The heads of seven tobacco companies stand with their right hands raised to be sworn in before a House subcommittee on 14 April 1994, Philip Morris's William Campbell nearest the camera behind his nameplate.
House health subcommittee, 14 April 1994 · Photo: John Duricka/AP

Report · 2006

United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc.: Amended Final Opinion

Judge Gladys Kessler's 2006 ruling that America's largest cigarette companies had deceived the public about smoking for some fifty years, in violation of the federal racketeering law. It is not an inquiry's view but a court's judgment, upheld on appeal. Built from a nine-month trial and the companies' own internal documents, it sets out what the industry knew about disease, addiction and "light" cigarettes, and what it said in public instead.

Introduction by Reports that Matter. Only words in quotation marks are the report's own; every link opens them in context.

In December 1953, as new studies linked cigarettes to lung cancer, executives from most of the leading American tobacco companies met at the Plaza Hotel in New York. On 4 January 1954 they announced a joint research committee in "A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers", published in 448 newspapers, which held that smoking had not been proven to cause disease. In November 1998 the companies settled the states' lawsuits against them in the Master Settlement Agreement.

On 22 September 1999 the Justice Department sued nine cigarette makers and parent companies, among them Philip Morris and Altria, R.J. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson, Lorillard and Liggett, and two industry bodies, the Tobacco Institute and the Council for Tobacco Research, under the civil racketeering law, RICO. Its claim to $289 billion of past profits was ruled out in 2005, when the appeals court held that the law allows only remedies that prevent future violations. The trial ran for nine months from September 2004, with 84 witnesses. Judge Kessler signed her opinion, shown here in its amended form, on 17 August 2006. She found for the Government on most but not all of its claims, and held that Liggett had withdrawn from the conspiracy. The court rejected the companies' arguments that the 1998 settlement had already changed their conduct and that their statements were protected speech.

On 22 May 2009 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit unanimously upheld the finding of liability and most of the remedies; on 28 June 2010 the Supreme Court declined to hear the case. The companies contested the corrective statements for years more. They began running in newspapers and on prime-time network television on 26 November 2017, later appeared on cigarette packs and company websites, and from July 2023 were posted in nearly 200,000 shops.

  1. The court found that the companies had conspired to violate RICO and had violated it, running a scheme to defraud smokers and potential smokers for financial gain that lasted some fifty years. p. 32 p. 1531 p. 33

    “In short, Defendants have marketed and sold their lethal product with zeal, with deception, with a single-minded focus on their financial success, and without regard for the human tragedy or social costs that success exacted.”
    p. 33 · Read in context →
  2. The court found that for at least 40 years the companies publicly denied that smoking causes disease, to keep up the appearance of an "open controversy", while their internal documents acknowledged the purpose of that strategy. p. 1538 p. 1537 p. 1535

    “Similarly, an undated internal B&W document titled ‘Smoking and Health Proposal’ explained: ‘Doubt is our product since it is the best means of competing with the 'body of fact' that exists in the mind of the general public. It is also the means of establishing a controversy.’”
    p. 1537 · Read in context →
  3. It found that the companies denied that nicotine is addictive, although they recognised it internally, and falsely denied that they controlled the nicotine their cigarettes deliver. p. 1538 p. 1539 p. 1543

    “Defendants spent many millions of dollars and thousands of scientist hours over decades to ensure that smokers of all brands consumed sufficient nicotine to establish and maintain addiction.”
    p. 1543 · Read in context →
  4. It found that the companies marketed "light" and "low tar" cigarettes to keep would-be quitters smoking, knowing for decades that they offered no meaningful reduction in risk. p. 1544 p. 1545 p. 1545

  5. It found that the companies recognised new teenage smokers as essential to their profits, marketed to young people, and publicly denied doing so. p. 1548 p. 1549

    “Defendants aggressively pursued the youth market, often not distinguishing those under 18 from those under 21, while publicly denying their activities. For example, Tobacco Institute spokesperson Brennan Dawson appeared on television and provided statements to newspapers, making such assertions as, ‘If a child never picks up another cigarette, it would be fine with the tobacco industry.’”
    p. 1549 · Read in context →
  6. It found that the companies denied that secondhand smoke causes disease despite acknowledging its hazards internally, and that they suppressed, concealed and destroyed documents and research. The opinion singles out the central role of their lawyers. p. 1553 p. 1556 p. 34

  7. The court did not find every allegation proved. It held that the Government had not shown that the companies deliberately chose to sabotage the marketing and production of less hazardous cigarettes. p. 768

  8. Finding that the violations were likely to continue and that the 1998 settlement had not changed the companies' conduct enough, the court banned "light", "low tar" and similar descriptors and ordered corrective statements on five subjects. p. 1634 p. 1639 p. 1660 p. 1665

Short on time? These sections carry the report's argument. Each opens at the start of the section.

  1. Introduction p. 32 · Read →

    The whole judgment in four pages — what the Government alleged, what the court found, the remedies it could and could not order, and a word on the lawyers.

    “At every stage, lawyers played an absolutely central role in the creation and perpetuation of the Enterprise and the implementation of its fraudulent schemes.”
    p. 34 · Read in context →
  2. Creation of the Enterprise p. 49 · Read →

    Where it began — the December 1953 meeting at the Plaza Hotel, the public relations firm Hill & Knowlton, and the "Frank Statement" of January 1954.

  3. Defendants Falsely Denied the Adverse Health Effects of Smoking p. 1536 · Read →

    The court's conclusions on the central deception, with the internal memos that set out the "open controversy" strategy.

    “Using the sophisticated and well-organized machinery created to serve their agenda, Defendants fraudulently denied the adverse health effects of smoking for at least 40 years in order to sustain the appearance of an open controversy about the link between smoking and disease, and thereby maintain and enhance the cigarette market and their collective revenues.”
    p. 1538 · Read in context →
  4. Defendants Falsely Denied that They Market to Youth p. 1549 · Read →

    The court's conclusions on marketing to young people, and on the companies' public denials.

    “Defendants' fraudulent statements stem from their recognition, contained in internal documents written for decades, that new teenage smokers were essential to their continued profitability.”
    p. 1548 · Read in context →
  5. Applicable Law p. 1632 · Read →

    Why the court concluded the companies had not changed — including what their senior executives said on the witness stand.

    “For example, during live testimony in January 2005, more than forty years after the 1964 Surgeon General's Report, Reynolds American Executive Chairman Andrew Schindler refused to admit that smoking causes disease.”
    p. 1634 · Read in context →
  6. Remedies: Banning "Light" and "Low Tar" p. 1658 · Read →

    The remedy the court ordered first — a ban on descriptors that imply a cigarette is less harmful.

    “Accordingly, beginning January 1, 2007, Defendants are prohibited from using any descriptors indicating lower tar delivery -- including, but not limited to, ‘low tar,’ ‘light,’ ‘mild,’ ‘medium’ and ‘ultra light’ -- which create the false impression that such cigarettes are less harmful to smokers.”
    p. 1660 · Read in context →

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