House. The CIA's June 2013 Response then acknowledges that the CIA was "comfortable11 with this decision.
¹⁶ DIRECTOR [Redacted] (152227Z MAR 07)
¹⁷ The Committee's conclusion is based on CIA records, including statements from CIA Directors George Tenet and Porter Goss to the CIA inspector general, that the directors had not briefed the president on the CIA's interrogation program. According to CIA records, when briefed in April 2006, the president expressed discomfort with the "image of a detainee, chained to the ceiling, clothed in a diaper, and forced to go to the bathroom on himself." The CIA's June 2013 Response does not dispute the CIA records, but states that "[w]hile Agency records on the subject are admittedly incomplete, former President Bush has stated in his autobiography that he discussed the program, including the use of enhanced techniques, with then-DCIA Tenet in 2002, prior to application of the techniques on Abu Zubaydah, and personally approved the techniques." A memoir by former Acting CIA General Counsel John Rizzo disputes this account.
¹⁸ CIA records indicate that the CIA had not informed policymakers of the presence of CIA detention facilities in Countries [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] and [Redacted] It is less clear whether policymakers were aware of the detention facilities in Country [Redacted] and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The CIA requested that country names and information directly or indirectly
¹⁸ Memorandum for DCI from J. Cofer Black, Director of Counterterrorism, via Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Counsel, Executive Director, Deputy Director for Operations and Associate Director of Central Intelligence/Military Support, entitled, " A p p r o v a h j ^ i s t ^ for Terrorists." 1
¹⁹ July 31, 2003, email from John Rizzo to [Redacted] re Rump PC on interrogations.
²⁰ Lotus Notes message from Chief of the CIA Station in Country [Redacted] to D/CTC, COPS; copied in: email from [Redacted] to [REDACTED], [REDACTED], cc: [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] , subj: ADCI Talking Points for Call to DepSec Armitage, date 9/23/2004, at 7:40:43 PM
²¹ Briefing slides, CIA Interrogation Program, July 29, 2003
²² No CIA detention facilities were established in these two countries.
²³ U.S. law (22 U.S.C. § 3927) requires that chiefs of mission "shall be kept fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the Govera men t within that country," including the activities and operations of the CIA.
²³ See infra, SSCI Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss joined by Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Rubio, and Cobum, December 5, 2014. pp. 33-37.
²⁴ Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and [Redacted] April 13, 2005.
²⁵ Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and April 13, 2005.
²⁶ March 29,2002, email from [Redacted] [Redacted] e / V Z Interrogation Plan.
²⁷ ALEC [Redacted] (182321Z JUL 02)
²⁸ January 8,1989, Letter from John L. Helgerson, Director of Congressional Affairs, to Vice Chairman William S. Cohen, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, re: SSCI Questions on [Redacted] at 7-8.
²⁹ [REDACTED] 1528 (191903Z DEC 03)
³⁰ Report of Audit, CIA-controlled Detention Facilities Operated Under the 17 September 2001 Memorandum of Notification, Report No. 2005-0017-AS, June 14,2006.
³⁰ Intelligence Community Directive Number 203, Analytic Standards (effective June 21, 2007), p. 2. ii i mi i < iii i [Redacted] II II I III I
³¹ [Redacted] April IS, 2005, email from [REDACTED] (Chief of Base of DETENTION SITE BLACK), to [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] re
³² "Learned helplessness" in this context was the theory that detainees might become passive and depressed in response to adverse or uncontrollable events, and would thus cooperate and provide information. Memo from Grayson SWIGERT, Ph.D., February 1, 2003, "Qualifications to provide special mission interrogation consultation."
³³ They also concluded that the CIA "should not be in the business of running prisons or 'temporary detention facilities."' May 12,2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from [Redacted] Chief, Information Operations Center, and Henry Crumpton, Chief, National Resources Division via Associate Deputy Director for Operations, with the subject line, "Operational Review of CIA Detainee Program."
³³ For example, the Committee did not include among the 26 individuals wrongfully detained: Dr. Hikmat Naft Shaukat. even though it was determined that he was not involved in CBRN efforts and his involvement with al- ja'ida members was limited to personal relationships with former neighbors ( [Redacted] |30414 [Redacted] DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] m . aka Asat Sar Jan, about whom <j u est ions were raised within the CIA about whether he may have been slandered by a rival tribal faction ( [Redacted] [Redacted]931 [Redacted] [REDACTED] Memo. [Redacted] SUBJECT: getting a handle on detainees); Areala Khan, who suffered disturbing hallucinations after 56 hours of standing sleep deprivation, after which the CIA determined thai he "does not appear to he the subject involved in... current plans or activities against l^MjereomieU^Lilities'' [Redacted] 1393 (2GI006ZOCT 03): HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] and Janat Gul. who also suffered "frightful" hallucinations following sleep deprivation and about whom the chief of the detention facility wrote, "[t|here simply is no 'smoking gun' that we can refer to thai would justify our continued holding of [Janat Gul| at a site such us [DETENTION SITE BLACK]" <[Redacted]
³⁴ March 21,2005, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Robert L. Grenier, Director DCI Counterterrorism Center, re Proposal for Full-Scope Independent Study of the CTC Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Programs.
³⁵ [Redacted] September 2, 2005, Memorandum from to Director Porter Goss, CIA, "Assessment of EITs Effectiveness."
³⁶ September 23, 2005, Memorandum from [Redacted] to The Honorable Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, "Response to request from Director for Assessment of EIT effectiveness."
³⁷ February 10, 2006, Memorandum for [Redacted] CIA OFFICER 1], CounterTerrorist Center, National Clandestine Service, from Executive Director re: Accountability Decision.
³⁸ Congressional notification, CIA Response to OIG Investigation Regarding the Rendition and Detention of German Citizen Khalid al-Masri, October 9, 2007.
³⁹ Memorandum for Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24,2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities.
⁴⁰ February 24, 2004, Memorandum from Scott W. Muller, General Counsel, to Inspector General re Interrogation Program Special Review (2003-7123-IG).
⁴¹ November 9, 2006, email from John A. Rizzo, to Michael V. Hayden, Stephen R. Kappes, cc: Michael Morell, [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] Subject: Fw: 5 December 2006 Meeting with ICRC Rep.
⁴² CIA Comments on the February 2007 ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen "High Value Detainees" in CIA Custody."
⁴³ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing transcript for April 12, 2007.
⁴⁴ DCIA Talking Points for 12 January 2006 Meeting with the President, re: Way Forward on Counterterrorist Rendition, Detention and Interrogation Program.
⁴⁴ [Redacted] Transcript of Committee Hearing on Interrogation Manual, June 17, 1988, pp. 3- 4 (DTS #1988-2302).
⁴⁵ HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] 7 1 7 4 2 Z JUN 04) _ _ _ _ _ [REDACTED] 5759 [Redacted] 03); ALEC 03); ALEC 03)
⁴⁵ CIA, Hambali Capture/Detention Timeline, no date, p. 6.
⁵⁵ See SSCI Transcript, Business Meeting to Discuss and Revote on the Terms of Reference for the Committee's Study of the CIA 's Detention and Interrogation Program, March 5, 2009, p. 11 (DTS 2009-1916).
⁶⁸ Email from: [REDACTED] [Redacted] t o : James Pavitt; subject: DCI Decision on [DETENTION SITE GREEN] Briefing for Armitage; date: S e p t e m b e r 2 6 ^ 0 0 2 j D I R E C T O [Redacted] ( [Redacted] MAR 02). 1111
⁶⁹ CIA, DIRECTOR [Redacted]
⁷⁰ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] subject: NEW INFO: A-Z Interrogation Plan; date: March 29, 2002.
⁷³ [REDACTED] 69132 ( [Redacted] MAR 02)
⁷⁵ SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014. p. 342.
⁷⁶ See, for example, [REDACTED] 70240 (300614Z APR 02); [REDACTED] 70112 (250929Z APR 02); [REDACTED] 70459 (080545Z MAY 02); Congressional Notification: Intelligence Support to [Redacted] [Redacted] Operation, [Redacted] 2 0 0 2 (DTS #2002-2932); and MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence; FROM: [Redacted] [Redacted] SUBJECT: Your meeting with [Redacted] [Redacted] 12002; [Redacted] cover page dated [Redacted] 2002.
⁸⁶ [Redacted] 10005 (092316Z APR 02). See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional information. ^^^^
⁸⁸ See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3. 2014. p. 378-379. 11III 11 in i [Redacted] inn mill i
⁸⁹ Interview of George Tenet, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 8 September, 2003. \
⁹⁰ SSCI Transcript, Briefing by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Regarding CIA's Counterterrorism Operations and Detention, Interrogation, and Rendition Program, March 15, 2006, p. 8 (DTS 2006-1308).
⁹¹ SSCI Transcript, Hearing on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention and Interrogation Program, April 1'2, 2007, pp. 16-17 (DTS 2007-3158).
⁹² SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 2.
¹⁰⁰ Saud Memon [Redacted] 0 4 74[Redacted] C I A detainee charts provided to the
¹⁰¹ Gul Rahman (2) [Redacted]04 4 [Redacted] Committee on April 27, 2007. Document in Committee Records entitled, "Briefing
¹⁰² Hassan Ahmed Guleed [Redacted] O 4 9[Redacted] Charts provided to committee members
¹⁰³ Abu 'Abdallah [Redacted] 0 4 S7[Redacted] from C I A Director Michael Hayden at the closed Hearing on April 12, 2007, [REDACTED] Approximately concerning EITs used with C I A detainees,
¹⁰⁴ ABU BAHAR AL-TURKI 2004 1[Redacted] and a list of techniques." D T S #2007- 1594. [REDACTED] Approximately
¹⁰⁴ SSCI Study, April 1,2014, Volume II, p. 446.
¹⁰⁵ ABU TALHA AL-MAGREBI 2004 l [Redacted] C I A operational cables and other records
¹⁰⁶ Abd al-Bari al-Filistini [Redacted]04 77[Redacted] produced for the Committee's Study of the C I A ' s Detention and Interrogation
¹⁰⁷ Ayyub al-Libi • • [Redacted] 0 0 4 30[Redacted] Program.
¹⁰⁷ Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting, Aprii 8,2005, p. 5. (emphasis added)
¹⁰⁸ Marwan al-Jabbur [Redacted]04 77[Redacted]
¹⁰⁹ Qattal al-Uzbeki [Redacted]04 8([Redacted] in Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani [Redacted] 73| KEY
¹⁰⁹ President George W. Bush, Trying Detainees; Address on the Creation of Military Commissions, Washington, D.C., September 6, 2006.
¹¹⁰ SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 7.
¹¹¹ SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31. 2014, p. 413.
¹¹² Sharif al-Masri [Redacted] 81|
¹¹² See CIA, [Redacted]
¹¹³ Abdi Rashid Samatar [Redacted] 0 4 65| subjected to ihe C I A ' s enhanced interrogation techniques.
¹¹⁴ Abu Farnj al-Libi [Redacted] 0 5 [Redacted] 44 Italics Text: Detainees in italics have not
¹¹⁵ Abu Munthir al-Mngrcbi [Redacted] [Redacted] ^^•2005 44 been previously acknowledged by the C I A to the S S C I .
¹¹⁶ Ibrahim Jan [Redacted] 31[Redacted]
¹¹⁷ Abu Ja'Far [Redacted] [Redacted] al-Iraqi 24 #: Detainee number on main detainee spreadsheet; based on date of C I A custody. IIS Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi [Redacted] • • • [Redacted] 0 0 6 17[Redacted] Number is based on a designation made by the S S C I , not the C I A .
¹¹⁹ Muhammad Rahim [Redacted] 0 7 24[Redacted] Sources: CIA Fax to SSCI Committee Staff, entitled, "15 June Request for Excel Spreadsheet," June 17, 2009 (DTS #2009-2529); CIA detainee charts provided to the Committee on April 27, 2007; document in Committee records entitled, "Briefing Charts provided to committee Members from CIA Director Michael Hayden at the closed Hearing on April 12, 2007, concerning EITs used with CIA detainees, and a list of techniques" (DTS #2007-1594, hearing transcript at DTS# 2007-3158); and CIA operational cables and other records produced for the Committee's Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. ** Gul Rahman, listed as detainee 24, was the subject of a notification to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence following his death at DETENTION SITE COBALT; however, he has not appeared on lists of CIA detainees provided to Committee.
¹⁵² CIA, DIRECTOR [Redacted] May 27, 2002. p. 4. [Redacted]
¹⁵⁵ See Captures Resulting From Detainee Information; Four Case Studies. November 26, 2003, p. 2; CIA, [Redacted] 10644. August 20; 2002. pp. 2-3; and CIA. ALEC [Redacted] g u s t 29.2002. p. 2.
¹⁵⁷ Email [Redacted] to: [REDACTED]; subject: Request for JPRA information; date: July 19, 2002. Records i n d i c a t e t h [Redacted] s notes were not provided to the Department of Justice. In November 2002, [Redacted] |, along with Chief of Interrogations [Redacted] led the first CIA interrogator training course. [Redacted]
¹⁶⁵ See CIA. CIA CABLE 12251, September [Redacted] 2 0 0 2 , p. 2; CIA, C I A [Redacted] [Redacted] September [Redacted] 2002. p. 2.
¹⁶⁷ photographic identification of Abu Badr and called htm KSM's man in Karachi. See CIA, ALEC [Redacted] [Redacted] CIA, CIA CABLE 12267, September 11, 2002, p. 2.
¹⁶⁸ See CIA, ALEC [Redacted] October 3, 2002, p. 2.
¹⁶⁹ CIA, Memorandum to the Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA Deputy Director for Operations, Comments to Draft IG Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities, February 27, 2004,
¹⁷⁰ President George W, Bush, Trying Detainees; Address on the Creation ofMUitarv Commissions, Washington, D.C., September 6, 2006.
¹⁷⁹ See CIA, ALEC [Redacted] August 29,2002, pp. 2-3
¹⁸⁴ Redacted]
¹⁸⁷ See CIA, CIA CABLE [Redacted] 10118]
¹⁸⁸ See CIA, CIA CABLE 530341 [Redacted]
¹⁸⁹ See CIA. CIA CABLE 101031 i n c l u d e d trying to track d o w n K S M . H e recognized A S S E T X ' s information [Redacted] He a d v i s e d A S S E T X ' s current c a s e o f f i c e r and the C h i e f o f B a s e against p r o c e e d i n g w i t h the t e r m i n a t i o n , a n d j o i n e d in a m e e t i n g b e t w e e n the current c a s e o f f i c e r and A S S E T XJ. A S S E T X w a s s u b s e q u e n t l y a b l e to p r o v i d e information that resulted in K S M ' s capture o n M a r c h 1, 2 0 0 3 .
¹⁹⁰ See CIA, CIA CABLE 1012 [Redacted]
¹⁹¹ See CIA, CIA CABLE [Redacted] 10140]
¹⁹² See CIA. CIA CABLE 1025' [Redacted]
¹⁹³ See CI [Redacted] IA CABLE] 30266, [Redacted]
¹⁹⁴ See CIA Oral History Program, Intemew of [REDACTED} by [REDACTED], October 14, 2004, p. 3.
¹⁹⁵ See CIA Oral Histor ' Program, Interview of [REDACTED] by [REDACTEDj, October 14, 2004, p. 4, l'»6 [Redacted] [Redacted] refers to:
¹⁹⁶ terrorist p l o t t i n g that targeted a variety o f U . S . and w e s t e r n interests in the Karachi area, to i n c l u d e the U . S . C o n s u l a t e , n a m e d h o t e l s near the airport a n d b e a c h , U . S . v e h i c l e s traveling b e t w e e n the C o n s u l a t e a n d the airport, U . S . d i p l o m a t i c h o u s i n g , potential sniper attacks against U . S . p e r s o n n e l , as w e l l as P a k i s t a n ' s Faisal A r m y B a s e . 1 9 9 T h e C I A has a c k n o w l e d g e d that o n several o c c a s i o n s , i n c l u d i n g in p r o m i n e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s s u c h as President's B u s h ' s 2 0 0 6 s p e e c h , it m i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d the i m p a c t o f the reporting a c q u i r e d f r o m d e t a i n e e s o n the Karachi plots. Instead o f c l a i m i n g that the i n f o r m a t i o n
¹⁹⁷ h e l p e d s t o p a p l a n n e d attack o n the U . S . C o n s u l a t e in Karachi," the C I A s h o u l d h a v e stated that it " r e v e a l e d o n g o i n g attack plotting against the U . S . o f f i c i a l p r e s e n c e in Karachi that p r o m p t e d t h e C o n s u l a t e t o take further steps to protect its o f f i c e r s . " 2 0 0 { T [Redacted] t ^ Our a n a l y s i s w i l l d e m o n s t r a t e that the i n t e l l i g e n c e c o l l e c t e d t h r o u g h the C I A ' s D e t e n t i o n and Interrogation P r o g r a m , i n c l u d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n obtained after the u s e o f e n h a n c e d interrogation techniques, p l a y e d a k e y role in the disruption o f the Karachi h o t e l s b o m b i n g plot. T h e Study notes that the C I A had i n f o r m a t i o n regarding the Karachi
¹⁹⁹ SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 239; see also CIA, [Redacted] [11454, April 30,2003, pp. 1- 4.
²⁰⁰ CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 6.
²⁰² See CIA, Captures Resulting From Detainee Information: Four Case Studies, November 26, 2003, p.2.
²¹¹ CIA, CIA CABLE 33804, September 19, 2002, p. 4; After bis capture on April 1, 2003, KSM would confirm that the Karachi plot referenced in the "perfume letter" was the plot directed at three named hotels, chosen because they were frequented by American and German guests. See SSCI Study, Volume II, April 1, 2014, pp. 592-593
²¹³ See E-mail from: CIA analyst; to: [Redacted] ; subject: Re: AZon the perfume letter; date; October 10, 2002, at 9:50 AM,
²¹⁴ See CIA, ALEC ctober 3, 2002, pp. 2-12.
²¹⁵ See CIA, ALEC •^ [Redacted] pO [Redacted] ct n h e r 3. 2002, 2-12.
²¹⁶ See CIA, CIA CABLE 45028, [Redacted]
²¹⁷ See CIA, [CIA CABLE] 38405, May
²¹⁸ CIA, CIA CABLE 1451 [Redacted]
²³⁵ By June 2002 the CIA had taken custody of five detainees who were captured outside of Country [Redacted] n d placed these CIA detainees in Country [Redacted] detention facilities. The detainees were held at the Country[Redacted] facilities at the request of the CIA and the CIA had unlimited access to them. See [Redacted] 21147 [Redacted] [Redacted]
²⁴⁶ [Redacted] 1 [Redacted] • [Redacted] 11443 [Redacted]
²⁴⁹ [Redacted] 27054 [Redacted]
²⁵¹ ALEC [Redacted] 162135Z JUL 02). The deputy chief of ALEC Station, [Redacted] and [Redacted] T C Legal [Redacted], would later travel to DETENTION SITE GREEN to observe the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah.
²⁵³ " See CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 19.
²⁵⁶ See CIA. Hambali Capture/Detention Timeline, no date. p. 7: CIA, [CIA [Redacted] CABLE}40915| [Redacted]
²⁵⁷ See CIA, Hambali Capture/Detention Timeline, no date, p. 7-8; CIA, ALEC [Redacted]
²⁶⁸ See CIA, CIA CABLE 87551, August 15, 2003, pp. 4-5.
²⁶⁹ CIA, ALEC [Redacted]
²⁷² See CIA, CIA CABLE 15359, [Redacted]
²⁷⁶ [Redacted] [Redacted] D I R E C T [Redacted] [Redacted] l n late 2005, the CIA convened an Accountability Board to review the actions of CIA personnel in Gul Rahman's death. The board recommended that the executive director "impose a 10 day suspension without pay" on [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1 ], and noted that this action would "strike the appropriate balance between: 1) the fact that [ [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1]] was the only individual who made decisions that led directly, albeit unintentionally, to Rahman's death, and 2) the significant weight die Board attached to the mitigating factors at play in this incident." (See Memorandum for Executive Director from [Redacted] [Redacted] Deputy Director for Science and Technology, re: Report and Recommendations of the Special Accountability Board Regarding the Death of Afghan Detainee Gul Rahman.) On February 10, 2006, however, the CIA Executive Director K.B. Foggo notified [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1 ] that he intended to take no disciplinary action against him. In his memo describing that decision, the executive director stated: "While not condoning your actions, it is imperative, in my view, that they... be judged within the operational context that existed at the time of Rahman's detention. Cable traffic reviewed by the board shows conclusively that Headquarters generally was aware of, and
²⁸⁵ CIA, Southeast Asia: Jemaah Islamiya's Al-Ghuraba Cell Coalescing, September 17, 2008, p. 2.
²⁸⁷ December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target IntenrogationandExpioitation (HVTIE) Training Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running) at 4. See also email from: [Redacted] t o : [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] subject: Formation of a High Value Target Interrogation team (describing initial training plan and requirements); date: August 30,2002, at 8:30 AM.
²⁹³ SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 366.
³⁰⁸ CIA document titled, Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, 1/28/03 - 4/30/03, May 22, 2003.
³¹¹ CIA, CIA CABLE 13758,1
³²⁵ CIA, DIRECTOR]
³²⁸ FBI, WASH 261909Z, March 26, 2003, p. 2.
³²⁹ CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 31.
³³³ CIA, CIA CABLE 13890, [Redacted]
³³⁷ Compare DO J, United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, Pakistani Man Convicted of Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda Sentenced to 30 Years in Federal Prison, July 20, 2006, p.l with CIA, DIRECTOR
³⁴² CIA Study Response, Case Studies (TAB C), June 27, 2013, p. 36; ALEC [Redacted]February [Redacted] 0 0 4 , pp. 5 and 11. tt
³⁴⁶ CIA, CIA CABLE [Redacted] February! 2004, pp. 10 and 12; CIA, CIA CABLE 1299, January 2004, pp. 2-
³⁴⁸ CIA, ALEC [Redacted] b r u a r y H [Redacted] O 4 , pp. 1-2; CIA, CIA CABLE 67575, May 6, 2004, p. 1-2; CIA, CIA CABLE 66803, April 26, 2004, pp. I-11.
³⁴⁹ SSCI Study Response, Executive Summary, December 3, 2004, p. 378; CIA, DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] CIA, Al-Qaida's Waziristan Sanctuary Disrupted but Still Viable. July 21, 2004, p 1, (DTS 2004-3240'}.
³⁵⁰ CIA, Al-Qaida 's Waziristan Sanctuary Disrupted but Still Viable, July 21, 2004, p. 1, (DTS 2004-3240).
³⁵⁴ CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003.
³⁵⁶ [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2) received a one-year Letter of Reprimand, was suspended for five days without pay, and was prohibited from promotions, within-grade step increases, quality step increases, or permanent salary increases during that one-year period. The decision did not affect [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2's] eligibility to receive Exceptional Performance Awards, bonuses, or non-monetary forms of recognition. See [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2] retired from the CIA on [Redacted] [Redacted] ) On June 20, 2005, the CIA director of transnational issues, aware of [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2's] problematic background, approved [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 2's] employment on a CIA contract because the project was 'mission critical" and "no other contractor with the needed skills was available." (See [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] i The chief of Base received a two-year Letter of Reprimand and a ten-day suspension without , and was prohibited from receiving any bonus awards from the CIA during the period of reprimand. On [Redacted] 2003, prior to the implementation of the prohibitions, this individual retired from the CIA. See [Redacted] [Redacted]
³⁷¹ CIA, Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting, August 2005, pp. 8-9 (emphasis added).
³⁷⁸ The CIA insisted [Redacted] he redacted in the Committee Study prior to the Study beingrelocatedtothe U.S. Senate from the off-site research facility.
³⁷⁹ [Redacted] 7827[Redacted]DEC02)
³⁸² HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted]
³⁸³ SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 348.
³⁸⁴ CIA, CIA CABLE 1411, 2004. p. 4.
³⁸⁵ [REDACTED] 7526 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED])
³⁹¹ See [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 20744 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]
³⁹⁴ SSCI Transcript, Briefing on Operation Neptune's Spear Targeting Usama Bin Ladin, May 4,2011, pp 13-14 47-49, and 53-54 (DTS 2011-2049).
⁴⁰¹ [Redacted] [Redacted]. See also [Redacted] [Redacted] |22695[Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 104071 [Redacted] [Redacted]
⁴²⁷ SSCI Study, Executive Summary. December 3, 2014. p. 443.
⁴²⁸ SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 6.
⁴²⁹ See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 11. "On September 17, 2001, six days after the teirorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush signed a covert action MON to authorize the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to 'undertake operations designed to capture and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning terrorist activities.'" (emphasis added).
⁴³⁰ In 1974. the Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 created the requirement for presidential "Findings" for covert action. The Intelligence Oversight Acts of 1980 and 1988 amended the Finding process, and the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1991 replaced Hughes-Ryan with the current Finding process. See William Daugherty, Executive Secrets, Covert Action and the Presidency, The University Press of Kentucky, 2004 pp. 92-98.
⁴⁴⁶ 34573 (061751Z MAR 03); 34614 (071551Z MAR 03)
⁴⁵⁰ DTS 2002-0371, p. 3.
⁴⁵⁷ SSCI Study, Volume 1, March 31. 2014, p. 413.
⁴⁶¹ SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 4.
⁴⁶⁴ SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3,2014, p. 5 n.13.
⁴⁶⁵ See CIA, CIA Draft Appendix on Necessity Defense.
⁴⁶⁶ CIA, CIA Draft Appendix on Necessity Defense, p. 6. See also SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, p. 179 (the Study provides an accurate quotation of this text).
⁴⁸² CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, p. 32.
⁴⁸⁵ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] subject: Re: State cable; date: March 13,2003, at 1:43:17 PM. The previous day, the medical officer had written that "I am going the extra mile to [Redacted] cc: try to handle this in a non confrontational manner." Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted]; subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP 3/10; date: March 12, 2003, at 5:17:07 AM.
⁴⁸⁶ [Redacted] 10803 (131929ZMAR 03)
⁴⁸⁹ See CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB8), June 27, 2013, p. 32.
⁵⁰³ See SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 417-418.
⁵¹³ CIA, CIA CABLE 1411. [Redacted] 2004. p. 4.
⁵³² CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, p. 34.
⁵³³ SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions, December 3, 2014, p. 8.
⁵³⁴ 50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(1)(D).
⁵³⁵ See CIA OIG, Semi-Annual Report to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, July-December 2006, p. 5 (DTS 2007-0669); CIA OIG, Semi-Annual Report to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, January-June 2006, p. 5 (DTS 2006-3195); CIA OIG, Semi-Annual Report to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, July-December 2005, p. 5 (DTS 2006-0678); CIA OIG, Semi-Annual Report to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, January- June 2005, p. 5 (DTS 2005-3140); CIA OIG, Semi-Annual Report to the Director of Central Intelligence, January- June 2004, p. 5 (DTS 2004-3307); and CIA OIG, Semi-Annual Report to the Director of Central Intelligence.
⁵³⁹ SSCI Study, Volume I, March 31, 2014, p. 899 n.6257. The CIA asserts that the "OIG conducted nearly 60 investigations" related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and that the OIG found the initial allegations in 50 of these investigations to be unsubstantiated or did not make findings warranting an accountability review. Of the remaining 10 investigations, one resulted in a felony conviction, one resulted in the termination of a contractor and the revocation of his security clearances, and six led to Agency accountability reviews. CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B), June 27, 2013, p. 7.
⁵⁵² SSCI Study, Findings and Conclusions. December 3, 2014, p. 8.
⁵⁵⁴ [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 2218 [Redacted]; HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]
⁵⁶¹ [REDACTED] 60040 [Redacted]
⁵⁶² CIA Study Response, Conclusions (TAB B). June 27, 2013, p. 39 (emphasis in original).
⁵⁷⁵ See Volume I for additional details.
⁵⁷⁸ HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted]
⁵⁸⁰ See Volume I for additional details.
⁵⁸² [REDACTED] 5417 [Redacted] See Volume 111 for additional details on detainees in Count: [Redacted]
⁵⁹⁴ u f t ^ ^ r a b ^ i ^ h a r i s i underwent at least two 48-hour sessions of sleep deprivation in October 2002. See [Redacted] 29036 [Redacted] and [Redacted] 29352 [Redacted] '
⁶⁴⁴ For detailed information, see Volume III.
⁶⁶⁹ U691 (081609Z SEP 04); [Redacted] 1716 (180742Z SEP 04); [Redacted] 1998 (020752Z JAN 05); [Redacted] 2023 (151735Z JAN 05) [Redacted] 2515 (3019462 JUN 05); [Redacted] 11150 (282019Z NOV 03)
⁷¹¹ [Redacted] 180219 [Redacted]
⁷¹⁶ HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] L During this same period, countries whose nationals were in CIA custody were issuing demarches. [Redacted] issued a demarche to Country [Redacted] in [Redacted] 2004, and [Redacted] issued a demarche to the U.S. in [Redacted] 2004. See [Redacted] 2274 [Redacted] and 93291 [Redacted]
⁷⁵⁷ [Redacted]
⁷⁵⁹ Using May 2004 exchange rates, this amounted to approximately $17,000.
⁷⁶³ [Redacted] [Redacted] HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] JAN 04) 7<M
⁷⁹⁰ Redacted]
⁸³³ See, for example, [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]; and [Redacted] [Redacted] 24611|
⁸⁴² While CIA Headquarters offered $ [Redacted] million to Country [Redacted] for hosting a CIA detention facility, [Redacted] precluded the opening of the facility. O n l y J [Redacted] l m i l l i o n w a s t i ^ CIA Station for support to the llll I I I III [Redacted] Mill l l l l l l
⁸⁴³ ALEC [Redacted] [Redacted] 03). In an interview on the CIA program, [Redacted] noted that the program had "more money than we could p o s s i b l ^ p e n ^ ^ h o u g h t , and it turned out to be accurate." In the same interview, he stated that "in one case, we gave [Redacted] $[Redacted]000,000 [Redacted] [Redacted] Myself and Jos6 [Rodriguez] [Redacted] [Redacted] We never counted it I'm not about to count that kind of money for a receipt." The boxes contained one hundred dollar bills, [Redacted] did not identify the recipient of the [Redacted] million. See transcript of Oral History Interview, Interviewee: [Redacted] (RJ) - October 13, 2006, Interviewer: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].
⁸⁴⁵ ALEC [Redacted]
⁸⁶⁰ [REDACTED] 2317 The CIA's June 2013 Response states that "[i|t was only as leaks detailing the program began to emerge that foreign partners felt compelled to alter the scope of their involvement.' As described above, the tensions with Country [Redacted] w e r e unrelated to press leaks.
⁸⁶⁶ [REDACTED] 3706 ([REDACTED] [REDACTED])
⁸⁸⁶ [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 19
⁹⁰⁶ Text redacted by the CIA prior to provision to Committee members at the U.S. Senate.
⁹²¹ S3053
⁹²³ [REDACTED] [Redacted]
⁹²⁵ [Redacted] "[REDACTED] article fallout." According to CIA records, the of Country [Redacted] was "very angry" about press reports, which, he believed, would be "exploitedbyradical elements" to "foment increased hostility toward [Country [Redacted] government." [REDACTED] DIRR [Redacted] [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] [Redacted] [REDACTED], CIA records further state that the press reporting would "put considerable strain on the relationship." (See "[REDACTED] article fallout.") Despite this record, and other records in the full Committee Study, the CIA's June 2013 Response states: "[w]e found no evidence that the RDI program in any way negatively affected US relations overall with Country [Redacted]
⁹²⁹ l ' HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]). See also HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] ([REDACTED] [REDACTED]).
⁹³³ SecCI^(^umen^ntiHed^COMPENSATION TO [Redacted] FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT," date not listed.
⁹³⁴ [Redacted] 1 9 [Redacted] See also CIA document entitled, "COMPENSATION TO LIAISON FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT," date not listed, which indicates that the total compensation provided was $ [Redacted] '
⁹³⁵ Summary and Reflections of Chief of Medical Services on OMS Participation in the RDI Program.
⁹³⁷ [Redacted] 4118 [Redacted] HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted]
⁹³⁹ Transcript of Oral History Interview, Interviewee: [Redacted] (R-D - October 13, 2006, Interviewer: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], 11>i ii iii i [Redacted] o r o n N
⁹⁴¹ [REDACTED] 1938 [Redacted]
⁹⁵⁴ See CIA Memo, "As of 01 January 2006, there were 28 HVDs in CIA custody." As noted above, DETENTION SITE VIOLET in Country [Redacted] would be closed in [Redacted] 2006.
¹⁰²⁶ See Volume III for additional information.
¹⁰³⁰ See. for example. [Company Y] Monthly report, February 2006; [Company Y| Monthly Report, March 2006; [Company Y| Quarterly. 01 Jan - 31 March 2007. ll>:
¹⁰³⁷ Email from: [REDACTED], C T C [Redacted] to: Hammond DUNBAR, Grayson SWIGERT; cc: [REDACTED], [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Copy of Signed Indemnification Agreement; date: July 13, 2007, at 02:22 PM; email from: [REDACTED], Chief, Contract Law Division; to: [Redacted] cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED), [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Fw: Modified Indemnification Agmt... New AR 7-17 Waiver Memo, Too?; date: November 13,2007, at 10:32 AM.
¹⁰³⁸ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] subject: [Redacted] Billing, May-December 2007; date: August 12,2008, at 06:42 PM.
¹⁰⁸⁵ Email from: John Rizzo; to: John M o s e m [Redacted] c c : Buzzy Krongard, Scott Muller, William Harlow; subject: Today's Washington Post Piece on Administration Detainee Policy; date: June 27, 2003. lose j u | y 2003, CIA Memorandum for National Security Advisor from Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet with the Subject: Reaffirmation of the Central Intelligence Agency's Interrogation Program. See also Scott Muller, Memorandum for the Record; subject: Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003; date: 5 August 2003(OGC^C^003-50078).
¹⁰⁸⁸ See sections of this summary and Volume II on the Identification, Capture, and Arrest of Iyman Faris; the Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha; the Identification and Arrest of Saleh al-Marri; die Capture of Majid Khan; and the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots (regarding the capture of Ammar al-Baluchi). 11ii ii iii i [Redacted] T Y W N
¹¹⁰⁰ Email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] cc: subject: Re: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 3:57:45 PM. See also "Signifi^nt Petmi^e^i^OT [Redacted]
¹¹⁰¹ CIA Memorandum for the Record, "Review of Interrogation Program on 29 July 2003," prepared by CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, dated August 5, 2003; briefing slides entitled, "CM Interrogation Program," dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials. Those attending the meeting included the director of the CIA, George Tenet; the CIA general counsel, Scott Muller; Vice President Cheney; National Security Advisor Rice; White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales; Attorney General Ashcroft; Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Patrick Philbin; and counsel to the National Security Council, John Bellinger.
¹¹¹¹ [Redacted] Interview of chief of the [Redacted] Branch of the UB L Group, [Redacted] by Office of the Inspector General, July 30, 2003.
¹¹²⁶ [Redacted] [Redacted] Email [Redacted] to: Scott Muller, John Rizzo, [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: "For the response to the IG report"; date: February 4, 2004, at 1:04:03 PM.
¹¹²⁷ to: Email from: [Redacted] [REDACTED]; subject: Addition on KSM/AZ and measures; date: February 10,2004.
¹¹⁵⁴ See the sections of this summary and Volume II on the Capture of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) and the Thwarting of the Karachi Plots (regarding the capture of Khallad bin Attash). [Redacted]
¹¹⁷⁶ [Redacted] Email from: [Redacted] to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: URGENT: FOR YOUR COMMENT: DCIA Questions on the Suskind Article; date: September 11, 2006, at 08:23 PM.
¹¹⁷⁹ The OLC memorandum, along with other OLC memoranda relying on inaccurate CIA representations, has been declassified, as has the May 2004 OIG Special Review containing inaccurate information provided by CIA officers. Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20,2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 14).
¹¹⁹³ See ODNI September 2006 Unclassified Public Release: "During initial intenogation, Abu Zubaydah gave some information that he probably viewed as nominal. Some was important, however, including that Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker 'Mukhtar.' This identification allowed us to comb previously collected intelligence for both names, opening up new leads to this terrorist plotter—leads that eventually resulted in his capture. It was clear to his interrogators that Abu Zubaydah possessed a great deal of information about al-Qa'ida; however, he soon stopped all cooperation, Over the ensuing months, the CIA designed a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal." See also Presidential Speech on September 6, 2006, based on CIA information and vetted by CIA personnel, that states: "We knew that Zubaydah had more information that could save innocent lives. But he stopped talking... And so, the CIA used an alternative set of procedures."
¹²⁶⁶ " c l iti c a i" description in this CIA representation is addressed in the section of this summary concerning the reported acquisition of actionable intelligence after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques that the CIA represented as enabling the CIA to thwart terrorist plots and capture specific terrorists. See Volume II for additional information.
¹²⁶⁷ Among other documents, see CIA Memorandum for the National Security Advisor (Rice) entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," December 2004; CIA Memorandum to the Office of Legal Counsel, entitled, "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques," March 2, 2005; CIA briefing notes entitled, "Briefing for Vice President Cheney: CIA Detention and Interrogation Program," March 4, 2005; CIA talking points for the National Security Council entitled, "Talking Points for 10 March 2005 DCI Meeting PC: Effectiveness of the High-Value Detainee Interrogation (HVDI) Techniques," dated March 4, 2005; CIA briefing notes entitled, "Briefing for Chief of Staff to the President Josh Bolten: CIA Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Programs," dated May 2, 2006; CIA briefing document, entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6, 2007, with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting." Also included in additional briefing documents referenced and described in this summary.
¹²⁸⁰ CIA Directorate of Intelligence, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa'ida," dated July 13, 2004; fax to the Department of Justice, April 22,2005, entitled, " [Redacted] Materials on KSM and Abu Zubaydah. [Redacted] " This report was widely disseminated in the Intelligence Community, and a copy of this report was provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on July 15, 2004. On March 31, 2009, former Vice President Cheney requested the declassification of this Intelligence Assessment, which was publicly released with redactions on August 24,2009.
¹³¹⁰ Italics added. CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah never provided information on "two operatives already in the United States." While neither Binyam Muhammad nor Jose Padilla was "already in the United States," die OLC description appears to be a reference to Jose Padilla and Binyam Mohammad, as the OLC then makes reference to the "Dirty Bomb" and "Tall Buildings" plotting.
¹³⁵⁶ Terrorism Watch, March 10, 2009, Guantanamo Detainee 's Torture Claims Could Impact Bilateral Relationship with UK.
¹³⁶⁹ and [Redacted] 45028 [Redacted] DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] The CIA's June 2013 Response concedes that the CIA "mischaracterized the impact of the reporting [the CIA] acquired from detainees on the Karachi plots," and acknowledges that the Karachi plotting was "thwarted by the arrest of the operatives and the interdiction of explosives by [Pakistani authorities]." The CIA does not dispute that Pakistani authorities arrested Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash independently, and that information from the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program played no role in die arrests. The CIA's June 2013 Response states, however, that CIA detainee reporting "revealed ongoing attack plotting against the US official presence in Karachi that prompted the Consulate to take further steps to protect its officers." This statement is incongruent with CIA records. In response to the reporting cited by the CIA, CIA personnel in Karachi wrote: "[wjhile reporting from both [al-Baluchi and bin Attash] was chilling- [CIA officers] had become aware of most of this reporting either through previous information or through interviews of al-Baluchi and [Khallad bin] Attash prior to their transfer out of Karachi." The CIA personnel in Karachi further reassured addressees that, in December 2002, the U.S. Consulate in Karachi took increased steps to protect U.S. Consulate personnel. See Volume II for additional information.
¹⁴⁸⁰ On April [Redacted] 2 0 0 [Redacted] relayed information acquired from Sajid Badat, the other U.K. "Issa." Badat stated that "anyone who had been involved with jihad in Britain since the mid-90s" would know the other Issa, naming among other individuals, Moazzem Begg. See [Redacted] 19907 (231744Z APR 04).
¹⁴⁹⁶ account. Within days, the Intelligence Community was collecting information from the account and had reported that the user of the account was in contact with other covered accounts and that the message content was in English.1497 KSM was captured on March 1, 2003. On March [Redacted] 2003, KSM was rendered to CIA custody and immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—including at least 183 applications of the waterboard interrogation technique—until March 25, 2003.1498 During the month of March 2003, KSM provided information on a variety of matters, including on a U.K.-based Abu Issa al-Britani. The information provided by KSM on "Issa" included both accurate and inaccurate information. At the time, the CIA was unable to discern between the two. During interrogation sessions in March 2003, KSM first discussed an "Issa al-Britani" among a list of individuals who were connected to KSM's Heathrow Airport plotting.1499 On March 17, 2003, KSM stated that, prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks, he tasked Issa to travel to the United States to "collect information on economic targets " On March 21, 2003, KSM was waterboarded for failing to confirm interrogators' suspicions that KSM sought to recruit individuals from among the African American Muslim community. KSM then stated that he had talked with "Issa" about contacting African American Muslim groups prior to September 11, 2001.1500 The next day KSM was waterboarded for failing to provide more information on the recruitment of African American Muslims. One hour after the waterboarding session, KSM stated that he tasked Issa "to make contact with black U.S. citizen converts to Islam in Montana," and that he instructed Issa to use his ties to Shaykh Abu Hamza al-Masri, a U.K.-based Imam, to facilitate his recruitment efforts.1501 KSM later stated that Issa's mission in the United States was to surveil forests to potentially ignite forest fires.1502 During this period, KSM was confronted with a series of emails that included the aforementioned "Lazylozy" email account and another email account [Redacted] KSM confirmed that the emails were established for communication between Issa al-Britani and Ammar al-Baluchi and stated that Issa used the "Lazylozy" account, and that al-Baluchi used the [Redacted] account.1503 (A month later the CIA reported that Issa did not use the "Lazylozy" email address, but the other email address.)1504 Over the next six months, KSM retracted or provided conflicting reporting on Issa. On June 22, 2003, CIA interrogators reported that "[KSM] nervously explained to [Redacted] A L G C [Redacted] 0 2 2 3 S Z MAR 03)
¹⁴⁹⁷ [Redacted] Update on E-mail Activity [Redacted] Messages Derived from [Redacted] Coverage, [Redacted] CIA [Redacted] [Redacted]
¹⁴⁹⁸ See KSM detainee review in Volume III for additional details,
¹⁴⁹⁹ f h e r e are no other records indicating that Dhiren Barot, aka Issa, was connected to KSM's Heathrow Plotting [Redacted] 8 2 8 (1513I0Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 1 5 ( 1 4 1 8 1 9 Z M A R 0 3 [Redacted] 10871 (172037Z MAR 03)
¹⁵⁰⁰ [Redacted] 10932 (212132Z MAR O [Redacted] 10921 (211046Z MAR 03)
¹⁵⁰¹ 10942 (2216I0Z MAR 03). According to KSM, Shaykh abu Hamza al-Masri had contacts in Montana.
¹⁵⁰² 02 DIRECTOR [Redacted] (312243Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 9 4 2 (221521ZMAR 03); [Redacted] 11070 (30211SZ MAR 03), disseminated as [Redacted]
¹⁵⁰³ 110948 [Redacted] (222101Z MAR 03)
¹⁵⁰⁴ A L E C [Redacted] 8 2 3 3 0 Z APR03)
¹⁵⁰⁵ [Redacted] 12095 (222049Z JUN 03)
¹⁵¹⁸ Email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] , [REDACTED]; cc: [Redacted] ; subject: KSM and Khallad Issues; date: October 16, 2003, at 5:25:13 PM.
¹⁵²³ Draft cable included in an email from: [REDACTED]; to [Redacted] and [Redacted] subject: "Abu Issa al-Hindi Targeting Study"; date: October 22, 2003, at 6:49:41 PM.
¹⁵²⁵ [Redacted] ALECI
¹⁵³⁴ [Redacted] [Redacted] email from: [REDACTED]; to [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: DRAFT DCI SPECIAL ITEM - 14Jul04; date: July 14, 2004, at 03:48 PM. This information was obtained from sources unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Prog
¹⁵⁴⁶ [REDACTED] 25533 (231257Z AUG 04). See also CIA [Redacted] (242144Z AUG 04). Internal CIA communications related to August 30, 2004, CIA talking points concerning Dhiren Barot state that a sketch of Issa al-Hindi, by U.S. military detainee Moazzem Begg, ultimately played a central role, as a surveillance photo of a suspected Issa al-Hindi "looked so much like the sketch." The CIA talking points identify [Redacted] [technical collection] capabilities as the CIA's primary contribution to the investigation, stating: "Probably the most important intelligence tool we used in breakin^hisrcase was o u r [Redacted] t e c h l 1 i c a l collection] enabled by the USA Patriot Act. From beginning to [Redacted] [technical collection) played a role, but it was not the only tool that was used. HUMINT and SIGINT threads were followed and contributed to our understanding of the [Redacted] [technical collection] and also in finding new [Redacted] [technical collection] leads. Exploitation of computers and other information obtained in raids before and during the case also contributed significantly, as did surveillance. However, none of these tools are stand-alones. Good old fashioned hard targeting and analysis of these maddeningly vague and disparate and incomplete threads of information was the glue that put it all together." See "Capture of Al-Qa'ida Operative Abu Issa al-Hindi (aka Dhiren Barot, aka Abu Issa al-Britani)," multiple iterations of talking points, including the revised version cited, found in an email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], with multiple ccs; subject: "IMMEDIATE: al-Hindi TPs for ADCI Tuesday Briefing of Kerry/Edwards"; date: August 30, 2004, at 02:51 PM.
¹⁵⁴⁹ In an email, a CIA officer commented on talking points prepared for "ADCI Tuesday Briefing of Kerry/Edwards" on Issa al-Hindi, stating that "KSM didn't decode the numbers for us (he just provided info on how he may have encoded the numbers—which when used didn't result in valid numbers) and address with the number didn't exist; it was a dead end, and it appears KSM was protecting al-Hindi." See email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], with multiple ccs; subject: "IMMEDIATE: al-Hindi TPs for ADCI Tuesday Briefing of Kerry/Edwards"; date: August 30,2004, at 02:51 PM, which contains comments on previous drafts of talking points.
¹⁶¹⁹ See document entitled, "DCIA Talking Points: Waterboard 06 November 2007," dated November 6 2007 with the notation the document was "sent to DCIA Nov. 6 in preparation for POTUS meeting."
¹⁶⁶⁹ Italics added. "Impact of the Loss of the Detainee Program to CT Operations and Analysis," prepared to support a letter from CIA Director Goss to Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant to the President/National Security Advisor, Frances F. Townsend, Assistant to the President/Homeland Security Advisor, and Ambassador John D. Negroponte, dated December 23, 2005.
¹⁶⁷⁰ Italics added. CIA memorandum to the CIA Inspector General from James Pavitt, CIA's Deputy Director for Operations, dated Febmary 27, 2004, with the subject line, "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, 'Coiinteitenorism Detention and Interrogation Program' (2003-7123-IG)," Attachment, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities," dated February 24, 2004.
¹⁷²⁷ [Redacted] 84783 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]
¹⁷³⁷ 86449 [Redacted] [Redacted]
¹⁷⁴² [Redacted] 1241 [Redacted]
¹⁷⁵¹ Joint Inquiry Into the Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, December 2002, pp. 325 - 331 (DTS #2002-5162); CIA Office of the Inspector General Report on CIA Accountability With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, June 2005, pp. xi, 100-126 (DTS #2005-3477).
¹⁷⁵² Joint Inquiry Into the Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, December 2002, p. 329 (DTS #2002-5162).
¹⁷⁶⁸ Italics added. As described in this summary and in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume 111, this statement was inaccurate. Abu Zubaydah provided information on al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships, in addition to information on its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics prior to, during, and after the utilization of die CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Abu Zubaydah's inability to provide information on the next attack in the United States and operatives in the United States was the basis for CIA representations that Abu Zubaydah was "uncooperative" and the CIA's determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to become "compliant" and reveal the information the CIA believed he was withholding—the names of operatives in the United States or information to stop the next terrorist attack. At no point during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah provide this type of information.
¹⁷⁷² Pakistan. While CIA records indicate that Abu Zubaydah provided information on Ramzi bin al-Shibh, there is no indication in CIA records that Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh's whereabouts. Further, while Abu Zubaydah provided information on bin al-Shibh while being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, he provided similar information to FBI special agents prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.1773 Prior to the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, during interrogation sessions on May 19, 2003, and May 20, 2003, Abu Zubaydah reviewed photographs of individuals known by his interrogators to be associated with safehouses, which he shared with us as a result of the use of EITs, for example, played a key role in (he ultimate capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh" (italics added). Among other records, s e e [Redacted] l [Redacted] P 0 [Redacted] C I A [Redacted] H ( [Redacted] [Redacted] 0 2 ) [Redacted] ALEC [Redacted] 1 5 5 1 Z SEP 02).
¹⁷⁷³ See additional information below, as well as the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, and Federal Bureau of Investigation documents pertaining "to the interrogation of detainee Zayn Al Abideen Abu Zabaidah" provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by cover letter dated July 20, 2010 (DTS# 2010-2939). The CIA's June 2013 Response includes the following: ". ..the Study states that Abu Zubaydah 'provided similar information to FBI interrogators prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.' This is incorrect. Abu Zubaydah's unique information concerning his contact with Hassan Gul was collected on 20 August 2002, after he had been subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques." This assertion in the CIA's June 2013 Response contains several errors: First, as described, the statement in the December 13, 2012, Committee Study pertains to Abu Zubaydah's reporting on Ramzi bin al-Shibh, not Hassan Ghul. As detailed in this summary and in other areas of the full Committee Study, while Abu Zubaydah provided information on Ramzi bin al-Shibh after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, he provided similar information on bin al-Shibh to FBI interrogators prior to the use and approval of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Second, as detailed in the full Committee Study, Abu Zubaydah provided considerable information on Hassan Ghul prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. (Some of this reporting has been declassified; for example, see the 9/11 Commission Report, specifically the Staff Report, "9/11 and Terrorist Travel," which highlights reporting by Abu Zubaydah on Hassan Ghul that was disseminated by the CIA on June 20, 2002.) Third, in referencing information that Abu Zubaydah provided on Hassan Ghul on August 20,2002, the CIA's June 2013 Response asserts that this was "unique information." The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "Abu Zubaydah stated that if he personally needed to reach Hassan Gul, he would contact [Redacted] [a well-known associate of Hassan Ghul], We provided this information to Pakistani authorities, who then interviewed [the well- known associate] a n [Redacted] [a specific family member of the well-known associate]—which ultimately led them to an apartment linked to Gul." The CIA's June 2013 Response adds that die "unique information concerning his contact with Hassan Gul was collected on 20 August 2002, after [Abu Zubaydah] had been subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques." CIA records indicate, however, that the information described in the CIA's Response was not unique. Pakistani authorities had raided the home and interviewed [Redacted] [Redacted] f'h e same well-known associate] more than a month earlier on July [Redacted] 2002, based on similar reporting from a cooperating detainee in foreign government custody. The CIA had specific and detailed knowledge of this raid and the resulting interview of [Redacted] [the well-known associate]. Pakistani authorities remained in contact with [Redacted] [the well known associate], the primary person interviewed, who was cooperative and sent [Redacted] to help Pakistani authorities identify a possible al-Qa'ida safe house—which the CIA noted was "extremely close to (if not an exact match)" for a safe house the FBI connected KSM to weeks earlier on June 18, 2002. 11 II 11111 [Redacted] III I II
¹⁷⁸⁰ See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details.
¹⁷⁹⁹ [Redacted]1746 [Redacted]
¹⁸⁰⁶ [Redacted]
¹⁸³⁸ ALEC [Redacted] (231718Z SEP 01). Ramzi Yousef is ser v i n g j n i f e s e n t ^ .
¹⁸³⁹ A CIA source from 1995 reported that "all members [Redacted] are acting together on behalf of a largerandwellorganized group." [Redacted] n mini nil in Inn Ii I I I I I I I and villains." (See WHDC [Redacted] C T 95).) Reporting from 1998 indicated that "Sheikh Khalid" (KSM), along with [Redacted] had "switched their allegiance" and were "part of the bin Ladin organization in Afghanistan." (See DIRr""T"P [Redacted] [Redacted] II I I ilisseminated as [Redacted] ) CIA cables describe [Redacted] [Redacted] 1 [Redacted] [specific intelligence collected on KSM's [Redacted] l 1 See [Redacted] [Redacted] WHDC [Redacted] [Redacted] 9 5 ) ; [Redacted] 89173 1
¹⁸⁴⁰ Email i [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED]; subjgctMhgjrousef c o h o r [Redacted] date: September 25,2001, at 6:58:17 PM.
¹⁸⁴⁴ [Redacted]1931 [Redacted]. ASSET X identified [Redacted] The CIA cable also describes ASSET X's [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 66193 [Redacted] [Redacted] [66ml [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] ; [Redacted] DIRECTOR| [Redacted] [Redacted] 137701 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]
¹⁸⁴⁹ [Redacted] 66487[Redacted]
¹⁸⁵⁰ DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted]
¹⁸⁵⁵ See CIA [Redacted] [Redacted] disseminated as [Redacted]
¹⁸⁵⁶ CIA officers proposed recontacting a 1995 asset with possible access to KSM through [Redacted] [Redacted] (See email from: [REDACTED]; to: Jose Rodriguez, [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED!, [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Finding Khalid Sheikh Muhammad; date: [Redacted] 2002, at 06:49:13 PM.) The email was resent, on [Redacted] 2002, to additional addressees. (See email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTEDUREDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] cc: subject: Finding Khalid Sheikh Muhammad; date: [Redacted] 2002, at 3:46:13 PM.) At this point, the nefarious activities of KSM's [Redacted] were of significant interest to the Intelligence Community and policymakers. KSM's [Redacted] |terrorism [Redacted] were briefed to the President and were the subject of a direct tasking by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. [Redacted] [Redacted] ALEC [Redacted] \ [Redacted]
¹⁸⁵⁸ [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] . At this time, the CIA offered a compensation package that was increased from die CIA's previous offer.
¹⁸⁵⁹ [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] ; DIR [Redacted] I [Redacted] H [Redacted] l H [Redacted] [Redacted] 41495 [Redacted] ; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program. During this time period, ASSET X reported that he
¹⁸⁶⁰ made contact with KSM's [Redacted] (See [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] during this period, CIA i il I [Redacted] I I in note that ASSET X had offered to locate K S M ' [Redacted] (See [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 481096[Redacted] [Redacted] to: [Redacted] See email from: [Redacted] [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted]; subject: another for the highlights; date: [Redacted] [Redacted] 2002, at 4:14:24 PM. 60 [Redacted] 37701 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 1414951
¹⁸⁶² Interview of [REDACTED] by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program. See [Redacted] [Redacted] DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] .
¹⁸⁶⁴ ASSET X had been using the same names [Redacted] since 2001. See interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program.
¹⁸⁶⁶ Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program. The CIA's June 2013 Response claims that the "CIA correctly represented that detainee reporting helped us capture [KSM]." This CIA assertion is based on an indirect chain of causation purporting to connect the reporting of Abu Zubaydah to the intervention of the visiting CIA officer and the subsequent capture of KSM. This account, which the CIA represented for the first time in June 2013, is inaccurate in numerous ways: (1) The CIA represents that "information provided by Abu Zubaydah... helped lead to the capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh [RBS]." The inaccuracies of this representation are described in this summary and in greater detail in Volume II. (2) The CIA represents that reporting from Ramzi bin al-Shibh (who was not in CIA custody at the time) regarding Ammar al- Baluclii was key to capturing KSM. This too is inaccurate. As detailed in the Study, Ammar al-Baluchi played no role in the operation that captured KSM, which centered around ASSET X and [Redacted] The CIA represents that bin al-Shibh's reporting on Ammar al-Baluchi was "used... to debrief [Redacted] [Redacted] [DETAINEE R]," who was in foreign government custody, and that as a result, DETAINEE R discussed [Redacted] This statement not supported by CIA records. CIA records related to DETAINEE R's intenogation in foreign government c u s t o d ^ n d i c a t ^ h a ^ E T A W E ^ R ' s reporting was prompted using a photograph and a letter. (See [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 0 [Redacted] [Redacted] 10158 [Redacted] WASHINGT [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] (4) The CIA represents that DETAINEE R's i n f o r m a t i o n [Redacted] I l o w e d [Redacted]11111111 mi 11 iii i [Redacted]
¹⁸⁶⁷ [Redacted] DIR [Redacted] Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; ^ — [Redacted] [Redacted]
¹⁸⁶⁸ Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program- Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 3 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program
¹⁸⁶⁹ Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program
¹⁸⁷⁰ Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program- Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED] by [REDACTED]; 24 November & 15 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of fREDACTRDl bv [REDACTED], 30 November 2004. See [Redacted] 0 3 4 [Redacted] '' "
¹⁸⁷¹ n t e r v i e ^ n R E D A C T E D ] , by [REDACTED], 3 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted]
¹⁸⁷³ Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral H i s t o r ^ r o g t w U n t e r v i e w of IREDACTEDI. bv [REDACTED], 3 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; 41490 [Redacted] Interview of [Redacted] by [REDACTED], 25 October 2004, CIA Oral History Program; Interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 September 2004, CIA Oral History Program.
¹⁸⁷⁴ interview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 14 October 2004, CIA Oral Histor^rogram^nterview of [REDACTED], by [REDACTED], 3 December 2004, CIA Oral History Program; 41490
¹⁸⁷⁶ [Redacted] 41490 [Redacted] )
¹⁸⁹² See FBI 302 on FBI case file [Redacted] and [Redacted] 88793 [Redacted] [Redacted]
¹⁹⁰⁰ See "CIA Validation of Remarks on Detainee Policy," drafts supporting the September 6, 2006, speech by President George W. Bush acknowledging and describing the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, as well as an unclassified Office of the Director of National Intelligence release, entitled, "Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program." In October 2007 CIA officers discussed a section of the President's speech, which was based on CIA information and vetted by the CIA, related to Camp Lemonier. Addressing die section of the speech that states, "[tjerrorists held in CIA custody have also provided information that helped stop the planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti," a senior CIA officer highlighted that the plotting had not been stopped, but in fact was ongoing. The officer wrote: "1 have attached the cable from Guleed that was used to source the Sept '06 speech as well as a later cable from a different detainee affirming diat as of mid-2004, AQ members in Somalia were still intent on attacking Camp Lemonier... As of 2004, the second detainee indicates that AQ was still working on attacking the base." The CIA officer explained that the "reasoning behind validation of the language in the speech—and remember, we can argue about whether or not 'planning' consistitutes [sic] a 'plot' and about whether anything is ever disrupted—was that the detainee reporting increased our awareness of attack plotting against the base, leading to heightened security." (See email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] subject: "More on Camp Lemonier"; date: October 22, 2007, at 5:33 PM), The President's reference to Camp Lemonier in die context of "this vital program" came immediately after the passage of the speech referencing the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against KSM and immediately before statements about the thwarting of the Karachi and Heathrow Airport plots, both of which have been explicitly attributed by the CIA to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. The disruption of the Camp Lemonier plotting was also referenced as an intelligence success in the context of the March 2008 presidential veto of legislation that would have effectively banned the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques. See "Text: Bush on Veto of Intelligence Bill," The New York Times, dated March 8, 2008, which states, the "main reason this program has been effective is that it allows the CIA to use specialized interrogation procedures... limiting the CIA's inten-ogation methods to those in the Army field manual would be dangerous...."
¹⁹¹¹ [Redacted] [Redacted] 15431
¹⁹³⁰ CIA records provided to the Committee identify the pseudonym created by the CIA for the asset. The Study r • " . [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] AR 04)
¹⁹³⁹ Draft memorandum from George Tenet to National Security Advisor re Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques, attached to email from: [Redacted] j J o l l n Moseman, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Stanley Moskowitz, Scott Muller, John R i z z o [Redacted] and [Redacted] subject: Draft Documents for Friday's NSC Meeting; date: June 29, 2004. i i ii 11111 [Redacted] "i i n
¹⁹⁵³ August 25, 2004 Letter from [Redacted] Associate General Counsel, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (DTS #2009-1809, Tab 10).
¹⁹⁷⁶ Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of [Redacted] United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.
²⁰²³ CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from [Redacted] [Redacted] Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques."
²⁰²⁷ Emphases in original. CIA Briefing forObama National Security Team - "Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations (RDI)" including "Tab 7," named "RDG Copy- Briefing on RDI Program 09 Jan. 2009." Referenced materials attached to cover memorandum with the title, "D/CIA Conference Room Seating Visit by President-elect Barrack [sic] Obama National Security Team Tuesday, 13 January 2009; 8:30 - 11:30 a.m." The briefing book includes the previously mentioned "Briefing Notes on the Value of Detainee Reporting" dated 15 May 2006, which provided the same intelligence claims in the document of the same name, but dated April 15,2005. See "RDI Key Impacts."
²⁰³¹ [Redacted] M R E C T O [Redacted] (210549Z SEP 04); [Redacted] 24533 (171207Z SEP 04). See also 114425 [Redacted] [Redacted] describing reporting on Jaffar al-Tayyar front the interrogation of Ammar al- Baluchi in foreign government custody. [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]
²⁰⁴⁹ [Redacted] 10741 (100917Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 11377 (231943Z APR 03), disseminated as [Redacted] [Redacted]
²⁰⁶² National Counterterrorism Center, REFLECTIONS, "Ja'far al-Tayyar: An Unlikely Al-Qa'ida Operational Threat," 22 December 2005. While NCTC's "mainline analytic group" disagreed with the Red Team's analytical conclusions, records do not indicate that the Red Team's account of the contrary detainee reporting was challenged Draft MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence General Counsel; SUBJECT: [Redacted]
²⁰⁶⁸ [Redacted] OiUuhM^CXB, informed the OIG that KSM's information "helped lead to the arrest o f ' al-Marri (See [Redacted] Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003). Two days later, [Redacted] wrote an email with information intended for CIA leadership that stated, accurately, that al-Marri "had been detained on a material witness warrant based on information linking him to the 911 financier Hasawi." (See email from: [Redacted] to- [Redacted] [Redacted]TREDACTED] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: value of detainees; date: July 18, 2003, at 2:30:09 PM).
²⁰⁸² CIA Memorandum for Steve Bradbury at Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, dated March 2, 2005, from [Redacted] [Redacted] Legal Group, DCI Counterterrorist Center, subject "Effectiveness of the CIA Counterterrorist Interrogation Techniques." In its June 2013 Response, the CIA states: "We never represented that Shkai was previously unknown to us or that Gul only told us about it after he was subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques. We said that after these techniques were used, Gul provided 'detailed tactical intelligence.' That intelligence differed significantly in granularity and operational utility from what he provided before enhanced techniques." As described in this summary, CIA representations about intelligence on Shkai were used as evidence of the necessity and effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Tire CIA did not inform policymakers or the Department of Justice about the extensive information provided by Hassan Ghul on Shkai prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
²⁰⁸⁵ On April 16, 2013, the Council on Foreign Relations hosted a forum in relation to the screening of the film, "Manhunt." The forum included former CIA officer Nada Bakos, who states in the film that Hassan Ghul provided critical information on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti's connection to UBL to Kurdish officials prior to entering CIA custody. When asked about the interrogation techniques used by the Kurds, Bakos stated: ".. .honestly, Hassan Ghul...when he was being debriefed by the Kurdish government, he literally was sitting there having tea. He was in a safe house. He wasn't locked up in a cell. He wasn't handcuffed to anything. He was—he was having a free flowing conversation. And there's—you know, there's articles in Kurdish papers about sort of their interpretation of the story and how forthcoming he was." See www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/film-screening-manhunt/p30560.
²⁰⁹⁰ [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 541941 [Redacted]jAN 04), later released as HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 1645 • • [Redacted] A N 04), later released as HEADQU ARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] JAN 04), later released as HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] i 647 [Redacted] JAN 04), later released as HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] JAN 04) [Redacted]CIA [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 1650 [Redacted] (IAN 04); [Redacted] 1651 [Redacted] [Redacted] 16521 [Redacted] JAN 04), later released as [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] JAN 04); [Redacted] 1654 [Redacted] 04); [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] JAN 04), later released [Redacted] asl :IA| [Redacted] [Redacted]FEB 04); 11657 [Redacted] N 04); [Redacted] 16771 [Redacted]TAN 04); 11679 [Redacted] [Redacted] AN 04); [Redacted] 1680 JAN 04); JAN [Redacted] 04), later released as [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] JAN 04), later released as [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 1687 [Redacted] 04), later released as [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] l 6 8 [Redacted] JAN 04), later released as [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 1656 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] As the dissemination of 21 intelligence reports suggests, information in CIA records indicates Hassan Ghul was cooperative with CIA personnel prior to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced inteirogation techniques. In an interview with die CIA OIG, a CIA officer familiar with Ghul stated, "He sang like a tweetie bird. He opened up right away and was cooperative from tire outset." See December 2,2004, interview with [REDACTED], Chief, DO, CTC UBL Department, [Redacted]
²¹⁰⁹ Hassan Ghul also discussed Abu Bilal al-Suri, aka, Shafiq, who was the father-in-law of Khalil Deek, aka Joseph Jacob Adams, aka Abu 'Abd al-Rahman BM, aka Abu Ayad al-Filistini. While Ghul did not know where Abu Bilal was located, he had recently seen Abu Bilal's son preparing a residence in Shkai. See [Redacted] 1679 [Redacted] JAN 04).
²¹¹¹ Hassan Ghul was shown photos of individuals apprehendedby [Redacted] on [Redacted] October 2003 [Redacted] and identified one as a Yemeni named Firas, "a well-trained fighter and experienced killer, who was known to be an excellent shot." Ghul reported that, when he first arrived in Shkai, Firas was living there. Prior to hearing about Firas' arrest, Ghul's understanding was that Firas was in Angorada with Khalid Habib, which Ghul characterized as the "front line." The other photo identified by Ghul was that of an Algerian named Abu Maryam, whom helped "hide out" in Shkai. See [Redacted] 1 6 7 8 [Redacted] A N 04).
²¹²⁵ The cable noted that "[b]efore Ghul's capture, the Shkai valley had already been an area of focus [Redacted] [Redacted] The cable detailed Hassan Ghul's reporting prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, as well as information unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, including extensive information on Shkai fro[Redacted] sources, the locations in Shkai [Redacted] [Redacted] and exact geolocational coordinates for numerous sites in Shkai. See [Redacted] 60245 [Redacted] \04)-
²¹³¹ 12742 (090403Z FEB 04) [Redacted]
²¹³⁶ Congressional Notification (DTS #2012-3802).
²¹⁷⁶ Italics added. Testimony of CIA Director Panetta, transcript of the May 4, 2011, briefing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee (DTS #2011-2049). 1 11 ii 11111 [Redacted] "1"
²¹⁹² Italics added. For a listing of the 12 detainees, see CIA's six-page chart entitled, "Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti," which lists 12 detainees, all of whom are listed as being in "CIA Custody" (DTS #2011 -2004).
²¹⁹⁵ Italics added. CIA testimony from CIA Director Panetta, and transcript of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 4, 2011 (DTS #2011-2049). 21 %
²²⁰⁵ Ammar al-Baluchi, Hassan Ghul, Ahmad Ghailani, Sharif al-Masri, and Muhammad Rahim.
²²¹⁵ "Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin," dated September 2012, compiled by the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, and provided on October 3, 2012 (DTS #2012-3826).
²²⁴¹ See Committee Notification from the C I A d a t [Redacted] (DTS #2012-3802).
²²⁴⁸ See CIA CTC "Al-Qa'ida Watch," dated November 23, 2007. wo [Redacted] 3 8 0 g (2H420Z JAN 08); HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] (232217Z JAN 08); [Redacted] 9044 (240740Z JAN 0 8 ) [Redacted] 5 6 8 (081633Z FEB 08)
²²⁶³ Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and [Redacted] April 13, 2005, from 19:23:50 to .19:56:05.
²²⁷⁸ [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] Email from: [Redacted] ; cc: [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] ^[REDACTED]; subject: Re: Interrogation Program—Going Public Draft Talking Points-Comments Due to [Redacted] me by COB TODAY. Thanks.; date: April 25, 2005, at 11:41:07 AM.
²²⁹² Email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] : [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] u b j e c t : Re: Fact Check on Ron Kessler draft; date: March 15, 2007, at 7:07:52 A M . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
²³¹⁷ Letter from Assistant Attorney General Jack L. Goldsmith, 111 to Director George Tenet, June 18, 2004 (DTS #2004-2710). As described above, the CIA's presentation to the NSC principals undercounted the frequency with which KSM and Abu Zubaydah were subjected to the waterboard.
²³²² June 4, 2004, Memorandum for Deputy Director for Operations from Director of Central Intelligence Re: Suspension of Use of Interrogation Techniques. On June 2, 2004, George Tenet informed the President that he intended to resign from his position on July 11, 2004. The White House announced the resignation on June 3, 2004.
²³²⁸ OMS GUIDELINES ON MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO DETAINEE RENDITION, INTERROGATION, AND DETENTION, May 17, 2004, OMS Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee Interrogations, First Draft, March 7, 2003. The evolution of OMS Guidelines is described in Volume III of the Committee Study.
²³³⁵ Letter from [Redacted] Associate General Counsel, CIA, to Dan Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, August 2 5 , 2 0 0 4 (DTS #2009-1809). For Gul's rendition, see [Redacted] 1512 [Redacted] 04). According to an August 16, 2004, cable, a CIA interrogator did "not believe that escalation to enhanced measures will increase [Gul's] ability to produce timely accurate locational and threat information." (See [Redacted] 1567 [Redacted] . ) On August 19, 2004, a cable from DETENTION SITE B ^ C I O i o t e d that theintorogaUon team "does not believe [Gul] is withholding imminent threat information." See [Redacted] 11574 [Redacted] 04).
²³⁵³ [Redacted] 11411([Redacted]
²⁴⁰³ Email from: [Redacted] to: [REDACTED]; c [Redacted] n Rizzo; subject: FW: Summary of Hamdan Decision; date: June 30, 2006, ut 4:44 PM.
²⁴⁸¹ e t t e ^ r o m David Shedd to Andy Johnson, J a n u a r ^ ^ 0 0 6 ( D T S #2006-0373); email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] to: Michael Leiter; cc: David Shedd, [Redacted] and others; subject: Review of Documents Requested by Senator Rockefeller; date: December 16, 2005.
²⁵⁰⁹ As in the September 6, 2006, briefing, only two staff members were permitted to attend.
²⁵⁷⁰ The CIA's June 20.13 Response states that "[w]e concede that prior to promulgation of DCI guidance on interrogation in January 2003 and the establishment of interrogator training courses in November of the same year, not every CIA employee who debriefed detainees had been thoroughly screened or had received formal training. After that time, however - the period with which DCIA Hayden, who came to the Agency in 2005, was most familiar - the statement is accurate." CIA records indicate that the first interrogator training course was established in November 2002. General Hayden became the CIA Director on May 30, 2006. After this time two CIA detainees entered CIA custody, one of whom was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
²⁵⁸¹ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] [Redacted]; subject: Re: MEDICAL S1TREP 3/10; date: March 11, 2003, at 8:10:39 AM.
²⁵⁹⁰ Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [Redacted], [REDACTED]; subject: Update; date: August 8,2002, at 06:50 AM.
²⁶⁰⁰ p 0 i i 0 W i n g al-Hawsawi's first interrogation session, Chief of Interrogations [Redacted] asked CIA Headquarters for information on what al-Hawsawi actually "knows," saying "he does not appear to the [sic] be a person that is a financial mastermind. However, we lack facts with which to confront [al-Hawsawi], What we need at this point is substantive information vice supposition." See [Redacted] 34757 (101742Z MAR 03).
²⁶⁰³ Authorization to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against ABU TALHA AL-MAGREBI was sought in order to "identify inconsistencies in [ABU BAHAR AL-TURKl's] story." See [Redacted] 2186 [Redacted] [Redacted] .
²⁶¹⁸ [Redacted] [Redacted] 84876
²⁶¹⁹ 84854 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 876171 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]
²⁶²⁰ 2621 [Redacted] [Redacted]
²⁶²³ [Redacted] [Redacted] |84908| [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]
²⁶²⁴ [Redacted] 1410171 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] In response to this information, [Redacted] r o t e , "Wow., this is just great... you guys are soooo closing in on Hmabali [sic]." See email f r o m [Redacted] [Redacted] others; subject: "wohoo—hilite for EA team pis....aliases for Hambali"; date: June [Redacted] 2003, at 9:51:30 AM. 2624 [Redacted] 8 6 4 4 9 [Redacted]
²⁶⁴⁷ Ti l e c i a has referred only to Abu Zubaydah in the context of this representation. See Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques diat May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees. The OLC document states: "As Zubaydah himself explained with respect to enhanced techniques, 'brothers who are captured and interrogated are permitted by Allah to provide information when they believe they have 'reached the limit of their ability to withhold it' in the fact of psychological and physical hardships."
²⁶⁵⁹ See [Redacted] 2563 [Redacted] email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [Redacted], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: TASKING - Fw: [Redacted]; date: March 30, 2007; DTS #2007-1502.
²⁶⁶⁹ [Redacted] 1 8 [Redacted] D E C 0 5 [Redacted] 1 8 1 3 [Redacted] DEC 05); [Redacted] 1819 [Redacted] C 0 5 ) ; [Redacted] 4 7 ( [Redacted] E C 05); [Redacted] S ( [Redacted] E C 05); HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] DEC 05). See additional information on Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi in Volume III. [Redacted]
²⁶⁸⁶ In M a y 2 0 0 [Redacted] stated that variety was introduced into Abu Zubaydah's diet; in addition to his daily intake of two cups of kidney beans, one cup of rice, Ensure, and juice, Abu Zubaydah was given a piece of fried chicken, Coke, and several cups of hot tea. See [Redacted] 10327 (240624Z MAY 02).
²⁶⁹⁵ b Interview of [Redacted] Y [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15,2003.
⁵³⁰ SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 428-429.
⁵³¹ SSCI Study, Executive Summary, December 3, 2014, pp. 428-429.