Each Defendant39 Is Liable for the RICO Conspiracy Charge Because Each

Entered into the Requisite Conspiratorial Agreement "In order to be guilty of a RICO conspiracy, a defendant must either agree to [individually]

¶commit two predicate acts or agree to participate in the conduct of the enterprise with the knowledge and intent that other members of the conspiracy would commit at least two predicate acts in furtherance of the enterprise." United States v. Nguyen, 255 F.3d 1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1286, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001); Brouwer v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 199 F.3d 961, 964 (7th Cir. 2000); To, 144 F.3d at 744; United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1138 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Shenberg, 89 F.3d 1461, 1471 (11th Cir. 1996). Defendants are liable for a RICO conspiracy under either test.

¶First, each Defendant individually agreed to commit at least two Racketeering Acts. The overwhelming evidence demonstrates that each Defendant personally committed numerous Racketeering Acts in furtherance of the affairs of the Enterprise. See Findings of Fact Section VII(G)(3)(a), supra. "Where, as here, the evidence establishes that each defendant, over a period of years, committed several acts of racketeering activity in furtherance of the enterprise's affairs, the inference of an agreement to do so is unmistakable." Elliott, 571 F.2d at 903; see also United States v. Ashman, 979 F.2d 469, 492 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204, 1218 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Carlock, 806 F.2d at 547 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Melton, 689 F.2d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1187 n.4 (5th Cir. 1981).

¶As discussed in great detail, infra at Section VIII(C), Liggett withdrew from the conspiracy in 1997. Accordingly, Liggett is not liable as a conspirator for any acts that occurred subsequent to 1997.

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¶Second, each Defendant agreed to participate in the conduct of the Enterprise with the knowledge and intent that other members of the conspiracy would also commit at least two predicate acts in furtherance of the Enterprise. A RICO conspiracy may exist even if a conspirator does not agree to commit or facilitate each and every part of the substantive offense. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 253-254 (1940). As the Supreme Court explained in reference to RICO:

A conspirator must intend to further an endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy all of the elements of a substantive criminal offense, but it suffices that he adopt the goal of furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor. He may do so in any number of ways short of agreeing to undertake all of the acts necessary for the crime's completion. One can be a conspirator by agreeing to facilitate only some of the acts leading to the substantive offense. It is elementary that a conspiracy may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensues. . . .

It makes no difference that the substantive offense under § 1962(c) requires two or more predicate acts. The interplay between subsections (c) and (d) does not permit us to excuse from the reach of the conspiracy provision an actor who does not himself commit or agree to commit the two or more predicate acts requisite to the underlying offense.

¶Salinas, 522 U.S. at 63-65.

¶Thus, to prove a RICO conspiracy,

[t]he focus is on the agreement to participate in the enterprise through the pattern of racketeering activity, not on the agreement to commit the individual predicate acts. . . . The government can prove [such] an agreement on an overall objective by circumstantial evidence showing that each defendant must necessarily have known that others were also conspiring to participate in the same enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.

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¶Starrett, 55 F.3d at 1543-44 (internal quotations and citations omitted); Accord Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d at 857; To, 144 F.3d at 744. It is sufficient "that the defendant agree to the commission of [at least] two predicate acts [by any conspirator] on behalf of the conspiracy." MCM Partners, Inc. v. Andrews-Bartlett & Assocs., 62 F.3d 967, 980 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 498 (7th Cir. 1986)). Accord Brouwer, 199 F.3d at 964; United States v. Quintanilla,²² It would appear this situation continues even to the present. For example, in this very litigation, a former long-time career government lawyer was so intent on representing a company (continued...) -4- F.3d 1469, 1484 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Neapolitan).

¶Defendants' conspiracy was in existence as of December 1953, when several of the cigarette company Defendants met in New York City to create CTR and to discuss and outline the Enterprise's future strategy.40 Each Defendant agreed to commit a substantive RICO offense with the knowledge that other members of the Enterprise were also conspiring to commit racketeering activity. All Defendants coordinated significant aspects of their public relations, scientific, legal, and marketing activity in furtherance of the shared objective -- to use mail and wire transmissions to maximize industry profits by preserving and expanding the market for cigarettes through a scheme to deceive the public. Defendants executed the scheme by using several different strategies including: (1) denying that there were adverse health effects from smoking; (2) making false, misleading, and deceptive public statements designed to maintain doubt about whether smoking and exposure to secondhand smoke cause disease; (3) denying the addictiveness of smoking cigarettes and the role of nicotine therein; (4) disseminating advertising for light and low tar cigarettes suggesting they were less harmful than full flavor ones; and (5) undertaking a publicly announced duty to conduct and publicize disinterested and independent research into the health effects of smoking upon which the public could rely. See Findings of Fact Sections III and V. As noted earlier, no evidence has been presented regarding a conspiracy before 1953.

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¶Moreover, the cigarette company Defendants jointly participated at various times and to various degrees in creating, funding, directing and controlling Defendants CTR, TI and other entities and causing Defendants CTR and TI to commit numerous racketeering acts to further those shared objectives. Furthermore, the frequent oral and written communications between and among Defendants illustrate their joint efforts to pursue their shared objectives. Significantly, Defendants worked together continuously, in many different venues and through many different entities, to disseminate their agreed upon deceptive public position denying the link between smoking cigarettes and adverse health effects, denying the addictiveness of smoking cigarettes and nicotine, and denying their marketing of cigarettes to young people. See Findings of Fact Sections V(A, B, F).

¶In addition, each Defendant also agreed to facilitate the substantive RICO violation by concealing or suppressing information and documents which may have been detrimental to the interests of the members of the Enterprise. Such information might well have been discoverable in smoking and health liability cases against Defendants and therefore could have constituted, or led to, evidence of the link between smoking cigarettes, addiction, and adverse health effects. See Findings of Fact Section V(H).

¶Thus, each Defendant knew the goals of the Enterprise, the general nature of the conspiracy, and that other members of the conspiracy would commit at least two Racketeering Acts in furtherance of the Enterprise's scheme to defraud. Indeed, each Defendant took substantial steps to facilitate the scheme to defraud that was the central purpose of the conspiracy, including committing numerous Racketeering Acts in furtherance of the Enterprise's affairs. Hence, each Defendant entered into the requisite conspiratorial agreement. Accord Salinas, 522 U.S. at 66 ("[E]ven if Salinas did not accept or agree to accept two bribes, there was ample evidence that he conspired to violate subsection (c). The evidence showed that [Salinas' conspirator] committed at least two acts of racketeering activity when he accepted numerous bribes and that Salinas knew about and agreed to facilitate the scheme. This is sufficient to support a conviction under § 1962(d).").

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¶While there is much explicit evidence of actual agreement between Defendants in the Findings of Fact, RICO liability does not require such an explicit agreement. "Regardless of the method used to prove the agreement, the government does not have to establish that each conspirator explicitly agreed with every other conspirator to commit the substantive RICO crime described in the indictment, or knew his fellow conspirators, or was aware of all the details of the conspiracy." Starrett, 55 F.3d at 1544 (internal quotations and citations deleted).

¶Even though the criminal activities may differ, they must still be linked to allow the inference of an agreement. United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 242 (1st Cir. 1990) (RICO conspiracy conviction upheld where "the defendants and their activities were nothing short of striking: each defendant was a detective assigned to work nights in District 4 at some time during the indictment period; each received things of value, usually cash, from restaurant or nightclub owners in exchange for services not officially sanctioned; the targeted establishments were all in District 4 and all under the Board's aegis. Moreover, there was a significant degree of interconnectedness. The defendants often cooperated with one another in collecting payments and in providing their specialized services. These common characteristics are precisely the kind of factors which can permissibly lead to the inference of a single conspiracy."); Ashman, 979 F.2d at 492 (in investment scheme, evidence sufficient for RICO conspiracy where defendants served as "bag men" for each other, used similar procedures for covering losses, and "were well aware that they were part of an ongoing and flexible agreement to commit fraud as the need -- or perhaps the opportunity -- arose"); see also United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 100 (2d Cir. 2000); To, 144 F.3d at 744; United States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 505 (1st Cir. 1990); Rastelli, 870 F.2d at 828 (collecting cases); United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1228 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963, 975 (3d Cir. 1985); Elliott, 571 F.2d at 902-03.

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¶To establish sufficient knowledge, it is only required that the defendant "know the general nature of the conspiracy and that the conspiracy extends beyond his individual role." Rastelli, 870 F.2d at 828 (collecting cases). Accord Zichettello, 208 F.3d at 100; Brazel, 102 F.3d at 1138; Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 577 n.29; Rosenthal, 793 F.2d at 1228; De Peri, 778 F.2d at 975; Elliott, 571 F.2d at 903-04. Furthermore, "[b]ecause conspirators normally attempt to conceal their conduct, the elements of a conspiracy offense may be established solely by circumstantial evidence. . . . The agreement, a defendant's guilty knowledge and a defendant's participation in the conspiracy all may be inferred from the development and collocation of circumstances." Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d at 857 (citations and internal quotations omitted).

¶For all the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Defendants are liable for conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) of RICO because they both explicitly and implicitly agreed to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) of RICO.41

¶Contrary to Altria's claim, the prohibition against intracorporate conspiracies under the antitrust laws does not apply to this case. In Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1989), the Seventh Circuit explained:

Since a subsidiary and its parent theoretically have a community of interest, a conspiracy "in restraint of trade" between them poses no threat to the goals of antitrust law – protecting competition. In contrast, intracorporate conspiracies do threaten RICO's goals of preventing the infiltration of legitimate businesses by racketeers and separating racketeers from their profits.

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