DEFENDANTS HAVE VIOLATED 18 U.S.C. §1962(d)1818 Defendants assert that the statements of their C.E.O.s before the Waxman Subcommittee in 1994 constitutes petitioning activity protected from any imposition of liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See, Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). This legal issue is addressed fully in the Conclusions of Law. The facts, as recounted herein, speak for themselves. -637-Show full note U.S.C. § 1962(d) provides in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of . . . Subsection (c) of this Section."

DEFENDANTS HAVE VIOLATED 18 U.S.C. §1962(d)¹⁸¹⁸ Defendants assert that the statements of their C.E.O.s before the Waxman Subcommittee in 1994 constitutes petitioning activity protected from any imposition of liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See, Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). This legal issue is addressed fully in the Conclusions of Law. The facts, as recounted herein, speak for themselves. -637-Show full note U.S.C. § 1962(d) provides in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of . . . Subsection (c) of this Section."

¶Before trial in this case, Defendants raised a number of affirmative defenses. The Court granted the Government's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for these defenses as to liability. See Order #476; see also Order #227, #356, #509, #538, and #586. However, at that time the Court reserved judgment about how these affirmative defenses might apply to remedies. See Mem. Op. to Order #476 at 27 n.21. Defendants now appropriately raise the same affirmative defenses in regard to remedies.

¶Repeating the arguments from their pre-trial brief, Defendants again assert that waiver, laches, unclean hands, in pari delicto, and equitable estoppel bar any claim for relief by the Government. See Defs.'Post-Trial Br. on Affirmative Defenses 18, Sept. 7, 2005. As in the pre-trial brief on affirmative defenses, Defendants' make the broad argument that because the Federal Trade Commission has had an historical role regulating tobacco products, the Court cannot grant the Government any relief in this action. See Defs.' Post-Trial Reply Br. in Support of Their Affirmative Defenses 1, Sept. 29, 2005. In previously rejecting this theory and Defendants' affirmative defenses in regards to liabilities, this Court found that, "the case law overwhelmingly supports the Government's position" that the enumerated equitable defenses may not be asserted against the United States "when, as here, 'it is acting in its sovereign capacity to exercise public rights to protect the public interest.'" United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 2d 65-66 (D.D.C. 2004) (internal citations omitted).

¶Significantly, the facts have not changed since Defendants asked this Court to rule on affirmative defenses in the liability stage of this matter. Furthermore, Defendants have not put forth any new arguments or cited any new precedent for why the Court should rule in favor of the affirmative defenses they now re-raise as to remedies. Therefore, this Court finds that the affirmative defenses now re-raised by Defendants as to remedies do not preclude the United States from obtaining relief.