X. Appendix 3: Example of Inaccurate CIA Testimony to the Committee- April 12,2007

X. Appendix 3: Example of Inaccurate CIA Testimony to the Committee- April 12,2007

Testimony of Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, April 12, 20072553

CIA [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] Testimony Sampling [Redacted] [Redacted]f [Redacted] Information in [Redacted] CIA [Redacted] Records [Redacted] The Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "Now Abu Zubaydah was rendered to CIA custody on March [Redacted] in June, after about four months 2002. The CIA representation that Abu Zubaydah stopped of interrogation, Abu Zubaydah cooperating with debriefers who were using traditional reached a point where he refused interrogation techniques is not supported by CIA records. to cooperate and he shut down. In early June 2002, Abu Zubaydah's interrogators He would not talk at all to the recommended that Abu Zubaydah spend several weeks in FBI interrogators and although he isolation from interrogation while the interrogation team was still talking to CIA members traveled [Redacted] "as a means of keeping [Abu interrogators no significant Zubaydah] off-balance and to allow the team needed time progress was being made in off for a break and to attend to personal matters [Redacted] learning anything of intelligence [Redacted] " as well as to discuss "the endgame" for Abu value. He was, to our eye, Zubaydah [Redacted] with officers from CIA Headquarters. employing classic resistance to As a result, Abu Zubaydah spent much of June 2002 and interrogation techniques and all of July 2002, 47 days in total, in isolation. When CIA employing them quite effectively. officers next interrogated Abu Zubaydah, they And it was clear to us that we immediately used the CIA's enhanced interrogation were unlikely to be able to techniques, including the waterboard. overcome those techniques without some significant Prior to the 47 day isolation period, Abu Zubaydah intervention." provided information on al-Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, and relationships, in addition to information

¶Transcript at DTS #2007-3158. The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "We disagree with the Study's conclusion that the Agency actively impeded Congressional oversight of the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program. ...As discussed in our response to Conclusion 9, we also disagree with the assessment that the information CIA provided on the effectiveness of the program was largely inaccurate. Finally, we have reviewed DCIA Hayden's testimony before SSCI on 12 April, 2007 and do not find, as the Study claims, that he misrepresented virtually all aspects of the program, although a few aspects were in error....The testimony contained some inaccuracies, and the Agency should have done better in preparing the Director, particularly concerning events that occurred prior to his tenure. However, there is no evidence that there was any intent on the part of the Agency or Director Hayden to misrepresent material facts." The CIA's June 2013 Response states that the CIA has "identified a number of broad lessons learned" and includes eight recommendations. Tlie CIA's only recommendation related to Congress was: "Recommendation 8: Improve recordkeeping for interactions with Congress. Direct the Director of the Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA) and the Chief Information Officer to develop a concrete plan to improve recordkeeping on CIA's interactions with Congress. OCA's records going forward should reflect each interaction with Congress and the content of that interaction. OCA should work with the oversight committees to develop better access to transcripts of CIA testimony and briefings. This plan should be completed within 90 days of the arrival of a new Director of OCA."

463

on its leadership structure, including personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics. Abu Zubaydah provided this type of information prior to, during, and after the utilization of the CIA's enhanced inteirogation techniques.2554

Abu Zubaydah's inability to provide information on the next attack in the United States and operatives in the United States was the basis for CIA representations that Abu Zubaydah was "uncooperative," and for the CIA's determination that Abu Zubaydah required the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques to become "compliant" and reveal the information the CIA believed he was withholding. At no point during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques did Abu Zubaydah provide the information sought.2555

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "This The CIA testimony that SWIGERT was deployed to really began in the spring of 2002 "overcome what seemed to be Abu Zubaydah's very with the capture of Abu strong resistance to interrogation" is not supported by Zubaydah. At that time we internal CIA records. Rather, CIA records indicate that deployed a psychologist who had CIA CTC officers anticipated Abu Zubaydah would resist been under contract to CIA [Dr. providing information and contracted with SWIGERT SWIGERT], to provide real-time prior to any meaningful assessment of Abu Zubaydah and recommendations to help us his level of cooperation. overcome what seemed, to be Abu Zubaydah's very strong • On April 1, 2002, at a meeting on the interrogation of resistance to interrogation... We AbuZubaydah, [Redacted] I C Legal [Redacted] also made arrangements for [Dr. [Redacted] recommended that SWIGERT—who was DUNBAR]. [Dr. DUNBAR] working under contract in the CIA's OTS—be brought was the [Redacted]ychologist for in to "provide real-time recommendations to overcome the Department of Defense's Abu Zubaydah's resistance to interrogation." (Abu SERE program, DOD's Survival, Zubaydah had been in CIA custody for [Redacted] That Escape, Recovery and Evasion evening, SWIGERT, and the CIA OTS officer who program, the program of training had recommended SWIGERT to [Redacted] , we put our troops, particularly prepared a cable with suggestions for the interrogation our airmen, through so that they of Abu Zubaydah. SWIGERT had monitored the U.S. can withstand a hostile Air Force's Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape environment." (SERE) training. SWIGERT, who had never conducted an actual interrogation, encouraged the CIA

¶See intelligence reporting charts in Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, as well as a CIA paper entitled, "Abu Zubaydah," dated March 2005. Similar information was included in, "Abu Zubaydah Bio," a CIA document "Prepared on 9 August 2006." 2555

See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III. 111111 11 ii 11111 [Redacted]

464

to focus on developing "learned helplessness" in CIA detainees.2556

• Following the suggestion of [Redacted] C Legal, CTC contracted with SWIGERT to assist in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah.
• As described in the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, almost immediately after Abu Zubaydah's transfer to CIA custody on March [Redacted] 2002, Abu Zubaydah's medical condition deteriorated and Abu Zubaydahwastransferred to the intensive care unit of a [Redacted] hospital in Country [Redacted] During this time, FBI personnel continued to collect significant intelligence from Abu Zubaydah. According to an FBI report, during the period when Abu Zubaydah was still "connected to the intubator" at the hospital and unable to speak, he "indicated that he was willing to answer questions of the interviewers via writing in Arabic." While in the intensive care unit of the hospital, Abu Zubaydah first discussed "Mukhtar" (KSM) and identified a photograph of KSM.
• When Abu Zubaydah was discharged from the [Redacted] [Redacted] hospital and returned to the CIA's DETENTION SITE GREEN on April 15, 2002, he was kept naked, sleep deprived, and in a cell with bright lights with white noise or loud music playing. The FBI personnel objected to the coercive aspects of Abu Zubaydah's interrogation at this time, as they believed they were making substantial progress building rapport with Abu Zubaydah and developing intelligence without these measures. (During their questioning of Abu Zubaydah, the FBI officers provided a towel for Abu Zubaydah to cover himself and continued to use rapport building techniques with the detainee.2557)

¶See Volume I, including [Redacted] 178955 (012236Z APR 02); April 1, 2002 email from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], re: Please coord on cable attached; and email from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], cc: [Redacted]

¶April 1, 2002, re: POC for [SWIGERT]- consultant who drafted Al-Qa'ida resistance to interrogation backgrounder (noting that CTC/LGL would contact SWIGERT). 2557

¶See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III.

465

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "We The representation that the "requirement to be in the CIA wanted [SWIGERT's and detention program is knowledge of [an] attack against the DUNBAR's] ideas about what United States or its interests or knowledge about the approaches might be useful to get location of Usama bin Ladin or Ayman al-Zawahiri" is information from people like Abu inconsistent with how the CIA's Detention and Zubaydah and other Interrogation Program operated from its inception.2558 As uncooperative al-Qa'ida detailed elsewhere, numerous individuals had been detainees that we judged were detained and subjected to the CIA's enhanced withholding time-sensitive, interrogation techniques, despite doubts and questions perishable intelligence. Keep in surrounding their knowledge of terrorist threats and the mind, as a backdrop for all of location of senior al-Qa'ida leadership. this, this wasn't interrogating a snuffy that's picked up on the battlefield. The requirement to be in the CIA detention program is knowledge of [an] attack against the United States or its interests or knowledge about the location of Usama bin Ladin or Ayman al-Zawahiri." DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "We The representation that Abu Zubaydah "would not talk" is began in 2002, in the spring of incongruent with CIA interrogation records. The CIA 2002. We had one very high representation that the CIA "knew [Abu Zubaydah] knew value detainee, Abu Zubaydah. a lot" reflected an inaccurate assessment of Abu Zubaydah We knew he knew a lot. He from 2002, prior to his capture, and did not represent the would not talk. We were going CIA's assessment of Abu Zubaydah as of the April 2007 nowhere with him. The decision testimony. was made, we've got to do something. We've got to have an • Prior to Abu Zubaydah's capture, the CIA had intervention here. What is it we intelligence stating that Abu Zubaydah was the "third can do?" or fourth" highest ranking al-Qa'ida leader. This

information was based on single-source reporting that was retracted in July 2002—prior to Abu Zubaydah being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. Other intelligence in CIA databases indicated that Abu Zubaydah was not a senior member of al-Qa'ida, but assisted al-Qa'ida members in acquiring false passports and other travel documents. Still other reporting indicated that, while Abu Zubaydah served as an administrator at terrorist training camps, he was not the central figure at these camps.

¶See Volume 1 for additional details.

466

• After Abu Zubaydah was subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in August 2002, the chief of Base at DETENTION SITE GREEN wrote: "I do not believe that AZ was as wired with al-Qa'ida as we believed him to be prior to his capture."^25592559 Email from: [REDACTED] (outgoing Chief of Base at DETENTION SITE GREEN): to: [REDACTED] subject: "Assessment to Date" of AZ; date: 10/06/2002, at 05:36:46 AM.
• In August 2006, the CIA published an assessment that concluded that "misconceptions" about Afghanistan training camps with which Abu Zubaydah was associated had resulted in reporting that "miscast Abu Zubaydah as a 'senior al-Qa'ida lieutenant.'" The assessment concluded that "al-Qa'ida rejected Abu Zubaydah's request in 1993 to join the group."^25602560 CIA Intelligence Assessment, August 16, 2006, "Countering Misconceptions About Training Camps in Afghanistan, 1990-2001."

CIA representations that interrogators "were going nowhere with [Abu Zubaydah]" prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques are also incongruent with CIA records.

• Prior the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Zubaydah provided information on al- Qa'ida activities, plans, capabilities, relationships, leadership structure, personalities, decision-making processes, training, and tactics. Abu Zubaydah provided this type of information prior to, during, and after the utilization of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
• A quantitative review of Abu Zubaydah's disseminated intelligence reporting indicates that more intelligence reports were disseminated from Abu Zubaydah's first two months of interrogation—prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—than were derived during the two-month period during and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^25612561 See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III, including monthly intelligence reporting charts. [Redacted]

467

¶CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques and the SERE School DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "After The CIA consistently represented that the CIA's enhanced lengthy discussion, [Dr. interrogation techniques were the same as the techniques SWIGERT] suggested that we used in the U.S. Department of Defense SERE school. might use the interrogation However, CIA interrogation records indicate there were approaches that had been, for significant differences in how the techniques were used years, safely used at the DOD against CIA detainees. For example, a letter from the survival school ~ in other words, assistant attorney general to the CIA general counsel the interrogation techniques that highlighted the statement in the Inspector General Special we were training our airmen to Review that the use of the waterboard in SERE training resist. Those techniques have was "so different from subsequent Agency usage as to been used for about 50 years, make it almost irrelevant."^25622562 Letter from Assistant Attorney General Goldsmitli to CIA General Counsel Scott Muller, May 27, 2004. For more information on the SERE program, see the Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, December 2008. See also statement of Senator Carl Levin relating to the inquiry, December 11, 2008: "In SERE school, our troops who are at risk of capture are exposed in a controlled environment with great protections and caution - to techniques adapted from abusive tactics used against American soldiers by enemies such as the Communist Chinese during the Korean War. SERE training techniques include stress positions, forced nudity, use of fear, sleep deprivation and, until recently, the Navy SERE school used the waterboard. These techniques were designed to give our students a taste of what they might be subjected to if captured by a ruthless, lawless enemy so that they would be better prepared to resist. The techniques were never intended to be used against detainees in U.S. custody."Show full note Prior to the use of the with no significant injuries." CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu VICE CHAIRMAN BOND: Zubaydah, the chief of Base at the detention site identified "And the techniques you are differences between how the SERE techniques were using are boiled down, is it true, applied in training, and how they would be applied to Abu from the SERE school?" Zubaydah: DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "AH of them are techniques that have "while the techniques described in Headquarters been used in the SERE school, meetings and below are administered to student that's right, Senator." volunteers in the U.S. in a harmless way, with no

measurable impact on the psyche of the volunteer, we do not believe we can assure the same here for a man forced through these processes and who will be made to believe this is the future course of the remainder of his life... personnel will make every effort possible to insure [sic] that subject is not permanently physically or mental harmed but we should not say at the outset of this process that there is no risk."^25632563 [REDACTED] 73208 (231043Z JUL 02) Department of Justice Approval

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "This As described in this summary, the August 1, 2002, list of recommended techniques Department of Justice OLC memorandum relied on then went to the Department of inaccurate information provided by the CIA concerning Justice for their opinion Abu Zubaydah's position in al-Qa'ida and the regarding whether or not the interrogation team's assessment of whether Abu Zubaydah techniques were lawful. DOJ was withholding information about planned terrorist returned a legal opinion that the attacks. 13 techniques were lawful, didn't constitute torture, and hence The OLC memorandum, which stated that it was based on could be employed for CIA CIA-provided facts and would not apply if facts were to interrogations."^25642564 y i l e August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum addressed 10 interrogation techniques. The May 10, 2005, OLC memorandum addressed 13 techniques. change, was also specific to Abu Zubaydah. The CIA nonetheless used the OLC memorandum as the legal basis for applying its enhanced interrogation techniques against other CIA detainees.^25652565 " Q u r at ivice is based upon the following facts, which you have provided to us. We also understand that you do not have any facts in your possession contrary to the facts outlined here, and this opinion is limited to these facts. If these facts were to change, this advice would not necessarily apply." (See Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 1).) CIA records indicate that it was not until July 29, 2003, that the Attorney General stated that the legal principles of the August 1, 2002, memorandum could be applied to other CIA detainees. (See June 18, 2004, letter from Assistant Attorney General JacJ^^Joldsmith III to Director Tenet (DTS #2004-2710).) In a subsequent interview with the OIG, however, [Redacted] Legal, [Redacted] stated that "every detainee interrogated is different in that they are outside the opinion because the opinion was written for Zubaydah." The context for [Redacted] s statement was the legality of the waterboarding of KSM. See Interview of [Redacted] by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 20, 2003.Show full note Resistance Training

468

¶VICE CHAIRMAN BOND: A review of CIA records on this topic identified no "How far down the line [does al- records to indicate that al-Qa'ida had conducted "broadly- Qa'ida] train [its] operatives for based" interrogation resistance training. The CIA interrogation resistance?" repeatedly represented that Abu Zubaydah "wrote al DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "I'm Qaeda's manual on resistance techniques."^25672567 Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 1). Mil I I III I [Redacted] B ^ ^ ^ B N This getting a nod from the representation is also not supported by CIA records. experts,^25662566 Other CIA attendees at the hearing included John Rizzo, [Redacted] and [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] former [Redacted] T C Legal, attended for the ODNI. Senator, that it's When asked about interrogation resistance training, Abu rather broadly-based." Zubaydah stated: VICE CHAIRMAN BOND: "So even if you capturcd the al- "... both Khaldan camp and Faruq [terrorist Qa'ida facilitator, probably the training] camp at least periodically included army field manual stuff are instruction in how to manage captivity. He things that he's already been explained that in one instance, Khaldan had an trained on and he knows that he Egyptian who had collected and studied doesn't have to talk." information from a variety of sources DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "We (including manuals and people who had been would expect that, yes, Senator." in 'different armies'). This Egyptian 'talked

to the brothers about being strong' and 'not talking.' Abu Zubaydah's response to this

469

was to take him aside—out of the view of the brothers—and explain to him that it was more important to have a 'super plan-not expect a superman.'"^25682568 110496 [Redacted] (162014Z FEB 03). On July 25, 2002, a CIA Headquarters cable stated that Abu Zubaydah was the "author of a seminal al-Qa'ida manual on resistance to interrogation techniques." (See DIRECTOR [Redacted] (251609Z JUL 02)). As a result of an ACLU lawsuit, in April 2010, the CIA released a document stating that Abu Zubaydah was the "author of a seminal al-Qa'ida manual on resistance to interrogation techniques." (See ACLU release entitled, "CIA Interrogation of AZ Released 04-15-10.") No CIA records could be identified to support this CIA assessment.Show full note

Abu Zubaydah explained that he informed trainees at the training camp that '"no brother' should be expected to hold out for an extended time," and that captured individuals will provide information in detention. For that reason, the captured individuals, he explained, should "expect that the organization will make adjustments to protect people and plans when someone with knowledge is captured."^25692569 [Redacted] 10496 (162014Z FEB 03) CIA Interrogators, U.S. Military Interrogators, and the Army Field Manual

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "All This CIA testimony is incongruent with internal CIA those involved in the questioning records and the operational history of the program. of detainees have been carefully chosen and carefully • On November [Redacted] 2002, after the completionofthe screened.2510 The average age of first formal interrogation training class, [Redacted] our officers interrogating C T C L e [Redacted] asked CTC attorney detainees is 43. Once they are [Redacted] "|m]ake it known that from now selected, they must complete on, CTC/LGL must vet all personnel who are enrolled more than 250 hours of in, observing or teaching - or otherwise associated specialized training for this with - the class."^25722572 Email from: [Redacted] [Redacted] / L G L ; to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted]ct: EYES ONLY; date: November [Redacted] 2002, at 03:13:01 PM. As described above, Gul Rahman likely froze to death at DETENTION SITE COBALT sometime in the morning of N o v e m b e r [Redacted] 2002. [Redacted] email, however, appears to have been drafted before the guards had found Gul Rahman's body and before that death was reported to CIA Headquarters. See [REDACTED] 30211 [Redacted] describing the guards observing Gul Rahman alive in the morning of November [Redacted] 2002. Gul Rahman's death appeared in cable traffic at least [Redacted] a f [Redacted] t e r email. No records could be identified to provide the impetus for [Redacted] email. 11 ii 11111 [Redacted]Show full note The chief of CTC, Jose program before they are allowed Rodriguez, objected to this approach, stating: "I do to come face-to-face with a not think that CTC/LGL should or would want to get terrorist And we require into thc business of vetting participants, observers, additional field work under thc instructors or others that are involved in this program. direct supervision of an It is simply not your job j Your job is to tell all what experienced officer before a new arc thc acceptable legal standards for conducting interrogator can dircct an interrogations per thc authorities obtained from Justicc interrogation." and agreed upon by thc White House." 2 " 3 Contrary to

470

¶CIA Director Haydcn's comments and Statement for DIRECTOR HAYDEN: 'The thc Record that "[a|ll those involved in thc questioning Army field manual was also of detainees are carefully chosen and screened for written to guide tlic conduct of a demonstrated professional judgment and maturity," mucli larger, much younger force CIA records suggest that thc vetting sought by that trains primarily to detain [Redacted] did not take place. The Committee large numbers of enemy reviewed CIA records related to several CIA officers prisoners of war. That's not what and contractors involved in thc CIA's Detention and ihc CIA program is." Interrogation Program, most of whom conducted interrogations. Thc Committee identified a number of DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "JThe personnel whose backgrounds includc notable Army Field Manual has| got to derogatory information calling into question their be done by hundreds and eligibility for employment, their access to classified hundreds of teenagers in information, and their participation in CIA battlefield tactical situations." interrogation activities. In nearly all cases, thc SENATOR JOHN WARNER: derogatory information was known to thc CIA prior to "Without ihc benefit of a tenth of the assignment of thc CIA officers to thc Detention thc training of your and Interrogation Program. This group of officers professionals." included individuals who, among other issues, had DIRECTOR HAYDEN: engaged in inappropriate detainee interrogations, had "Exactly."2571 workplace anger management issues, and had reportedly admitted to sexual assault.2574

Director Haydcn's testimony on thc required hours of training for CIA interrogators is inconsistent with thc early operational history of the program. Records indicate that CIA officers and contractors who conducted CIA interrogations in 2002 did not undergo any interrogation training. Thc first interrogator training course, held in November 2002. required approximately 65 hours of classroom and operational

¶In addition, [Redacted] Former Chief, [Redacted] CTC, testified: "First off, we have thirteen interrogators and, of that thirteen, eleven arc contract employees of ours, and they've all been through the screening process, they've all been through our vetting process, and they are certainly more than qualified. They are probably some of the most mature and professional people V"ii will have in this business." J

¶™ Email from; Jose Rodriguez:. t t [Redacted] [Redacted]TC/LGL; cc: [REDACTED|, [REDACTED], [REDACTED!, I REDACTED], [Redacted] j e c t : EYES ONLY; date: November [Redacted] 2002, at 04:27 PM. 1,74

¶For additional detailed information, see Volume 111.

471

instruction.^25752575 December 4, 2002 Training Report, High Value Target Intenogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training Seminar 12-18 Nov 02, (pilot running). The initial training was designed and conducted by [Redacted] who had been sanctioned for using abusive interrogation techniques in the 1980s, and [Redacted] who had never been trained in, or conducted interrogations. In April 2003, [Redacted] [CIA OFFICER 1] was certified as an interrogator after only a week of classroom training.^25762576 DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] APR 03) In 2003, interrogator certification required only two weeks of classroom training (a maximum of 80 hours) and 20 additional hours of operational training and/or actual interrogations.^25772577 Interrogator Selection, Training, Qualification, and Certification Process; approximately January 29-February 4, 2003. Other Members of the Interrogation Team

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "All This testimony is incongruent with CIA records, for interrogation sessions in which example: one of these lawful procedures is authorized for use has to be • During the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, CIA observed by nonparticipants to personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN objected to ensure the procedures are applied the continued use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation appropriately and safely. Any techniques against Abu Zubaydah, stating that it was observer can call 'knock it off' at "highly unlikely" Abu Zubaydah possessed the threat any time. They are authorized to information CIA Headquarters was seeking.^25782578 See [Redacted] 10604 (091624Z AUG 02) and [Redacted] 10607 (100335Z AUG 02). In an email, the former SERE psychologists on contract with the CIA, who largely devised the CIA enhanced interrogation techniques, wrote that Abu Zubaydah stated he was "ready to talk" the first day after they used the CIA's techniques. Speaking specifically of the waterboard technique, they wrote, "As for our buddy; he capitulated the first time. We chose to expose him over and over until we had a high degree of confidence he wouldn't hold back. He said he was ready to talk during die first exposure." See email from: [REDACTED]; subject: "Re: [SW1GERT and DUNBAR]"; date: August 21,2002, at 10:21 PM.Show full note When terminate an interrogation the interrogation team made this assessment, they immediately should they believe stated that the pressures being applied to Abu anything unauthorized is Zubaydah approached "the legal limit."^25792579 [Redacted] 1 0 6 0 7 (100335Z AUG 02) CIA occurring." Headquarters directed the interrogation team to SENATOR SNOWE: "So you continue to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation also mentioned that there are techniques and instructed the team to refrain from non-participants who are using "speculative language as to the legality of given observing the interrogation activities" in CIA cables.^25802580 Email from: Jose Rodriguez; to: [REDACTED]; subject: "[DETENTION SITE GREEN]," with attachment of an earlier email from: [REDACTED1; to: [REDACTED]; date: August 12, 2002. See also the section on Abu Zubaydah's intenogation in this summary and the Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III. mi 11 iii i [Redacted] i mi inn i process. Who are these nonparticipants?"

472

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "They During the KSM interrogation sessions, the CIA chief could be other interrogators, of Base directed that the medical officer at the medical personnel, chief of base, detention site not directly contact CIA Headquarters debriefers, analysts." via the CIA's classified internal email system, to avoid SENATOR SNOWE: "Do they establishing "grounds for further legal action." ever raise concerns during this Instead, the chief of Base stated that any information process, during these on KSM's interrogations would be first reviewed by interrogations?" the chief of Base before being released to CIA DIRECTOR HAYDEN: Headquarters.2381 Prior to KSM's third waterboard "Everybody watching has - every session of March 13, 2003, the on-site medical officer individual has an absolute right raised concerns that the session would exceed the to stop the procedure just by limits of draft OMS guidelines for the waterboard.^25822582 from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] cc: [Redacted] [Redacted] Jose Rodriguez; subject: re: Eyes Only - Legal and Political Quand[]ry; date: March 13, 2003, at 11:28:06 AM. saying 'stop.'" The waterboard session was conducted after an SENATOR SNOWE: "Did it approval email from a CTC attorney at CIA happen? It's never happened?" Headquarters.^25832583 Email from: [Redacted] to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]; subject: EYES ONLY - Use of Water Board; date: March 13, 2003, at 08:28 AM. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ The medical officer would later DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "No, write that "ft]hings are slowly evolving form [sic] we're not aware. I'm sorry. [medical officers] being viewed as the institutional John [Rizzo] and [Redacted] conscience and the limiting factor to the ones who are H H [Redacted] point out it's just not dedicated to maximizing the benefit in a safe manner the ability to stop it; it is an and keeping everyone's butt out of trouble."^25842584 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] cc: [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: Re: State cable; date: March 13, 2003, at 1:43:17 PM. The previous day, the medical officer had written that "I am going the extra mile to cc: try to handle this in a non confrontational manner." See email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP 3/10; date: March 12, 2003, at 5:17:07 AM. obligation to stop it if they believe something is happening As was the case with several other CIA detainees, that is unauthorized." 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was repeatedly subjected to

the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at the direction of CIA Headquarters, despite opposition from CIA interrogators.^25852585 See, for example., the report of investigation of the Inspector General: "By mid-2002, Headquarters and [DETENTION SITE BLUE] were at odds regarding [DETENTION SITE BLUE]'s assessment on Al-Nashiri and how to proceed with his interrogation or debriefing. On several occasions throughout December 2002, [DETENTION SITE BLUE] reported via cables and secure telephone calls that Al-Nashiri was not actively resisting and was responding to questions directly. Headquarters disagreed with [DETENTION SITE BLUE]'s assessment because Headquarters analysts thought Al-Nashiri was withholding imminent threat information." See. Report of Investigation, Office of the Inspector General, Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE] (2003-7123-IG), 29 October 2003, p. 18 (DTS #2003-4897). [Redacted]Show full note

The CIA Inspector General Special Review states that CIA "psychologists objected to the use of on-site

473

psychologists as interrogators and raised conflict of interest and ethical concerns." According to the Special Review, this was "based on a concern that the on-site psychologists who were administering the [CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques] participated in the evaluations, assessing the effectiveness and impact of the [CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques] on the detainees."^25862586 Special Review, Office of the Inspector General, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), 7 May 2004, p. 35 (DTS #2004-2710). In January 2003, CIA Headquarters required that at least one other psychologist be present who was not physically participating in the administration of the CTA's enhanced interrogation techniques. According to [Redacted] [Redacted] however, the problem still existed because "psychologist/interrogators continue to perform both functions."^25872587 Special Review, Office of the Inspector General, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), 7 May 2004, p. 40 (DTS #2004-2710).

¶SENATOR SNOWE: "Did any This statement is incongruent with CIA records. For CIA personnel express example, from August 4, 2002, through August 23, 2002, reservations about being engaged the CIA subjected Abu Zubaydah to its enhanced in the interrogation or these interrogation techniques on a near 24-hour-per-day basis. techniques that were used?" The non-stop use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "I'm techniques was disturbing to CIA personnel at not aware of any. These guys are DETENTION SITE GREEN. These CIA personnel more experienced. No." objected to the continued use of the CIA's enhanced

interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, but were instructed by CIA Headquarters to continue using the techniques. The interrogation using the CIA's enhanced techniques continued more than two weeks after CIA personnel on site questioned the legality "of escalating or even maintaining the pressure" on Abu Zubaydah. CIA records include the following reactions of CIA personnel expressing "reservations about being engaged in the interrogations" and the use of the techniques:

• August 5, 2002: "want to caution [medical officer] that this is almost certainly not a place he's ever been before in his medical career... It is visually and psychologically very uncomfortable."^25882588 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Monday; date: August 5, 2002, at 05:35AM.

474

• August 8, 2002: "Today's first session... had a profound effect on all staff members present... it seems the collective opinion that we should not go much further... everyone seems strong for now but if the group has to continue... we cannot guarantee how much longer."^25892589 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [Redacted], [REDACTED]; subject: Update; date: August 8, 2002, at 06:50 AM.
• August 8, 2002: "Several on the team profoundly affected... some to the point of tears and choking
• August 9, 2002: "two, perhaps three [personnel] likely to elect transfer" away from the detention site if the decision is made to continue with the enhanced interrogation techniques.^25912591 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: Re: 9 August Update; date: August 9, 2002, at 10:44 PM. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
• August 11, 2002: Viewing the pressures on Abu Zubaydah on video "has produced strong feelings of futility (and legality) of escalating or even maintaining the pressure." With respect to viewing the interrogation tapes, "prepare for something not seen previously."^25922592 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] [REDACTED]; subject: Greetings; date: August 11, 2002, at 09:45AM.

The chief of CTC, Jose Rodriguez—via email—instructed the CIA interrogation team to not use "speculative language as to the legality of given activities" in CIA cable traffic.^25932593 Email from: Jose Rodriguez; to: [REDACTED]; subject: [DETENTION SITE GREEN]; date: August 12, 2002. Shortly thereafter, circa December 2002, the CIA general counsel had a "real concern" about the lack of details in cables of what was taking place at CIA detention sites, noting that "cable traffic reporting was becoming thinner," and that "the agency cannot monitor the situation if it is not documented in cable traffic."^25942594 Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, Scott W. Muller, September 5, 2003. The CIA's chief of interrogations—who provided training to CIA interrogators—expressed his view that there was

475

"excess information" in the Abu Zubaydah interrogation cables.^25952595 Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Inteirogations for Counterterrorism Puiposes, [Redacted] April 7, 2003.

¶Reporting Abuses DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "Any This testimony is not supported by CIA records, for deviations from approved example: procedures and practices that are seen are to be immediately • Multiple individuals involved in the interrogation of reported and immediate CIA detainee 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri failed to report corrective action taken, including inappropriate activity. With regard to the unauthorized referring to the CIA Office of use of a handgun and power drill to threaten al- Inspector General and to the Nashiri, one CIA interrogator stated he did not report Department of Justice, as the incidents because he believed they fell below the appropriate." reporting threshold for the CIA's enhanced

interrogation techniques, while noting he did not receive guidance on reporting requirements. The chief of Base stated he did not report the incidents because he assumed the interrogator had CIA Headquarters' approval and because two senior CIA officials had instructed him to scale back on reporting from the detention site to CIA Headquarters. The inappropriate activity was discovered during a chance exchange between recently arrived CIA Headquarters officials and security officers.^25962596 Report of Investigation, Office of the Inspector General, Unauthorized Intenogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE] (2003-7123-IG), 29 October 2003, p. 24 (DTS #2003-4897).

• There were significant quantitative and qualitative differences between the waterboarding of KSM, as applied, and the description of the technique provided to the Department of Justice. Neither CIA interrogators nor CIA attorneys reported these deviations to the inspector general or the Department of Justice at the time.
• Additionally, CIA records indicate that at least 17 detainees were subjected to CIA enhanced interrogation techniques for which they were not approved.^25972597 See Volume III for details. Detainee Statistics

476

¶[Redacted]

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "What This testimony is inaccurate. At the time of this you have there is a matrix. On testimony, there had been least 118 CIA detainees. CIA the lefthand side of the matrix are records indicate at least 38 of the detainees had been the names of the 30 individuals in subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation the CIA program who have had techniques.^25982598 See Volume III for details. As discussed in this summary and in greater detail in the full Committee Study, on January 5, 2009, a CIA officer informed Director Hayden that additional CIA detainees beyond the 98 CIA detainees previously briefed to Congress had been identified. A CIA chart indicated there were "13 New Finds," additional individuals who had been detained by the CIA, and that the new true number of CIA detainees was now at least 112. After the briefing with Director Hayden, the CIA officer sent a record of this interaction via email only to himself, which stated: "I briefed the additional CIA detainees that could be included in RDI numbers. DCIA instructed me to keep the detainee number at 98 — pick whatever date i needed to make that happen but the number is 98." (See email from: [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with DCIA; date: January 5, 2009, at 10:50 PM.) Shortly thereafter, the final draft of prepared remarks by Director Hayden to President-elect Obama's national security team state: "There have been 98 detainees in the history of the CIA program."Show full note any EITs used against them. Mr. Chairman and Vice Chairman and Members, you've heard me say this before. In the history of the program, we've had 97 detainees. Thirty of the detainees have had EITs used against them."

¶Legal Basis for CIA Detention and Interrogation

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "The This testimony is incongruent with CIA detention and

¶Army field manual is designed interrogation records. For example, numerous individuals for the folks at Guantanamo to had been detained and subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogate a rifleman that was in interrogation techniques, despite doubts and questions the employ of Gulbuddin surrounding their knowledge of terrorist threats and the

¶Hekmatyar. That guy never gets location of senior al-Qa'ida leadership. They include into our program. The ticket into Asadullah,^25992599 Interrogators had asked CIA Headquarters for the assessments supporting the decision to subject Asadullah to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, noting that "it would be of enormous help to the interrogator to know whaUf^oncret^acUindwhat is good analysis, " (See 33963 [Redacted] [Redacted] 3 [Redacted] 34098 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] " response, ALEC Station acknowledged that "[t]o be sure, our case that Asadullah should have a good sense of bin Ladin's location is circumstantial." (See ALEC [Redacted] [Redacted] The following day, interrogators commented that "it may be that he simply does not know the [locational information on AQ leaders]." See [Redacted] 1 0 [Redacted] _ _ _ _Show full note Mustafa al-Hawsawi 2600 Abu Hudhaifa,^26012601 Although CIA records include no requests or approval cables for the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, Abu Hudhaifa was subjected to ice water baths and 66 hours of standing sleep deprivation. He was released because die CIA discovered he was likely not the person he was believed to be. See WASHINGTON DC [Redacted] this program is knowledge of Arsala Khan,^26022602 CIA Headquarters initially resisted approving Arsal^Clmn^apture b e c a u s ^ ^ U a c l ^ n n f o r n i a t i o n confirming that he was a "continuing threat." [Redacted] 169986 [Redacted] email from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] [Redacted] and Approval to Capture Ai iliilliiii ilili [Redacted] I I'i |iili iliinlil, that Arsala Khan was the individual sought by the CIA, interrogators subjected him to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "to make a better assessment regarding [his] willingness to start talking, or assess if our subject is, in fact the man we are looking for." see [Redacted] 1 3 7 3 [Redacted]Show full note ABU TALHA AL-MAGREBI 2603 and threat to the homeland or the ABU BAHAR AL-TURKI,^26042604 The true names of these detainees have been replaced with the capitalized pseudonyms AL-MAGREBI and AL- TURKI. At the time the two detainees were rendered to CIA custody, the CIA was aware that they were tiien working for a foreign partner government. They were subjected to sleep deprivation and dietary manipulation until the CIA confirmed that the detainees had been trying to contact the CIA for weeks to inform the CIA of what they believed were pending al-Qa'ida terrorist attacks. After the CIA had determined that AL-MAGREBI and AL- TURKI should not be in CIA custody, the two detainees were held for [Redacted] additional months before they were released.Show full note Janat Gul,^26052605 Janat Gill's CIA interrogators wrote: "Team does not believe [Gul] is withholding imminent threat information, however team will continue to press [Gul] for that during each session." (See [Redacted] 1574 [Redacted] 04).) The interrogation of Janat Gul is described in this summary and detailed in Volume 111. Ahmed interests of the United States or Ghailani,^26062606 The CIA's assessment of Ghailani's knowledge of terrorist threats was speculative. As one CIA official noted, "[a]lthough Ghailani's role in operational planning is unclear, his respected role in al-Qa'ida and presence in Shkai as recently as October 2003 may have provided him some knowledge about ongoing attack planning against the United States homeland, and the operatives involved." See email [Redacted] CTC/UB[Redacted] (formerly A L E [Redacted] ; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: derog information for ODDO on Talha, Ghailani, Hamza Rabi'a and Abu Faraj; date: August 10, 2004.Show full note Sharif al-Masri,^26072607 As noted above, the credibility of the source implicating Sharif al-Masri, Janat Gul, and Ghailani's connection to a pre-election plot was questioned by CIA officials prior to the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against the detainees. The source was later determined to have fabricated die information. and Sayyid Ibrahim^26082608 p j v e (j a y S a f t e r interrogators began using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Sayyid Ibrahim, interrogators cabled CIA Headquarters requesting information that would "definitively link [Ibrahim] to nefarious activity or knowledge by [Ibrahim] of known nefarious activities of al-Qa'ida members, if this is possible." (See [Redacted] 1324 [Redacted] E B 04).) Without receiving a response, they continued using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Ibrahim. CIA Headquarters, which rejected an assessment from two CIA debriefers that Ibrahim was, "at best... a low-level facilitator," would later indicate that it was "uncertain" he would meet the Buirements for U.S. military or foreign government detention. (See HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] ; HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted] Other detainees, Abd al-Karim and Abu Hazim, were subjected to die CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques "in an attempt to more rapidly assess [their] knowledge of pending attacks, operational planning, and whereabouts of UBL." See [Redacted] 36843 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 36908 [Redacted] 11 ii 11111 [Redacted] I II I IIShow full note knowledge of location of 1 or 2."

477

The CIA represented to the OLC that the CIA would only use its enhanced interrogation techniques against detainees who had knowledge of imminent threats or direct involvement in planning and preparing of terrorist actions. Not until July 20, 2007, more than three months after this testimony, did the OLC approve the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against detainees based

478

on their suspected knowledge of the locations of UBL or Ayman al-Zawahiri. 2609 Prior to July 20, 2007, in the case of at least six CIA detainees, the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was nonetheless predicated on the assessment that the detainees possessed "locational information" on senior HVTs, to include UBL or Ayman al-Zawahiri. 2610 Intelligence Reporting from Overall Detainee Population

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "Since CIA representations suggesting that every CIA detainee we began this in the summer of provided intelligence reporting are not supported by CIA 2002, the 97 detainees have records. A detailed reporting chart is provided in Volume helped us by their testimony II. CIA reporting records indicate that 34 percent of all create 8,000 intelligence reports." CIA detainees produced no intelligence reports, and nearly SENATOR SNOWE: "Of the 70 percent produced fewer than 15 intelligence reports. 8,000 intelligence reports that Of the 39 detainees who were, according to CIA records, were provided, as you said, by 30 subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, of the detainees - " nearly 20 percent produced no intelligence reports, while DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "By all 40 percent produced fewer than 15 intelligence reports. 97, ma'am."^26112611 Similar representations had been made by Director Hayden on September 6, 2006. Senator Bayh: "I was impressed by your statement about how effective the [CIA's enhanced interrogation] techniques have been in eliciting important information to the country, at one point up to 50 percent of our information about al-Qa'ida. I think you said 9000 different intelligence r[Redacted]00, sir." Senator Bayh: "And yet Mil I I III I I III! " I l l I this has come from, I guess, only thirty individuals." Director Hayden: "No, sir, 96, all 96" (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Briefing by the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, on the Central Intelligence Agency Detention, Interrogation and Rendition Program, September 6, 2006 (DTS #2007-1336)).Show full note

¶2609 y j l e OLC defined a High-Value Detainee as "a detainee who, until time of capture, we have reason to believe: (J) is a senior member of al-Qai'da or an al-Qai'da associated terrorist group (Jemaah Islamiyyah, Eqyptian [sic] Islamic Jihad, al-Zarqawi Group, etc.); (2) has knowledge of imminent terrorist threats against the USA, its military forces, its citizens and organizations, or its allies; or that has/had direct involvement in planning and preparing terrorist actions against the USA or its allies, or assisting the al-Qai'da leadership in planning and preparing such terrorist actions; and (3) if released, constitutes a clear and continuing threat to the USA or its allies" (Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 10, 2005, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 9); Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, May 30, 2005, Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of High Value Al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 11)). Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, July 20, 2007, Re: Application of the War Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (DTS #2009-1810, Tab 14) ("The CIA informs us that it currently views possession of information regarding the location of Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri as warranting application of enhanced techniques, if other conditions are met.") 26,0

¶RidhaAhmai^ifNaiiy [Redacted] 1 [Redacted] C [Redacted] [Redacted] Ghairat Bahir [Redacted] 31118 [Redacted] m a r ' Abd al-Rahman aka Asadullah (CIA [Redacted]

¶[Redacted] [Redacted] 4 0 [Redacted] [Redacted] H [Redacted] T O R [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]

¶[Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]

¶B id Bin Muhammad Bin Sulayman Khayil aka Arsala Khan [Redacted] [Redacted]

¶
• Ibrahim — 1294

¶13701 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]

479

¶CIA Detainee Reporting and Captures of Terrorists DIRECTOR HAYDEN: The CIA consistently represented that the interrogation of "Detainee reporting has played a CIA detainees using the CIA's enhanced interrogation role in nearly every capture of techniques resulted in critical and otherwise unavailable key al-Qa'ida members and intelligence that led to the capture of specific terrorists, to associates since 2002." include, among others: KSM, Majid Khan, Ramzi bin al-

Shibh, Iyman Faris, Saleh al-Marri, Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad bin Attash, Sajid Badat, and Dhiren Barot.^26122612 See, for example, [Redacted] Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003; Memorandum for: Inspector General; from: James Pavitt, Deputy Director for Operations; subject: re (S) Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program" (2003-7123-IG); date: February 27, 2004; attachment: February 24, 2004, Memorandum re Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities; CIA briefing slides entitled, "CIA Interrogation Program." dated July 29, 2003, presented to senior White House officials; Hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 14, 2007 (DTS #2007-1337). For additional details, see Volume II.Show full note These representations were inaccurate.

¶The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program Led to the Capture of Hambali and the

¶Karachi "Cell" DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "March The chronology provided in this testimony, which is 2003, KSM gives us information consistent with other CIA representations, is inaccurate. about an al-Qa'ida operative, Prior to KSM's capture, in early January 2003, coverage Majid Khan... KSM was aware of a known al-Qa'ida email account uncovered that Majid had been recently communications between the account and a former captured. KSM, possibly Baltimore, Maryland, resident, Majid Khan. The believing that Khan was talking, communications indicated that Majid Khan traveled to admitted to having tasked Majid Bangkok for terrorist support activities and was in contact with delivering $50,000 to some there with a "Zubair."^26132613 ALEC [Redacted] (170117Z JAN 03) By this time, the CIA had of Hambali's operatives in significant intelligence indicating that a "Zubair" played a December 2002... So now we go central supporting role in Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), was to [Majid] Khan and we tell him, affiliated with al-Qa'ida figures like KSM, had expertise hey, your uncle just told us about in [Redacted] in Southeast Asia, and was the money. He acknowledged suspected of playing a role in Hambali's October 12, that he delivered the money to an 2002, Bali bombings.^26142614 See intelligence chronology in Volume II. On March 6, 2003, the day after operative named Zubair. He Majid Khan was captured (the capture was unrelated to provided Zubair's physical CIA detainee reporting), and while being questioned by description and phone number. foreign government interrogators using rapport-building Based on that [Redacted] captured techniques, Majid Khan described how he traveled to Zubair in June." Bangkok and provided $50,000 USD to Zubair at the behest of al-Qa'ida.^26152615 A cable describing the foreign government interrogation of Majid Khan stated, "|a foreign government officer] talked quietly to [Majid Khan] alone for about ten minutes before the interview began and was able to establish an llll I I III I [Redacted] I llll Ill I Majid Khan's physical description of Zubair matched previous intelligence reporting already collected on Zubair.^26162616 See intelligence chronology in Volume II.

480

When confronted with this information, KSM confirmed the reporting, but denied knowing Zubair.^26172617 [Redacted] 13678 (070724Z MAR 03), disseminated as [Redacted] [Redacted] 10865 (171648Z MAR 03), disseminated as [Redacted] [Redacted] 10866 (171832Z MAR 03). Prior to Majid Khan's reporting in foreign government custody, the CIA was aware from sources outside of the CIA detainee program that KSM had used couriers to transfer money to Hambali. Even while being questioned about such transfers, however, KSM made no mention of Majid Khan. See DIRECTOR [Redacted] j j ^ Z S E P 02); ALEC [Redacted] (072345Z MAR 03); [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]Show full note

By May 2003, the CIA learned that a source the CIA had been developing, [Redacted] [Redacted] received a call from a phone number associated with Zubair. When the source was contacted by the CIA, he described a Malaysian man [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]

[Redacted] t e r , the source alerted the CIA that Zubair would [Redacted] Acting on this information, Thai a u t h o r i t i [Redacted] captured Zubair on June 8, 2003.

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "Zubair This testimony is incongruent with CIA records. Prior to enters the program. During entering the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, debriefing, Zubair reveals he while still in foreign government custody, Zubair was worked directly for Hambali. He questioned about his efforts to obtain fraudulen[Redacted] provides information on [Redacted] documents, as well as his phone contact with [Redacted]

Hambali and a [Redacted] [Business Q] [Redacted] .2hl'' [Redacted] Zubair admitted to seeking illeg[Redacted]documents on [Redacted] behalf of Hambali, as well as using [Redacted] [Business Q] [Redacted] detention records do not state what immediate investigative steps the CIA or Thai authorities took with regard to [Redacted] [Business Q], although signals intelligence had indicated that Zubair had been in frequent contact with the company. 2621

After being rendered to CIA custody, Zubair was immediately subjected to the CIA's enhanced

¶excellent level of rapport." (See [Redacted] 13678 (070724Z MAR 03).) Records indicate that this information was also disseminated in FBI channels. See ALEC [Redacted] [Redacted] interrogation techniques.^26222622 [Redacted] [Redacted] After days of being questioned about other matters, Zubair was asked about his efforts to obtain [Redacted] c u m e n t s for Hambali, at which point he again acknowledged [Redacted] [Redacted] u s i n e s s Q] [Redacted] [Redacted] h e n T h a i approached "a c o n t a c T a [Redacted] [Business Q], they were provided [Redacted] [Redacted]

481

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: In an operation that included surveillance of [Redacted] "Working with [an entity of a [Business Q], Hambali associate Amer was arrested on foreign government], we used August 11, 2003.^26252625 [Redacted] 87409 876171 Amer was immediately cooperative that information to capture and assisted in the arrest of Lillie hours later at another Hambali lieutenant, a approximately 6:00 PM.^26262626 87414 [Redacted] [Redacted] 87617 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] During his arrest, Lillie was fellow named Lillie — who is also found to have a key fob in his possession imprinted with on your list [of CIA detainees] - an address of an apartment building in Ayutthaya, who provided the location of Thailand. In response to questioning, "within minutes of Hambali. And that location capture," Lillie admitted that the address on the key fob information led us to his was the address where Hambali was located. Less than capture." four hours later, Hambali was captured at the address found on the key fob.^26272627 Lillie provide this information immediately and prior to entering CIA custody. See [Redacted] \ [Redacted] 187617 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] H H H 874141 [Redacted] [Redacted] "Hambali Capture." [Redacted] M M

According to the chief of the CTC's Southeast Asia Branch:

"[The CIA] stumbled onto Hambali. We stumbled onto the [source]... picking up the phone and calling his case officer to say there's [Redacted] ...we really stumbled over it. It wasn't police work, it

482

wasn't good targeting, it was we stumbled over it and it yielded up Hambali."^26282628 CIA Oral History Program Documenting Hambali capture, interview of [REDACTED|, interviewed by [REDACTED], on November 28, 2005. KSM, Hambali, am the Karachi "Cell" (the al-Ghuraba Group)

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: CIA Director Hayden's reference to "the guys trying to

¶"Bringing this story full circle, implement KSM's plot to fly hijacked planes into the

¶'Abdul al-Hadi then identifies a tallest buildings on the west coast of the United States," is cell of JI operatives whom a reference to the al-Ghuraba student group and KSM's

¶Hambali had sent to Karachi for "Second Wave" plotting detailed in this summary and in another al-Qa'ida operation. We greater detail in Volume II.^26292629 [REDACTED] 45915 (141431Z SEP 03). See also February 27, 2004, Memorandum for CIA Inspector General from James L. Pavitt, CIA Deputy Director for Operations, entitled "Comments to Draft IG Special Review, "Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program," which contains a February 24, 2004, attachment entitled, "Successes of CIA's Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities"; CIA Intelligence Product entitled, "Jemaah Islamiya: Counterterrorism Scrutiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in Pakistan," dated April 18, 2008; KSM and Hambali reporting from October 2003 in Volumes II and III.Show full note take this information from Abdul

¶Hadi to his brother, Hambali. A review of CIA records found that contrary to CIA

¶Hambali then admits that he was representations, Hambali's brother, 'Abdul al-Hadi, aka grooming members of the cell for Gunawan, who was in foreign government custody, did a U.S. operation, at the guidance not identify a "cell of JI operatives whom Hambali had of KSM — remember, this is sent to Karachi for another al-Qa'ida operation." He where this started — and we're identified "a group of Malaysian and Indonesian students almost certain these were the in Karachi" who were witting of his affiliation with guys trying to implement KSM's Jemaah Islamiyah.^26302630 153591 2630 [Redacted] [Redacted] 153591 iiii 11 III i [Redacted] i i"' ""Ii CIA officers on site recalled other plot to fly hijacked planes into intelligence reporting indicating that KSM planned to use the tallest buildings on the west Malaysians in the "next wave of attacks," connected it to coast of the United States." Gunawan's statements about Malaysian students, and

reported that Gunawan had just identified "a group of 16 individuals, most all of whom are Malaysians." 2631 Records indicate that it was this initial analysis that led the CIA to consider the group a KSM "cell" for the "next wave of attacks."

While Hambali was being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, he was confronted about KSM's efforts to find pilots, as well as information on the al-Ghuraba group—which the CIA assessed was a KSM "cell." Hambali told his CIA interrogators "that some of the members of [the al-Ghuraba group] were destined to work for al-Qa'ida if everything had gone

483

according to plan," and that "KSM told him to provide as many pilots as he could."^26322632 See the intelligence chronology in Volume II, including [REDACTED] 45953 (151241Z SEP 03) [REDACTED] 1323 (161749Z SEP 03).

Months later, on November 30, 2003, after three weeks of being questioned by a debriefer "almost entirely in Bahasa Indonesia," Hambali admitted to fabricating information during the period he was being subjected to the CIA's enhanced intenogation techniques. According to Hambali, he fabricated these claims "in an attempt to reduce the pressure on himself' and "to give an account that was consistent with what [Hambali] assessed thc questioners wanted to hear."^26332633 [Redacted] 142 (301055Z NOV 03) A November 30, 2003, cable noted that CIA personnel "assesse[d] [Hambali]'s admission of previous fabrication to be credible." Hambali then consistently described "the al-Ghuraba organization" as a "development camp for potential future JI operatives and leadership, vice a JI cell or an orchestrated attempt by JI to initiate JI operations outside of Southeast Asia." This description was consistent and corroborative of other intelligence reporting.^26342634 See intelligence chronology in Volume II. Although NSA signals intelligence was not provided for this Study, an April 2008 CIA intelligence report on the Jemaah Islamiya noted that the al-Ghuraba group "consisted of the sons of JI leaders, many of whom completed basic militant training in Afghanistan and Pakistan while enrolled at Islamic universities in Karachi," and that this assessment was based on "signals intelligence and other reporting." See CIA Intelligence Product entitled, "Jemaah Islamiya: Counterterrorism Scrutiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in Pakistan," dated April 18,2008.Show full note

A wide body of intelligence reporting indicates that, contrary to CIA representations, the al-Ghuraba group was not "tasked" with, or witting, of any aspect of the "Second Wave" plotting.^26352635 See intelligence chronology in Volume II.

While KSM's reporting varied, KSM stated "he did not yet view the group as an operational pool from which to draft operatives."^26362636 [Redacted] 10223 (221317Z OCT 03); [Redacted] An Octobcr 27, 2006, CIA cable stated that "all of the members of the JI al-Ghuraba cell have been released,"^26372637 WASHINGTON DC [Redacted] (272113Z OCT 06) LLLL I I III I [Redacted] I LLLL Mill I while an April 18, 2008, CIA intelligence report referencing the al-Ghuraba group

484

makes no reference to the group serving as potential operatives for KSM's "Second Wave" plotting.^26382638 C I A Intelligence Product entitled, "Jemaah lslamiya: Counterterrorism Scrutiny Limiting Extremist Agenda in Pakistan," dated April 18,2008. M39 N u m e r o u s detainees were stripped and shackled, nude, in the standing stress position for sleep deprivation or subjected to other enhanced interrogation techniques prior to being questioned by an interrogator. See for example KSM [Redacted] 9 1 (051400Z MAR 03); Asadullah (DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] B 0 3 ) ) ; Abu Yasir [Redacted] [Redacted] MAR 03)); Suleiman Abdullah ( [Redacted] [Redacted] 35787 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] Abu Hudhaifa [Redacted] [Redacted] II 11 11 11 I [Redacted] [Redacted] 1 [Redacted] and Majid Khan [Redacted] (241242Z MAY [Redacted] 39077 (271719Z MAY 03).Show full note r J he Interrogation Process

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "As This testimony is incongruent with CIA records. As is before, with these seven detailed throughout the Committee Study, CIA detainees [enhanced interrogation were frequently subjected to the CIA's enhanced techniques] we use the least interrogation techniques immediately after being rendered coercive measures to create to CIA custody. 2639 CIA interrogators asked open-ended cooperation at a predictable, questions of CIA detainees, to which the CIA did not reliable, sustainable level. They know the answers, while subjecting detainees to the CIA's are used to create a state of enhanced interrogation techniques. This approach began cooperation. Once the state of with Abu Zubaydah, whose interrogation focused on him cooperation is created, we simply being told to provide "the one thing you don't want me to productively debrief the detainee. know,"^26402640 [Redacted] 10016 (120509Z APR 02); [Redacted] 10594 (061558Z AUG 02) and remained a central feature of the program. On average, we get to that state Numerous CIA detainees were determined never to have of cooperation in a period reached a "state of cooperation." Several detainees, when measured by about one to two subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, weeks." transitioned to normal debriefing, and were then subjected to one or more additional periods of being subjected to the "When we're asking him techniques.^26412641 See detainee reviews in Volume III for additional information. questions during that period of increased stress, when we're being more rather than less coercive, we are generally asking him questions for which we know the answers. Otherwise, how do we know we have moved him from a spirit of defiance into a spirit of cooperation? And only after we have moved him into this second stage do we then begin to ask him things we really think he knows but we don't."

485

¶Use of Detainee Reporting DIRECTOR HAYDEN: The CIA regularly disseminated intelligence reports based "Nothing that we get from the on uncorroborated statements from CIA detainees. The program, however, is used in reports, some of which included fabricated or otherwise isolation. It's a data point that inaccurate information, required extensive FBI then has to be rubbed up against investigations.^26422642 For example, on May 15 and May 16, 2003, the FBI hosted a conference on KSM and investigations resulting from KSM's reporting. The agenda included al-Qa'ida recruitment efforts in the U.S., a topic on which KSM had provided significant fabricated infonnation. (See Memorandum from: [REDACTED]; for: [Redacted] [ R E D A [Redacted] • [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [ R E D A C T E D [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [ R E D A C T E D [Redacted] E D A C T E D ] , [Redacted] [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] , [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], 11 I 11 I II ll| [Redacted] |l I II I II ll| [REDACTED]; date: 8 May 2003.) See also Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] .subject: Thanks from FBI; date: May 17, 2003, at 7:25:15 P M [Redacted] 12095 (222049Z JUN 03); [Redacted] 12558 (041938Z AUG 03); [Redacted] 31148 (171919Z D E C ^ 5 [Redacted] 1 1 4 7 (171919Z DEC 05), disseminated [Redacted] as]Show full note For example, the CIA disseminated all the other data points we have information that KSM had sent Abu Issa al-Britani to available to us." Montana to recruit African-American Muslim converts.^26432643 110942 [Redacted] (221610Z MAR 03), disseminated as [Redacted] [Redacted] 10948 (222101Z MAR 03), disseminated as [Redacted]

In June 2003, KSM stated he fabricated the information because he was "under 'enhanced measures' when he made these claims and simply told his interrogators what he thought they wanted to hear."^26442644 t [Redacted] , 2095 (222049Z JUN 03) Other KSM fabrications led the CIA to capture and detain suspected terrorists who were later found to be innocent.^26452645 The CIA captured and detained two individuals whom KSM had identified as the protectors of his children. KSM later described his reporting as "all lies." See [Redacted] 34569 (061722Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 1281 (130801Z JUN 04). The Relit 'ious Foundation for Cooperation

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "This The CIA made a similar representation to the Department proposed program you have in of Justice in the context of Abu Zubaydah. 2647 CIA front of you has been informed records do not indicate that CIA detainees described a by our experience and it has been religious basis for cooperating in association with the informed by the comments of our CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.^26482648 while there are no records of CIA detainees making these statements, the Deputy Chief of ALEC Station, [Redacted] told the Inspector General on July 17, 2003, that the "best information [the CIA1 received on how to handle the [CIA] detainees came from a walk-in [a source[Redacted] [Redacted] to volunteer information to the CIA] after the arrest of Abu Zubaydah. He told us we were 2646 j n addition, CIA o f f i [Redacted] f i e d at the April 12, 2007, Committee hearing: "I spoke with Zubaydah. I was at one of these facilities for several months and I spent around 18 hours a day with Abu Zubaydah. At the conclusion of my time, as I was leaving the facility, he spoke with me, and he said there is something I need you to understand - to go back to the question that came earlier about walling and a collar. He looked at the plywood wall in the cell and said I want to thank you for that. I've had a lot of time to sit and reflect, and I understand why that's there. That's there so I don't get hurt. In terms of the totality of the experience, his advice was I may have been the first person, but you need to continue to do this because I need to be able to live with who I am and I will continue to be the religious believing person I am, but you had to get me to the point where I could have absolution from my god to cooperate and deal with your questions. So he thanked us for bringing him to that point, beyond which he knew his religious beliefs absolved him from cooperating with us." There are no CIA records to support this testimony.Show full note detainees. It's built on the The CIA has referred only to Abu Zubaydah in the context particular psychological profile of this representation. As detailed, Abu Zubaydah of the people we have and expect referenced religion in the context of his cooperation prior to get ~ al-Qa'ida operatives. to being subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation Perceiving themselves true techniques. On May 14, 2002, more than two months believers in a religious war, before Abu Zubaydah began his August 2002 enhanced detainees believe they are interrogation period, Abu Zubaydah told interrogators that morally bound to resist until "if he possessed any more information on future threats, Allah has sent them a burden too then he would provide this information to us to help great for them to withstand. At himself, claiming that 'the sharia' gives him permission to that point — and that point varies do so in his current situation."2649 Abu Zubaydah also by detainee ~ their cooperation made a similar statement to his interrogators in their own heart and soul approximately a week later—again, prior to the use of the becomes blameless and they CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—stating that he enter into this cooperative had "prayed his 'Istikharah' (seeking God's guidance) and relationship with our debriefers." was now willing to tell what he really knew," and "that he DIRECTOR HAYDEN: had received guidance from God" to cooperate to "prevent "Number one, we use the his captured brothers from having a difficult time." 2650 enhanced interrogation Further, Abu Zubaydah maintained that he always techniques at the beginning of intended to provide information and never believed he this process, and it varies how could withhold information from interrogators.2651 In long it takes, but I gave you a February 2003, he told a CIA psychologist that he week or two as the normal believed every captured "brother" would talk in detention, window in which we actually and that these "brothers should be able to expect that the helped this religious zealot to get organization will make adjustments to protect people and over his own personality and put plans when someone with knowledge is captured."2652 himself in a spirit of Abu Zubaydah stated he conveyed this perspective to cooperation." trainees at a terrorist training camp. 2653

486

¶VICE CHAIRMAN BOND: "Once you get past that time period, once you have convinced them that Allah gives them the green light, that's when you get the 8,000 intelligence reports."

¶underestimating Al-Qa'ida. The detainees were happy to be arrested by the U.S. because they got a big show trial. When they were turned over to [foreign governments], they were treated badly so diey talked. Allah apparently allows you to talk if you feel threatened. The [CIA] detainees never counted on being detained by us outside the U.S. and being subjected to methods they never dreamed of." See [Redacted] Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorist Center ALEC Station; date: 17 July 2003.

¶10262 (151138Z MAR 02)

¶[Redacted]

10262 (151138Z MAR 02) 110496 (162014Z FEB 03) [Redacted] 10496 (162014Z FEB 03) 10496 (162014Z FEB 03)

487

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "That's correct, Senator, when we get the subject into this zone of cooperation. I think, as you know, in two-thirds of the instances we don't need to use any of the techniques to get the individual into the zone of cooperation."

¶SENATOR NELSON: "How do you suspect that al-Qa'ida operatives are training in order to counter your techniques?" DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "You recall the policy on which this is based, that we're going to give him a burden that Allah says is too great for you to bear, so they can put the burden down." 2646

¶Threats Related to Sodomy, Arrest of Family DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "Many This testimony is incongruent with CIA interrogation assertions [in the ICRC report] records. regarding physical or threatened abuse are egregious and are • As documented in the May 2004 Inspector General simply not true. On their face, Special Review and other CIA records, interrogators they aren't even credible. threatened 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, KSM, and Abu Threats of acts of sodomy, the Zubaydah with harm to their families.^26542654 According to the Inspector General Special Review, a debriefer threatened al-Nashiri by saying "[w]e could get your mother in here," and, "[w]e can bring your family in here." In addition, one of KSM's interrogators told the inspector general that the psychologist/interrogators told KSM that, if anything happens in the United States, "[wje're going to kill your children." (See Special Review, pp. 42-43; interview of [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 30 April 2003; interview of [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 22 October 2003; [Redacted] 10757 (111505Z MAR 03).) According to a CIA cable, a case officer "used [Abu Zubaydah's] 'family card' to apply more psychological pressure on [Abu Zubaydah]." The cable stated that the case officer "advised [Abu Zubaydah] that even if [Abu Zubaydah] did not care about himself... [Abu Zubaydah] should at least care about his family and keep in mind their welfare; the insinuation being [that] something might happen to them." See [Redacted] \ 10095 (220713Z APR 02) ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^Show full note

488

¶[Redacted] aixest and rape of family members, the intentional Rectal exams were standard operating procedure for infection of HIV or any other security purposes. A June 2002 cable noted that Abu diseases have never been and Zubaydah was mildly "tense," "likely an anticipatory would never be authorized. reaction given his recent unexpected rectal exam" the There are no instances in which previous day.^26552655 [Redacted] 10507 [Redacted] CIA leadership, including CIA General Counsel Scott Muller and DDO James Pavitt, were also alerted to allegations that rectal exams were conducted with "excessive force" on two detainees at DETENTION SITE COBALT. See email from [REDACTED]; to [REDACTED]; cc: [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted], [REDACTED]; subject: ACTIONS from the GC Update this Morning, date: [Redacted] 12:15 PM; Email f r o [Redacted] t o : [REDACTED]; cc: [Redacted] [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], subject: ACTIONS from the GC Update this Morning; date: [Redacted] 1:23:31 PM; Email from [Redacted] to: [REDACTED]; cc: [Redacted] [REDACTED]; subject: Re: ACTIONS from die GC Update this Morning REQUEST FOR STATUS UPDATE; date: [Redacted] at 10:47:32 AM^[Redacted]223[Redacted]DQUARTERS [Redacted] [Redacted]Show full note such threats or abuses took place." At least five detainees were subjected to rectal

rehydration or rectal feeding. There is at least one record of Abu Zubaydah receiving "rectal fluid resuscitation" for "partially refusing liquids."^26562656 [Redacted] [Redacted] According to CIA records, Majid Khan was "very hostile" to rectal feeding and removed the rectal tube as soon as he was allowed to.^26572657 [REDACTED] 3868 (291534Z DEC 04); [REDACTED] 3868 (291534Z DEC 04). See also HEADQUARTERS [Redacted] 0 2 1 1 4 Z NOV 04). KSM was subjected to rectal rehydration without a determination of medical need, a procedure that KSM interrogator and chief of interrogations, [Redacted] would later characterize as illustrative of the interrogator's "total control over the detainee."^26582658 134491 [Redacted] (051400Z MAR 03); Interview o [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, 27 March 2003. [Redacted] [Redacted] e Office of Medical Services (OMS), described the rectal rehydration of KSM as helping to "clear a person's head" and effective in getting KSM to talk. Marwan al-Jabbur was subjected to what was originally referred to in a cable as an "enema," but was later acknowledged to be rectal rehydration 2559 Both al-Nashiri^26602660 As described in the context of the rectal feeding of al-Nashiri, Ensure was infused into al-Nashiri "in a forward- facing position (Trendlenberg) with head lower than torso." See [Redacted] 1203 (231709Z MAY 04). and Majid Khan were subjected to rectal feeding.^26612661 According to CIA records, Majid Khan's "lunch tray," consisting of hummus, pasta with sauce, nuts, and raisins was "pureed" and rectally infused. See [Redacted] ( 2 3 1 8 3 9 Z SEP 04). [Redacted] techniques and had never been employed and that CIA officers never threatened a detainee or his family." The CIA's June 2013 Response adds: "Part of that assertion was an error. The DCIA would have been better served if the Agency had framed a response for him that discussed CIA's policy prohibiting such conduct, and how the Agency moved to address unsanctioned behavior which had occurred (including punches and kicks) and implement clear guidelines." ^^^^^^^^^^^^Show full note

489

• Three detainees, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Khallad bin Attash and Adnan al-Libi, were threatened with rectal rehydration.2662

Punches and Kicks

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: This testimony is incongruent with CIA records.

¶"Punches and kicks are not Interviews conducted for two CIA internal reviews related authorized and have never been to Gul Rahman's death provided details on CIA employed." 2663 interrogations at the CIA's DETENTION SITE COBALT.

In an interview report, CIA contractor DUNBAR described the "hard" or "rough" takedown used at DETENTION SITE COBALT. According to the interview report of DUNBAR, "there were approximately five CIA officers from the renditions team... they opened the door of Rahman's cell and rushed in screaming and yelling for him to 'get down.' They dragged him outside, cut off his clothes and secured him with Mylar tape. They covered his head with a hood and ran him up and down a long corridor adjacent to his cell. They slapped him and punched him several times. [DUNBAR] stated that although it was obvious they were not trying to hit him as hard as they could, a couple of times the punches were forceful. As they ran him along the corridor, a couple of times he fell and they dragged him through the dirt (the floor outside of the cells is dirt). Rahman did acquire a number of abrasions on his face, legs, and hands, but nothing that required medical attention. (This may account for the abrasions found on Rahman's body after his death. Rahman had a number of surface abrasions on his shoulders, pelvis, arms, legs, and face.)"^26642664 Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from [Redacted] January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN, pp. 21-22. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 26(55 CIA Inspector General report, "Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee [Redacted] (2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005, at 38. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 11 ii 11111 [Redacted] " i " i

The use of the "hard" or "rough" takedown, as used on Gul Rahman, was described by the CIA officer in charge of the CIA's DETENTION SITE COBALT as "employed often in interrogations at [DETENTION SITE COBALT] as 'part of the atmospherics."' 2665

¶26152

¶See Volume 111 for additional information. 2M3 j j j e CIA's June 2013 Response states, "DCIA Hayden stated that 'punches' and 'kicks' were not authorized

490

¶Hygiene

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: This testimony is incongruent with CIA records. CIA

¶"Detainees have never been detainees, particularly those subjected to standing sleep denied the means ~ at a deprivation, were routinely placed in diapers. Waste minimum, they've always had a buckets were not always available. In the interrogation of bucket — to dispose of their Abu Hazim, a waste bucket was removed from his cell for human waste." punishment. According to a CIA cable, Abu Hazim

"requested a bucket in which he could relieve himself, but was told all rewards must be earned."^26662666 [Redacted] 37493 [Redacted] Medical Personnel and Medical Care

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "The CIA records detail how throughout the program, CIA medical section of the ICRC medical personnel cleared detainees for the use of the report concludes that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques and played a association of CIA medical central role in deciding whether to continue, adjust, or officers with the interrogation alter the use of the techniques against detainees. For program is 'contrary to example: international standards of medical ethics.' That is just • Prior to the initiation of the CIA's enhanced wrong. The role of CIA medical interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah, CIA officers in the detainee program Headquarters, with medical personnel participation, is and always has been and stated that the "interrogation process takes precedence always will be to ensure the over preventative medical procedures."^26672667 ALEC [Redacted] (182321Z JUL 02). According to the CIA attorney who reviewed the videotapes of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, "the person he assumed was a medical officer was dressed completely in black from head to toe, and was indistinguishable from other [interrogation] team members." See June 18, 2003, Interview Report of [REDACTED], Office of General Counsel Assistant General Counsel. safety and the well-being of the detainee. The placement of • Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi was provided medication for medical officers during the swelling in his legs to allow for continued standing interrogation techniques sleep deprivation.^26682668 Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi was subjected to nudity, dietary manipulation, insult slaps, abdominal slaps, attention grasps, facial holds, walling, stress positions, and water dousing with 44 degree Fahrenheit water for 18 minutes. He was shackled in the standing position for 54 hours as part of sleep deprivation, and experienced swelling in his lower legs requiring blood thinner and spiral ace bandages. He was moved to a sitting position, and his sleep deprivation was extended to 78 hours. After the swelling subsided, he was provided with more blood thinner and was returned to the standing position. The sleep deprivation was extended to 102 hours. After four hours of sleep, Abu Ja'far al- Iraqi was subjected to an additional 52 hours of sleep deprivation, after which CIA Headquarters informed interrogators that eight hours of sleep was the minimum. In addition to the swelling, Abu Ja'far al-Iraqi also experiencedan edemaonhisheiid due to walling, abrasions on his neck, and blisters on his ankles from shackles.Show full note represents an extra measure of caution. Our medical officers do not recommend the employment or continuation of any procedures or techniques."

491

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "The This testimony is incongruent with CIA records. For allegation in the report that a CIA example, as CIA interrogators prepared for the August medical officer threatened a 2002 "enhanced interrogation" phase of Abu Zubaydah's detainee, stating that medical interrogation, the CIA's DETENTION SITE GREEN care was conditional on noted, and CIA Headquarters confirmed, that the cooperation is blatantly false. interrogation process would take precedence over Health care has always been preventing Abu Zubaydah's wounds from becoming administered based upon detainee infected. 2659 DETENTION SITE GREEN personnel also needs. It's neither policy nor stated that delaying a medical session for 72 hours after practice to link medical care to the start of the new phase of interrogation would convey any other aspect of the detainee to Abu Zubaydah that his level of medical care was program." contingent upon his cooperation. 2670 On August 10, 2002, SENATOR HATCH: "Has there the medical officer at DETENTION SITE GREEN stated been any use of any kind of drug that, under the model of medical intervention that the or withholding of any kind of detention site was following during the most aggressive drug or medication?" interrogation phase, Abu Zubaydah's medical status was DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "No, likely to deteriorate to an "unacceptable level" over the absolutely not." next two weeks. 2671 On August 25, 2002, the Base stated

that the "combination of a lack of hygiene, sub-optimal nutrition, inadvertent trauma to the wound secondary to some of the stress techniques utilized at that stage, and the removal of formal obvious medical care to further isolate the subject had an overall additive effect on the deterioration of the wound." 2672

Abu Zubaydah lost his left eye while in CIA custody. In October 2002, DETENTION SITE GREEN recommended that the vision in his right eye be tested, noting that "[w]e have a lot riding upon his ability to see, read and write." DETENTION SITE GREEN stressed that "this request is driven by our intelligence needs vice humanitarian concern for AZ." 2673

CIA detainees Abu Hazim and Abd al-Karim each broke a foot while trying to escape capture and were placed in casts; Abd al-Karim's medical evaluation upon entry into CIA custody included a recommendation that he not be subjected to "extended standing for a couple of weeks,"

10536 (15J006Z JULY 02); ALEC [Redacted] (182321Z JUL 02) 10536 (151006Z JULY 02)

¶[Redacted]

10607 (100335Z AUG 02) 10647 (201331Z AUG 02); [Redacted] 10618 (121448Z AUG 02); [Redacted] 10679 (250932Z

¶[Redacted] 11026 (070729Z OCT 02) which was then extended to three months. 2674 A cable describing the CIA enhanced interrogation techniques to be used on the two detainees stated that the interrogator would "forego cramped confinement, stress positions, walling, and vertical shackling (due to [the detainees'] injury)."^26752675 [Redacted] [Redacted] 136862 [Redacted] (181352Z APR 03); DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]; DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] Abd al-Karim was nonetheless subjected to two 45-minute sessions of cramped confinement,^26762676 [Redacted] 3690$ [Redacted] T [Redacted] 36862 (181352Z APR The interrogator requested approval to use sleep deprivation, the facial slap, attention grasp, abdominal slap and water dousing. To accommodate Abu Hazim's and Abd al-Karim's injuries, the cable stated that, rather than being shackled standing during sleep deprivation, the detainees would be "seated, secured to a cell wall, with intermittent disruptions of normal sleeping patterns." For water dousing, the detainees' injured legs would be "wrapped inShow full note repeated walling, and a stress position that involved placing his "head on [the] wall, bent at waist, shuffled backwards to a safe, yet uncomfortable position."^26772677 lastic." The request was approved. See DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] As part of sleep deprivation, he was also "walked for 15 minutes every half-hour through the night and into the morning."^26782678 37121 (221703Z APR 03); [Redacted] 37152 (231424Z APR 03) A few days later, a cable stated that, even given the best prognosis, Abd al-Karim would have arthritis and limitation of motion for the rest of his life.^26792679 [Redacted] 37508 (021305Z MAY 03); [Redacted] 37202 (250948Z APR 03) Meanwhile, Abu Hazim was subjected to repeated walling.^26802680 37152 (231424Z APR 03) [Redacted] [Redacted]

492

Subsequently, and despite the aforementioned recommendation related to Abd al-Karim and a recommendation from a regional medical officer that Abu Hazim avoid any weight-bearing activities for five weeks,^26812681 [Redacted] 37410 (291828Z APR 03); [Redacted] 37509 (021309Z MAY 03) [Redacted] [Redacted] 03); [Redacted] 37754 [Redacted] interrogators sought and received approval to use standing sleep deprivation on al-Karim and Abu Hazim.^26822682 [Redacted] 38161 (131326Z MAY 03); DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted] A Y 0 3 ) ; DIRECTOR [Redacted] [Redacted]

Abu Hazim underwent 52 hours of standing sleep deprivation,^26832683 [Redacted] 39582 (041743Z JUN 03); [Redacted] 39656 (060955Z JUN 03) and Abd al-Karim underwent an unspecified period of standing sleep deprivation.^26842684 38365 (170652Z MAY 03)

493

Interrogators left Asadullah, a detainee with a sprained ankle, in the standing sleep deprivation position. When Asadullah was subsequently placed in a stress position on his knees, he complained of discomfort and asked to sit. He was told he could not sit unless he answered questions truthfully.^26852685 Asadullah was also placed in a "small isolation box" for 30 minutes, without authorization and without discussion of how the technique would affect his ankle. [Redacted] [Redacted] 340981 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] 10 [Redacted]

Due to a lack of adequate medical care at CIA detention sites and the unwillingness of host governments to make hospital facilities available, CIA detainees had care delayed for serious medical issues. See, for example, the detainee reviews for Janat Gul, Hassan Guleed, Mustafa al-Hawsawi, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Firas al-Yemeni in Volume III. Dietary Manipulation

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "And, This testimony is inaccurate. CIA records detail how Abu in the section [of the ICRC Zubaydah was fed solid food shortly after being report] on medical care, the discharged from the hospital in April 2002. 2686 In August report omits key contextual facts. 2002, as part of the CIA's enhanced interrogation For example, Abu Zubaydah's techniques, Abu Zubaydah was placed on a liquid diet of statement that he was given only Ensure and water as both an interrogation technique, and Ensure and water for two to three as a means of limiting vomiting during waterboarding.^26872687 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] and [REDACTED]; date: August 4, 2002, at 09:45:09AM. weeks fails to mention the fact In planning for the interrogation of subsequent detainees, that he was on a liquid diet [was] the CIA determined that it would use a "liquid diet."^26882688 [Redacted] 1 0 9 6 1 (260650Z SEP 02) quite appropriate because he was At least 30 CIA detainees were fed only a liquid diet of recovering from abdominal Ensure and water for interrogation purposes.^26892689 See detainee reviews in Volume III. surgery at the time."

¶Waterboarding and Its Effectiveness SENATOR HATCH: "So this is This testimony is incongruent with CIA interrogation not tipping the board and putting records. As described in the Study, the waterboarding of his head underneath the water." KSM involved interrogators using their hands to maintain DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "No. a one-inch deep "pool" of water over KSM's nose and It's slightly inclined, cloth, mouth in an effort to make it impossible for KSM to ingest all the water being poured on him.^26902690 Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [Redacted] [Redacted]; subject: Re: Sitrep as of AM 3/15; date: March 15, 2003, at 3:52:54 AM; Interview of [Redacted], by [REDACTED] and According to the pouring of water under the rules I attending medical officer, the technique became a "series just laid out, Senator." of near drownings."2691 DIRECTOR HAYDEN: This testimony is incongruent with CIA interrogation "[W]aterboarding cannot take records. For example, KSM was waterboarded on nine place any more than five days out separate days over a two-week period. On March 13, of a total of 30 days. There 2003, KSM was subjected to three waterboard sessions in cannot be more than two sessions one day. Over March 12-13, 2003, he was subjected to per day. A session is described five waterboard sessions in 25 hours. During that same as being strapped to the board. period, he was subjected to the pouring of water for more No session can last longer than than twelve minutes during a 24-hour period.^26922692 [Redacted] 10800 (131909Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 10801 (131918Z MAR 03); [Redacted] 10802 (131921Z MAR 0 3 ) [Redacted] 10803 (131929Z MAR 03) two hours. In any session, there can be no more than six pourings In regard to the description of "pouring," a CIA record of the water greater than ten related to Abu Zubaydah states that: seconds in duration. Under no circumstances can any detainee "Each iteration of the watering cycle consisted be under the pouring of the water of four broad steps: 1) demands for a total of more than twelve information interspersed with the application minutes in any 24-hour period, of the water just short of blocking his airway and one pouring cannot exceed, 2) escalation of the amount of water applied one application cannot exceed 40 until it blocked his airway and he started to seconds." have involuntary spasms 3) raising the waterboard to clear subject's airway 4) lowering of the water-board and return to demands for information."^26932693 CIA record entitled, "Aggressive Interrogation Phase Synopsis," Abu Zubaydah, August 2002.

494

¶SENATOR NELSON: "On This testimony is incongruent with CIA interrogation KSM, was it waterboarding that records. CIA personnel—including members of KSM's you were able to get the interrogation team—believed that the waterboard information from him?" interrogation technique was ineffective on KSM.^26942694 Similarly, participants in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah wrote that Abu Zubaydah "probably reached the point of cooperation even prior to the August institution of 'enhanced' measures - a development missed because of the narrow focus of the questioning. In any event there was no evidence that the waterboard produced time- perishable information which otherwise would have been unobtainable." See CIA Summary and Reflections of [Redacted] e d i c a l Services on OMS participation in the RDI program, at 41.Show full note The DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "Yes, on-site medical officer told the inspector general that, after sir, it was." three or four days, it became apparent that the waterboard SENATOR NELSON: was ineffective, and that KSM "hated it but knew he could "Although it took you a long manage."2693 KSM interrogator [Redacted] told the time to break him?"

¶[REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003. See also interview of [Redacted] [REDACTED] anc^REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15,2003.

¶from: [Redacted] to: [Redacted] cc: [Redacted] subject: More; date: April 10, 2003, at 5:59: 27 PM. ^ ^ ^ ^

495

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "He had inspector general that KSM had "beat the system,"^26962696 Interview of [Redacted] by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October 22,2003. _____ and nine separate days in which assessed two months after the discontinuation of the waterboarding took place. He waterboard that KSM responded to "creature comforts and also was subjected] to sleep sense of importance" and not to "confrontational" deprivation and I believe his approaches.^26972697 [Redacted] 11715 (201047Z MAY 03). In August 2006, [Redacted] wrote in a Saraetime communication that KSM and Abu Zubaydah "held back" despite the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, but added "I'm ostracized whenever I suggest those two did not tell us everything." See Sametime Communication, [Redacted] [Redacted] d [Redacted] A u g / 0 6 , 10:28:38 to 10:58:00. KSM debriefer and Deputy Chief of deprivation was the longest of ALEC Station [Redacted] told the inspector any detainee's, at one stretch, and general that KSM "figured out a way to deal with [the I think that may be what Senator waterboard]."^26982698 I n t e r v i e [Redacted] H [Redacted] b y [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 2003. [Redacted] also wrote in a 2005 Sametime communication that "we broke KSM... using the Majid Khan stuff... and the emails." See Sametime Communication, [Redacted] and [REDACTED], 02/May/05, 14:51:48 to 15:17:39. [Redacted] C Legal, [Redacted] Hatch was referring [Redacted] to by that to ld the inspector general that the 180 number. That's the number waterboard "was of limited use on KSM."^26992699 Interview of [Redacted] by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 20, 2003. CIA of hours at one stretch." records indicate that KSM was subjected to the waterboard

interrogation technique at least 183 times. Injuries and Deaths

¶DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "The This testimony is incongruent with CIA interrogation most serious injury that I'm records. CIA records indicate that CIA detainees suffered aware of - and I'll ask the physical injuries beyond bruising from shackling, as well experts to add any color they as psychological problems: want, Senator - is bruising as a result of shackling." • During a waterboard session, Abu Zubaydah "became

completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth." He remained unresponsive after the waterboard was rotated upwards and only regained consciousness after receiving a "xyphoid thrust."^27002700 Email from: [Redacted] 0 M S ; t o : [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], subject: Re: Acceptable lower ambient temperatures; date: March 7, 2003; email from: [Redacted] OMS; to: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Talking Points for review and comment; date: August 13, 2004; email from [Redacted] [Redacted] to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]; subject: Re: Discussion with Dan Levin - AZ; date: October 26, 2004.Show full note

• Multiple CIA detainees subjected to prolonged sleep deprivation experienced hallucinations, and CIA interrogation teams did not always discontinue sleep deprivation after the detainees had experienced hallucinations.^27012701 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]

496

• Some detainees exhibited significant bruising and swelling unrelated to shackling. For example, a medical officer noted that, in addition to the swelling of his ankles and wrists, Ramzi bin al-Shibh had a bruise on his brow. 2702
• During the application of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM was described as "[tJired and sore," with abrasions on his ankles, shins, and wrists, as well as on the back of his head. 2703 He also suffered from pedal edema 2704 resulting from extended standing. 2705
• At the CIA's DETENTION SITE COBALT, CIA interrogators used "rough takedowns," described as taking a naked detainee outside of his cell, placing a hood over his head, and dragging him up and down a long corridor while slapping and punching him. Gul Rahman, after his death, was found to have surface abrasions on his shoulders, pelvis, arms, legs, and face.^27062706 Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from [Redacted] January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN, pp. 21-22. See Volume III for additional injuries resulting from CIA interrogations. ALEC [Redacted] [Redacted]

¶SENATOR LEVIN: "Did This testimony is incongruent with CIA records. anybody die?" DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "No." • Gul Rahman died in CIA custody at the CIA's SENATOR LEVIN: "Not one DETENTION SITE COBALT after being rendered person?" there on November [Redacted] 2002. At the time, DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "No DETENTION SITE COBALT was described as a one. The Committee is aware place where the CIA could detain suspected terrorists that there was an individual who for the purposes of "intense interrogations" by CIA died in CIA custody prior to the officers 2707 DDO James Pavitt told the inspector initiation of this program." general that "there were some who say that SENATOR LEVIN: "Prior to [DETENTION SITE COBALT] is not a CIA facility, the initiation of what?" but that is 'bullshit.'"^27082708 August 21, 2003, Interview Report of James Pavitt, (pursuant to 2003-7123-IG), Deputy Director of Operations. nil 11 I I I [Redacted] I IIII Mill I DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "This program. In fact, the discipline • CIA records reveal that Gul Rahman was subjected to of this program is a product of or what the CIA chief of interrogations described as

[Redacted] 10429 (101215Z FEB 03) 110916 (210845Z MAR 03) ; of the feet. [Redacted] 10909 (201918Z MAR 03) ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

497

¶result of the undisciplined "coercive techniques without authorization."^27092709 |29520 [Redacted] [Redacted] ; email dated November [Redacted] 2002, from CIA interrogator [Redacted] to CTC/LGL Officer [Redacted] with the subject line, "Another example of field interrogation using coercive techniques without authorization: At activity that took place earlier." ALEC Station's request, CIA contractor Hammond

¶DUNBAR conducted an assessment of Gul Rahman to DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "[Gul determine which CIA enhanced interrogation Rahman] was not part of this techniques should be used on him.^27102710 2710 29909 [Redacted] [Redacted]; ALEC [Redacted] [Redacted] While the program, but I understand it was CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were never in CIA custody." authorized, DUNBAR interrogated Rahman, once

employing the "insult slap" enhanced intenogation technique without CIA Headquarters approval.^27112711 Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee [Redacted] (2003-7402-IG), 27 April 2005, p. 23 (DTS #2005- 1957). On November [Redacted] 2002, Gul Rahman was shackled to the wall of his cell in a short chain position,^27122712 In the short chain position, a detainee's hands and feet are shackled together by a short chain. which required him to sit on the bare concrete.^27132713 [REDACTED] 29520 [Redacted] Rahman was wearing a sweatshirt, but was nude from the waist down. On November [Redacted] 2002, the guards at DETENTION SITE COBALT found Gul Rahman's dead body.^27142714 January 27, 2003, Memorandum from [REDACTED], Chief, Counterintelligence Evaluation Branch, Counterespionage Group Counterintelligence Center, to Deputy Director for Operations, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul Rahman. Although a CIA employee tried to perform CPR, Gul Rahman remained unresponsive and was declared dead.^27152715 January 27, 2003, Memorandum from [REDACTED], Chief, Counterintelligence Evaluation Branch, Counterespionage Group Counterintelligence Center, to Deputy Director for Operations, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul Rahman. The circumstances surrounding Gul Rahman's death are described in detail in both reports prepared by the Counterintelligence Center and a 2005 report prepared by the Inspector General. See April 27, 2005, CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee [Redacted] (DTS #2005-1957).Show full note An autopsy report by the CIA found that the cause of Gul Rahman's death was "undetermined," but that the clinical impression of the medical officer who conducted the autopsy was that the cause of death was hypothermia.^27162716 FINAL AUTOPSY FINDINGS, by [REDACTED], MP, CASE #: OMS A-01-02. Stress Positions

¶SENATOR LEVIN: [Reading a This testimony is inaccurate. SSCI staff document, "Summary Notes of the February 14, 2007 There are multiple descriptions of CIA detainees being ICRC Report"] "Prolonged forced to stand with their arms shackled above their heads stress standing position, naked, for extended periods of time at the CIA's DETENTION armed chained above the head [?] SITE COBALT.^27172717 [Redacted] 28246 [Redacted] v i e w Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism P u r p o [Redacted] r i l 5, 2003; Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, In one example, a U.S. military legal DIRECTOR HAYDEN: "Not advisor observed the technique known as "hanging," above the head. Stress positions involving handcuffing one or both wrists to an overhead are part of the EITs, and horizontal bar. The legal advisor noted that one detainee nakedness were part of the EITs, was apparently left hanging for 22 hours each day for two

498

¶Senator." consecutive days to "break" his resistance.^27182718 Memorandum for [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] [Redacted] [Redacted] N o v e m b e [Redacted] 0 0 2 , Subject: Legal Analysis of [REDACTED| Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in [Redacted] (aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]").

CIA records indicate that multiple detainees were shackled with their hands above their heads at other CTA detention sites. For example, see detainee reviews in Volume IE, to include 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri,^27192719 t0: Email from: [DETENTION SITE BLUE] COB [Redacted] [Redacted] subject: EYES ONLY - I [Redacted] ONLY - MEMO FOR ADDO/DDO; date: January 22,2003. Hassan Ghul,^27202720 [Redacted] 285 [Redacted] and KSM.^27212721 [Redacted] A|34491 M , [Redacted] (051400Z MAR 03); 1 0 6 5 4 ( 0 3 0 9 0 4 Z M A R [Redacted] 7 5 2 (102320Z MAR 03) According to CIA cables, Abu Zubaydah was handcuffed "high on the bars."^27222722 [Redacted] 1 0 4 8 7 (1 g l 6 5 6 Z j U N 02); [Redacted] 10393 (020543Z JUN 02)

Draft OMS guidelines on interrogations, noted that detainees could be shackled with their arms above their heads for "roughly two hours without great concern," and that the arms could be elevated for between two and four hours if the detainee was monitored for "excessive distress."^27232723 OMS GUIDELINES ON MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS, "First Draft," March 7, 2003. Legal i leasonsfor Overseas Detention

¶SENATOR WHITEHOUSE: Mr. Rizzo's testimony is incongruent with CIA records. "Has there been any After the capture of Abu Zubaydah, [Redacted] T C Legal, consideration at any point within [Redacted] prepared a PowerPoint presentation the Agency that the purpose in laying out the "pros" and "cons" of six detention options. locating facilities overseas is The pros for detention in Country [Redacted] where Abu either to avoid liability under Zubaydah would be rendered, included "[n]o issues of American statutes or to avoid the possible U.S. [court] jurisdiction." The cons for a CIA ability of any court to claim facility in the United States included "[c]an't foreclose jurisdiction because they would ability of U.S. [courts] considering Habeas Corpus not know where these took petition."^27242724 PowerPoint presentation, Options of Incarcerating Abu Zubaydah, March 27, 2002. place? Is there an element of

¶Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purp""-" [Redacted] n i l III I Hi I Memorandum for [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] [Redacted] b e i j B 2 [Redacted] 0 2 , Subject: LeeaIAnalysisof[REDACTED] Personnel Participating in Interrogation at the CIA Detention Facility in

¶[Redacted] (aka "[DETENTION SITE COBALT]").

499

¶providing legal defense to the In late 2003 and early 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court's participants in these decision to accept certiorari in the case of Rasul v. Bush applications?" prompted a decision by the CIA, in coordination with the MR. RIZZO: "Well, certainly Department of Justice, to transfer five CIA detainees held not the first." at Guantanamo to other CIA detention facilities. 2725

¶Email from: Scott W. Muller; to: [Redacted] [REDACTED]; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: Detainees in Gitmo; date: January [Redacted] 0 0 4 ; email from Scott W. Muller; to: [REDACTEDl^ubject: DCI Meeting with Rice; date: January[Redacted]2004; email from: Scott Muller; to: James Pavitt, [Redacted] cc: George Tenet, Jobn McLaughlin, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [Redacted] A C T E D ] , [Redacted] subject: CIA Detainees at GITMO; date: February [Redacted] 0 0 4 .

500