5.5 When to Replace the Space Shuttle?

¶In addition to budget pressures, workforce reductions, management changes, and the transfer of government functions to the private sector, the Space Shuttle Program was beset during the past decade by uncertainty about when the Shuttle might be replaced. National policy has vacillated between treating the Shuttle as a "going out of business" program and anticipating two or more decades of Shuttle use. As a result, limited and inconsistent investments have been made in Shuttle upgrades and in revitalizing the infrastructure to support the continued use of the Shuttle.

¶Even before the 1986 Challenger accident, when and how to replace the Space Shuttle with a second generation reusable launch vehicle was a topic of discussion among space policy leaders. In January 1986, the congressionally chartered National Commission on Space expressed the need for a Shuttle replacement, suggesting that "the Shuttle fleet will become obsolescent by the turn of the century."⁵⁴⁵⁴ National Commission on Space, Pioneering the Space Frontier: An Exciting Vision of Our Next Fifty Years in Space, Report of the National Commission on Space (Bantam Books, 1986). Shortly after the Challenger accident (but not as a reaction to it), President Reagan announced his approval of "the new Orient Express" (see Figure 5.5-1). This reusable launch vehicle, later known as the National Aerospace Plane, "could, by the end of the decade, take off from Dulles Airport, accelerate up to 25 times the speed of sound attaining low-Earth orbit, or fly to Tokyo within two hours."⁵⁵⁵⁵ President Ronald Reagan, "Message to the Congress on Americaʼs Agenda for the Future," February 6, 1986, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan: Book I-January 1 to June 27, 1986 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982- 1991), p. 159. This goal proved too ambitious, particularly without substantial funding. In 1992, after a $1.7 billion government investment, the National Aerospace Plane project was cancelled.

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¶This pattern – optimistic pronouncements about a revolutionary Shuttle replacement followed by insufficient government investment, and then program cancellation due to technical difficulties – was repeated again in the 1990s.

¶Figure 5.5-1. A 1986 artistʼs conception of the National Aerospace Plane on a mission to the Space Station.

¶In 1994, NASA listed alternatives for access to space through 2030.

Upgrade the Space Shuttle to enable flights through
Develop a new expendable launcher
Replace the Space Shuttle with a "leapfrog" next-generation advanced technology system that would achieve order-of-magnitude improvements in the cost effectiveness of space transportation.⁵⁶⁵⁶ Office of Space Systems Development, NASA Headquarters, "Access to Space Study—Summary Report," January 1994, reproduced in John M. Logsdon, et al. eds., Exploring the Unknown, Volume IV: Accessing Space NASA SP-4407 (Government Printing Office, 1999), pp. 584-604.

¶Figure 5.5-2. The VentureStar was intended to replace the Space Shuttle based on technology developed for the X-33.

¶Reflecting its leadershipʼs preference for bold initiatives, NASA chose the third alternative. With White House support,⁵⁷⁵⁷ The White House, Office of Science and Technology Policy, "Fact Sheet--National Space Transportation Policy," August 5, 1994, pp. 1-2, reprinted in Logsdon et al., Exploring the Unknown, Volume IV, pp. 626- 631. NASA began the X-33 project in 1996 as a joint effort with Lockheed Martin. NASA also initiated the less ambitious X-34 project with Orbital Sciences Corporation. At the time, the future of commercial space launches was bright, and political sentiment in the White House and Congress encouraged an increasing reliance on private-sector solutions for limiting government expenditures. In this context, these unprecedented joint projects appeared less risky than they actually were. The hope was that NASA could replace the Shuttle through private investments, without significant government spending.

¶Both the X-33 and X-34 incorporated new technologies. The X-33 was to demonstrate the feasibility of an aerospike engine, new Thermal Protection Systems, and composite rather than metal propellant tanks. These radically new technologies were in turn to become the basis for a new orbital vehicle called VentureStar™ that could replace the Space Shuttle by 2006 (see Figure 5.5-2). The X-33 and X-34 ran into technical problems and never flew. In 2001, after spending $1.3 billion, NASA abandoned both projects.

¶In all three projects – National Aerospace Plane, X-33, and X-34 – national leaders had set ambitious goals in response to NASAʼs ambitious proposals. These programs relied on the invention of revolutionary technology, had run into major technical problems, and had been denied the funds needed to overcome these problems – assuming they could be solved. NASA had spent nearly 15 years and several billion dollars, and yet had made no meaningful progress toward a Space Shuttle replacement.

¶In 2000, as the agency ran into increasing problems with the X-33, NASA initiated the Space Launch Initiative, a $4.5 billion multi-year effort to develop new space launch technologies. By 2002, after spending nearly $800 million, NASA again changed course. The Space Launch Initiative failed to find technologies that could revolutionize space launch, forcing NASA to shift its focus to an Orbital Space Plane, developed with existing technology, that would complement the Shuttle by carrying crew, but not cargo, to and from orbit. Under a new Integrated Space Transportation Plan, the Shuttle might continue to fly until 2020 or beyond. (See Section 5.6 for a discussion of this plan.)

¶As a result of the haphazard policy process that created these still-born developmental programs, the uncertainty over Shuttle replacement persisted. Between 1986 and 2002, the planned replacement date for the Space Shuttle was consistent only in its inconsistency: it changed from 2002 to 2006 to 2012, and before the Columbia accident, to 2020 or later.

¶Safety Concerns and Upgrading the Space Shuttle

¶This shifting date for Shuttle replacement has severely complicated decisions on how to invest in Shuttle Program upgrades. More often than not, investments in upgrades were delayed or deferred on the assumption they would be a waste of money if the Shuttle were to be retired in the near future (see Figure 5.5-3).

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PAST REPORTS REVIEWED

¶During the course of the investigation, more than 50 past reports regarding NASA and the Space Shuttle Program were reviewed. The principal purpose of these reviews was to note what factors that reports examined, what findings were made, and what response, if any, NASA may have made to the findings. Board members then used these findings and responses as a benchmark during their investigation to compare to NASAʼs current programs. In addition to an extensive 300-page examination of every Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel report (see Appendix D.18), the reports listed on the accompanying chart were examined for specific factors related to the investigation. A complete listing of those past reportsʼ findings, plus the full text of the reports, is contained in Appendix D.18.

¶Report Reviewed Topic Examined

¶Risk

Infrastructure Maintenance Communica- Quality Safety Workforce Contracts Security tions Management Issues Assurance Programs

¶Rogers Commission Report – 1986 • • • • • • •

¶STS-29R Prelaunch Assessment – 1989 •

¶"Augustine Report" – 1990 • • • • •

¶Paté-Cornell Report – 1990 • •

¶"Aldridge Report" – 1992 •

¶GAO: NASA Infrastructure – 1996 • •

¶GAO: NASA Workforce Reductions – 1996 • • Super Light Weight Tank Independent

¶• • Assessment – 1997 Process Readiness Review – 1998 • • •

¶S&MA Ground Operations Report – 1998 • GAO: NASA Management Challenges

¶• • • – 1999 Independent Assessment JS-9047 – 1999 •

¶Independent Assessment JS-9059 – 1999 •

¶Independent Assessment JS-9078 – 1999 • •

¶Independent Assessment JS-9083 – 1999 •

¶S&MA Ground Operations Report – 1999 • • Space Shuttle Independent Assessment Team

¶• • • • • – 1999 Space Shuttle Ground Operations Report

¶• – 1999 Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Annual Report

¶• – 1999

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Risk Infrastructure Communica-

¶GAO: Human Capital & Safety – 2000 Independent Assessment JS-0032 – 2000 Independent Assessment JS-0034 – 2000 Independent Assessment JS-0045 – 2000 IG Audit Report 00-039 – 2000 NASA Independent Assessment Team – 2000 • Space Shuttle Program Annual Report – 2000 • ASAP Report – 2001 • GAO: NASA Critical Areas – 2001 GAO: Space Shuttle Safety – 2001 Independent Assessment JS-1014 – 2001 • Independent Assessment JS-1024 – 2001 • Independent Assessment KS-0003 – 2001 • Independent Assessment KS-1001 – 2001 Workforce Survey-KSC – 2001 Space Shuttle Program Annual Report – 2001 • SSP Processing Independent Assessment – 2001 ASAP Report – 2002 • GAO: Lessons Learned Process – 2002 Independent Assessment KS-1002 – 2002 Selected NASA Lessons Learned – 1992-2002 • NASA/Navy Benchmarking Exchange – 2002 Space Shuttle Program Annual Report – 2002 • ASAP Leading Indicators -- 2003 • NASA Quality Management System – 2003

¶Maintenance Quality Safety Workforce Contracts Security tions Management Issues Assurance Programs

¶• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

¶• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • QAS Tiger Team Report – 2003 • Shuttle Business Environment – 2003 •

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Fiscal Year Upgrades 1994 $454.5

1995 $247.2 1996 $224.5

1997 $215.9 1998 $206.7 1999 $175.2

2000 $239.1 2001 $289.3 2002 $379.5

¶2003 $347.5

¶Figure 5.5-3. Shuttle Upgrade Budgets (in millions of dollars). (Source: NASA)

¶In 1995, for instance, the Kraft Report embraced the principle that NASA should "freeze the design" of the Shuttle and defer upgrades due to the vehicleʼs "mature" status and the need for NASA to "concentrate scarce resources on developing potential replacements for the Shuttle."⁵⁸⁵⁸ Report of the Space Shuttle Management Independent Review Team, pp. 3-18. NASA subsequently halted a number of planned upgrades, only to reverse course a year later to "take advantage of technologies to improve Shuttle safety and the need for a robust Space Shuttle to assemble the ISS."⁵⁹⁵⁹ "Statement of William F. Readdy, Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Space Flight, National Aeronautics and Space Administration before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics Committee on Science, House of Representatives," October 21, 1999. CAIB document CAB026- 0146.

¶In a June 1999 letter to the White House, NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin declared that the nation faced a "Space Launch Crisis." He reported on a NASA review of Shuttle safety that indicated the budget for Shuttle upgrades in Fiscal year 2000 was "inadequate to accommodate upgrades necessary to yield significant safety improvements."⁶⁰⁶⁰ Letter from Daniel Goldin to Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget, July 6, 1999. After two "close calls" during STS-93 in July 1999 Goldin also chartered a Shuttle Independent Assessment Team (SIAT) chaired by Harry McDonald, Director of NASA Ames Research Center. Among the teamʼs findings, reported in March 2000:⁶¹⁶¹ NASA, Space Shuttle Independent Assessment Team, "Report to the Associate Administrator, Office of Space Flight, October-December 1999," March 7, 2000. CAIB document CTF017-0169.

"Over the course of the Shuttle Program … processes, procedures and training have continuously been improved and implemented to make the system safer. The SIAT has a major concern … that this critical feature of the Shuttle Program is being eroded." The major factor leading to this concern "is the reduction in allocated resources and appropriate staff … There are important technical areas that are ʻone-deep.ʼ " Also, "the SIAT feels strongly that workforce augmentation must be realized principally with NASA personnel rather than with contractor personnel."
The SIAT was concerned with "success-engendered safety optimism … The SSP must rigorously guard against the tendency to accept risk solely because of prior success."
"The SIAT was very concerned with what it perceived as Risk Management process erosion created by the desire to reduce costs … The SIAT feels strongly that NASA Safety and Mission Assurance should be restored to its previous role of an independent oversight body, and not be simply a ʻsafety auditor.ʼ "
"The size and complexity of the Shuttle system and of

¶NASA/contractor relationships place extreme importance on understanding, communication, and information handling … Communication of problems and concerns upward to the SSP from the ʻfloorʼ also appeared to leave room for improvement."⁶²⁶² Ibid.

¶The Shuttle Independent Assessment Team report also stated that the Shuttle "clearly cannot be thought of as ʻoperationalʼ in the usual sense. Extensive maintenance, major amounts of ʻtouch laborʼ and a high degree of skill and expertise will always be required." However, "the workforce has received a conflicting message due to the emphasis on achieving cost and staff reductions, and the pressures placed on increasing scheduled flights as a result of the Space Station."⁶³⁶³ Ibid.

¶Responding to NASAʼs concern that the Shuttle required safety-related upgrades, the Presidentʼs proposed NASA budget for Fiscal Year 2001 proposed a "safety upgrades initiative." That initiative had a short life span. In its Fiscal Year 2002 budget request, NASA proposed to spend $1.836 billion on Shuttle upgrades over five years. A year later, the Fiscal Year 2003 request contained a plan to spend $1.220 billion – a 34 percent reduction. The reductions were primarily a response to rising Shuttle operating costs and the need to stay within a fixed Shuttle budget. Cost growth in Shuttle operations forced NASA to "use funds intended for Space Shuttle safety upgrades to address operational, sup- portability, obsolescence, and infrastructure needs."⁶⁴⁶⁴ Dr. Richard Beck, Director, Resources Analysis Division, NASA, "Agency Budget Overview, FY 2003 Budget," February 6, 2002, p. 20. CAIB document CAB070-0001.

¶At its March 2001 meeting, NASAʼs Space Flight Advisory Committee advised that "the Space Shuttle Program must make larger, more substantial safety upgrades than currently planned … a budget on the order of three times the budget currently allotted for improving the Shuttle systems" was needed.⁶⁵⁶⁵ Space Flight Advisory Committee, NASA Office of Space Flight, Meeting Report, May 1-2, 2001, p. 7. CAIB document CTF017-0034. Later that year, five Senators complained that "the Shuttle program is being penalized, despite its outstanding performance, in order to conform to a budget strategy that is dangerously inadequate to ensure safety in Americaʼs human space flight program."⁶⁶⁶⁶ Senators Bill Nelson, Bob Graham, Mary Landrieu, John Breaux, and Orrin Hatch to Senator Barbara Mikulski, September 18, 2001. (See Chapter 7 for additional discussion of Shuttle safety upgrades.)

¶Deteriorating Shuttle Infrastructure

¶The same ambiguity about investing in Shuttle upgrades has also affected the maintenance of Shuttle Program ground infrastructure, much of which dates to Project Apollo and 1970s Shuttle Program construction. Figure 5.5-4 depicts the age of the Shuttleʼs infrastructure as of 2000. Most ground infrastructure was not built for such a protracted lifespan. Maintaining infrastructure has been particularly difficult at Kennedy Space Center, where it is constantly exposed to a salt water environment.

¶Board investigators have identified deteriorating infrastructure associated with the launch pads, Vehicle Assembly Building, and the crawler transporter. Figures 5.5-5 and 5.5-6 depict some of this deterioration. For example, NASA has installed nets, and even an entire sub-roof, inside the Vehicle Assembly Building to prevent concrete from the buildingʼs ceiling from hitting the Orbiter and Shuttle stack. In addition, the corrosion-control challenge results in zinc primer on certain launch pad areas being exposed to the elements. When rain falls on these areas, it carries away zinc, runs onto the leading edge of the Orbiterʼs wings, and causes pinholes in the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panels (see Chapter 3).

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