VIII-D

Diotr:but i o~ DAOl/Y. R. Lucaa USFC Flight Readiness Revieu (FRR) Board for USFC Elements for Eirslon 51-L

¶An USFC FRR Board of senlor RSFC manageaent personnel u i l l convene at 8:30 a . ~ . on January 1 3 , 1986, in Building 4663, HOSClUCR, to revieu and assess the resd:ness status of t h e USFC Fission 51-L eleaents for flight. This aeetlng u i l l be held at the SECRET level and Bll documentation u l l l b e handled and prezented in accordance with the NASA Security regulations. Attendance uill be restrlcted and all Prcjccts are t o coordinatr this activity through the Program Planning and Uanagement S y S t e m Office, Ton S t a p l e s , 5-0338. The Center Board is composed of the followlng:

DAOl/W. R. Lucas: Chmirman DDOl/T. J. Lee Vice Chairman EAOl/J. E. Kingsbury DSOl/F. A . Specr ECOl/J. P. Uadole JAOtlJ. A . Oouncy PAOl/U. R. WarSh.11 ESOl/J. C . Walker ,k7t/S. G . Herderson: SecrcLariat

¶Each project manager musL certify t h e fll&ht readiness o f hir harouare ane present supportin& r8tlon8lc 8nd d8t8 so the Board can independently 8ssess t h e fli&ht readiness. The Shuttle Projects Office manager l r responsible f o r preparation and coordinatlon o f the reetlng, p r e s m t l n g a n overall ss$essment of flight readlners, recordlna o f minuter ant action items, and tracking action items for closure by the Review B o a r d . 0

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394

E r r h a s i s w i l l h e p l a c e d on s b i e t y o r f l : g , h t end tr~z5icrl ~ U C C C S S , inc1ud:rp p o t t ~ t ! a l impact of prior f'lJSht a n o n e l i e s ; g r o u n d t e s t a n ~ c a 1 : e s ; rrv!sions to h a r d h ' a r e , l o f t w a r e , l a u n c h c o c c i t c r : t t r i r , o r r e d l i n e s wh:-& h s v e n o t been f l i g h t v e r i f i e d ; r e v i s i o n s Lo SRP r e c o v e r y r i s k s Z i n c @ t h e p r e i i o u s f 1 i E t . t ; s c y w n i v e r u h l c t , has n o t t e e n f : l g L ) t verlfivd o r w h i c h regu;rez e x : r ~ r " a : sj,;.rc.va!; and any rev1s:ons t o r.?za!-d or cr:ticel i:err, l i ~ ~ c T . c r n C t ' r n z , an: r i z i ~3 b j . ? t : i , ' i p c:terl,v :dt.r:Ci!-ieC P Z h me:hcd: of c i c f ; r e .

I n a n e f f o r t t i n!r im:.-c s d r r l n > s t l 8t:!ir cintrol :f.<:ijr a s s o c i a t e d w i t h tlhe d i s s e a i n a t ~ o n o f c : e s s i f ~ e d d a t a , a n e f f o r t 1 3 t o b e r~.acie t o p r e s e n t c l s s r i r i e d i n f o r m a t i o n o r l y through viewgraphs. I f Frojects elect to lncorpol2te c l a s s i f i e d d z t s w i t V , l n t h e i r h a n d o u t s , l t Is t h e P r o J t C t . ' S r e s y o n s l b j l i t y t o a s s u r e t h a t t h e h a n d c u t s a r e ~ a r h e . ! and h a n d l e d ir, a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e RASA S e c u r i t y r e g u l z t l o n s . If a r y s s s i s t a n c r i s n r e d e d i n t t . : J r r . a t t e r , p l e a s e c c n t a c t t h e KSFC Security D i v i s i o n a t ? - S ? l o .

¶A pre!lminary a p e n d a is e n c l o s e d .

¶F.,/+

¶-Y/'R. Lucas A Director

¶Enclosure

Distribution: S e e Fage 3

395

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0 READINESS STATMENT

¶SRB-2

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STS 51-L SICNIf ICAHT CONfICURATION DIFFERENCE CHANGE REASON BASIS FOR ClRTIFICATION . ** ------ ------- -._____-----

¶IIPtEKNTS CAPABILITY TO 0 NOZZLE SEPARATION 0 ANALYSlS SEPARATE $RH NOZZLE AT 0 PRECLUDE FRACMENTS FROM - STRUCTURAL

AWCEE AND TO SEPARATE NOZZLE EXTENSION DESTROYING - DYNAHIC HAIN PARACHUTES AT UATEB DROCUE PARACHUTE - FKA IWQACT 0 REDUCE DESICN LOAD 0 QUAIIFICATION EXCEEDANCES ON M I N TEST PARACHUTE SYSTEH 0 MAIN PARACHUTE SEPARATION 0 F M L PWCDR 0 SRB RETRIEVAL PERSONNEL 0 DCR SAFETY SRB-I

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¶51 (136 FOOT MAINS) c. I .²² Rogers Commission Report, Volume I, p. 199. o bid., Chart SRB-4. 2 1 Larry Mulloy, NASA, Marshall Space Fli ht Center, "STS-51L Level I1 Flight Readiness Review,'' January 14,1986. See Appendix VIII-g. 2 2 Discussion with Allan McDonald, September 4, 1986. Z3 Rogers Commission Report, Volume 11. See Chart 15 (p. H-10) and Chart 19 (p. H-12). s Ibid., Chart 30 (p. H-18). N

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SUPPORT HISSION 51-L /S/ HR. KILNINSTER /S/ HR. HURPHY

KILHINSTEb HTI C. HURPHYt USBI-BPC

VICE PRESIOENT EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIOENT SPACE BOOSTER PROCRAHS

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VIII-G

¶TWR- 15284C

FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW

¶SRH-24 (STS-6lC)

02 DECEHBER

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¶STS-618 OUICKLOOK EVALUATION

SRY-23 PERFORMANCE

(CHART NO. 3-1) - -. - W&TFD f73.a

¶o AVERAGE X A D PRESSURE (5-20 SEC, P S I A )

o LEFT MOTOR 901.0 926.2 o R!C'IT MOTOR 899.7 928. I

¶o WEE TIME (SEC)

o LEFT MOTOR 109,7 108.11 o RIGHT MOTOR 109,7 108.0

¶o ACTION TIME (SEC)

o LEFT MOTOR 121.4 121.6 o RIGHT MOTOR 121.5 120.6

¶0 SEPARATION COf'PiAND TIME BASED ON 50 124.9 123.9

¶P S l A ON LAST SfUl + 5.7 SEC o PROP. BURN RATE ( I P S )

o LEFT !40TOR ,372 6369)' o RIGHT MOTOR ,372 (.369)'

¶ALJUSTED TO A TEMPERATURE 3F 60'F AND PRESSURE OF 625 PSIA

420

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3TS-61B ( S T S - 3 1 ) (SRN-23) PERFORMANCE (CHART NO. 3 - 2 1

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ALL THREE STIFFENER REUSE OF SRM HARDWARE ACCEPTABLE RIIIGS ON BOTH SRM'S

¶EXPfRIENCED WATER

IYPACT DAMAGE. CRACKS

¶All0 B U C K L t S OBSERVED 111 ALL THE RINGS. t t l N E OF T!

E i 18 S T I F -

¶r M R RIt4G SEGMENTS WILL HAVE TO RE RE- ,*LACED.

NO REPORTABLE POCKETS, SIM NOZZLE PERFORMANCE ACCEPTABLE NO

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THE I N L E T RINGS FOR

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¶ALL A B L A T I V E RINGS I N SRM NOZZLE PERFORMANCE ACCEPTABLE NO N PLACE BUT SOME D I S - PLACEMENT FORWARD.

APPARENTLY DUE TO WATER IMPACT. HAS CAUSED LOCAL R A I S E D AREAS AT SOME OF

¶THE RING INTERFACES.

SOOT OBSERVED ON SRN-23A SRM NOZZLE PERFORMANCE ACCEPTABLE NO

¶( L H ) AFT E X I T CONE SEAL-

ING SURFACE BUT THERE WAS NO APPARANT DAMAGE

¶TO O-RING.

SRM-23A ( L H ) HAD NO GAS SRM PERFORMANCE 'ACCEPTABLE NO PATHS THROUGH THE PUTTY

¶AT AIlY F I E L D JOINT

(SEE SKETCH ON SUBSEOUENT CHART

423

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STS-61B (STS-31) (SRN-23) PERFORNANCE (CHART NO. 3-3)

SRN-23B (RH) HAD ONE SRN PERFORHANCE ACCEPTABLE NO GAS PATH AT THE AFT/ AFT CENTER JOINT AT 58' BUT IT D I D NOT PROGRESS

¶TO THE PR IHARY 0-R ING.

PERFORNANCE ACCEPTABLE NO

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